The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure: Why Warning Was Not Enough by Erik J. Dahl. Georgetown University Press, 2023, 232 pp.
A timely analysis of one of the more impactful global events of the modern era, The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure retells the evolution of the pandemic through the lens of global intelligence activities and the corresponding response. An associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Erik Dahl outlines noteworthy shortfalls in the global early response to the COVID-19 pandemic, at times drawing painful parallels between this pandemic and failures in other recent global health events, including severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Ebola, the Zika virus, and swine flu.
It is said that wisdom comes with time, and it would be reasonable to wonder if a book written so soon after the pandemic—at a time when COVID-19 response operations were still underway in some areas—could provide the kind of analysis that will be relevant for future intelligence and health leaders. But Dahl does just that in a manner that is specific yet concise and readable, with extensive chapter notes worth paying attention to.
It is also reasonable to ask why a book on a public health challenge has been written by a professor of national security. Dahl demonstrates the compelling link between health security and traditional national security concerns and the role the US intelligence community and its global partners played in the early risk assessment, communication, and mitigation efforts surrounding COVID-19. Dahl analyzes a series of failures partly related to the early detection of the virus’ threat but more so involving the communication of the nature of the threat and mitigation strategies to political leaders and the public. With a background grounded squarely in the traditional intelligence sphere, Dahl offers a perspective seemingly removed from the traditional public health system. Yet he quickly establishes the necessity of strong cooperation between the public health sector and the intelligence community in order to provide support at the depth, quality—and perhaps above all—pace that an emerging threat requires and that political leaders, and ultimately the public, expect.
The book describes two elements which must work in harmony to ensure a robust all-hazards response capability: an intelligence community capable of conducting a real-time adaptive assessment of nontraditional threats and political leadership which is receptive to those assessments and prepared to act. Considering heightened political tension in many corners of the world, the book acknowledges the role politics play in both intelligence operations and for the decisionmakers that such intelligence supports; however, the book artfully avoids proverbial finger pointing. It instead focuses on systemic intelligence capabilities with concrete strategies to ensure the lessons failed to learn from previous global health threats drive improvements in capability with an all-hazards mindset.
In outlining the emergence of the pandemic, The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure considers the discrete operations in fields such as global health monitoring, force protection, continuity of operations, interagency and international intelligence collaboration, political engagement, and public information. While COVID-19 may be the most high-profile global health threat to date, it is only the latest in a long string of threats, with undoubtedly more global infectious diseases to follow. As Dahl demonstrates through his analysis of the challenges posed by the nontraditional nature of the COVID pandemic, US and global intelligence systems must be capable of monitoring for and responding to an ever-widening range of threats.
These challenges are amplified by the operational issues involving the additional players which collectively form “the medical intelligence, surveillance, and warning systems.” Discussions of the uneasy collaboration between the traditional intelligence community and the medical intelligence community are not novel. Yet Dahl has the unique advantage—as well as the burden—of analyzing these challenges at a time when the United States looks not only to past threats but also at present divisive questions related to modern technology and its implications for surveillance of health threats, among other new threats. Such questions delve into the balance between liberty and security. For instance, what are the ramifications of artificial intelligence-assisted contact tracing utilizing smart phone data? How can misinformation and even intentional disinformation be prevented during times of peace and times of crisis?
Leaders in both traditional intelligence settings and a broad range of public health settings will find The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure a powerful guide to reflecting on their own responses to the pandemic and to improving preparedness. Decisionmakers at all levels of government may benefit from the insights offered into the interface between intelligence partners and political leaders. Having operated primarily at the local level during the pandemic, I was struck to find how many of the lessons discussed in a national or international context were relevant to local and state operations.
The United States and the global community will face future emerging infectious diseases as challenging as COVID-19, if not more so. The COVID-19 Intelligence Failure offers the opportunity to reflect on not only how we could have better worked together in the early days of the COVID pandemic, but also how we can further prepare for whatever dynamic threats lie ahead, embracing a true all-hazards mindset.
Major W. J. Cole Ettingoff, USAFA