Colonel Andrews concentrates on tactical innovation during war. He examines the extent to which USAF doctrine prepared the US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) for its mission against the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). He describes how CENTAF adjusted air operations against Iraq's RGFC in the 1990-91 invasion of Kuwait. CENTAF instituted six significant tactical innovations in one week that required its aviators to create new tactics in the midst of combat operations. Colonel Andrews evaluates those innovations because they enabled CENTAF to satisfy theater objectives. He recommends that the Air Force identify means to measure air operations against land forces during peacetime because the press of war does not provide time for reflection and analysis. [William F. Andrews / 1998 / 144 pages / AU Press Code: CP0002]

Major Carter explores three case studies that have important similarities: the doctrine of Great Britain's Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force's strategy from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force's strategy from 1953 to 1965. He begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. He dissects the relationship between offense and defense to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time. He examines the nature of offense and defense as they apply to airpower and offers reasons military organization may prefer offensive doctrines. Major Carter identifies the elements and implications of the cult of the offensive. [Maj John R. Carter, USAF / 1998 / 125 pages / AU Press Code: P-3]

This work attempts to demonstrate that a profound shift in airpower doctrine has occurred since Desert Storm with the increasing perfection of precision guided munitions. Wills argues that the air component can now be considered supported by the ground component in combat. The consequence of this shift is a requirement for thorough reconsideration of “force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training.” [Lt Col Craig D. Wills, USAF / 2006 / 100 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-161-9 / AU Press Code: P-44]

Colonel Purdham provides a successful evaluation of Michael Howard's construct that current doctrine is probably wrong, but what matters is the capability of the military to get it right when a particular conflict begins. He uses a simple but effective test, an evaluation of important airpower factors to include familiarity with the nature and geography of the conflict; parity with the adversary, especially in terms of air superiority; command and control of air assets, especially in interdiction and close air support missions; and the confluence of airpower weapons with doctrine and training. Colonel Purdham filters these airpower factors through three conflicts of the last half-century—Korean War, Vietnam War, and Operation Desert Storm—looking as much as possible at the early air operational stages of the conflict. Colonel Purdham concludes that Professor Howard's construct has some validity, but the real world offers alternative conclusions. Because of the effectiveness of Desert Storm and the lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Purdham recommends that our air forces go to war well trained in the way they will fight. [Aldon E. Purdham Jr. / 2003 / 100 pages ISBN: 1-58566-123-6 / AU Press Code: P-30]

This paper provides a unique parallel review of the histories of Air Force special operations and combat search and rescue forces. With a thorough understanding of their organizational culture and history, the author examines the 1983-89 merger of these two communities under the banner of the Twenty-third Air Force. The paper demonstrates how ingrained culture and hidden agendas may have ultimately affected the dissolution of the merger. In light of the 2003 merger of combat search and rescue and special operations under the Air Force Special Operations Command, the author offers lessons learned from the Twenty-third Air Force merger and suggests that could help commanders avoid hazards that could undermine organizational success. [Lt Col Ioannis Koskinas, USAF / 2006 / 238 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-159-7 / AU Press Code: P-45]

Major Spacy examines the kinds of weapons that have been proposed for use in space. He compares their capabilities with those of their surface-based counterparts. He addresses two questions: What do space-based weapons have to offer that other forms of military power lack? What are space-based weapons likely to cost both in terms of dollars and in lost opportunities for pursuing other systems? Major Spacy evaluates the theoretical capabilities of orbital weapons and compares them to weapons already in existence and concepts proposed for development. His objective is to provide insight into where future investments should be made if the United States is to protect its increasingly important space-based assets and retain its position as a global leader able to project military power wherever necessary. [William L. Spacy II / 1999 / 130 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-070-1 / AU Press Code: P-10]

Lt Col Downey, USAFR; Wing Cdr Forestier, RAAF; and Lt Col David E. Miller, USAF, advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space and explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space. They point first to the mission enabling advantages of nuclear reactors in space—factors like light weight, high power, long life, and potentially lower costs. They see that nuclear-powered spacecraft would serve long-range NASA missions as well as permit effective hyperspectral satellites that would have profound benefits for the Department of Defense. The limiting factors for nuclear power in space are a compelling mission requirement and broad acceptance in popular support. Many opponents either have general doubts about such an undertaking or perceive cataclysmic dangers. A failure of a space launch carrying nuclear systems would produce something on the order of a “dirty” nuclear bomb. Two things were clear to the authors. One, nuclear space developers must convince the public that they are capable of developing a safe and robust system. Two, because the political battle is primarily over perceived risks rather than empirically based understanding, employment of a values-focused decision strategy is necessary to convince the public and congressional leaders of the feasibility of a space nuclear program. [James R. Downey, Anthony M. Forestier, and David E. Miller / 2005 / 124 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-138-4 / AU Press Code: P-39]

This study investigates Europe's motives to develop the independent satellite navigation system known as Galileo despite the existence of America's successful global positioning system (GPS). It begins by analyzing both systems to familiarize the reader with global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and to provide an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of GPS and Galileo, as well as the systems’ similarities and differences. Although the two systems have different founding principles, they employ similar infrastructures and operational concepts. In the short term, Galileo will provide better accuracy for civilian users until GPS upgrades take effect. But performance is only part of the rationale. The author contends that Europe’s pursuit of Galileo is driven by a combination of reasons, including performance, independence, and economic incentive. With Galileo, Europe hopes to achieve political, security, and technological independence from the United States. Additionally, Europe envisions overcoming the US monopoly on GNSS by seizing a sizable share of the expanding GNSS market and setting a new world standard for satellite navigation. Finally, the author explores Galileo’s impact on the United States and reviews US policy towards Galileo. The paper concludes with recommendations to strengthen the competitiveness of GPS. [Scott W. Beidleman / 2003 / 98 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-149-X / AU Press Code: P-41]

As the United States conducts foreign policy and military operations, it must assess and consider the impact of religion in societies to achieve long-term stability in a region. So say authors Chaplain (Col) William Sean Lee, ARNG; Lt Col Christopher J. Burke, USAF; and Lt Col Zonna M. Crayne, ANG, in proposing that the role of military chaplains be expanded to include what they term "religious liaison," allowing for formal involvement of indigenous religious leaders in stability operations. Rather than avoiding religion in implementing foreign policy, they would allow chaplains to directly interface with indigenous religious leaders to develop dialogue, build relationships, promote goodwill, and create formal inter-religious councils. Lee, Burke, and Crayne recommend changes to doctrine, training, and assignments necessary to facilitate this expanded role. They note commanders often use a military lawyer and intelligence officer when making substantial decisions; chaplains can be just as important to a commander conducting stability operations. This policy implementation would assist the US military in transforming the asymmetric, soft power of indigenous religious influence into a significant source of power for mission accomplishment and enable a greater chance for achieving US foreign policy goals. [William Sean Lee, Christopher J. Burke, and Zonna M. Crayne / 2004 / 41 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-132-5 / AU Press Code: P-36]

Colonel Belote concentrates on the question: What are the qualities necessary for airmen to perform effectively as war-fighting commanders in chief (CINC)? He identifies those necessary qualities of knowledge, insight, and skill through three methods. He reviews theoretical and historical literature on command. He uses the careers of two early theater CINCs—Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Jacob L. Devers—to establish a baseline for analysis. Colonel Belote offers two detailed biographical case studies on Gen Lauris Norstad and Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring. He complements his historical inquiry with findings based on interviews with senior Department of Defense officials coupled to an analysis of the recent literature on joint command. Colonel Belote proposes a creation of a new and intentionally broad-gauged "joint war-fighter" career track. [Howard D. Belote / 2000 / 117 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-082-5 / AU Press Code: P-12]