SRR approaches typically rely on human networks and organizations to afford an asymmetric advantage against opponents. Understanding the human terrain comprises the essential component in understanding operational environments in which SRR takes place. The ability to understand and shape the environment in times of competition and deterrence short of armed conflict reduces risk to force, allows for efficient use of scarce resources, and facilitates both influence and information advantage. Can human-centric strategies (like the Resistance Operating Concept or ‘total defense’) effectively deter or prevent aggression? How do we assess SRR within steady-state environments? What metrics can be applied to SRR to achieve strategic-operational effects and prevent or deter aggression? How can SOF measure resilience? Should we focus on a resilient state, a resilient population, or a resilient infrastructure? How can we build resilience to/for compound security issues?
How can we best carry out assessment, analysis, and planning to support national resilience and resistance? What lessons can SOF draw from the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to better understand how non-state actors can both participate in, and counter, resistance, and resilience campaigns? How can we better understand the civil-military interconnections, legal issues, and overt/covert operational balances? When should SOF take the lead in SRR, and when should it provide support to other government agencies? Should social network analysis include a component of SRR approaches? How can exercises and trainings help with preparation of the environment for SRR efforts?