Vulnerabilities and Hybrid Threats in the North American Arctic

 

 

The North American Arctic has long been neglected by the national security and defense establishments in Washington, DC, and Ottawa, owing to its inaccessibility, austerity, and remoteness.^[1] Discussions on homeland defense have tended to focus on conventional and strategic threats passing through the Arctic.^[2] However, as the region becomes more accessible due to climate change, a growing number of countries are showing interest in the region, its resources, and sea routes. China, in particular, has shown keen interest in the North American Arctic. In 2023, two Chinese high-altitude balloons flying over North America were shot down by US fighter jets, one over Yukon and the other off the coast of North Carolina in the Atlantic Ocean. These incidents attracted substantial public attention and raised concerns for national security and continental defense in both Canada and the United States.

While US conventional and strategic deterrence remains robust, North America is no longer the geographic sanctuary it once was. Thank to technological advancements and the emergence of new domains such as cyber and information warfare, adversaries—especially China and Russia—are employing alternative tactics to undermine Canadian and US interests without engaging in direct conflict. These hybrid threats blend military and nonmilitary means to achieve the adversary’s strategic objectives at the expense of both nations.^[3]

Despite the evident risks, the national defense community continues to overlook hybrid threats to North America and its Arctic domain. To gain a deeper understanding of how hybrid threats could manifest in the North American Arctic and undermine homeland defense, it is crucial to understand how unique geographical, economic, social, and political conditions contribute to vulnerability in the region. Accordingly, this article examines vulnerabilities across the North American Arctic and how adversaries might exploit them to undermine the defense of Canada and the United States. It concludes by discussing the critical importance of resilience and integrated deterrence to counter hybrid threats in the North American Arctic.

Understanding Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities are factors that heighten susceptibility to harm. In the Arctic, Canada and the United States are most vulnerable  due to the range of vulnerabilities  and how those vulnerabilities interact and overlap.^[4] From a military perspective, significant vulnerabilities for national and continental defense arise from gaps in situational awareness, limited military infrastructure, and lack of government presence across the North American Arctic.^[5] Nonmilitary factors—particularly socioeconomic disparities, inadequate critical infrastructure, and complex governance structures governing land and resources—further expose the region to hostile actions. The region’s challenging geography and climate, along with the rapid and profound impacts of climate change, compound these vulnerabilities.

Social-Economic Discrepancies

Indigenous peoples across Northern Canada and Alaska struggle  significant socioeconomic disparities compared to the rest of the region’s inhabitants and the general Canadian and US populations. In Canada, Inuit communities contend with elevated infant mortality rates and heightened food insecurity. In Alaska, Native populations face increased risks of cardiovascular disease, homicide, alcoholism, and domestic violence. Moreover, Indigenous communities across the region confront a heightened risk of suicide, with Inuit populations experiencing some of the highest rates in the world.

These populations also bear a disproportionate burden of economic hardship. In Canada, the median individual income for Inuit individuals stands at a striking 75 percent lower than that of their non-Indigenous counterparts residing in Inuit Nunangat.^[6] The growth of the formal wage economy, coupled with the effects of climate change, is transforming traditional ways of life, encroaching upon subsistence and nonwage-based activities.^[7] In Alaska, despite being one of the wealthiest states per capita in the United States, a quarter of Native Alaskans find themselves living below the poverty line. ^[8]

Of notable significance are the disparities between urban and rural Alaskan Natives; rural Native communities often lack access to public services, essential infrastructure, and tangible economic opportunities.^[9] These disparities exacerbate long-standing grievances among Indigenous peoples, eroding trust and legitimacy in their interactions with provincial, state, and federal authorities.

Sparse Critical Infrastructure

Critical infrastructure encompasses the array of “processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or economic well-being of and the effective functioning of government.”^[10] Compared to other parts of the continent, the North American Arctic suffers from a glaring deficiency in critical infrastructure, further compounded by its heightened vulnerability to environmental stressors and damage. Shortcomings in redundancy, maintenance deficiencies, and the impact of climate change on permafrost and ice layers exacerbate this challenge, jeopardizing the safety and wellbeing of local populations and impeding resilience in the face of disasters and emergencies.

For example, the lack of roads and the ongoing challenge of maintaining existing ones as the permafrost shifts severely restricts access to isolated communities. In Iqaluit, the largest population center in Nunavut, insufficient access to potable water required the intervention of the Canadian Armed Forces in 2022.^[11] Additionally, limited telecommunications and internet connectivity across the region creates significant hurdles for local communities, as well as government and military operations.^[12] While the gradual installation of sub-sea optical cables across the region enhances internet accessibility, recent incidents highlight the need for redundancy through satellite-based services.^[13]

In Alaska, where the energy sector generates 80 percent of the state government’s revenues, concerns loom large over the durability and safety of the Trans-Alaska pipeline and associated infrastructure amid permafrost thawing. ^[14] Any incident would disproportionately impact Native communities and their land, exacerbating the situation due to constrained disaster response and search-and-rescue capabilities.

Land and Resources Governance

The region presents a complex governance landscape due to the presence of multiple stakeholders with often divergent interests, goals, and authorities.^[15] Relationships among these entities are often fraught with conflict and discord, rooted deeply in enduring colonial legacies.^[16] Central to this governance conundrum are issues of land and resource ownership and management spanning the region.^[17]

In Canada, the reconciliation process between the federal government and Indigenous peoples led to unique governance arrangements with Indigenous communities, pivotal for resource management and development.^[18] In Alaska, the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act facilitated the transfer of land to Alaska Native corporations, granting them freehold land and subsurface resource rights.^[19]

Nonetheless, these arrangements are far from flawless, and tensions occasionally flare. At times, federal entities have disregarded established agreements in favor of pro-development interests. For examples, Alaskan tribes have expressed serious concerns over potential rollbacks of protections over federally managed land, which could pave the way for resource extraction and exploitation on land Alaskan Natives consider part of their traditional landscape.^[20] Such actions could significantly impact ecosystems already fragile due to the effects of climate change.^[21]

Projects like the Willow oil development on the North Slope, have received mixed support from Native Alaskans and face legal challenges. On the one hand, some welcoming the promised economic benefits while others fear the environmental and health consequences on their communities.^[22] While some groups embrace these projects for their potential to bolster local economies and reduce dependence on state and federal funding, others residing closer to the sites harbor concerns over the environmental and health impacts on their communities. Similar dynamics exist in Canada, exemplified by the protracted hiatus in the expansion of the Mary River mine on Baffin Island.^[23] Here, diverse factions engage in a tug-of-war for influence via governance and review mechanisms, with questions of Indigenous group representation and legitimacy at the heart of the saga.

Socioeconomic disparities, insufficient critical infrastructure, and complex land and resource management systems are but a few examples of conditions rendering the North American Arctic vulnerable to hybrid threats. These vulnerabilities intertwine in ways that magnify their effects, potentially fostering rifts and contentious issues ripe for exploitation by hostile actors, thereby undermining homeland defense.

Hybrid Threats

One of the biggest challenges associated with hybrid and subthreshold threats lies in their elusive nature, often cloaked in plausible deniability by their sponsors. Legitimate, overt activities can serve as cover for concurrent or future nefarious actions. Even when hostile activities are detected within North American borders, gauging their scope, intent, and impact on homeland defense proves arduous. Incidents occurring in or targeting the Arctic can also have consequences outside the region, undermining public trust, sowing disagreements and resentment between northerners and southerners, or influencing public debate and agenda setting through disinformation campaigns.

While the threat posed by China and Russia to—rather than through—the North American Arctic should not be overstated, both nations have demonstrated their ability to exploit gaps and seams in the region to undermine Canadian and US interests, and potentially, homeland defense. Nevertheless, it is important to not conflate Russian and Chinese posture and interests in the region. Russia is the biggest Arctic nation by both population and territory, and thus holds sovereign rights in the region, whereas China is battling for influence and secure access.

China

China’s interest in the circumpolar Arctic is growing, but its current presence and influence remains fairly limited.^[24] Beijing’s primary focus revolves around issues closer to its homeland, including Taiwan and the South China Sea. Nonetheless, the circumpolar North has emerged as a theater for great power competition, with the North American Arctic being no exception. Unlike the United States and Russia, China lacks territorial holdings above the Arctic Circle. Consequently, Beijing relies on scientific and economic endeavors to stake a claim in the region. However, operating under the principle of civil-military fusion, Chinese civilian activities, technology, and infrastructure can be leveraged for military purposes. This permeability between the civilian and military  contributes to China’s rapid military development and raises serious concerns in the North American Arctic where needs for economic development, critical infrastructure, and financial investment are acute and but also susceptible to exploitation by Beijing.^[25]

China frames its scientific expeditions in the Arctic as efforts to better understand climate change, support sustainable resource exploitation, and map commercial sea routes.^[26] In recent years, the Xue Long II icebreaker has traversed the Northwest Passage and conducted research expeditions in the Beaufort Sea and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Chinese monitoring buoys have also been deployed in Canadian Arctic waters.^[27] These scientific expeditions and monitoring devices facilitate a deeper understanding of sea ice dynamics, underwater acoustics, and the Arctic seabed.^[28] Such research also holds significant implications for underwater operations and maritime capabilities development, potentially paving the way for the deployment of nuclear submarines to the Arctic or the creation of technology capable of monitoring US submarine activities.

Furthermore, within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is developing infrastructure projects encompassing satellite receiver stations, offshore platforms, cables, pipelines, and deep-sea ports that could enable future military applications. While Beijing initially envisioned the Polar Silk Road as part of the BRI, Russia is the sole Arctic nation to join the initiative, while others have worked to thwart Chinese investments. Nonetheless, Chinese companies persist in expressing keen interest in investing across the mining, energy, and infrastructure sectors. On its Canadian website, Huawei strategically exploits the internet and telecommunications deficiencies experienced by northern communities, coupled with their strained relationship with Ottawa, to promote Chinese services and technology.^[29] Chinese firms have also attempted to acquire a gold mine and a hangar near North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) installations in Inuvik, Nunavut, although Ottawa blocked both transactions on national security grounds.^[30]

China has faced repeated accusations of employing “cooperative state-to-state, multilateral, and environmental narratives to disguise aggressive and assertive ambitions.”^[31] A recent report by Mandiant shed light on China’s intentions in the rare earth sector, with potentially serious implications for resource development in the Arctic. In 2022, Mandiant uncovered an ongoing pro-China covert influence campaign targeting rare earth mining companies, offering concerning insights into China’s readiness to leverage cyber means to advance its economic and geostrategic interests at the expense of the United States and Canada.^[32] Dubbed “Operation Dragonbridge,” the campaign aimed to derail new rare earth mining projects by inciting local public opposition through social media, targeting potential sites and associated companies in Texas and northern Saskatchewan.^[33] Similar tactics could be used to impede the exploration and exploitation of important critical mineral deposits in the Arctic, where operational costs are prohibitive and the lack of infrastructure, coupled with intricate regulations, already pose significant challenges.^[34] China currently dominates the global rare earth mining and processing sector that is key to technological and military advancement. Activities such as Dragonbridge seek to undermine Canadian and US efforts to reduce their dependency on Chinese rare earth materials and expertise.

Growing Chinese tourism in the Arctic also raises concerns. In a recent incident in Alaska, Chinese nationals were arrested for trying to access military facilities while carrying a drone in their vehicle.^[35] Ultimately, China’s conduct both within and outside the confines of the North American Arctic point’ to Beijing’s willingness to employ coercive means and subterfuge in pursuit of its economic and strategic goals. While the current threat posed by China in the North American Arctic remains manageable for the time being, the PRC  remains the long-term pacing challenge to homeland defense in the long term. North American policy makers must implement measures to deter and counter China’s growing influence and nefarious activities in the region while they remain within manageable bounds.

Russia

In the short term, Russia poses the most pressing conventional and strategic threat to homeland defense in the circumpolar Arctic. However, Moscow’s inclination to employ hybrid tactics in targeting the North American Arctic appears less pronounced. Nevertheless, in the European High North, Russia has demonstrated its ability and willingness to use hybrid means to advance its interests both within and outside the region. These tactics encompass cyberattacks, sabotage of undersea cables, and the exploitation of migrant populations to overwhelm Finnish border security services.

Instances of Russia successfully targeting the Canadian North and Alaska remain scarce.^[36] Nonetheless, Moscow could exploit vulnerabilities in the Arctic through cyber operations and disinformation campaigns to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of government entities and decision-makers in Ottawa and Washington. As evidenced in 2017, Russian media misrepresented a statement by an Alaskan state official, implying that “Alaska would be better off under Russian leadership.”^[37] Furthermore, in scenarios escalating to conventional or strategic attacks on North America, Moscow could target northern military and civilian infrastructure through cyberattacks to undermine warning and defense systems in the region. 

Currently, Russia exhibits scant interest in meddling in North American Arctic affairs. Russian hybrid threats in the European High North should be understood in the context of the war in Ukraine, as well as Finland and Sweden’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Additionally, Moscow places significant importance on preserving its maritime access to the North Atlantic for global naval projection through bastion defense strategies. In the circumpolar north, it is still in Russia’s interest to abide by international rules and norms given its Arctic status and enduring interests in the region.

Resilience against Hybrid Threats

While some experts argue that the Arctic is relatively less vulnerable to undue foreign influence compared to other regions, the examples provided above illustrate how the North American Arctic has evolved into an arena of strategic competition.^[38] Here, China—and Russia to a lesser extent—endeavor to further their interests at the expense of Canada and the United States.  Resilience is the best defense against hybrid threats. By identifying vulnerabilities across the North American Arctic and proactively addressing them, North American leaders can deter adversaries from exploiting these vulnerabilities, thus fortifying the region against adversarial actions.

Efforts to counter hybrid threats should focus first and foremost on addressing vulnerabilities at their source whenever possible. Investments in critical infrastructure, with a focus on enhancing service provision and ensuring the safety of Arctic communities, alongside initiatives promoting sustainable socioeconomic development led by northern communities and Indigenous peoples in collaboration with all levels of government, are paramount. Moreover, fostering dialogue around security risks pertaining to economic security, social cohesion, and democratic values should be central to any strategy to safeguard the North American Arctic.

To that end, the government of Yukon announced in January 2024 the creation of an Arctic Security Advisory Council to “study risks across the Yukon security landscape, determine what assets and infrastructure require additional protection and identify opportunities for the Government of Yukon to work with the Government of Canada to enhance security across the territory.”^[39] This initiative is expected to enhance transparency, promote dialogue, and enhance security literacy among Yukon stakeholders, ultimately leading to more informed decision making that safeguards both homeland defense and the safety and security of Yukon residents. Furthermore, valuable insights can be drawn from the Norwegian concept of total defense, which emphasizes the pivotal role of individuals and communities in defending their country. ♦

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Dr. Gaëlle Rivard Piché

Dr. Rivard Piché is a strategic analyst with Defence Research and Development Canada. Since joining DRDC in 2016, she worked closely with the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. In Fall 2014, she will join the North American Aerospace Defense Command in Colorado Springs. She co-authored two books on Arctic security and defence, and her research has been published in the Texas National Security Review, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, International Journal, and Études internationales. She is a senior fellow with the Canadian Defence Associations Institute, an affiliated expert with the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, and a former Fulbright research fellow in the International Security Program at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Notes

^[1] The North American Arctic is defined here as comprising Alaska’s and Canada’s Arctic and northern regions. The latter includes Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut, as well as portions of northern Quebec and Labrador that are part of the homeland of Inuit peoples, Inuit Nunangat.

^[2] On distinguishing threats in, to and through the Arctic, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Threats Through, To, and In the Arctic: A Framework for Analysis,” NAADSN Policy Brief, 23 March 2021, https://www.naadsn.ca/.

^[3] For a definition of hybrid threats, see “Hybrid threats as a concept,” The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, n.d., https://www.hybridcoe.fi/.

^[4] Gaëlle Rivard Piché and Bradley Sylvestre, Vulnerabilities and Hybrid Threats in the Canadian Arctic: Resilience as Defence (Helsinki: The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, May 2023), https://www.hybridcoe.fi/.

^[5] Rivard Piché and Sylvestre, Vulnerabilities and Hybrid Threats in the Canadian Arctic, 7.

^[6] Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) delineates the land, water, and ice that form the ancestral homeland of the Inuit in Canada. This expanse encompasses four key northern Canadian regions: the Inuvialuit Settlement Region in the Northwest Territories, the territory of Nunavut, Nunavik in northern Quebec, and Nunatsiavut in Newfoundland and Labrador. Translated from Inuktitut, the term signifies “the place where Inuit live,” underscoring the fundamental role of the land, water, and ice in Inuit culture. The concept of Inuit Nunangat holds pivotal significance in grasping the geographical and cultural milieu of the Inuit people. It not only delineates their physical territory but also encapsulates their profound connection to the environment and asserts their sovereignty over this terrain. See: Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (Ottawa: Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, 2019), 23, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/.

^[7] Paula Arriagada and Amanda Bleakney, “Inuit participation in the wage and land-based economies in Inuit Nunangat,” Aboriginal Peoples Survey, 13 June 2019, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/; Tristan Pearce et al., “Transmission of Environmental Knowledge and Land Skills among Inuit Men in Ulukhaktok, Northwest Territories, Canada,” Human Ecology 39, no. 3 (2011): 271–88, https://www.jstor.org/; and George W. Wenzel, “Canadian Inuit subsistence and ecological instability—if the climate changes, must the Inuit?,” Polar Research 28, no. 1 (2009): 89–99, https://doi.org/.

^[8] Matthew Berman, “Resource rents, universal basic income, and poverty among Alaska’s Indigenous peoples,” World Development 106 (June 2018), 162, https://doi.org/.

^[9] Berman, “Resource rents, universal basic income.”

^[10] “Canada’s Critical Infrastructure,” Public Safety Canada, 1 June 2021, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/.

^[11] Kaylia Little, “Iqaluit’s water crisis highlights deeper issues with Arctic infrastructure,” Arctic Institute, 2 May 2022, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/.

^[12] Timothy J. Pasch and Olaf Kuhlke, “Arctic Broadband Connectivity and the Creative Economy: Access, challenges, and opportunities in Nunavut and Alaska,” in Renewable Economies in the Arctic, ed. David C. Natcher and Timo Koivurova (New York: Routledge, 2022), 9–45, https://commons.und.edu/.

^[13] Emma Roth, “Satellite internet is on the way after Arctic fiber cut unplugs part of Alaska,” The Verge, 23 June 2023, https://www.theverge.com/.

^[14] Viviane Gomide et al., “Native Communities in Alaska: Vulnerabilities in Light of Climate Change,” Cornell Policy Review (2017) https://cornellpolicyreview.com/.

^[15] See, John S. Dryzek, Conflict and Choice in Resource Management: The Case of Alaska (London: Taylor & Francis, 1983), 164.

^[16] Martin Papillon, “Canadian Federalism and the Emerging Mosaic of Aboriginal Multilevel Governance,” in Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy, 3rd ed., ed. Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

^[17] Crystal Leonetti et al., “Indigenous Led Land Planning in Alaska and Canada,” Northern Latitudes Partnerships, 18 July 2022, https://www.northernlatitudes.org/.

^[18] Thierry Rodon and Aude Therrien, “Resource Development & Land Claim Settlements in the Canadian Arctic: Multilevel Governance, Subsidiarity and Streamlining,” Arctic Yearbook 2015 (Akurcyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum, 2015), 119–31, https://arcticyearbook.com/.

^[19] “Indigenous lands: Recognition, management and development,” in Linking Indigenous Communities with Regional Development (Paris: OECD, 2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/.

^[20] https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2023/11/20/alaska-tribes-urge-bureau-of-land-management-to-protect-critical-lands-and-waters

^[21] Suzanne Little, “Will the Federal Government Reverse Course, Retain Protections on Intact Alaskan Landscapes?,” PEW Trust Magazine, 6 April 2021, https://www.pewtrusts.org/.

^[22] Ella Nielsen, “The Willow Project has been approved. Here’s what to know about the controversial oil-drilling venture,” CNN, 13 March 2023,  https://www.cnn.com/.

^[23] Rivard Piché and Sylvestre, Vulnerabilities and Hybrid Threats in the Canadian Arctic.

^[24] Rivard Piché and Sylvestre, Vulnerabilities and Hybrid Threats in the Canadian Arctic.

^[25] Civil-military fusion refers to leveraging civilian science and technology to support military development. Lorand Laskai, “Civil-Military Fusion: The Missing Link Between China’s Technological and Military Rise,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), 29 January 2018, https://www.cfr.org/; and Elsa B. Kania and Lorand Laskai, Myths and Realities of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy (Washington: Center for a New American Security, 28 January 2021), https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/.

^[26] The People’s Republic of China, “China’s Arctic Policy,” Xinhua, 26 January 2018. http://english.www.gov.cn/.

^[27] David Fraser, “Canadian military says it has tracked, stopped China surveillance in Arctic waters,” CBC, 22 February 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/.

^[28] See, for example, Shen Xinyi, Zhang Yu, Chen Changsheng and Hu Song, “Long-term Spatial and Temporal Variations of Sea Ice in the Northwest Passage of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago,” Chinese Journal of Polar Research 33 no.1 (2021): 71–87, https://journal.chinare.org.cn/.

^[29] “We also believe that every Canadian deserves access to a fast, reliable network, no matter which part of Canada they call home. Huawei Canada is proud to help our partners connect those living in rural and remote communities, bringing people together from coast to coast to coast.” Huawei, “Connecting Canada’s North,” 2024, https://www.huawei.com/.

^[30] Walter Strong, “Ottawa blocks Chinese takeover of Nunavut gold mine project after national security review,” CBC News, 22 December 2020, https://www.cbc.ca/; and Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Ottawa bends to U.S. push to purchase strategic hangar in Arctic sought by Chinese buyer,” Globe and Mail, 4 April 2023, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/.

^[31] Elizabeth Buchanan, “China’s Hybrid Arctic Strategy: Implications for the High North Rules-Based Order,” per Condordiam, 8 September 2021, https://perconcordiam.com/.

^[32] “Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE Influence Campaign Targets Rare Earths Mining Companies in Attempt to Thwart Rivalry to PRC Market Dominance,” Mandiant Threat Intelligence (blog), 28 June 2022, https://www.mandiant.com/.

^[33] “Pro-PRC DRAGONBRIDGE Influence Campaign.”

^[34] Heather Exner-Pirot, “Canada’s Northern Economic Development Paradigm and Its Failures,” in Canada’s Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex, ed. John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019), 16–18, https://www.cigionline.org/; and Jessica M. Shadian, “Brief to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development: Canada’s Sovereignty in the Arctic,” Arctic 360 (November 2018), 3, https://arctic360.org/.

^[35] Tom Vanden Brook, “Suspected Chinese Spies, Disguised as Tourists, Tried to Infiltrate Alaskan Military Bases,” USA Today, 31 May 2023, https://eu.usatoday.com/; and John Last, “Canada disputes Chinese news report that famous sailor was turned back from Northwest Passage,” CBC News, 17 September 2021, https://www.cbc.ca/.

^[36] Katarina Kertysova and Gabriella Gricius, Countering Russia’s Hybrid Threats in the Arctic (London: European Leadership Network, 2023), 8, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/.

^[37] Kertysova and Gricius, Countering Russia’s Hybrid Threats in the Arctic, 8; and Jeanette Lee Falsey, “Alaska’s Arctic Policy Adviser Falls Victim to Fake News—in Russia,” Anchorage Daily News, 12 April 2017, https://www.adn.com/.

^[38] “The Arctic presents strong factors of resilience that make it unlikely that Chinese investments in infrastructure could present the negative security, political, economic, social, and environmental outcomes that other regions of the world have experienced.” Stephanie Pezard et al., China’s Strategy and Activities in the Arctic: Implications for North American and Transatlantic Security (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation): vi, https://www.rand.org/.

^[39] “Yukon’s new Arctic security council to help prepare territory for a changing world,” CBC News, 4 January 2024, https://www.cbc.ca/.