Colonel Allvin analyzes the theater airlift implications for the United States Army's vision, Army After Next (AAN)—now called the Army Vision: The Transformation of the Army, which is a continuum of the AAN—for land warfare in the twenty-first century. He identifies theater airlift capabilities critical to the AAN concept and examines emerging systems that seem likely to furnish those capabilities. He argues that improvements in cargo-handling, situational awareness, and defensive systems—as well as the ability to operate in austere conditions—constitute the most crucial future requirements for theater airlift. Colonel Allvin concludes that the most promising emerging systems for achieving required theater airlift capabilities include the tilt-wing concept, autonomous cargo-handling systems, and a standoff capability for examining the suitability of opportune landing sites. [David W. Allvin / 2000 / 110 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-084-1 / AU Press Code: P-14]

Colonel Chun undertakes a case study of an experimental US antisatellite defense fielded by the Air Force in the 1960s as a departure for assessing the need for an ASAT system today. The author argues that the US Air Force was able to develop a relatively effective system based on rudimentary technology. Using aging booster rockets (the Thor ICBM) and existing tracking and targeting radar systems, the Air Force was able to intercept satellites. Colonel Chun argues that extrapolating from this historical example several states, particularly North Korea, Iran, India, and the Peoples Republic of China, could use widely available improved missiles and radar systems to develop ASAT weapons that would make critical US and allied space systems (military and commercial) vulnerable to attack, thus seriously undermining our offensive and defensive capabilities and perhaps wreak havoc on our economic system. [Clayton K. S. Chun, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF / 2000 / 98 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-071-X / AU Press Code: P-6]

Colonel Laughbaum argues that current joint doctrine does not provide sufficient and acceptable guidance for synchronizing Air Force and Army deep operations. He analyzes service and joint doctrine produced since Operation Desert Storm and examines the evolution of the fire support coordination line (FSCL). He traces the development of the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine and historical Air Force Perspectives on the deep battle. His investigation of the deep battle during the Persian Gulf War emphasizes targeting and the application of the FSCL. Major Laughbaum provides five recommendations to change joint doctrine so that our services can work together effectively. [R. Kent Laughbaum / 1999 / 92 pages / AU Press Code: P-6]

Colonel Zentner addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. He defines aircrew morale and establishes a framework within which aircrew morale can be assessed in three historical case studies of air combat. Colonel Zentner answers this question: Is it possible to identify those characteristics of leadership that are able to sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses? He concludes that aircrew control over development of combat tactics was the most important element affecting morale. Colonel Zentner recommends that the USAF take steps to modify doctrine and the professional military education curriculum to relate these findings to the combat air forces. [John J. Zentner / 2001 / 124 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-090-6]

The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolution in Military Affairs is a broad, thought-provoking examination of the relationship between the advancement in conventional weapons guidance technology and the [beta]revolution in military affairs[gamma] (RMA). He defines an RMA as a rapid change in military technology, doctrine, and organization leading to a sweeping new way that wars are fought. Dr. Mets then considers whether the improvement in conventional air weapons accuracy since World War II is the foundation, the main pillar, one of the principal supports, or is irrelevant to the RMA which is said to be afoot. Clearly, the air theorists of the 1920s were fully persuaded that indeed a revolution was afoot. Equally clearly, the visions of Giulio Douhet, William [beta]Billy[gamma] Mitchell, and the Air Corps Tactical School were no more than partially fulfilled in World War II. Dr. Mets also explores the degree to which the shortcomings of aerial weapons were responsible for the denial of their visions and the degree to which those inadequacies were overcome in the conflicts that followed. He closes with an estimate as to whether their dreams of a revolution are about to be ful-filled." [David R. Mets, PhD]

Lieutenant Colonel Hinman examines what coercion theory suggests about the use of airpower in the early twenty-first century. Specifically, he seeks to determine whether any of the existing theories of coercion can stand alone as a coherent, substantive, and codified approach to airpower employment. Framing his analysis on three key attributes of conflict in the post-Cold War era--limited, nonprotracted war; political restraint; and the importance of a better state of peace--Hinman examines the contemporary applicability of the four major theories of coercive airpower: punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial. Finding limitations in these theories, he proposes a three-phase "hybrid approach" to coercion that more adequately meets the needs of post-Cold War conflict. [Lt Col Ellwood P. Hinman / 1900 / 88 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-109-0]

The authors propose that military actions should be employed through effects-based operations (EBO). The US military is undergoing a transformation to be prepared for operations across the spectrum of engagement. These authors also propose that part of the transformation should deal with how the military thinks and operates. Mann, Endersby, and Searle have developed an extended explanation of EBO methodology earlier defined in the May 2002 Air Combat Command white paper titled "Effects-Based Operations." They have attempted to answer the challenge by the white paper to help establish procedures in the EBO methodology, to further codify the understanding of an EBO way of thinking. Submitting that this methodology is extremely promising, they recognize two major areas of challenge. First, is modifying both service and joint doctrine to fully articulate what can be accomplished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the area of command and control (C2). Effective C2 for EBO depends on how intelligence analysis and combat assessment not only are performed but also integrated into the planning process. The authors conclude that the EBO methodology is actually a refinement or evolution of the objectives-based planning currently incorporated in US military doctrine. [Edward C. Mann III, Gary Endersby, and Thomas R. Searle / 2002 / 118 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-112-0]

Experiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force have highlighted a significant weakness in the US Air Force's ability to engage time-critical targets. Major Marzolf introduces and investigates two methods—reactive and preemptive—and determines how they might solve the problem in 2010. Evidence suggests that the USAF is attempting to solve the problem by using the reactive approach, which first detects a target with an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform and tasks a loitering-strike platform to kill it. While this is a cost-effective approach from a weapons-employment perspective, it is not efficient for weapons delivery aircraft. Major Marzolf found that even though this approach has long-term advantages, it would not likely be ready for implementation circa 2020, which would be 10 years too late. Evidence suggests that the USAF should pursue persistent area dominance munitions as an answer to the time-critical targeting problem. [Gregory S. Marzolf / 2004 / 112 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-130-9]

The Air Force and Air Force Space Command need an official implementation plan to integrate space into air operations or they might founder in this third attempt to transition to an air and space force. The historical precedent established during the integration of aviation into the US Navy from 1921 to 1941 suggests the policy areas essential to successful integration. The Air Force has initiated several excellent programs to increase the knowledge and understanding of space operations in the flying community by incorporating space capabilities and products into air operations, professional military education, and field exercises. Including space power in war games is also promoting understanding and creating an environment for innovation. The Air Force is on the verge of a bitter dispute between combat aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles; and space systems. From this debate, the Air Force must establish priorities. While space operations officers have earned the highest ranks in the Air Force, they are underrepresented in the command positions. Providing opportunities for space operators to experience air operations will cultivate aerospace officers to employ the aerospace force. The Air Force can benefit from this historical analogy by recognizing that integration is more than the acquisition of weapons and combat capabilities. Integration relies on a powerful human component that will ultimately determine the success or failure of the endeavor. [Lt Col Mark P. Jelonek / 1999 / 89 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-072-8 / AU Press Code: P-5]

Colonel Givens examines three battles—1973 Yom Kippur War, 1972 Easter offensive, and1944 Normandy campaign—to test the validity of airpower operating as a maneuver force. He avoids wringing the concept through to the Persian Gulf War because of the heated feelings that arose during the analysis of that path-breaking campaign some 12 years ago. What is unique and instructive about this study is its examination of historical warfare to illustrate current maneuver force concepts. Through the experiences of Kosovo and Afghanistan, the Air Force advocates with greater urgency that airpower can operate as a major force and is not endemically oriented to a supporting role. The contention is that exercising airpower in this role will enhance the future campaigns of the American military might. Where once there were fronts, flanks, and rears, there is now the vertical dimension. The Air Force attempts to control this element and, that along with the ground forces controlling the fronts and flanks, military operations commanded by a joint force commander point to the superior American military force. Colonel Givens concludes that, at the very least, the principle of economy of force demands airpower be seen as a viable maneuver force. He shows that in the conduct of warfare, we missed lessons in the past that we need to apply today. [Robert P. Givens / 2002 / 106 pages / ISBN: 1-58566-108-2]