Q1: What prompted you to write this series?
The genesis of this book series comes from what I view as a fundamental need for Airmen to better understand base defense and its nexus with irregular warfare operations. The idea for volume I was born from my own frustration as I began my preparations for deploying to Joint Base Balad, Iraq, in 2009. I found it difficult to access relevant material on defending air bases in a counterinsurgency environment because too few had taken the time to examine and share their thoughts on these subjects. Few wrote on this subject, and those that did often found their research papers buried in a military library or lessons-learned report—or overclassified and forgotten, if written in the field. There were only three other dated studies of note on the subject of air base defense, which were primarily focused on the Vietnam experience and did not discuss counterinsurgency in any detail.
After I returned from Iraq in 2010, I cowrote an article called “Defending the Joint Force: Lessons Learned from Joint Base Balad,” which appeared in Air and Space Power Journal’s 2011 Spring edition. I am deeply appreciative of the support and encouragement I received from Dr. Dan Mortensen, dean of Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), who encouraged me to write more about base defense for Air University Press. Over the course of a year and a half, Dr. Mortensen was generous with his time and advice as I labored to mature a manuscript on the subjects of base defense and counterinsurgency. The work contained in volume I, published in 2014, reopened the air base defense historiography and updated the literature in this field of study. The anthology encompassed the lessons learned from air base defense in Iraq, Afghanistan, and more recent conflicts, and explored best practices for base defenders when operating in a counterinsurgency environment. Volume II, published in 2020, examined additional lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam, evaluated how best to provide base defense in dispersed operations and the pivot to the Pacific, scrutinized the strategic effect of air base attacks, reviewed the responsibilities of commanders in defending their people and war-fighting assets, and exposed base defense challenges at the beginning (getting in) and end of conflicts (getting out). Importantly, volume II featured material collected through a research partnership with the Air Force Historical Research Agency, which assessed and categorized the effects of air base attacks during the Iraq Conflict (2003–12) using Air Force history reports. Finally, volume III, published in 2021, was specifically designed to be a short read for busy non-security forces commanders to quickly grasp their base defense responsibilities. Volume III captures the more cogent lessons from volumes I and II to benefit commanders by offering ten short principles in leading an integrated base defense.
Q2: What do you want readers to take from this work?
The goal of this anthology was to stir discussion and debate about how best to protect airpower in the future. It is my hope, and the hope of my co-authors, that these three volumes will spur interest in the history of air base defense, generate healthy deliberation regarding better methods for protecting air assets in irregular warfare environments and against peer competitors, and lead to strategies and methods that better prepare Airmen for deployment to high-threat areas. Dr. Alan Vick, a senior political scientist, RAND Corporation, author of Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases and Air Base Attacks and Defensive Counters: Historical Lessons and Future Challenges, was an inspiration for this book series and wrote the following review after volume III was released:
Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency: Integrated Base Defense Principles for Commanders is the final volume of the Air University Press trilogy on air base ground defense. The first two volumes present a uniquely comprehensive assessment of integrated base defense combat lessons learned and evolving requirements. Thus, volumes I and II were directed primarily at an audience comprised of professional air base defenders, analysts, and scholars. Volume III perfectly complements the first two volumes, offering 10 principles for base commanders who typically will not have Security Forces backgrounds. The 10 principles are crisp and pithy but also well-grounded in history, offering practical advice that all base commanders would be wise to heed. The three volumes in this set are an invaluable resource and belong on the bookshelves of every air base defender, base commander, and airpower analyst. (2021)
Q3: Did any unanticipated findings emerge from your research?
Despite persistent attacks, USCENTCOM and the US Air Force were so unconcerned by the air base defense threat in Iraq that they did not track the number of aircraft damaged or destroyed due to ground attack. When the data was requested, Air Forces Central directed researchers to the Air Force Historical Research Agency to cull through history reports. After a year of research, students at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) found that only 15 fixed-wing aircraft had been damaged across all the bases—10 in Balad and 5 in Baghdad— with zero aircraft destroyed. While the United States has been largely successful in defending its air bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy in these conflicts was not optimally trained, organized, or equipped. It would be wrong to simply cite air base defense efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as the proper template for future defense or perpetuate the mind-set that new thinking is not needed to meet future threats. Vietnam showed what a determined, well-trained, and committed foe could accomplish in attacking air bases. In the future, the merging of competent irregular enemy forces with precision weapons and modern technology will likely be the impetus for the real change needed to treat the defense of airfields with the seriousness of purpose it truly deserves. Given the replacement cost and lengthy manufacturing timetables of modern aircraft, the USAF and its coalition partners would not be able to sustain Vietnam-level ground-attack losses. Leaders must ensure that the full spectrum of air base threats is addressed, including the traditional ground threat married with the high-tech capabilities of precision-guided indirect fire and remotely piloted vehicles. It is often said that generals try to fight the last war. The lack of enemy effectiveness against air bases in recent conflicts should not lull leaders into under-resourcing or dismissing the growing threats against air bases.