This report draws on open-source reporting, Chinese-language primary sources, satellite imagery, and multiple business databases to examine China’s air defense radar capabilities and the industrial base that develops, produces, and deploys them. Key findings include:
• China’s large air defense radar industrial base produces comprehensive detection capabilities at all heights and ranges, and its newest systems appear to be on the international cutting edge of radar technology. The bulk of air defense radar capabilities in the PLA are “third-generation” platforms that are solid-state, 3D radar systems with automated recording and networking capabilities, as well as limited anti-stealth capabilities. Modernization in this sector has been rapid, and the third-generation platforms are gradually being replaced with “fourth-generation” platforms that offer superior stealth-penetration capabilities, wider ranges of functions (combining fire control and surveillance, for instance), and expanded detection ranges. China’s domestic market for military radars almost tripled in size over the last decade; in 2022, that market had grown to 42.5 billion RMD ($6 billion USD).
• The PLA’s air defense radar development in recent years has focused on fielding mobile systems and stealth-penetrating systems that can be networked with other radars to generate a more comprehensive sensing capability. The PLA appears able to network air defense radar platforms of multiple types and capabilities at least at the brigade level, and can likely fuse information from air defense radars across the country into a centralized detection network. Given well-known problems with jointness and interoperability in the PLA, however, it is unclear exactly which systems can be incorporated into that network and how widely shared the fused data is.
• China’s air defense radar industrial base is large, robust, and still centered on large state-owned defense enterprises. The China Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC) and several of its subsidiary companies and research institutes dominate this sector, but development and production capabilities are spread across at least 21 major corporate entities. One private company, Xi’an Tianhe Defense Technology Co., is also a major player.
• China is pursuing a wide range of new radar technologies. The companies involved in development and production are typically also involved in publicly available research on emerging radar technologies such as cognitive radar, quantum radar, intelligent radar, and microwave photon radar. This research is typically pursued in collaboration with academic researchers at a range of institutions, among which Beihang University and Tsinghua University are some of the most prominent civilian participants. PLA academic institutions, such as the National University of Defense Technology and the Air Force Early Warning Academy are also often involved in this work.
• China’s air defense radar systems are competing on the international market. At least 23 countries were found to have received Chinese-made air defense radar systems, although occasional reports about problems with their capabilities and reliability may indicate PRC manufacturers are struggling to compete in this sector. Major recipients of these systems include Pakistan, Venezuela, and Egypt.
• China’s air defense radar capabilities limit U.S. freedom of action in the Indo-Pacific and, increasingly, in other countries. The PRC’s own air defense radar network offers comprehensive coverage of China’s airspace, and domestically-produced long-range radar systems—many of which have been exported—provide layered detection capabilities outside China’s borders, as well. The PRC’s air defense radar network would be difficult for U.S. forces to penetrate except with the most advanced stealth, long-range, and hypersonic platforms. As the PLA’s more advanced radar capabilities continue to proliferate, this may become true in other regions as well.
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