The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a finite resource critical to the US military’s ability to gain superiority in the five war-fighting domains. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) electromagnetic strategy is spectrum access, when and where needed, to achieve mission success. However, the future electromagnetic operating environment will find gaining assured access increasingly difficult due not only to adversaries actively contesting it, but also to the congestion attributed to the exponential growth in commercial and civilian access. Despite these signs, the US federal government and the DOD continue to cling to a century-old model for managing the EMS. A revolution is in order. This paper explores how the collision between technological advances in software-defined radios, machine learning, and cloud computing offers a viable solution to this growing problem. That solution is cognitive radio cloud networks. [Maj Lawrence O. Jones, USMC / 2018 / 41 pages / AU Press Code: WF-63]

This research paper analyzes historical data from Southeast Asia, Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Allied Force to identify combat search and rescue (CSAR) helicopter shortfalls that endanger viable personnel recovery in a major theater war. It identifies still-relevant survivability requirements and suggests a helicopter fleet size based on historical asset density ratios. A comparative mission planning analysis reframes the benefit of increased helicopter speed in terms of reduced fighter and tanker requirements for long-range CSAR. This analysis of historical and contemporary issues informs a four-phase proposal to equip and organize the CSAR helicopter force for future relevance. [Maj Brandon T. Losacker / 2019 / 116 pages / ISSN: 2687-7260 / AU Press Code: WF-68]

This paper introduces military commanders to DOJ capabilities and the potential for military-DOJ collaboration. It proposes a five-part framework for working with federal prosecutors. First, military and DOJ authorities should agree upon the types of wrongdoing which warrant military authorities sending cases to DOJ for prosecution. Second, they should identify the operational event which triggers referral to DOJ. Third, they should determine the level of military command, which authorizes the referral. Fourth, they should identify supporting and supported roles during both operational and investigative phases. Fifth, they should establish joint training and information-exchange programs to provide end-to-end feedback. This paper suggests a practical framework that aspires to facilitate synergy between military and DOJ apparatuses.[Anthony DeStefano / 2021 / 62 pages / ISSN 2687-7260 / AU Press Code: WF-85]

Although aircraft have shown to be effective in small wars, the United States Air Force currently does not possess counterinsurgency (COIN) aircraft of the type advocated by many students of small wars. Little attention is placed on obtaining a COIN operations platform; however, within academic circles and the special operations community, the need for a “low-tech” airborne participant in COIN operations is gaining traction. Acquiring a weapons system platform is serious business, with meticulously defined processes and authorities. By examining opportunities to turn ideas into aircraft, Major Peeler identifies specific authorities, processes, requirements, and methodologies for quickly procuring an aircraft for COIN operations. [Maj David L. Peeler, Jr., USAF / 2009 / 45 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: WF-40]

The current service-centric approach to bare base capability has produced capability overlaps and logistics inefficiencies. The two primary bare base systems—the Air Force Basic Expeditionary Airfield Resources (BEAR) and the Army Force Provider—have limited interoperability. In recent conflicts, the lack of joint doctrine or joint bare base architecture has hampered the ability of the services to achieve fully operational forward locations within a satisfactory length of time. The current approach to bare base operations is at odds with Department of Defense (DOD) transformation plans, which direct the development of joint, interdependent capabilities to support the current operating environment, in which interservice operations and rapid deployments are the norm. The DOD also has a domestic requirement to contribute to disaster response and homeland security operations, which may be slowed or complicated by service-specific bare base capabilities. To prepare for operations in a joint environment and eliminate inefficiencies, the services should establish a joint bare base architecture that is simplified, modular, and interchangeable. This study proposes a joint architecture that potentially would reduce the resources required to procure, move, store, and maintain bare base assets. Because expeditionary basing is one of its distinctive capabilities, the Air Force should be designated as the executive agent for joint bare base operations, with each service continuing to train its bare base support forces and meet its service-specific requirements. [Maj William D. Trautman Jr., USAF / 2007 / 29 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: WF-28]

In this paper, the author argues that the tenuous relationship between the US and Russia regarding ballistic missile proliferation and defense systems is in jeopardy. As US ballistic missile defense expands, Russia’s nuclear deterrent weakens. This may result in Russia finding new capabilities to circumvent US defense systems to maintain what they believe to be a balance between the countries. Technological advances and further expansion on both sides threaten stability and put future arms control agreements at risk. [Shawn A. Russell / 2020 / 80 pages / ISSN 2687-7260 / AU Press Code: WF-80]

The United States Air Force (USAF) currently faces a shortfall in the type and number of electronic combat (EC) aircraft capable of operating with an Aerospace Expeditionary Wing (AEW). This has a direct impact on the USAF’s global attack core competency and undermines the combat power of any deployed AEW. Why have EC assets been allowed to deteriorate to this state? The answer begins with people, who have a flawed understanding of the theory of airpower. Because the theory is not understood correctly, money is not dedicated to the needed technology. Because the technology isn’t developed or is lacking, that community-if you will-fails to get representation at the higher levels of leadership. This cycle of organizational behavior repeats itself over and over until acted upon by an outside force-in this case the shootdown of a US F-117 during the Kosovo action. This is not the first time that the USAF has been through this cycle of organizational behavior. The almost exact same scenario played out in the famous pursuit versus bombers debates of the 1930s. Pursuit lost out and thereby lost money, technology, and people in key leadership positions. It was not until the horrific bomber losses of 1943 that leaders fully realized the mistake they had made. This paper explores the connection between the two stories, looks at the current state of EC, and offers some suggestions for the future. [LCDR James C. Rentfrow, USN / 2001 / 34 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: WF-15]

In this paper, the author argues for establishing a separate and complete organizational identity for the United States Space Force. Leaders must manage and incorporate new cultural artifacts to foster the desired identity of the Space Force through heraldry and other historical items. Through the use of organizational identity theory, the author proposes a methodology to help establish corporate-level cultural guidance to develop this identity now and in the future. [Joshua A. Faustman / 2021 / 34 pages / ISSN 2687-7260 / AU Press Code: WF-83]

This paper identifies a possible shortfall in United States (US) military planning, the experience of US Central Command (CENTCOM) planners in dealing with the Central Asian States. Their emphasis is understandably focused on Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This paper develops for these planners the most likely threat to stability in CENTCOM's area of responsibility-ethnic conflict caused by spillover from neighboring countries. This paper also attempts to counter critics in the January-February 2000 Foreign Affairs who maintained that our obtuse military ties are not sensible nor sustainable. They described our current activities as a manner reminiscent of ill-advised US activities in Latin America in the 1970s. All of these condemnations from authors Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, although mostly unfounded, are perceptions that senior economists and political scientists hold. This paper helps CENTCOM "fire for effect" in developing and implementing a dynamic engagement strategy in this important region. [Maj William M. Tart, USAF / 2001 / 49 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: WF-16]

Under the new Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) concept, the US Air Force is capable of deploying and employing in 72 hours or less. Furthermore, the US mission frequently requires 24-hour activities to meet operational demands. Because of its commitment to project power with such a rapid fighting force, aviators on contingency operations will regularly face fatigue-related challenges inherent in sustained and continuous operations, as well as those from rapid, transmeridian travel. The purpose of this research paper is to extract all relevant materials pertaining to fatigue and aircrews in order to provide a plan for equipping Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF) commanders and personnel with a historical perspective, critical information, and new technologies to enable effective fatigue management. This information was attained via an extensive literature search and review, primarily utilizing the Internet and the Air University Library. [Maj Michael A. LeClair, USAF / 2001 / 63 pages / ISBN: / AU Press Code: WF-12]