MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, Ala. -- Between May 1944 and May 1945, the United States Strategic Air Forces—Eighth Air Force from England, Fifteenth Air Force from North Africa and later Italy and the Royal Air Force Bomber Command—conducted a systematic bombing campaign, known as the Oil Plan, against German oilfields, refineries and synthetic oil production plants.
By September 1944, the around-the-clock bombing of the German oil industry had reduced the production of petroleum, oil and lubricants, or POL, by more than 90 percent, resulting in spreading shortages of gasoline for German mechanized and motorized divisions and several curtailments of the Luftwaffe’s pilot training program.
Additionally, this bombing campaign significantly decreased the production of nitrogen, which adversely affected the production of munitions for weapons and fertilizers for agriculture.
Although Allied senior air leaders had identified the German oil industry as a key target system for strategic bombing as early as 1940, they had focused more on German cities since late 1940 and German industries, especially aircraft factories, after August 1942.
Between August 1942 and October 1943, the USSTAF bomber formations suffered grievous aircraft and aircrew losses from German antiaircraft defenses, especially German fighters, as the bomber formations lacked fighter escorts. Because of these losses, the destruction of German industrial was not catastrophic. For example, German fighter production was at its highest in September 1944.
However, by spring 1944, the Allied air forces in Europe had sufficient numbers of strategic bombers and escort fighters and had reduced the threat of the Luftwaffe to the point that they could begin the bombing of the German oil industry.
Germany was especially vulnerable to systematic attacks against its oil industry. Greater Germany (prewar Germany and Austria) had very few domestic oilfields, which together provided perhaps 10 percent of its POL requirements. It imported oil from the Soviet Union until the German invasion of that country in June 1941 and from Hungary and Romania (25 percent of its annual requirements by 1944) after April 1941 when these two countries became German allies prior to the Soviet invasion.
In June 1942, the German army launched a major offensive to the southeast Soviet Union with the objectives of seizing Stalingrad and eventually the Baku oilfields in the Caucasus region. However, the surrender of the remnants of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in January 1943 ended this offensive.
Given the limited quantities of crude oil from German-controlled oilfields, the German war machine depended extremely heavily on POL products—75 percent of its aviation gasoline—from 16 synthetic oil production plants, which turned German coal into oil. These plants were large, complex facilities not easily dispersed or moved underground.
Before May 1944, the Allies had conducted a number of attacks on German oilfields, oil refineries and synthetic oil production plants. These attacks, however, were episodic with little or no follow-up and only temporarily stopped the production of POL products at these facilities. For example, the American attack on the oilfields and refineries at Ploesti, Romania, in August 1943, Operation Tidal Wave, although heroic in its conduct, shut down these facilities for less than two months.
Starting in May 1944, the attacks, especially on the synthetic oil production plants, became more systematic. In particular, the Allied operations staff began using aerial photographs to monitor the German reconstruction efforts and then would launch a new attack against a specific plant as it was nearing full production capability. Over time, despite herculean efforts by the Germans to return these complexes back to full production after each attack, German POL production steadily declined throughout the rest of the war.
Between May 1944 and May 1945 when the war in Europe ended, the Allies had launched 651 attacks against German oil targets and dropped 208,566 tons of bombs. The most significant problem of the Allied bombing campaign was the lack of accuracy of the bombs actually hitting their specific targets—about 15 percent of the bombs dropped directly struck their discrete targets.
However, over time, the systematic bombing produced stunning results. By July 1944, Allied bombers had attacked every major plant and had reduced POL production from an average of 316,000 tons in April to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September (95 percent reduction). The production of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September (97 percent reduction).
The growing shortages of POL products forced the Luftwaffe to shorten its pilot training program, resulting in growing numbers of relatively inexperienced pilots as Allied pilots grew in numbers and experience. Additionally, the Luftwaffe experienced growing losses of its experienced pilots as they had to enter aerial combat more frequently to “shepherd” the new pilots.
Increasing numbers of German Army mechanized and motorized units literally began running out of fuel on the battlefield. Given these desperate conditions, the German High Command launched the mid-December 1944 Ardennes Offensive, aimed at capturing Allied fuel supplies at Antwerp. Not only did it fail to achieve its objectives, it used up most of Germany’s fuel reserves.
In addition, the Oil Plan significantly reduced the production of nitrogen, which soon produced shortages in the production of all types of munitions for weapons, fertilizers for agriculture and synthetic rubber.
By December 1944, Albert Speer, the German Minister for Armaments and War Production, viewed the systematic attacks on Germany’s oil industry and the resulting fuel shortages as “catastrophic.” After searching for a truly strategic target system whose destruction would strategically adversely affect the outcome of the current war from 1940 forward, the Allied air leaders found that target system in Germany’s oil industry.