Cold War 2.0: Artificial Intelligence in the New Battle between China, Russia, and America by George S. Takach. Pegasus Books, 2024, 432 pp.
In analyzing the challenges faced by democracies today, George S. Takach’s Cold War 2.0 argues that four key accelerator technologies—artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductor chips, quantum computing, and biotechnology—may very well determine whether democracies or autocracies win the next cold war, which he believes is currently underway. Takach, a Canadian attorney with over 40 years of experience in technology law, contends that innovation through technological advancements allows societies to move forward and establish their global dominance. Democracies led by the United States need to decouple the four modern accelerator technologies from their autocratic competition or they risk facing a new hegemonic order led by China with Russia on its coattails.
Takach begins his 14 chapters with his thoughts on how national powers utilize technology. He then ties this into a historical overview of the Cold War—identified as Cold War 1.0—and finally concludes with his analysis on how Russia failed to innovate and develop technology toward the end of the war, resulting in its dependence on foreign countries for tech components. He specifically points out in later chapters how Russia currently lacks semiconductor chip manufacturing capabilities. This has compelled Russia to find creative ways to bypass sanctions—which it currently accomplishes through the increased import of household appliances, such as washing machines. Russia then salvages the chips from the appliances, and the chips are then utilized in drones throughout Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The book then takes a deep dive into China’s learning from Russia’s past mistakes over the years. China’s technological innovation, though behind most western and neighboring countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, has accelerated its global power. Takach ultimately labels China as the main antagonist in Cold War 2.0.
When discussing China, Takach focuses on its current domestic and international actions as China’s leader Xi Jinping sets his sights on leading the world under China’s rule. Most recently, Xi changed the law to stay in power indefinitely. Takach also shows how Xi’s measures within China seek to control its citizens, demonstrating its return to a closed society focused on the preservation of the Chinese Communist Party. For example, he presents cases on how China utilizes AI for population control through the suppression of free speech. Internet censorship prevents Chinese citizens from searching online for topics that the country deems critical of the communist regime. China has also developed and implemented social credit scores that impact everything from loans to job applications. If a citizen crosses the street outside of the crosswalk or questions the local authorities, surveillance linked with AI automatically reduces a person’s social hierarchy status, which further reduces any of their perceived freedoms. The book also points to the human rights abuses against the Muslim Uyghur minority in Xinjiang, drawing parallels with George Orwell’s disturbing vision of a dystopian future.
Disobeying the law or speaking out against China leads to serious consequences for its citizens as well as for other countries. As Takach points out, the outlook for improving international relationships with China is grim. States critical of China can face repercussions through means of economic coercion, such as the trade war Beijing initiated against Australia when the latter questioned China’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic. While censorship restricts China’s population from questioning its governments actions internally, the great propaganda machine itself retaliates against other countries critical of its policies, wreaking havoc on these countries’ economies. The book provides numerous examples of China’s unfair practices, reinforcing Takach’s argument that a new cold war has already begun as well as raising questions about why more has not been done to counter such efforts.
Cold War 2.0 then examines the semiconductor chip industry and analyzes which countries have manufacturing capabilities, demonstrating how globally interconnected and fragile the industry is. Takach argues that democracies dependent on Taiwan’s technology need to stand up against China. Details on trade deficits between China and Taiwan suggest why China would seek to control it beyond its geopolitical and strategic reasons. In 2022 Taiwan sold $156.5 billion more to China than Taiwan purchased from China, thus representing China’s largest trade deficit. The United States has attempted to slow China’s semiconductor industrial growth and bring more manufacturing stateside.
Such restrictions faced by China are estimated to have put it 10 to 20 years behind the democratic world, thus compelling China to place significant investments in quantum computing. Now being developed, quantum computing offers technology described as being even faster than the world’s most powerful super computers. Used in something such as encryption, it would take hundreds of years before the world’s current machines could crack the code. If China can master this technology, it could essentially take semiconductor chips out of the equation altogether, resulting in its technological world dominance. For China to accomplish this, however, it still needs to advance its semiconductor chip and AI technologies.
Takach’s book makes a strong case for the need to manage the future of AI, semiconductor chips, and quantum computing. A reader with little to no background knowledge on these topics would be informed enough to be concerned of the challenges ahead. Yet the book does not provide equal emphasis on the fourth accelerator technology, the biotech industry. Although Takach presents the challenges to the industry and makes a strong case for why biotechnology is extremely important, details are not as substantive as with the other three technologies.
Another area lacking development is Takach’s discussion of the outcomes of Cold War 2.0, specifically with China. Takach seems to offer only three possible and drastic conclusions: China will start playing by the rules and be on par with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan; democracies decouple their technology from China, and it gets left behind the democratic free world; or China goes to war with its democratic adversaries. While this approach drives home the urgent need for democratic leaders to act now, it also does not consider China’s response. China is an independent nation that has just as much right to its own sovereignty as every other country, and any drastic measures might push China over the edge, possibly starting a war. Yet if such measures are ignored or misinterpreted, China may not see any offramps, which could result in military conflict.
Nevertheless, Cold War 2.0 is a great read, seeking to jumpstart the discussion on how leaders can begin to strategize innovative approaches for handling the challenges of addressing modern autocracies’ influence over AI, semiconductor chips, quantum computing, and biotechnology. Even though Takach acknowledges that any decoupling actions would not be easy and would be met with resistance, all leaders of democracies who want to know how to stay ahead of a peer competitor like China should consider these recommendations. Change in itself is difficult to manage—even more on a global scale. Yet as the leader of the free world, the United States would be wise to engage its Allies and partners to help in countering such threats from its peer competitors.
Lieutenant Colonel Eric S. Haegele, USMCR