A World Safe for Commerce: American Foreign Policy from the Revolution to the Rise of China by Dale C. Copeland. Princeton University Press, 2024, 504 pp.
In A World Safe for Commerce, Dale Copeland—professor of international relations at the University of Virginia and the author of multiple publications exploring economics and warfare—endeavors to make his unique contribution to history by developing and applying one systemic theory, dynamic realism, across 250 years of US foreign policy. His theory takes the foundation of systemic realism and applies a dynamic understanding of the commercial realm to emphasize the relevance of a state’s expectations for future trade and investment as the propelling factor for why great powers either enter conflict, resolve conflict, or avoid conflict altogether.
The book unfolds in three parts. Copeland’s first two chapters set the foundation for understanding dynamic realist theory through an assessment of systemic realism, the differentiation of three realms of economic core power spheres, and the importance of character type and culture. Chapters 3 through 9 are empirical and cover multiple cases, demonstrating Copeland’s theory of dynamic realism and the importance of commercial factors in explaining significant shifts for the United States toward conflict or away from it. Herein lies the explanatory power of this book: Copeland’s consistent ability to identify and describe particulars within the economic context and background of great power conflicts by which the reader may find new meaning. The final and concluding chapter analyzes different scenarios of future US-China relations within the lens of dynamic realism to examine whether a better understanding of one another’s expectations of trade and commerce can avoid future conflict.
In the book’s first part, Copeland solidifies that his approach is decidedly externalist, and that systemic realist theory is limited given the divide between offensive and defensive realists. His finding that neither side has placed proper emphasis on economic and commercial factors frames the book’s foundational claim: the reason for great power competition post-1660 is within the commercial realm as opposed to the territorial-military realm. Copeland then recognizes the existing work on economic and commercial power and extends it by differentiating three economic core power spheres: realm one, where a great power engages trade and investment with countries and regions where it holds the clear political and military advantage over other great powers; realm two, where a great power engages trade and investment with neutral states that seek to trade freely with all the great powers; and realm three, where a great power engages trade and investment within realm one of another great power. Viewing the three realms holistically, Copeland asserts that all great powers inevitably seek to extend their economic power spheres out of the first realm and ultimately clash with other great powers in what he labels the trade-security dilemma.
While Copeland’s defense of economic and commercial factors has merit, his review of the existing literature is minimal compared to his outline of his comprehensive distaste of how offensive and defensive realists talk past one another. Additionally, the intersection and description of the three realms of economic spheres within his figures presumes the simplicity of two nations within a bipolar contest. Moreover, while the author greatly explores causal factors and pathways, the distinction of a state’s regime type is again presented in too simplistic a manner through the intersection of rationality and security ends. The four variations presented are rational security maximizer, irrational security maximizer, rational non-security maximizer, and irrational non-security maximizer. Overall, these terms are rarely referenced in the rest of the book for the reader to appreciate fully.
In chapters 3 through 9, Copeland does his best work by inviting the reader to appreciate and consider the factors of commerce and economics as significant contributors to inciting the major conflicts from American independence to the conclusion of the Cold War. For example, Copeland contends in chapter 3 that to understand the source of conflict for American, independence one must look beyond the oft-cited colonial elitism or ideology differences. Instead, one considers dynamic realism’s propelling factor whereby the British felt they had to preserve control over their economic power spheres, while the Americans felt this level of control would lead to the eventual loss of their wealth and power.
Chapters 4 and 5 cover nearly a century of case studies offering indications that whenever the United States felt its commercial access was threatened and their expectations for future trade within their realms one and two endangered, the response was swift, hard line, and commensurate with military power. Of note is the initiation of war against Spain in 1898, where Copeland argues that although the military threat was absent, the economic threat from Europe within US realms one and two was high. Readers who wish to explore rationales for how and when democratic peace theory breaks will find the author’s analysis insightful.
Chapters 6 and 7 highlight the two World Wars, and Copeland again asks the reader to reexamine what they believe are the causal factors for entry. He contends that while ideological goals were of great importance to President Woodrow Wilson, the real reason he entered the United States into the war was the perceived economic impact should Germany win. Copeland asserts that Wilson was primarily concerned with France and Russia suing for peace, which would not only reduce the United States’ ongoing trade in the European realms but also allow the opportunity for Germany to encroach on US realms. Anyone interested in alternative explanations for the United States delayed entry into the great wars will find these chapters worthwhile.
Chapters 8 and 9 cover multiple conflicts post-World War II to the end of the Cold War, and Copeland’s most significant impact is his explanation of why the Cold War finally ended and why it could have ended even earlier. Copeland believes the hostility of the early 1960s occurred primarily because Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy would not allow Russia to trade for higher technology goods. Noteworthy is the author’s fight against the casual link of lack and significance by arguing that the expectation of future trade, not trade in and of itself, had the most significant impact during this period. Furthermore, although positive trade expectations could never fully envelope reasons for the Cold War’s conclusion, Copeland argues that the Cold War wound down only when both sides signaled a willingness to commit to higher trade. Readers interested in understanding how and why a conflict such as the Cold War can seemingly end with a whimper instead of a bang will appreciate this section.
Chapter 10 is Copeland’s final call for the reader to reorient their thinking about state behavior beyond the static, traditional models of realism and toward expectations of future trade and commerce. The author does not believe war with China is inevitable and argues that the United States should view China’s future through his provision of the lessons learned within chapters 3 through 9. Yet Copeland’s hopeful push comes across as overly reliant on the US ability to leverage the international order and seemingly absolves China from its share of responsibility. He presents four main scenarios of China’s future through the intersection of their character type and relative gross domestic product and associates them with a US level of geopolitical concern. The best-case scenario is a China with an inferior relative GDP that is a rational security maximizer, and the worst-case scenario is a China with a superior relative GDP that is a non-rational security maximizer.
Yet while these scenarios are insightful to forecast differentiating pathways toward stability or conflict, it is only at the end of the chapter that Copeland asserts China’s current regime deserves a degree of culpability for which scenario occurs. In this sense, what should be the most impactful and resonant chapter may leave the reader feeling disconnected and unfulfilled.
In sum, chapters 1 and 2 provide the greatest value for those seeking international relations insights, while the historical analysis of chapters 3 through 9 are of greatest impact to the historian. Anyone studying the future of US-China relations will find the main theme of chapter 10 interesting. Readers should note that the author’s aim is not to replace or diminish existing theory but to obtain a robust consideration of the power of economics and trade expectations as the factors that incite conflicts between great powers. Overall, Copeland’s thorough analysis of two-and-a-half centuries of US foreign policy decidedly gets his point across.
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel P. McGuire, USAF