Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs --
Abstract
In recent years, China has become New Zealand’s largest trading partner, while the United States and its allies, particularly Australia, remain its traditional security partners. Like other Indo-Pacific states, New Zealand has adopted an asymmetric hedging strategy to manage its relationships with the United States and China. As tensions between Wellington and Beijing, and Beijing and Washington intensify, there are calls for New Zealand to adopt a more active pro-US stance. This article examines the likelihood of New Zealand changing its hedging strategy. We assess the role economic security plays in Wellington’s calculus to determine if closer ties with the United States are feasible. We argue that, in the short term, Wellington is unlikely to abandon its hedging strategy due to high economic security costs. Finding alternative markets is difficult, due to international pessimism toward free trade and constraints within New Zealand’s domestic political economy, suggesting China will remain indispensable for New Zealand.
***
As US–China strategic competition sharpens, the Indo-Pacific’s regional security architecture is in “flux.”[1] The relationship now hinges more on competition than cooperation, marking a major shift in the global order since 1945. During the Cold War, the order was defined by US–Soviet rivalry. Afterward, it transformed with America’s emergence as the sole superpower in a unipolar system.[2] With China’s rise and Xi Jinping’s assertive foreign policy, geopolitics have shifted to an asymmetric multipolar order or a Cold War-style bipolar order.[3] Consequently, Indo-Pacific states and beyond must adjust their foreign policies.[4]
For many Indo-Pacific states, China is the largest trading partner, while the US and its allies remain their closest security partners. New Zealand faces a similar dilemma. It has maintained close relations with traditional security partners—the United States, Australia, and the Five Eyes countries—while enhancing its economic relationship with China.[5] New Zealand has walked a “middle path,” but as US–China relations fracture and Wellington’s ties with Washington and Beijing evolve, this approach may falter.[6] Reuben Steff and Francesca Dodd-Parr argue that a strategic triangle exists among New Zealand, the United States, and China, where changes in any bilateral relationship, such as intensifying US–China rivalry, will affect New Zealand.[7]
Examining how New Zealand’s foreign policy and relations with great powers have evolved, especially in the past two decades, illustrates how this strategic triangle affects New Zealand’s foreign policy. After World War II, the signing of the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Treaty committed the three states to the defense of the other treaty partners, with the United States emerging as New Zealand’s security guarantor.[8] In the defense-security sphere, New Zealand further entrenched itself with the United States and its allies by joining the Five Eyes intelligence sharing network along with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia in 1956.[9] However, the New Zealand–US relationship was severely strained when Wellington adopted a nuclear-free policy that opposed nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific and refused entry to nuclear-powered naval vessels into New Zealand’s territorial waters.[10] Subsequently, Washington suspended its security guarantees to New Zealand under ANZUS and downgraded New Zealand from an ally to a “friend” in 1985 since New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy directly clashed with Washington’s strategic interests in the South Pacific.[11] New Zealand was excluded from high-level military and naval exercises hosted by the United States, and cooperation in the defense-security sphere was frozen for 10 years.[12] Relations remained distant under Labour Prime Minister Helen Clark, who refused to be a part of the “coalition of the willing” and did not join the invasion of Iraq since Washington’s military invasion did not have the backing of the UN Security Council.[13]
However, some limited cooperation in the defense-security sphere re-emerged in the 1990s. New Zealand contributed troops during the Gulf War in 1991 and was part of multilateral UN peacekeeping missions.[14] Despite Prime Minister Clark’s decision not to join the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, New Zealand deployed 61 Defence Force (NZDF) army engineers to Iraq in 2003 in noncombat roles, primarily to help with reconstruction efforts.[15] As part of the global response to the September 11 attacks, New Zealand deployed over 3,500 defense personnel in Afghanistan to support North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and US efforts over a 15-year period.[16]
These developments under Helen Clark paved the way for the conservative National Party’s John Key to tilt New Zealand’s security alignment more toward the United States when he became prime minister in 2008.[17] Under Key, New Zealand and the US signed several documents, such as the Wellington Declaration in 2010 and the Washington Declaration in 2012.[18] These aimed to normalize the New Zealand–US relationship and elevate New Zealand’s strategic partnership with the United States.[19] Military cooperation increased, with New Zealand invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise with the US Navy in 2012. High-level exchanges between military personnel resumed after being frozen following the ANZUS suspension.[20] In 2016, a US Navy destroyer visited New Zealand for the first time in 36 years.[21]
Relations in the defense-security sphere continued to grow when the Labour Party’s Jacinda Ardern was elected prime minister in 2017.[22] Under Ardern, the United States remained the largest supplier of arms to New Zealand, which bought four P8 Poseidon aircraft from the United States.[23] Other developments under Key and Ardern, such as cooperation in space and New Zealand being invited by the United States to join the Command Space Operations, cemented New Zealand–US relations in the defense-security sphere.[24] In a bilateral meeting with US President Joe Biden at the White House, Ardern and Biden reaffirmed the US–New Zealand strategic partnership and highlighted other areas for cooperation, such as working with Pacific Island Countries (PIC), in a joint statement during Ardern’s visit to the White House in 2022.[25]
This improvement in New Zealand’s relationship with the United States coincides with a period wherein New Zealand also forged closer relations with China.[26] The New Zealand–China relationship is characterized by a series of firsts.[27] In 1997, New Zealand became the first Western state to back China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).[28] In 2004, New Zealand was the first Western country to designate China as a market economy.[29] The most significant development occurred in 2008 when New Zealand signed a free trade agreement (FTA) with China.[30] This was followed by New Zealand becoming the first Western state to join the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015. New Zealand was also the first Western country to sign a memorandum of understanding with China on its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017.[31]
Although New Zealand–China cooperation on the AIIB and the BRI never resulted in anything concrete, the New Zealand–China FTA in 2008 has led to China emerging as New Zealand’s largest trading partner. In 2008, the Chinese market accounted for only 5.8 percent of New Zealand exports. After the signing of the FTA, this figure rose to 27.7 percent in 2020.[32] Not only has China become New Zealand’s largest trading partner, but New Zealand also enjoys a trade surplus with China. For instance, in 2021, New Zealand’s total exports of goods and services to China were valued at NZD 21.45 billion, while New Zealand’s imports from China were valued at NZD 16.26 billion.[33] In 2021, New Zealand therefore had a trade surplus with China of NZD 5.19 billion.
However, this strategy of forging close ties with both the United States and China is becoming difficult for New Zealand to execute as the bilateral relationships within the NZ–US–China strategic triangle have changed over the past decade. As US–China strategic competition intensifies, differences between New Zealand and China on various issues—from the Taiwan Strait to human rights violations in Xinjiang and China’s conduct in the South China Sea—have emerged in recent years.[34] New Zealand’s difficulty in walking the middle path is illustrated by criticism from Western security partners for not speaking out on China’s coercive foreign policy actions, while also upsetting China by publicly confronting it on issues of disagreement. For instance, New Zealand was labeled a “weak link” for not joining the other Five Eyes countries in criticizing China’s actions in Xinjiang in a 2021 joint statement.[35] New Zealand has been accused of being too soft and too scared of confronting China, prioritizing economic interests over moral values such as adherence to the rules-based international order and human rights, earning the label of a “good international citizen.”[36]
On the other hand, Wellington has faced Beijing’s ire and upset China on multiple occasions. For instance, Beijing accused New Zealand of being a mouthpiece for its Western allies when Australia and New Zealand released a joint statement voicing concerns about China’s actions in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.[37] Similarly, the Chinese embassy in Wellington stated that New Zealand should give up its “Cold War mentality” when New Zealand publicly called out China for being a source of cyberattacks affecting New Zealand.[38] More recently, when New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters called out China over its security presence in the South Pacific, the Chinese embassy in Wellington rebuked New Zealand and urged it to stop using “megaphone diplomacy.”[39]
After the election of a National Party-led right-leaning government in 2023, several observers and scholars called for New Zealand to take a more robust stance against China. Winston Peters was reappointed as foreign minister after the National Party-led coalition government came to power in 2023. Peters, a longtime advocate of strong New Zealand–US relations, stated that he aims to move New Zealand closer to the United States and other Five Eyes partners.[40] After being elected prime minister, the National Party’s leader Christopher Luxon visited Australia on his first official overseas trip and stated that Australia and New Zealand would seek to deepen their cooperation in the defense-security sphere.[41]
The current National-led government has taken measures to move New Zealand closer to the United States and its Five Eyes partners in the defense-security sphere. The government continued the previous administration’s practice of attending annual NATO summits, with Prime Minister Luxon leading New Zealand’s delegation to the NATO summit in 2024.[42] This marks the third consecutive year that New Zealand has been invited, along with Australia, South Korea, and Japan, to attend NATO summits.[43] New Zealand’s current defense minister, Judith Collins, has met her American and British counterparts on multiple occasions. New Zealand has joined several initiatives, such as the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) participating in the US-led deployment in the Red Sea, the US-led multinational space initiative Operation Olympic Defender, and the United Kingdom’s Bletchley Declaration on Artificial Intelligence (AI) Safety.[44] In September 2024, a New Zealand Navy vessel passed through the Taiwan Strait with an Australian Naval vessel for the first time since 2017.[45] The government has also stated that other multilateral arrangements led by these traditional partners, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), “contribute to peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.”[46] It is argued that the Luxon government is developing a more consistent view on joining Pillar II of the Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) trilateral arrangement, a departure from the previous Labour government, which was more cautious in its views on AUKUS.[47]
Apart from shared history, the role of values and principles has also been highlighted by the current government as a key factor influencing closer alignment with the United States and its allies in the defense-security sphere. In a 2024 joint US–NZ Declaration, Foreign Minister Peters highlighted some of these shared values and principles, such as “rule of law, democracy, human rights,” as well as “freedom of navigation, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for sovereignty and internationally agreed-upon rules and norms.”[48] A commitment to the rules-based international order and democratic values, partly emerging from its identity as a liberal democracy that was a British settler state, drives New Zealand to continue to be seen as a good global citizen.[49] These shared values also influence how the New Zealand public perceives its relations with the United States and its allies. For instance, James Headley and Andreas Reitzig noted that this aspect of shared values resulted in the New Zealand public perceiving Australia in a positive light, with more than 45 percent of respondents favoring closer defense ties with Australia.[50]
As Brian Roper notes, several recent realist analyses, largely anti-China, have called for New Zealand to take a clearer stance by forging closer ties with the United States.[51] For these observers, the current conservative National Party-led government, positioning Wellington closer to Washington and Canberra while aiding Washington’s strategic objectives of containing China in the Pacific, presents an opportune moment for the country to fully reposition its foreign policy and take a definitive pro-US stance through measures such as joining Pillar II of AUKUS.[52] One study even argues that New Zealand has become “the latest country to pivot” toward the United States and that, due to Beijing’s “bullying” tactics and the ideological leanings of its current government, Wellington is being pushed into “Washington’s welcoming arms.”[53]
Considering these developments, the question arises: How likely is it that New Zealand will change its existing hedging strategy and adopt a more active pro-US stance? To answer this, the costs and benefits New Zealand will incur if it moves away from its hedging strategy are assessed using an expected utility model. Examining the concept of economic security is crucial to gain a more comprehensive understanding of New Zealand’s grand strategy. In the short term, New Zealand will incur high costs if it moves away from its hedging strategy, as it has limited options to ensure its own economic security. New Zealand’s domestic political economy, specifically its status as an exporter of primary sector products with high substitutability and the lack of a domestic manufacturing sector, further limits its ability to ensure its own economic security. Consequently, this limits New Zealand’s ability to adopt a more overt and active pro-US stance in the short term, as China will continue to be an indispensable trading partner during this period.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: The next section examines New Zealand’s asymmetrical hedging strategy. An expected utility model is then proposed to provide a theoretical framework through which New Zealand’s decision-making calculus can be analyzed. Following this, the likelihood of a move away from the existing hedging strategy and the costs New Zealand would incur from such a move are examined. The final section concludes.
New Zealand’s Hedging Strategy
Small states like New Zealand face three strategic choices when confronted by a threatening or rising power: balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging.[54] Balancing safeguards their autonomy and security against a “menacing state,” achieved through an internal military build-up or by forming external security alliances.[55] Alternatively, small states may choose to bandwagon by aligning with the rising power, avoiding actions that contradict or harm the rising power’s strategic interests.[56] By doing so, the small state aims to avoid harm and sometimes “gain a profit.”[57]
However, both balancing and bandwagoning have costs and consequences. A small state that bandwagons may lose autonomy due to the dominant position of the rising power.[58] Engaging in external balancing may expose states to the dangers of entrapment or abandonment, while internal balancing can incur significant costs.[59]
The third strategy, hedging, combines elements of both balancing and bandwagoning to reduce the risks and costs associated with adopting a pure bandwagoning strategy.[60] Hedging allows small states to counter “the threatening power through strengthening its own defence and/or forming an alliance with other countries while at the same time engaging with the menacing state.”[61] Scholars offer various definitions and characteristics of hedging, using it as an umbrella term to describe a wide variety of state actions.[62] For small states, hedging is a strategy to “cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another.”[63]
According to Cheng-Chwee Kuik, strategic behavior by small states requires three key elements to qualify as hedging.[64] First, states must insist on not taking sides among competing powers and avoid fully aligning their interests or support with another major power.[65] Second, states must adopt “opposite and counteracting measures.” Finally, states must pursue the dual goals of preserving the gains acquired by hedging while planning for a fallback option using instruments such as opposite actions.[66]
Other factors or preconditions are needed to ensure successful hedging by small states. Small states need to adopt appropriate signaling measures, possess the right capabilities, and benefit from a favorable regional geopolitical environment and domestic political landscape.[67] Several small states have adopted a hedging strategy to manage relations with the two great powers in the Indo-Pacific, especially during a time of international uncertainty. For example, this uncertainty has led small Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states like Malaysia and Singapore to adopt hedging strategies that incorporate return-maximizing and risk-contingency options, along with developing fallback options.[68]
For these small states, a hedging strategy also legitimizes the political authority of ruling elites at home and addresses challenges posed by China’s rise and the sharpening US–China strategic competition.[69] Several small states in the South Pacific, such as Fiji, Samoa, and Kiribati, have also adopted a hedging strategy due to enduring uncertainties from geostrategic competition between the United States and China in the region.[70] These PICs incorporate elements such as a return-maximizing strategy to enhance their developmental options in their hedging strategies.[71] It is crucial to note that there is significant variation in these hedging strategies since no two states or hedges are identical.[72]
In New Zealand’s case, Nicholas Ross Smith argues that the country has pursued an asymmetrical hedging strategy to manage its relations with the United States and China.[73] According to Smith, asymmetrical hedging occurs when “the smaller power nominally (usually with regards security) aligns with one great power but does so in a way that is not exclusive to having relations (usually trade) with the other great power.”[74] This strategy aims to “spread risk wide to mitigate potential calamity.”[75]
For at least the past decade and a half, New Zealand has been following this strategy and employing several “instruments,” such as sending signals that convey “constructive ambiguity.”[76] Wellington has attempted to placate both sides, signing up for several if not all of Washington’s security objectives in the region while relying heavily on New Zealand’s trade relationship with China, focusing on measures like seeking to upgrade its FTA with China in 2019.[77]
Smith elaborates that New Zealand’s asymmetric hedging differs from other kinds of hedging behavior, such as nonalignment, which other states may adopt. He notes that the strategy is “a less ambitious strategy than dual-aligned hedging, but it is certainly more ambitious than a nonaligned hedge as the smaller power is still trying to forge a middle ground whereby it reaps the benefits of alignment with one state but also the benefits of having cordial relations with the other.”[78]
Steff notes that New Zealand has adopted some components of a balancing strategy in the defense-security sphere.[79] However, he also notes that this balancing falls within the parameters of asymmetrical hedging and is part of New Zealand’s asymmetric hedge.
Beyond the binary framing of hedging versus balancing with the US, New Zealand can deploy other strategies—such as zigzagging or wedging—wherein the larger players are played off against each other.[80] Smith notes that small states may use a zigzagging strategy to “maximize relations” with the power that is the “highest bidder” at the expense of the other power.[81] For the small state, the aim of this zigzagging strategy is to secure a more favorable balancing or bandwagoning arrangement with the highest bidder.[82] However, zigzagging is rare and extremely risky for small states since relations with the power that is the “lowest bidder” may completely break down.[83] These risks are further heightened if relations with the highest bidder sour in the long term. Hence, due to its nature as a “high risk, high reward” strategy, Smith argues that New Zealand is even less likely to adopt this zigzagging strategy than bandwagoning with China.[84]
New Zealand Foreign Policy and Expected Utility
How likely is it that New Zealand will move away from its hedging strategy and adopt a more pro-US stance? The emerging points of difference in the New Zealand–China relationship and the ideological leanings of its current government have sparked calls for New Zealand to re-examine its foreign policy and reassess its relationship with China.
The fracturing US–China relationship is adding pressure on New Zealand, as adversarial US–China relations shrink the room for New Zealand’s asymmetrical hedging strategy.[85] Additionally, like balancing and bandwagoning, hedging also has costs, and policy makers must make decisions under conditions of uncertain outcomes.
To address these questions, Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory is adapted to New Zealand’s strategic decisions.[86] Expected utility theory examines states’ preferences concerning outcome uncertainty. It helps to understand how states make choices when policy makers are unsure about their decisions’ outcomes.
Consider the following: As New Zealand (N) wades into the US–China rivalry, it effectively chooses whether to side with China (C) or the United States (A). If n represents New Zealand’s capability, c represents China’s capability, and a represents America’s capability then 
is the probability that C will win with N’s help = 
and, 
is the probability that A will win with N’s help = 
. The expected utility for N if it sides with C can be represented by 
[1].
Equation 1 indicates that the expected utility for New Zealand, if it sides with China, is the probability of China prevailing (
multiplied by the satisfaction that New Zealand gains if China prevails (
), and the probability of America prevailing 
multiplied by the ‘satisfaction’ New Zealand gains if America prevails (
), minus the costs New Zealand bears for siding with China (
).
Conversely, the expected utility for New Zealand (N) if it decides to side with the US (A) is as follows: 
[2]. Combining equation 1 and equation 2 of New Zealand’s decision calculus gives us the following: <>=
[3].
It follows then that if 
> 
, New Zealand will side with China. Conversely, it will side with the United States if < . If New Zealand’s expected utility in siding with China is larger than its expected utility in siding with the US, it will side with China. Conversely, it will side with the United States if its expected utility from taking that action is higher than siding with China. If these two expected utilities are equal, New Zealand will decide to stay neutral. These statements are self-evident and illustrate that a country’s decision to ally with another country boils down to the difference in the benefits it expects to gain and the costs it expects to incur.
To gain further insights into the decision calculus equation, rearrange the terms in equation 3. After simplifying, we find: 
[4]. Noting that and are simply the probabilities of either China or the United States prevailing with New Zealand’s assistance, we can simplify equation 4 further: 
[5]. Here 
represents the proportion of resources and capability that New Zealand can commit, 
is New Zealand’s differential motivation (or satisfaction) in siding with China or the United States, and 
is the marginal difference in costs that New Zealand will incur in helping China or the United States.
With this rearrangement, some interesting observations emerge. Equation 5 shows that New Zealand’s decision to side with China or the United States is influenced by the resources and capabilities it can or must “bring to the table” and the satisfaction or motivation it derives from one side prevailing over the other. These factors are weighed against the costs it will bear and incur from its action to side with either China or the United States.
Applying equation 5 from the expected utility theory to Wellington’s foreign policy decisions provides rich insights into the decision calculus facing New Zealand’s policy makers. Assuming that <, from the perspective of New Zealand–China relations, it suggests New Zealand derives less satisfaction from a stronger China prevailing. China’s assertive responses to New Zealand’s recent statements, which publicly confronted China about points of difference in their bilateral relationship, and the moves by New Zealand’s current government to vocally address belligerent Chinese actions in the South Pacific support this assumption. A stronger China does not necessarily mean more peaceful New Zealand–China relations.
Comparing the left-hand side terms (capability and satisfaction/motivation) with the right-hand side terms (differential costs) reveals interesting insights into New Zealand’s decision calculus. Given the assumption that New Zealand is less satisfied with a stronger China, the differential satisfaction term is negative, making the left-hand side negative. If 
, meaning the cost of supporting China is higher than the cost of supporting the United States, equation 5 suggests that New Zealand should side with America. If 
, meaning the cost of supporting either side is equally high, it makes sense for New Zealand to develop closer ties with the United States. However, if 
, meaning the cost of supporting the United States is clearly higher than supporting China, New Zealand will likely remain neutral or noncommittal to both sides. These observations illustrate how New Zealand’s decision to ally with another country hinges on the differences in benefits it expects to gain and the costs it expects to incur.
From the expected utility framework, two of the three scenarios suggest that New Zealand should develop closer ties with America. In the third scenario, where the relative cost of supporting America is higher compared to China, New Zealand remains noncommittal to both sides and is unlikely to support China due to lower satisfaction with a stronger China. The current state of New Zealand–US relations and the calls for New Zealand to adopt a more overt pro-US stance indicate that the first scenario, 
is what New Zealand should pursue. However, New Zealand’s current stance suggests that Wellington’s assessments of the costs and benefits align with the third scenario () of remaining neutral and staying out of the fray.
Examining the costs associated with each of these scenarios provides insights into New Zealand’s decision-making process. The expected utility model and equation 5 indicate that the costs associated with a shift in New Zealand’s foreign policy posture (
should determine whether New Zealand moves away from its hedging strategy and adopts a more active pro-US stance. If New Zealand decides to abandon its current hedging strategy, it must find a way to lower the costs associated with such a move ( and increase the benefits of adopting a more pro-US strategy. If New Zealand cannot lower the costs and increase the benefits of changing its strategy, the expected utility model suggests that New Zealand has little to gain from such a shift.
Economic Security and New Zealand’s Grand Strategy
The expected utility framework outlined above illustrates that New Zealand must consider the costs and benefits of moving away from its current strategy and adopting a more overt pro-US stance in its foreign policy. One way to examine these costs is to define what constitutes security for New Zealand and understand its perception of the concept.
Various scholars have offered different definitions of security, and the concept has been intensely debated over the years.[87] As Barry Buzan notes, security is an “essentially contested concept” characterized by “unsolvable debates about its meaning and application.”[88] In the post-Cold War era, the debate about what constituents security widened to include nonmilitary threats to the state.[89] This represented a shift from the Cold War years, where the conceptualization of security was narrow, focusing on the state and military threats in a bipolar system dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.[90]
Some of these traditional security challenges, centering on predominantly military threats as envisioned during the Cold War, still influence New Zealand’s strategic thinking. Recent statements by the New Zealand government indicate that its strategic thinking is partly shaped by the evolving geostrategic environment in the Indo-Pacific and the security challenges faced by states in the region. The 2023 Strategic Foreign Policy Assessment by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade highlights challenges such as North Korean nuclear missile tests, China’s aggressive moves against the Philippines in the South China Sea (SCS), and the militarization of artificial islands in the SCS.[91] Additionally, New Zealand has expressed deep concern over the growing tensions across the Taiwan Strait in recent years.[92]
However, the expansion of the security debate after the Cold War introduced other forms of security, such as environmental and economic security, along with variables like culture, identity, and domestic determinants.[93] Consequently, economic security was conceptualized as an examination of “trade, production and finance,” a concept that has “preoccupied national governments, in Asia and elsewhere, when economic shocks have been so unexpected and severe that existing social and political arrangements appear threatened.”[94]
These additional elements of security, along with traditional military-related concepts, have shaped New Zealand’s strategic thinking over the years. Jason Young argues that economic security has always been pivotal in New Zealand’s foreign policy due to its position as a “small, externally reliant and vulnerable economy with a tiny domestic market that limits economies of scale and the state’s ability to shape trade or economic relations with larger economies.”[95] Concerns over New Zealand’s status as a “trading nation” have influenced policy makers since the 1930s.[96]
These concerns heightened in the 1970s when New Zealand lost its free trade access to the British market after the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973.[97] As a consequence of the “loss of Britain,” trade became the primary basis for New Zealand’s engagement with other states.[98] The emphasis on trade and economic security was so pronounced that former Prime Minister Robert Muldoon proclaimed, “Our foreign policy is trade. We are not interested in the normal foreign policy matters to any great extent. We are interested in trade.”[99]
In the 1980s and 1990s, New Zealand’s engagement with Asian countries was shaped by its position as a small trade-dependent nation seeking the security of liberal trade arrangements and the quest of its policy makers to ensure the country’s economic security.[100] Crucially, New Zealand’s approach to China has been shaped by a similar perception of its own economic vulnerability, and New Zealand policy makers have viewed “China’s rise as part of an effort to seek ontological security as a small trading nation.”[101]
The significance of economic security in New Zealand’s perception of its overall security becomes more evident when considering its geographical distance from other major powers and conflicts. Surrounded by ocean, New Zealand has never had to defend itself from a direct invasion or attack, unlike neighboring Australia, which experienced Japanese bombings during World War II.[102] A New Zealand diplomat once summarized these differences by stating, “Australia felt itself to be strategically vulnerable but economically strong, whereas New Zealand felt strategically secure but economically insecure.”[103]
The historical absence of a physical threat from a hostile power, combined with experiences of economic shocks and vulnerabilities, highlights that economic security is as crucial as geostrategic or military security in New Zealand’s security perception. Therefore, when considering the costs of a strategy change, New Zealand policy makers must account for economic security costs, given the significant role this factor plays in Wellington’s conceptualization of security.
Considering current trade patterns, it is unsurprising that New Zealand policy makers have adopted an asymmetric hedging strategy. China has been New Zealand’s largest trading partner since 2012, with over NZD 20-billion worth of goods headed for the Chinese market in 2022 (fig. 1). In contrast, New Zealand’s combined trade with Japan, the United States, and Australia was still less than its trade with China in 2022. This economic relationship with China and concerns about economic security explain why Wellington has maintained its asymmetric hedging strategy, adhering to the third scenario in the model ().
Figure 1. New Zealand Goods Exports to top markets (NZ$ billions). (Source: Compiled by authors using data from Stats NZ and the New Zealand China Council.)
The debate around economic security has re-emerged in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Considering China’s economic coercion of Australia, which had significant consequences for Australia’s economy, there have been renewed calls for Wellington to reassess its economic relationship with China.[104] Given China’s willingness to use trade as a weapon of coercion, some argue that New Zealand should re-examine the risks to its economic security since a considerable proportion of its goods are headed for a single market.[105]
The previous Labour government highlighted these concerns when former Prime Minister Chris Hipkins urged businesses to diversify trade away from China, stating that “making sure our eggs are spread across a range of baskets offers us a greater level of protection.”[106] This sentiment was echoed in a series of government documents, such as the National Security Strategy released by the New Zealand government in 2023, which highlighted “economic coercion by foreign actors” and urged “economic resilience.”[107] In effect, overreliance on a single market may result in economic insecurity.
Based on the model, lesser reliance on trade with China may reduce the costs associated with the third scenario 
) and may incentivize New Zealand to adopt scenario one () or scenario two (
, both of which advocate developing closer ties with the United States. However, “spreading eggs” in different baskets and diversifying trade face two challenges making this unlikely in the short term.
The first challenge is posed by the current state of the international order, which is less favorable to free trade than it has been since the end of the Cold War.[108] Several countries have moved away from free trade and adopted protectionist and mercantilist measures. Terms such as resilience and economic self-sufficiency now increasingly describe this noticeable uptick in protectionism and aversion to free trade.[109]
In the Indo-Pacific, America’s absence from any regional multilateral arrangement with provisions for market access, since the Trump administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), illustrates the current state of free trade.[110] The Biden administration has continued the Trump administration’s skepticism toward free trade. Although President Biden established the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), his administration has been unable to introduce market access provisions in IPEF due to domestic political opposition.[111]
This presents a challenge for Wellington, as its previous approach to ensuring economic security after losing the British market was to diversify trade and push for free trade deals with other states. New Zealand’s chief trade negotiator acknowledges that this approach is now inadequate and that the “golden weather” for New Zealand’s trading policy is over.[112] Given the prevailing international environment, despite Wellington’s desire to diversify trade and reduce economic dependence on China, there are few alternative markets available.
The second challenge arises from New Zealand’s domestic political economy structure. New Zealand’s comparative advantage lies in the primary sector, including dairy farming, horticulture, forestry, meat, and wool.[113] Over the years, New Zealand’s manufacturing base has shrunk due to factors such as the distance from large markets and a relatively small domestic market, making it challenging to achieve economies of scale.[114] As demonstrated in figure 2, the primary sector accounts for at least 50 percent of all New Zealand exports to its top five trading partners.
Figure 2. Percentage of primary sector exports to New Zealand’s top export markets 2022. (Source: Compiled by authors using data from Stats NZ and the New Zealand China Council.)
Although the primary sector adds value to the New Zealand economy, it remains one of the most protected sectors. Several countries are reluctant to open their markets to free trade in this sector.[115] Indeed, New Zealand’s bilateral trade talks with Japan in the 1980s and currently with India illustrate the difficulties in securing market access in these countries since both have large domestic primary sector producing markets.[116]
There are other challenges associated with having a comparative advantage in the primary sector. Primary sector products are relatively low “value-added” and, in most cases, are not part of critical supply chains like some of the natural resources Australia exports or other advanced manufactured goods.[117] These products have a high substitutability, and countries can find alternative suppliers in trade disputes.[118]
The challenge for New Zealand is not just the difficulty in finding alternative markets to reduce reliance on China, but also that the sector in which New Zealand specializes limits its appeal due to its prevailing political economy and industrial structure. Given these challenges, New Zealand may find it difficult to move away from the third scenario in our model () in the short term, unless it finds a way to lower the costs to its economic security and increase the benefits. If, for instance, access to an alternative market like the United States or India was possible, this would change the calculus of costs and benefits for New Zealand and may move Wellington toward the first 
) or second ( scenarios of the model, which advocate developing closer ties with the United States.
Several scholars argue that the benefits of developing closer ties with the US outweigh the costs. Some note the congruence of values between the United States and New Zealand, and how recent belligerent actions by China, such as missile firings in the South Pacific, challenge New Zealand’s principles.[119] Others highlight the emerging power of the US and its allies, suggesting that “If a US–China neo-Cold War is underway, it might pay to bet on the most powerful and dynamic side—which is the US and Australia.”[120] Additionally, it is often noted that “If New Zealand finds itself in a situation where it has to choose to balance with the US or bandwagon with China, it is almost a certainty that New Zealand would follow Australia’s footsteps and firmly align itself with the US.”
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that the hedging strategy is contingent on the international environment allowing small states the breathing room to undertake a successful hedge. There may be long-term risks, such as strategic irrelevance, associated with hedging. If the international order in the Indo-Pacific transforms into one similar to the Cold War due to the deterioration of Sino–US relations, New Zealand may be forced to rethink its asymmetrical hedging strategy.[121]
Smith notes, “If New Zealand finds itself in a situation where it has to choose to balance with the US or bandwagon with China, it is almost a certainty that New Zealand would follow Australia’s footsteps and firmly align itself with the US.” [122] However, Smith also argues that New Zealand may adopt a nonaligned form of hedging in the short term instead of entirely abandoning its hedging strategy if US–China relations turn more adversarial.[123]
Due to factors like the congruence of values, New Zealand may decide to support the US and its allies if forced to choose between the two. However, Wellington’s policy posture indicates hesitancy to move away from its hedging strategy. While Wellington may include values and principles in its decision-making calculus, it also accounts for its material interests and economic security. Indeed, in the long term, Wellington may lower the costs to its economic security to the extent that the benefits of aligning more closely with the United States outweigh the costs. However, Wellington may struggle to achieve this in the short term due to the constraints discussed above.
Terence O’Brien notes that “values as well as interest drive New Zealand foreign policy.”[124] This balance of interests against values is most clearly demonstrated in the question of New Zealand’s AUKUS membership. The current government has developed a more consistent position on New Zealand’s membership of Pillar II of AUKUS than the previous government and has highlighted the role that shared values have played in moving New Zealand closer to Australia and the US in the defense-strategic dimension. However, despite the congruence of values, New Zealand has not yet joined AUKUS, unlike Australia.
Richard Devetak and Jacqui True note that foreign policy differences between Australia and New Zealand arise “from different governmental worldviews.”[125] The New Zealand government’s worldview is influenced as much, if not more, by concerns of economic security as by shared values. Foreign Minister Peters stated in a 2024 speech that the “Government is a long way’ from making the decision about joining Pillar II of AUKUS and that ‘critics and commentators are well ahead of where the government presently sits in relation to Pillar II.”[126]
Conclusion
This study examines the likelihood of New Zealand changing its existing hedging strategy and adopting a more active pro-US stance. With the recent deterioration of relations between Wellington and Beijing, as well as Beijing and Washington, there have been calls for New Zealand to move away from its asymmetric hedging strategy, especially with the room for hedging shrinking due to US–China strategic competition.
Using de Mesquita’s expected utility model, various scenarios and the costs New Zealand will incur with a policy change were mapped out. The role that economic security plays in Wellington’s calculus was assessed to determine whether New Zealand will develop closer ties with the United States. It was argued that, at least in the short term, Wellington is unlikely to move away from its current hedging strategy due to the high economic security costs associated with such a move. Given the difficulties in finding alternative markets, owing to international pessimism toward free trade and the constraints of New Zealand’s domestic political economy, China may continue to remain an indispensable partner for New Zealand in the short term.
New Zealand policy makers have begun to publicly recognize the risks associated with overreliance on trade with a single partner in recent years. The overreliance on the British market in the 1970s serves as a reminder of the pitfalls of having a singular trading partner accounting for more than 30 percent of all goods exports. However, it is vital that New Zealand policy makers also recognize the risks associated with developing a comparative advantage in the primary sector. The primary sector accounts for a disproportionate share of all goods exports to New Zealand’s top trading partners. High tariffs and other barriers to entry create additional hurdles in securing new markets for the primary sector, as exemplified by New Zealand’s experience with free trade negotiations with India.
It is crucial for New Zealand policy makers to convey the risks associated with safeguarding the country’s economic security to the public. Instead of making policy announcements promising an FTA with India within three years, New Zealand policy makers should engage in honest conversations with the public about the challenges in overcoming this hurdle and securing the country’s economic security in the long term.[127] ♦
Dr. Alexander C. Tan
Dr. Tan is the founder and a principal research fellow of the Institute of Indo-Pacific Affairs. He is a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. His research is focused on contemporary democracies, party politics, and political economy with a focus on East and Southeast Asia.
Neel Vanvari
Mr. Vanvari is a research fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs and is a PhD candidate at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand. He researches on political economy, Indian politics, and comparative politics with a focus on South Asia.
Notes
[1] Rohan Mukherjee, “Chaos as Opportunity: The United States and World Order in India’s Grand Strategy,” Contemporary Politics 26, no. 4 (2020), 421, https://doi.org/.
[2] Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93, no. 3 (Summer 1964): 881–909, https://www.jstor.org/; Immanuel Wallerstein, “The World-System After the Cold War,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 1 (1993): 1–6, https://journals.sagepub.com/; and John G. Ikenberry, “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order,” International security 23, no. 3 (1998): 43–78, https://doi.org/.
[3] Avery Goldstein, “US–China Rivalry in the twenty-first century: Déjà vu and Cold War II,” China International Strategy Review 2, no. 1 (2020), 48–62, https://doi.org/; Pascale Massot, “Global order, US–China relations, and Chinese behaviour: The ground is shifting, Canada must adjust,” International Journal 74, no. 4 (2019): 600–11, https://doi.org/; and Stewart Patrick, “The World Order Is Starting to Crack,” Foreign Policy, 25 July 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/.
[4] Nicholas Khoo, Germana Nicklin, and Alexander C. Tan, Indo-Pacific Security: US-China Rivalry and Regional States’ Responses (London: World Scientific Publishing, 2024), 1–7.
[5] Nicholas Ross Smith and Bonnie Holster, ““New Zealand’s ‘Maori foreign policy’ and China: a case of instrumental relationality?,” International Affairs 99, no. 4 (July 2023): 1575–93, https://academic.oup.com/.
[6] Reuben Steff, “‘Our region is now a strategic theatre’: New Zealand’s balancing response to China,” Pacific Review 37, no. 6 (2024): 1120–51, https://doi.org/; and Jason Young, “Seeking ontological security through the rise of China: New Zealand as a small trading nation,” Pacific Review 30, no. 4 (2017): 513–30, https://doi.org/.
[7] Reuben Steff and Francesca Dodd-Parr, “Examining the immanent dilemma of small states in the Asia-Pacific: the strategic triangle between New Zealand, the US and China,” Pacific Review 32, no. 1 (2019): 90–112, https://doi.org/.
[9] Toby Manhire, “New Zealand spying on Pacific allies for ‘Five Eyes’ and NSA, Snowden files show,” The Guardian, 5 March 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/.
[10] James McCormick, “Healing the American Rift with New Zealand,” Pacific Affairs 68, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 392–410, https://www.jstor.org/.
[11] Stephen Hoadley, New Zealand United States Relations (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2016).
[12] Ken Ross, “New Zealand prime ministers–at the White House,” New Zealand International Review 40, no. 2 (March/April 2015): 18–21, https://www.jstor.org/.
[13] David McCraw, “New Zealand Foreign Policy under the Clark Government: High Tide of Liberal Internationalism?,” Pacific Affairs 78, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 217–35, https://doi.org/.
[15] Geoffrey Miller, “New Zealand’s Middle East Strategy, 20 Years After the Iraq War,” The Diplomat, 20 March 2023, https://thediplomat.com/.
[17] Steff, “‘Our region is now a strategic theatre’,” 8.
[18] Ken Ross, “John Key’s global diplomacy,” New Zealand International Review 42, no. 3 (May/June 2017): 22–25, https://www.jstor.org/.
[20] Audrey Young, “Navy’s Pearl Harbour ban ‘nothing new’—PM,” New Zealand Herald, 3 July 2012, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/; and Steff, “‘Our region is now a strategic theatre’,” 8.
[21] Sam LaGrone, “Timelapse Video: U.S. Warship Visits New Zealand for First Time in 30 Years,” USNI News, 20 November 2016, https://news.usni.org/.
[22] Clifford A. Hart, “New Zealand and the Indo-Pacific: Adaptation to Changing Geopolitics,” in New Zealand’s Foreign Policy under the Jacinda Ardern Government, ed. Robert Patman et al. (London: World Scientific, 2024), 23–41.
[25] “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern of New Zealand before Bilateral Meeting” (remarks, The White House, 31 May 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/.
[26] Steff, “‘Our region is now a strategic theatre’,” 7.
[29] Boyka Stefanova and Paskal Zhelev, “Revisiting China’s market economy status: state capitalism within the WTO liberal trading system,” Australia and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 14, no. 2 (September 2022): 94–111, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/.
[31] Wang, “Five ‘firsts’ in nearly half a century.”
[34] Nicholas Khoo, “Talk of a new Cold War is overheated—but NZ faces complex challenges in the era of ‘strategic competition’,” The Conversation, 29 August 2023, https://theconversation.com/.
[35] Patrick Wintour, “New Zealand’s stance on China has deep implications for the Five Eyes alliance,” The Guardian, 23 April 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/.
[36] Latika Bourke, “Jacinda Ardern savaged as British Parliament declares treatment of Uighurs ‘genocide’,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 April 2021, https://www.smh.com.au/; Jamie Ensor, “New Zealand not too scared to call out China, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon says,” Newshub, 12 December 2023, https://www.newshub.co.nz/; Terence O’Brien, “New Zealand foreign policy: the importance of reputation,” New Zealand International Review 38, no. 5 (September 2013): 20–23, https://search.informit.org/; and Young, “Seeking ontological security through the rise of China,” 527.
[37] “Response to Media Query by Spokesperson of Chinese Embassy in New Zealand on the Joint Statement on Xinjiang by New Zealand and Australia” (press release, The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand, 2021), http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/.
[39] Sylvie Zhuang, “Stop megaphone diplomacy, China urges New Zealand after Winston Peters raises Pacific security worries,” South China Morning Post, 5 May 2024, https://www.scmp.com/.
[40] Alasdair Pal, “New Zealand foreign minister seeks closer ties with Five Eyes powers,” Reuters, 11 December 2023, https://www.reuters.com/.
[41] Lillian Hanly, “First official leaders’ meeting between Luxon and Albanese amid AUKUS questions,” Radio New Zealand, 15 August 2024, https://www.rnz.co.nz/.
[43] “Relations with partners in the Indo-Pacific region,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 16 July 2024, https://www.nato.int/.
[45] Niva Chittock, “NZ naval vessel sailing through Taiwan Strait ‘routine movement’—Defence Minister,” Radio New Zealand, 27 September 2024, https://www.rnz.co.nz/.
[46] Antony J. Blinken and Winston Peters “Joint US and NZ declaration” (joint statement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 April 2024), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.
[47] Kathryn Paik, “The Geopolitical Promise of New Zealand’s Conservative Swing,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 16 January 2024, https://www.csis.org/.
[48] Blinken and Peters, “Joint US and NZ declaration.”
[49] Terence O’Brien, “New Zealand foreign policy,” 20–23; and James Headley and Andreas Reitzig, “Does foreign policy represent the views of the public? Assessing public and elite opinion on New Zealand’s foreign policy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 1 (2012): 70–89, https://doi.org/.
[50] Headley and Reitzig, “Does foreign policy represent the views,” 77.
[51] Brian S. Roper, “China’s rise and the United States’ response: implications for the global order and New Zealand/Aotearoa. Part II: The US response, emergence of a multi-polar order, and New Zealand/Aotearoa foreign policy-making,” Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online (2024): 1–11, https://doi.org/.
[52] Guy C. Charlot and Xiang Gao, “Re-Thinking New Zealand’s Independent Foreign Policy,” The Diplomat, 14 June 2024, https://thediplomat.com/.
[54] Baldur Thorhallsson, Sverrir Steinsson, and Thorsteinn Kristinsson, “The Small State in International Relations,” in Small States and Shelter Theory: Iceland’s External Affairs, ed. Baldur Thorhallsson (London: Routledge, 2018), 1–17; T.Y. Wang and Alexander C. Tan, “Balancing, bandwagoning or hedging: Taiwan’s strategic choices in the era of a rising China,” Political Science 73, no. 1 (2021): 66–84, https://doi.org/; and Patrick, Köllner, “Australia and New Zealand recalibrate their China policies: convergence and divergence,” Pacific Review 34, no. 3 (2021): 405–36, https://doi.org/.
[55] Wang and Tan, “Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging,” 69; and Kirsten Williams, Steve Lobell, and Neal Jesse, eds., Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons: Why Secondary States Support, Follow, or Challenge (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).
[56] Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43, https://doi.org/.
[57] Wang and Tan, “Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging,” 67.
[58] Glenn H. Snyder, “The security dilemma in alliance politics,” World politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 461–95, https://doi.org/; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 30, no. 2 (August 2008): 159–85, https://muse.jhu.edu/; and Kei Koga, “The Concept of ‘Hedging’ Revisited: The Case of Japan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia’s Power Shift,” International Studies Review 20, no. 4 (December 2018): 633–60, https://doi.org/.
[59] Wang and Tan, “Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging,” 67; Steve Chan, “An Odd Thing Happened on the Way to Balancing: East Asian States’ Reactions to China’s Rise,” International Studies Review 12, no. 3 (September 2010): 387–412, https://doi.org/; and David C. Kang, “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,” International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003/2004): 165–80, https://www.jstor.org/.
[60] Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (August 2005): 305–22, https://www.jstor.org/; Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging,” 163; and Koga, “The Concept of ‘Hedging’ Revisited,” 642.
[61] Wang and Tan, “Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging,” 69.
[62] Nicholas Ross Smith, “New Zealand’s grand strategic options as the room for hedging continues to shrink,” Comparative Strategy 41, no. 3 (2022): 314–27, https://doi.org/.
[64] Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge?: Unpacking ASEAN States’ Alignment Behavior towards China,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (2016): 500–14, https://doi.org/.
[65] Kuik, “How Do Weaker States Hedge?,” 504.
[66] Yuen Foong Khong, “Coping with strategic uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Strategy,” in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency, ed. J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 109–29; and Kuik, “How Do Weak States Hedge?,” 504.
[67] Smith, “New Zealand’s grand strategic options,” 315; Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia,” Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015): 696–727, https://doi.org/; Nikolas Vander Vennet and Mohammad Salman, “Strategic Hedging and Changes in Geopolitical Capabilities for Second-tier States,” Chinese Political Science Review 4 (2019): 86–134, https://doi.org/; Hiep Le Hong, “Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy against China since Normalization,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 3 (December 2013): 333–68, https://www.jstor.org/; Nicholas Ross Smith, “When Hedging Goes Wrong: Lessons from Ukraine’s Failed Hedge of the EU and Russia,” Global Policy 11, no. 5 (2020): 588–97, https://doi.org/.
[68] Kuik, “How Do Weak States Hedge?,” 512; and Kuik “The Essence Of Hedging, 159–85.
[69] Kuik “The Essence Of Hedging,” 183.
[70] Ashika Bali, “Managing Growing Strategic Competition in the South Pacific: Hedging the Pacific Way” (thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 2022), https://openaccess.wgtn.ac.nz/.
[72] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 318.
[73] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 315.
[74] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 319; and Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 719.
[75] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 315
[76] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 318–20; and Steff and Dodd-Parr, “Examining the immanent dilemma of small states,” 106.
[77] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 318–20; Steff and Dodd-Parr, “Examining the immanent dilemma of small states,” 106; Reuben Steff, “The Biden Administration and New Zealand’s Strategic Options: Asymmetric Hedging, Tight Five Eyes Alignment, and Armed Neutrality,” National Security Journal 3, no. 2 (2021): 1–22, https://doi.org/; Young, “Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China; and “China Free Trade Upgrade further boosts economic recovery” (press release, New Zealand Government, 7 April 2022), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.
[78] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 319.
[79] Steff, “‘Our region is now a strategic theatre’.”
[80] Steff, “‘Our region is now a strategic theatre’,”; and Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 322–23.
[81] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 322–23.
[82] Alexander Korolev, “Shrinking Room for Hedging: System-Unit Dynamics and Behavior of Smaller Powers,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 19, no. 3 (September 2019), 419–52, https://doi.org/.
[83] David A. Scott, “Multipolarity, multilateralism and beyond…?: EU–China understandings of the international system,” International Relations 27, no. 1 (2013): 30–51, https://doi.org/.
[84] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 322–23.
[85] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 322–23.
[86] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “A decision making model: Its structure and form,” International Interactions 23, no. 3–4 (1997): 235–66, https://doi.org/; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).
[87] Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (December 1952), 483, https://doi.org/; Helga Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory-building and Discipline-building in International Security,” International studies quarterly 35, no. 1 (March 1991), 3–17, https://doi.org/; and Swatilekha Bhattacharya, “Explaining The Conceptualisation Of Security In Mainstream International Relations Theory,” Indian Journal of Political Science 77, no. 1 (2016): 77–84, https://www.jstor.org/.
[88] Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 7.
[89] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 2.
[90] Holger Stritzel, Security in Translation: Securitization Theory and the Localization of Threat (London: Springer, 2014).
[93] Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, Security; Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (December 2003): 511–31, https://doi.org/; and Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 3 (2007): 357–83, https://doi.org/.
[94] Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, Security, 7; and Miles Kahler, “Economic security in an era of globalization: definition and provision,” Pacific Review 17, no. 4 (2004), 486, https://doi.org/.
[95] Young, “Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China,” 516.
[96] Young, “Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China,” 516.
[97] Chris Rudd and Brian Roper, The Political Economy of New Zealand (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997).
[98] Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1993).
[99] Cited in Derek Round, “Our Foreign Policy Is Trade,” New Zealand International Review 5, no. 1 (January–February 1980), 3.
[100] Young, “Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China,” 520.
[101] Young, “Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China,” 526.
[102] Young, “Seeking Ontological Security through the Rise of China,” 527; and Alexander Downer, “Australia–Japan relation,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 60, no. 4 (2006): 487–88, https://doi.org/.
[103] Rosemary Banks, “Jumping on Lord Palmerston’s Grave: New Zealand’s Enduring Alliances and Security Partnerships,” Kwentuhan, 3 October 2023, https://www.indopac.nz/.
[104] Georgia Edmonstone, “China’s trade restrictions on Australian exports,” United States Studies Centre, 2 April 2024, https://www.ussc.edu.au/.
[107] New Zealand’s National Security Strategy 2023–2028 (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, August 2023), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/; and Defence Policy Review: Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 New Zealand Government (Wellington: Ministry of Defence, 4 August 2023), https://www.defence.govt.nz/.
[109] Gideon Rachman, “The real reasons for the west’s protectionism,” Financial Times, 18 September 2023, https://www.ft.com/.
[113] Rudd and Roper, The Political Economy of New Zealand.
[114] Beyond Commodities: Manufacturing into the Future (Wellington: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, August 2018), https://www.mbie.govt.nz/.
[115] Megumi Naoi and Ikuo Kume, “Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment during the Global Recession,” International Organization 65, no. 4 (October 2011): 771–95, https://doi.org/.
[117] Ralph Lattimore and Shamubeel Eaqub, The New Zealand Economy: An Introduction, (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2011); and “China and Australia: Frenemies who need each other,” BBC News, 4 November 2023, https://www.bbc.com/.
[118] Cosimo Beverelli, Mauro Boffa, and Alexander Keck, “Trade policy substitution: Theory and evidence,” Review of World Economics 155, no. 4 (2019): 755–83, https://doi.org/.
[121] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 320.
[122] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 322; and Sung Chul Jung, Jaehyon Lee, and Ji-Yong Lee, “The Indo-Pacific Strategy and US Alliance Network Expandability: Asian Middle Powers’ Positions on Sino-US Geostrategic Competition in Indo-Pacific Region,” Journal of Contemporary China 30, no. 127 (2021): 53–68, https://doi.org/.
[123] Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options,” 321.
[124] O’Brien, “New Zealand Foreign Policy,” 20.
[125] Richard Devetak and Jacqui True, “Diplomatic divergence in the Antipodes: Globalisation, foreign policy and state identity in Australia and New Zealand,” Australian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 2 (2006): 241–56, https://doi.org/.
[126] Winston Peters, “Speech to New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Parliament—Annual Lecture: Challenges and Opportunities” (speech, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 May 2024), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.
[127] Katie Scotcher, “New Zealand to put ‘every single effort’ into getting free trade deal with India,” Radio New Zealand, 4 December 2023, https://www.rnz.co.nz/.