Black Hats and White Hats This paper provides a unique parallel review of the histories of Air Force special operations and combat search and rescue forces. With a thorough understanding of their organizational culture and history, the author examines the 1983-89 merger of these two communities under the banner of the
Airpower, Afghanistan, and the Future of Warfare: An Alternative View This work attempts to demonstrate that a profound shift in airpower doctrine has occurred since Desert Storm with the increasing perfection of precision guided munitions. Wills argues that the air component can now be considered supported by the ground component in combat. The consequence of this
Time-Critical Targeting Experiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force have highlighted a significant weakness in the US Air Force's ability to engage time-critical targets. Major Marzolf introduces and investigates two methods—reactive and preemptive—and determines how they might solve the problem
What Happened to Battlefield Air Interdiction? Colonel McCaffrey traces air-ground doctrine and operational practices relative to battlefield interdiction from World War I to Operation Desert Storm and suggests at one point that even the flank support for General Patton was, in effect, battlefield air interdiction (BAI). He carries the
America's First Air Battles: Lessons Learned or Lessons Lost? Colonel Purdham provides a successful evaluation of Michael Howard's construct that current doctrine is probably wrong, but what matters is the capability of the military to get it right when a particular conflict begins. He uses a simple but effective test, an evaluation of important airpower
Thinking Effects The authors propose that military actions should be employed through effects-based operations (EBO). The US military is undergoing a transformation to be prepared for operations across the spectrum of engagement. These authors also propose that part of the transformation should deal with how the
The Politics of Coercion Lieutenant Colonel Hinman examines what coercion theory suggests about the use of airpower in the early twenty-first century. Specifically, he seeks to determine whether any of the existing theories of coercion can stand alone as a coherent, substantive, and codified approach to airpower employment.
Turning the Vertical Flank Colonel Givens examines three battles—1973 Yom Kippur War, 1972 Easter offensive, and1944 Normandy campaign—to test the validity of airpower operating as a maneuver force. He avoids wringing the concept through to the Persian Gulf War because of the heated feelings that arose during the
The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat Colonel Zentner addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. He defines aircrew morale and establishes a framework within which aircrew morale can be assessed in three historical case studies of air combat. Colonel Zentner answers
Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles Colonel Clark chronologically traces the evolution of uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) beginning two centuries before the birth of Christ and ending with the USAF abandonment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and UCAVs in the late 1970s. He provides some background information and examines
Once in a Blue Moon Colonel Belote concentrates on the question: What are the qualities necessary for airmen to perform effectively as war-fighting commanders in chief (CINC)? He identifies those necessary qualities of knowledge, insight, and skill through three methods. He reviews theoretical and historical literature
Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? Major Spacy examines the kinds of weapons that have been proposed for use in space. He compares their capabilities with those of their surface-based counterparts. He addresses two questions: What do space-based weapons have to offer that other forms of military power lack? What are space-based
Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle Download Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle[notes][item]Colonel Laughbaum argues that current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient and acceptable guidance for synchronizing Air Force and Army deep operations. He analyzes service and joint doctrine produced since Operation
Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive Major Carter explores three case studies that have important similarities: the doctrine of Great Britain's Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force's strategy from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force's strategy from 1953 to 1965. He begins by establishing the
Airpower Against an Army Colonel Andrews concentrates on tactical innovation during war. He examines the extent to which USAF doctrine prepared the US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) for its mission against the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). He describes how CENTAF adjusted air operations against Iraq's