TOPIC SPONSOR: JSOU
During the Cold War, the People’s Republic of China supported numerous resistance groups as a foreign policy tool. In the post-Cold War environment, the PRC and CCP have focused on elite capture strategies to achieve its desired foreign policy goals. As elite capture strategies are exposed and become less useful as an effective strategy to support PRC foreign policy goals, it is possible that China will follow the Russian example and begin to sponsor existing, or foment new dissident movements, or resistance organizations.
What foreign irregular armed groups, such as the Wa State Army and other similar organizations in neighboring Burma, have the PRC supported in the past or continue to support? What nonviolent civil resistance movements have the PRC supported in the past? What types of support has the PRC provided to such groups in the past and how effective were they? What non-state organizations does the CCP United Front have relationships with today? What are the most effective influence methods employed by the United Front? What makes non-state organizations or prominent individuals vulnerable to the influence operations, propaganda dissemination, and perception management activities of the CCP United Front? How can the bonds between regimes and their population be disrupted with irregular warfare?