This study analyzes and builds on Dr. Robert Pape’s framework for analyzing airpower strategies. The analysis shows the underlying value of his Targets and Timing, Mechanism, Outcomes construct as well as the considerable clarification and expansion it requires in order to perform comprehensive air strategy analysis for the broad range of strategic air and space tasks. An enhanced framework is proposed, the elaboration of which comprises the bulk of the paper. Considerable time is spent describing the structure and logic of the framework and the models it contains. [Maj Thomas P. Ehrhard, USAF / 1995 / 85 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

In World War II’s Pacific Theater, the US Army Air Forces (AAF) devoted a small percentage of its long-range capability to aerial minelaying against Japanese warships and commerce. Sea mines––explosive underwater devices that damaged, sank, or deterred ships--were weapons that had difficulty gaining the same acceptance as guns, bombs, and torpedoes. Yet, with time, a small number of aerial mining advocates influenced wartime commanders to ensure the growth of minelaying doctrine, equipment development, and combat experience. Ultimately, aerial minelaying became one of the most successful AAF maritime missions of the war and signaled an important role in sea control for the future US Air Force. [Maj John S. Chilstrom, USAF / 1992 / 59 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

The Air Force’s current doctrinal maxims of centralized control and decentralized execution have the potential to produce over centralized planning at the theater air operations center (AOC); the result of this tendency is a cumbersome air tasking order (ATO) and a campaign vulnerable to lost communications, information overload, and decapitation. One cure for such problem is the decentralization of tactical planning through the use of mission-type orders at the wing or air task-force level. Mission-type orders include a clear statement of the superior commander’s intent and state each unit’s tasks in terms of operational effects to be achieved in several days rather than daily targets and aim points. A related problem exists in the horizontal command relationships at the theater level. During Operation Desert Storm, there was friction between some ground commanders and the joint forces air component commander (JFACC) about the issue of air interdiction targeting. When the theater CINC insisted that ground commanders pick air targets and then micromanaged the targeting himself, without providing feedback to these commanders, they frequently blamed the JFACC and his staff for ignoring their targeting nominations. To reassert their influence, they supported the formation of a joint targeting board that had the potential to degrade the JFACC’s control of his air interdiction assets. An alternative to such a system is the use of mission-type requests from the ground commander to the air commander couched in terms of desired operational effects over a discrete period of time. This study seeks to answer the question, “If a joint force air commander finds it useful or necessary to operate at the theater level and one level below with mission-type orders or requests, what are the preconditions that must exist in order to make such a partially decentralized command system work?” [Maj Michael E. Fischer, USAF / 1995 / 72 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

Strategic bombing against civilian targets was attempted on a grand scale during the Second World War against Britain, Germany, and Japan. Although the physical destruction was great, the coercive effect on the leadership of these states was questionable. However, in 1991, air attacks of negligible military or destructive value against cities in Israel imperiled the very existence of the allied coalition arrayed against Saddam Hussein. If large, continuous, destructive air attacks against civilian targets did not work in the past, why should small, brief, minimally destructive attacks coerce leaders now? This thesis examines three campaigns during which aerial terror raids, peripheral to the main war efforts and incapable of destroying the enemy war-making capacity, elicited disproportionate reactions from the targeted leaderships. The raids on London during World War I, the V-1 and V-2 raids on London three decades later, and the Scud attacks on Israel during Desert Storm each show evidence of overreaction by Allied/coalition leaders. Maj C. G. C. Treadway, USAF / 1998 / 43 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

The term real-time information into the cockpit (RTIC) involves systems capabilities required to provide aircrews timely and essential off-board information to allow mission adjustments in response to rapidly changing combat conditions. The term military technical revolution (MTR) requires converging technological products which have a demonstrated military utility, and military recognition that the application of these converging technologies will cause a radical change in the character of warfare over a very short period of time. RTIC does not foreshadow a coming MTR although it does employ converging technological products which have a demonstrated military utility. RTIC is not likely to cause radical change to the character of warfare. Nonetheless, it improves a commander’s ability to employ operational art—to employ military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. This thesis assesses the capabilities of RTIC from two perspectives: its impact on the air tasking process, and the command and control flexibility it affords the joint force air component commander (JFACC). It concludes that the impact on the air tasking process is evolutionary, not revolutionary—current RTIC capabilities remain largely dependent on human-intensive operations which limit reductions in decision cycle times. It further suggests that RTIC’s true impact on targeting is directly attributable to the increased flexibility provided to the JFACC for prosecuting the execution-day air tasking order. [Maj William G. Chapman, USAF / 1997 / 54 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

Much occurred to influence Russian military doctrine from the Gulf War’s end to the Russians issuing their draft doctrine in May 1992. The Gulf War was a significant military experience for the Russians because it highlighted what their General Staff thought was wrong with the military doctrine they inherited from the former Soviet Union. The Gulf War affected their perception of future war and how they should posture their forces for it. This thesis explores the evolution of Russian military doctrine in light of the lessons they say they learned from the Gulf War. [Lt Col Edward J. Felker, USAF / 1996 / 73 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

The United States has been involved in peace enforcement operations for many years. This evolution continues and gives offensive airpower the advantage over the defense. Focusing on command and control, the issues can be loosely grouped into categories of force and command structure, political impacts, and interoperability. In force and command structure, the US has not come to grips with the difficulties of operating in a multinational coalition under international (e.g., United Nations)control. The problems of dual lines of control and Byzantine command structures plagued both the Dominican and Somalia operations. The ability to integrate humanitarian relief and nation-building forces effectively into the overall structure has deteriorated rather than improved. Stand-by, earmarked forces, combined exercises (including nonmilitary agencies), and stronger civil-military integration cells could help mitigate difficulties, but they need to be pursued more vigorously. [Maj Harold E. Bullock, USAF / 1995 / 88 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background by describing CENTAF’s role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. [Maj Charles K. Shugg, USAF / 1996 / 47 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

Aircrews had dealt with threats --fighters and anti- aircraft artillery (AAA) --since the beginnings of the use of aircraft in combat, but the introduction of the Soviet-built SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) in the Vietnam War ushered a new and deadly threat into air war over Vietnam. Although it was not an unexpected threat, having earlier shot down two American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, the US Air Force’s tactical forces were largely unprepared. A counter had to be found, and that counter was the Wild Weasel, a specially configured F-100 F aircraft with electronics for detecting and then homing on radar emissions from SAM sites. The Weasel proved to be an effective weapon for suppressing enemy radar and SAM threats. Many changes occurred in the Weasel program. The F-100F airframe was too slow to keep up with the primary attack aircraft of the day, the F-105, so the Weasel electronics were added to an F-105 aircraft designated the EF-105 and later redesignated the F-105G. That airframe had too little life left in it and was itself replaced by the F-4C. Following the Vietnam War, the F-4C was replaced by the current Wild Weasel platform, the F-4G, a modified F-4E platform incorporating more capable electronic gear for employment against the mobile Soviet threats. The introduction of Shrike anti-radiation missile (ARM) negated the requirement to overfly the site, but its short range required further improvement. The improvement came in the Standard ARM, a missile that was followed by development of the High-Speed Anti- Radiation Missile, or HARM, the weapon of choice for today’s Weasel. [Maj William A. Hewitt, USAF / 1992 / 53 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

This study concludes airpower will play an increasingly dominant role in future US contingency responses. Power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national command authority to achieve discrete political ends outside the borders of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Power projection contingencies are characterized as wars and operations short of war, but not conflicts that are global or total in nature. Future contingencies that demand a US response may occur without warning, be time sensitive, and require short duration deployments. US forces may not have immediate access to or a previously established presence in potential theaters of operation. Due to the changing nature of the international environment and domestic priorities, the President defined a new National Security Strategy that emphasizes projecting military forces in response to regional conflicts. The military services are currently modifying their doctrine and force structures to reflect the shift towards power projection. The services agree power projection forces must be lethal, flexible, deployable, mobile, and capable of surviving an increasingly hostile threat environment. Comparing force characteristics reveals airpower has greater flexibility, deployability, mobility, and is better able to survive future threat environments than surface forces. New domestic imperatives have also forced the services to engage in a healthy competition to preserve their share of a shrinking defense budget. In terms of efficiency, apportioning resources according to an arcane formula that does not reflect force capabilities or the future utility of primary service functions is illogical. Building a strong power projection capability requires a thorough evaluation of the relative efficacy of air, land, and sea power to perform the power projection mission. [Maj Mark A. Gunzinger, USAF / 1992 / 110 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

The decline of the Soviet Union upset the world’s balance of power and opened the door to third world proliferation since the superpowers no longer have tight control over their client-states. This increase in proliferation raised the issue of how the United States (US) should respond to a third world nation that is acquiring nuclear weapons. Should the United States depend on preventive attacks to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons? This is not a new issue. Proliferation and preventive war have both been issues since the end of World War II. The United States considered a preventive attack against the Soviet Union in the postwar years. The Soviet Union considered preventive attacks against the People’s Republic of China in 1969. Israel conducted a preventive attack in 198l against the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq. Preventive attacks are politically untenable and are not militarily possible. Without perfect political conditions, it is unacceptable for the only remaining superpower to attack a second-rate power. It is militarily impossible for the United States to guarantee the removal of all nuclear weapons in a single preventive attack. This study concludes that the United States should not depend on preventive attacks to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons. [Maj Steven R. Prebeck, USAF / 1993 / 33 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]

The purpose of this thesis is to determine which form of airpower will best serve American power projection requirements as we approach the turn of the century. It examines three forms of airpower: carrier air, long-range combat air (B-2), and theater air (i.e., F-15, F-16, and EF-111). The author concludes that theater aircraft are the mainstay of US airpower. Theater airpower was the decisive form of airpower in our three major conflicts since World War II (Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq) and will be in the regional conflicts of the future. It is superior in the broadest sense of the word—economically, militarily, and politically. [Maj Roy Michael Mattson, USAF / 1992 / 39 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: ]