Æther-ASOR

Arms Control at a Crossroads: Renewal or Demise?

  • Published

Arms Control at a Crossroads: Renewal or Demise? Edited by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Shane Smith. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2024, 331 pp.

As recently as January 2022, the 1985 joint declaration by then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” was affirmed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, President Joseph Biden, and the leaders of China, France, and the UK—all who represent nuclear powers and hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council.1 Only a month later, however, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to Putin’s announcement that Russia would suspend its participation in New START, the treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation that limits all Russian deployed intercontinental-range nuclear weapons. With that treaty set to expire in 2026, and agreements like the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Agreement being suspended by participating states in the aftermath of the invasion, Arms Control at a Crossroads asks this question: Does arms control have a future? Editors Jeffrey Larsen and Shane Smith admit that the “prognosis appears grim” (1).

The editors bring academic and policy practitioner experience to their timely and important work. Larsen, a research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and president of Larsen Consulting Group, has worked at NATO and at Science Applications International as a senior policy analyst. Smith, the director of the Air Force Institute for National Security Studies and associate professor of political science at the Air Force Academy, previously served as a senior fellow at the National Defense University and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Larsen and Smith have compiled a work with 16 separate analyses from experts in the policy, research, and academic worlds. Within the framework of the questioning of the future of arms control and what will be required for it to remain viable, the contributors cover the topic in four parts: foundations and context of arms control, perspectives of the major powers, arms control domains, and the way ahead—the longest of which is the discussion of domains.

The meatiest of the four parts covers the arms control domains, serving not just as a refresher on the issues of nuclear weapons, proliferation and disarmament, and chemical and biological weapons, but the history and status of arms control monitoring regimes. Notably included in this portion of the work is the discussion of emerging technologies, conventional and novel weapons, and the idea of space and cyberspace arms control.

The sections on emerging technologies and conventional weapons are especially laudable considering Russia’s war in Ukraine. Where arms control is often thought of as solely the domain of nuclear weapons, the conflict has shown why buildups of conventional weapons on a border and the need for monitoring new weapons and technology—or old ones used in previously unseen ways—still matter. While increasing nuclear rhetoric and an expiring New START will call for discussing the future of nuclear arms control, NATO and other Western governments are already working to address the need for the future of conventional and emerging arms control. A section discussing cooperative security as arms control by other means is especially insightful.

While perspectives of the United States, Russia, and China are covered, and sections on the return of geopolitics and cooperative security address the roles and actions of presumed or acknowledged nuclear states somewhat, the only—albeit small—area for improvement would be further discussion on the role other current or potential nuclear states will have in the future of arms control, how issues like Israel-Saudi normalization may impact arms control going forward, or how the United States and Russia’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and America’s solidarity with NATO will be affected. As one analysis suggests, if New START expires without replacement, America will face uncertainty not only with Russia but also with its nuclear nonproliferation strategy and solidarity with NATO.2

Arms Control at a Crossroads is well worth the read for those seeking to understand better the greater arms control landscape surrounding the issue. Newcomers to the topic will become well-versed in the foundations and various domains, and practitioners will be spurred to better understand the geopolitical perspectives and think about new ways forward. At a manageable 331 pages, including references, acknowledgments, and contributor biographies, the book is highly readable for non-experts while being engaging to those with advanced knowledge of the subject. Larsen and Smith remain hopeful that “political leaders will one day again see the utility and value of arms control as a primary tool for managing competition” (2). Stating that arms control is “not quite” dead, Larsen and Smith have curated a compelling case for why, and more importantly how, that could be (1).

Lieutenant Colonel Jason Baker, USAF

 

1 “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races,” White House, January 3, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

2 Vince Manzo, Nuclear Arms Control without a Treaty? Risks and Options after New Start (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2019), https://www.cna.org/.

"The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense."