Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 36

Challenges in

Institutionalizing

Rules-based

Order in the Indo-

Pacific

Defending or Reordering

the Status Quo

Dr. Ngaibiakching

he rules-based international

order led by the West is under-

going a crisis, with post-World

War II (“liberal international”) in-

stitutions seeming particularly vul-

nerable to the relative decline of

the United States. Meanwhile, the

tectonic shift of power from the

West to Asia has intensified the ge-

opolitical and strategic relevance of

the Indo-Pacific,

with China’s

challenge to US leadership (along-

side the rise of regional middle

powers) amplifying existing criti-

cisms of the international rules-

based order as inadequate or bi-

ased. Indeed, what is happening in

the Indo-Pacific region can be con-

sidered a microcosm of global poli-

tics, underscoring the need for a re-

inforced yet reshaped rules-based

order.

The Importance of Rules in

the Indo-Pacific

Rules-based order is a “system”—

the basic principles and standards

of conduct in a “society of states”

where members share a “sense of

common interest,” rules and insti-

tutions, and seek to facilitate these

rules effectively in the form of in-

ternational organizations, treaties,

and law.

In other words, rules-

based order is a shared commit-

ment by states based on consensus.

The rules-based international or-

der formulated under the United

Nations and the Bretton Woods in-

stitutions seven decades ago

brought much prosperity and or-

der. In Asia, the West assumed

that as China opened up to the

world, it would slowly embrace lib-

eral and democratic values. How-

ever, this turned out not to be the

case: China has kept its core

Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │37

traditional values intact despite

embracing capitalism, and now

represents a challenge to America’s

vision of regional and global order.

Dissensus seems to have replaced

consensus: China’s exponential

rise, a growing US-China rivalry,

widespread unwillingness or ina-

bility to enforce rules, the waning

of US leadership - all these factors

and more have the rules-based or-

der to the test. In such a volatile

environment, sustaining a rules-

based Indo-Pacific has become crit-

ical to attaining a rules-based glob-

ally.

Paradoxically, the United States -

the key proponent of rules-based

order—retreated from multilater-

alism under the Trump admin-

istration,

leaving regional part-

ners on tenterhooks. Meanwhile,

the Chinese Communist Party un-

der President Xi Jinping became

more nationalistic, assertive, and

expansionist. The signal that

China sends out concerning power

projection is perplexing, at times

displaying “Wolf Warrior diplo-

macy”

while, on other occasions,

appearing to operate within the ex-

isting rules-based order. The result

is that most maritime nations in

the littorals of the Indo-Pacific har-

bor at least some apprehension

about China’s assertiveness.

Malcolm Jorgensen has observed

that, rather than overturning

existing international laws, China

has preferred to “fragment” the

rules, furthering its own “security

and strategic interest” by slicing

out a new “geolegal” space. What is

more, some small states are ready

to concede to China because of the

incentives and inducements that

Beijing provides.

In a similar vein,

Vijay Gokhale opines that China

(perhaps the highest beneficiary of

economic globalization and West-

ern-led multilateral institutions)

need not overthrow the global or-

der when it can simply take over

the order instead.

From this view,

reinventing a new system of order

or rules would not be necessary for

China to serve its self-interest.

Fu Ying has argued, China’s ac-

tions are “complementary to the

existing international system,”

helping to facilitate a “gradual evo-

lution into a fairer and more inclu-

sive structure.”

It is to be ex-

pected, after all, that emerging

powers will seek to attain “greater

voice and weight” within the rules-

based system.

Seen from another lens, however,

China’s ambitions have ideological

underpinnings and are directed to-

ward changing the status quo.

Consider, for example, the estab-

lishment of the Asian Investment

and Infrastructure Bank and the

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

When a country accumulates

Ngaibiakching

Indo-Pacific Perspective │38

enough wealth and influence, it

eventually desires political clout

commensurate with its economic

power. In China’s case, its at-

tempts to expand political and eco-

nomic influence have attracted

criticisms; the BRI faced a back-

lash for “debt-trapping” poorer na-

tions as a new form of colonialism

with exploitative practices, for ex-

ample.

The overall picture is that China

observes the existing rules-based

order where it suits the Chinese

national interest but will seek to

change rules and laws that do not

align with its needs and wants.

There is a risk that smaller states

will accede to China’s revisionism

out of fear of punishment or desire

for material benefits (induce-

ments), which result in a “snow-

ball” effect: Beijing would become

emboldened, its ambitions to alter

the status quo might expand, and

other states would be put in the po-

sition of choosing whether to vali-

date China’s demands or put up a

costly fight to preserve the existing

order.

Institutionalizing Rules-

Based Order in Indo-Pacific

In the Indo-Pacific megaregion,

charting out rules-based order is a

colossal task. The region is multi-

layered with several major stake-

holders at play, such as ASEAN, at

geographic the core of the Indo-Pa-

cific region; the “Quad” of Aus-

tralia, India, Japan, and the

United States; and regional powers

like South Korea. The viability of

the Free and open Indo-Pacific

(FOIP) strategy in upholding rules-

based order rests on how (or

whether) regional stakeholders

like ASEAN can fully embrace the

FIOP strategy put forward by the

Quad countries.

There is reason

to believe that a broad agreement

can be found, for despite some com-

peting agendas and diversity in

how the “Indo-Pacific” narrative is

being interpreted, all of the afore-

mentioned regional stakeholders

are confronted with the same

China threat and, as such, seem to

be advocating a rules-based order

in response.

In the current international con-

text, the concept of a global

“hegemon” has become anachronis-

tic.

There are several stakehold-

ers and middle powers that now

help to shape international poli-

tics, which is quite unlike the ear-

lier Cold War-era of bipolarity.

Even the concept of the

“Indo-Pacific” is at a nascent stage:

“the litmus test for the Indo-Pacific

[…] is whether it can be institu-

tionalized; that is, whether states

are willing to develop meaningful

institution-building mechanisms

on the basis of Indo-Pacific

Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │39

concept.”

The fact is, there is no monolithic

consensus on the rules-based or-

der; it is entirely subject to inter-

pretation. Rules often work on the

terms and dictates of the majority

and the powerful, given that, at

some point, all great powers flout

the rules whenever such rules do

not align with their interest—

China’s disregard for the United

Nations Convention on the law of

Sea (UNCLOS) ruling in 2016, for

example. If Louis Henkin’s famous

statement is true that “almost all

nations observe almost all princi-

ples of international law and al-

most all of their obligations almost

all of the time,” it is partly because

powerful states that fail to adhere

to rules and obligations are often

successful at justifying their viola-

tions.

If the existing norms are compro-

mised, does rules-based order

mean anything? According to Ian

Hall and Michael Heazle, “the

rules-based order is […] neither

fixed nor uncontested.”

States fol-

low the rules because one way or

another, it benefits them - or, at

least, does not compromise their

interests. Besides, rules create an

“element of stability and predicta-

bility.”

For Ben Scott, “rules mat-

ter even when they are violated.”

Along similar lines, Greg Raymond

maintains that it is an

overstatement to assume that

rules are made purely at the

whims of great powers, as all inter-

national rules need some “consen-

sus and legitimacy.” Even con-

certed attempts by small “like-

minded states” can go a long way

toward achieving reform.

And of

course, great powers face at least

some reputational costs whenever

they flout rules. In sum, rules are

better than no rules despite the

shortcomings of multilateral inter-

national organization.

In the evolving region of the Indo-

Pacific, the need for new rules is

evident in areas such as climate

change, cybersecurity, and non-tra-

ditional security threats such as

terrorism, infectious disease pan-

demics, and more.

Along with the

challenges brought by globaliza-

tion, all countries big and small

face common challenges, which

makes inclusive collaborative ef-

forts necessary. It is an opportune

moment to see the relevance of the

existing rules and then reshape

and reorder those rules to cater to

the current exigencies.

Conclusion

The feasibility of a rules-based or-

der in the Indo-Pacific depends on

the degree to which regional states

can come up with a concerted re-

sponse. Rules and norms are indis-

pensable, as is compliance with

those rules and norms.

Ngaibiakching

Indo-Pacific Perspective │40

Multipolarity with shared commit-

ment to multilateralism has the

potential to make the Indo-Pacific

peaceful, predictable, and rules-ori-

ented. The task of the new US

President Joe Biden is to undo

Trump’s legacy, which undermined

the cause of a rules-based order in

the Indo-Pacific; salvage US lead-

ership and influence; and resusci-

tate multilateralism for the com-

mon good. At the same time, it is

necessary for other powers to en-

gage both the United States and

Notes

1 The Indo-Pacific is a regional construct that in-

cludes Northeast Asia, the South China Sea, and the

extensive sea lines of communication in the Indian

and Pacific Oceans. The geographical realm of Indo-

Pacific region represents over 50 percent of global

GDP and population.

2 Stewart Patrick, “World Order: What, Exactly, are

the Rules?” The Washington Quarterly 39, no. 1

(2016): 7–27.

3 Tarik Oğuzlu, “Understanding China’s Challenge

to the International Order,” Daily Sabah, 23 July

2019, https://www.dailysabah.com/.

4 Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “More and more countries

now share India’s vision for the region,” Indian Ex-

press, 7 November 2020, https://indianexpress.com/.

5 Trump has an apparent aversion to and disdain for

the United Nations, World Trade Organization, and

NATO. He withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord

the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Iran Nuclear

Deal. See: Alex Pascal, “Against Washington’s ‘Great

Power’ Obsession,” 23 September 2019,

https://www.theatlantic.com/.

6 Zhiqun Zhu, “Interpreting China’s ‘Wolf-Warrior

Diplomacy’,” The Diplomat, 15 May 2020, https://the-

diplomat.com/.

7 Malcolm Jorgensen, “International law cannot save

the rules-based order,” Lowy Institute, 18 December

2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.

China to prevent the Indo-Pacific

region from becoming a theater of

the “new cold war,” and to ensure

that freedom and openness across

the region are enough to abate the

risk of coercion and instability. ■

Dr. Ngaibiakching

Dr. Ngaibiakching is a researcher

in Indo-Pacific Studies at Jawa-

haral Nehru University.

8 Vijay Gokhale, “China Doesn’t Want a New World

Order. It Wants This One,” New York Times, 4 June

2020, https://www.nytimes.com/.

9 Greg Raymond, Hitoshi Nasu, See Seng Tan, and

Rob McLaughlin, “Prospects for the Rules-Based

Global Order,” ANU College of Asia & the Pacific,

June 2017, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/.

10 Fu Ying, “Is China’s Choice to Submit to the U.S.

or Challenge It?” Huffington Post, 26 May 2015,

https://www.huffpost.com/.

11 Patrick, “World Order.”

12 Caitlin Byrne, “Securing the ‘Rules-Based Order’

in the Indo-Pacific,” Security Challenges 16, no. 3

(2020): 10–15.

13 Ryosuke Hanada, “ASEAN’s Role in the Indo-Pa-

cific: Rules-Based Order and Regional Integrity” in

Mind the Gap: National Views of the Free and Open

Indo-Pacific, ed. Sharon Sterling, (Washington, DC:

German Marshall Fund of the United States Report,

2019): 7–12.

14 Maja Groff and Joris Larik, “Strengthening the

Rules-Based Global Order: The Case for an Interna-

tional Rule of Law Package,” Stimson Center, Sep-

tember 2020, https://www.stimson.org/.

15 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “The Institutionaliza-

tion of the Indo-Pacific,” International Affairs 96, no.

1 (2020): 149–68.

16 Patrick, “World Order.”

17 Ian Hall and Michael Heazle, “The Rules-Based

Order in the Indo-Pacific: Opportunities and

Challenges in Institutionalizing Rules-based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific Perspective │41

Challenges for Australia, India and Japan,” Griffith

Asia Institute, Regional Outlook Paper No. 50 (2017),

https://www.griffith.edu.au/ .

18 Hall and Heazle, “The Rules-Based Order in the

Indo-Pacific.”

19 Raymond, Nasu, Tan, and McLaughlin, “Prospects

for the Rules-Based Global Order.”

20 Byrne, “Securing the ‘Rules-Based Order’ in the

Indo-Pacific.”

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA

are those of the authors and should not be construed

as carrying the official sanction of the Department of

Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com-

mand, Air University, or other agencies or depart-

ments of the US government or their international

equivalents.