Australia in the Indo-Pacific

As a Royal Australian Air Force officer embedded as a Deputy Commander in the US Indo-Pacific Command’s (INDOPACOM) Pacific Air Forces, I have been privileged to view Australia’s engagement in the region from an allied perspective. All countries in this region have a role in sustaining stability and security. Australia’s deft partnership-centered approach to its activities in the Indo-Pacific is consistent with other allied and partner nations. These partnerships are representative of a greater strategy that positions Australia to provide positive contributions with the United States and others to sustain a favorable strategic balance within the Pacific realm.

While having long made positive contributions to regional stability, Australia has recognized the deterioration in the strategic environment and has recently responded with the release of a comprehensive National Defence Strategy (NDS). This strategy harnesses all elements of national power through a coordinated whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach to defend Australia and its interests. Coupled with an Integrated Investment Plan (IIP), the NDS provides a thorough outline of defense policy and resourcing, enabling Australia to meet the growing challenges of the security environment.

The Indo-Pacific region has gained growing significance for all nations, particularly Australia. Home to more than half of the world's population, 60 percent of global trade, and significant maritime routes through 15 of the world’s busiest seaports, the region also hosts seven of the largest militaries. The future of the Indo-Pacific will have a global impact on governments and people everywhere. The new NDS recognizes that Australian security and prosperity are inextricably linked to the region’s stability. As a maritime nation, Australia relies on such stability to ensure the free flow of goods and trade. For global, regional, and national interests, Australia must play a proactive role in reinforcing the international system and the rules and norms that benefit all nations.

Australia’s NDS acknowledges that the Indo-Pacific region and the broader strategic environment are increasingly characterized by great-power competition. This rivalry, manifesting through both military and nonmilitary means, heightens uncertainty and tension. The risks of conflict or crisis are growing, as is the potential for geopolitical coercion through military force. Rapid military modernization, often lacking transparency of strategic intent, further complicates these dynamics. The introduction of new technologies, including artificial intelligence, autonomy, and quantum developments, transforms military capabilities and increases risks.

Amid this strategic environment, the Australian NDS is clear: Australia must protect itself, deny any adversary’s attempt to project force through its northern approaches, and safeguard its economic connections to the world. Regional dialogue and diplomatic partnerships remain central to Australia’s strategy for contributing to peace and stability. The NDS emphasizes the need to deepen ties with its closest ally, the United States, and other key partners across Southeast Asia, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and North Asia. Australia will seek mutual opportunities to expand relationships with nations that value a free and open Indo-Pacific, ensuring interactions across all domains are lawfully managed within a rules-based global order.

Sustaining this rules-based order requires a united and robust approach to deter aggression, coercion, and conflict. It requires like-minded nations, equipped with capabilities across all elements of their national power, to operate seamlessly across the tyranny of distance in increasingly contested environments.

Australia must demonstrate both resolve and capability. Credible and effective diplomatic and military strength are essential to preserve and advance Australia’s interests. Possessing flexible response options and maintaining a regional presence with strong partnerships increases the cost calculus, deterring any actor from using force to destabilize the collaborative and open rules-based order, preventing it from devolving into a zero-sum game.

Accordingly, Australia’s NDS and its associated IIP will focus Australian Defence Force (ADF) capabilities to enable a strategy of denial. This approach aims to deter conflict, coercion, or direct action against Australia and its interests by enhancing the range and lethality of ADF response options, significantly increasing the risk calculus for any potential adversary. The NDS prioritizes capabilities that safeguard Australia’s immediate maritime approaches, encompassing the northeastern Indian Ocean through Southeast Asia and into the Pacific. Protecting these maritime approaches requires integrating and optimizing all military capabilities across land, sea, air, space, and cyber to support deterrence through denial.

An integrated and optimized ADF will include a larger, more lethal Navy capable of projecting and sustaining a greater presence; an Army capable of littoral operations in Australia’s North with long-range strike capabilities; and an Air Force ready to rapidly project airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), air defense, and strike capabilities as needed. Space and cyber capabilities will be bolstered and integrated into the joint force, including improved network protection, enhanced cyber and electronic warfare effects, and new space-based situational awareness and communications capabilities.

To improve its ability to deny and respond, the ADF will increase, harden, strengthen, and lift its workforce, command-and-control capabilities, infrastructure, logistics systems, defense industry, and supply chain. These efforts are essential for improving the ADF’s resilience and enabling sustained operations in the face of potential attacks.

The integrated and hardened capabilities outlined in the NDS and IIP will create a credible military force, bolstering the ADF’s capacity to defend and deter any adversary's attempts to project power against Australia and protect its economic connections to the region. Lastly, these enhanced capabilities will force-multiply with those of other partner nations, ensuring the collective security of the Indo-Pacific and maintaining the global rules-based order.

The ADF and US military have already achieved an impressive level of interoperability, effectively working together with integrated high-end capabilities. In PACAF, I witness this repeatedly as our respective air combat, mobility, airborne ISR, and airbase teams collaborate in exercises like Red Flag Alaska and Cope North. Through our combined exercise and engagement program, RAAF and USAF elements continue to enhance our ability to operate seamlessly as one team, achieving mission outcomes. This integration will only strengthen as Australian capabilities and its operations, activities, and investments progress. INDOPACOM and the ADF are rightly increasing collaboration to enhance security capacity, improving integration between our forces, and advancing from being highly interoperable to possessing fully interchangeable capabilities.

This level of integration stands on the shoulders of deliberate efforts across decades of our countries operating side-by-side. Our two nations have developed a deep network of exchange and embedded positions, leveraging our most important capability: our people. Together, we work as a true part of each other’s organizations, from the highest levels of our respective defense enterprise leadership to the workforce on the flightlines, in the field, in the sky, and on our vessels at sea. The US and Australian militaries have members who are readily interchangeable, providing each other with the benefit of diverse perspectives and whose vast and varied experiences and knowledge increase the collective capability of our respective forces.

Not only are ADF and US personnel able to operate together seamlessly, but our nations’ respective weapons systems are also improving in their ability to integrate and are becoming increasingly interchangeable. Logistics systems are being modified to streamline the sharing of common spares and equipment. Information sharing, mission planning, and infrastructure systems are being designed to enhance interchangeability.

Interchangeability of personnel, weapon systems, and expanded information sharing provides both Australia and the United States with improved sovereign choices for response options, enhancing the efficiencies and effectiveness of our respective militaries’ warfighting edge. Our nations’ collective capabilities strengthen deterrence against those that might consider using military force to advance their interests at the expense of our own. If deterrence fails, we are continuing to build formidable capabilities for sustained combat operations to deny any adversary.

Relationships are the key to success. Australia and the ADF are not only strengthening ties with the United States but are also increasingly building relationships and partnering in bilateral and multilateral activities with other like-minded countries across the region and globally. Australia continues to deepen engagement with long-standing partners, while forging new relationships for the benefit of Australian security and security in the region. These partnerships are crucial for preserving stability and maintaining balance in the region. By enhancing interoperability through multilateral operations, the ADF bolsters regional security and benefits from the cultural, positional, and capability advantages of other partners.

The challenges within the Indo-Pacific are substantial, and the strategic outlook highlights increasing risks. In response, Australia’s strategy of denial postures the ADF and broader tools of national power to deter conflict, coercion, or direct action against its interests. The NDS outlines a coherent plan that, combined with investments in credible, integrated, and focused military capabilities and strengthened engagement with allies and partners, positions Australia to defend itself and its interests and to make a substantial contribution to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific. ♦

AVM Carl Newman, RAAF

Air Vice-Marshal Carl Newman is Deputy Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, and the Deputy Theater Air Component Commander to the Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command. He began service in 1989, as a direct entrant Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) navigator flying the C-130 Hercules. On postings to 37 and 36 Squadrons, AVM Newman accrued 6,400 flight hours in all RAAF C-130 roles and missions.

During his distinguished flying career, AVM Newman has served in numerous operations, including the liberation of Kuwait in 1990, the UN Advanced Mission Cambodia in 1991, Unified Task Force Somalia in 1993, Australian Defence Force East Timor operations in 1999, and Australian Defence Force Middle East operations in 2003. He also participated in numerous humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations supporting affected personnel within Australia, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific.

In 2004, AVM Newman attended the US Air Force’s Air Command and Staff College, receiving a master’s degree in military operational art and science. He is also a graduate of the Australian Defence Strategic Studies Course in 2019. He has had key staff tours, including leading the RAAF’s Plan Jericho, as the J3 Deputy Chief of Operations Plans at US Central Command Tampa, Florida, and as the RAAF’s Air Mobility Group Chief of Staff. Air Vice-Marshal Newman has commanded the RAAF’s Air Mobility Training and Development Unit, Number 84 Wing and its Air Mobility Group.