Abstract
This article examines Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) within the context of evolving regional dynamics and global strategic competition. Emphasizing deterrence by denial, the NDS prioritizes capabilities aimed at thwarting aggression and safeguarding Australia’s interests, particularly in its northern approaches. The strategy underscores the importance of integrating military power with broader national resilience and international partnerships, including through initiatives like the Quad and AUKUS. Critically analyzing the NDS, the article explores its implications for regional stability, defense modernization challenges, workforce constraints, and the need for clearer strategic communication. It argues for a nuanced approach to deterrence that considers diverse methods beyond military means, addresses regional perceptions, and adapts to unpredictable geopolitical shifts. As Australia navigates these complexities, the article calls for continuous assessment, adaptive strategy, and robust engagement with regional actors to effectively uphold security in the Indo-Pacific.
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Australia has responded to the most challenging strategic circumstances since World War II by updating its defense strategy. The 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) addresses a fundamentally new approach to the defense of Australia and its interests.
The 2024 NDS introduces a broader concept of coordinated national power, together with the development of a military force capable of achieving effects with enhanced lethality and at greater range.[1] This strategy represents a shift for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) from a balanced force, ready for a range of contingencies, to one focused on “the most consequential risks.” Australia’s strategy is characterized as deterrence by denial, with prioritization of capabilities that will hold at risk projection of force against the nation from its northern approaches.
This article examines Australia’s defense strategy, emphasizing national power and deterrence, future ADF capabilities, and the assumptions underpinning this new approach.
Evolution of Australian Strategy
For nearly five decades, the Australian government has published defense white papers reflecting its commitment to national defense and outlining, at an unclassified level, its defense strategy. Although these white papers have been produced sporadically, their frequency has increased over the past 15 years.[2] While defense can be a battleground for Australia’s two main political parties to establish comparative credibility, there is generally a high level of bipartisanship on defense investment, and consistency across white papers commissioned by either side of politics. This bipartisanship provides continuity but has also been criticized for restricting policy creativity and accountability and reducing engagement.[3]
Until recently, these white papers provided a modest approach to defense investment, balancing such spending with other priorities. For example, the 2009 white paper was constrained by the global financial crisis, while the 2016 white paper noted that a military attack on Australia by another state was no more than a remote prospect in the foreseeable future.[4]
In 2020, the Australian government released a strategic update acknowledging a deteriorating geostrategic environment. Citing factors such as strategic competition, assertiveness, and military modernization, it assessed an increased prospect of high-intensity conflict and the inability to rely on strategic warning time.[5] The loss of warning time necessitated improved preparedness, rather than relying on long lead times to develop capability in response to emerging threats. The update defined its strategy in terms of shaping the environment, deterring aggression, and responding to events. It committed to a defense spend of 2 percent of GDP, a benchmark level Australia had not achieved since 1995.[6]
Following a change of government in 2022, Australia’s defense strategy underwent further updates in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review. This review highlighted the rising risks of increasing competition and military modernization in the Indo-Pacific region. It reiterated the framework of shaping, deterring, and responding, while emphasizing the importance of self-reliance and partnerships to build capacity for these objectives. Specifically, it stated that the ADF must defend Australia, deter power projection against it, protect economic connections to the region and the world, and collaborate with partners to ensure the security of the Indo-Pacific and uphold the rules-based order.[7]
The 2023 review recommended shifting from intermittent white papers to a biennial strategy. The first of these strategies, the NDS, was released in April 2024, alongside an investment plan.[8]
The strategic documents from 2023 and 2024 are framed within the context of China–United States competition. They address Chinese military and economic activities, which, while benefiting many Indo-Pacific countries, lack transparency or reassurance of their strategic intent.[9] Promoting a focused force structure, the 2023 review and the 2024 NDS prioritize investments in military capabilities that will contribute to deterring the most consequential risks. Although the NDS does not specify what scenarios might represent such risks, it is primarily concerned with attempts to project power against Australian territory and its northern approaches.[10] Thus, the strategy emphasizes possessing credible capabilities to deter such acts.
Integrated Deterrence
The 2024 NDS underscored the importance of international engagement activities to bolster deterrence. Central to regional engagement is transparency about Australia’s strategic intentions to build trust. The NDS outlines defense engagement efforts to strengthen international relationships and maintain peace and security across the Indo-Pacific, including multilateral arrangements like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).
While emphasizing the need for self-reliance, the NDS also acknowledged that the alliance with the United States remains fundamental to Australia’s security, particularly concerning US extended nuclear deterrence. The US relationship, embodied in the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, reflects Australia’s foreign policy, built around this strong alliance, which the late Allan Gyngell characterized as a fear of abandonment.[11]
Earlier Australian defense white papers recognized the value of broader international engagement. However, the 2024 NDS and the 2023 review also highlighted a whole-of-nation approach to deterrence and the need for a unified national approach to security threats. They introduced the concept of national defence as a broader way of harnessing all arms of national power to protect Australia’s security and interests. National defence encompasses integrated statecraft, national resilience, industry resilience, secure supply chains, enhanced innovation and skills, and a robust intelligence community.
The second chapter of the NDS elaborates on the need for national defence, recognizing that the Defence Department would contribute the military power aspects of this concept. It implies that other areas of government would pursue other whole-of-nation initiatives, though no published government document addresses their implementation or coordination. This reflects the broader debate in Australia about the absence of a national security strategy.[12] Unlike the Defence Department portfolio responsibilities reflected in the NDS, the whole-of-nation initiatives are not clearly linked to other government portfolios, obscuring their funding and the commitment of other departments to deliver the national defence concept. The lack of a higher-level strategy could hinder Australia’s ability to manage integrated deterrence, develop strategies tailored to specific threats, or assess the economic and diplomatic implications of the NDS.
The international and whole-of-nation dimensions of deterrence in the NDS reflect the US concept of integrated deterrence, a key focus of the 2022 US National Defense Strategy, which devoted a chapter to it.[13] While this term is not used in the NDS, its dimensions are integral to the Australian strategy. The 2024 NDS incorporates these dimensions, acknowledging that Australian military capabilities alone offer a limited deterrence effect.
The Australian NDS’s emphasis on deterrence by denial is also featured in the 2022 US strategy. However, the US strategy highlights the importance of deterrence through resilience and cost imposition and explains the need to tailor deterrence approaches “for specific problems, competitors and setting.”[14] Both the Australian and US strategies promote a credible military force, with lethality as a central characteristic. Both strategies also emphasize the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) partnership as a means to enable the future force through technology cooperation to develop advanced capabilities.
Denial
The NDS emphasizes deterrence by denial, aiming to make aggressive actions infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thereby denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives.[15] Consequently, the NDS and its supporting investment plan prioritize acquiring various long-range strike capabilities. The logic behind this strategy is that an aggressive act against Australia would be deterred because the ADF would possess the capability to defeat such aggression, particularly in its northern approaches. Thus, the foundation of the Australian strategy lies in the implicit threat that strike responses would alter an aggressor’s calculus of risk and cost.
While this approach has its logic, focusing excessively on denial through offensive capabilities may have unintended consequences. Such capabilities could be perceived as reflecting a general policy of hostility, reducing their effectiveness in deterring actions. This perception, combined with the limitations of the ADF’s strike assets and a lack of defensive capabilities, could lead an aggressor to sidestep the strategy. An aggressor might pre-emptively strike against these capabilities, without its forces being held at significant risk by the ADF. Therefore, it is crucial that a denial approach balances achieving deterrence objectives and managing escalation.[16]
This highlights a potential disadvantage of the NDS’s shift toward a “focused force.” The ADF may not be prepared for, or likely to deter, situations outside the scenarios focused on the most consequential risks that have shaped the force design. Based on the NDS, these scenarios seem preoccupied with operations to defeat aggression within Australia’s immediate northern approaches. At one end of the spectrum, there would be little to deter an aggressor that incrementally gains territory or advantage through gray-zone activities. At the other end, the force may be poorly prepared to deter attacks involving long-range, including ballistic, missiles.
The NDS also reveals a potential weakness in its balance between offense and defense. A strategy of denial should focus on reducing the likelihood of successful aggression, demanding not only strike but also resilience and counterstrike capabilities. There is a view that the NDS affords insufficient priority to the ADF’s acquisition of air and missile defense systems.[17] On a positive note, the NDS emphasizes the need for resilience, with funding allocated to hardening defense facilities in northern Australia and enhancing cybersecurity. However, compared to the 2023 review, it narrows resilience to that associated with military capabilities, providing little clarity about investment in national resilience, given it falls outside the defense portfolio.
A deterrence approach should also account for the full range of factors that weigh on the cost-benefit calculus of a potential aggressor, not just those derived from military power. While the NDS acknowledges the importance of a whole-of-government approach, it would add deterrence value to explicitly address broader ways to dissuade adverse acts. Raising the cost of aggression should utilize other forms of power, such as information, economic, and diplomatic tools. The strategy should also embrace dissuasion through reassurances and benefits, making an aggressive action unattractive or unnecessary.[18]
What constitutes an effective deterrence-based strategy is a complex topic, given the difficulty in attributing causality to an aggressor’s action (or inaction). Yet, there is a strong basis for three conditions that affect the success of a deterrence strategy: understanding the aggressor’s motivation, clarity of the object of deterrence and the response if the threat is ignored, and the credibility of the deterring state’s capability and will to carry out the threatened response.[19]
Of these conditions, the first demands analysis that embraces the full range of options to dissuade aggression. The second highlights the importance of clear communication. The third, the will to carry out responses, requires a sophisticated consideration of escalation dynamics.[20] Additionally, it is crucial to assess whether the ADF has the capability to impose a heavy price for aggression.
The Right Stuff
The NDS aims to achieve an effective future force structure through investment in “key capabilities to bolster Australia’s deterrence capabilities.”[21] These capabilities are intended to enable force projection against threats, hold an adversary’s forces at risk, protect forces and critical infrastructure, sustain protracted operations, and maintain effective situational awareness and command and control.[22]
The Australian government’s approval of the NDS facilitated a AUD 50-billion increase in defense investment over the next decade, focused on 11 capability priorities.[23] This appears to be a significant commitment to the ADF’s military modernization, but whether it will support the deterrence strategy must be considered in the context of several challenges.
The first challenge is whether the NDS will realize capabilities consistent with the perceived urgency and loss of strategic warning. The NDS emphasizes that significant and urgent changes are needed to transform the ADF. Yet, 90 percent of the additional funding in the decade sits outside the next four years of defense budgets. At a time when the Australian government has achieved a budget surplus, this delay in increased funding contradicts the NDS’s characterization of urgency.[24] While this may reflect the reality of a lack of agility in existing acquisition processes, it has also drawn criticism for not moving fast enough.[25]
The second consideration relates to the resultant focused force of the ADF. Of the additional AUD 50.3 billion in investment over the decade, more than AUD 49 billion will be consumed by just two programs: nuclear-powered submarines and general-purpose frigates.[26] This means that the vast majority of new ADF capability will be in the maritime domain, with maritime systems comprising 38 percent of the total investment budget over the decade. While this aligns with Australia’s identity as a maritime nation, submarines and surface combatants are not the only capabilities that can achieve effects in the maritime domain.
While more weapons will integrate with air combat platforms, the investment plan no longer includes a Super Hornet replacement program, opting instead to extend the life of the existing F/A-18F fleet. This is partly balanced by the anticipated integration of future unmanned systems like the Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat. Similarly, future programs for maritime support and mine countermeasures have been discontinued, with expectations that these functions, along with some underwater missions, will transition to unmanned vessels. In land investments, littoral maneuver vessels will dominate, reflecting the anticipation of strategic risks primarily within Australia’s northern approaches. Other key upgrades for the Army include infantry fighting vehicles and battlefield aviation.
Although the future ADF will enhance its capability to exert influence over greater distances, the focused force represents more of an evolutionary step than a revolutionary change. A chapter in the 2023 review and sections of the 2024 NDS and investment program emphasize the importance of asymmetric advantage. These efforts, particularly through the accelerated development of the Advanced Strategic Capability Accelerator (ASCA) and allied cooperation under AUKUS Pillar II, prioritize achieving technological superiority.
However, positive asymmetry can derive from various sources, including exploiting intent, environment, resources, methods, and socionormative factors. Combining these sources can enable advantages over adversaries by imposing significant costs at low risk, such as through the development of affordable mass capabilities and autonomous systems. While the exploitation of emerging technologies through the ASCA and AUKUS Pillar II will contribute to future capabilities, competitors are also advancing in technological development. Therefore, achieving a true asymmetric advantage will likely require significant breakthroughs or the strategic integration of technological advantages with other sources of asymmetry.
An additional challenge will arise from the tension between innovative development and the NDS’s emphasis on speed to capability in acquisition. Achieving balance will hinge on conducting early analysis and risk reduction to establish clear objectives for each capability program.
The NDS also recognizes that people are the ADF’s most valuable asset and are crucial to achieving the strategy's goals. In 2022, the previous government announced a plan to increase the ADF workforce by 30 percent by 2040.[27] However, by the following year, the ADF workforce had shrunk.[28] Recruitment targets were not met, and high separation rates further exacerbated the shortfall. With a workforce deficit of 4,400 at the time of the NDS publication, the inability to effectively build and train the ADF workforce poses a significant risk to Australia’s deterrence strategy. While the NDS outlines initiatives to enhance recruitment and retention, these efforts do not appear significantly different from current practices to reverse the trend. This underscores the necessity for an effective strategy that considers the agency of key actors and other external factors.
Agency and Uncertainty
To address workforce shortfalls, the NDS identifies initiatives to broaden eligibility criteria for new recruits, streamline processes, and encourage longer service among current personnel. However, only the latter acknowledges that individuals have their own interests and agency to act on them. While changes to eligibility criteria and recruitment processes may offer marginal improvements, they do not fundamentally address what motivates individuals to join, remain in, or leave the ADF.
Similar to the ADF workforce, Australia’s industry also acts with agency. The NDS underscores the need for a domestic defense industrial base capable of operating at full capacity, resilient to disruptions, competitive in delivering necessary systems and support, and innovative to maintain technological edge.[29] It also emphasizes supporting industry through targeted grants and opportunities in key areas called Sovereign Defence Industrial Priorities.
However, achieving a robust defense industrial base faces challenges inherent to working within the Australian defense sector, such as difficulties in doing business with the Defence Department and recent declines in opportunities.[30] This revenue decline has resulted in reduced focus by Australian industry on defense projects and a significant downsizing of their defense-related workforce.[31] While new opportunities could potentially reverse this trend, industry may prioritize other sectors based on its own interests and motivations. Therefore, the Department of Defence must consider its requirements for industry support from both demand and supply perspectives, taking into account industry motivations to contribute effectively to a strong support base.
Regional nations also possess the agency to act in their sovereign interests. While the NDS acknowledges this point, it may be somewhat understated, particularly since the strategy assumes access for ADF operations in the region.[32] As noted by Marigold Black and Austin Wyatt, assumptions that international engagement activities will automatically lead to support or acquiescence for “impactful projection” operations could be flawed.[33]
Many regional nations have recently updated their defense strategies, which bear similarities to the Australian NDS. Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s strategies address regional challenges and emphasize the importance of strong military forces supporting a deterrence-based approach.[34] Japan’s defense strategy justifies a significant increase in spending, driven by a deteriorating security environment and the imperative to deter aggressors over longer distances.[35] South Korea’s latest defense plan increases defense spending to enhance deterrence, develop preemptive strike capabilities, and bolster missile defenses.[36]
Given the regional context, it is unlikely that the Australian NDS will singularly stand out or precipitate significant economic or diplomatic implications. Many Indo-Pacific nations historically maintain a posture of nonalignment, necessitating sustained engagement and statecraft to translate shared interests and concerns into cooperative behavior; such cooperation cannot be assumed.
Crucially, a deterrence-focused strategy must account for the agency of potential aggressors, understanding their motivations, beliefs, and perceptions. The most noteworthy response to the release of the NDS came from the Chinese government, which criticized the strategy as grounded in “unwarranted anxieties” and a “misjudgment of China’s strategic intentions.”[37] While this reaction could potentially impact the recovering Australia–China relationship economically and diplomatically, Premier Li Qiang struck a more conciliatory tone during his June 2024 visit to Canberra.
Official Chinese defense policy states no intentions of hegemony, expansion, or interference;[38] yet ambiguity persists regarding China’s military buildup and its influence efforts in the Pacific.[39] Timothy Heath suggests that discerning Beijing’s intentions is best achieved through monitoring official and public communications as well as potential preparations for conflict.[40]
An effective defense strategy should also consider potential adversaries’ ability to anticipate and adjust, gaining advantages in counterstrategies.[41] It is conceivable that such analyses have been conducted within classified components of the NDS but were not apparent in the public document.
Just as adversaries may seek to disrupt a strategy, external changes, uncertainty, and surprises can undermine even the most carefully laid plans. This underscores the adage that while plans themselves may become obsolete, the process of strategic planning remains indispensable.[42] Strategic planning processes must adeptly manage uncertainty and pivot as circumstances evolve. Assumption-based planning (ABP) emerges as a valuable tool in this context.[43]
ABP involves identifying load-bearing assumptions that underpin the success of a strategy, actively monitoring these assumptions, taking corrective actions when feasible, and devising contingency plans for when assumptions fail. The Australian government’s Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act advocates for the management of assumptions as a best practice, with the Defence Department already implementing ABP in several major acquisition programs.
While the specific methods employed by the Australian Department of Defence to handle uncertainty beyond ABP remain unclear, the biennial nature of the new NDS and its accompanying investment plan suggests an ongoing analytical process. This approach implies a commitment to continuous analysis and adaptation in response to evolving threats and strategic landscapes.
Conclusion
Concerned by the instability stemming from great power competition and challenges to the global rules-based order, Australia’s updated defense strategy directs the future ADF force structure towards capabilities aimed at thwarting aggression, thereby advancing deterrence through denial. The decision to adopt a biennial cycle for the defense strategy aims to enhance the agility of Australia’s defense policies and plans, underscoring the imperative for preparedness to deter conflict.
However, the strategy may face several challenges that should be addressed in or before the next update, specifically:
- Integrated deterrence requires consideration and coordination with other elements of national and international power, that are referred to but are not within the remit of the NDS. Australia needs a national security strategy.
- The timing and scope of modernization programs do not reflect the urgency conveyed in NDS rhetoric. Clarification is essential to determine whether the pace of modernization is appropriate, as investments slated for several election cycles ahead may be met with cynicism.
- The NDS should appreciate the interests and intentions of key nation states and communicate clearly about the objectives of deterrence. It should adopt a more tailored approach to deterrence, encompassing all effective deterrent methods to prevent unintended consequences arising from perceptions of hostility.
- The ongoing nature of the NDS necessitates continuous analysis of the risks associated with the strategy and its underlying assumptions. This includes assessing what constitutes the most consequential risks. It should also consider at what point the aggregation of incremental acts of aggression become consequential.
- Workforce challenges remain a significant obstacle to Australia’s defense ambitions. Simply enhancing remuneration and adjusting entry eligibility criteria are unlikely to meet recruitment targets. The Defence Department must explore fundamentally different approaches that address the motivations of potential recruits. Similarly, the agency of industry and its workforce must be considered to achieve the sovereign capability envisioned in the NDS.
- Technology development and cooperative initiatives such as AUKUS Pillar II are critical enablers to achieving capability advantage and deterring aggression. However, given the programs are similar to competitor nations’ efforts, they are unlikely to achieve truly asymmetric advantage unless combined with other sources of asymmetry.
The NDS represents a milestone in Australia’s foreign policy, aiming to safeguard national and regional interests in pursuit of a stable, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. For the strategy to effectively deter aggression, it must be accompanied by efforts to comprehend the motivations of potential aggressors and adopt a comprehensive, integrated approach to dissuading aggression. ♦
Dr. Andrew Dowse AO
Dr. Dowse is a retired air vice-marshal of the Royal Australian Air Force. He had senior leadership roles in capability development, strategic planning and as the Australian J6. He was director of defence research at Edith Cowan University from 2018 to 2021, before taking up his current position as director of RAND Australia.