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Abstract
This article scrutinizes the expanding role of deterrence in Australian strategic thought and defense policy, particularly since 2009. It explores how Australia has transitioned from a focus on territorial defense to adopting deterrence by denial as a central element of its national defense strategy. The authors assert that although Australia has rhetorically embraced deterrence, substantial gaps remain in strategy development and force capabilities, undermining the credibility of its deterrence posture. The article argues that there is a risk in viewing planned capabilities, such as nuclear submarines, as inherently deterrent without sufficient strategic rationale. The article also examines the compatibility of Australia’s deterrence approach with the US concept of integrated deterrence. The authors conclude that while Australian and US deterrence thinking are broadly aligned, both nations must address strategic deficiencies to bolster the credibility and effectiveness of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.
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Throughout the Cold War, deterrence was central to Western strategic thought, whether as a concept, policy, or strategy. The importance of deterrence arose from the nuclear reality, where its failure could have resulted in Armageddon. Australia’s interest in deterrence during this period relied almost entirely on the extended deterrence provided by its American ally against nuclear attack. Beyond the logic of Cold War nuclear deterrence, Australian strategic policy showed little interest in the subject until the 2009 Defence White Paper, which publicly acknowledged the growing China threat for the first time. Since then, deterrence has played an increasingly significant role in Australia’s strategic thought.
However, the new emphasis on deterrence in defense policy raises several unanswered questions about defense strategy and the posture of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). It also has implications for alliance strategy, which include considerations such as Australia’s role in coalition deterrence thinking for the western Pacific and US expectations of the ADF’s contribution to an alliance deterrent posture. This article argues that the mechanics of deterrence as a political-strategic relationship between competitive states may not be fully understood in Canberra. Instead, certain ADF capabilities are seen as “the” deterrent, with an expectation that a relevant arsenal will, somehow, as if by an almost alchemical process, existentially deliver the desired deterrent effect. The planned AUKUS nuclear submarines, in particular, seem to fit within that paradigm.
Second, the article contends that the symbiotic relationship between deterrence and defense lacks clear strategic guidance for potential ADF employment. Without an evident strategy backed by clear political intent, the potential effectiveness of deterrence is highly questionable. Third, Canberra’s statements about independently deterring attacks on the country or its national interests within vaguely defined “northern approaches” raise concerns about whether Australian policy intent and planned ADF developments align with US and other allied strategic interests in deterring regional aggression. Finally, the article assesses the compatibility of Australian deterrence thinking with the US concept of integrated deterrence.
In developing these interrelated arguments, the article begins by briefly explaining the idea of deterrence in both theory and practice, then outlines the application of explicit deterrence logic in recent Australian government policy. It questions the apparent absence of strategy and the strategic rationale behind promoting the idea of an independent Australian deterrent. We argue that strategy is the essential link between deterrence and defense. We conclude by suggesting that a potential disconnect between Australian and US deterrence thinking is likely illusory, with the alliance remaining robust. However, both parties must address the ongoing strategy deficit.
Deterrence in Theory and Practice
Deterrence has been defined as the “threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else.”[1] Effective deterrence, however, requires more than mere military power; it depends on a comprehensive national posture that dissuades potential adversaries by threatening to impose costs that outweigh any prospective gains.[2] Admittedly, deterrence is a complex process, necessitating the fulfillment of various conditions on both sides for success. These conditions include effectively communicating the deterrent effects and the circumstances that would trigger them, the subject of deterrence calculating anticipated costs and benefits, the decision to desist, and the implementation of that decision.[3] Essentially, effective deterrence arises from a combination of capability, communication, and credibility.
In discussing the diplomacy of violence, Thomas Schelling highlighted the multiple facets that need to be integrated within a deterrence strategy: “To exploit a capacity for hurting and inflicting damage one needs to know what an adversary treasures and what scares him and one needs the adversary to understand what behavior of his will cause the violence to be inflicted and what will cause it to be withheld.”[4]
Thus, deterrence can be classified in multiple ways, distinguished by the nature of the threats intended to be deterred and the manner in which deterrent effects are applied.
Direct vs. Extended Deterrence
Direct deterrence seeks to employ national capabilities to protect or defend one’s own interests, whereas extended deterrence involves the ability to protect an ally from aggression.[5] Extended deterrence is particularly relevant in the Australian context, as the United States serves as the principal guarantor of its security against nuclear attack. As the 2024 National Defence Strategy states, “Australia’s best protection against the increasing risk of nuclear escalation is US extended nuclear deterrence, and the pursuit of new avenues of arms control.”[6] Extended deterrence can apply to a specific instance or generally over a longer period, as intended with US alliance guarantees.
General vs. Immediate Deterrence
General deterrence refers to ongoing and sustained efforts to dissuade actions against one’s interests in the absence of any crisis or specific and identifiable threats.[7] Conversely, immediate deterrence applies to urgent situations involving a specific and imminent threat from an identifiable foe.[8] The concepts of “narrow” and “broad” deterrence are similar. Broad deterrence aims to prevent conflict itself, while narrow deterrence focuses on dissuading the use of a specific form of warfare, such as a weapon of mass destruction, within an ongoing conflict.[9]
Deterrence by Denial vs. Deterrence by Punishment
Deterrence by denial seeks to degrade the adversary’s likelihood of success or at least influence their estimate of it sufficiently to dissuade action. On the other hand, deterrence by punishment aims to impose high costs on the adversary for their actions without influencing the probability of success calculus.[10] As Glenn Snyder, the originator of this distinction elaborated: “In military affairs deterrence by denial is accomplished by having military forces which can block the enemy’s military forces from making territorial gains. Deterrence by punishment grants him the gain but deters by posing the prospect of war costs greater than the value of the gain.”[11]
By adopting a denial strategy, a state seeks to assert its dominance over a situation or area, creating doubts in the adversary’s mind about the costs of contesting such dominance. Punishment, on the other hand, deters by demonstrating a credible capability to inflict unacceptable pain on the aggressor.[12] Deterrence by denial is now the preferred strategy for the United States and its allies, including Australia,[13] as punishment is likely to be ineffective in the current balance of power where revisionist powers like China rely on fait accompli strategies to alter strategic realities in their favor.[14]
While the distinctions between different forms of deterrence are important, the tools that serve them are generally similar, though not necessarily identical. Thus, a state’s military capabilities and preparedness dictate the effectiveness of general deterrence and become relevant when an immediate threat emerges. The military means developed to punish an adversary’s aggression may closely align with those that seek to deny any gains initially. However, this point may not hold true in all cases. For example, in any conflict in the western Pacific, a Western deterrence-by-denial strategy will demand a strong focus on directly countering aggression against Taiwan launched by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and other maritime forces to prevent China from achieving its political objectives. A force optimized for deterrence by punishment, while also requiring substantive counter-naval and counter-maritime capability, would likely place much greater emphasis on the ability to conduct large-scale strikes against strategically or economically important targets on the Chinese mainland. While distinctions between various types of deterrence often pertain more to the stage of the conflict or confrontation to which they are applied or the geographical scope of deterrent effects than the actual means of their application, the specific character of individual threats and geographical theaters of operation must nevertheless heavily inform military force development for particular deterrence strategies.
The Growing Role of Deterrence in Australian Policy
Conventional deterrence has become the focus of Australian defense policy, a significant shift from its traditional stance. Historically, deterrence primarily referred to the importance of US extended nuclear deterrence against the threat of nuclear attacks on Australia. From the late 1970s, and formalized during the 1980s, Australia’s defense planning concentrated on the “defense of Australia doctrine.” This doctrine emphasized defending the Australian continent from direct military attack, including the ability to deny an enemy access via the much-debated “air and sea gaps” running through the archipelagos to the north of Australia. These ideas found their most prominent expression in the 1987 Defence White Paper.[15]
After the Cold War, Australia’s defense policy gradually evolved from this narrow defense of Australia mind-set to recognizing the importance of regional interests and the national imperative to protect them.[16] However, policy continued to emphasize defending Australia’s territory and interests, with limited importance given to deterrence.[17] This period was marked by ambiguity in the external strategic environment. The ADF, often in concert with the United States, engaged in several extra-regional interventions, such as the 1991 Gulf War, the post-9/11 campaign in Afghanistan, and the 2003 Iraq War. Additionally, Australia led regional missions in East Timor (INTERFET) and the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Contributing to alliance and coalition small wars and policing operations to restore stability to broken nations was the order of the day, with deterrence still absent from Australian strategic thought. Moreover, post-9/11 counterterrorism preparedness was never solely, or even primarily, a defense responsibility, and Islamist terror groups were not easily deterrable.
However, the practice and demands of mounting expeditionary operations, both in Australia’s near neighborhood and farther afield, began to diminish the status of the defense of Australia doctrine in the early 2000s. By 2009, the long-building Chinese challenge to regional order in East Asia was officially recognized in the seminal Defence White Paper of that year.[18] This document marked the first time any major Australian policy acknowledged deterrence as a leading ADF task, though it was still constrained by the persistent defense of Australia dogma. The paper declared, “the principal task for the ADF is to deter and defeat armed attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries.”[19] Notwithstanding the narrow explicit objective of the ADF’s deterrent task, the white paper committed to augmenting capability in a manner clearly designed to support deterrence as a central pillar of Australia’s national security strategy.[20]
By 2016, deterrence had become the centerpiece of defense policy. Importantly, it was no longer limited to the territorial defense of Australia but applied more broadly to “threats to Australia and its national interests and northern approaches.”[21] The 2020 Defence Strategic Update required the ADF to “deliver credible deterrence,” noting that maintaining a purely defensive force was inadequate for offering such credible deterrence.[22] Instead, it emphasized that defense capabilities “must be able to hold potential adversaries’ forces and infrastructure at risk from a greater distance, and therefore influence their calculus of costs involved in threatening Australian interests.”[23]
The 2023 report to the government, the Defence Strategic Review, highlighted the policy shift from the defense of Australia to a new concept termed “National Defence”: an attempt at grand strategy to harness multiple forms of national power to influence a potential adversary. This concept encompassed “a focus on deterrence through denial, including the ability to hold an adversary at risk.”[24] This idea was incorporated into the government’s 2024 National Defence Strategy, which made deterrence a truly national pursuit. The strategy explained deterrence as “the use of the military and other elements of national power to discourage or restrain a potential adversary from taking unwanted actions. It involves having in place measures and responses that change a potential adversary’s risk assessment and therefore decision-making calculus.”[25] It explicitly adopted a strategy of denial to achieve deterrent effect. The strategy is
Designed to deter a potential adversary from taking actions that would be inimical to Australia’s interests and regional stability. The Strategy of Denial involves working with the US and key partners to ensure no country attempts to achieve its regional objectives through military action. By signalling a credible ability to hold potential adversary forces at risk, this strategy also seeks to deter attempts to coerce Australia through force. Both objectives involve altering any potential adversary’s belief that it could achieve its ambitions with military force at an acceptable cost.[26]
Australia’s new denial strategy has reshaped the prioritization of the three defense objectives initially outlined in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update: shaping the country’s strategic environment, deterring threats against national interests, and responding with force as needed. While previously these objectives were equally emphasized, the National Defence Strategy has elevated deterrence to Australia’s “primary strategic objective.” Moreover, the strategy mandates that defense shaping activities and the “signalling of Australia’s response capabilities” must now be optimized to “more clearly support deterrence.”[27]
Deterrence via a strategy of denial has, therefore, been explicitly adopted as the master concept of the policy, and grand strategy, of National Defence.[28] In a relatively short span since 2009, deterrence has emerged as perhaps the most critical pillar of Australian defense policy. However, achieving this policy objective requires situating deterrence within Australia’s unique geostrategic environment and developing a strategy that aligns with current or planned ADF capabilities, as well as with US alliance strategy. Harmonizing these highly evolved defense policy objectives with alliance goals, Australia’s own strategic development, and ADF force structure planning remains a central task awaiting clear direction from policy makers and strategists.
Strategy: The Missing Link?
Two important, interrelated elements often overlooked in Australian defense debates pertain to the role of strategy. Firstly, with deterrence established as the primary concept in its National Defence policy, one might expect clear guidance on where and how the strategy of denial is to be applied, including specific tactical and operational objectives it aims to achieve. Secondly, the critical relationship between deterrence and defense appears more implicit in capability statements regarding planned force structures and posture developments than explicitly stated in policy. A corollary to this second point is that certain planned ADF capabilities are being treated, in and of themselves, as “the” deterrent.
Amid discussions on policy, forces, and posture, a persistent aspect of Australia’s new deterrence thrust is the apparent absence of a clearly articulated strategy despite the establishment of a “strategy of denial.” Instead, strategic intent is inferred primarily through planned enhancements in force capabilities. The 2024 National Defence Strategy, akin to its American counterpart, the 2022 US National Defense Strategy, translates into policy rather than strategy in practice. Both documents, particularly in their unclassified versions, lack insight into how military power is to be leveraged strategically to achieve the political objectives of deterrence, inviting skepticism.
As highlighted by a prominent Australian strategic thinker regarding US efforts to deter China from achieving hegemonic control in the western Pacific, there remains a notable absence of “a clear and agreed strategy for deterring and, if necessary, fighting and winning” such a conflict in Washington.[29] Similarly, leading proponents of a denial strategy in the United States, including those involved in drafting the 2018 National Defense Strategy, offer limited clarity on the strategic methods or pathways through which denial is to be effectively realized.[30]
These questions encapsulate the critical “how” of strategy. In the context of Australian deterrence, how can the strategy of denial be sufficiently robust and credible to deter potential threats from materializing into actual contingencies? What specific operational outcomes must the ADF demonstrate to effectively support the success of deterrence? Strategy serves as the metaphorical “bridge” that connects military capabilities, along with other instruments of national power, to policy objectives.[31] Without a clear strategy, there is no systematic approach to harnessing national resources toward achieving policy goals. In this case, the overarching policy goal is deterring Chinese threats to Australia or its interests in regional stability.
While warfare and the competitive statecraft that represents war preparation in strategically momentous periods, such as those we are doubtless now experiencing in the western Pacific, are inherently uncertain and subject to chance, a lack of coherent strategy only exacerbates these uncertainties.[32] States cannot eliminate uncertainty or chance when pursuing deterrence objectives, given the political-psychological dynamics between deterrer and intended “deteree.”[33] Deterrence without a well-defined strategy suggests a defense policy that may not be taken seriously or considered competent. Such a policy is highly unlikely to be perceived as credible by potential adversaries.
In Canberra’s case, the situation appears potentially more challenging than in the United States, with the National Defence Strategy implicitly acknowledging a deficit in strategy by emphasizing the need for strategic reform. This reform process will necessitate the “transformation of the core elements of Defence that deliver effects to achieve the Strategy of Denial.” It underscores the imperative for transforming strategy, force structure, posture, and preparedness to effectively deliver the desired strategic effects.[34]
The nexus between deterrence and defense forms the bedrock of effective deterrence practices. For Australia, positioned as a middle power with limited current resources, the ambition of achieving broad deterrence across all international security interests in a rapidly deteriorating global strategic climate, marked by conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, is unrealistic. Instead, Australia must pursue a form of deterrence that is immediate—targeting a clear and identifiable near-term adversary—and direct, focusing on deterring threats against Australia itself and its explicitly articulated interests.
The immediate threat, notably from China, is palpable, despite Canberra’s diplomatic and economic caution in discussing it. This approach, while prudent, inhibits necessary open discussions on strategy. Moreover, Australia tends to be ambiguous or vague when articulating its broader regional security concerns, aside from its emphasis on maritime trade. Presumably, the objectives of the denial strategy laid out in the National Defence Strategy, such as preserving regional stability and deterring military actions that alter the status quo, should encompass safeguarding partners like Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan—the primary target of Beijing’s aggressive intentions. However, Australian policy and government statements lack clarity in this regard.
Another critical aspect is understanding what actually deters in specific deterrence scenarios. In Australia’s case, this entails contributing to both immediate and direct deterrence against Chinese aggression toward Australia or its regional interests. Effective deterrence cannot rely solely on governmental declarations or wishful thinking; it necessitates substantive military capabilities to influence an adversary’s risk calculation positively. As previously argued, the strategic framework underpinning these military capabilities is notably deficient. Furthermore, the current military means lack the capacity to deliver the requisite deterrent effect.
In the realm of conventional deterrence (non-nuclear), the late Colin S. Gray, drawing on historical evidence, convincingly argued that it often proves unreliable against assertive and resolute aggressors—categories that aptly describe China today.[35]
Gray further posited that while conventional deterrence historically tends towards failure, it remains a fundamental axiom that a “good defense should function as a potent deterrent” if anything can.[36] However, Australia faces immediate challenges in generating sufficient joint combat power to effectively deter or significantly contribute to alliance deterrence objectives in the distant theaters of the western Pacific. This limitation is underscored by the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, which candidly acknowledged Australia’s current defense capabilities and force structure are “not fit for purpose for our current strategic circumstances.”[37] The government concurred with these assessments, outlining in the National Defence Strategy a road map for reform. Yet, even with full and timely implementation, the envisaged Future Integrated Force—a capability fit for purpose—is not projected to materialize until after 2031.[38]
That future force will notably prioritize joint, integrated long-range strike capabilities, enhancing the ADF’s mobility and capacity for operations beyond Australia’s immediate vicinity. This includes enhancing the army’s ability for littoral maneuver and the air force’s capability for expeditionary air operations.[39] The most notable new capability for the future force, however, is the previously announced nuclear attack submarines (SSN) under AUKUS Pillar I. There remains a concern that amid developing these diverse capabilities for the Future Integrated Force, there could be a tendency to view the capabilities themselves as “the” deterrent.[40] This perception risks equating possession of particular capabilities, such as the AUKUS submarines, with deterrence effectiveness, as if by mere possession alone a particular capability will be able to deter.
There is more than an inkling that that is a view held within Australia’s defense establishment. For example, a Defence Department document outlines the roles of SSNs as including conventional deterrence and enhancing regional security by “increasing deterrence.”[41] This portrayal of deterrence as a measurable, concrete element of capability suggests a view that contrasts with the nuanced and often unpredictable psychological dynamics between adversarial states and their leadership. Setting aside debates on whether nuclear deterrence holds existential weight, and mindful of Gray’s caution regarding the reliability of conventional deterrence, no conventional capability can reasonably be expected to deter a resolute adversary solely by its mere existence.
An Independent Capability?
A separate, pertinent issue stemming from defense policy is whether Australia intends its deterrence posture to function autonomously or as part of a broader collective defense effort involving the United States and other partners. In this regard, policy exhibits ambiguity. For example, the National Defence Strategy outlines five primary tasks for the ADF. These include defending Australia and “our immediate region”—or “our primary area of military interest,” which spans from “the Northeast Indian Ocean through maritime Southeast Asia into the Pacific.” However, it also asserts the necessity for the ADF to deter any adversary’s attempts to project power against Australia through “our northern approaches.” The exact geographical boundaries of Australia’s “northern approaches” remain somewhat unclear, despite the document indicating that Australia’s immediate region “includes our northern approaches.”[42]
Whether the “immediate region” is exactly coterminous with the “northern approaches” is murky, although that is probably the intent. If the intent is to be less geographically expansive—say, limited to the Indonesian and Papua New Guinea archipelagoes and the area south of Indonesia—the ADF would struggle to counter a PLA threat to the continent prior to missile launch. In that situation, therefore, deterrence would be undermined. Additionally, complications arising from Indonesia’s likely neutrality in a conflict could further constrain ADF responses, especially in the Indonesian archipelago.
Conversely, another task assigned to the ADF is safeguarding Australian trade and economic connections. Given the strategic significance of Australia’s trade relationships with Japan and South Korea, and the potential for aggression originating from mainland China against Australia or its interests via these approaches, it logically extends the concept of northern approaches to encompass all of littoral Northeast Asia. This suggests a need to enhance collective defense arrangements to allocate geographical responsibilities for trade protection during crises or wartime, akin to an expanded version of the US Navy–Royal Australian Navy Radford/Collins Agreement.[43]
Perhaps the bigger concern revolves around whether the revised defense policy merely perpetuates a mind-set focused on defending Australia, albeit with an ADF capable of operating at significantly greater distances from the continent than envisioned in the 1980s. This perspective is bolstered by another closely related concept from the 1970s–1980s era of defense thinking: “defense self-reliance,” which has proven challenging to overcome intellectually.[44] These ideas continue to exert considerable influence in Australian strategic thought, particularly among veterans of uniformed or civilian defense roles from that period.[45]
Conversely, policy consistently emphasizes the need to enhance interoperability with allies and partners, as well as collective resolve and “collective deterrence.”[46] Developments within the ANZUS alliance, such as force posture initiatives in Australia and efforts to promote not just interoperability but also “interchangeability,” are expected to contribute significantly to collective deterrence.[47] Such statements suggest an expanded regional interpretation of defense policy intent towards collective defense. This broader approach is further underscored by the Future Integrated Force’s plans for longer-range, more potent capabilities.
To ensure military effectiveness and operational viability in practice, the Future Integrated Force is envisioned as an ADF capable of projecting offensive combat power tactically and operationally over much greater distances than currently possible. This capability is crucial for countering China’s air- and sea-based missile platforms north of the Indonesian and Papua New Guinea archipelagoes before they can launch weapons against Australia, its allies, or partners. Central to this military-strategic objective are the AUKUS SSNs, which will play a pivotal role. Additionally, the force will integrate other critical components such as sea-launched Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, including the Maritime Strike Tomahawk variant, as well as air-launched long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM), joint air-to-surface standoff missiles–extended range (JASSM–ER), and an army capable of littoral maneuver with medium and heavy landing craft, along with longer-range rocket artillery and missiles.[48]
The Future Integrated Force will need to develop new tactics and operational concepts to bridge the strategy deficit, and thus improve the credibility of the intended deterrence-by-denial policy. Tactics pose primarily technical and technological challenges rather than political-strategic ones. These challenges necessitate collaborative development, particularly with the US military, which also grapples with similar complexities in deploying new, longer-range weapons to project adequate combat power across the expansive distances of the western Pacific.
Operational concepts, on the other hand, present more politically contentious but absolutely necessary approaches to conducting operations that achieve strategic effects. The ADF must thoroughly consider how and where the Future Integrated Force will effectively deter or engage in conflict. However, a government inclined towards diplomatic euphemism may obscure clarity in strategic policy and consequently undermine deterrence credibility.
Moreover, the full realization of the Future Integrated Force is not anticipated until the 2030–2040 timeframe, presenting the ADF with the interim challenge of devising less ambitious concepts to accommodate its current limited combat capabilities. This limitation significantly restricts its ability to deter effectively in the short term.
Compatibility with the US Integrated Deterrence Framework
Therefore, as a steadfast ally of the United States committed to deterring threats across the Indo-Pacific, Australia’s deterrence policy closely aligns with the Biden administration’s integrated deterrence framework on multiple levels.[49] This comprehensive strategy exemplifies grand strategy in action, blending military and nonmilitary elements alongside allied and partner capabilities. It emphasizes deterrence by denial, by “cost imposition” (i.e., punishment) and by “resilience.”[50] Despite its grand strategic approach in defense policy, however, the framework lacks clear articulation on how the US military will specifically contribute to deterrence through strategy or force posture.[51]
The AUKUS partnership stands as a tangible embodiment of integrated deterrence, aiming to bolster collective deterrence by jointly developing critical capabilities, including SSNs.[52] While beset with numerous obstacles, the successful implementation of the AUKUS plan could potentially amplify deterrent effects collectively, surpassing those achievable individually by member countries.[53] Nonetheless, AUKUS alone cannot singularly provide deterrence; its effectiveness hinges on addressing the aforementioned strategy deficit, advancing new operational concepts and tactics, and explicitly signaling political intentions.
Just as the US integrated deterrence framework seeks to integrate deterrence across military and non-military domains, Australia’s approach similarly embeds deterrence within its broader whole-of-government national defense framework, leveraging all elements of national power.[54] While both countries articulate these concepts more aptly within national security (grand) strategies rather than mere defense policies, it is evident that both Australia and the United States perceive effective deterrence as an outcome of comprehensive national efforts spanning military and nonmilitary spheres.
The economic dimension of Australia’s national deterrence strategy, particularly the use of trade as a tool of coercion and punishment, holds significant relevance. Beijing’s imposition of trade sanctions in response to Australia’s national security measures, including laws against political interference and advocacy for a Covid-19 origin inquiry, notably failed to achieve their intended outcomes. Australian companies mitigated potential losses by diversifying their markets.[55] Moreover, sectors affected by the sanctions, aside from coal, constitute relatively minor segments of the Australian economy. While discussions often highlight Australia’s trade dependence on China as a vulnerability, it is noteworthy that China did not restrict imports of crucial commodities such as iron ore, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and wool, which are vital to its own economy and lack viable alternative sources, especially iron ore. Restrictions on Australian coal imports ultimately inflicted more economic harm on China than Australia and were eventually reversed.
This underscores that disrupting international trade, particularly critical mineral flows, represents a significant vulnerability for China itself. The West can wield this vulnerability as a potent grand strategic tool of deterrence. In crisis periods preceding conflict, Australia and its allies may possess economic deterrent power comparable to, if not greater than, China’s, especially considering their control over critical commodities essential for China’s industrial base and economic stability.
In addition to the diplomatic, informational, and cyber domains, Australia needs to develop a coherent approach for deploying the economic facets of deterrence, particularly within an alliance context. Given the close collaboration between Australia and the United States in intelligence (ANZUS and Five Eyes), cybersecurity, and trade, there is significant potential to evolve a comprehensive deterrence framework that spans multiple policy sectors across allied and partner countries—a vision central to Australian policy on collective deterrence. Effective utilization of the information and cyber domains will be crucial for controlling leading narratives and ensuring that deterrence messages are communicated clearly and unambiguously to adversaries.
At the military level, the alliance is being strengthened with additional dimensions such as the enhanced rotational presence of US military forces in Australia and the collaborative development of advanced capabilities in areas like artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and quantum technologies.[56] The deployment of additional US military platforms, such as SSNs, watercraft, and maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Australia, along with logistics support and prepositioning of stores through the Combined Logistics Sustainment and Maintenance Enterprise (CoLSME), underscores the recognition of the western Pacific as the primary region where deterrence is most needed.[57] It should be noted that denial is expected to be the preferred approach for collective deterrence within the alliance framework.
Australian Deterrence Policy: A Work in Progress
Australia’s new policy of deterrence not only aligns with the integrated deterrence framework of the United States but also advances both ANZUS and broader collective deterrence efforts in the Indo-Pacific. While ambiguities remain regarding the precise objectives of Canberra’s policy, the emphasis on collective deterrence—as an analog to collective defense—and the planned long-range, mobile, and tactically offensive capabilities for the ADF suggest a significant strategic shift from the old defense of Australia doctrine and defense self-reliance.
However, several critical challenges undermine the policy. The operational capabilities necessary for credible and reliable deterrence will not be in place for at least another decade, if not longer. If a contingency arises in the near term—a plausible scenario— not only does Australia lack adequate military means to respond, but deterrence would have obviously failed. Compounding this issue is the absence of clearly defined methods for applying force to deter or respond to a major western Pacific contingency, even within the alliance context. Collective deterrence risks becoming a hollow component of alliance policy if such a strategy deficit persists without urgent remediation. ♦
Dr. Chris Rahman
Dr. Rahman is principal research fellow (associate professor) at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong. His research focuses on maritime strategy and security, strategic theory, Australian defence policy, China, and the strategic relations of the Indo-Pacific.
Dr. Prakash Gopal
Dr. Gopal is a lecturer at the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong. He is a former Indian naval officer, and conducts research on national and maritime security issues in the Indo-Pacific, India’s foreign and security policy, and the protection of critical maritime infrastructure.
Acknowledgment
This activity was supported by the Australian Government through a grant by the Australian Department of Defence. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian Government or the Australian Department of Defence.