Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs -- View PDF version here.
Abstract
In the twenty-first century, effective security strategies demand more than sophisticated military might. Social and information technologies have transformed the character of conflict, compelling democracies to expand their defenses beyond traditional military domains. Adversaries now wield unprecedented influence over the minds of individuals, leaders, and decision-makers across the security enterprise and society at large. The Chinese Communist Party wages a comprehensive and calculated political warfare campaign, exploiting cognitive weaknesses and harnessing social media platforms to subvert democratic values and advance its strategic aims. While Beijing poses an internal threat, democracies possess the means to fortify cognitive security within their societies and security frameworks. The United States and its allies must prioritize investment in and exploitation of the unique strengths of their diverse populations, while revitalizing the bedrock principles of free speech, free markets, and inherent human rights, which face renewed assault from totalitarian regimes.
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The digital revolution in social and information technology has triggered a profound shift in the landscape of Homeland Defense and Security, challenging traditional paradigms. Democracies must embrace a philosophy of “failing forward,” addressing historical shortcomings and reimagining security strategies to navigate the competitive and conflict-ridden terrain of the twenty-first century. With the ubiquity of smart devices, rival powers now possess direct access to almost every citizen, enabling nefarious actors like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to marshal national resources for information warfare campaigns often conducted clandestinely. In this era of information warfare, every individual becomes a potential combatant or target, exploiting historical vulnerabilities in the American way of war and capitalizing on the openness of democratic societies. As P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooker put it, “These new wars are not won by missiles and bombs, but by those able to shape the story lines.”
While maintaining high-end military capabilities remains paramount, this article argues that the transformation brought about by social and information technologies necessitates a broader perspective for deterring adversaries and safeguarding the homeland. Adversaries now wield unprecedented influence over the minds of individuals, leaders, and decision-makers within both the security enterprise and society as a whole. Democracies, recognizing their susceptibility, must take proactive measures to bolster their defenses. Accordingly, the article delves into an examination of the CCP’s political warfare strategy, introduces cognitive theory, draws insights from past conflicts, analyzes case studies, and proposes measures at the national, communal, and individual levels to enhance cognitive security (COGSEC).
The advent of the Internet era coincided with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a time when Francis Fukuyama famously proclaimed the triumph of democracy over rival ideologies such as fascism and communism. However, early optimism, buoyed by a fervent belief in the transformative potential of technology and liberal values, failed to anticipate the ways in which authoritarian regimes would harness information technologies for their own ends. President Bill Clinton’s 2000 observation likening China’s initial attempts to censor the Internet to “trying to nail Jell-O to the wall“ now appears naïve in hindsight. Today, the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) not only exercises strict censorship over its domestic Internet but also exploits the openness of democratic societies’ information infrastructure. Beijing’s infiltration is evident, signaling a pressing challenge. Beijing is inside the gates.
Cognitive Warfare and How We Think
According to Eric Rosenbach and Katherine Mansted, cognitive warfare employs cyber tools to manipulate enemy cognitive processes, exploiting mental biases, inducing thought distortions, and influencing decision-making both at the individual and collective levels. This form of warfare serves as the foundation for political warfare, encompassing activities aimed at expanding a nation’s influence and legitimacy while undermining adversaries, all without resorting to conventional or nuclear conflict. Political warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of tactics, including public opinion/media warfare, psychological warfare, and economic warfare, using all available resources at a nation’s disposal.
Cognition refers to how individuals mentally respond to stimuli, making an understanding of cognitive processes essential in comprehending cognitive warfare. According to Kenneth Boulding, an individual’s accumulation of knowledge and experience shapes their worldview, forming an image of the world and their role within it. This image, akin to a schema, dictates perceptions and behaviors, filters reality and influences reactions to new information. Robert Jervis’ Perception and Misperception in International Politics demonstrates how perceptions, including self-image and historical interpretations, give rise to biases that impact political decision making. Cognitive warfare exploits these biases to achieve desired effects and reshapes the individuals’ underlying images to manipulate their perceptions.
Groups that “share the same image of the world” are typically “exposed to much the same set of messages in building up images.” A shared image is like an anchor that grounds people to fundamental assumptions and values. If an adversary understands targets’ anchors and cognitive vulnerabilities, it can exploit emotionally charged predispositions and hack individuals and groups.
In psychology, the anchoring effect occurs when individuals rely on a specific value as a reference point when estimating an unknown quantity. These anchors subsequently influence choices, perspectives, and behaviors. Anchoring can occur rapidly or gradually over time, as individuals accumulate images and information, often without awareness of the anchoring process. Beijing’s efforts seek to destabilize free societies by undermining the anchoring narratives of democracy and imposing its own image.
Beijing’s War
The CCP’s extensive political warfare against the United States and its allies has been extensively documented. The PRC wages a widespread campaign aimed at surveilling, harassing, and coercing residents of not only the United States but also other nations. Since 2014, it has been reported that the PRC has hacked and stolen data from approximately 80 percent of Americans. Influence operations play a central role in Beijing’s strategy, as highlighted by security expert Michael Pillsbury’s exposition of the “Hundred-Year Marathon” strategy, which aims to realize the “China Dream” by 2049, reshaping the international order according to traditional Chinese ideals.
In 2014, leading CCP theorist Zeng Huafeng outlined the concept of “brain control in cognitive space,” emphasizing its importance in “future wars,” where nations must leverage various informational channels—including propaganda media, national languages, and cultural products—as weapons to infiltrate, influence, and potentially dominate public cognition, emotions, and consciousness, particularly among both the general populace and national leadership. President Xi Jinping has further asserted that the Chinese socioeconomic model presents a novel option for global modernization.
The narratives propagated by the CCP encompass several key themes:
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The portrayal of Beijing’s strategy, policies, and intentions in a positive light.
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Characterizations of the CCP’s governance model as superior, emphasizing collectivism over individualism.
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Depiction of Western nations as imperialistic and colonial powers, often accused of hypocrisy, racism, and sexism. Notably, the CCP’s news agency released “Ameri-cracy” in 2022, a viral video critiquing the United States for election fraud, human rights violations, and attempts at global domination, set to a children’s song.
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Promotion of “One China” themes that assert territorial claims over Taiwan and delegitimize ethnic minorities such as Tibetans, Uighurs, Mongols, and others.
The PRC has a history of employing cognitive warfare to further its strategic objectives. During China’s Warring States period (475–221 BCE), a strategic landscape emerged marked by prolonged and deceptive competition. Competitors sought to undermine hegemonic powers by fostering complacency and discord, resorting to military action only when the “emperor was too weak to resist.” Drawing inspiration from this historical context, Beijing’s “Hundred-Year Marathon” strategy is informed by insights gleaned from the Stratagems of the Warring States, a compilation of lessons that articulate nine fundamental principles.
Figure 1. Stratagems of the Warring States of China. The Stratagems of the Warring States, also known as Zhan Guo Ce, is an ancient Chinese text filled with anecdotes of political manipulation and warfare during the Warring States period (fifth to third centuries BCE). It offers a fascinating glimpse into the strategies and political views of that era.
Paraphrasing one author stated from an official People’s Liberation Army (PLA) publication, warfare has transcended the physical realm and increasingly revolves around mass media, making cognitive warfare the focal point where information serves as the ammunition. In 2015, the PRC allocated USD 10 billion toward foreign propaganda, an amount that has certainly increased since then. The PRC actively conducts “a concerted information operations (IO) campaign on a global scale . . . to influence governments and voters.” A 2023 cyberthreat analysis identified 10 coordinated covert information operations promoting CCP narratives, with a noted acceleration in PRC efforts against the United States and its allies, exploiting “emerging conspiracy theories.”
The security enterprise inevitably experiences conceptual delays in adopting new technologies as it deliberates their implications. However, there comes a point when the profession can no longer ignore anomalies and must embark on the extraordinary investigations that lead to paradigm-shifting revolutions. Authoritarian regimes adeptly exploit and adapt to new technologies, employing information as a potent tool in the “heart of great-power competition,” while democracies often find themselves lagging behind. Insights from past conflicts can guide adaptation to the evolving security landscape.
Truth emerges more readily from error than from confusion.
—Francis Bacon
Lessons from Wars Past
On 31 January 1968, North Vietnam launched the Tet Offensive, unleashing 70,000 Communist troops in a coordinated surprise attack from the 20th parallel to the southern tip of Vietnam. Vietcong sappers breached the American Embassy in Saigon, and the disturbing images permeated the airwaves. Up to that point, Americans had consistently ingested realistic war coverage and become accustomed to a familiar pattern. However, Tet shattered this familiarity. The years of witnessing helicopters hovering, navigating dense jungles, and encountering booby traps had ingrained in the American psyche images of a distant war and elusive enemy. In stark contrast, the coverage of the Tet Offensive portrayed the North as bold and triumphant, challenging previous perceptions.
Tet proved to be a resounding military setback for the North. Despite initial gains, American and South Vietnamese forces swiftly regained control of most territory, repelled subsequent offensives, and inflicted significant losses on North Vietnam and the Vietcong. However, the objective reality of the situation paled in comparison to the prevailing perception. After years of conflicting messages and faltering narratives, compounded by a nation increasingly uncertain about the direction and purpose of the Vietnam War and America’s role in it, President Lyndon Johnson addressed the nation, acknowledging, “There is a division in the American house now. There is a divisiveness among us . . . I cannot disregard the peril . . . With America’s sons in the fields far away, with America’s future under challenge at home, with our hopes and the world’s hopes for peace in the balance . . . I shall not seek . . . the nomination of my party for another term as your President.”
The Tet-induced cognitive dissonance, while not the sole factor, played a significant role in the demise of Johnson’s presidency, just as conflicting perceptions and shifting public opinion contributed to the war’s ultimate outcome. Though not initially intended, the impact of Tet on the United States was deemed favorable by the politburo’s official history, acknowledging, “We had struck a decisive blow that bankrupted the ‘limited war’ strategy of the American imperialists.” The images from Tet reshaped American perceptions of the war and their government, effectively unmooring and re-anchoring them. As observed, “Tet contorted the reality of American military achievements to a false perception of North Vietnamese Victory. What mattered was not the reality of Tet but what the public perceived to be true.”
Despite possessing military, economic, and technological superiority, the United States encountered strategic failure in Vietnam. Similarly, more recent American efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan also fell short despite similar advantages. In 1972, President Richard Nixon contextualized the Vietnam War within the broader framework of great-power competition, remarking, “We’re in a much bigger game—we’re playing a Russia game, a China game, and an election game.” As the United States once again shifts focus toward great-power competition, it must heed the lessons learned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
The three wars were marked by significant cultural, historical, and social complexities that defied mere military prowess. When viewed through the lens of a socio-technical system, war emerges as a dynamic interplay between hard systems and human elements, indivisible in their interaction. According to socio-technical systems theory, organizations consist of interconnected subsystems encompassing both social and technical dimensions, where individuals work toward common goals, adhere to established processes, use technology, and share cultural assumptions and norms. Failures within campaigns or organizations often stem from a narrow focus on isolated aspects of the system, neglecting to analyze the intricate interdependencies that exist within it.
Figure 2. Socio-technical systems theory. (Source: “Socio-technical systems theory,” Leeds University Business School, n.d., https://business.leeds.ac.uk/.)
Past shortcomings in warfare can be partly attributed to the security enterprise’s failure to adequately consider critical cultural, social, and human subsystems. Colin Gray identifies eight characteristics of American strategic culture, including a disregard for historical context, a preference for technical solutions, a lack of appreciation for cultural nuances, and a tendency to resort to military force. Gray criticizes what he terms “a cult of modernity,” which often neglects the complexities of the human dimension when formulating and implementing security strategies.
Achieving growth necessitates recognizing both gaps and opportunities. Cyberspace comprises not only technology but also the individuals and processes that connect them. While technology undoubtedly plays a vital role, the human element remains indispensable. The security enterprise must accelerate its adaptability or risk losing an ongoing information-cyber war that threatens “social, economic, and political cohesion.” Past failures should be viewed as opportunities for improvement rather than condemnations, and democracy, despite its imperfections, must not be relegated to the dustbins of history. Nonetheless, democracy faces significant threats, necessitating security strategies that can effectively counter the evolving landscape of “psychological-social-technical warfare.”
The manipulation of perceptions occurs on unprecedented “scales of time, space, and intentionality,” constituting one of the most significant vulnerabilities we, both as individuals and as a society, confront. Metadata algorithms empower the PRC to surveil, define, and manipulate targets. Smart devices serve as homing beacons for cognitive “bombs” within the networked information ecosystem, pinpointing weaknesses with precision. Beijing adeptly exploits cognitive vulnerabilities, categorizing targets based on their image, and either leveraging existing anchoring narratives or subverting and reshaping them to align with Beijing’s worldview. This article presents four interrelated terms encapsulated by the acronym NIRV, delineating how the PRC generates cognitive effects:
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Nudging—involves subtly attaching new or minor changes to already accepted narratives to steer target images toward CCP-aligned views, likened to putting kale in a child’s chocolate milkshake to get them to consume vegetables.
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Injection—entails the rapid dissemination of flash messages, images, or narratives directly to the subconscious, often devoid of context.
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Repetition—refers to the frequency with which a particular narrative recurs across all mediums.
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Volume— encompasses the diversity of narratives directed at a target, encompassing a wide range of perspectives and themes.
Case Studies
The PRC leverages Hollywood and social media platforms to exert influence over American populations. Access in this context refers to the capability to deploy effects into a specified operational domain with adequate freedom of action to achieve the intended objectives.
It’s Just a Panda
In their 2023 Kenney Paper, Mapping Chinese Influence in Hollywood, Morgan A. Martin and Clinton J. Williamson provide insights into PRC objectives, investment partnerships between the PRC and US film companies, and outline PRC-approved movie narratives. The evolution of narratives within the Kung Fu Panda franchise across its three films released between 2008 and 2016 is notable. Initially, the storyline followed the protagonist, Po, on his hero’s journey as he triumphed over his adversary, echoing classic Western individualistic themes. Chinese elites questioned why the film was solely an American production and invited DreamWorks staff to visit pandas in mainland China.
Subsequent sequels witnessed a shift in scenery from a blend of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean backgrounds to predominantly Chinese imagery, with Po adopting more traditional Chinese attributes. Notably, DreamWorks and China Film Production Group collaborated on Kung Fu Panda 3, wherein Po’s success depended on countering the potent chi of a long-deceased villain and rallying the townspeople (the collective) to save China. The seemingly harmless collaboration aimed to eliminate unfavorable narratives and suggest pro-China alterations.
These changes, which may seem inconsequential individually, collectively established numerous anchors in narratives and images. While some may dismiss the film as mere entertainment featuring a cartoon panda, the PRC’s stratagems, inducing complacency and employing shi (aligning all forces and deception), remain applicable. It is crucial to recognize that youths and young adults, being particularly susceptible to significant self-image influences, constitute the primary target audience for most such coproduced films. Notably, Kung Fu Panda 4 released in 2024.
The Guest Becomes the Owner
Smart devices have expanded users’ access to the world and vice versa. However, this interconnectedness has also led to information overload, creating ripe opportunities for exploitation. Users often find themselves inundated with torrents of information, compelling them to rely on biases, analogies, and emotions when making decision, and rendering them more susceptible to influence. In the emerging “attention economy,” truth takes a backseat to capturing interest. Algorithms meticulously curate personalized feeds, frequently featuring emotionally charged content that amplifies the NIRV effects. Despite the dubious reliability of social media, these platforms continue to rank among the top sources of news for many individuals.
The popularity of social media can largely be attributed to its personalized nature. Users either select interest groups themselves or have them suggested based on algorithms that gather demographic data to construct tailored interest ecosystems.
The PRC employs over one million individuals in the online censorship sector, while more than 730,000 American computers have been compromised, allowing PRC hackers to transform them into “slaves.” PRC operatives engage in trolling, amplification, and dissemination of discord and disinformation across social platforms to achieve strategic objectives. For instance, the PRC-based information operations group Empire Dragon targeted American and Taiwanese populations with more than 1,800 posts disparaging democratic elections, democracy itself, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, her family, and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen during Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022.
ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, is owned by the PRC, exerting significant influence over Chinese domestic opinion and conducting surveillance on citizens through a suite of mobile entertainment and e-commerce applications. Despite being perceived as innocuous entertainment, TikTok boasts 150 million monthly active users in the United States alone, contributing to its estimated global user base of 1.218 billion individuals, which accounts for approximately 25 percent of social media users worldwide—these figures only consider users aged 18 and above. However, beneath TikTok’s façade of ostensibly harmless amusement lies an intelligence apparatus that systematically collects, analyzes, and furnishes copious amounts of data to the CCP. Beijing actively monitors, censors—referred to as harmonizing by the CCP—and exploits this data to serve its strategic interests.
China’s domestic counterpart to TikTok, Douyin, bears a striking resemblance in appearance but operates under a vastly different framework. On Douyin, user-generated content takes a backseat, replaced instead by the dissemination of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) and other educational videos, carefully crafted to propagate approved narratives and educate China’s populace. The stark contrast between ByteDance’s domestic and international platforms speaks volumes about the company’s objectives. Equally telling is the genesis of TikTok.
In 2017, ByteDance made headlines with its acquisition of Musical.ly, a US-owned karaoke application centered on user-generated content, for a staggering USD 1 billion. By merging the data-collection infrastructure of Musical.ly with that of Douyin, ByteDance birthed TikTok.
In 2022, the US Department of Defense passed the No TikTok on Government Devices Act, two years after it was initially proposed by then-President Donald Trump. While the bill provides scant context for the ban, media coverage highlighted TikTok’s use of location tracking and data collection, particularly against Forbes journalists probing the app’s ties to the PRC. Notably, a recent poll revealed that 32 percent of individuals aged 18-29 in the United States regularly consume “news” from TikTok (see fig. 3). Additionally, ByteDance owns Jinri Toutiao, an exclusively domestic news application that delivers curated news content to Chinese citizens. With ByteDance controlling the algorithms that govern content curation for millions of Americans (see fig. 4), concerns about information manipulation and censorship loom large.
Figure 3. US consumption of TikTok “news.” (Source: Pew Research Center)
Figure 4. PRC tradecraft using companies to create access points and collect private data
Two discernible themes surface from the analysis of access points. Firstly, the PRC strategically establishes footholds within the US system, cultivates dependencies on funding, and fosters habitual relationships. Democratic institutions and free-market societies often prioritize short-term gains and only later realize they have become ensnared in a far-reaching strategic web. Secondly, the CCP adeptly conceals nefarious intentions within seemingly innocuous and enticing ventures. Indeed, we find ourselves embroiled in a broader geopolitical contest.
Figure 5. The new “Great Game”
Recommendations
At the national level, it is crucial to increase public awareness regarding the national security threat posed by products and services originating from the PRC. National leaders should actively disseminate the PRC’s openly shared strategies concerning lawfare, media warfare, and psychological warfare to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the challenges faced. Moreover, following the US Congress’s passage of legislation banning TikTok from government devices, a national statement should have been issued to elucidate the reasons behind this decision and to empower citizens to take proactive measures to raise awareness and safeguard freedoms.
Additionally, there is a pressing need to address the significant gap between existing US data privacy legislation and the evolving threats to citizens’ data security and exposure to manipulative narratives. Enhancing data privacy laws to provide more comprehensive coverage, particularly concerning metadata collection, is essential. Drawing insights from the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), implemented in 2018, could inform potential US policies in this regard.
Weather forecasts serve as valuable tools, prompting individuals to take precautionary measures regardless of the forecast’s accuracy. Similarly, forecasting heightened adversarial information campaigns could effectively alert populations to anticipated adversarial narratives correlated with specific platforms and time horizons. By delivering forecasts akin to the air quality index, awareness of information operations could be raised, identifying groups most likely to be targeted and offering recommendations for media consumption practices (see table 1). One potential name for such an index could be the Adversarial Influence Index (AI2).
Table 1. Air Quality Index basics for ozone and particle pollution. (Source: “Air Quality Index (AQI) Basics,” AirNow, n.d., https://www.airnow.gov/.)
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Daily AQI Color
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Levels of Concern
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Values of Index
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Description of Air Quality
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Green
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Good
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0 to 50
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Air quality is satisfactory, and air pollution poses little or no risk.
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Yellow
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Moderate
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51 to 100
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Air quality is acceptable. However, there may be a risk for some people, particularly those who are unusually sensitive to air pollution.
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Orange
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Unhealthy for Sensitive Groups
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101 to 150
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Members of sensitive groups may experience health effects. The general public is less likely to be affected.
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Red
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Unhealthy
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151 to 200
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Some members of the general public may experience health effects; members of sensitive groups may experience more serious health effects.
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Purple
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Very Unhealthy
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201 to 300
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Health alert: The risk of health effects is increased for everyone.
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Maroon
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Hazardous
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301 and higher
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Health warning of emergency conditions: everyone is more likely to be affected.
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In 2024, major elections are taking place around the world, including the United States, with those in Russia and Taiwan already having taken place. Despite the conclusion of the latter two elections, the need for tailored forecasts remains relevant as future elections approach. These forecasts could be customized for specific regions, communities, and interest groups. Social media companies could play a significant role in generating these predictions through trend analysis. Subsequently, a separate entity could analyze trends across platforms to identify information operations campaigns and provide forecasts accordingly. It is worth noting that this proposed model diverges from the existing information operations condition (INFOCON) threat level system, which primarily concentrates on providing system status updates for computer network attack defense.
At the personal level, social media inundates users with vast amounts of information, often devoid of context, thereby providing adversaries with opportunities to sow and exploit internal divisions. Individuals struggle to adequately process the sheer volume of media content. Compounding this challenge, social media platforms were intentionally crafted based on principles of social engineering and influence. The chart presented below illustrates the correlation between some of Robert Cialdini’s seven foundational influence principles and common social media practices (see table 2).
Table 2. Cialdini’s seven foundational principles and common social media practices. (Source: Created using Robert Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, 2nd ed. [Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2001], 2–17).
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Influence Principle
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Definition
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Media Feature Examples
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Consistency
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Making something familiar through repetition generates belief
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Algorithm curated content generating echo chambers, auto-play based on previous video
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Social Proof
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Behavior is deemed correct in a given situation if we see other performing it (i.e., laughter tracks in 1990s sitcoms)
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Like buttons, sharing, demonstrating behavior on video, number of views counter
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Liking
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People prefer to say yes to individuals they know, share similarities with, and like
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Interest groups, like buttons, connection recommendations
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Scarcity
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Opportunities seen as more valuable when they are less available
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Number of views counter, endless scrolling, 24/7 news cycle
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Automaticity
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Avalanche of information and choice (cognitive overload) require shortcuts to function in the modern world
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Endless scrolling, billions of content generators, “short” format videos
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Platforms strategically optimize design features, such as delaying the release of “likes” until a specific time, to trigger fixed-action subconscious responses. These features provide users with a series of calculated dopamine hits—a neurotransmitter associated with instant gratification. Additionally, applications capitalize on the four stages of the habit development cycle: cue, craving, response, and reward. This cycle habituates users toward behaviors that are favorable to platform providers. You are being targeted anytime you use social media. Designed to exploit cognitive vulnerabilities, social media is optimized for political warfare.
How to recognize if you are being targeted with disinformation? One key indicator is the emotional response elicited by the content. If a piece of content triggers a strong emotional reaction, individuals should pause and question the credibility of the content or evaluate their own response. Developing emotional intelligence (EQ) skills can enhance self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management. By improving EQ, individuals can become more attuned to their social media habits and better regulate their responses to various types of content. This heightened self-awareness facilitates improved self-management, which in turn can lead to reduced consumption of disinformation and significantly limit adversarial access.
In addition to EQ, critical thinking skills are indispensable for navigating the cognitive battlespace. Critical thinking enables users to identify logical fallacies, recognize biases (including their own), and seek out additional sources of information for verification. Digital literacy education is also crucial, as it empowers users to recognize and resist addictive design features (such as infinite scroll) and avoid harmful content. Democracies should prioritize the normalization of digital literacy as part of their K–12 curricula to ensure citizens are equipped to navigate the complexities of the digital landscape. Organizations like NATO’s Strategic Communication Center of Excellence and Taiwan’s counterinfluence strategy offer valuable reports and initiatives to aid in this endeavor.
EQ, complemented with critical thinking and digital literacy skills, forms an indispensable toolkit for combating adversarial narratives. This multifaceted approach harnesses the adaptive and innovative potential of a democracy’s diverse population, thereby capitalizing on one of its greatest strengths.
Figure 6. Democracy’s version of Go. (Source: Authors’ creation.)
Conclusion
The evolution of conflict demands that nations expand their focus beyond traditional military domains to safeguard their homelands. This article has provided a glimpse into essential concepts necessary for dissecting the security challenges presented by contemporary socio-technical systems. Key themes explored include political warfare, cognitive warfare, PRC anchoring narratives and stratagems, COGSEC, the image, US historical blind spots, and the NIRV acronym. Through case study analysis, we have observed the patterns of CCP access and data collection techniques aimed at propagating PRC narratives, underscoring how such access grants Beijing strategic footholds within the gates of democracy.
It is imperative for free nations to unite and implement strategies that bolster COGSEC at the national, communal, and personal levels. By safeguarding democracy’s foundational image, enshrined in documents like the American Constitution and exemplified by the values upheld by democratic nations worldwide, we can fortify against external threats. As Pillsbury astutely observes, military confrontation represents only the culmination of a broader narrative. Today’s competition unfolds predominantly in the information environment—a story still in the making, where democracies undoubtedly wield significant influence. As we navigate this evolving landscape, it is clear that democracies not only have a stake but also possess the agency to shape the course of events to come. ♦
Col Dr. William “Ox” Hersch, USAF, Retired
Dr. Hersch is a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and holds a doctorate in military strategy. He is a retired Air Force colonel and B-1 instructor weapon system officer, a veteran of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and a political-military affairs specialist. Currently, he serves as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies, US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Lt Col Melissa “Sharpie” McLain, USAF
Lieutenant Colonel McLain is an Institute for Future Conflict Fellow and will go on to complete her doctorate in human-agent teaming in the summer of 2024. She is a career intelligence officer with a background in B-1B missions, SIGINT analysis, and emerging technology forecasting. Currently, Sharpie serves as an instructor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies, US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Notes