Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs -- View PDF version here.
In the grand theater of geopolitics, where the titans of East and West engage in their sempiternal struggle for supremacy, we find ourselves drawn to an unlikely protagonist: New Zealand, that diminutive archipelago nestled in the vast expanse of the South Pacific. In collaboration with the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs (IIPA), an independent, nonpartisan research center based in Christchurch, the journal has chosen to illuminate this curious case, presenting a veritable smorgasbord of scholarly ruminations on Wellington’s precarious position betwixt the Scylla of Chinese economic enticement and the Charybdis of American strategic embrace. Our guest editors for this issue are IIPA’s very own Dr. Alexander C. Tan and Dr. Orson Tan.
One cannot help but marvel at the audacity—nay, the sheer chutzpah—of New Zealand’s diplomatic corps as they pirouette along the precipice of great-power rivalry. For the better part of a decade, these antipodean acrobats have been lauded for their masterful execution of what the cognoscenti have dubbed “asymmetric hedging.” This euphemism is but a polite way of saying that New Zealand has been shamelessly cavorting with the dragon while still maintaining its vows to the eagle.
But lo! The tectonic plates of global power are shifting, and the fault lines of this delicate balance are beginning to show. As the leviathans of Washington and Beijing lock horns with increasing ferocity, Wellington finds itself in the unenviable position of a rabbit caught between two warring elephants. The question that now looms large over Aotearoa is whether its diplomatic dexterity can withstand the gravitational pull of this new bipolar order.
At the heart of this Gordian knot lies the age-old tension between Mammon and Mars. Dr. Alexander C. Tan and Neel Vanvari, in their aptly titled discourse “Strategically Secure but Economically Insecure,” lay bare the cold, hard calculus facing New Zealand’s policy makers. With the perspicacity of a Wall Street analyst and the sobriety of a mortician, they argue that the siren song of Chinese lucre is simply too alluring for Wellington to resist, even as the drums of war echo faintly in the distance.
One can almost picture the New Zealand farmer, ruddy-cheeked and calloused-handed, looking wistfully toward the setting sun as he contemplates the Faustian bargain his nation has struck. For it is the sweat of his brow, transmuted into milk and wool, that now flows eastward to sate the insatiable appetite of the Middle Kingdom. To sever this lifeline, our learned authors posit, would be tantamount to economic hara-kiri.
Yet, as any student of Thucydides will tell you, the exigencies of power rarely bow to the dictates of commerce. The United States, that colossus astride the Pacific, has not been idle. Through initiatives bearing acronyms that would make a Soviet bureaucrat blush—AUKUS, anyone?—Washington has been assiduously weaving a web of alliances to contain the Chinese behemoth. And herein lies the rub for our Kiwi friends: how long can one dance at two weddings with one posterior?
The historical trajectory of New Zealand’s foreign policy, we are told, has been one of “strategic adaptability.” This is a charitable way of saying that Wellington has a penchant for hedging its bets. From the halcyon days of ANZUS to the more recent overtures to Beijing, New Zealand has played the field with the alacrity of a seasoned diplomat and the moral flexibility of a contortionist. But as the tectonic plates of geopolitics grind ever closer, one wonders if this adaptability will prove to be New Zealand’s salvation or its undoing. Dr. Nicholas Ross Smith’s article, “The End of New Zealand’s ‘Asymmetrical Hedge’?,” suggests, the pressure on Wellington’s middle-ground diplomacy is becoming more acute as great-power tensions escalate.
In “Smart Power or Strategic Apathy?,” Dr. Juhn Chris P. Espia offers a sobering analysis of New Zealand’s defense posture, revealing a nation dangerously unprepared for the strategic challenges of the Indo-Pacific. Dr. Espia, argues persuasively that geography, history, and domestic politics have conspired to create a military force structure ill-suited to New Zealand’s stated ambitions. Years of underfunding and policy stagnation have left the New Zealand Defence Force playing an outsized diplomatic role while lacking traditional combat capabilities. The author rightly points out the perilous contradiction between New Zealand’s vaunted “independent foreign policy” and its de facto free-riding on Australian and American security guarantees. As China’s influence grows in the Pacific, New Zealand’s strategic apathy looks increasingly like a reckless gamble. Unless Wellington awakens to the realities of great-power competition and invests seriously in defense, it risks finding itself adrift in increasingly turbulent geopolitical waters.
In his article, “Retooling New Zealand’s Independent Foreign Policy for the AUKUS Era,” Dr. Nicholas Khoo presents a compelling case for New Zealand's participation in the AUKUS alliance, particularly its Pillar II component. The author meticulously dissects the arguments of AUKUS critics, who fear entanglement, damage to New Zealand's independent foreign policy, and Chinese retaliation. These objections are systematically refuted as shortsighted and potentially detrimental to New Zealand's long-term interests. The piece persuasively argues that AUKUS membership would allow New Zealand to contribute meaningfully to regional stability and reinvigorate its crucial alliance with Australia. It emphasizes the changing geopolitical landscape, particularly China's assertiveness, as necessitating a recalibration of New Zealand's foreign policy. The author adroitly points out that New Zealand's historical independent stance need not preclude strategic partnerships, and that AUKUS offers vital opportunities for technological cooperation and interoperability with allies. In essence, the article advocates for a pragmatic, forward-looking approach to New Zealand's security interests in an increasingly complex Indo-Pacific region.
Dr. Orson Tan, in “Hurting, Not Helping,” presents a cogent analysis of New Zealand's misguided approach to foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The author argues that New Zealand's emphasis on a values-based, ideologically-driven foreign policy has proven ineffective and even counterproductive in its relations with ASEAN nations. While New Zealand champions liberal democratic values, ASEAN prioritizes pragmatic concerns of regional stability and economic development. This misalignment of interests has led to frustration among ASEAN members, who view New Zealand as failing to substantially contribute to the region's security and prosperity. The author suggests that New Zealand must pivot from its moralistic posturing to a more practical engagement with Southeast Asian realities if it hopes to deepen its strategic partnerships in this crucial region. In essence, the article serves as a cautionary tale against the folly of idealism in the face of realpolitik.
The domestic political landscape of New Zealand, far from being a bastion of stability, adds yet another layer of complexity to this diplomatic minuet. The recent ascendancy of the center-right National Party, with the irrepressible Winston Peters once again donning the mantle of foreign minister, portends a potential shift in the wind. Peters has long been a proponent of closer ties with the Anglosphere. His reappointment may well herald a recalibration of New Zealand’s compass, potentially steering the ship of state back toward the familiar shores of its “traditional allies.”
However, let us not be too hasty in our prognostications. The siren song of Chinese capital continues to echo through the corridors of power in Wellington. The economic entanglement with Beijing, we are reminded, is not some passing dalliance but a deeply rooted symbiosis. To extricate oneself from such an embrace would require a feat of economic and political legerdemain that would make Houdini himself blanch.
And so, we find New Zealand caught in a geopolitical Catch-22 of Hellerian proportions. Too strategically significant to be ignored, yet too economically dependent to act with true autonomy. It is a position that has led some to brand New Zealand as the “weak link” in the vaunted Five Eyes alliance—a characterization that, while perhaps uncharitable, is not entirely without merit.
Yet, in this precarious balancing act, there is also opportunity. New Zealand’s very vulnerability may prove to be its strength, allowing it to exercise a degree of agency that belies its size. By playing the role of honest broker—a Switzerland of the South Pacific, if you will—Wellington may yet carve out a niche for itself in the emerging Indo-Pacific order.
As we survey the geopolitical chessboard, it becomes clear that New Zealand’s grand strategy cannot be reduced to a simple binary choice between the American eagle and the Chinese dragon. Rather, it is a multidimensional calculus, incorporating elements of economic pragmatism, strategic necessity, and a uniquely Kiwi brand of realpolitik.
The contributors to this special issue argue, with an unanimity that would make a Soviet election blush, that New Zealand’s path forward will likely involve some recalibration of its current stance. Yet they also contend, with equal conviction, that the core of Wellington’s strategy—its penchant for hedging—will remain intact, at least in the short to medium term.
But here’s the rub, as the tectonic plates of great power rivalry continue to shift, the space for such diplomatic gymnastics may well be shrinking. The day may soon come when New Zealand finds itself forced to make a choice—to declare, in no uncertain terms, where its true allegiances lie.
In conclusion, this special issue of the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs presents us with a tableau vivant of New Zealand’s strategic predicament. It is a picture painted in shades of grey, with nuances that would confound even the most astute observer of international relations. As the Indo-Pacific region enters a new phase of great power competition, New Zealand’s ability to navigate these treacherous waters will not only determine its own fate but may well serve as a bellwether for small states everywhere.
For in the end, New Zealand’s dilemma is not merely a question of foreign policy—it is a test of national character. It is a challenge that will require all the ingenuity, all the resilience, and yes, all the strategic adaptability that this small but proud nation can muster. The world watches with bated breath to see whether the Land of the Long White Cloud can continue to chart its own course, or whether it will ultimately be swept up in the currents of history.
—the Editors