Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs --
Abstract
In the complex landscape of global security, operating in the gray zone—employing strategies that fall below the threshold of armed conflict—has become increasingly vital. This article explores adapting gray-zone strategies to the unique operational dynamics of space. It emphasizes synchronizing diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments to dissuade and deter adversaries while avoiding kinetic conflict. Focusing on the Indo-Pacific region’s strategic significance, particularly China’s activities, it delves into nonkinetic actions such as jamming and cyber operations aimed at degrading satellite capabilities, which can impact homeland defense operations. The article addresses legal frameworks governing space activities, the rise of commercial space ventures, and the need for collaboration between military and commercial entities to mitigate space threats. It advocates for transparency, international cooperation, and response strategy development to uphold space sustainability and stability. Ultimately, the article stresses collective responsibility in navigating the gray zone to preserve space accessibility for future generations.
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Operating in the gray zone necessitates synchronizing the elements of national instruments of power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—to dissuade and deter adversaries, along with crafting a strategy to achieve national objectives. The military, too, plays a crucial role in developing and executing these strategies, asserting strength through displays of force and forging alliances with partners and allies, while refraining from physical strikes. To avoid kinetic conflict in space, the United States and its allies must devise effective strategies enabled by coercive capabilities within the space domain, thereby avoiding a transition out of the gray zone.
The gray zone avoids large-scale conventional conflict and employs strategies such as competition, coercion, and compellence to achieve political objectives. Gray-zone operations encompass coercive actions falling below the threshold of armed conflict, surpassing normal diplomatic, economic, and other activities to achieve national objectives.
Despite differing national objectives among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, these nations share common adversaries—the United States and its like-minded allies and partners. This interconnectedness, particularly within the global economy, underscores the necessity of assessing each country in relation to others. Notably, the Indo-Pacific region, through which two-thirds of the world’s container trade traverses, plays a pivotal role in global trade and energy supplies. China, boasting the world’s second-largest economy, tightly links its security to the South China Sea, where strategic importance is magnified. With more than half of the world’s population residing in the Indo-Pacific region, its strategic significance is further underscored. China, as the second-largest military spender after the United States, has modernized its forces at “the fastest pace we’ve seen since World War II,” as noted by ADM John Aquilino, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).
Chinese activities in the gray zone strategically align with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) overarching domestic, economic, foreign policy, and security objectives in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing prioritizes this region, seeking to reshape the regional status quo in its favor while remaining below the threshold that might provoke a militarized response from the United States or China’s neighbors.
While consensus is lacking on which gray-zone activities and operations pose the greatest challenges to the United States and its allies, this article will concentrate on one specific domain—the space domain. Often dubbed the final frontier, space does not lend itself to isolation and presents opportunities for strategic competitors to inflict harm on the US homeland, its national interests, and its allies within the gray zone.
Operating in the gray zone is not a novel concept. Influencing adversaries and non-allies has been integral to military operations for centuries. It is the unique environmental features of space, along with recent activities in orbit, that have brought gray-zone concepts to the forefront in the space domain. Gray-zone actions have been standard operations for the space enterprise since the first military spacecraft entered orbit in the 1960s. Nonphysical, nonkinetic operations have been and will remain the norm in the accessible and contested environment of space. As the 1980s progressed, command control warfare evolved into information warfare, which further expanded to include cyberwarfare. These nonkinetic activities manifest in various forms that contribute to operational objectives encapsulated in the “Five Ds”—deceive, degrade, deny, disrupt, and destroy—with gray-zone operations predominantly addressing the first four.
Gen Stephen Whiting, the commander of US Space Command, emphasizes that space capabilities empower a “joint force to be a truly global military able to see over the next hill and able to conduct operations anywhere on Earth.” The enigmatic realm of space, epitomizing the final frontier, has seamlessly integrated into our daily lives, underpinning essential functions such as communications, weather monitoring, precision navigation and timing, and earth imaging for climate change or humanitarian response. It serves as the backbone for critical sectors like government, finance, and global positioning systems (GPS). Beyond these everyday conveniences, space capabilities serve to achieve strategic effects and safeguard national interests.
In space, gray-zone operations are deemed “situation normal,” delineating an environment where nations engage in discrete actions across the counterspace continuum, employing reversible and nonkinetic effects to assert influence. These calculated tactics aim to degrade or deny satellite usage. Many activities—such as jamming, spoofing, cyber operations, and laser usage—serve military objectives by imposing economic costs or providing diplomatic leverage. The strategic interplay in the gray zone of space operations underscores the evolving dynamics of global security and emphasizes the delicate balance nations must maintain to safeguard their interests while avoiding open conflict.
As we navigate this complex space domain, it is imperative to unravel the layers of ambiguity surrounding the gray-zone activities. This article will explore the nuances of the strategic sequencing in space, shedding light on the tactics employed and their ramifications. Through understanding these subtleties, our goal is to facilitate informed discourse on space security and promote sustainable and responsible use of the final frontier for the betterment of all humankind. The article will delve into diverse scenarios that illustrate the evolving landscape of space warfare, remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.
Legal History/Lawfare
During the initial space race in the 1960s, the prevailing sentiment was that “Military space programs helped keep the peace and civilian space programs helped us live better in peace.” At that time, space was primarily a government-only domain, with the two major players being the Soviet Union and the United States. The foundational framework of international space law, which regulates and governs the exploration and use of outer space, emerged with the UN Outer Space Treaty of 1967. This treaty, ratified by 99 countries and signed by 27, aimed to harness the vast potential of the space age for the collective benefit of humanity, even amid deep political divisions between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The principles enshrined in the treaty include ensuring the peaceful use of outer space for the betterment of all; prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction (though conventional weapons are not explicitly prohibited, even to this day); fostering international cooperation, especially in exploration and research; acknowledging national sovereignty, with states retaining jurisdiction and control over their space activities, including those conducted by nongovernmental entities; holding states liable for any damage caused by their space activities or objects; mandating the registration of space objects launched into outer space; and rejecting any claims of sovereignty over outer space, including celestial bodies such as the Moon. Subsequent treaties, such as the Rescue Agreement (1968), Liability Convention (1968), Registration Convention (1975), and Moon Agreement (1979), further elaborate on the fundamental tenets of the Outer Space Treaty. Notably, the Moon Agreement garnered limited ratification, particularly among space-faring nations like the United States, China, and Russia.
Despite the existence of these treaties, nations have frequently employed lawfare to advance their strategic objectives, often with the sole purpose of impeding the progress of strategic adversaries. An illustrative case is the joint proposal by China and Russia in 2008, reissued in 2014 to the United Nations, aiming to “Prevent the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or Use of Force against Space Objects,” which failed to address Earth-to-space weapons—thus, permitting activities such as the Chinese antisatellite (ASAT) missile test in 2007 (further elaboration on this incident will follow). In December 2022, the United Nations passed a nonbinding resolution with 155 votes in favor, while nine countries, including China and Russia, voted against it, and nine abstained, including India. This resolution discouraged countries from conducting ASAT tests, underscoring the stagnation in negotiations for international agreements to restrict weapons testing, deployment, and usage in outer space.
Recognizing the significance of these agreements is crucial, particularly as reliance on space capabilities continues to grow. While terrestrial boundaries are delineated by state borders, giving states exclusive rights to regulate and control the use of airspace above their lands and territorial waters, airspace extends vertically from the Earth’s surface to the Kármán Line, approximately 100 kilometers (62 miles) above sea level. Aircraft entering a sovereign state’s airspace must obtain clearance and authorization from the relevant aviation authorities. For instance, when traveling from California to New York or from California to France, airlines manage this process on behalf of passengers. This delineation of airspace is exemplified in the case of the US Air Force’s inability to traverse French airspace during the 1986 mission to bomb Libya from bases in the United Kingdom—Operation El Dorado Canyon. French aviation authorities refused permission for overflight, highlighting how a state can imbue a diplomatic dimension into military actions by controlling its airspace. This instance also highlights the significance of partnerships and alliances, particularly in scenarios warranting military intervention, a principle that extends to the maritime domain as well.
A state’s sovereignty extends 12 nautical miles from its coastal baseline, encompassing the authority to regulate and enforce laws pertaining to customs, immigration, and pollution. Various maritime zones and boundaries exist, including the high seas, intended for peaceful purposes and facilitating freedom of navigation, particularly for global commerce, without any single state exerting sovereignty. This framework explains why the United States can intervene militarily to safeguard commercial vessels traversing the Red Sea, even though it lies far from American shores, when they come under threat from Yemen’s Iran-sponsored Houthi rebels.
In contrast to the domains of land, air, and maritime, no state can enforce a quarantine or establish a no-fly zone in space. Objects in space enjoy freedom of navigation, capable of traversing any path at any time, orbiting Earth in low Earth orbit (LEO) approximately 16 times within a 24-hour period. While the UN Outer Space Treaty holds states accountable for authorizing and overseeing satellite launches and operations, the absence of sovereign control in outer space presents challenges. The international community collaborates to develop legal frameworks addressing emerging issues, such as debris mitigation. Initiated in 2007 by the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines primarily respond to incidents like the Chinese ASAT test, with a focus on minimizing debris creation. Recent efforts prioritize space traffic management and norms of behavior in light of the increasing number of objects and the heightened risk of space collisions. As nations navigate the intricacies of space activities, continually evolving legal frameworks are indispensable for ensuring the stability and sustainability of outer space for the benefit of all.
Complex Space Domain Operations
As the space domain has evolved from a bilateral race in the 1960s to a multifaceted arena involving more than 90 countries and numerous commercial entities, the challenges and dynamics have grown exponentially intricate. In 2023, Lt Gen John Shaw, US Space Force, delineated three distinct Space Ages. The initial era revolved around national security and scientific exploration, epitomized by the Apollo missions, during which commercial presence was minimal, save for a handful of communications satellites. The subsequent age witnessed increased collaboration between NASA and commercial entities. Throughout the 1990s, commercial space activities thrived, primarily in geosynchronous orbit. Concurrently, other nations observed how the United States and its allies leveraged space for military purposes, realizing its potential significance in conflicts, particularly with the advent of GPS; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and missile warning satellites. However, space access and operations remained predominantly under governmental purview, with governments heavily investing in commercial space ventures.
A pivotal juncture for the space domain occurred during the second Space Age when space ceased to be a benign environment, transforming into an openly contested realm. In 2007, China demonstrated this shift by launching a ground-based missile into space, intercepting its defunct weather satellite, Fengyun 1, and generating a debris cloud comprising over 32,000 fragments. The consequential aspect was China’s willingness to compromise space integrity, with the debris cloud projected to remain in orbit until approximately 2108, spanning altitudes ranging from 100 to 2,300 miles above Earth. China’s objective was to showcase its ability to counter satellite surveillance in wartime scenarios and compel the United States to engage in negotiations, following President George W. Bush’s authorization of a new national space policy that disregarded calls for a global ban on such tests and emphasized American freedom of action in space. Despite a robust international response to the incident, it garnered scant attention from the general populace. Gen Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations, lamented that “the Air Force’s myopic focus on space as merely an enabler for other forces caused it to lose sight of the increasing competition in space and to forget how contested it had been throughout the Cold War.”
Around 2015, the onset of the third Space Age marked a competitive shift in the space domain, with commercial space endeavors surpassing government space programs in both spending and revenues. By 2021, these earnings had soared to USD 362 billion. This transformation was propelled by the remarkable capabilities demonstrated by commercial space entities like SpaceX and Planet. Innovations such as reusable rockets and satellite constellations in LEO have revolutionized various applications, including commercial internet and electro-optical uses.
Figure 1. Chart showing number of objects >10 cm in LEO. (Source: US Space Force and NASA)
While these commercial advancements have significantly enhanced global communication, provided internet access to remote areas, and bolstered Earth observation capabilities, they have also raised concerns regarding space congestion. The proliferation of satellites, especially with large constellations like Starlink and OneWeb, has resulted in a substantial increase in active satellites in LEO. Projections indicate that by 2030, the number of active satellites could surpass 100,000.
The surge in satellite numbers amplifies concerns over space debris, further complicating the already congested space environment. In addition to active satellites, Earth monitoring detects over 2,800 defunct satellites, 2,040 rocket bodies, and 21,000 other debris objects exceeding 10 cm in size. Notably, more than 130 million debris pieces smaller than 10 cm pose a significant risk to space operations, eluding detection and tracking. Incidents such as the June 2021 collision, wherein a piece of space debris traveling at more than 15,000 miles per hour struck the International Space Station’s robotic arm, resulting in a substantial hole in a section of the arm boom and thermal blanket, vividly illustrate the potential hazards of space debris to spacecraft and astronauts alike.
Efforts to mitigate such risks entail maneuvers by satellite operators. Between 1 June and 30 November 2023, SpaceX’s Starlink satellites executed 24,410 collision avoidance maneuvers. The US Space Force assumes a crucial role in providing space situational awareness services, issuing warnings to satellite operators about potential collisions. This service has been operational since 2009, following the first and only collision incident to date. However, as space commercialization burgeons, responsibilities are transitioning, with the Department of Commerce (DOC) assuming space traffic coordination services from the Department of Defense (DOD). The Office of Space Commerce within the DOC intends to integrate data from the DOD while incorporating commercial data to help maintain a comprehensive space catalog and issue conjunction warnings.
Figure 2. Satellites vs debris (Source: European Space Agency and UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Satellites vs Debris,” June 2023, https://www.esa.int/.)
While advancements in space traffic coordination are imperative for ensuring safety, understanding the intent behind satellite behavior poses a significant challenge. Space domain awareness serves as a cornerstone for assessing activities and providing indications and warnings, particularly in the gray zone. For US Space Command, space domain awareness is essential for deterring aggression, safeguarding national interests, and, if necessary, neutralizing threats.
Deterring aggression in the gray zone using the elements of national power presents challenges, given that counterspace threats can range from reversible to nonreversible effects. These deliberate tactical maneuvers have persisted since inception and are employed to achieve strategic effects that remain below the threshold that would warrant a military response. The erosion of US policy and military options in response to reversible, nonkinetic threats raises questions about when and where a response is justified. Space functions as a conduit for achieving economic stability, accessing information, and asserting relative power. In this context, Russia and China, as strategic competitors to the United States and its allies, employ gray-zone counterspace tactics to further their respective national objectives.
Gray-Zone Counterspace Tactics and Potential Solutions
Reversible effects stemming from denial, deception, and electronic warfare are transient and nondestructive, whereas directed energy weapons, cyberspace threats, and orbital threats can cause either temporary or permanent effects. As stated, “Permanent effects from kinetic energy attacks on space systems, physical attacks against space-related ground infrastructure, and nuclear detonation in space would result in degradation or physical destruction of a space capability.”
Counterspace measures and satellite design considerations play crucial roles in mitigating these threats and bolstering resilience in the continually evolving space domain. Nonetheless, as Rebecca Reesman and James Wilson point out, it is important to acknowledge that “even if satellites and spacecraft are designed to have more energy for maneuverability, distances in space are so big that extensive maneuvering will remain painstakingly slow.”
Figure 3. Counterspace threat continuum. (Source: Challenges to Security in Space: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion [Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2022], 3, https://www.dia.mil/.)
Beginning with direct-ascent ASAT capabilities, these kinetic threats pose enduring damage not only to the targeted satellite but can also render segments of space unusable for protracted periods. During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union conducted destructive ASAT tests, generating substantial debris that continues to orbit today. More recent tests, including those by the United States, China, Russia, and India, have heightened concerns due to the increased risk of collisions in the congested LEO.
Notably, the international response in the third space age reflects a heightened awareness of the interconnected nature of space operations across governmental, civil, and commercial sectors. Russia’s ASAT test shortly before its 2021 invasion of Ukraine brought space threats to the forefront of global attention. US Space Command commander, Gen James Dickinson, US Army, asserted that Russia is “deploying capabilities to actively deny access to and use of space by the United States and its allies,” further emphasizing that Russia’s counterspace weapons systems undermine strategic stability. Furthermore, in February of this year, US Representative Mike Turner (R–OH), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, expressed grave concern about a potential Russian space-related nuclear system designed to destroy satellites. Although this concept is not novel, its utilization would result in irreversible damage to satellites and render large portions of orbits unusable. It would contravene the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. These incidents underscore the imperative for diverse response options, including military interventions for catastrophic events in space. While the US has historically held a well-documented negative stance on proposed space weapons bans, as recently as 2020, citing challenges with verifying such proposed treaties, the Biden Administration announced a voluntary moratorium on destructive direct ascent-ASAT testing and introduced a non-binding UN resolution in 2022, garnering support from 150 countries and signed by the US, albeit opposed by Russia, China, Iran, and five other states.
It is crucial to acknowledge that in the years leading up to this period, the United States established the US Space Force in 2019 and subsequently reinstated a new combatant command, US Space Command, in 2020. These actions were significant policy decisions aimed at affirming that the space domain constituted a warfighting domain necessitating its own dedicated force. However, the failure to achieve deterrence in the gray zone emphasizes the persistence of national interests and the need to maintain offensive options. Consequently, it is imperative to develop and consider options for neutralizing such threats.
USINDOPACOM must possess distinct operational plans and options for neutralizing threats before a missile is launched, despite the challenges posed by China’s road-mobile platform, which complicates targeting. Failing to act could yield immense consequences if the target is a communication (SATCOM) or ISR satellite, resulting in the loss of crucial communication or “eyes in the sky” required to pursue non-gray space counterforce strategies. As space operations continually advance and grow more sophisticated, the need for strategy, doctrine, and policy to keep pace with the evolving landscape becomes increasingly crucial. The loss of space assets at one juncture would have been catastrophic and considered an assault on “national technical means,” resulting in the loss of strategic warning capabilities. However, this may no longer hold true. With the proliferation of technical means for detecting and verifying a strategic attack, including varied orbits and detection methods, gray-zone operations against these assets may not garner the same reaction they would have during the Cold War.
Progressing along the spectrum of space threats, cyberattacks on satellites have emerged as another significant concern. The example of Russia’s cyberattack against a ViaSat commercial satellite during the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, disrupted Kyiv’s command-and-control communications. This incident underscored the potential for spillover effects into other critical infrastructure, affecting wind turbines and tens of thousands of customers in Europe. In May 2022, three months following the attack, the United States disclosed that “Russia had been doing a series of disruptive cyber operations, including website defacements, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and cyber-attacks to delete data from computers belonging to government and private entities.” Although this attack purportedly had reversible effects, it demonstrated to the global community that commercial satellites could be targeted at the behest of an adversary country (the perpetrator remains unattributed). The attribution of such actions is critical for gray-zone deterrence and timely responses. The United States provided direct support to Ukraine to bolster its digital connectivity, even as they were being physically attacked by Russia. Cyberattacks can be irreversible and carry severe consequences, such as shutting down critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is imperative for all satellite operators to prioritize cybersecurity and implement measures to defend against such threats.
However, the hurdles of information sharing in the commercial space sector, driven by concerns over financial implications and shareholder interests, present a complex landscape. The DOD endeavors to address this challenge through an upcoming commercial strategy, yet cultivating trusting relationships with commercial satellite operators remains a challenge. Establishing a collaborative model, akin to the Commercial Integration Cell, is essential to nurturing mutual trust and ensuring superior space domain awareness along with coordinated response options.
Orbital threats, ranging from close approaches, to “grabbling,” or the ability of one satellite to seize, propel, or dismantle another satellite, to intentionally colliding with another satellite—introduce additional layers of complexity to space operations. Instances of close approaches by Russia to US satellites in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) have persisted for decades. If a satellite were to intentionally collide with another satellite, it would have similar effects as the 2009 collision between Iridium and Cosmos, resulting in the destruction of both satellites and generating a substantial debris field. In 2022, China demonstrated its ability capacity to grapple a satellite and relocate it to another position in space. However, this capability could also be beneficial for repairing or relocating satellites—resembling a space tug—and for removing space debris in a novel mission category termed on-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (OSAM). These capabilities encompass dual-use technologies that could be used for both offensive military purposes and commercial utility. Discerning the specific dual-use capability being employed hinges on the ability to monitor and track. As commercial companies equipped with OSAM capabilities start operating in space, coordinating and communicating among satellite operators will be essential to forestall misinterpretations in the gray zone.
Another orbital threat involves shadowing or stalking a satellite, as demonstrated by Russia’s actions toward a first and second-generation satellite named the Luch/Olymp in GEO. Between 2014 and 2019, this Russian satellite snuggled up, called rendezvous and proximity operations, to 19 commercial satellites. This behavior is akin to a hazardous air-to-air intercept. As Rachael Zisk states, “It’s unusual for satellites in GEO to move around much. Usually, satellites maintain a position over a particular area of the Earth’s surface. Such frequent movement is a red flag to US authorities and satellite operators.” The primary concern is safety of flight, but there is also a concern regarding cyber surveillance and attack. Many speculate that Russia’s proximate satellites could potentially intercept the ground signals directed at the targeted satellite, though it remains unclear from the limited publicly available information whether this is happening. Numerous commercial communication satellites serve US government customers, meaning the data streams could encompass various mission traffic, ranging from unmanned aircraft video feeds to mobile ground unit communications. Consequently, encrypting the communication links is essential to secure the information. In gray-zone operations, anticipating this behavior is essential to eliminate operational surprise. Some commercial entities, such as Slingshot Aerospace, employ machine learning to determine the pattern of life of satellites like the Luch/Olymp, facilitating prediction.
The US military heavily relies on satellite communications to project power. Consequently, jamming these capabilities stands as the most widely employed counterspace effect to achieve temporary, reversible disruption. Jamming entails the use of radio frequency (RF) “noise” to interfere with communications to and from a satellite. Ground-based satellite jamming systems are inexpensive and don’t require much technological expertise to construct and operate. This means they are easily proliferated and can be used from land, sea, or air. Additionally, there are two forms of satellite jamming: uplink, the more challenging technique, which interferes with the signal going from a ground station to the satellite, and downlink jamming, which disrupts transmissions from the satellite to ground-based or airborne receivers. Russia is not the sole nation possessing substantial electronic warfare capability. According to John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, “China has already fielded ground-based counterspace weapons and it continues to seek new methods to hold US satellites at risk.” The United States also maintains “an operational electronic warfare (EW) offensive counterspace system, the Counter Communications System (CCS), which is deployed globally to provide uplink jamming capability against geostationary communications satellites.” There is growing concern that jammers, particularly those targeting GPS, provide an asymmetric capability and could be deployed nearer to the US homeland, impacting not only space launches but also air and seaports, unmanned vehicles, and GPS-enabled air, maritime, and land transportation systems. This concern arises because the satellite-based GPS signal servicing these systems is relatively weak, rendering them vulnerable to catastrophic effects from RF jamming.
Attributing jamming to a specific actor is difficult whether deliberate or inadvertent. Attribution requires technical expertise to characterize the signals, discern interference, geolocate the source, and cancel interfering signals. According to Gen John Hyten, formerly the commander of the Air Force Space Command, US military personnel lack “awareness of what our own forces are doing in the spectrum, let alone of what an adversary might do.” While several countermeasures for jamming exist, the primary objective should be establishing redundant and diverse communication paths between military and commercial networks and terminals to ensure connectivity even if one path is jammed, with minimal or no disruption. Crafting policy responses is most difficult for this gray-zone threat to homeland security. However, when attribution can be ascertained, clear response strategies and consequences can, and should, be enforced.
The gray-zone aggressive behaviors exhibited by US adversaries have become somewhat routine, reshaping the perception of what is considered “normal.” To tackle the multifaceted challenges posed by space threats, collaboration between military and commercial entities will be paramount. Various stakeholders are endeavoring to establish rules and standards for space operations to mitigate risks in space, despite the absence of legal principles to deter aggressors from engaging in inappropriate behavior and escalating into conflict. As Robin Dickey states, “Norms, when done right, can be helpful for defense and deterrence, but it still takes effort and cooperation to strike the right balance.”
Conclusion
Maintaining space domain awareness, which includes sharing information about orbital objects and coordinating responses, remains a fundamental aspect of mitigating threats in space and ensuring stability in the homelands. Many commercial and government operators share orbital information through a space situational awareness sharing agreement with the US government, facilitating conjunction screening. However, the current catalogue’s incompleteness underscores the importance of robust tracking. Additionally, the US government maintains an exclusion list for national security satellites, the details of which are not disclosed despite the ability to track and monitor them using commercial telescopes and radars.
To enhance space stability and eliminate potential misperceptions, the United States could cease this practice by sharing information with allies, partners, and ideally with a broader audience. As the US Space Command transitions to dynamic space operations, the need for transparency and international cooperation becomes even more critical to avoid misperceptions and catastrophic events in the gray zone. Whether one is a Soldier, Sailor, Airman, Marine, Guardian, or policy expert, there is a shared responsibility to keep space safe and sustainable for all, for eternity. ♦
Mike Carey
Mr. Carey is the president and founder of M. Carey Consultants, and senior technical advisor for HII Mission Technologies. He is also a partner at Elara Nova, a professional aerospace consultant, and cofounder of ATLAS Space Operation. In addition to his current consulting role, Carey serves as an advisor to multiple aerospace companies, leveraging his knowledge and experience to provide strategic guidance and drive innovation. He is passionate about developing businesses and cultivating leaders in the NewSpace sector.
Charlie McGillis
Ms. McGillis is the founder and CEO of 2 Polaris & Beyond, LLC. She works on strategy, business development and engagement in the public and private sectors, with emphasis on the national security space mission area. She is also the vice president (public sector) at The Provenance Chain Network and previously served as the senior vice president of government relations & strategy at Slingshot Aerospace. She is co-lead for the International Academy of Astronautics Committee on Space Traffic Management Conference, and is a member of the Commission 5 on Space Policy, Law, and Economy. Charlie received her bachelor’s degree from the Georgia Institute of Technology, is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, holds a Master of Military Art and Science from the School of Advanced Military Studies, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the Air War College.