December 2020

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ARTICLE 8 – PAGE 42

Indo-Pacific

Perspectives

Indo-Pacific Perspectives

December 2020

from the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs

Introduction

Dr. Peter Harris, editor

The Indian Ocean’s Key Role

in the Indo-Pacific…

Nilanthi Samaranayake

Chinese Vision of a Rules-

based Order

Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho

Do Regimes Matter?

Dr. Laura Southgate

A Rules-based Order in the

Indo-Pacific

Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Challenges in

Institutionalizing Rules-

based Order…

Dr. Ngaibiakching

India’s Indo- Pacific

Reckoning

Dr. Titli Basu

Next Priorities for Japan’s

FOIP Vision

Dr. Kei Koga

Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 1

Introduction

A Rules-Based Order

for the Indo-Pacific?

Dr. Peter Harris, editor

t is the policy of the United

States government to ensure that

the Indo-Pacific megaregion re-

mains “free and open.” In no small

part, this vision rests upon the wa-

ger that a single rules-based order

can exist from the western reaches

of the Indian Ocean to the vast ex-

panses of the Asia-Pacific. How-

ever, developing and enforcing a

cohesive international rulebook for

the Indo-Pacific will be far from

simple. For the United States and

its allies, the urgent need to

cement a rules-based order in the

Indo-Pacific is driven, at least in

part, by anxiety surrounding the

rise of China—yet this ongoing

movement in the balance of power

is also a major reason for why a

stable rules-based system will be

difficult to maintain. Then there is

the question of legitimacy. It is

possible for a rules-based system to

be truly fair and inclusive, or does

international order inevitably re-

flect the interests of some more

than others? Finally, it is not as-

sured that America’s presence in

the Indo-Pacific will continue to be

welcomed by regional govern-

ments.

This, the first “Indo-Pacific Per-

spectives” roundtable from the

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, will

offer some answers to these com-

plex geopolitical (and “geolegal”)

questions. As the name suggests,

this new series of roundtables will

showcase viewpoints from across

the Indo-Pacific megaregion (and

sometimes beyond). The goal is to

facilitate a dialogue between aca-

demics and policy practitioners

that will be of great interest—and,

we hope, considerable use—to an

international cast of scholars and

decision makers whose work fo-

cuses on the Indo-Pacific. In this

inaugural roundtable, the partici-

pants hail from the United States,

United Kingdom, Singapore, India,

Harris

Indo-Pacific Perspective │2

and Indonesia. They are academ-

ics, expert analysts, and seasoned

policy advisers. Tasked with shed-

ding light on the concept of a rules-

based order in the Indo-Pacific,

they have provided a range of per-

spectives to clarify just how

fraught and contentious such an

order-building (and order-defend-

ing) project will be.

The roundtable begins with Nilan-

thi Samaranayake’s keen analysis

of US foreign policy toward the

Indo-Pacific. She points out that,

despite the inclusive rhetoric and

phraseology of a “free and open

Indo-Pacific,” America’s leaders

sometimes betray a preoccupation

with the Asia-Pacific at the ex-

pense of the Indian Ocean. For ex-

ample, US officials sometimes dis-

cuss the entire Indo-Pacific region

as bedeviled by maritime boundary

disputes, whereas such disagree-

ments are much more prominent

and consequential in the Asia-Pa-

cific than the Indian Ocean. If

states from India to Japan are to

remain committed to the idea of

belonging to a single Indo-Pacific

region, it will be important to clar-

ify the interests that these states

are supposed to share in common

with one another.

Benjamin Ho turns to analyze the

foreign-policy motivations of

China, America’s supposed rival in

the Indo-Pacific and another

potential driver of a rules-based

system for the region. According to

Ho, China’s leaders are open to the

broad concept of a rules-based in-

ternational order, even if they (un-

surprisingly) tend to support a dif-

ferent configuration of rules than

that put forward by the United

States. One of Ho’s major insights

is that Chinese leaders desire a

rules-based international system

that will help them to ward off ex-

ternal threats to domestic security.

This is the reverse of how interna-

tional order is discussed in the

West—that is, as a straitjacket to

prevent domestic actors from up-

ending international security.

Laura Southgate agrees that

China has an interest in using in-

ternational rules as tools to serve

its national interests—and, moreo-

ver, that its growing power means

that Beijing must be taken seri-

ously as a rule-shaper in the re-

gion. This is true whether China

chooses to be an active “maker” of

new rules for the Indo-Pacific or

whether it is expected to be a mere

“taker” of rules made by others.

Simply put, China is so powerful,

and its interests are so expansive,

that China’s willingness to comply

with rules will be a decisive factor

in determining the success of any

rule-based order. Southgate pro-

vides a case study of the United

Nations Convention on the Law of

Introduction

Indo-Pacific Perspective │3

the Sea—to wit, Beijing’s summary

rejection of a 2016 ruling by the

Permanent Court of Arbitration

that held some of China’s maritime

claims in the South China Sea to

be incompatible with international

law—to illustrate the central im-

portance of China to the success of

rules old and new.

Kei Koga offers a complementary

analysis of Japanese foreign policy

toward the Indo-Pacific. He points

out Japan’s leaders were among

the first to articulate the existence

of a cohesive Indo-Pacific space.

Koga points to the Quadrilateral

Security Dialogue (“Quad”) as Ja-

pan’s primary means of operation-

alizing and institutionalizing its

commitment to a free and open

Indo-Pacific, but makes the im-

portant observation that Japan

and the other Quad members (Aus-

tralia, India, and the United

States) cannot act imperiously to-

ward smaller regional actors. Koga

emphasizes the special importance

of the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN), noting

that Southeast Asia is the geo-

graphical center of the Indo-Pa-

cific. Without the endorsement of

ASEAN, Japan’s leaders seem to

have concluded, there can be no

hope of maintaining a rules-based

order to unite the Western Pacific

and Indian Ocean. Such interna-

tional-level considerations have

interacted with domestic politics to

shape Japanese policy toward or-

der-building, Koga argues.

Titli Basu uses her contribution to

bring India into the frame. Basu

makes the incisive point that the

coming multipolar world will be

anchored in a multipolar Asia; how

the competing powers of the Indo-

Pacific can manage to live along-

side one another will, in no small

measure, determine the fate of

global governance and security.

Basu argues that India must be

considered a major player in the

Indo-Pacific (and, by extension, the

rest of the world), but she insists

that India should not be regarded

as a mere “balancer.” This is some-

thing that US analysts are some-

times guilty of—valuing India in

geopolitical terms as a bulwark

against Chinese expansion, but not

taking the time to consider how

Delhi intends to exert itself as a

shaper of regional and global order

in its own right.

Ngaibiakching provides a sweeping

analysis of the issues facing Indo-

Pacific nations, from the problem

of institutionalizing regional order

to the imperative of avoiding a new

“Cold War” between the United

States and China. She echoes both

Southgate and Basu in observing

the importance of power as a foun-

dation for rule making; agrees with

Koga that small and middle

Harris

Indo-Pacific Perspective │4

powers will play a critical role in

shaping the emerging Indo-Pacific

order; and makes the forceful argu-

ment that multipolarity will not be

kind to the Indo-Pacific if it is not

accompanied by a firm commit-

ment to multilateralism on behalf

of the region’s major powers.

Finally, Dewi Fortuna Anwar of-

fers her unique perspective as not

just an eminent academician but

also a former policy maker in the

Indonesian government. Her de-

scription of ASEAN’s successes at

order-building, rulemaking, and

shared regional governance is an-

other powerful reminder that the

Indo-Pacific zone is far from mono-

lithic. Even if there is ample rea-

son to treat the Indo-Pacific as a

single megaregion, this must

surely be done while paying careful

attention to variation at the sub-

regional level.

What future is there for a rules-

based order in the Indo-Pacific? It

depends. Great powers like the

United States, India, and China;

middle and smaller powers like

Australia, Japan, and Indonesia;

regional blocs like ASEAN —all of

these actors will have an impact

upon the development of rules for

the region. The contributions to

this roundtable shed valuable light

on the interests and decision-mak-

ing processes of some of the parties

involved. They suggest that a

rules-based order from the Persian

Gulf to Northeast Asia is possible,

and perhaps even inevitable, but

still as yet undetermined. ■

Dr. Peter Harris

Dr. Harris is an assistant professor

of political science at Colorado

State University, where his teach-

ing and research focus on interna-

tional security, international rela-

tions theory, and US foreign policy.

He serves as the editor for the

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs’

new “Indo-Pacific Perspectives” se-

ries. Dr. Harris has two main re-

search projects underway: one fo-

cusing on great-power relations

during periods of major interna-

tional change (with a specific em-

phasis on US–China relations) and

another focusing on the environ-

mental protection of US military

bases, including overseas bases in

the Indo-Pacific, as well as instal-

lations in the US states and terri-

tories. He has conducted extensive

research into Diego Garcia, the

largest island of the Chagos Archi-

pelago (British Indian Ocean Terri-

tory), which is home to one of the

most important US military bases

in the world. He received his PhD

from the University of Texas at

Austin and holds additional de-

grees from SOAS, University of

London, and the University of Ed-

inburgh. His work has appeared in

Introduction

Indo-Pacific Perspective │5

journals such as the Journal of

Indo-Pacific Affairs, African Af-

fairs, Anthropology Today, Asian

Security, Chinese Journal of Inter-

national Politics, Environmental

Policy and Law, International

Journal, International Political So-

ciology, International Politics, Is-

rael Journal of Foreign Affairs,

Journal of Transatlantic Studies,

Marine Policy, National Interest,

Political Quarterly, PS: Political

Science & Politics, and Review of

International Studies. He is news-

letter co-editor for the Interna-

tional History and Politics section

of the American Political Science

Association.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied

in JIPA are those of the authors and should

not be construed as carrying the official

sanction of the Department of Defense, Air

Force, Air Education and Training Com-

mand, Air University, or other agencies or

departments of the US government or their

international equivalents.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 6

The Indian

Ocean’s Key

Role in the

Indo-Pacific

Rules-based

International

Order

Nilanthi Samaranayake

n September 2020, the US secre-

tary of defense gave a speech to

promote the “international rules-

based order, rooted in our shared

values, that has supported

stability and prosperity around the

world for more than seven dec-

ades.”

The United States and its

allies and partners have played a

decisive role in establishing inter-

national rules and norms since the

end of World War II. This order,

however, is now being challenged

by a rising China and a resurgent

Russia. The defense secretary re-

ferred specifically to the Indo-Pa-

cific region and Washington’s work

“to focus attention on our priority

theater, the Indo-Pacific. Not only

is this region important because it

is a hub of global trade and com-

merce,” he elaborated, “it is also

the epicenter of great power com-

petition with China. And in the

face of destabilizing activities from

the PLA, particularly in the mari-

time domain, the United States

must be ready to deter conflict, and

if necessary, fight and win at sea.”

Yet, the Indian Ocean is not char-

acterized by rampant territorial

disputes and Chinese assertive-

ness, as the Pacific is. From such

characterizations, it seems clear

that US strategy is still focused on

the Pacific segment of the Indo-Pa-

cific and less so the Indian Ocean,

which remains a secondary theater

for US defense planners. The De-

partment of Defense’s Indo-Pacific

Strategy Report repeated a phrase

that is often stated by US officials:

“The United States is a Pacific

The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │7

nation.”

Whereas China has un-

questionably challenged estab-

lished rules and norms in the Pa-

cific, it has, for the most part, been

a lawful actor in the Indian Ocean.

In considering the rules-based in-

ternational order in the wider

Indo-Pacific region, therefore, it is

important to examine the Indian

Ocean on its own terms and con-

sider options for preserving the

rules and norms of this still rela-

tively peaceful maritime region.

Evolving US Policy toward the

Indian Ocean: From the Asia-

Pacific to the Indo-Pacific

The 2017 National Security Strat-

egy identified China and Russia as

the major threats to US interests,

and great-power competition has

since become the organizing princi-

ple behind the implementation of

Washington’s diplomatic

and de-

fense

policies globally. Since 2017,

Washington has adopted the term

Indo-Pacific to describe the region

stretching from “the west coast of

India to the western shores of the

United States.”

This reflects the

evolution of US policy toward this

region over the past decade, espe-

cially the increased importance of

the Indian Ocean. At the beginning

of the decade, the region was re-

ferred to by the long-standing

“Asia-Pacific” term. By 2011-2012,

this geography was prioritized

under the pivot

(or “rebalance”)

strategy to offset the operational

focus of the United States in the

Middle East. Then, this regional

concept evolved as US diplomats

began to link Southeast Asia with

South Asia under an “Indo-Pacific

Economic Corridor.”

Among US

defense officials, in 2013 Admiral

Samuel Locklear, then the Com-

mander of U.S. Pacific Command

(PACOM), began to refer to the re-

gion as the “Indo-Asia-Pacific.”

The term was used in US military

service documents such as the US

Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast

Guard strategy in 2015. Finally, in

2017 and 2018, the concept of the

“Indo-Pacific” was adopted in

Washington’s highest-level na-

tional strategy documents. This

was in part due to recognition of

how allies such as Japan and Aus-

tralia had described the wider re-

gion. Even PACOM was renamed

“Indo-Pacific Command” in 2018 as

part of this alignment of terms.

Washington has expanded the ar-

ticulation of its interests in this

wider region over the past decade

through shifts in geographic terms.

Most recently, it has assigned a

normative dimension to the region

as well. By calling the region the

“Free and Open Indo-Pacific,”

the

US acknowledges the rules, values,

and norms that it seeks to defend

and promote through the concept.

Samaranayake

Indo-Pacific Perspective │8

Washington applies this vision to

the Indian Ocean segment of the

Indo-Pacific. Yet, even as the In-

dian Ocean has assumed greater

importance in U.S. strategic plan-

ning through the Indo-Pacific con-

cept, the United States continues

to understand the region through a

Pacific lens and risks overlooking

the unique features of the Indian

Ocean.

A Rules-based International Or-

der in the Indian Ocean

As a laboratory for cooperation, the

Indian Ocean has seen many suc-

cesses. This is due largely to the

fact that the Indian Ocean’s strate-

gic importance derives from its eco-

nomics. The region effectively

serves as a highway, connecting

the bustling Pacific waters through

the Malacca Strait and across to

the Middle East and African

straits of the Hormuz and Bab Al-

Mandeb, respectively. The Indian

Ocean sees significant traffic of hy-

drocarbons and container shipping.

Due to the economic significance of

this region, countries increasingly

share a common interest in keep-

ing the sea lanes open and safe.

When piracy in the western Indian

Ocean threatened to disrupt the

stability of these waterways more

than a decade ago, we witnessed a

multinational response to secure

them. Counterpiracy operations

emerged, including from the US-

led coalition Combined Maritime

Forces Task Force 151 and the

NATO alliance’s Operation Ocean

Shield. Meanwhile, China began

its own counterpiracy operations as

an independent deployer, as did In-

dia and Japan. Despite tensions in

other domains, all three countries

coordinate on escort convoys.

In addition to counterpiracy,

search and rescue is another area

where countries have cooperated—

for example, in the search for the

missing Malaysia Airlines 370

plane. Beyond military operations,

countries have pursued Indian

Ocean seabed mineral exploration

rights lawfully through the Inter-

national Seabed Authority. This in-

cludes China, South Korea, and In-

dia, among other countries. The

role of international law in the In-

dian Ocean has also been bolstered

by the use of the International Tri-

bunal for the Law of the Sea and

the Permanent Court of Arbitra-

tion (PCA) to resolve maritime dis-

putes between Bangladesh, India,

and Myanmar.

The respect for in-

ternational law in these cases

stands in contrast to China’s disre-

gard for the PCA decision over the

Philippines-China dispute in 2016.

In addition to working within legal

institutions, major extraregional

powers such as the US and China

have pursued membership roles in

The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │9

existing venues for cooperation in

the Indian Ocean. This includes re-

gional institutions such as the In-

dian Ocean Rim Association

(IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval

Symposium (IONS). Without ob-

stacles such as major territorial

disputes and with converging eco-

nomic interests to protect the free

flow of commerce, the Indian

Ocean is not as contentious as the

Pacific Ocean.

Connecting US Strategic Goals

in the Indo-Pacific with the In-

dian Ocean Order

This examination of the coopera-

tive successes in the Indian Ocean

does not intend to minimize the

threat of major power rivalry in

this region. In fact, this is a histori-

cal concern among countries in the

Indian Ocean region. During the

late 1960s and early 1970s, smaller

countries promoted their vision for

an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace due

to the Cold War rivalry between

the Soviet Union and the United

States. Resident Indian Ocean

countries face a similar challenge

in a new era of great power compe-

tition.

The regional security envi-

ronment is even less stable when

considering the broad-based milita-

rization and increased acquisition

of naval platforms, including in the

undersea domain, by resident

countries themselves.

Yet, while many observers fear the

implications of China’s expanding

footprint through the Belt and

Road Initiative, deployment of sub-

marines to the Indian Ocean, es-

tablishment of a military base in

Djibouti, and even undersea sur-

veillance and exploration for sea-

bed minerals, the reality is that

China is mostly behaving accord-

ing to the laws and norms in the

Indian Ocean. In fact, even actions

that India sees as intrusive, such

as Chinese platforms operating in

its exclusive economic zone (EEZ),

are actually in line with the US in-

terpretation of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS). As China becomes a

global deployer, ironically this sta-

tus helps underscore the order that

the US wants—the freedom of nav-

igation where international law al-

lows. Many Indian Ocean countries

reject the US interpretation of UN-

CLOS that would permit military

activities in EEZs. They include

Bangladesh, Myanmar, India,

Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives,

Mauritius, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri

Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, and

United Arab Emirates.

Still, the United States should be

vigilant about threats by China to

disrupt the Indian Ocean order.

One disturbing demonstration of

this potential lies in the Chinese

military’s lasering of US Air Force

Samaranayake

Indo-Pacific Perspective │10

personnel in Djibouti in 2018. Such

incidents suggest China’s asser-

tiveness in the Pacific could carry

over into the Indian Ocean re-

gion—which is precisely the fear of

resident Indian Ocean countries

that call for an Indian Ocean Zone

of Peace.

As Washington considers its

broader Indo-Pacific strategy, it

should call out the areas where

China wants to benefit across the

board. This is clear when Beijing

seeks to limit international rules

and norms to its advantage in the

Pacific, yet free-ride off the lawful

order and the interpretation of

UNCLOS that the US seeks in the

Indian Ocean. At the same time,

Washington should also recognize

the current strengths that exist to

underpin the lawful order in the

Indian Ocean. More importantly, it

should not ignore the key differ-

ences between this region and the

Pacific while continuing to invoke

the Free and Open Indo-Pacific

concept as another decade begins

in this dynamic region. ■

Nilanthi Samaranayake

Ms. Samaranayake is the Director

of the Strategy and Policy Analysis

program at CNA, a nonprofit re-

search organization in Arlington,

VA. She is the author of numerous

publications on Indian Ocean secu-

rity issues. The views expressed

are solely those of the author and

not of any organization with which

she is affiliated.

The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │11

Notes

1 Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper, “Secretary of

Defense Speech at RAND (As Delivered),” September

16, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News-

room/Speeches/Speech/Article/2350362/secretary-of-de-

fense-speech-at-rand-as-delivered/.

US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Re-

port: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Net-

worked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.de-

fense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPART-

MENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-RE-

PORT-2019.PDF.

3 US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pa-

cific: Advancing a Shared Vision, November 4, 2019,

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-

and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.

4 US Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Na-

tional Defense Strategy, January 19, 2018,

https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-

National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

5 The White House, National Security Strategy of the

United States of America, December 2017,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/up-

loads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

6 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign

Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpol-

icy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.

7 US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global

Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January

2012, https://archive.defense.gov/news/defense_strate-

gic_guidance.pdf.

8 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Deliver-

ing on the Promise of Economic Statecraft,” Singapore

Management University, November 17, 2012,

https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clin-

ton/rm/2012/11/200664.htm.

9 Donna Miles, “Locklear Calls for Indo-Asia-Pacific Co-

operation,” American Forces Press Service, February 8,

2013, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsar-

ticle.aspx?id=119243.

US State Department, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific:

Advancing a Shared Vision, November 4, 2019,

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-

and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.

11 Cornell Overfield, “Reflecting the Law of the Sea: In

Defense of the Bay of Bengal’s Grey Area,” Center for

International Maritime Security, July 22, 2020,

http://cimsec.org/reflecting-the-law-of-the-sea-in-de-

fense-of-the-bay-of-bengals-grey-area/44784.

12 Commodore Kazi Emdadul Haq, “The Indo-Pacific

Strategy and Its Ramification on Weaker Countries,”

Security World, June 22, 2020, http://securi-

tyworldbd.com/the-indo-pacific-strategy-and-its-ramifi-

cation-on-weaker-countries/; P.K. Balachandran, “Presi-

dent Gotabaya reiterates Lanka’s plea to make the In-

dian Ocean a Zone of Peace,” NewsIn.Asia, October 5,

2020, https://newsin.asia/president-gotabaya-reiterates-

lankas-plea-to-make-the-indian-ocean-a-zone-of-peace/;

and Meera Srinivasan, “Indian Ocean Has to Remain a

Zone of Peace: Ajit Doval,” The Hindu, December 1,

2014, https://www.thehindu.com/news/interna-

tional/south-asia/indian-ocean-has-to-remain-a-zone-of-

peace-ajit-doval/article6651325.ece

13 Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China Strate-

gic Competition in South and East China Seas: Back-

ground and Issues for Congress, R42784, August 28,

2020, 40, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf.

Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Asian Basing in Africa: In-

dia’s Setback in Seychelles Could Be Worse,” India in

Transition, Center for the Advanced Study of India at

University of Pennsylvania, September 24, 2018.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be

construed as carrying the official sanction of the

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education

and Training Command, Air University, or other

agencies or departments of the US government or

their international equivalents.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 12

Chinese Vision

of a Rules-

based Order

International Order with

Chinese Characteristics

Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho

n recent years, the idea of a

“rules-based order” (RBO) has

been in vogue among scholars

and practitioners of international poli-

tics, particularly in the Asia-Pacific (or

Indo-Pacific) region amid heightened

geopolitical rivalry between the

United States and China. At first

glance, the need for “rules” to ensure

international order is stating the obvi-

ous: to have order, individuals and

states need to operate with some rules.

At the same time, however, what

these rules might be (and ought to be)

remains a vexing problem, particu-

larly given the varying opinions and

views among states regarding who

gets to set the rules and, more funda-

mentally, whose interests the rules

are meant to serve.

To be certain, countries in the

West are far from monolithic; com-

petition for global influence exists

even among states who subscribe

to the liberal tradition. However,

the idea that rules remain neces-

sary to ensure a degree of predicta-

bility and regularity in interna-

tional affairs is generally accepted

by Western powers. From this

view, only with rules can interna-

tional stability—even as an ideal-

ized outcome—be sustained and

safeguarded amid shifting domes-

tic-political dynamics.

The rise of China complicates the

Western-centric understanding of

RBO given that the idea of a rules-

based order is not inherently self-

evident within traditional Chinese

political philosophy. Indeed, Bei-

jing’s experience of encountering

RBO (and multilateralism more

generally) is a comparatively re-

cent phenomenon; only after its re-

form and opening-up program in

the 1980s was Beijing more ame-

nable to considering its foreign pol-

icies in such terms—and even

then, mostly with an eye to the

Chinese Vision of a Rules-based Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │13

Taiwan issue. It was only after the

2008–09 global financial crisis,

whereby Chinese leaders perceived

a notable decline in the West and a

reduction of Western (particularly

American) influence in global mul-

tilateral institutions that Beijing

started to court multilateral insti-

tutions with greater deliberation.

As the thinking in China goes, di-

minished American influence

would create an opportunity to

modify the rules governing the in-

ternational system. In addition,

Beijing’s realpolitik vision of inter-

national politics leads it to con-

clude that most countries who

aligned with the United States in

the past did so not because of some

higher ideational motivation (for

instance, to preserve individual hu-

man rights, or believing that de-

mocracy was the best form of gov-

ernance) but because their own na-

tional interests—often materially

defined—were best served sub-

scribing to the American-led inter-

national order. A Chinese-led order

could therefore expect to command

similar levels of support.

China perceives the present mo-

ment, marked by US domestic dys-

function and the especially the on-

going COVID-19 pandemic, as a

golden opportunity to shape global

norms and values in accordance

with its own preferences. This does

not mean entirely dismantling the

present international structure

and replacing it with a Chinese one

(Beijing is aware that many coun-

tries would not go along with it),

but rather to continue to support a

rules-based order (jiyu guize de

guojizhixu 基于规则的国际秩序)

that preserves “Chinese character-

istics” and ultimately Chinese na-

tional interests.

To be clear, the safeguarding of na-

tional interests is hardly unique to

China; most if not all countries

prefer rules that favor themselves.

What is problematic is that China’s

national interests are defined pri-

marily with respect to the preser-

vation of its one-party rule. In lib-

eral democracies, of course, politi-

cal parties vie to see who can best

articulate the national interest. As

observed by Qin Yaqing, who pre-

viously headed the China Foreign

Affairs University, “the most basic

feature of socialism with Chinese

characteristics is the leadership of

the Chinese Communist Party.”

Seen this way, it comes as no sur-

prise that many Chinese scholars

equate the pursuit of a rules-based

order as being synonymous with

the pursuit of a liberal interna-

tional order, which runs funda-

mentally at odds with the CCP’s

single-party rule. Indeed, the nar-

rative the CCP frequently touts is

that the pursuit of a liberal order

by the United States is meant to

Indo-Pacific Perspective │14

make other countries to become

more “Western,” thus fundamen-

tally threatening the CCP’s grip on

power.

Not surprisingly, when Chinese

leaders discuss regional order, they

frequently talk about building “a

more just, equitable, fair, demo-

cratic and representative interna-

tional political and economic order”

in the future tense, a vision that

China aims to have an influential

role in helping to implement.

Sim-

ilarly, there is a deeply held belief

among many Chinese scholars and

policymakers that the United

States—as a hegemonic power—

does not practice what it preaches

in terms of living up to the ideals

of the RBO. For instance, China

points to the United States as hav-

ing violated (or opted out of) core

aspects of international order—

such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq

or Washington’s nonratification of

the UN Convention on the Law of

the Sea (UNCLOS)—to argue that

hegemons have the privilege of hy-

pocrisy.

Again, this suggests that

China perceives the RBO as being

conceived ultimately to preserve

American international primacy

while artificially constraining

China’s own rise.

With this in mind, I contend that

China’s approach to multilateral-

ism is one which seeks not to ac-

quiesce in existing ideas of RBO

(which posits certain universal ide-

als) but rather one which call into

question the relevance of multilat-

eralism as framed by Western

thinking and worldview. China

takes a more flexible approach to

international law by portraying

such rules as less morally (and le-

gally) binding than how the West

views them. In other words, Bei-

jing seeks to relativize the applica-

tion of international rules for rea-

sons of self-interest. Unlike the US

vision of multilateralism and RBO,

which is that international rule-

making can help to preserve inter-

national stability despite changing

domestic-political circumstances,

China’s goal for a revised RBO is

far narrower, more limited, and

conspicuously inverted: to ensure

domestic stability amid a changing

international environment. In sum,

multilateralism and the RBO

means different things to different

state actors: the United States and

the West see multilateralism as a

means of entrenching global leader-

ship and promoting a liberal vision

of world order, while China sees

multilateralism as a diplomatic

tool to preserve China’s national in-

terests and legitimize its one-party

rule.

Moving forward, it will be more

necessary than ever for countries

to demonstrate that their support

for RBO (if indeed they support

Chinese Vision of a Rules-based Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │15

such an order) is more than just an

outgrowth of their alignment with

the United States or a product of

anti-China politics. In other words,

states will have to articulate how

and why abiding by the tenets of a

RBO is inherently good for them,

or else what the characteristics of a

better, more equitable RBO ought

to be like. Should their dispositions

depart from the preferences of

Washington and Beijing, then per-

haps it is time the international

community come together to exam-

ine what is problematic and how

best to remedy it. On the other

hand, if there are core aspects of

Notes

1 Yaqing Qin, Song Dexing, Zhang Yensheng, Zhang

Xiaotong, Zhu Feng, and Lu Chuan Ying. “Zhuan-

jiabitan: Dabianjuzhong de zhongguo yu shijie” [Ex-

perts in conversation: China and the World in the

Great Game], Shanghai Institute of International

Studies conference, 2019, DOI:

10.13851/j.cnki.gjzw.202001001 (accessed at CNKI),

see 5.

2 See Mira Rapp-Hooper, Michael Chase, Matake Ka-

miya, Shin Kawashima, and Yuichi Hosoya. “Re-

sponding to China’s Complicated Views on Interna-

tional Order.” Carnegie Endowment for International

RBO that speak to broader univer-

sal concerns, than China’s framing

of international order as inherently

biased in favor of the West will be

exposed as self-interested and, in-

deed, irresponsible. ■

Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho

Dr. Ho is an assistant professor in

the China Programme, S. Raja-

ratnam School of International

Studies, Nanyang Technological

University, Singapore.

Peace, October 10, 2019, https://carnegieendow-

ment.org/.

3 Rapp-Hooper et al., “Responding to China’s Compli-

cated Views on International Order.”

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be

construed as carrying the official sanction of the

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education

and Training Command, Air University, or other

agencies or departments of the US government

or their international equivalents.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 16

Do Regimes

Matter?

Implications of the

2016 UNCLOS South

China Sea Ruling for

a Rules-based order

in the Indo-Pacific

Dr. Laura Southgate

he Philippines’ 2013 decision

to initiate proceedings against

China at the Permanent Court

of Arbitration (PCA) under Article 287

and Annex VII of the 1982 United Na-

tions Convention on the Law of the

Sea (UNCLOS) was a result of the on-

going, heated sovereignty dispute

between the two countries over mari-

time territory in the South China Sea.

China claims historical rights to all

territory within the ‘nine-dash line’,

an undefined demarcation that encom-

passes the majority of the South

China Sea. This has created conflict

with a number of small claimant

states in Southeast Asia and other re-

gional powers such as the United

States, Japan, India and Australia.

China’s militarization of islands in the

disputed waters and the assertive tac-

tics it has used to defend its sover-

eignty claims are symptomatic of its

growing status as Great Power in the

international system. These actions

have also increasingly challenged the

existing rules-based order in the Indo-

Pacific. As stated by President Obama

in April 2015, “where we get con-

cerned with China is where it is not

necessarily abiding by international

norms and rules and is using its sheer

size and muscle to force countries into

subordinate positions.”

The Philip-

pines’ attempt to have its sovereign

rights in the South China Sea

acknowledged under international law

represents a direct challenge to

China’s regional claims. China’s re-

sponse to the PCA ruling provides a

window through which to examine

both the existence of a rules-based or-

der in the Indo-Pacific and its future

prospects as China increasingly seeks

to exert its influence in the interna-

tional system.

Do Regimes Matter?

Indo-Pacific Perspective │17

UNCLOS Ruling and Its

Aftermath

China responded dismissively to

the Philippines’ arbitration case by

refusing to participate in proceed-

ings. China’s Ministry of Foreign

Affairs released a ‘position paper’

in December 2014 claiming that

territorial sovereignty over mari-

time features was beyond the scope

of the Convention.

This did not de-

ter the PCA, which ruled in July

2016 that China’s claim to historic

rights to resources in the South

China Sea were “incompatible with

the exclusive economic zones pro-

vided for in the convention” and

that “there was no legal basis” for

China to claim historic rights

within the nine-dash line.

The

groundbreaking ruling had little

immediate impact on the dispute,

however. China dismissed the rul-

ing as a “null and void decision”

and “nothing more than a piece of

paper.”

The Philippines’ new Pres-

ident Rodrigo Duterte stated that

he would “set aside the arbitral

ruling” in favor of economic incen-

tives from China.

This was con-

firmed by the Philippines’ Foreign

Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr., who

stated that the Philippines “won’t

take any steps against China” and

that he wanted “to make sure that

there will be no further actions

that will heighten the tensions be-

tween the two countries,

particularly in the Scarborough

Shoal.”

Yasay concluded: “we can-

not stop China at this point in

time…we will continue to pursue

peaceful means” to the dispute.

Despite the brokering of a ‘status-

quo’ between the Philippines and

China, whereby the latter purport-

edly agreed to halt further expan-

sion in the South China Sea,

re-

ports from as early as November

2017 suggested that China had

continued to develop facilities in

the Paracel Islands, in addition to

a military buildup in the Spratly

Islands.

In the wake of the UNCLOS rul-

ing, China has also pursued a new

legal basis for its territorial inter-

ests in the South China Sea. It has

done so by re-packaging its sover-

eignty claims to appear more con-

sistent with UNCLOS. Employing

a new legal tactic referred to as a

legal warfare, or ‘lawfare’ ap-

proach, China’s ‘nine-dash line’

narrative has been de-emphasized

in favour of a ‘Four Sha’ claim.

Translated as ‘four sands’, this new

position sees China asserting sov-

ereignty over four island chains:

the Pratas Islands, Paracel Is-

lands, Spratly Islands and Mac-

clesfield Bank area. In adopting

this approach, China has at-

tempted to strengthen its legal

claims in the South China Sea by

claiming the Four Sha as part of

Southgate

Indo-Pacific Perspective │18

China’s 200-mile Exclusive Eco-

nomic Zone (EEZ), and by assert-

ing that they are part of China’s

extended continental shelf.

noted by two prominent interna-

tional legal experts, while “this

new Chinese legal strategy is even

weaker than the Nine-Dash Line

given [that] it clearly violates UN-

CLOS,” China “may have con-

cluded that it can better shape (or

undermine, depending on your

viewpoint) the law of the sea by

adopting UNCLOS terminology.”

Thus China’s ‘Four Sha’ claim at-

tempts to circumnavigate existing

law and re-conceptualize the exist-

ing rules-based order in support of

Chinese state interests.

Regimes, Sovereignty and

Power

China’s actions raise a number of

interesting questions regarding the

importance of regimes in the inter-

national system and what happens

when states seek to pursue their

own interests to uphold state sov-

ereignty. According to Hans Mor-

genthau, “international law owes

its existence and operation to two

factors, both decentralized in char-

acter: identical or complementary

interests of individual states and

the distribution of power among

them.”

In many respects, power

dynamics are at the center of inter-

national law enforcement, whereby

“it makes it easy for the strong

both to violate the law and to en-

force it, and consequently puts the

rights of the weak in jeopardy.”

Legal rules therefore only serve to

satisfy the interests of the most

powerful. This is supported by Rob-

ert Gilpin, who argues that “the

primary foundation of rights and

rules is in the power interests of

the dominant group or states in a

social system.”

China’s reaction

to the UNCLOS South China Sea

ruling demonstrates how interna-

tional laws exist and operate on

the basis of powerful state inter-

ests. Great Powers will seek to un-

dermine existing laws when con-

flictual matters of state sover-

eignty and territorial integrity are

at stake. The doctrine of sover-

eignty is both an operating princi-

ple enshrined in international law

and a principle that can be used as

a tool to circumvent or manipulate

international law in support of

state interests.

Underlying this

argument is the crucial role of

state power and the distribution of

capabilities in the international

system.

China’s largely successful attempts

to reconfigure international law in

the South China Sea is evidence of

its growing regional and interna-

tional power. It is also testament

to the continued applicability of re-

gimes insofar as they can be used

Do Regimes Matter?

Indo-Pacific Perspective │19

to support a state’s agenda. As this

case study shows, a powerful state

will seek to challenge international

law if it is in its interest to do so,

particularly as it relates to a core

security concern such as state sov-

ereignty. This treatment of inter-

national law is certainly not new,

nor limited to actions conducted by

China. However, it is indicative of

the type of behavior we can expect

to see repeated as China seeks to

exert its influence over the Indo-

Pacific as its power rises. If suc-

cessful, a new type of rules-based

order may develop, one that does

not necessarily reflect the existing

status quo. As far as the existing

order reflects US interests, Great

Power security competition cannot

be ruled out. For smaller states in

the international system, the

Notes

1 “Obama says China bullying smaller nations in

South China Sea row,” The Guardian, April 10, 2015,

https://www.theguardian.com/.

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic

of China, “Position Paper of the Government of the

People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdic-

tion in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by

the Republic of the Philippines,” December 07, 2014,

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/.

3 Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, “Press

Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Re-

public of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of

China,” July 12, 2016, https://pca-cpa.org/.

4 Richard Javad Heydarian, “Has Duterte’s China

engagement backfired?,” Asia Times, July 14, 2017,

http://www.atimes.com/.

UNCLOS ruling will undoubtedly

act as a valuable lesson: that while

all states, regardless of their size,

have recourse to the international

courts, little can be done to enforce

a ruling if a powerful state chooses

to ignore it. ■

Dr. Laura Southgate

Dr. Southgate is lecturer in politics

and international relations at As-

ton University, deputy co-director

of the Aston Centre for Europe,

and author of ASEAN Resistance to

Sovereignty Violation: Interests,

Balancing and the Role of the Van-

guard State (Bristol University

Press, 2019).

5 Jim Gomez, “Duterte says he’ll set aside sea feud

ruling against China,” Philstar, December 17, 2016,

http://www.philstar.com/.

6 Gomez, “Duterte says he’ll set aside sea feud ruling

against China.”

7 Ibid.

8 Manuel Mogato, “Philippines says China agrees on

no new expansion in South China Sea,” Reuters, Au-

gust 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/.

9 “As attention focuses on North Korean threat, Bei-

jing quietly expanding South China Sea militarisa-

tion,” Japan Times, November 1, 2017,

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/.

10 Mark J. Valencia, “China, US Both Using Lawfare

in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, October 12,

2017, https://thediplomat.com/.

11 Patricia Lourdes Viray, “South China Sea: China

has new claim to nibble more land from Taiwan, Vi-

etnam, the Philippines? “The Four Sha Claim,”

Philstar, September 27, 2017.

Southgate

Indo-Pacific Perspective │20

12 Julian Ku and Chris Mirasola, “The South China

Sea and China’s “Four Sha” Claim: New Legal The-

ory, Same Bad Argument,” Lawfare, September 25,

2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/.

13 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The

Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred

Knopf, 1965), 277.

14 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 294.

15 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International

Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1981), 35.

16 Anthony Clark Arend, “Do Legal Rules Matter?

International Law and International Politics,” Vir-

ginia Journal of International Law 38, no. 2 (1997):

107–53, at 142.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be

construed as carrying the official sanction of the

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education

and Training Command, Air University, or other

agencies or departments of the US government

or their international equivalents.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 21

Next Priorities

for Japan’s

FOIP Vision

The Quad, ASEAN,

and Institutional

Linkages in the Indo-

Pacific

Dr. Kei Koga

ne of Japan’s most important

diplomatic agendas has be-

come the realization of a

“Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP),

which was launched by former Prime

Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016 to main-

tain and facilitate the existing rules-

based order in the region.

And yet, it

was not clear to what extent new

Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga would

emphasize this strategic vision. In

fact, the question of Japan’s commit-

ment to the FOIP has drawn much in-

ternational attention from practition-

ers and foreign policy experts because

of Japan’s potential preoccupation

with a number of domestic issues,

ranging from COVID-19, economic re-

covery, and the 2021 Tokyo Olympics.

Indeed, Suga’s political priorities ap-

pear to focus on domestic affairs, such

as unemployment and revising the

small and medium-sized enterprise

basic law. The Prime Minister is also

said to lack diplomatic experience,

which was well illustrated by his

statement during the campaign for

President of the Liberal Democratic

Party in September 2020, when Suga

stated that he cannot emulate Shinzo

Abe’s summit diplomacy and that he

would consult with the Minister and

Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as

former Prime Minister Abe about Ja-

pan’s diplomacy.

As a result of this apparent inertia,

diplomatic continuity has ensued.

Since Suga was inaugurated on

September 16, 2020, he empha-

sized the importance of Abe’s for-

eign-policy agendas. The FOIP re-

mains Japan’s core strategic vi-

sion, with the US-Japan alliance

playing a pivotal role.

Japan

hosted the second Japan-Australia-

India-US Foreign Ministers’

Koga

Indo-Pacific Perspective │22

meeting (the so-called “Quad”) on

October 6 to further coordinate

their policies to realize the FOIP

region.

Suga regards Southeast

Asia as the geographical center of

the Indo-Pacific, and he made his

very first diplomatic trips to Vi-

etnam (2020 ASEAN chair) and In-

donesia (the largest Southeast

Asian country) in October. Based

on these early moves, there ap-

pears to be no diplomatic upset:

Suga seems likely to follow

through on what Abe has envi-

sioned for the FOIP.

However, this diplomatic posture is

not sustainable in the long-term.

Eventually, Japan needs to provide

a clear strategy to realize the FOIP

in the context of the rapidly evolv-

ing US-China great power rivalry.

There are three reasons for this.

The Need for Flexible

Adaptation

First, Japan’s FOIP vision is essen-

tially evolutionary, which requires

conceptual updates over time. As

many have already pointed out,

the concept of Japan’s FOIP has

been changing since its inception

in 2016. Initially, Japan aimed to

maintain and strengthen the rules-

based international order in the

Indo-Pacific region, which has been

largely shaped by the United

States in the post-Cold War era.

Japan’s interest has been to blunt

China’s increasing political influ-

ence in the region, which is

thought to be detrimental to exist-

ing international rules and norms.

Most notably, China’s rejection of

the 2016 South China Sea Tribu-

nal Award disrespected interna-

tional laws, while China’s “Belt

and Road Initiative” has been re-

sponsible for setting new interna-

tional standards for development.

However, Japan’s strategy to pro-

tect the FOIP principles was un-

clear to begin with. Japan initially

emphasized the importance of “fun-

damental rights” such as the rule

of law, human rights, and democ-

racy.

Yet, because there are many

non-democratic states in the re-

gion, such an emphasis soon disap-

peared. Moreover, the FOIP vision

was initially called the “Free and

Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” but

Japan eliminated “strategy” from

the phraseology because some

ASEAN member states were con-

cerned about its diplomatic impli-

cations—that FOIP aimed to coun-

terbalance or contain China, for ex-

ample.

As such, Japan flexibly

changed the FOIP concept in ac-

cordance with reactions from other

states.

Currently, Japan’s FOIP vision

consists of “three pillars”: (1) “pro-

motion and establishment of the

rule of law, freedom of navigation,

free trade, etc.”; (2) “Pursuit of

Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision

Indo-Pacific Perspective │23

economic prosperity (improving

connectivity and strengthening

economic partnership including

EPA/FTAs and investment trea-

ties)”; and (3) “Commitment for

peace and stability (capacity build-

ing on maritime law enforcement,

HA/DR cooperation, etc.).”

These

are all international rules and

norms that Japan has long sup-

ported. Nevertheless, these pillars

might change in the future, de-

pending on the development of the

region’s strategic environment.

Particularly, as power diffuses

across the region, a renewed rules-

making mechanism may become

necessary. The Suga administra-

tion must prepare for this chal-

lenge in the future.

Navigating Great Power

Rivalry

Second, Japan still seeks a balance

in its diplomatic relations with

both the United State and China.

Currently, Japan’s foremost ally,

the United States, has begun to

take a much tougher stance on

China in terms of COVID-19, eco-

nomics, and technological moderni-

zation. Many in Washington now

believe the past approach of “en-

gagement” to have been a mistake.

The experience of the COVID-19

pandemic has exacerbated this

trend.

To be sure, the Trump ad-

ministration’s confrontational

approach toward China faces se-

vere criticism, and there are de-

bates over a means to manage its

relations with China. Neverthe-

less, Washington’s tough posture

toward China has garnered broad

bipartisan support. America’s

FOIP strategy is now part of an

anti-China strategy, designed to

force Beijing to follow existing in-

ternational rules and norms. This

trend will not easily be reversed.

On the other hand, Japan still at-

tempts to engage China. Earlier

this year, Abe invited Xi Jinping to

Japan as a state visit in April and

attempted to draft the “fifth docu-

ment,” the fifth symbolic official

document after the Sino-Japanese

diplomatic normalization in 1972

that highlights the future vision of

Sino-Japanese relations.

The

visit was postponed because of the

COVID-19 pandemic, however, and

rising tensions over the East China

Sea mean that both leaders seem

to have lost political traction for bi-

lateral initiatives.

Suga recognizes the importance of

Japan-China relations for national,

regional, and global stability. He

has advocated the need for com-

mon agendas.

Even as he main-

tains a firm stance on territorial

sovereignty and the rule of law,

then, Suga has shown interest in

persuading China to follow inter-

national rules and norms by

Koga

Indo-Pacific Perspective │24

maintaining channels of communi-

cation at various levels, including

the summit level.

In this sense,

there is a divergence in diplomatic

posture between Japan and the

United States. Yet, since the US-

Japan alliance is the core of the

FOIP vision, it will be necessary

for both states to coordinate how to

maintain consistency between Ja-

pan’s softer and US tougher FOIP

stance vis-à-vis China.

Realigning Institutions

Third, Japan’s institutional strat-

egy in the Indo-Pacific has yet to

be clearly articulated. In the initial

concept, Japan’s emphasis was on

the Quad as a central framework

to realize FOIP.

However, given

diplomatic concerns raised by sev-

eral ASEAN member states in

2018, Japan and the Quad mem-

bers began to emphasize the im-

portance of ASEAN unity and cen-

trality.

In response, with a strong

push from Indonesia and a diplo-

matic coordination by Thailand as

ASEAN chair, ASEAN issued its

“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pa-

cific” (AOIP) statement in 2019,

which emphasized the “inclusive-

ness” of regional architecture and

regional cooperation over “ri-

valry.”

ASEAN’s priority is thus

to neutralize great power rivalry

and its negative spill-over effect to

Southeast Asia and other sub-

regions of the Indo-Pacific. Japan

immediately supported the AOIP.

That said, it is still not clear what

Japan and the Quad members ex-

pect from ASEAN. If the Quad

members regard ASEAN’s utility

only as a dialogue convenor that

provides multilateral communica-

tion channels, and if they attempt

to create “effective multilateral-

ism” that gets things done as the

US Secretary State Pompeo indi-

cated, some ASEAN member states

would likely view this as diplo-

matic marginalization.

To reas-

sure ASEAN and garner its sup-

port for their FOIP vision, Japan

and the Quad members need to

clearly delineate ASEAN’s role in

the Indo-Pacific.

The Future of FOIP

These three factors show that more

work needs to be done to realize

Japan’s FOIP vision—constructing

a new regional rules-based order.

This is the work that the Abe ad-

ministration left out, and that the

Suga administration needs to work

on.

Two tasks should be prioritized.

The first is to evolve the Quad into

the Quad-Plus as an Indo-Pacific

institutional framework. While

agreeing the basic principles of the

FOIP, Quad-Plus member and

partner states will have to under-

stand that there are diverging

Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision

Indo-Pacific Perspective │25

national interests among them,

and that cooperation will not be

possible in all issue areas. Rather,

an expanded Quad-plus could emu-

late the division of labor modeled

by the Japan-Australia-US “Trilat-

eral Partnership for infrastructure

investment in the Indo-Pacific,”

and the partnership between the

United States and Japan on en-

ergy, infrastructure, and digital

connectivity.

In short, the Quad(-

Plus) can function best as a forum

to flexibly coordinate policies that

advance the FOIP vision where

possible. This means that the Quad

can also expand its membership to

any states that agree with the

FOIP principles. Accordingly, it is

in Japan’s interests to ensure that

the Quad-Plus formula it utilized

to include more regional states,

such as Vietnam and Indonesia, as

well as European states, such as

the United Kingdom, France, and

Germany, to buttress the provision

of international public goods such

as knowledge-transfer rules, infra-

structure development, and man-

agement of non-traditional security

issues.

The second task is to strike a bal-

ance between ASEAN and the

Quad. As mentioned above, some

ASEAN member states are skepti-

cal about the development of the

Quad framework, which threatens

to diplomatically marginalize

ASEAN and intensify great power

rivalry with China. Without close

consultation, institutionalizing the

Quad could exacerbate ASEAN’s

concerns and skepticism. Also,

given ASEAN’s consensus-based

decision-making process, it is im-

portant to reassure all member

states in this regard. Therefore,

Japan should propose to enhance

ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific

by forming “webs” of regional insti-

tutions. The starting point might

be to create a Quad-ASEAN Track-

II dialogue, as well as to link the

Quad and ASEAN-X formula. The

Quad’s strength is its flexibility: it

should actively engage ASEAN and

its individual member state, offer-

ing reassurance and building part-

nerships. At the same time, in or-

der to enable regional states to en-

gage in deeper multilateral, strate-

gic discussions and prevent great

powers from irreversible political

and economic decoupling, Japan

should encourage ASEAN to fur-

ther institutionalize the East Asia

Summit, such as strengthening its

secretariat functions and conduct-

ing more frequent Senior-Official

level exchanges.

Japan’s FOIP vision under the

Suga administration aims to avoid

an intensive confrontation between

the United States and China by de-

veloping regional rules and norms

that are based on the existing

Koga

Indo-Pacific Perspective │26

international order. This will be a

difficult task given that the consol-

idation of rules and norms will re-

quire a regional consensus. If the

attempt fails, it will result in ex-

posing intraregional divides. How-

ever, such a window of opportunity

has not been closed yet. Japan is in

a good strategic position to bridge

the various regional powers. Proac-

tively taking a normative leader-

ship role in the Indo-Pacific by

evolving the Quad, encouraging

ASEAN to further institutionalize

Notes

1 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’

Strategy: Tokyo’s Tactical Hedging and the Implica-

tions for ASEAN,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 41,

no. 2 (2019): 286-313; Yuichi Hosoya, “FOIP 2.0: The

Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Strategy,” Asia-Pacific Review 26, no. 1 (2019): 18–

28.

2 See, for example, Zack Cooper and Jeffrey Hor-

nung, “The US-Japan alliance after Abe,” Los Angeles

Times, September 8, 2020, https://www.aei.org/.

3 “Jiminto sosaisen no kokai toronkai—Ishiba, Suga,

Kishida-shi no hatsugen Yoshi” [Public Debated for

the LDP Presidential Election—summary of state-

ments by Ishiba, Suga, and Kishida]. Nihon Keizai

Shimbun, September 12, 2020, https://www.nik-

kei.com/.

4 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. “Dai nihyakusan

kai kokkai ni okeru suganaikakusouridaijin shoshin

hyomei enzetsu” [203th Diet Session: The Suga ad-

ministration’s Policy Speech], October 26, 2020,

https://www.kantei.go.jp/.

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), “The

Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Minis-

ters’ Meeting,” October 6, 2020,

https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

6 MOFA, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at

the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International

Conference on African Development (TICAD VI),”

EAS, and creating the linkages be-

tween them — all of these are

goals worth trying for. ■

Dr. Kei Koga

Dr. Koga is an Assistant Professor

at the Public Policy and Global Af-

fairs Programme, School of Social

Sciences, Nanyang Technological

University, Singapore.

August 27, 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

7 Kei Koga, “Japan’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ Question: Counter-

ing China or Shaping a New Regional Order?” Inter-

national Affairs 96, no. 1 (2020): 49–73.

8 MOFA, “State Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishi’s

Speech at the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)

Summit,” March 8 2017, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ ;

and MOFA. “Japan-U.S. Working Lunch and Japan-

U.S. Summit Meeting,” November 6, 2017,

https://www.mofa.go.jp/ .

9 “Indo taiheiyo, kieta ‘senryaku’ seifu ga ‘koso’ ni

shusei” [Indo-Pacific: Disappeared ‘Strategy’: The

Japanese Government Altered It to ‘Vision’]. Nikkei

Shimbun, November 13, 2018.

10 MOFA, “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” n.d.,

https://www.mofa.go.jp/ .

11 Matthew Lee, “At Nixon library, Pompeo declares

China engagement a failure,” The Washington Post,

July 24, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/; and

Alice Su and Tracy Wilkinson, “New Analysis: How

bad could U.S.-China relations get?” Los Angeles

Times, July 26, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/.

12 “Japan, China to craft new political document for

Xi’s state visit,” Kyodo News Service, January 9,

2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/.

13 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, “Dai nihyakusan

kai.”

14 MOFA, “Japan-China Summit Telephone Talk,”

September 25, 2020, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

15 MOFA, “Priority Policy for Development

Next Priorities for Japan’s FOIP Vision

Indo-Pacific Perspective │27

Cooperation FY 2017,” 9, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

16 Charissa Yong, “Singapore will not join Indo-Pa-

cific bloc for now: Vivian,” The Straits Times, May 15,

2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/; and MOFA. “Ja-

pan-Australia-India-U.S. Consultations,” June 7,

2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/.

17 ASEAN Secretariat. “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-

Pacific.” June 23, 2019, https://asean.org/.

18 US Department of State, “Briefing with Senior

State Department Officials on Secretary Pompeo’s

Visit to Japan,” October 6, 2020.

https://www.state.gov/.

19 Prime Minister of Australia, “Joint Statement of

the Governments of Australia, Japan and the United

States,” November 17, 2018. https://www.pm.gov.au/;

and White House, “U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on

Advancing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific through En-

ergy, Infrastructure and Digital Connectivity Cooper-

ation,” November 13, 2018,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be

construed as carrying the official sanction of the

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education

and Training Command, Air University, or other

agencies or departments of the US government

or their international equivalents.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 28

India’s Indo-

Pacific Reckoning

Dr. Titli Basu

S-China disorder presents a

defining moment in interna-

tional history. A fractured

power structure and contestation

over the rules of the international

system have been sharpened by

the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing’s

ascent in the international order

and the ensuing disequilibrium in

the balance of power between the

United States and China at the

global level, and China and India

at the regional level, are making

policy elites in Delhi fiercely de-

bate key strategic choices in pur-

suit of the national interest. Stakes

are high with trade, technology,

the fourth industrial revolution,

and infrastructure all defining

great power contestation in the

strategic theatre of the Indo-Pa-

cific.

Disequilibrium in US-China-

India Triangle

China frames its pursuit of power

within the narrative of “great reju-

venation of the Chinese nation,”

anchored in an historical interpre-

tation of the Middle Kingdom’s

“century of humiliation” from the

First Opium War through the Sino-

Japanese War. Beijing’s path to

primacy is anchored not only in

military modernization and eco-

nomic statecraft but also soft and

sharp power instruments to ad-

vance grand strategic designs like

the Belt and Road Initiative. With

China’s rise, the Chinese Com-

munist Party (CCP) seeks a rene-

gotiation of the asymmetry that ex-

ists between the distribution of

power and the distribution benefits

in international society. Offering

Chinese solutions to international

problems, Beijing has challenged

the US-led liberal order with alter-

native rules and norms, ideas, and

institutions.

At the regional level, the growing

India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

Indo-Pacific Perspective │29

power differential in India-China

relations is manifesting beyond

contested Himalayan borders. Chi-

nese checkers in Pakistan, South

Asia, and the wider Indian Ocean

Region further complicate geopoli-

tics. In the last two decades, Bei-

jing’s defense spending has wit-

nessed around a seven-fold in-

crease, rising from $39.6 billion in

1999 to $266.4 billion in 2019.

The

reality of China’s economy being

one-sixth larger than America’s (in

purchasing power parity terms) is

upon us.

It is imperative for India

to adjust to the profound impact of

China’s rise in the immediate

neighborhood, and especially when

it comes to addressing Chinese ag-

gression along its land border with

India. In recent times, India has

managed incidents like Doklam,

Chumar, and Depsang—but the

Galwan standoff was the definitive

moment when Beijing has “strate-

gically lost India.”

In India, the

debate over China is increasingly

turning in favor of making the cost

of unilaterally altering the status

quo unsustainable for Beijing.

Beijing’s Proposition of a

Unipolar Asia in a Chinese

Century

The narrow prism of analyzing In-

dia as a mere “balancer” in great

power game is flawed. Sharper

strategic articulation from Delhi is

positioning India as a leading

power in a multi-polar world.

Delhi’s strategic quest for a multi-

polar world was shaped amid ap-

prehension of US hegemony in the

post-Cold War years. India believes

that a multipolar world should be

anchored by a multipolar Asia at

its core.

But today, the prospect of

a unipolar Asia has become more

pronounced with President Xi

Jinping’s “China Dream.” While

India is seeking strategic equilib-

rium, China is relentless in its pur-

suit of engineering a hierarchical

Asian order, with Beijing at top,

fueling its vision of a Chinese cen-

tury as opposed to an Asian cen-

tury.

Judging from key policy pro-

nouncements, India aspires to be a

stabilizing power bringing its ca-

pacities to bear on the interna-

tional system for the purpose of

promoting the global good.

wants to be a net-security provider

rather than a disruptionist power

in the Indo-Pacific. India’s Foreign

Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has

deftly articulated that today’s

multi-polar world reflects strong

bipolar characteristics, with not all

the poles being of the same size,

and the United States and China

being relatively more influential

than other players.

Shaking off “hesitations of his-

tory”

and debunking the

Basu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │30

narrative of India as a reluctant

power, Delhi aims to be a rules-

shaper and not an abstainer – rec-

ognizing that “rule of force” under-

writes the “rule of law.” At the

Shangri-La Dialogue, India has ar-

gued that the Indo-Pacific should

be anchored in rules and norms

based on the consent of all and not

the power of a few. Strategic con-

versations have urged for a New

Delhi Consensus, characterized by

a call for a more inclusive, equita-

ble, and participatory world or-

der.

The experience of the liberal

rules-based order was “neither lib-

eral, nor particularly orderly”

for

all. History shows that great pow-

ers have often customized rules of

the international system and have

taken an a la carte approach in

pursuit of their national interest

and strategic ambitions. Rules-

based order has at times been over-

ridden by power-based order.

The rules of the international sys-

tem need to be overhauled and In-

dia cannot afford to be a passive

player. India largely has a rule-

taker instinct. For instance, unlike

Beijing’s disregard for the PCA’s

ruling in favor of the Philippines,

Delhi respected the ruling by a

PCA-established tribunal in favor

of Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal

Boundary Arbitration. But India’s

rising political capital as a rule-

shaper makes it imminent for

Delhi to make tough policy choices

and shape global conversations set-

ting standards on pertinent issues,

for instance, global trade rules,

tech rules and digital governance.

Dividends of India’s Doctrine

India’s search for solutions in man-

aging differences and protecting

strategic equities has renewed the

debate on strategic autonomy ver-

sus alliances. The strategic assess-

ment in Delhi is that “the more In-

dia rises, the more it must expect

Chinese opposition.”

With the

Galwan misadventure, Beijing has

incentivized Delhi’s pivot to Wash-

ington, but the current border cri-

sis might not fundamentally reori-

ent Indian policy towards alliance,

but it may rebalance some of its

priorities.

Sieving the conversation in Delhi

shows that, while alliance contin-

ues to remain the “wrong answer”

for India, greater “realism” is per-

meating policymaking. Political

discourse suggests that while India

cannot give any other country a

veto over its policy options, there is

a need to look beyond dogma and

enter the real world of conver-

gences.

Today, military alliances

are neither being offered to nor

sought by Delhi. The very dis-

course in India has pivoted to en-

compassing issue-based multi-

alignments and coalitions in

India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

Indo-Pacific Perspective │31

pursuit of shared strategic inter-

ests and leveraging partnerships to

further India’s national interests.

Indeed, this new discourse has ech-

oes in India’s history of trysts with

various shapes and forms of alli-

ances, all of which were influenced

by the evolving nature of interna-

tional threats.

While the Trump administration

has treated Delhi relatively more

gently than Beijing and even some

of its formal allies,

India is

keenly aware that the United

States has fed the rise of China

and that a US-China “grand bar-

gain” at some point is not impossi-

ble. To date, India’s strategy of en-

gagement-with-all without having

to choose between rival great pow-

ers paid rich dividends in terms of

sourcing capital and technology.

“Balance of interest” has remained

the guiding principle of Indian for-

eign policy.

Between National Interests and

International Responsibilities

India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, while

being a critical component of

Delhi’s China policy, also enumer-

ates an open, inclusive, and cooper-

ative construct to maximize geopo-

litical advantages and geo-eco-

nomic guarantees in advancing In-

dia’s global influence.

Maritime security is at the heart of

Indo-Pacific construct. While the

geography extends from the

“shores of Africa to that of the

Americas,” the India Ocean re-

mains the primary theater for

Delhi. Despite the natural geo-

graphic advantages in the littoral,

India’s policy elites have long had

a continental orientation. But

China’s strategic ambition in the

Indian Ocean, manifested in its ex-

panding military footprint and the

Century Maritime Silk Road

projects, has compelled Delhi to re-

orient its focus. As such, island na-

tions and smaller littoral states sit-

uated in the strategic geography

across Indian Ocean, Pacific

Ocean, and even the Caribbean are

gaining more attention in New

Delhi’s strategic thinking.

Securing a stable maritime order -

and the rule of law at sea - has

driven Indian maritime diplomacy.

To uphold rule of law and freedom

of seas, Delhi is weaving a deeper

security-cooperation network

among Indo-Pacific stakeholders.

This is taking the form of a grow-

ing number of logistics agree-

ments, intelligence sharing ar-

rangements, advancing maritime

capacity building, maritime do-

main awareness, and strengthen-

ing interoperability between navies

through joint drills like the Mala-

bar exercise in key theatres. India

has conceived the Indo-Pacific

Ocean Initiative (IPOI), building

Basu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │32

on the Security and Growth for All

in the Region (SAGAR) doctrine, in

its quest for securing maritime

global commons and present gov-

ernance solutions to shared mari-

time challenges. In designing a

rules-based regional architecture,

India’s IPOI rests upon the seven

pillars of maritime security, mari-

time ecology, maritime resources,

capacity building and resource

sharing, disaster risk reduction

and management, science, technol-

ogy and academic cooperation, and

trade connectivity and maritime

transport.

This has gained trac-

tion with other maritime democra-

cies like Japan and Australia, and

also features in the India-ASEAN

Plan of Action (2021-2025).

Strategic pursuit of a free, open,

and inclusive Indo-Pacific is shap-

ing India’s issue-based alignments

with various Indo-Pacific stake-

holders, especially the United

States, Japan, Australia, and

France in addition to ASEAN and

the European Union in bilateral,

trilateral, quadrilateral and “Quad

plus” strategic geometries. While

the Quadrilateral Security dia-

logue (“Quad”) is anchored by a de-

sire to keep maritime highways

free and open, coordination under

the India-Japan-Australia Supply

Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)

is driven by the need to map and

manage supply-chain

vulnerabilities in key sectors like

pharmaceuticals, medical devices,

semiconductors, automotives, and

chemicals. India’s recent involve-

ment along with Japan in the Five

Eyes intelligence-sharing frame-

work is designed to navigate ten-

sions between law enforcement

and the encryption policies of tech

companies – another demonstra-

tion of Delhi’s rising interest in

forming global coalitions.

India accords primacy to advancing

regional connectivity and infra-

structure across the Indo-Pacific.

Doing so not only connects the eco-

nomic growth poles and advances

regional economic linkages, pro-

duction networks and value chains,

but also acts as strategic leverage

in the great power game. As host

nations today have several financ-

ing options, including BRI, India

advocates infrastructure projects

underpinned by consultative prac-

tices involving local stakeholders.

India’s infrastructure outreach is

driven by compliance with global

governance standards, including

respect for sovereignty, responsible

debt financing practices, and eco-

logical sustainability. As such, In-

dia has steered a Coalition for Dis-

aster Resilient Infrastructure and

International Solar Alliance.

Infrastructure financing is a vital

geo-economic instrument of state-

craft and India is catching up by

India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

Indo-Pacific Perspective │33

tapping into the joint capacities of

strategic partners like Japan and

the United States to deliver on the

shared responsibility of addressing

the infrastructure gap. The Indo-

Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral

Forum aims to channel the assets

and resources of the India-Japan-

United States private sectors to ad-

dress the infrastructure gap. More-

over, India is inching towards join-

ing forces with the US-Japan-Aus-

tralia-led Blue Dot Network

(BDN), seeking to advance high

quality infrastructure. Japan has

emerged as India’s preferred part-

ner in third country co-operation

with a few success stories to boast

in the Bay of Bengal.

Beyond hard infrastructure, strate-

gic competition also centers on

technology and data. Given the vi-

tality of digital connectivity and se-

cured networks, India is coordinat-

ing with like-minded partners at

the D-10 on strategic vulnerabili-

ties and national-security chal-

lenges posed by critical technolo-

gies including 5G. The Open Radio

Access Network (O-RAN) is driving

the discourse and an O-RAN Policy

Coalition is formed to advance

open and interoperable solutions

aimed at enabling innovation. Mu-

tual interests could drive momen-

tum on key verticals including arti-

ficial intelligence, quantum tech-

nologies, space technologies and in

strategic metals and minerals.

Revisiting the global economic or-

der became apparent following

Covid-19. The pandemic unleashed

severe economic contraction across

the world, and tentatively dialed

down India’s growth story. The dis-

ruption has made Delhi devise the

Atmanirbhar Bharat strategy

which has sparked a fierce debate

on globalization versus economic

autarky. To be clear, Prime Minis-

ter Modi’s self-reliance policy is not

about being self-contained or being

closed to the world but is driven by

India’s determination to enhance

its economic contribution to the

global economy. India’s exit from

the Regional Comprehensive Eco-

nomic Partnership (RCEP) pact,

which took place even before the

COVID-19 pandemic struck, un-

derscores the domestic compul-

sions and urgent need to accelerate

structural reforms and enhance

competitiveness.

India’s ability to economically en-

gage with the region remains im-

perative since economic isolation is

not an option. But the RCEP nego-

tiations proved that the world is

perhaps unwilling to accommodate

India’s interest despite the size of

its market. India’s target of becom-

ing a US$5 trillion economy is con-

tingent on becoming able to with-

stand global competition and seize

benefits from export opportunities

Basu

Indo-Pacific Perspective │34

that external markets offer. Multi-

lateral agreements create such ex-

panded opportunity.

Walking the Talk

While the Indo-Pacific is dominat-

ing the political lexicon and strate-

gic thinking in Delhi, the biggest

challenge will be matching political

intent with material and national

capacity. The conversation on the

Indo-Pacific gained traction with

Japanese Prime Minister Abe

Shinzo’s landmark speech in the

Indian Parliament – “Confluence of

the Two Seas” - capturing the dy-

namic coupling of the Indian and

Pacific Oceans as seas of freedom

and prosperity. India’s “Look East

Policy,” meanwhile, pivoted to “Act

East” and subsequently the idea of

a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” If

geopolitical churning in the major

capitals of the world have posi-

tioned India at the heart of their

respective Indo-Pacific strategy,

India has, for its part, shed its

Notes

1 “What Does China Really Spend on its Military?,”

CSIS China Power, September 15, 2020,

https://chinapower.csis.org/.

2 Graham Allison, “China Is Now the World’s Largest

Economy. We Shouldn’t Be Shocked,” National Inter-

est, October 15, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/.

3 Ananth Krishnan, “For Minor Tactical Gains on the

Ground, China has Strategically Lost India, Says

Former Indian Ambassador to China,” The Hindu,

June 21, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/.

4 Brahma Chellaney, “China Alone,” Project

initial reluctance and is ready to

step up to the challenge. Structural

organization in the Indian foreign

ministry (the creation in 2019 of an

Indo-Pacific division) and institu-

tion of key 2+2 dialogues with ma-

jor Indo-Pacific powers like the US,

Japan, and Australia; elevating the

Quad’s profile; and the rise of Indo-

Pacific trilaterals with India-Ja-

pan-US, India-Japan-Australia, In-

dia-Australia-France, and India-

Indonesia-Australia – all of these

developments demonstrate Delhi’s

quest to engage in a collaborative

and cooperative framework to de-

sign a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Without doubt, India is now walk-

ing the walk when it comes to

Indo-Pacific order. ■

Dr. Titli Basu

Dr. Basu is an associate fellow at

the Manohar Parrikar Institute for

Defence Studies and Analyses.

Syndicate, August 21, 2020, https://www.project-syn-

dicate.org/.

5 “Multipolar World Should Include Multipolar Asia:

Jaishankar,” The Hindu, September 19, 2020,

https://www.thehindu.com/.

6 S D Muni, “While seeking equilibrium with China,

diplomatic adjustments through give-and-take must

be explored,” Indian Express, August 25, 2020,

https://indianexpress.com/.

7 Raja Mohan, “China’s hegemonic ambitions mean

that Beijing’s focus is now on building Chinese cen-

tury,” Indian Express, July 7, 2020, https://indianex-

press.com/.

India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

Indo-Pacific Perspective │35

8 Ministry of External Affairs, “External Affairs Min-

ister in Conversation at Raisina Dialogue 2020: The

India Way,” January 16, 2020,

https://www.mea.gov.in/.

9 Ministry of External Affairs, “Geopolitics of Oppor-

tunity: As World Rebalances, How should India Capi-

talise?,” YouTube, July 20, 2020,

https://www.youtube.com/ .

10 Ministry of External Affairs, “External Affairs

Minister's speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lec-

ture, 2019,” November 14, 2019, https://mea.gov.in/.

11 Shashi Tharoor and Samir Saran, “The New

World Disorder and The Indian Imperative - an ex-

tract,” World Economic Forum, January 22, 2020,

https://www.weforum.org/.

12 Shivshankar Menon, “China-US Contention Has

Opened Up Space for Other Powers, Including India,”

The Wire, December 24, 2018, https://thewire.in/.

13 Shinvshankar Menon, “India’s Foreign Affairs

Strategy,” Impact Series, Brookings Institution, May

2020, https://www.brookings.edu/.

14 Arzan Tarapore, “India does not need a Cold War

alliance,” East Asia Forum, July 27, 2020,

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/.

15 Ministry of External Affairs, “EAM's interaction at

USIBC India Idea Summit,” July 22, 2020,

https://www.mea.gov.in/.

16 C. Raja Mohan, “Confusion reigns on what the

Quad is and its future in India’s international

relations,” Indian Express, October 6, 2020,

https://indianexpress.com/.

17 Suhashini Haidar, “More ups than down, and

many surprise turns in Trump’s foreign policy for In-

dia,” The Hindu, November 1, 2020, https://www.the-

hindu.com/.

18 Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific:

New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity,” Carnegie Work-

ing Paper, June 2020, https://carnegieendow-

ment.org/.

19 Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “More and more coun-

tries now share India’s vision for the region,” Indian

Express, November 7, 2020, https://indianex-

press.com/.

20 Pradeep S. Mehta and Amol Kulkarni, “Why India

Shouldn’t View its Refusal to Join RCEP as a Vic-

tory,” The Wire, November 6, 2019,

https://thewire.in/.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA

are those of the authors and should not be construed

as carrying the official sanction of the Department of

Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com-

mand, Air University, or other agencies or depart-

ments of the US government or their international

equivalents.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 36

Challenges in

Institutionalizing

Rules-based

Order in the Indo-

Pacific

Defending or Reordering

the Status Quo

Dr. Ngaibiakching

he rules-based international

order led by the West is under-

going a crisis, with post-World

War II (“liberal international”) in-

stitutions seeming particularly vul-

nerable to the relative decline of

the United States. Meanwhile, the

tectonic shift of power from the

West to Asia has intensified the ge-

opolitical and strategic relevance of

the Indo-Pacific,

with China’s

challenge to US leadership (along-

side the rise of regional middle

powers) amplifying existing criti-

cisms of the international rules-

based order as inadequate or bi-

ased. Indeed, what is happening in

the Indo-Pacific region can be con-

sidered a microcosm of global poli-

tics, underscoring the need for a re-

inforced yet reshaped rules-based

order.

The Importance of Rules in

the Indo-Pacific

Rules-based order is a “system”—

the basic principles and standards

of conduct in a “society of states”

where members share a “sense of

common interest,” rules and insti-

tutions, and seek to facilitate these

rules effectively in the form of in-

ternational organizations, treaties,

and law.

In other words, rules-

based order is a shared commit-

ment by states based on consensus.

The rules-based international or-

der formulated under the United

Nations and the Bretton Woods in-

stitutions seven decades ago

brought much prosperity and or-

der. In Asia, the West assumed

that as China opened up to the

world, it would slowly embrace lib-

eral and democratic values. How-

ever, this turned out not to be the

case: China has kept its core

Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │37

traditional values intact despite

embracing capitalism, and now

represents a challenge to America’s

vision of regional and global order.

Dissensus seems to have replaced

consensus: China’s exponential

rise, a growing US-China rivalry,

widespread unwillingness or ina-

bility to enforce rules, the waning

of US leadership - all these factors

and more have the rules-based or-

der to the test. In such a volatile

environment, sustaining a rules-

based Indo-Pacific has become crit-

ical to attaining a rules-based glob-

ally.

Paradoxically, the United States -

the key proponent of rules-based

order—retreated from multilater-

alism under the Trump admin-

istration,

leaving regional part-

ners on tenterhooks. Meanwhile,

the Chinese Communist Party un-

der President Xi Jinping became

more nationalistic, assertive, and

expansionist. The signal that

China sends out concerning power

projection is perplexing, at times

displaying “Wolf Warrior diplo-

macy”

while, on other occasions,

appearing to operate within the ex-

isting rules-based order. The result

is that most maritime nations in

the littorals of the Indo-Pacific har-

bor at least some apprehension

about China’s assertiveness.

Malcolm Jorgensen has observed

that, rather than overturning

existing international laws, China

has preferred to “fragment” the

rules, furthering its own “security

and strategic interest” by slicing

out a new “geolegal” space. What is

more, some small states are ready

to concede to China because of the

incentives and inducements that

Beijing provides.

In a similar vein,

Vijay Gokhale opines that China

(perhaps the highest beneficiary of

economic globalization and West-

ern-led multilateral institutions)

need not overthrow the global or-

der when it can simply take over

the order instead.

From this view,

reinventing a new system of order

or rules would not be necessary for

China to serve its self-interest.

Fu Ying has argued, China’s ac-

tions are “complementary to the

existing international system,”

helping to facilitate a “gradual evo-

lution into a fairer and more inclu-

sive structure.”

It is to be ex-

pected, after all, that emerging

powers will seek to attain “greater

voice and weight” within the rules-

based system.

Seen from another lens, however,

China’s ambitions have ideological

underpinnings and are directed to-

ward changing the status quo.

Consider, for example, the estab-

lishment of the Asian Investment

and Infrastructure Bank and the

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

When a country accumulates

Ngaibiakching

Indo-Pacific Perspective │38

enough wealth and influence, it

eventually desires political clout

commensurate with its economic

power. In China’s case, its at-

tempts to expand political and eco-

nomic influence have attracted

criticisms; the BRI faced a back-

lash for “debt-trapping” poorer na-

tions as a new form of colonialism

with exploitative practices, for ex-

ample.

The overall picture is that China

observes the existing rules-based

order where it suits the Chinese

national interest but will seek to

change rules and laws that do not

align with its needs and wants.

There is a risk that smaller states

will accede to China’s revisionism

out of fear of punishment or desire

for material benefits (induce-

ments), which result in a “snow-

ball” effect: Beijing would become

emboldened, its ambitions to alter

the status quo might expand, and

other states would be put in the po-

sition of choosing whether to vali-

date China’s demands or put up a

costly fight to preserve the existing

order.

Institutionalizing Rules-

Based Order in Indo-Pacific

In the Indo-Pacific megaregion,

charting out rules-based order is a

colossal task. The region is multi-

layered with several major stake-

holders at play, such as ASEAN, at

geographic the core of the Indo-Pa-

cific region; the “Quad” of Aus-

tralia, India, Japan, and the

United States; and regional powers

like South Korea. The viability of

the Free and open Indo-Pacific

(FOIP) strategy in upholding rules-

based order rests on how (or

whether) regional stakeholders

like ASEAN can fully embrace the

FIOP strategy put forward by the

Quad countries.

There is reason

to believe that a broad agreement

can be found, for despite some com-

peting agendas and diversity in

how the “Indo-Pacific” narrative is

being interpreted, all of the afore-

mentioned regional stakeholders

are confronted with the same

China threat and, as such, seem to

be advocating a rules-based order

in response.

In the current international con-

text, the concept of a global

“hegemon” has become anachronis-

tic.

There are several stakehold-

ers and middle powers that now

help to shape international poli-

tics, which is quite unlike the ear-

lier Cold War-era of bipolarity.

Even the concept of the

“Indo-Pacific” is at a nascent stage:

“the litmus test for the Indo-Pacific

[…] is whether it can be institu-

tionalized; that is, whether states

are willing to develop meaningful

institution-building mechanisms

on the basis of Indo-Pacific

Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │39

concept.”

The fact is, there is no monolithic

consensus on the rules-based or-

der; it is entirely subject to inter-

pretation. Rules often work on the

terms and dictates of the majority

and the powerful, given that, at

some point, all great powers flout

the rules whenever such rules do

not align with their interest—

China’s disregard for the United

Nations Convention on the law of

Sea (UNCLOS) ruling in 2016, for

example. If Louis Henkin’s famous

statement is true that “almost all

nations observe almost all princi-

ples of international law and al-

most all of their obligations almost

all of the time,” it is partly because

powerful states that fail to adhere

to rules and obligations are often

successful at justifying their viola-

tions.

If the existing norms are compro-

mised, does rules-based order

mean anything? According to Ian

Hall and Michael Heazle, “the

rules-based order is […] neither

fixed nor uncontested.”

States fol-

low the rules because one way or

another, it benefits them - or, at

least, does not compromise their

interests. Besides, rules create an

“element of stability and predicta-

bility.”

For Ben Scott, “rules mat-

ter even when they are violated.”

Along similar lines, Greg Raymond

maintains that it is an

overstatement to assume that

rules are made purely at the

whims of great powers, as all inter-

national rules need some “consen-

sus and legitimacy.” Even con-

certed attempts by small “like-

minded states” can go a long way

toward achieving reform.

And of

course, great powers face at least

some reputational costs whenever

they flout rules. In sum, rules are

better than no rules despite the

shortcomings of multilateral inter-

national organization.

In the evolving region of the Indo-

Pacific, the need for new rules is

evident in areas such as climate

change, cybersecurity, and non-tra-

ditional security threats such as

terrorism, infectious disease pan-

demics, and more.

Along with the

challenges brought by globaliza-

tion, all countries big and small

face common challenges, which

makes inclusive collaborative ef-

forts necessary. It is an opportune

moment to see the relevance of the

existing rules and then reshape

and reorder those rules to cater to

the current exigencies.

Conclusion

The feasibility of a rules-based or-

der in the Indo-Pacific depends on

the degree to which regional states

can come up with a concerted re-

sponse. Rules and norms are indis-

pensable, as is compliance with

those rules and norms.

Ngaibiakching

Indo-Pacific Perspective │40

Multipolarity with shared commit-

ment to multilateralism has the

potential to make the Indo-Pacific

peaceful, predictable, and rules-ori-

ented. The task of the new US

President Joe Biden is to undo

Trump’s legacy, which undermined

the cause of a rules-based order in

the Indo-Pacific; salvage US lead-

ership and influence; and resusci-

tate multilateralism for the com-

mon good. At the same time, it is

necessary for other powers to en-

gage both the United States and

Notes

1 The Indo-Pacific is a regional construct that in-

cludes Northeast Asia, the South China Sea, and the

extensive sea lines of communication in the Indian

and Pacific Oceans. The geographical realm of Indo-

Pacific region represents over 50 percent of global

GDP and population.

2 Stewart Patrick, “World Order: What, Exactly, are

the Rules?” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 1

(2016): 7–27.

3 Tarik Oğuzlu, “Understanding China’s Challenge

to the International Order,” Daily Sabah, 23 July

2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/.

4 Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “More and more countries

now share India’s vision for the region,” Indian Ex-

press, 7 November 2020, https://indianexpress.com/.

5 Trump has an apparent aversion to and disdain for

the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and

NATO. He withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord

the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Iran Nuclear

Deal. See: Alex Pascal, “Against Washington’s ‘Great

Power’ Obsession,” 23 September 2019,

https://www.theatlantic.com/.

6 Zhiqun Zhu, “Interpreting China’s ‘Wolf-Warrior

Diplomacy’,” The Diplomat, 15 May 2020, https://the-

diplomat.com/.

7 Malcolm Jorgensen, “International law cannot save

the rules-based order,” Lowy Institute, 18 December

2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.

China to prevent the Indo-Pacific

region from becoming a theater of

the “new cold war,” and to ensure

that freedom and openness across

the region are enough to abate the

risk of coercion and instability. ■

Dr. Ngaibiakching

Dr. Ngaibiakching is a researcher

in Indo-Pacific Studies at Jawa-

haral Nehru University.

8 Vijay Gokhale, “China Doesn’t Want a New World

Order. It Wants This One,” New York Times, 4 June

2020, https://www.nytimes.com/.

9 Greg Raymond, Hitoshi Nasu, See Seng Tan, and

Rob McLaughlin, “Prospects for the Rules-Based

Global Order,” ANU College of Asia & the Pacific,

June 2017, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/.

10 Fu Ying, “Is China’s Choice to Submit to the U.S.

or Challenge It?” Huffington Post, 26 May 2015,

https://www.huffpost.com/.

11 Patrick, “World Order.”

12 Caitlin Byrne, “Securing the ‘Rules-Based Order’

in the Indo-Pacific,” Security Challenges 16, no. 3

(2020): 10–15.

13 Ryosuke Hanada, “ASEAN’s Role in the Indo-Pa-

cific: Rules-Based Order and Regional Integrity” in

Mind the Gap: National Views of the Free and Open

Indo-Pacific, ed. Sharon Sterling, (Washington, DC:

German Marshall Fund of the United States Report,

2019): 7–12.

14 Maja Groff and Joris Larik, “Strengthening the

Rules-Based Global Order: The Case for an Interna-

tional Rule of Law Package,” Stimson Center, Sep-

tember 2020, https://www.stimson.org/.

15 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “The Institutionaliza-

tion of the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96, no.

1 (2020): 149–68.

16 Patrick, “World Order.”

17 Ian Hall and Michael Heazle, “The Rules-Based

Order in the Indo-Pacific: Opportunities and

Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │41

Challenges for Australia, India and Japan,” Griffith

Asia Institute, Regional Outlook Paper No. 50 (2017),

https://www.griffith.edu.au/ .

18 Hall and Heazle, “The Rules-Based Order in the

Indo-Pacific.”

19 Raymond, Nasu, Tan, and McLaughlin, “Prospects

for the Rules-Based Global Order.”

20 Byrne, “Securing the ‘Rules-Based Order’ in the

Indo-Pacific.”

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA

are those of the authors and should not be construed

as carrying the official sanction of the Department of

Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com-

mand, Air University, or other agencies or depart-

ments of the US government or their international

equivalents.

Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 42

A Rules-based

Order in the

Indo-Pacific

A View from Jakarta

Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar

n In recent years, there has been

a lot of talk about the importance

of ensuring a rules-based inter-

national order in the Indo-Pacific re-

gion. The increasing use of the “Indo-

Pacific” terminology to replace the

more familiar “Asia-Pacific” has been

promoted by the United States, Japan,

India, Australia, and Indonesia among

others in recognition of the integration

of the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a

single geostrategic theater and the

growing importance of the maritime

domain. Various initiatives proposed

by different countries to promote a co-

operative framework in the Indo-Pa-

cific, such as a “Free and Open Indo-

Pacific” (FOIP) by Japan and the

United States and the “ASEAN Out-

look on the Indo-Pacific” by the Associ-

ation of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN), each stress the importance

of adherence to international laws and

a rules-based international order. On

the one hand, this emphasis on a

rules-based international order could

be seen as nothing out of the ordinary,

since naturally all regional and inter-

national initiatives would and should

be based on commonly accepted inter-

national conventions and laws that

regulate international relations. On

the other hand, however, it also re-

flects the growing concerns that a

rules-based international order in the

Indo-Pacific is being threatened by

certain events and actions.

The current rules-based interna-

tional order is understood as a

broad architecture of global gov-

ernance which has developed since

the end of World War II.

This

rules-based international order is

centered on multilateral organiza-

tions, with the United Nations

(UN) as its primary custodian; a

set of universal norms, values and

principles; and international laws

all designed to maintain interna-

tional peace, prevent conflicts, and

promote common prosperity. In an

inherently anarchical international

A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │43

system where nation-states tend to

maximize their respective power

and compete with each other to

gain relative advantage, a rules-

based international order is aimed

at constraining power and curbing

the illegitimate use of power. The

UN Security Council has the ulti-

mate, and in the eyes of most

states, the only legitimate author-

ity to enforce compliance to the

rules-based international order by

punishing violations of the princi-

ples of the UN Charter and other

international laws. As a comple-

ment to the UN system, regional

organizations have played im-

portant roles in acting as early

warning systems, and in promoting

regional cooperation that help

maintain peace and stability in

their immediate neighborhoods.

It must be admitted that a rules-

based international order has re-

mained more of an aspiration than

a reality. Since the establishment

of the UN in 1948, world politics

was first dominated by the Cold

War between two opposing ideolog-

ical blocs led by the United States

and the Soviet Union respectively

(1948-1990), while in the post-Cold

War period there has been a prolif-

eration of interstate and intrastate

conflicts. Great power competition

has made a rules-based interna-

tional order difficult to achieve, as

adherence to international laws

has often been subjected to the

vested interests and military might

of major powers. In Southeast

Asia, international laws could not

protect the sovereignty and territo-

rial integrity of regional states, as

major powers used the former as

proxies in the Cold War. At the

multilateral level, the interna-

tional community has often found

it difficult to take collective actions

to maintain a rules-based interna-

tional order as the veto-wielding

powers on the UN Security Coun-

cil, particularly the United States

on the one hand, and China and

Russia on the other, have taken op-

posite positions in dealing with in-

ternational crises and supported

different sides in conflicts. Moreo-

ver, unilateral actions carried out

by major powers also often under-

mine the multilateral system un-

derpinning the rules-based inter-

national order.

The Indo-Pacific is a vast and di-

verse region with many security

flash points, such as the India-

China border dispute, the India-

Pakistan conflict over Kashmir,

North Korea’s nuclear threat, the

Taiwan issue, and the East China

Sea and South China Sea territo-

rial disputes. At the same time,

there are also myriad nontradi-

tional threats to security such as

transnational crimes carried out by

nonstate actors including

Anwar

Indo-Pacific Perspective │44

terrorism, people-smuggling, drug-

trafficking, and illegal fishing. De-

spite all these traditional and non-

traditional security threats, how-

ever, a rules-based international

order has overall prevailed in the

Indo-Pacific region. This region has

become a dynamic center of eco-

nomic growth, made possible by

the existence of relative regional

peace and stability which has ena-

bled countries to devote their

scarce resources to more produc-

tive uses and to engage in interna-

tional trade, investment, tourism

and other economic activities. The

relations between peace and devel-

opment are shown to be inextrica-

bly linked. In East Asia since the

1979, there have been significant

reductions in deaths from inter-

state conflicts as countries priori-

tized economic development as the

primary strategy for achieving

their national objectives, resulting

in the so-called “developmental

peace.”

While many intractable disputes

remain unresolved, regional states

have for the most part acted with

restraint to prevent open conflicts

and respect international laws,

while devoting their energies to

pursue economic development and

improve the welfare of their citi-

zens. ASEAN has succeeded in de-

veloping norms, values, principles,

and promoting ever widening and

deepening regional cooperation

that has transformed the formerly

conflict-ridden Southeast Asian re-

gion into a security community

where wars between the member

states are becoming unthinkable.

The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast

Asia has played an important role

as a regional code conduct which

stresses the importance of adher-

ence to international laws, peaceful

settlements of disputes, and the re-

jection of the use or threat of use of

force in resolving conflicts. ASEAN

has also tried to promote the prin-

ciples of the TAC to other countries

and, in fact, made accession to the

TAC as one of the conditions for

the dialogue partners to be ac-

cepted in the ASEAN-driven East

Asia Summit, now comprising the

10 ASEAN member states, Aus-

tralia, China, India, Japan, New

Zealand, South Korea, the United

States, and Russia.

In the past few years, however, the

rules-based international order has

come under greater challenge due

to the intensifying rivalry between

the China and the United Sates -

the ascending and incumbent su-

perpower, respectively - and

China’s increasingly assertive pol-

icy in the East and South China

Seas to enforce its territorial

claims. While the 1982 United Na-

tions Convention on Law of the Sea

A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │45

(UNCLOS) has provided the legal

basis for maritime governance,

particularly the extent of waters

and continental shelves that come

under the sovereignty and jurisdic-

tion of littoral states, it has also

engendered new disputes due to

overlapping claims between coun-

tries separated by narrow seas.

Several ASEAN countries have not

fully demarcated their maritime

boundaries, but they accept the

1982 UNCLOS without reserve,

carrying out drawn-out bilateral

negotiations to achieve mutually

satisfactory agreements, and in

certain cases submitting their dis-

putes to the International Court of

Justice (ICJ) and accepting the

Court’s decisions. For instance,

Malaysia accepted the ICJ’s deci-

sion to award the disputed island

Pedra Blanca to Singapore in 2008,

while Indonesia accepted the ICJ’s

ruling which favored Malaysia over

the disputed islands Sipadan and

Ligitan in 2002.

Based on UNCLOS, the Spratly Is-

lands in the South China Sea are

claimed in parts by four ASEAN

countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the

Philippines, and Vietnam) whose

claims do not overlap, and by Tai-

wan. China, on the other hand,

claims the entirety of the South

China Sea, based on historical and

traditional rights not recognized by

UNCLOS, which has become the

major focus of contention in the

area. Although Indonesia is not a

claimant in the Spratlys, China’s

so-called “nine-dash line” impinges

on Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic

Zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna

Sea. While relations between

China and ASEAN countries have

become increasingly close, and

both sides try to manage conflicts

in the South China Sea through

the nonbinding 2002 Declaration of

the Conduct of Parties in the South

China Sea (DOC) and are currently

negotiating a binding Code of Con-

duct (COC), China has reclaimed

and militarized islands while its

navy and coast guards enforce

China’s claims through displays of

force. China has also refused to

recognize the Permanent Court of

Arbitration (PCA) ruling of 2016

which affirmed the Philippines

rights to its claims in the Spratlys

based on the 1982 UNCLOS. Alt-

hough it has ratified the 1982 UN-

CLOS, China clearly does not feel

bound by it in pursuing its claim in

the South China Sea, while its

growing economic and military

prowess has given China the confi-

dence to flout the UNCLOS openly.

The United States, while it still

has not ratified the 1982 UNCLOS,

has played a leading role in pro-

moting the concept of a rules-based

international order in the Indo-Pa-

cific, joining others in adopting the

Anwar

Indo-Pacific Perspective │46

language of a FOIP strategy, such

as that proposed by President

Trump in 2017. The United States

is particularly concerned about dis-

ruptions to the freedom of naviga-

tions and overflights in the dis-

puted areas in the East and South

China Seas due to China’s military

actions. Under the Trump admin-

istration, the United States in-

creased the frequency of Freedom

of Navigation Operations (FONOP)

in the South China Sea and revi-

talized the Quadrilateral Security

Dialogue (the Quad) between the

United States, Japan, India, and

Australia as a deterrent to China’s

military actions. China undoubt-

edly regards the emphasis on a

rules-based international order

propounded by the United States

and the other Quad members as a

strategy to contain China, thus

perceiving this concept to be exclu-

sive rather than inclusive.

Southeast Asia as the frontline in

the US-China rivalry has no desire

to see the region being forced to

take side and divided again as had

happened during the Cold War.

Both China and the United States

are important partners of ASEAN

and its member states. While most

tacitly accept that the US initia-

tives in promoting a rules-based

order in the Indo-Pacific can play

an important role in deterring

China’s hegemonic ambitions in

the region, Southeast Asian coun-

tries do not wish to see the rivalry

between the existing superpowers

escalate and destabilize the region

as a whole, which could disrupt the

peace, stability and economic de-

velopment that the ASEAN region

has enjoyed. ASEAN has played an

important role as the primary re-

gional convenor in bringing to-

gether all the main stakeholders in

the Indo-Pacific region into

ASEAN-led regional mechanisms

such as the ASEAN Regional Fo-

rum (ARF) and the EAS. In 2019,

ASEAN launched the ASEAN Out-

look on the Indo-Pacific, which em-

phasized openness, transparency,

inclusiveness, and adherence to in-

ternational laws, including the UN

Charter and the UNCLOS, and the

principle of ASEAN centrality.

Faced with increasing major power

competitions, ASEAN has tried to

put itself as a bridge to promote di-

alogues and cooperation within an

inclusive regional architecture to

build trust, foster preventive diplo-

macy, and resolve conflicts through

peaceful means, that in turn may

contribute to a more inclusive

rules-based order in the Indo-Pa-

cific region. ■

Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Dr. Anwar is a research professor

at the Indonesian Institute of Sci-

ences.

A Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │47

Notes

Ben Scott, Madeleine Nyst, Sam Roggeven, Aus-

tralia’s Security and The Rules-Based Order. Track-

ing a Decade of Policy Institution, https://interac-

tives.lowyinstitute.org/.

Stein Tønnesson, “Explaining East Asia’s Develop-

mental Peace: The Dividends of Economic Growth”,

Global Asia 10, no. 4 (December 2015),

https://www.globalasia.org/.

Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng, The ASEAN

Miracle. A Catalyst for Peace (Singapore: NUS Press,

2017).

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the ASEAN

Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96,

no. 1 (2020): 111–29.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA

are those of the authors and should not be construed

as carrying the official sanction of the Department of

Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com-

mand, Air University, or other agencies or depart-

ments of the US government or their international

equivalents.

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Call for Articles and Manuscripts

Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2)

Air University Press is soliciting manuscripts, journal articles,

and short papers that focus on Joint All Domain Operations

(JADO—see LeMay Doctrine Note 1-20). More specically,

Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2), is dened as

“The art and science of decision making to rapidly translate

decisions into action, leveraging capabilities across all

domains and with mission partners to achieve operational

and information advantage in both competition and conict.”

Products could be historical case studies, lessons learned

from ongoing initiatives, or suggestions for future constructs.

Length may vary from journal articles (typically under

15,000 words), papers (15,000-75,000 words), or full-length

book manuscripts (over 75,000 words). Submit works to the

Director of Air University Press. Digital submissions and

inquiries are also welcome through our organizational email

at AirUniversityPress@au.af.edu.

Indo-Pacific Perspectives series

The Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs' Indo-Pacific

Perspectives series, edited by Dr. Peter Harris, brings to

publication roundtable discussions offering answers to

complex geopolitical (and “geolegal”) questions. As the

name suggests, this new series will showcase viewpoints

from across the Indo-Pacific megaregion (and sometimes

beyond). The goal is to facilitate a dialogue between

academicians and policy practitioners that will be of great

interest to readers, policy makers, and decision makers.

University Press