The SOE has renewed its focus on irregular and unconventional warfare. How can SOF better understand, articulate, and operationalize irregular and unconventional warfare campaigns? What is the relationship between irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, and security cooperation? How can SOF and conventional forces best work together in these areas? Are there gaps in our knowledge of how to carry out irregular and unconventional warfare campaigning? Does current SOF training and education about these types of warfare need to be updated? Have new technologies like satellite and internet communication and inexpensive, highly capable weapons, such as remotely piloted vehicles, caused changes in the ways in which irregular and unconventional warfare can be carried out, or do operational and strategic concepts remain the same? Can SOF’s recent experiences with counter-violent extremist organizations (CVEO) operations provide ideas for how to disrupt adversarial actors?
Within irregular warfare, what is a ‘win’? Is ‘win’ the right framing term? What conditions will aid/impede winning? Is it possible to win without fighting? What is the SOF role within irregular warfare? How does that role vary based on geography, adversary, level of conflict, and other variables? Within an environment of strategic competition, how can SOF identify, train, and coordinate networks to deny, degrade, and influence adversary irregular warfare efforts? Historically, when has unconventional warfare been effective in coercing, disrupting, and overthrowing regimes? How does unconventional warfare campaigning interact, or conflict, with concepts of strategic competition and strategic patience? Does the time required for a successful unconventional warfare campaign hinder its ability to be coordinated with conventional warfare campaigns? If so, how can this be mitigated?
Security cooperation, to include security assistance and foreign internal defense, has a role to play within both irregular and unconventional warfare. What is SOF’s role in security cooperation, and how can SOF best integrate or coordinate with conventional forces engaged in security cooperation in the same theater? Are there changes required to security cooperation authorities and practices for SOF? What are ways in which adversaries have, or might seek to, hinder security cooperation efforts?
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- Thiam, Lt. Col. Babacar (Senegalese AF), "How to Improve Security Assistance for the Sahelian Countries Using Lessons Learned from Previous U.S. SOF Engagements in the Region, Case Study Mali," AWC Strategic Studies paper, 2017, 40 pgs.
- Tomczak, Maj. Joseph, "Parallel Lives in the Indo-Pacific: Edward Lansdale, Donald Wurster and the Irregular Warfare Mindset," SAASS thesis, 2022, 146 pgs.