Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Air University Press --
Book Reviews
India and Nuclear Asia: Forces,
Doctrine, and Dangers, by Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell.
Georgetown University Press, 2019.
The China India Rivalry in the
Globalization Era, ed. T.V. Paul. Georgetown University Press,
2018.
With a
burgeoning economy and one-sixth of the global population, India’s
nuclear policy will be increasingly significant to its regional and
global role. More specifically, India must navigate the strategic
complexities of defense policy with two strategic competitors: China
and Pakistan. India, which has been fighting Pakistan off and on since
1947, acts as the more sophisticated conventional force. However,
Pakistan enjoys the backing of the much larger, much more powerful
China. The second
nuclear age is Asian-centric, and these three nuclear powers form the
core of the debate.
Joshi and
O’Donnell argue that growing regional force structures, technological
sophistication, ambiguous nuclear policy, and potentially low
escalation thresholds set the stage for deadly misperception between
India, China, and Pakistan. This misperception could lead to
inadvertent regional escalation through a naval domain that lacks
multilateral regulation, dual-use platforms that shade strategic
intent and mission, and conventional targeting seeking to seize
operational advantages. Beyond the military operational environment,
political leadership runs the risk of accidental escalation due to a
lack of understanding of the potential nuclear consequences of their
actions. These risks are prominent among India and its nuclear
neighbors due to a lack of clear policy and a void of trilateral
relations.
The book goes
on to describe in detail the rapidly advancing nuclear
forces of India and China and the growing force of Pakistan. It offers
insights into the decision making of the three states with respect to
one another and the composition and disposition of their strategic
forces. The authors suggest that a murky Indian policy may be allowing
its long-standing no-first-use and minimum deterrence policies to give
way in practice to nuclear war-planning; including extremely punitive
response measures and a Herman Kahn-esque flexible response option.
Regional nuclear stability, as much as India can uniquely contribute
to it, requires two things. First, India must execute a service-wide
nuclear posture review to synchronize and stabilize its nuclear policy
amid rapidly advancing technology and adversarial activity. Once
internally sorted, India should push for meaningful trilateral
dialogue between itself, China, and Pakistan to remove a degree of
potentially costly strategic ambiguity from the political arena.
The authors
ground their analysis on the concepts developed by Posen, Kahn,
Schelling, Stoessinger, and the so-called “Third Wave” practitioners
of nuclear deterrence theory. They have done a superb job developing
the implications of various nuclear policies and postures, and they
present careful discussions of policy challenges related to doctrine,
force structure, technology, and leadership-driven dynamics. However,
suggesting an entirely public defense review is probably unrealistic
in such a contentious security environment. Additionally, there is a
contradiction when the authors assert that a sea leg could help
minimize forces while claiming this somehow conflicts with designs for
a minimal deterrence posture. I believe they more accurately are
suggesting the increasing complexity from a nuclear monad to a nuclear
dyad breaks with traditional concepts of force expansion. The authors
base much of their argument on the idea that excessive strategic
ambiguity and mirror imaging national components of rationality will
not add stability to the situation. They derive this argument from
discussing the misperception inherent in the lack of declaratory
policy between India and China and the assumed responses to
conventional strikes or development meant to create parity. I tend to
agree, yet these assertions could benefit from discussing or
referencing a wealth of post–Cold War literature and documentation
that supports such a claim. This includes but is not limited to Keith
Payne’s The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction,
in which the author demonstrates a fundamental US misperception of
Cuban resolve to die for their cause in 1962—or the since declassified
Soviet doctrine that incorporated nuclear weapons into warfare in
Europe, very contrary to the US perception.
Ultimately,
the dialogue stimulated in this book is informative, chilling, and
logical. India’s nuclear future has global implications for deterrence
theory and stability. As the authors depict, the United States has had
a significant degree of involvement in helping shape India’s nuclear
policy. I would look forward to seeing the trilateral discussions
forwarded in this book expanded to include the United States. Other
nuclear powers, particularly the United States, could help
counterbalance a united Pakistan and China, should India find itself
at a negotiating disadvantage—ideally leading to a more impartial and
stable nuclear peace.
Moving beyond
nuclear force structures and strategic escalation alone, T.V. Paul et
al. seek to characterize the nature of the relationship between two
rising Asian great powers, India and China. The China India
Rivalry in the Globalization Era seeks to explain why, in some
sense, these two Asian giants seem to be experiencing a degree of
economic and political rapprochement; yet, maritime disputes,
disagreements over international status, and a near territorial
military conflict in 2017, according to Paul, suggest an “enduring
managed rivalry.”
The book
introduces the paradox of Chinese and Indian territorial conflict
across the so-called McMahon Line. Currently, stability supports
Chinese and Indian prosperity and development, yet each must remain
uncompromising on settlement demands to placate political interests.
The compilation offers a nuanced discussion of status,
conceptualizations of international order, strategic culture, and
strategy to shed theoretical light on the various fissures and bridges
between the two nations. The discussion of resource scarcity and its
effects on competitive polices provide reasons for hope in future
renewable energy pursuits. Yet there is a grave potential for future
contention over freshwater shortages. The work suggests macroeconomic
interactions are becoming increasingly asymmetric (a destabilizing
trend) as India is about eight times more reliant on Chinese imports
than China is on Indian imports, and so forth. Moreover, certain
Chinese investment practices and Chinese investment into Pakistan
prove problematic for the hopes of a stabilizing economic
interdependence between India and China. The paradoxical nature of
this rivalry extends into global governance, where both nations seek
greater institutional membership and eventually more influence in a
reorganized system. However, instead of facilitating, they work to
block the interest realization of the other in these institutions.
Ultimately, this compilation of papers asserts that there exists a
managed rivalry where status and influence are as much a source of
disagreement as are substantive concerns. In fact, because the
material and conceptual are bound together in this rivalry, the
authors suggest that the asymmetry of Chinese and Indian power
prevents large-scale traditional conflict while also enabling the
persistence of general competition.
I am not sure
if the ultimate assertion that each paper displaying a complex
paradoxical relationship is always enough to draw the papers
coherently together as a single narrative or common operating picture.
The global contextualization of the theme of this book was a strength
and something these authors had over O’Donnell and Joshi. O’Donnell
and Joshi’s in-depth engagement of Pakistan provides very useful
context to a number of Paul’s various sections. O’Donnell and Yoshi’s
in-depth description of Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine drives
home the operational complexities for India’s posture and force
development discussed in Paul’s book. I would perhaps like to see both
texts discuss Russian strategic interests, even if just to explain
away their relevance if that is their reason for exclusion.
The China
India Rivalry suggests that India does not, in the foreseeable
future, pose a strategic threat to China. However, India and the
Nuclear Asia makes a compelling case as to why Indian force
structure is already problematic for China and provides evidence that
Chinese policy has begun to recognize this. O’Donnell and Yoshi
emphasize the trilateral nature of regional nuclear dynamics, deftly
displaying the interdependent policy and threat dynamics. In Paul’s
compilation, Narang mentions the nuclear relationship between India
and China as almost negligible compared to Pakistan for India and the
United States for China. While it is important to understand national
priorities and a broader strategic scope, Narang seems to overlook the
interdependent security dynamic of Pakistan, India, and China that
requires India to plan strategic contingencies for Chinese involvement
in a conflict with Pakistan. This strategic planning drives force
structure, weapon development, and operational plans that ultimately
take a bilateral issue and turn it into a regional or global powder
keg. Narang also suggests an utter acceptance of Schelling’s
principals for nuclear deterrence between China and India. However,
O’Donnell and Joshi portray a much more ambiguous and contentious
nuclear relationship, with potential brinksmanship tailored by
something akin to escalation rungs. What Paul so critically adds is
the asymmetric status dynamic between India and China that drives
Indian ambitions for recognition, as well as the hard-balancing of the
other leading to the internalization of a bilateral enmity identity.
The perceptive American reader should see a direct correlation between
the dynamics and potential perils of China ignoring Indian status
contextualized through a reading of both books and the same factors
that shape the status dynamics between China and the United States.
Additionally, Paul’s sections help the reader zoom out from the
all-consuming nuclear dynamics of O’Donnell and Joshi and witness the
broader implications and flashpoints for conflict, as well as an
overall stability driven by very complex and intertwined interests.
Taken
together, these works provide an excellent context for the
Asian-centric future of global politics and the competition therein.
Chris
Giuliano
Graduate Student
Department of
Defense and Strategic Studies
Missouri
State University