Mankind Beyond Earth: The History, Science, and Future
of Human Space Exploration by Claude A. Piantadosi.
Columbia University Press, 2012, 279 pp.
In Mankind Beyond Earth, Claude A. Piantadosi, MD,
director of the F. G. Hall Environmental Laboratory at Duke University
and 30-year consultant to NASA, examines the plausibility of humankind
living beyond Earth. To that end, Piantadosi states that the purpose
of the book is to establish evidence supporting a return to the moon.
While there is no paucity of literature related to space
exploration’s past and futuristic examinations of life in space,
Piantadosi’s work is one of the first to ground the argument
firmly in an extensive body of scientific evidence. Despite heavy
doses of biology, physics, and chemistry, Piantadosi’s work is
readily accessible to many readers due to his straightforward
explanations.
Given Piantadosi’s overarching thesis that argues for an
American return to the moon, one might surmise that he would take a
purely scientific argumentation. Piantadosi surprises the reader. In
building up to his major proposition, Piantadosi reviews the state of
US space activity and shows that the technological lead the nation
once held is quickly eroding. Moreover, he suggests that
America’s “scientific illiteracy” tends to devalue
science and results in confusion on how to evaluate new science (p.
3). This confusion has led, in his opinion, to the expensive detours
of the 2010 National Space Policy’s asteroid missions (p. 40).
Furthermore, Piantadosi suggests that such shortsightedness may well
lead to the United States relinquishing its lead in the space sector
to the up-and-coming Chinese space program. In fact, he states that if
the nation continues “busily chasing asteroids” and allows
the historical trend of space programs to continue, then China will
likely beat the United States to the moon, where it will develop the
necessary follow-on technologies to voyage to Mars (p. 205).
Still, while there is urgency in Piantadosi’s words, he does
not conflate aimless activity with deliberate, careful planning
designed to further American space power. To wit, he not only cautions
against frivolous space excursions but also warns that attempting to
be the hare in the next space race could prove unbearably expensive.
Instead, the nation must be the tortoise.
Throughout the book, Piantadosi balances between highlighting the
urgency of going to the moon, and eventually Mars, with the reality
that nothing comes easily in space. In fact, much of the book takes
great care in making the case for a return to the moon. Piantadosi
takes the first steps in walking this tightrope in his second chapter,
where he explains the realities of space and travel within the domain.
While he acknowledges the usefulness of futuristic thought, he admits
that there is too much to be accomplished now to spend time dreaming
of what could one day be (p. 44).
Chapters 3 and 4 provide an historical overview of
humankind’s space endeavors and, given the author’s
medical background, the history of the study of physiology in space.
Piantadosi uses these two chapters to build the case as to why the
United States must return to the moon, which he argues in detail in
chapter 5. Importantly, he does more than merely make the case for a
return to the moon; he offers ways to do so with current technology
and lists what would be needed to establish a settlement on the lunar
surface, which he believes is a requirement for follow-on deep-space
exploration.
After offering convincing arguments for returning to the moon,
Piantadosi spends the next five chapters discussing the challenges of
deep-space exploration. Whether discussing cosmic radiation in chapter
9 or the dilemmas of producing sustenance using indigenous resources
in chapters 6 and 7, Piantadosi methodically works towards the
culminating point of the book’s second part, which is chapter
10’s discussion of how humankind will travel to and set foot on
Mars.
Such a discussion on the challenges of interplanetary travel leads
to part 3, where the author argues why the United States
should travel to Mars. Much of the argument hinges on the
fact that few other planets provide hospitable environments in which
explorers could even venture. Indeed, Piantadosi concludes his final
chapter by hearkening back to John von Neumann. He admits that maybe
von Neumann was correct in his assessment that the best humanity could
do to explore outer space was to send robotic probes. To wit, as
humankind learns more about the cosmos, it has discovered the
uniqueness of Earth; while there are many potential planets out there,
so far, few exhibit the qualities of Earth. Many are inhospitable, and
those that may be friendly to humans are sufficiently far away that
even relativistic speeds (fractions of the speed of light) make such
travel essentially improbable due to concerns over resources, genetic
bottlenecking aboard spacecraft, and myriad other reasons. For that
reason, Piantadosi states, “Our own uniqueness and space’s
insuperability are the best incentives we have to take the best
possible care of Spaceship Earth” (p. 250).
Overall, this book provides reasonable arguments for an American
return to the moon and a follow-on mission to Mars. The biggest
critique of the book is the unstated assumption that the United States
will go to Mars. In other words, it appears that Piantadosi takes it
as a foregone conclusion that the United States will attempt to go to
Mars. That is not to say that he builds a straw man argument for
returning to the moon. Indeed, his argument for going to the moon is
compelling based on its merits without the consideration he gives for
subsequent Martian endeavors. Nevertheless, he never fully questions
the aim of a US space program. Such a critique has troubled NASA since
the United States beat the Soviet Union to the moon in 1969. Back
then, national prestige powered our efforts. Today, it seems (and
Piantadosi’s arguments support this supposition), the nation
continues its space program to benefit from the ways that space
science can be used to detect problems on Earth, and the nation goes
for pure research (pp. 5–6). In other words, the United States
continues its largely scientifically focused space program for
science’s sake. Yet as recently as February 2016, Congress
questions the “science for science’s sake”
approach.
To be fair, Piantadosi does touch on other reasons for returning to
the moon. Specifically, he discusses the economic potential of mining
and suggests that economic incentives may be the necessary carrot to
drive the establishment of a moon settlement (p. 102). He is a medical
researcher and not an economist; his argument for bolstering the
American space program may gain more traction when combining
scientific and commercial reasons for a lunar return. If “flag
follows trade,” as many scholars have suggested, then it may be
the merchants who lead the nation to Mars and beyond.
The student of strategy can take away three points from this book.
The first two points deal with preparation. First, as Piantadosi
asserts, space technology requires long lead times. The same might be
said of war-fighting capabilities. The strategist, therefore, must
account for those lead times in crafting strategy. As J.F.C. Fuller
attested, strategy should precede force structure, planning, and
expenditure. Yet, if technology is the long pole in the tent, the
strategist must accord proper consideration to its development during
the formulation of strategy. Second, preparation is also paramount for
the strategist in another fashion. The strategist cannot simply select
the strategic conditions that are just right but must prepare for
those conditions that are wrong (p. 48). Concerning Piantadosi’s
book and this reviewer’s earlier allusion to economic
development being the primary driver of future space power
development, the strategist cannot solely focus on military matters
but must also have a finger on the pulse of the greater environment in
which the military operates. Thus, if space development “takes
off,” then it is reasonable to suggest that the nation will need
to protect its space merchants. When combining this assertion with the
first takeaway highlighting technology’s long lead time, one can
conclude that waiting until the time is right equates to tardiness.
National defense can ill afford sleeping on the watch.
Third, Piantadosi’s final observation may prove the most
relevant for the student of strategy. By reminding the reader that
careful stewardship of our current planet should out-prioritize
seeking other planets, Piantadosi highlights the fact that resources
are neither inexhaustible nor invulnerable. In fact, the National
Security Strategy and the Air Force Strategic Master Plan espouse
these ideas. Accordingly, the strategist should consider new ways of
using the resources one has. One can only build strategy’s
bridge with the materials available. Game-changing technologies like
space-based solar power provide one way that the nation can exploit a
new development. In the same breath, many discuss third offsets and
game-changing weapons. What if a third offset were, instead, a
capability that obviated adversary attempts to influence (such as
petroleum is now) or interfere with (such as they were during
Operation Enduring Freedom) our resources and their concomitant supply
chains? Piantadosi does not discuss such ideas, but his ideas lead to
such extrapolation and discussion. The scientific material found in
Piantadosi’s work will not appeal to every reader, but because
he forces the reader to think critically about the nation’s
space program and because his ideas have basis in strategy writ large,
this book is highly recommended.
Maj Ryan Sanford, USAF