Cyber Deterrence Revisited

Cyber Deterrence Revisited endeavors to disentangle the ongoing academic discussions regarding creating a deterrence theory applicable to cyberspace. It critically reflects on deterrence mechanism outcomes, shortfalls, and misconceptions and explains when cyber deterrence is and is not successful. The paper also outlines potential research avenues, policies, and access requirements that will help to ascertain the deterrence effects we so desperately crave to create in cyberspace.

Until academics and war-game par­ticipants understand the realities of how militaries defend, fight, and win in cyberspace, cyber discussions—and to a larger degree, escalation dynamics—will remain deductive, reductive, and superficial. Nonetheless, the field of cy­ber deterrence is not a dead end. But progress in the field necessitates that researchers understand what effects we are currently able to create, what ef­fects we cannot yet create, and which ones we would have to create to deter adversaries in and through cyberspace. Only through access to military thinking on the art of cyber, continuous experimentation, expedient practical adaptation, and out-of-the-box thinking will academics and military tacti­cians be able to piece together the puzzle that binds tactical and operational actions to produce the deterrence effects that we so desperately crave to cre­ate in cyberspace.