Air Force Disappointments, Mistakes, and Failures: 1940–1990, by Kenneth P. Werrell, Texas A&M University Press, 2024, 312 pp.
American historian Kenneth P. Werrell, a former US Air Force pilot and a retired history professor from Virginia’s Radford University, has published numerous articles and essays in the field of airpower and technology and has authored several books detailing military and historical events, including most recently Death from the Heavens: A History of Strategic Bombing (Naval Institute Press, 2009). His Air Force Disappointments, Mistakes and Failures: 1940–1990, is another masterpiece, an exhaustive and unbiased work that adds to his already well-deserved reputation in the field. He examines the history of the US Air Force, focusing on failed military projects, including aircraft projects that flew no matter how briefly, missile projects, and one intelligence project—all occurring over the span of the fifty years before the Cold War’s end, during a period of heightened global insecurity, rapid technological advancements, and a shifting geopolitical landscape.
While the primary focus is within the United States, some of these failures occurred in the battlefields in World War II, Vietnam, Korea, and Iraq. Werrell articulates his arguments through the lens of military strategy, technological innovation, organizational behavior, and the geopolitics of the Cold War and civil-military relations. He starts by discussing 18 aircraft projects with a chapter devoted to each, followed by an analysis of seven missile projects and finally his evaluation of an intelligence project.
Werrell aims to establish why these projects were disappointments, mistakes, and failures by analyzing the complex interplay between political and military interests, strategic decisions, interservice rivalries, and technological developments. He argues that these projects promised too much, were too costly, and failed to perform as expected, basing his research on detailed case studies, comparative analysis, critical analysis, and historical context.
Werrell organizes his book into chapters that focus on individual projects. He presents each as a case study, providing a brief background and valuable insight into what went wrong and why. He places these case studies into a broader historical and strategic context for better understanding of the prevailing circumstances and the pressures that affected decision-making. He also critically analyzes the decision-making processes by interrogating the roles of keys individuals and institutions. In some instances, he makes some limited comparative analyses about the US Air Force experience, centering on operational setbacks, technological failures, and organizational and strategic blunders. His work is based on primary and secondary sources that include government documents, congressional hearings, military archives, interviews, oral histories, historical analyses, technical data, newspapers and magazines, biographies, and memoirs.
He highlights the complex interplay between political leadership and military interests as one of the reasons for some of these failed projects, based on issues such as the costs of the project, misaligned interests, the emergence of competing systems, and bureaucracy. Examples include the cancellation of the Convair B-58 supersonic bomber project due to the preference of civilian leadership for surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). With the F-111 project—considered the most controversial aircraft in US Air Force history—both political and military interests clashed and interservice rivalry also played a part. The North American Rockwell B-1A project failed due to a political preference for ballistic missiles over manned bombers. The Lockheed F-104, though politically a win due to its commercial success, failed militarily because of its poor safety and versatility in combat. The Douglas GAM-87 was another project that saw political interference from the Department of Defense when it was cancelled in preference for ballistic missiles. Political leaders considered the mobile ICBM project costly and adopted other land-based means instead.
Strategic decisions by the military leadership led to other failed projects. For example, the XB-40 and XB-41 escort bomber project—which involved converting bombers to bomber escorts after World War II’s strategic shift from area bombing to precision bombing—faced technical failings, and the bombers could not prevail in that role. The XP-75 project, which intended to produce a fighter aircraft at lower cost by using portions of aircraft already in service, faced design and fight challenges—a need that was eventually overtaken by improvements in the P-47 and P-51, both already in service. The heavily armed long-range interceptor McDonnell XP-67 and Bell XP-77 project failed as the two designs could not outperform the fighters already in service and could not escape design delays.
Interservice rivalries led to the failed projects of the dive bombers Douglas A-24, Curtiss A-25, and Vultee A-31/25—whose deployment was largely influenced by Germany’s tactical aviation successes of dive-bombing in World War II. US Army leadership pushed the dive bomber concept, whereas the US Air Corps preferred a low-flying heavy attack concept. The F-111 aircraft also faced interservice issues between the Air Force and Navy. The AIM-4D preferred by the Air Force performed poorly in comparison with the Navy’s AIM-9 Sidewinder.
Above all, technological developments influenced most of the failed projects discussed by Werrell. These were due to advancements in technology, improvements to existing equipment, or the development of new equipment. For instance, the Consolidated B-32, a backup for the B-29, received mixed reviews in combat mission but failed due to technical shortcomings and mediocre performance in comparison to the B-29. The Pusher-Propelled project—Vultee X-54, Curtis-Wright XP-55, and Northrop X-56—failed to offer the intended aeronautical advantages during World War II due to their inferior performance, technical and design issues, and the emergence of jet-propelled aircraft. The Propeller to Jet Project—Douglas XB-42, Douglas XB-42A and Douglas XB-43—failed despite the great strides in innovation. Northrop’s Flying Wings project—Northrop XB-35, XB-49, YRB-49A and XP-79—intended to produce a lighter and more aerodynamically clean aircraft with a higher performance, but it, too, failed due to bad timing, design issues, and safety concerns. It could not outperform its predecessors with piston engines.
Other examples include the propeller conversion to Convair YB-60 jet project and Unique Propulsion project—North American F-86, Republic XF-91 and XF84H, Convair X-81, and McDonnell XF-88B—which were attempts to advance to jet propulsion for fighter aircraft. They both were unsuccessful partly due to poor results of turboprops at speeds close to the speed of sound. The Mach 3 North American B-70 bomber project gave way due to costs; it was out-modelled due to the emergence of SAMs.
Despite Werrell’s comprehensive research, balanced critique, and insightful analysis, there is limited comparative analysis and receptiveness in the themes of bureaucracy and technological overreach/balance. Still, his work cannot go without commendation, as it contributes to the field of airpower and technology not only through highlighting lessons learned but also by offering a comprehensive analysis that fills existing gaps in the literature.
Air Force Disappointments seems to strive to prevent the future recurrence of failed events. Its balanced view encourages critical thinking and emphasizes the organizational and bureaucratic challenges that can impact military effectiveness. With Air Force Disappointments, Werrell has made a valuable contribution to the field that will no doubt aid effective military operations and civil-military decision-making. It may also assist the military against misguided doctrine and technological overreach, and encourage interservice cooperation, technological-strategy alignment, and balanced force structure.
Colonel Howard Katuba Lungu, Zambia Air Force