Retooling New Zealand’s Independent Foreign Policy for the AUKUS Era: Mission Impossible or Mission for a New Era?

 

In an August 2023 speech, New Zealand Defence Minister Andrew Little declared that “we do not live in a benign environment.”^[1] This statement reflects a consensus that New Zealand’s strategic environment has deteriorated over the past decade. However, consensus breaks down on how to respond to this development. This reality is evident in the contentious internal discussion regarding Wellington’s potential participation in the Pillar II dimension of the AUKUS technology partnership, introduced by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in September 2021. The stakes are high. If critics are right, New Zealand’s participation in AUKUS will antagonize its leading trade partner, China, potentially harming the relationship. Conversely, if AUKUS advocates are right, nonparticipation in AUKUS raises the real prospect that New Zealand’s alliance with Australia will atrophy, while opportunities for partnership deepening with the United States and the United Kingdom are passed over.

This article explores the major perspectives on New Zealand’s participation in the nonnuclear Pillar II component of AUKUS, which fall under the categories of “AUKUS critics” and “AUKUS advocates.”^[2] The critics’ views are evaluated, and the merits of the alternative AUKUS advocates’ perspective are discussed as a more compelling alternative. In making the case for Wellington’s membership in the Pillar II component of AUKUS, a realist theoretical perspective is adopted, highlighting the operation of a security-based foreign-policy strategy.^[3] This strategy is characterized by the following components:

1. An “alliance drift” concern and attendant focus on buttressing the Australia–New Zealand alliance;^[4]
2. A threat-based attention to a wedge “divide-and-rule” strategy from China;^[5] and
3. A commitment to contributing to defending an international order from which New Zealand profits.^[6]

The upshot is that the New Zealand case highlights the operation of a rational interest-based foreign policy, where agency is increasingly sensitive to strategic context. The alternative is a high-risk foreign policy where state agency is exercised in a manner insufficiently sensitive to contemporary international realities of heightened insecurity.^[7]

The AUKUS Critics

Critics of New Zealand’s participation in AUKUS present four major arguments. First, it is argued that AUKUS membership jeopardizes New Zealand’s independent foreign policy. Second, critics contend that membership increases the risk of entanglement. Third, association with AUKUS risks antagonizing China, New Zealand’s top trade partner. Fourth, it is claimed AUKUS membership damages New Zealand’s reputation and distinct identity.

AUKUS Membership Jeopardizes New Zealand’s “Independent Foreign Policy”

Any discussion of AUKUS and New Zealand’s concept of an independent foreign policy must begin with the collapse of the US–New Zealand leg of the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) alliance in the mid-1980s.^[8] This relationship was a casualty over the Lange administration’s decision to challenge the US policy of “neither confirming nor denying” the presence of nuclear-weapons technology on US naval ships visiting its allies’ territories.^[9] To be sure, the relationship has significantly improved, with Prime Minister John Key declaring in 2013 that “the relationship between New Zealand and the United States has never been better.”^[10] Indeed, the Biden administration’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy refers to New Zealand as one of its “leading regional partners.”^[11] Nevertheless, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz’s statement at the time of the ANZUS break in 1986, that “we remain friends, but we are no longer allies,” still holds true.^[12]

This historical context is crucial to understanding the current AUKUS discussion. Former Prime Minister Helen Clark and former National Party leader Don Brash reject AUKUS membership for New Zealand, citing the need to maintain “the kind of independent foreign policy symbolized by our departure from the ANZUS alliance.”^[13] Clark and Brash argue that involvement in AUKUS is tantamount to abandoning New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.^[14] Another important voice in the AUKUS discourse states, “we haven't closed the door on it [AUKUS], but it’s a considerable risk from New Zealand’s point of view, because a lot of our credibility is [in] having [an] independent foreign policy.”^[15] Closer inspection of the critics’ arguments reveals two significant problems.

First, the argument that AUKUS damages New Zealand’s independent foreign policy is based on a selective focus on the post-1987 period. There is an alternative pre-1987 New Zealand foreign-policy tradition that can, with the necessary adjustment to reflect contemporary circumstances, serve as a guide for foreign policy. During the pre-1987 era, Wellington clearly pursued an independent foreign policy even while maintaining various security partnerships. These partnerships included the Cold War–era ANZUS alliance, established in 1951–1952 and rooted in the 1944 Canberra Pact, and the Five Eyes intelligence network, of which Wellington has been a partner since 1956. The point is clear—security partnerships such as AUKUS are not incompatible with an independent foreign policy. Indeed, as Jim Rolfe shows, security cooperation has always been an integral part of Wellington’s foreign-policy toolbox.^[16]

The second problem concerns the issue of interest construction in the AUKUS critics’ understanding of New Zealand foreign policy. The critics' commitment to a particular ideologically-defined post-1987 ANZUS alliance interpretation of New Zealand’s independent foreign policy drives their understanding of foreign-policy interests.^[17] This politically constructed foreign-policy stance rules out Wellington’s AUKUS membership on the ideological basis of the US role in the partnership. Thus, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters characterizes this perspective as “ideologically-defined,” supporting a “non-aligned” posture, and as containing “a strand of anti-Americanism” where “being independent means for them saying no to the United States ^[18] Predetermining outcomes on ideological grounds is the opposite of a strategic interest-based understanding of New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.^[19]

AUKUS Membership Raises New Zealand’s Entanglement Risks

A second argument advanced by the critics is that AUKUS membership raises the risks of entanglement for New Zealand. One AUKUS critic notes, “we are all acutely aware of changes in the geopolitical environment, but entanglement with [AUKUS] isn’t the response New Zealand needs.”^[20] Another critic is more specific, asserting that AUKUS targets China and that “by joining an explicitly anti-China military alliance, we place a target on our chest in the event of war.”^[21]

What is entanglement? According to Michael Beckley, “entanglement occurs when a state is dragged into a military conflict by one or more or its alliances. The essence of entanglement is that loyalty trumps self-interest: a state is driven by moral, legal, or reputational concerns to uphold an alliance commitment without regard to, and often at the expense of, its national interests.”^[22] Would New Zealand’s involvement in AUKUS Pillar II raise its entanglement risks? The straightforward answer is yes. AUKUS is one of the various deterrence mechanisms in the contemporary Indo-Pacific that sustains an international order underpinning New Zealand’s security. At the same time, no security arrangement is foolproof or risk-free. Foreign policy involves balancing risks. There is a risk with joining AUKUS. Equally, there are risks if New Zealand declines AUKUS membership.

It is magical thinking on the part of AUKUS critics to assume that New Zealand’s noninvolvement in Australia’s core security commitment for the next few decades is either risk-free or will have no deleterious effect on the alliance. For AUKUS critics to present an intellectually plausible case for nonparticipation, they must conduct a more rigorous analysis than they have currently done. This involves weighing the alleged benefits of entanglement avoidance against the costs of a less robust Australia–New Zealand alliance.^[23] Other costs and benefits must also be considered, including the increased costs of running a larger military if the alliance with Australia weakens, and the benefits New Zealand enjoys from the current international order.

Plausible alternative scenarios for New Zealand’s foreign policy must be squarely faced. For example, if Wellington were to reject an invitation to join AUKUS, in the current era of US–China strategic competition, it would not be surprising if China offered compelling incentives to reshape New Zealand foreign policy. The purpose would be to drive a wedge in the Australia–New Zealand alliance.^[24] China has already made several attempts to drive a wedge in various regional alliances—notably the US alliances with Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Why should the Australia–New Zealand alliance be an exception? In such a scenario, the decline in entanglement risks associated with rejecting an offer to join AUKUS Pillar II would increase wedge risks for the Australia–New Zealand alliance.^[25]

To summarize, in this new geopolitical environment, Wellington faces a balance of risks. Entanglement risks can likely only be reduced at the cost of increasing the risks of a wedge being driven in the alliance with Australia. To offer a cogent contribution to the AUKUS discourse, critics need to provide a systematic reflection on the wedge risks to the alliance if New Zealand does not join Pillar II.

AUKUS Membership Jeopardizes New Zealand’s Relationship with Its Largest Trade Partner: China

A third argument advanced by the critics is that China’s rivalry with AUKUS jeopardizes New Zealand’s relationship with its largest trading partner.^[26] This raises fears among critics that Beijing will punish Wellington should New Zealand join AUKUS. Remarks by Chinese officials and AUKUS critics, featuring a Cold War-laced containment theme, demonstrate these dynamics. In response to the joint statement made by New Zealand and Australia after the February 2024 ANZMIN Defence and Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Melbourne, a spokesperson from the Chinese embassy in New Zealand expressed a dark view of AUKUS, stating, “AUKUS is a stark manifestation of Cold War mentality as it seeks to establish a nuclear-related exclusive military alliance that targets third parties. It will not make the relevant parties or the wider region more secure.”^[27] Beijing has doubled down on this position. At the 10th China Business Summit in Auckland in May 2024, China’s ambassador to New Zealand characterized AUKUS as “a nuclear-based military-nature alliance openly targeting other countries” and one that “threatens to start a regional arms race.”^[28] In a related op-ed piece, Wang Xiaolong critiqued AUKUS as a reflection of a “Cold War mentality.”^[29]

A Cold War theme also features in the narrative of New Zealand’s AUKUS critics. It is contended that AUKUS contributes to the maintenance of the United States’ military primacy and China’s containment, generating practical concerns.^[30] Brash has asked, “Would China seek to punish us in some way for signing up to an explicitly anti-Chinese alliance? I don’t know of course, but it would be hard to blame them if they did.”^[31] The logic of this argument is that since China is New Zealand’s top trade partner, joining AUKUS poses too much of a risk to the economic bottom line. Referencing the well-established economic links between the two countries, Brash and Clark note that “New Zealand has a huge stake in maintaining a cordial relationship with China.”^[32] They add that “AUKUS is . . . designed to make an enemy of our largest trading partner.”^[33]

Two points merit highlighting. First, the argument that AUKUS targets China, and the concern that this will ignite a regional arms race, overlooks China’s significant agency as the architect of its own strategic problems. In 2009, China’s regional neighbors were broadly coexisting peacefully with Beijing. However, since then, Beijing has adopted a highly assertive foreign policy, increasing tensions between China and states in Northeast Asia (Japan, South Korea), Southeast Asia (Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam among others), and South Asia (India). In 2017, the Sino-US relationship shifted from engagement to strategic competition. In effect, a countervailing coalition of like-minded states has formed. The point is clear: AUKUS is a symptom rather than the cause of current regional tensions. Moreover, Beijing exercises significant agency in this story. It can choose to exercise its agency by modifying its foreign policy to stabilize the region and defuse AUKUS’s momentum.

Second, if the fear of China’s response is the reason New Zealand does not join AUKUS, then Wellington has already lost a substantial part of the independence in its foreign policy. New Zealand might still call its foreign policy independent, but it will not be worthy of the name. Indeed, the AUKUS critics’ excessive focus on China in assessing economic costs and benefits is misplaced. In their fixation with New Zealand’s trade dependency with China, critics have overlooked the fact that Wellington’s economic ties with the United States, and US treaty allies Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea are even more extensive than those with China. According to World Bank figures for 2022, China is New Zealand’s leading trade partner, with 31.43 percent of the New Zealand trade pie. A review of the AUKUS partners’ trade with New Zealand, including the next two likely new AUKUS entrants, Japan and South Korea, reveals that this represents 34.2 percent of the country’s trade pie.^[34] The conclusion is clear: a concern for New Zealand’s security should lead AUKUS critics to a more balanced approach, reflecting on the implications of Wellington’s trade dependence on its non-China partners’ economic and military concerns. These are equally important to Wellington’s security.

AUKUS Membership Will Damage New Zealand’s Identity and Reputation

A fourth critique of New Zealand’s AUKUS membership interest is that this will inflict damage on the country’s reputation and distinct identity as a nonnuclear state committed to nuclear nonproliferation and an international rules-based order featuring a central role for multilateralism. One critic points to “New Zealand’s evolving sense of national identity—anchored in the Pacific—[that] has generated a distinctive worldview” as a reason not to participate in AUKUS.^[35] In this perspective, an identity-based worldview significantly influences New Zealand’s foreign policy. Accordingly, “this worldview brings with it certain commitments, including to regional security, that is expansive, nonnuclear, Pacific-led, and takes climate-change to be the principal threat to life and livelihood. AUKUS does not reflect or respect these values.”^[36] Moreover, “even if New Zealand joined AUKUS in a non-nuclear fashion, technically, it may be seen through the eyes of others as diluting our commitment to that (non-nuclear) norm.”^[37] The conclusion is that “staying outside AUKUS would avoid reputational damage to New Zealand’s non-nuclear security policy in the eyes of other states.”^[38] Other aspects of the argument involve claims that AUKUS is a “military alliance” or a “strategic alliance.”^[39] It has even been inaccurately asserted that AUKUS is “based on nuclear weapons.”^[40] There are two responses to these arguments.

First, the many inaccuracies in the characterization of AUKUS in the New Zealand discourse highlighted above impede productive discussion on a critical national security issue. An attempt is therefore made here to correct these inaccuracies. Any New Zealand participation in AUKUS will be exclusively in the Pillar II phase, which, like Pillar I, does not involve nuclear weapons. Pillar II features a variety of nonnuclear advanced technologies in eight areas, ranging from artificial intelligence to quantum technology. Contrary to inaccurate claims by critics, AUKUS is an Australian-initiated technology-sharing partnership, not an alliance.^[41] An alliance involves formal treaty obligations that far outweigh those of a partnership. This distinction is critical and has legal and practical significance.

Furthermore, the submarines to be acquired by Australia under Pillar I contain nuclear propulsion technology and are not armed with nuclear weapons. On the containment point, AUKUS was created to restore regional stability in response to China’s rise and is not principally designed to contain China.^[42] Indeed, the use of the Cold War–era containment concept uncritically accepts and repeats Beijing’s characterization of contemporary regional security.^[43] Finally, fears that AUKUS undermines nuclear disarmament norms by raising nuclear proliferation concerns overlooks the fact that Australia is an upstanding member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is consulting closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency on AUKUS.^[44] Moreover, when Pillar II membership was proposed in March 2023, New Zealand Defence Minister Andrew Little specifically clarified that New Zealand’s membership “would not compromise our legal obligations and our moral commitment to a nuclear-free Pacific.”^[45]

Second, a state’s reputational identity and worldview is dynamic. Far from being set in stone, all states’ identities develop over time. Moreover, state agency is a variable and should neither be minimized nor exaggerated. Contrary to the impression conveyed by critics, no state completely determines its foreign policy, which depends on context and is a function of domestic and international factors. All states exist within prevailing international and domestic structures, and the impact of these structures cannot be wished away or ignored without cost. New Zealand’s AUKUS discourse highlights the type of agency Wellington seeks to play in the Indo-Pacific in the twenty-first century. On this point, Wellington’s foreign-policy environment in 2024 is significantly different from the era from the break in the US–New Zealand leg of the ANZUS alliance in 1987 to the onset of US–China strategic competition in 2017. Will Wellington’s agency consist exclusively of the foreign-policy aspects advocated by AUKUS critics? Or, will New Zealand’s foreign-policy role be redefined to include aspects present in the pre-1987 era but deemphasized in the 1987–2017 era?

Greater political attention is needed to raise public awareness and engagement on these questions. Preliminary polling on the New Zealand public’s perspective on AUKUS shows low awareness of the issue, with just 43 percent having heard of the partnership.^[46] As it stands, among those aware of AUKUS, twice as many support exploratory talks and investigations on membership as those who oppose it.^[47] The subsequent section on the views of AUKUS proponents will explore how New Zealand’s AUKUS membership can contribute meaningfully to its security and the wider Indo-Pacific region in which it is a stakeholder.

AUKUS Proponents

AUKUS proponents offer two inherently political arguments in favor of New Zealand seriously considering membership in Pillar II. First, AUKUS membership represents a more valuable contribution to regional stability than nonmembership. Second, AUKUS membership is a valuable investment in the New Zealand–Australian alliance, which will either be retooled for a new era or atrophy. One key aspect of this retooling is a focus on alliance cooperation to ensure stability in the Pacific Island region, where China has shown increasing interest in extending its security footprint, exemplified by the China–Solomon Islands agreement of 2022. Another aspect is New Zealand’s role in Pillar II of AUKUS.

New Zealand’s Contribution to Regional Stability

New Zealand’s AUKUS proponents view the critics as prematurely dismissing the opportunities offered by AUKUS membership. For AUKUS proponents, a state’s agency must be seen in the context of the structural (both domestic and international) environment, which significantly conditions policy outcomes. Unlike critics, proponents believe it is imperative to look beyond New Zealand’s post-1987–2017 foreign-policy history for ideas to address contemporary strategic circumstances.^[48] As stated earlier in this article, there is an alternative tradition in New Zealand’s foreign policy, rooted in the ANZUS era (1951–1986), that can be drawn on to construct a retooled foreign policy for a new era of heightened security challenges. New Zealand’s participation in Pillar II of AUKUS stakes out a clear position in favor of a security partnership with Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.^[49] This perspective resonates with Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s recent statement that “we welcome AUKUS as an initiative to enhance regional security and stability.”[50]

That said, AUKUS represents only one component in a multipronged attempt to stabilize the Indo-Pacific region. Other components include maintaining a robust relationship with China even while expanding cooperation with multiple regional partners, ranging from Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia, to states in Southeast Asia (both bilaterally and multilaterally through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and India in South Asia. This understanding of New Zealand’s foreign policy seeks to incorporate the Luxon administration’s perspective that “prosperity is only possible with security” and endeavors to contribute to regional stability through attention to both traditional and nontraditional security instruments.^[51] This alternative understanding of New Zealand’s foreign-policy role is anchored in the suite of government reports released in 2023.^[52] It is fully cognizant of the country’s responsibilities as a Pacific nation, according a central role to its membership in the Pacific Islands Forum. Such a role represents neither a hedging, nonalignment, bandwagoning, nor zigzagging vision for New Zealand foreign policy.^[53]

Future-Proofing the New Zealand–Australia Alliance

The New Zealand–Australia alliance is currently operating in a new era of heightened security concerns to which AUKUS critics are simply insufficiently sensitive to. AUKUS’s emergence reflects a new era of great-power politics where small states have sought to fortify their security in various ways.[54] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade’s (MFAT) June 2023 three-year strategic assessment document chronicles a deteriorating international environment characterized by three significant shifts: a movement from rules to power, from economics to security, and from efficiency to resilience.^[55] The report is clear that “New Zealand’s alliance relationship with Australia and security partnerships with the US and other key partners remain vital in this changing environment.”^[56] In particular, it highlights that “New Zealand has an indispensable relationship with Australia.”^[57] This explains why current New Zealand Defence Minister Judith Collins stated, “any threat to Australia is a threat to us.”^[58]

But has New Zealand’s level of investment in the alliance matched the characterization of the relationship cited above? Whatever New Zealand’s self-perceptions may be, it must recognize that as Canberra tools up for this era, it has reasonable concerns about Wellington’s investment in the alliance. On this point, the late Gerald Hensley, New Zealand Secretary of Defence (1991–1999) and Head of the Prime Minister’s Department (1980–1986), speaks clearly. Writing in 2023, Hensley noted that “our security is still tied to Australia’s but as the long peace (after the Cold War) has endured, we have given up on carrying our share of the common defence burden. . . . The outcome is that Australia no longer sees us as a reliable defence partner.”^[59] If this sounds alarmist, it should not. The first and only mention of New Zealand in the 2023 Australian Defence Strategic Review is on page 46.^[60] Canberra’s defense planners are tasked to think clearly and plan accordingly. After all, the essence of an alliance is the obligation to come to a partner’s aid in the event of an attack on either partner’s territory or its military. This is explicitly stated in Article Five of the ANZUS Treaty, which underpins the Australian alliance with New Zealand.^[61]

Wellington’s participation in the Pillar II component of AUKUS is an opportunity for reinvigorating the alliance. As Prime Minister Luxon has stated, New Zealand is “committed to remaining a credible and effective ally and partner.”^[62] The analysis below focuses on two mutually reinforcing points: first, a shared imperative of maintaining security in the Pacific Islands region as part of a reinvigorated alliance solidified by cooperation in AUKUS; and second, the imperative for bolstering alliance interoperability with Canberra.

Australian–New Zealand Cooperation in the Pacific Islands Region

No country can be secure if its immediate periphery is unstable. By dint of geographic proximity, the Pacific Islands region represents a core security interest for both New Zealand and Australia, and an arena for future cooperation. Both Wellington and Canberra are founding members of the region’s core institution, the Pacific Islands Forum, established in 1971. Together, they account for close to half of the area’s official development assistance (Australia contributes 40 percent and New Zealand 9 percent).^[63] Other interdependencies exist. Both New Zealand and Australia have deployed personnel to the Pacific Islands region to restore stability on a number of occasions in recent decades. Between 1993 and 2003, Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Fiji participated in three peacekeeping missions to stabilize the situation arising from the Bougainville crisis in Papua New Guinea from 1988 to 1998.^[64] From 2003 to 2017, together with Australia and six other Pacific nations, New Zealand was part of a Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) force that restored stability in the Solomon Islands.^[65] Australian and New Zealand military personnel were deployed again after instability rocked the Solomon Islands from 2021 to 2024.^[66]

Wellington and Canberra are coming to a new understanding that the Pacific Island region’s security cannot be taken for granted. In April 2022, news reports emerged that China and the Solomon Islands had signed a five-year security agreement.^[67] Australia’s shadow Foreign Minister at the time, Penny Wong, characterized this development as the worst “foreign policy blunder” since World War II.^[68] Then–New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern also registered disapproval. During a specially scheduled interview with the BBC during a visit to Singapore, Ardern stated that this development was “gravely concerning,” and questioned why the Solomon Islands looked to China, an extraregional power, to meet its security concerns.^[69] According to Ardern, New Zealand and Australia have “highlighted that should any extended need exist, we are there to help and support. What gap remains that requires such an agreement with China?”^[70]

Indeed, the October 2000 Biketawa Declaration agreed upon by the Solomon Islands and 17 other Pacific Islands Forum members (including New Zealand) already constitutes a framework for pursuing collective responses to security crises. The declaration notes “the vulnerability of member countries to threats to their security, broadly defined” and emphasizes “the importance of cooperation among members in dealing with such threats when they arise.” ^[71] The China–Solomon Islands security agreement contravenes the spirit, if not the letter, of the declaration. This explains why New Zealand responded on 31 May with a strong joint statement released after Ardern’s meeting in the White House with President Joe Biden, expressing shared concern with the China–Solomon Islands agreement.^[72]

In response to these developments, Beijing doubled down.^[73] On 31 May 2022, during a speech at the New Zealand China Council, China’s Ambassador to New Zealand, Wang Xiaolong, implicitly linked New Zealand’s response to the Solomon Islands to the overall bilateral relationship. Wang highlighted New Zealand–China trade interests and called for greater care to be taken. He noted, “In China, there is widespread cognisance of New Zealand as a green, clean, open and friendly country. This very positive national branding is one of the most valuable assets of our relationship, and arguably the most potent marketing tool for all products and services from New Zealand.”^[74] Then came Beijing’s reminder that its goodwill is conditional. According to Wang, “we have to keep in mind, though, that this asset of ours did not come out of nowhere or as a matter of course, but has been slowly built up with hard work over the years from both sides. Nor can it be taken for granted.”^[75]

To buttress the point, on 1 June, Zhao Lijian, a spokesman with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, critiqued the Ardern-Biden statement. According to Zhao, the Ardern-Biden joint statement reflects “the deep-rooted US hegemonic mentality” and was made “out of ulterior motives to create disinformation and attack and discredit China.”^[76] He further added, “we hope New Zealand will adhere to its independent foreign policy and do more to enhance security and mutual trust among regional countries and safeguard regional peace and stability.”^[77]

Wellington’s and Canberra’s concerns remain. In mid-July 2023, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare announced that China will “fill the gap” after Australia and New Zealand allegedly suddenly withdrew funding to the Solomons.^[78] This development confirms the prescience of the various New Zealand government national security reports released in 2023. In particular, the 2023 New Zealand Defence Policy and Strategy Statement underlined that “over recent years the Pacific has become increasingly significant as a theater for strategic competition. The Chinese government in particular has sought to grow its political, economic, and security influence in the Pacific at the expense of more traditional partners such as New Zealand and Australia.”[79] This perspective informs the imperative for alliance interoperability discussed below.

Alliance Interoperability

At a major speech in Tokyo in June 2024, Prime Minister Luxon emphasized that “strengthening interoperability with our ally Australia will be a central principle of our capability decisions.”[80] There are genuine and significant opportunities for bolstering alliance interoperability with Canberra. Before discussing these opportunities, it is necessary to provide the political context. A reinvigorated alliance will occur in the context of an adverse international environment that has seen the direct application of Chinese coercive diplomacy against Australia.

Wellington’s political Richter scale went haywire after Beijing responded to then–Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s April 2020 formal call for an independent World Health Organization inquiry into the origins of the Coronavirus pandemic with an array of economic sanctions.^[81] In November 2020, the Chinese ambassador to Australia passed on to the Australian media a list of “fourteen grievances” it had with the Morrison government’s China policy, which it required Canberra to satisfactorily address before relations could be restored.^[82] This prompted Morrison to declare that Australia’s values, democracy, and sovereignty are “are not up for sale.”^[83] Even as Chinese sanctions were increasing in intensity, on 2 July 2021, New Zealand Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta referred to Australia as “our closest foreign policy and security partnership.”^[84] It is in this context that the Morrison government announced the formation of AUKUS on 15 September 2021.^[85] Following Anthony Albanese’s election in Australia in May 2022, Beijing doubled down on its sanctions policy, initially rebuffing calls from the newly elected government to drop tariffs.^[86] The open conflict between New Zealand’s sole treaty ally and its top trade partner was marked by no open comment from Wellington at the time. Nevertheless, China’s treatment of Australia, has driven home to New Zealanders the less benign side of China’s rise in ways that no amount of speeches or visits by officials or leaders could ever do. Beginning in late 2022, a cautious rapprochement occurred in Australian–China relations.^[87]

It is in this context that alliance interoperability has assumed increased importance and urgency. AUKUS Pillar II is clearly one pathway for improving alliance interoperability, not least since its eight identified working group sectors have military technology implications. In the absence of AUKUS partnership status, on the technology front, it is likely that New Zealand will simply drift further and further from the AUKUS states, and Australia in particular. This will invariably lead to a technology gap between New Zealand and Australian militaries and security agencies, which will widen over time, contributing to alliance divergence. Clearly, there is the issue of how exactly New Zealand can contribute to Pillar II. Reuben Steff has identified a list of New Zealand firms that can participate in Pillar II.^[88] These include firms with expertise ranging from space launching, artificial intelligence, aeronautical and marine systems, cybersecurity, object detection, optical design, and motion simulation. Ultimately, the decision to join AUKUS Pillar II is a political one. While New Zealand can offer niche assets such as advantages in rocket launch capabilities which are a function of its geography, it is the politics of technology rather than its technological capabilities that is the critical factor.

Conclusion

As a small, trade-focused state, the relatively benign post-Cold War US-centric international order from 1991 to 2017 allowed New Zealand to double down on an economic-centric form of liberal globalization. That era has been replaced by a more adversarial one, where technological cooperation, as represented by AUKUS, plays a more significant role. This article has two aims. The first is to review the arguments challenging Wellington’s participation in the Pillar II component of AUKUS. The four major reasons proposed for rejecting membership are found to be highly problematic. The second aim is to make the case for New Zealand’s AUKUS membership, based on Wellington’s contribution to stability in the Indo-Pacific and future-proofing the New Zealand–Australia alliance.

Moving forward, plausible future foreign-policy options for New Zealand regarding AUKUS and the alliance with Australia include:

1. AUKUS Pillar II membership fortified by Wellington’s alliance with Canberra;
2. A New Zealand that is not a member of AUKUS but is sympathetic to its aims and retains its alliance with Australia; and
3. Nonmembership in AUKUS, with an increasingly critical viewpoint developing internally, leading to a drift in the alliance with Australia—raising the possibility of a reluctant abrogation as the imperatives of international politics force hard choices.

Whatever decision is made by New Zealand on AUKUS membership, it will be a fateful one. ♦

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Dr. Nicholas Khoo

Dr. Khoo is an associate professor in the politics program at the University of Otago in New Zealand. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, great-power politics, Asian security, and international relations theory, with a focus on alliances and coercive diplomacy. He can be reached at: nicholas.khoo@otago.ac.nz

Notes

^[1] Andrew Little, “Speech to Announcement of Roadmap for Future of Defence and National Security Released” (speech,  Ministry of Defence, 4 August 2023), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/. Three documents were released in conjunction with the speech. These included New Zealand’s first National Security Strategy, a Defence Policy Strategy, and a Future Force Design Principles.

^[2] At the outset, it should be noted that the discussion of New Zealand’s participation in AUKUS is limited to the Pillar II dimension involving technology sharing. The Pillar I dimension involving cooperation on nuclear powered submarines is not analyzed here as the New Zealand government has ruled this option out.

^[3] Note that I am using neorealism as a theory of foreign policy. For the theoretical basis for this approach, see Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?,” Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 7–53, doi.org/.

^[4] Alexander Lanoszka, Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2022), 75–134; and Randall Schweller and David Priess, “Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate,” Mershon International Studies Review 41, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 1–32, https://doi.org/.

^[5] Timothy Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 155–89, https://www.jstor.org/.

^[6] Jacinda Ardern, “Prime Minister’s Speech to the NZIIA Annual Conference” (speech, Office of the Prime Minister, 14 July 2021), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/; and Christopher Luxon, “Strategic Security Speech,” (speech, Office of the Prime Minister, 19 June 2024), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

^[7] Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 118.

^[8] William Tow, “The ANZUS Dispute: Testing US Extended Deterrence in Alliance Politics,” Political Science Quarterly 104, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 117–49, https://doi.org/. 

^[9] Tow, “The ANZUS Dispute,” 128.

^[10] Zachary Keck, “The Interview: New Zealand’s Prime Minister John Key,” The Diplomat, 8 February 2013, https://thediplomat.com/.

^[11] Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, 2022), 9, https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

^[12] Bernard Gwertzman, “Shultz Ends U.S. Vow to Defend New Zealand,” New York Times, 28 June 1986, https://www.nytimes.com/.

^[13] Don Brash and Helen Clark, “We Mustn’t Abandon Independent Foreign Policy,” New Zealand Herald, 13 February 2024, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/. 

^[14] Brash and Clark, “We Mustn’t Abandon”; Robert Patman, “The Case for New Zealand Staying on the Outside of AUKUS,” The Post, 4 August 2023, https://www.thepost.co.nz/; and Don Brash, “We Must Be Wary of Aligning With AUKUS,” The Post, 14 April 2024, https://www.thepost.co.nz/.

^[15] Christina Persico, “Potential AUKUS Deal Could Come Between NZ and Pacific, Expert says,” Radio New Zealand, 29 July 2023, https://www.rnz.co.nz/.

^[16] Jim Rolfe, “New Zealand’s Security: Alliances and Other Relationships” Working Paper 10/97 (Wellington: Center for Strategic Studies, 1997), https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/.

^[17] This is represented in the following causal diagram:

Ideologically-defined independent foreign policy concept  New Zealand’s foreign policy interests

^[18] Winston Peters, “Speech to New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Parliament, Annual Lecture: Challenges and Opportunities,” (speech, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 May 2024), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/. 

^[19] In this view, New Zealand’s nonideological interests determine its independent foreign policy, as represented in the causal argument below:

New Zealand’s nonideological interests  Independent foreign policy concept

^[20] Sam Sachdeva, “Anti-AUKUS Feeling Growing at Home,” Newsroom, 17 April 2023, https://newsroom.co.nz/.

^[21] Don Brash, “More About AUKUS,” Bassett, Brash & Hide (blog), 21 April 2024, https://www.bassettbrashandhide.com/.

^[22] Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015), 12, https://doi.org/.

^[23] This is different from the World War I–era Australia–New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) alliance, which is often used interchangeably in public discourse in Australia and New Zealand.

^[24] Timothy Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security 35 no. 4 (Spring 2011), 155–89, https://www.jstor.org/. 

^[25] This dynamic is represented in the following causal argument:  Entanglement Risks   ANZAC Wedge Risks

^[26] Richard Prebble, “It Is Lunacy to Join a Military Alliance Aimed at Our Biggest Trading Partner,” New Zealand Herald, 17 April 2024, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/; Don Brash and Helen Clark, “AUKUS and New Zealand,” New Zealand Herald, 21 June 2024, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/; and Marco de Jong and Robert G. Patman, “Aukus Pillar II Compromises NZ’s Principled, Independent Voice,” Newsroom, 3 April 2024, https://newsroom.co.nz/.

^[27] “Remarks by the Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in New Zealand on the Joint Statement on ANZMIN 2024” (press release, Chinese Embassy in New Zealand, 2 February 2024), http://nz.china-embassy.gov.cn/.

^[28] Wang Xiaolong, “Harnessing the Potential: China’s Economy and China-New Zealand Relations, 10^th China Business Summit” (speech, Chinese Embassy in New Zealand, 10 May 2024), http://en.ccg.org.cn/. 

^[29] Wang Xiaolong, “Why China Has a Grave Concern over AUKUS, Even Pillar II,” Newsroom, 14 April 2024, https://newsroom.co.nz/.

^[30] Brash and Clark, “We Mustn’t Abandon”; Marco de Jong and Robert G. Patman, “Problems With Pillar Two, Identity,” Otago Daily Times, 5 April 2024, https://www.odt.co.nz/; and Alexander Gillespie, “With the AUKUS Alliance Confronting China, New Zealand Should Ramp Up Its Anti-Nuclear Diplomacy,” The Conversation, 27 September 2021, https://theconversation.com/.

^[31] Brash, “More about AUKUS.”

^[32] Don Brash and Helen Clark, “Statement on NZ Government Jeopardising NZ's Independent Foreign Policy and Economic Security,” Helen Clark Diary (blog), 16 July 2024, https://www.helenclarknz.com/.

^[33] Brash and Clark, “We Mustn’t Abandon.”

^[34] The breakdown is as follows: Australia 12.54 percent (no. 2), United States 10.64 percent (no. 3), Japan 5.64 percent (no. 4), South Korea 3.15 percent (no. 5), United Kingdom 2.23 percent (no. 6). The figures are from the World Bank at: https://wits.worldbank.org/. 

^[35] De Jong and Patman, “Problems with Pillar Two.”

^[36] De Jong and Patman, “Problems with Pillar Two.”

^[37] As cited in Persico, “Potential AUKUS Deal.”

^[38] Patman, “The Case for New Zealand Staying on the Outside of AUKUS.”

^[39] Brash, “More About AUKUS.”

^[40] See Clark’s X tweet that “there appears to be an orchestrated campaign on joining the so-called ‘Pillar 2’ of #AUKUS which is a new defence grouping in the Anglosphere with hard power based on nuclear weapons. #NZ removed itself from such a vice when it adopted its #nuclear free policy,” https://x.com/.  Nicholas Khoo, New Zealand Foreign Needs a Debate – Not Tweets—On Foreign Policy,” Newsroom, 8 August 2023, https://newsroom.co.nz/.

^[41] Thomas Coughlan, “AUKUS ‘Not An Alliance’—British High Commissioner,” New Zealand Herald, 14 May 2024, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/.

^[42] De Jong and Patman, “Problems with Pillar Two.”

^[43] Melvyn P. Leffler, “China Isn’t the Soviet Union. Confusing the Two is Dangerous,” The Atlantic, 3 December 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/; and Wang, “Why China Has a Grave Concern.”

^[44] De Jong and Patman, “Aukus Pillar II Compromises”; and Patman, “Why New Zealand Should Remain Sceptical.” See also, the Australian Foreign Minster’s comment on this issue: Penny Wong, “AUKUS Won’t Undermine Australia’s Stance Against Nuclear Weapons,” The Guardian, 23 January 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/.

^[45] Jane Peterson, “AUKUS Participation Talks Highlight New Zealand’s Nuclear-free Status,” Radio New Zealand, 29 March 2023, https://www.rnz.co.nz/.

^[46] Sam Sachdeva, “Aukus Polling Shows Partisan Divide, Low Awareness,” Newsroom, 12 September 2024, https://newsroom.co.nz/.

^[47] Sachdeva, “Aukus Polling Shows Partisan Divide.”

^[48] Reuben Steff, “AUKUS + NZ = win-win,” The Interpreter, 1 May 2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/; Reuben Steff, “The Strategic Case for New Zealand to Join AUKUS Pillar II,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, (forthcoming), https://doi.org/; Nicholas Khoo “Where To Next For The AUKUS Ruckus?,” Newsroom, 8 May 2024, https://newsroom.co.nz/; and Nicholas Khoo, “Critics of NZ Joining AUKUS Need To Answer a Crucial Question: What Exactly is An Independent Foreign Policy?,” The Conversation, 28 March 2024, https://theconversation.com/.

^[49] Nicholas Khoo, “AUKUS Engagement Has More Benefits Than Risks,” Newsroom, 15 April 2023, https://www.newsroom.co.nz/.

^[50] Luxon, “Strategic Security Speech.”

^[51] Luxon, “Strategic Security Speech.”

^[52] Secure Together: New Zealand’s National Security Strategy 2023-2028 (Wellington: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet [DPMC], 2023), https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/; Navigating a Shifting World (Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade [NZ MFAT], 2023), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/; New Zealand’s Security Threat Environment 2023 (Wellington: New Zealand Security Intelligence Service [NZSIS], 2023), https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/; and Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 (Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Defence [NZ MOD], 2023). https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

^[53] Nicholas Ross Smith, “New Zealand’s Grand Strategic Options as the Room for Hedging Continues to Shrink,” Comparative Strategy, 41 no. 3 (2022): 314–27, https://doi.org/.

^[54] Thus, El Salvador and Singapore have invested in a robust nonalliance security cooperation with the United States; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have doubled-down on the NATO alliance; and Djibouti has expanded security ties with a variety of states, leveraging the country’s strategic location by offering use of its territory.

^[55] Navigating a Shifting World, 18.

^[56] Navigating a Shifting World, 28.

^[57] Navigating a Shifting World, 36.

^[58] Jamie Ensor, “‘Increasing’ Threats to NZ Security, Ministry Warns, as Judith Collins Appoints New Defence Chiefs,” New Zealand Herald, 28 August 2024, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/.

^[59] Gerald Hensley, “How Will A Self-Absorbed New Zealand Face China’s Growing Power?,” The Post, 3 June 2023, https://www.thepost.co.nz/.

^[60] National Defence: Defence Strategic Review (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2023), 46, https://www.defence.gov.au/.

^[61] “Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS); September 1, 1951,” https://avalon.law.yale.edu/.

^[62] Luxon, “Strategic Security Speech.”

^[63] Lowy Institute, “Pacific Aid Map,” 2024, https://pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/.

^[64] “Bougainville: Peace Without Guns,” New Zealand Navy, n.d., https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/.

^[65] Anna Powles, “Finding Common Ground: New Zealand and Regional Security Cooperation in the Pacific,” in Regionalism, Security & Cooperation in Oceania, ed. Rouben Azizian and Carleton Cramer (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2015), 88.

^[66] “Solomon Island Deployment Concludes,” New Zealand Navy, 1 August 2024, https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/.

^[67] The final agreement is not publicly available at this time. However, a leaked draft states that “China may, according to its own needs and with the consent of the Solomon Islands, make ship visits to carry out logistics replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in the Solomon Islands.” See document on X, uploaded by Dr. Anna Powles, an academic at Massey University: https://twitter.com/. 

^[68] Josh Butler and Daniel Hurst, “Solomon Islands-China Pact is Worst Policy Failure in Pacific Since 1945, Labor Says,” The Guardian, 20 April 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/.

^[69] Eva Corlett and Daniel Hurst, “Jacinda Ardern Questions Motive for China-Solomons Security Pact,” The Guardian, 21 April 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/.

^[70] Corlett and Hurst, “Jacinda Ardern Questions Motive.”

^[71] Pacific Islands, Forum Secretariat, “Biketawa Declaration,” Kirabati, 28 October 2000, https://forumsec.org/.

^[72] “United States–Aotearoa New Zealand Joint Statement” (press release, The White House, 31 May 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

^[73] Jun Mai, “Cosy China-New Zealand Relations Cannot Be Taken for Granted, Beijing’s Ambassador Warns,” South China Morning Post, 3 June 2022, https://www.scmp.com/.

^[74] Wang Xiaolong, “China’s Foreign Policy and China–NZ Relationship in a Changing World” (speech, Chinese Embassy in New Zealand, 31 May 2022), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/.

^[75] Wang, “China’s Foreign Policy and the China–NZ Relationship.”

^[76] Zhao Lijian, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on June 1, 2022” (press conference, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 June 2022), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/.

^[77] Zhao, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference.”

^[78] Ben Doherty, “China To ‘Fill The Gap’ in Solomon Islands Budget as PM Blasts ‘Unneighborly’ Australia, and US,” The Guardian, 17 July 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/.

^[79] Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023, 14.

^[80] Luxon, “Strategic Security Speech.”

^[81] Helen Davidson and Paul Karp, “China Bristles at Australia’s Call for Investigation into Coronavirus Origin,” The Guardian, 29 April 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/; and “The deterioration of Australia–China relations,” Strategic Comments 26 no. 3 (2020): v–viii, https://doi.org/.

^[82] Daniel Hurst, “China’s Infamous List of Grievances with Australia ‘Should Be Longer Than 14 points’, Top Diplomat Says,” The Guardian, 19 November 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/.

^[83] Jason Scott, “Australia PM Defiant After China Airs 14 Grievances,” Bloomberg, 19 November 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/.

^[84] Nanaia Mahuta, “Navigating a New Normal, Speech to the 55th Otago Foreign Policy School” (speech, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 July 2021), https://www.beehive.govt.nz/.

^[85] “Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of AUKUS” (press release, The White House, 15 September 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/.

^[86] Michael Smith, “China Defiant on Australian Trade Sanctions,” Australian Financial Review, 23 June 2022, https://www.afr.com/.

^[87] Giulia Interesse and Yi Wu, “China-Australia Relations: Trade, Investment, and Latest Updates,” China Briefing, 16 August 2024, https://www.china-briefing.com/.

^[88] Steff, “The Strategic Case,” 6.