Abstract
In pursuit of its “independent” foreign policy, New Zealand often likes to harp on the fact that the guiding principle to its interaction with the world is rooted in the liberal values that it believes in, resulting in a “values-based” foreign policy that is less pragmatic and more normative idealistic. Under the Ardern government, New Zealand had often highlighted its commitment to this values-based approach, with then-Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta having spoken of an indigenous foreign policy guided by Māori principles to underpin New Zealand’s commitment to the liberal values. The importance of values to New Zealand was signaled most strongly in the US-Aotearoa New Zealand Joint Statement released in 2022 where Ardern reaffirmed New Zealand’s commitment to defending the international rules-based order and the liberal values that underpin it. Yet as the geopolitical environment continues to evolve under the tension of great power strategic competition, New Zealand has found itself having to acknowledge a new security environment, one in which it is required to actively seek out partnerships to balance its worries. It is in this situation that New Zealand’s values-based approach is proving to be an obstacle to the addressing its security concerns, especially in the Southeast Asian region that is its closest neighbor. This article aims to examine why New Zealand’s traditional focus on values has fallen on deaf ears in Southeast Asia and what it can do to address its partnerships in this crucial region.
***
In the twenty-first century, contemporary global politics has shifted dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The onset of US-China strategic competition has shattered post-Cold War stability. Clearly, as Carla Norloff wrote, “the return of great power rivalry” is the defining feature of the twenty-first century,[1] and this intensifying strategic competition “permeates almost all aspects of world politics.”[2] Since 2018, this rivalry has created an milieu where the two top players compete, maintaining a sizable gap from the rest of the world. Beneath them, other powers vie for space and security, [3] leaving small states like Aotearoa New Zealand the most affected, as their traditional strategic environment changes.[4]
In fact, the 2023 New Zealand Strategic Foreign Policy Assessment highlights the challenges New Zealand faces, emphasizing that the global outlook is “experiencing heightened strategic tension.” [5] The report points out that New Zealand has traditionally seen itself “protected by its geography and a relatively peaceful Pacific region” but the country’s “interconnectedness with the world” and the “evolution of new threats” mean that New Zealand is affected by this increasingly complex international environment as much as any other nation.[6] Additionally, the Indo-Pacific region, which New Zealand calls home, is now becoming the “central global theatre for strategic competition.”[7] As a result, the Pacific region is “no longer strategically benign,” and countries in the region face “a number of shared challenges to regional stability and security.”[8] This changing nature of the region has prompted New Zealand to pursue an independent foreign policy focused on building partnerships and relationships, driven by its essential and enduring interests.[9]
Additionally, in pursuit of its independent foreign policy, New Zealand has rooted its interests in liberal values, resulting in a “values-based” foreign policy that's more normatively idealistic.[10] Under the Jacinda Ardern’s Labour government, New Zealand ften highlighted its commitment to this values-based approach, with then-Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta speaking of an indigenous foreign policy guided by Māori principles to underpin this commitment.[11] The importance of values to New Zealand was strongly signaled in the 2022 US–Aotearoa New Zealand Joint Statement, where Prime Minister Ardern reaffirmed New Zealand’s commitment to defending the international rules-based order and the liberal values underpinning it.[12]
However, this values-based approach seems to be an obstacle to achieving closer partnerships, particularly in Southeast Asia, its closest neighbor besides Australia. Southeast Asia is critical to New Zealand’s security and prosperity,[13] yet a closer partnership with ASEAN and its member states has not developed. Earlier this year, reports indicated that Southeast Asian officials felt New Zealand needed to play a bigger role in the region.[14] In the 2024 State of Southeast Asia survey released by the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, Aotearoa ranked last in strategic relevance among ASEAN Dialogue partners, behind Russia and Canada, indicating weaker ties to the region.[15] This is despite, as the report noted, Aotearoa “maintaining amicable relations with ASEAN.”[16] In fact, New Zealand’s insistence on a values-based foreign policy has caused frustration and unsettlement among Southeast Asian governments.[17]
This article seeks to examine why New Zealand’s values-based foreign policy has not gained traction in a region that Aotearoa’s own Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) officials acknowledge as increasingly important, given the challenging new geostrategic environment.[18] Using a conceptual framework based on national interests, the article analyzes the alignment between New Zealand and its Southeast Asian neighbors. It aims to explain why a values-based foreign policy does not work and proposes adjustments to address the challenges in deepening this partnership.
Conceptual Framework
To better analyze the ineffectiveness of Aotearoa New Zealand’s values-based foreign policy in deepening its relationship with ASEAN, an appropriate framework must be used. Given that much of foreign policy is driven by national interests, a framework built upon national interests seems logical. However, the term national interest has been widely used since the founding of nation-states,[19] creating an expectation that everyone understands what is meant when countries discuss their “essential and enduring interests,” as New Zealand’s MFAT puts it.[20]
Arguably, there is widespread ambiguity about the meaning of national interest. When countries like New Zealand claim that they share common interests with their Southeast Asian partners, there is no guarantee that these interests align.[21] Scholars like Charles Bear, Hans Morgenthau, Joseph Frankel, and Donald Nuechterlein have written extensively about national interest.[22] Using their writings, a distilled definition of national interests can be formed: the national interest is the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states.[23]
Given that the national interest is a perception of a state’s needs and desires, the overall national interest will be formed from a state’s assessment of its needs across several spheres. Nuechterlein calls these spheres the state’s basic interests and identifies four that help form a state’s national interest and underpin its foreign policy.[24] His conceptual framework is represented in figure 1.
Figure 1. Nuechterlein Framework of Basic Interests. (Source: Author’s Own)
Nuechterlein’s framework posits that a state’s national interest is broadly influenced by its defense, economic, world order and ideological interests. He defines these interests as:[25]
- Defense interests: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state, and/or an externally inspired threat to its system of government.
- Economic interests: the enhancement of the nation-state’s economic well-being in relations with other states.
- World Order interests: the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure, and in which its citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders.
- Ideological interests: the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the people of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good.
These four basic interests are not mutually exclusive; there are compromises and trade-offs between them. This also means that each sovereign state will have its own ranking priority of these interests. For example, Country A may rank defense first, followed by economic, while Country B may instead focus on world order, followed by defense. This rank ordering is influenced by the intensity with which the state believes in the importance of the basic interests. The intensity can be broadly divided into four levels:[26]
- Survival: where the very existence of the nation-state will be jeopardized.
- Vital: where serious harm will be afflicted on the state.
- Major: where the state may be adversely affected.
- Peripheral: where the state will not be adversely affected.
Nuechterlein argues that the intensity of interests is issue-based, citing the British interests during the Suez Canal crisis to support his point. However, this article suggests that while the levels of intensity are issue-specific, they can be adapted. When formulating a foreign policy, a state will naturally rank order the four basic needs based on their perceived importance. Consequently, the levels of intensity can be adapted to reflect the perceived importance of the basic interests. In this case, this paper suggests dropping the survival level, leaving three levels of perceived importance:
- Vital: a central goal of its foreign policy.
- Major: an important goal of its foreign policy.
- Peripheral: a goal of its foreign policy.
By identifying the perceived importance that New Zealand and the ASEAN bloc attribute to these basic interests, it is possible to theorize a rank ordering of the basic interests. Comparing the rank ordering between New Zealand and the ASEAN bloc could explain why New Zealand’s traditional focus on values is an obstacle rather than a boon in Southeast Asia.
Methodology
Applying Nuechterlein’s framework requires identifying the attention or importance that New Zealand and ASEAN attribute to the four basic interests in their foreign policy. This identification can be done through documentary analysis of foreign policy statements, speeches, and documents from both New Zealand and ASEAN. Documentary analysis is a distinctive research method suitable for policy study.[27] It allows us to identify the basic interests highlighted by leaders and policy documents as central to the foreign policy of respective parties.
When using documentary analysis, it's important to acknowledge the limitations arising from using documents as sources, including the lack of ready availability or access to official documents.[28] However, given that the chosen documents are publicly available statements like the Strategic Foreign Policy Assessment and speeches by political leaders, this limitation is mitigated. To ensure a broader perspective, research by other academics on foreign issues of these two actors is also used to analyze the value placed on the respective basic interests.[29]
The results of these analyses will allow us to identify the relative importance of the basic interests for the parties and display it in a table like the one below. Comparing the tables for New Zealand and ASEAN will help identify any misalignments in basic interests between the two parties.
Table 1. Perceived Importance of Basic Interests for Country A. (Source: Author’s own, adapted from Nuechterlein, Donald E., “National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making,” Review of International Studies 2, no. 3 (1976): 246–66.)
|
|
Vital
|
Major
|
Peripheral
|
|
Defence
|
-
|
X
|
-
|
|
Economic
|
X
|
-
|
-
|
|
World Order
|
-
|
X
|
-
|
|
Ideological
|
-
|
-
|
X
|
It is important to note that analyzing ASEAN’s basic interests involves examining a regional bloc of sovereign states rather than an individual state, as Nuechterlein’s framework was originally intended. However, this does not hinder the application of the framework because ASEAN, as a regional organization, makes decisions by consensus. Thus, its foreign policy interests represent a lowest common denominator, meaning the basic interests protected by these decisions are shared by all member states. This allows us to analyze ASEAN as a single actor and compare it with Aotearoa New Zealand.
The documents collected for this analysis cover the period from 2018 to 2023. This timeframe was chosen as it includes the start of the US–China strategic competition in 2018 and the end of the Labour government in 2023, whose foreign policy influenced the attitudes toward New Zealand reflected in the State of Southeast Asia survey.[30]
Findings
This section examines how New Zealand and ASEAN perceive the relative importance of the four basic interests between 2018 and 2023. It begins with New Zealand, highlighting its normative idealistic foreign policy constructed through a values-led approach, emphasizing the importance of “Ideology.” Then it turns to ASEAN, projecting a belief in pragmatic foreign policy and emphasizing “World Order.” Finally, it analyzes the misalignment between the ranking of basic interests and how this proves to be an obstacle to deepening relations.
New Zealand’s Values-based Foreign Policy
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, New Zealand’s foreign policy direction since 2018 can be seen as normatively idealistic.[31] Aotearoa has insisted that its foreign policy is driven by the values that the country presumptively believes in, and the Labour government doubled down on this values-based approach during its second term from 2020 to 2023, when then-Foreign Minister Mahuta gave a speech outlining a kaupapa Māori (collective Māori vision) foreign policy for New Zealand.[32] This indigenous foreign policy would be rooted on tikanga Māori (Māori customary practices and behaviors) principles of manaakitanga (hospitality), whanaungatanga (kinship), mahi tahi or kotahitanga (unity), and kaitiakitanga (steward/guardianship, in terms of intergenerational well-being).[33] Mahuta stated that the “principles of partnership and mutual respect” would drive her approach to shaping Aotearoa’s foreign policy, and she was committed to pursuing a values-based approach driven by the values listed above, which seemed highly idealistic during a period when international politics could be argued to have become more realist.[34]
This embrace of a values-based foreign policy was not unique to Mahuta. While Aotearoa’s foreign policy took on a distinct indigenous flavor during Mahuta’s time as Foreign Minister, the overarching dedication to the values-based approach can be seen from the speeches given by her predecessor, Winston Peters, who held the portfolio from 2018 to 2020. In various speeches throughout his term, Peters spoke about the values that are Aotearoa’s “foundations as a nation and as a society” and that drive its foreign policy.[35] Peters emphasized how New Zealand’s “democratic traditions have also underpinned how we engage with the world.”[36] This commitment to a values-based approach aligns with New Zealand’s traditional pursuit of moral objectives in foreign policy, a direction driven by its sense of identity.[37] Aotearoa’s foreign policy has long been defined by its sense of morality, stemming from the Labour Party of the 1930s, which believed that upholding collective security through the League of Nations was a moral obligation. This commitment continued through the country’s involvement in promoting human rights and, most importantly, the adoption of the nuclear-free policy that has become central to the country’s identity and a core national interest.[38]
As New Zealand navigated the post-Cold War world and the breakdown of its alliance with the United States over the nuclear-free policy, the country has increasingly channeled its moral foreign policy. This culminated in Aotearoa’s successful bid for a nonpermanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2014.[39] Aotearoa has styled itself as a contributor to human security in the new millennium, leaning into its history of pursuing moral objectives and solidifying its perception as a moral international actor.[40] Prime Minister Arden reaffirmed this when she told the New Zealand US Business Summit that New Zealand has “held firmly to our independent foreign policy but also to our values.”[41]
Table 2. Perceived importance of basic interests for New Zealand. (Source: Author’s own, adapted from Nuechterlein [1976].)
|
|
Vital
|
Major
|
Peripheral
|
|
Defence
|
-
|
-
|
X
|
|
Economic
|
-
|
X
|
-
|
|
World Order
|
-
|
X
|
-
|
|
Ideological
|
X
|
-
|
-
|
The analysis of speeches and other related documents regarding New Zealand’s foreign policy paints a picture of a nation that ranks its ideological interests as most vital. Table 2 shows the perceived importance of the four basic interests based on this analysis. Ideological interests are ranked as vital given the emphasis in both speeches and foreign policy documents on the values that drive New Zealand’s assessment of its national interests.
It is important to note that economic and world order interests can also be ranked as vital in the assessment of Aotearoa’s national interests. Both Peters and Mahuta, during their terms as foreign minister, frequently spoke about the country’s commitment to upholding the international rules-based order and the perception that New Zealand acted as if it felt economically insecure.[42] Arguably, Aotearoa values its world order and economic interests even more than its ideological ones, especially considering how New Zealand benefits greatly from the current international system.
Furthermore, in the current discourse on AUKUS and the wider US–China strategic competition, both the ongoing challenge to the current rules-based international order and China’s significant role as New Zealand’s largest trading partner are frequently discussed by proponents and opponents of AUKUS and New Zealand’s positioning.[43] However, the analysis of documents and research regarding New Zealand’s foreign policy during this period shows that while the country may believe in the importance of its world order and economic interests, it emphasizes ideological interests in its foreign policy presentations to regional partners.
As David Capie noted, the Ardern government championed a distinctly values-driven approach to foreign policy, which not only unsettled ASEAN partners but also frustrated them, given it felt at odds with the increasing coercion and sharp competition faced by the region.[44]
The Basic Interests of ASEAN
The reason for such unsettlement could be that, unlike New Zealand, ASEAN’s approach to foreign policy appears more pragmatic and proactive.[45] As mentioned above, ASEAN is not a singular nation-state but a regional bloc formed in 1967 amid Cold War tensions and regional instability caused by the Konfrontasi.[46] This environment necessitated a cooperative style stressing respect for national sovereignty, avoiding confrontation, and reaching agreement, all in pursuit of regional security objectives, chiefly stability and order.[47]
Given its founding context, ASEAN’s approach to foreign policy differs from New Zealand's. While Aotearoa can be idealistic and pursue values, ASEAN pragmatically seeks regional stability. ASEAN aims to define the rules and norms of international relations in the region, evident in its insistence on doing things the ASEAN Way and building a wide-reaching network embedding the regional bloc and its institutions.[48]
This approach has led to the creation of ASEAN-centric regional multilateral institutions, specifically ASEAN and its four ASEAN-led mechanisms: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus).[49] These mechanisms and ASEAN’s broader security objectives provide insight into its basic interests as an international actor. ASEAN’s pragmatic and proactive approach, especially in norm-setting via its multilateral mechanisms, shows a policy not driven by ideological interests. Instead of pushing values like human rights or liberal democracy, the bloc’s overarching regional security objective highlights its core interest in world order. Table 3 below displays the perceived importance of the basic interests for the bloc, with world order being most vital and ideological being peripheral.
Table 3. Perceived importance of basic interests for ASEAN. (Source: Author’s own, adapted from Nuechterlein [1976].)
|
|
Vital
|
Major
|
Peripheral
|
|
Defence
|
-
|
X
|
-
|
|
Economic
|
-
|
X
|
-
|
|
World Order
|
X
|
-
|
-
|
|
Ideological
|
-
|
-
|
X
|
The ranking of world order interests as vital is supported by the analysis of ASEAN documents. In a statement on the rising tensions in the South China Sea, the 10 ASEAN foreign ministers reaffirmed their “unity and solidarity and shared commitment to maintaining and further strengthening stability” through peaceful dialogue and upholding international law.[50] In another statement presented at the United Nations, ASEAN highlighted its commitment to “upholding multilateralism, as well as the rule of law and a rules-based international order in responding to increasingly complex global challenges.”[51]
The post–Cold War world order has benefited the regional bloc, allowing ASEAN to maintain its relevance by engaging with numerous dialogue partners to uphold regional stability, thereby promoting its military and economic security. Consequently, world order is clearly a vital interest for ASEAN, while both defense and economic interests are major, as ASEAN’s comprehensive definition of security links the two together.
Interests Misalignment and Course Corrections
A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 offers insight into the misalignment of interests between New Zealand and ASEAN. Aotearoa has clearly prioritized ideological interests, staunchly pursuing a values-based approach in its regional engagement. In contrast, ASEAN has little interest in the moral objectives of such an approach. Ranking ideological interests as peripheral helps explain the region’s frustration with New Zealand as a partner.
To ASEAN, New Zealand’s emphasis on shared values and issues like human rights and democratic values is not compelling. This is especially true since many ASEAN countries can hardly be considered liberal democracies.[52] Recent elections and political upheaval have seen a return to political dynasties, with “nepo babies” like Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. in the Philippines, Samdech Hun Manet in Cambodia, Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka in Indonesia, and Paetongtarn Shinawatra in Thailand.[53]
From the beginning, ASEAN has structured its relationships with Western liberal dialogue partners, including New Zealand, based on common interests rather than common values. This is because the liberal democratic values of these partners do not necessarily match those of the region. By pushing a values-based approach, New Zealand appears to misunderstand what drives its ASEAN counterparts, leading to a lack of strengthened relationships.
The misalignment also helps explain why officials from ASEAN states see New Zealand as not pulling its weight in the region. ASEAN values maintaining the current order as paramount to its security interests. New Zealand’s focus on values in engaging with ASEAN partners is akin to someone speaking loudly but doing little to back things up. This perception is exacerbated by ASEAN’s formation in a tense and unstable environment, leading to a paradigm of security that includes military and economic aspects, anchored by the current rules-based international order.
New Zealand’s lack of adequate investment in its defense capabilities further reinforces this image of an unreliable partner. From ASEAN’s perspective, the era of a prosperity-driven Asia-Pacific is over, replaced by the new reality of a security-centered Indo-Pacific, epitomized by the US–China strategic competition.[54] In fact, in the joint statement commemorating the 45th anniversary of ASEAN–New Zealand relations, both parties committed to “maintaining and promoting peace, security and stability in the region” based on a “dedication to an open, transparent, inclusive, and rules-based regional architecture.”[55] To do so, they pledged to have “regular and comprehensive ASEAN-New Zealand dialogue and cooperation.”[56]
However, by the end of 2023, MFAT’s own report highlighted that New Zealand had conducted almost double the number of visits to European states than to Southeast Asian ones (41 to 23), with some ASEAN states like Malaysia not visited by a New Zealand Prime Minister since 2009.[57] This failure to uphold its commitment, driven by a lack of focus on Southeast Asia, further increases the perception of Aotearoa as not pulling its weight in its partnership with ASEAN.
While the misalignment of interests may contribute to the perception that New Zealand is not pulling its weight in its relationship with ASEAN, and to its view as the least strategically relevant Dialogue Partner to the bloc, two points are important to note. Firstly, this misalignment will differ slightly among individual ASEAN states. Secondly, there is still a role for New Zealand’s idealistic foreign policy.
The analysis of ASEAN’s perceived interests applies to the regional bloc as a single entity, due to its consensus-decision making mechanism. This means that the ranking of world order ahead of defense and economic interests applies strictly to ASEAN’s perception of regional needs. Individual states will have their own considerations and ranking of needs, although these rankings would largely look the same, as ASEAN has long been able to elicit the common interests of its members.[58]
However, with slightly differing rankings among individual states, some countries may be more receptive to Aotearoa’s values-based foreign policy, or at least not see it as a stumbling block. For example, while New Zealand’s relationship with most ASEAN states has stagnated during the Ardern governments, the first country Ardern visited after reopening New Zealand’s borders in 2022 was Singapore. During that visit, the two countries announced a further addition to the Singapore–New Zealand Enhanced Partnership.[59] Yet, even the deepening of this relationship was centered on common interests shared by both countries, both being small states that supported each other during the pandemic and depended on the international order to prosper.
That being said, ideological differences are not an insurmountable stumbling block. The misalignment occurs because Aotearoa appears to emphasize its ideological interests more than its world order interests, when arguably, the latter means more to New Zealand. As a small state at the end of the global supply chain, New Zealand is highly dependent on multilateralism and international law to protect its sovereignty and interests and has often reiterated its commitment to the current multilateral system.[60]
There is no expectation from ASEAN that Aotearoa pivots entirely away from its ideological and normative approach. As Thitinan Pongsudhirak mentions, the values New Zealand holds are part of its unique selling point to its Asian neighbors.[61] The framing of these values could make a difference in correcting the misalignment. A foreign policy approach grounded in pragmatic idealism would help, projecting that Aotearoa’s foremost concern is upholding the multilateral system that allows it to pursue its values-based concerns. Pragmatic idealism would allow for greater alignment between Aotearoa and ASEAN, as both parties would be driven primarily by their world order interests, while New Zealand remains free to pursue the normative issues it feels compelled to address.[62]
It is important that the current National-led coalition government has acknowledged the failure to deepen its strategic relationship with ASEAN and its member states. The National coalition government has announced a foreign policy reset focused on Aotearoa’s immediate neighbors in Southeast and South Asia.[63] Senior ministers, led by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, have made multiple trips to ASEAN countries since taking office.[64] Delegations led by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Peters have already visited Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. The government has also hosted an ASEAN–New Zealand Dialogue in Wellington in April, while Luxon attended an ASEAN dialogue in Melbourne and Peters attended the EAS in July.
The increase in engagement is an important first step to address the stagnation in the ASEAN–New Zealand relationship, but more needs to be done. Luxon’s messaging during his Southeast Asian trips, stating that “New Zealand is open for business,” once again highlights the misunderstanding resulting from the misalignment of interests.[65] With ASEAN facing an increasingly volatile strategic environment, such messages do little to persuade Aotearoa’s ASEAN partners that New Zealand understands the region’s issues and is willing to step up its involvement.
he ASEAN statement from the EAS reaffirmed the bloc’s commitment to implementing its ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, recognizing the challenging security environment and driving a focus on maritime cooperation and connectivity.[66] Peters acknowledged the challenges that New Zealand and ASEAN states face in his speech at the Asia Summit this October, highlighting that the “world today is disordered and becoming more dangerous” as the “multipolar world is here to stay, and states: large, middle, and small are all jostling to advance their interests.”[67] He also emphasized the government’s recognition of the region’s concerns regarding challenges to the existing rules and the overarching US–China strategic competition as key drivers of their foreign policy reset, signaling an understanding of ASEAN’s view of New Zealand as an unreliable partner.
To that end, it was announced that the coalition government would be advancing toward a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with ASEAN as a sign of Aotearoa’s concrete commitment to the region. Advancing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership would be a significant step forward in solidifying relationships with ASEAN. Beyond that, New Zealand should signal its position as a true regional partner by stepping up its engagement at both the political and security levels. This is only achievable if the country increases its investment in the necessary defense infrastructure, equipment, and capabilities.
New Zealand recently sent a navy vessel to participate in a freedom of navigation exercise in the Taiwan Straits and dispatched its pair of P8 Poseidon aircraft to Exercise Bersama Shield with its Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) partners.[68] However, beyond that, its security engagement with Asia and ASEAN specifically is limited. Investing in its defense, particularly the Royal New Zealand Navy, would allow Aotearoa to pursue more joint military exercises with individual ASEAN states beyond Singapore and Malaysia, which are part of the FPDA.
By expanding its navy, New Zealand can engage with ASEAN partners like Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, who have existing concerns about instability in the South China Sea and have conducted bilateral naval exercises in that maritime arena. It can also partake in joint ASEAN military exercises, especially after the bloc carried out its very first whole-ASEAN exercise last year.[69]
New Zealand should also enhance its climate change agreements with ASEAN as part of the steps to achieve a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the bloc. The impact of climate change has been felt around the region with an increase in natural disasters like Typhoon Yagi. Climate change is an existential threat for both ASEAN and Aotearoa. Deepening cooperation on green technology, whether through two-way investments or sharing research, would help signal New Zealand’s position as a committed partner to the region.
Conclusion
In summary, this essay highlights how a misalignment of basic interests has contributed to the stagnation of the ASEAN-New Zealand relationship. Frustration and uneasiness with the previous New Zealand administration’s foreign policy resulted in no significant deepening of ties with a region that is incredibly vital to its economic and defense stability, and which has also seen increasing tension and geopolitical maneuvering.
Analyzing the key drivers of both Aotearoa’s and ASEAN’s foreign policy, we can see that New Zealand’s decision to pursue a values-based foreign policy stems from its understanding of ideological values as a vital interest, driven by its desire to pursue moral objectives. The nation's self-image as a society of high moral values has created an ideological identity that permeates its behavior in the international arena. This focus on being a moral international actor has caused it to champion its ideological interests, despite greater concerns regarding economic security and world order.
In contrast, ASEAN’s frustrations stem from a pragmatic approach to challenges on the horizon, driven by a vital interest in maintaining the current order and stability. This approach is partly rooted in the region’s experiences in the late 1960s and early 1970s when conflict between ASEAN states and Cold War tensions turned Southeast Asia into a geopolitical battleground. ASEAN was formed as a regional organization centered on the security objectives of its member states, primarily maintaining regional stability and the current world order.
ASEAN’s foreign policy is driven by world order interests as its core concern, which allows it to pursue security concerns in the economic and defense realms. The analysis of New Zealand’s and ASEAN’s interests shows a clear case of misalignment between both parties, especially given ASEAN’s peripheral value on ideological interests. This misalignment creates a significant stumbling block, as the two parties misunderstand the core drivers of their foreign policy actions. This is evident in New Zealand’s attempt to pursue a values-based foreign policy and helps explain the adverse reactions from its ASEAN partners.
Thus, it is clear that the values-based approach has hindered rather than helped develop the relationship. As ASEAN becomes an increasingly important partner in the changing regional environment, Aotearoa must ensure its current course correction continues and pursues actions that strongly signal its understanding of ASEAN’s needs to deepen this relationship. ♦
Dr. Orson Tan
Dr. Tan is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs. He researches on the areas of identity politics, comparative politics, Southeast Asia politics, international relations of the Asia-Pacific, and regional security of the Indo-Pacific. His research publications have appeared in The Diplomat, East Asia Forum, The Interpreter, and Kwentuhan, and includes multiple chapters in the Encyclopaedia of Asian Politics and a forthcoming co-edited book Shaping the Asia-Pacific: Trailblazing Leaders and their Global Impact (World Scientific Publishing 2025).