Reform and Experimentation after the Cold War, 1989–2001, History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense, vol. V, by Philip L. Shiman, Elliott V. Converse III, and Joseph A. Arena. DoD Historical Office, 2022, 656 pp.
In 15 chapters and a remarkable conclusion, authors Philip Shiman, Elliott Converse, and Joseph Arena present a concise and applicable history of weapon system acquisition within the context of a crucial 12-year period in US history. The period studied in Reform and Experimentation begins and ends with two dramatic events. The first is the dissolution of a superpower, which ended the 40 years of expected confrontation with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The last is the traumatic 9/11 attack, which began a decades-long war on terror. These world-changing events, and continued conflict in the Middle East, exposed significant solutions and problems in the Defense Department’s acquisition of major weapon systems following the Cold War, when defense spending was curtailed and weapons technology experienced rapid advancement.
The authors supplement the volume with copious end notes, official biographies, figures, illustrations, a list of abbreviations, a bibliography, appendices, and an index, and take great strides in synthesizing the existing information to make a worthy presentation. All three authors are well-respected in their fields: Shiman is a consultant and contractor in military history; Converse, a retired Air Force colonel and well-known historian, is the lead for the DoD’s acquisition history project; and Arena is a senior historian for the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
This fifth volume is part of a series from the Historical Office, documenting weapon system acquisition from 1945 to 2001. Converse authored the first volume, Rearming for the Cold War: 1945–1960 (2012). This was followed by Adapting to Flexible Response 1960–1968 (2014) by Walter S. Poole. In a related series, J. Ronald Fox, with contributors, authored Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal (2011).
All four publications document the turmoil in the history of acquisition since 1945. Before this period, the Army and Navy possessed nearly complete independence in acquisition, subject only to the president and Congress. Even the National Security Act of 1947, which reorganized the armed forces and established the Defense Department and the National Security Council, did little to change this fact.1 But the act started a reform movement in many military weapon system programs. Poole reports that in the 1960s, the DoD secretary instituted massive budgeting, management, and program evaluation changes, eventually shifting authority from the military services.2 According to Fox, defense acquisition reform initiatives remained a high priority each time a new administration came into office.3 Yet reform was elusive then and was still absent in the 1980s. In fact, Shiman, Converse, and Arena further discovered little or no oversight of the process before 1989. Constant reporting of cost overruns, deficiencies, misleading reporting, and maleficence continued to tarnish the military services.
In detailing the reform and experimentation that took place during this period, the authors note that solutions to both strategic and regional national security policy had to be reformulated. With two areas of responsibility, the military services had to field systems faster, within cost, and meet policy requirements. Problems continued: systems were late, cost more, and failed to meet some, if not all, requirements.
The irony of the Middle East conflicts is that all three services were able to rapidly field systems that changed the conduct of war. A new approach allowed evolving technological modifications to transition directly into weapon systems rather than languishing in the demonstration and validation phase of development. Soldiers, Airmen, and Sailors could field systems that brought forth exceptional results during the war. Furthermore, this approach was so successful that Congress, the Department of Defense, the military services, and the defense industry attempted to implement the evolving approach to weapon system development. Yet the attempts were unsuccessful, and reform and experimentation continue in weapon system acquisition. Capable weapon systems to meet perceived post-Cold War threats are still lacking.
Congress’ answer was more legislation, oversight, and civilian control, newer lines of control, educating a dedicated workforce, and including the use of technology and newer procedures. The efforts by the Department of Defense followed congressional guidelines and included the appointment of an under secretary for acquisition, implementing various special commission recommendations, reducing military specifications requirements, training a professional cadre of acquisition personnel, establishing specialized training programs, and updating the massive 5000 series of acquisition documents—which pertains to the management and execution of defense programs. The military services responded by reorganizing commands to streamline acquisition, creating an officer acquisition career field, making reporting lines clearer, and giving program managers more authority, accountability, and responsibility. Additionally, the military services introduced several innovative program processes to develop new weapon systems. In each military service, programs explored developmental processes like the spiral approach, the evolutionary approach, or a combination of others, attempting to mitigate or curtail problems. The defense industry also appeared ready to implement changes to meet or exceed governmental directives. Yet input from all levels merely added complexity, non-compliance, and lack of consistency to an acquisition system already in disarray.
Throughout the volume major weapon systems and their cost overruns, lack of meeting or changing requirements, and delivery delays are featured and examined. Important systems such as the Air Force C-17 Globemaster III and F-35 Lightning II, the Army Crusader self-propelled howitzer, the Navy A-12 Avenger II, and the Marine V-22 Osprey are thoroughly discussed. According to the authors, acquiring and fielding these systems remained haphazard, frantic, chaotic, frustrating, and mismanaged.
In conclusion, systems acquisition will remain a topic of conversation for subsequent years. Although the acquisition process appeared well-designed and produced capable weapon systems, this volume and other historical volumes in the series refute this finding. Systems acquisition was and is a minefield for the military services, the Department of Defense, Congress, and even the defense industry. At any time, without a firm hand, acquiring systems through the acquisition process remains an overly ambitious adventure of dealing with conceptual ideas brought forth by contractors, tested by users, and then revamped, re-introduced with modifications, left to wither and expire, or restarted. Problems with entrenched parochial leanings, short program manager tenures, contractor mismanagement, cost overruns, and lack of trained personnel will continue. As the authors suggest, reform and experimentation appear to be a metaphor for systems acquisition.
Based upon my own knowledge of systems acquisition as the former project manager of the F-100 Engine Diagnostic System for the F-15 aircraft, I recommend this volume, its precedents, and the DoD 5000 series for other viewpoints on systems acquisition for policymakers, general readers, and DoD personnel to understand how systems acquisition remains a quandary to all. Numerous challenges exist, including the fact that there are many participants, requirements change, program managers come and go, funding is problematic, and corruption can be present. But if personnel are willing to review system acquisition history, they may be able to perform their assigned tasks with an appreciation of the myriad tasks involved.
Dr. James A. Boyless, Major, USAF, Retired
1 Elliott V. Converse III, Rearming for the Cold War: 1945–1960, History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense (DoD), vol. 1 (Washington, DC: DoD, 2012).
2 Walter S. Poole, Adapting to Flexible Response 1960–1968, History of Acquisition in the DoD, vol. II (Washington, DC: DoD, 2014).
3 J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960–2009: An Elusive Goal (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History , 2011).