America's First Air Battles: Lessons Learned or Lessons Lost?

Colonel Purdham provides a successful evaluation of Michael Howard's construct that current doctrine is probably wrong, but what matters is the capability of the military to get it right when a particular conflict begins. He uses a simple but effective test, an evaluation of important airpower factors to include familiarity with the nature and geography of the conflict; parity with the adversary, especially in terms of air superiority; command and control of air assets, especially in interdiction and close air support missions; and the confluence of airpower weapons with doctrine and training. Colonel Purdham filters these airpower factors through three conflicts of the last half-century—Korean War, Vietnam War, and Operation Desert Storm—looking as much as possible at the early air operational stages of the conflict. Colonel Purdham concludes that Professor Howard's construct has some validity, but the real world offers alternative conclusions. Because of the effectiveness of Desert Storm and the lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Purdham recommends that our air forces go to war well trained in the way they will fight.