Dynamics of war termination have evolved over time, from the more limited aims of wars in the eighteenth century, through the more decisive objectives of many wars in the 19th and early 20th centuries, then back to the “limited wars” of the Cold War period. As such, there is an evolving need to understand the means by which contemporary conditions affect how leaders seek to terminate conflicts and the conditions under which they will be successful.
This topic focuses on empirical and explanatory models of the war termination process to understand the progress and outcomes of this dynamic process. It assumes that the belligerents’ choices are informed by the structure of interaction, the intensity and domestic and international dimensions of the conflict, and the cultures of the belligerents. We are particularly interested in projects that develop innovative understandings of the evolution of actors’ preferences during the course of fighting. Preference will be shown for proposals that utilize multidisciplinary teams to qualitatively and quantitative characterize the social, cultural, economic, and political contexts of the problem at the micro-, meso-, and macro-scales. It is also assumed that the problem of war termination requires both theoretical and empirical investigation.
Specific foci may include, but are not limited to:
Conflict Effects on Preferences and Choices:
• How can we understand the varied costs associated with war—e.g. general economic costs, societal harm, etc.— how they change, and what drives belligerents to negotiate in specific contexts?
• How does war termination as a dynamic process affect actors’ preferences and choices? What theoretical and empirical insights can we get into this process?
• How does the military strategy—the application of the means of destruction to control the pattern of conflict—interact with the political strategy and the war termination process? • What is the interaction between the negotiating process and an ongoing conflict? Can negotiation set condition for military action? Can fighting set conditions for negotiating? How can signals sent in negotiations affect incentives for fighting? How do interests change during the progress of a conflict? How do interests change as the conflict's end approaches?
War Termination, Strategy, and the Causes of War:
• Are there incentives when a war is started that complicate war termination? Are there incentives in political or military strategy that discourage thinking about the termination process?
• How should military strategy account for the dynamics of war termination?
• How do the stakes of a war influence which “exit ramps” or termination strategies are feasible?
• How have the terms of war termination historically influenced subsequent deterrence and the likelihood of future conflict?
Conflict Structure and War Termination:
• How do multi-level conflicts or the conflict structure affect the war termination process? Does the number of belligerents and neutral parties affect the process? Does the kind of belligerent—e.g., state or non-state—matter?
• Conflicts may occur at several levels. All wars will include intra-belligerent as well as inter-belligerent dynamics or factors. Consider the wars in Asia at the beginning of the 20th century as an example of a multi-level conflict: (1) the civil war in China; (2) the conflict between China and Japan; (3) the war between the Allied powers and Japan. How do these levels interact and affect the war termination process at each level?
• How do intra-elite dynamics influence war termination?