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

On War, Time, and the Principle of Substitution

The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force

from the editor's aerie

According to the official *U.S. Army Air Forces History of World War II*, the bombing of Japan affected civilian morale more in 1945 than had the earlier bombing of Germany. This was not because of more bombs, for substantially lower tonnages were dropped in the Far East than in Europe. The pace of attack was the thing. In Europe the buildup from the first attack in 1942 to the avalanche of bombs in 1944 was gradual. In Japan practically no bombs had fallen before November 1944. Yet, the ultimate horror was reached only four months later with the holocaust in Tokyo.

In this issue, one of the *Review's* stalwarts, Dr. Herman Gilster (Colonel, USAF, Ret.), explores that subject of gradualism through historical and economic analyses. His "On War, Time, and the Principle of Substitution" concludes that too often Americans have been preoccupied with the weight of the attack and have not given enough attention to its timing. We have devised brilliant methods, but we have applied them so gradually as to give the enemy time to develop effective defenses.

Our cover relates to that theme of Gilster's article, the B-52 "Buff" representing the heaviest imaginable attack and an hourglass symbolizing that timeliness is critical in such an assault.

We have heard much lately about the relationship between leadership and management. Almost always the former is assigned the higher priority, but the latter is also deemed necessary. Nonetheless, we occasionally come forth with a package on management, and we are pleased with the one in this issue. USAF Captain James S. Seevers gives us the pro side of the management by objectives argument; Army Lieutenant Colonel Philip Perles delivers the con. Other Air Force men give practical advice on the subject: "Survival in the Management Jungle" and "MBO at the Micro Level."

By the time you read this, I will have completed my thirty years and faded away like other old editors. I thank both readers and contributors for what I perceive to be rising support of the *Review* and ask that you continue the trend for my successor.

The new *Review* editor is Lieutenant Colonel John F. Guilmartin, Jr., who assumes editorship in September, coming here from Hq Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, Scott AFB, Illinois. As I see it, "Joe" has a near-perfect balance of academic and professional qualifications for the job. He graduated from the United States Air Force Academy in 1962 and earned both master's degree and Ph.D. in history from Princeton. His book, *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century* (1974), has received enviable reviews. On the military side, Colonel Guilmartin served two tours in Southeast Asia as a Jolly Green pilot, earned the Silver Star, and led missions into the city during the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975.

I predict a rosy future for the *Review*. Sawadee!

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departments

Only when an economic system is critically strained and time is running out can the type of bombing campaigns described in this article succeed in achieving their affirmed results.

ON WAR, TIME, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION

Dr. Herman L. Gilster

OUT of the recent conflict in Southeast Asia has emerged once again evidence of the subtle but powerful role that substitution plays in the art of warfare. Traditionally, nations under attack — given sufficient time — have effected both product and factor substitution to a degree that in large measure attenuated the economic impact of military strikes against their industrial and logistics sectors. Seldom has a wartime economy been so fully mobilized and fine-tuned that the loss of a single part or function could not in some way be compensated for through the process of substitution. Franklin's "horseshoe nail" dictum, so applicable in time-sensitive, tactical situations, loses much of its relevance over the long-term. This was particularly true of the protracted war in Southeast Asia.

Substitution in warfare, of course, is not a recent phenomenon. History abounds with examples of belligerent nations' taking advantage of this age-old principle. For example, until perhaps this century, the process of converting plowshares into swords was quite characteristic of military preparations for warfare; advancements in peacetime technology were later incorporated into the development of military hardware. John Nef, in his evaluation of warfare and industrialism, concluded that, "Many weapons, from the crossbow to the bayonet, were apparently invented, not for war but for the chase . . . it was not until the nineteenth century that war replaced sport as the leading stimulus to technical improvements in firearms,"[1] and "Saltpeter and gunpowder appear in Western history as by-products of remarkable general progress in knowledge for peaceful purposes."[2] Gunpowder was initially used during the twelfth century to blast through stone encountered at lead and silver mines. It was not until two centuries later that we find references of its use for military purposes in the tubes of cannon. The technology for producing the cannon themselves was derived from the

peaceful endeavor of casting church bells, first noted in the eleventh century.[3]

As the demands of warfare increased through the seventeenth century and plowshares were increasingly converted into swords, many European nations found themselves short of the vital metals required for military hardware. It therefore became necessary to reduce the more decorative and extravagant uses of this limited resource. The utility of armor, for instance, had by that time been largely undermined by the evolution in firearms—the warrior of the day could no longer be protected at a weight that did not restrict his mobility. Consequently, the last vestiges of armor from the equipment of soldiers were eliminated, and even the manufacture of breastplates was abandoned. The metal thus saved was used to produce the required firearms. Along this same line, Gustavus Adolphus is said to have sponsored several new models of light artillery—one a so-called "leather gun" that consisted of a thin copper or bronze tube strengthened with iron rings and covered with a leather skin.[4] Although the primary purpose of his innovations may have been to provide the king's infantry units with maneuverable firepower, they also enabled him to conserve more scarce metals. Substitutions such as these let warfare continue, but on an admittedly more limited scale than would have prevailed if the nations of that age had possessed more advanced scientific and administrative skills—factors that in large measure determine the extent to which substitution can be carried.[5]

Our Experience with Germany

The art of substitution in warfare, further developed over the centuries, was applied with remarkable success by the more advanced nations during World War II. In one sense this result was contingent on the advent of air power and its application deep behind enemy lines against target systems that were only indirectly and in the long-term related to battlefield success. Given sufficient time, plus some slack in her economy, a nation can normally improvise and adjust for strategic shortages that might be created. Germany and Great Britain, for instance, were particularly adept at compensating for shortages during most of the war.

Let us look at the German experience a bit more closely. Burton Klein, in his classic study of Germany's wartime economy, concluded that for the first five years of World War II the German economy contained considerable slack.[6] It was not until after the Battle of Stalingrad and the initiation of large-scale raids on her cities at the beginning of 1943 that Germany was shocked into the reality of total war and began to mobilize fully her national resources. From that time until mid-1944, the peak of her war effort, munitions production increased by nearly 50 percent. During the same period, the gradually expanding British and U.S. air effort exacted only a 5 to 10 percent reduction in military output. Beginning in the summer of 1944, however, the tremendous weight of increased Allied air attacks, territorial losses, and manpower problems made it impossible to increase military output further; subsequently, these factors brought about Germany's economic collapse. Still, by December 1944 total industrial production was within 15 percent of peak output, and munitions production had fallen by only 18 percent.

After the end of the year, military production rapidly collapsed, and by March, the last month production data were collected, munitions production was 45 percent below the December level. But paradoxically, states Klein, "even in March 1945, Germany's total military output was at a substantially higher rate than when she began her attack on Russia—an attack which was to have brought complete victory by the summer of 1941."[7]

Although Klein gives Hitler's Nazi regime relatively low marks in their economic prepa-

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Axis oil facilities

During World War II, primary target systems in Germany and Axis Europe of Allied bombing were the synthetic oil plants and dumps. An oil blending plant (right) suffered heavy damage.... Also frequently attacked in the bombings were such plants as the Xenia (below) and Romana (facing page) oil refineries at Ploesti, center of the important Romanian oil fields.







ration for war, he still admired the resilience of their economy. "What the Germans really excelled in was in improvising. The measures taken to get around the shortage of ferroalloys were truly ingenious. The kinds of measures taken to restore production after bombing attacks and the speed with which production was restored were remarkable."[8]

From an incisive evaluation of target selection during the Combined Bomber Offensive by Mancur Olson, Jr., we gain further insight into the capability of the German economy to withstand for so long the Allied strategic air campaign.[9] Two distinct hypotheses were promoted during the bomber offensive. The British advocated area bombing of cities on the premise that the German economy was so fully and efficiently mobilized that any transfer of resources for either civilian or industrial restoration would subtract from the war effort. There is now, however, an impressive array of evidence that area bombing did not decisively affect either industrial production or the German will to resist.

John Kenneth Galbraith, who along with his other accomplishments was a director of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, cites as an example the bombing of Hamburg.[10] For three nights the Royal Air Force Bomber Command subjected the city of Hamburg to devastating attacks. A third of the city was destroyed, and at least 60,000 persons were killed. The industrial plants that were around the edge of the city, however, were not greatly damaged, and after several weeks of adjustment production was back to normal. In fact, many persons previously engaged in nonessential occupations in the destroyed portion of the city turned to the war industries for employment, thus alleviating a former labor shortage. Galbraith concludes that, "In reducing, as nothing else could, the consumption of nonessentials and the employment of men in their supply, there is a distinct possibility that the attacks on Hamburg increased Germany's output of war material and thus her military effectiveness."[11]

The American command favored selective or precision bombing, but these attacks met with only mixed results. Planners first searched for the small single "horseshoe nail" target system, which if destroyed would cause a virtual stoppage of all military production. The selection of the ball bearing industry appeared a logical choice. Attacks on these plants alone were to reduce German armaments production by 30 percent, and, since production was concentrated in relatively few cities, the industry could be easily destroyed. In the subsequent raids, about one-half of the industry floorspace was destroyed and another half severely damaged, yet Germany's capacity to wage war was not impaired. A limited amount of dispersal had already taken place, and losses in output were restored between raids much more quickly than believed possible. Moreover, the Germans were able to manage with fewer ball bearings than anticipated through redesign of equipment and the reduction of excessive and often luxurious uses of bearings.[12]

Olson feels that the economist's fundamental theory of substitution explains the shortcomings of both strategies cited above. In the case of area bombing, the British could not expect to destroy more than a small proportion of a large number of industries. But when only "a small proportion of the productive capacity of an industry is destroyed, this capacity can be spared or replaced particularly easily."[13] For selective bombing the search for the small but indispensable industry proved illusionary. "The enemy could always afford to replace most of any industry if that industry was small enough. And it matters not how 'essential' an industry might be if the enemy can easily replace that industry once it has been destroyed."[14]

Contrast the results against the ball bearing industry, for example, with the success experienced in strikes against the German synthetic oil industry. These raids, coming during the final year of the war, put a tremendous strain

on the German economic system. Throughout the war oil had been exceedingly expensive and in short supply. Having been cut off from their primary sources, the Germans had developed a synthetic process for making oil out of coal. The synthetic oil industry was large, extremely costly, and critically important to her war effort. Destruction of this industry, which was already a substitute for a missing source of supply, in the final year of the war foreclosed the opportunity to improvise further. Time had run out, and the limits of substitution had been reached.[15]

Our Experience with North Vietnam

With the preceding historical survey as background, let us now turn to the more recent conflict in Southeast Asia and investigate the role that substitution played in the ability of North Vietnam to withstand U.S. strategic air attacks. In contrast to Germany, North Vietnam at the start of the air war was essentially an agricultural country with only a rudimentary transportation system and little modern industry of any kind. More than 90 percent of the population lived in primitive villages and earned their living from the soil. Less than 2 percent were engaged in industry, and only the capital city of Hanoi and the port city of Haiphong had populations of more than 100,000 people.

The gradual escalation of the bombing campaign in the north provided the North Vietnamese ample time and opportunity to make appropriate adjustments and institute countermeasures to the destruction rendered from the air. Both the military logistics system and the civilian economy converted to highly dispersed and decentralized methods of storing and handling supplies. Hundreds of miles of highway were constructed as bypasses and alternate routes, and the carrying capacity of the railroad network was improved by conversion to dual gauge. Inland waterways were improved, and bridges were replaced by fords and alternate structures less vulnerable to air attacks. Construction material, equipment, and workers were pre-positioned at advantageous locations along key routes in order to effect quick repairs.

Harrison Salisbury, the *New York Times* correspondent who visited Hanoi in December 1966, observed at firsthand many of the repair activities instituted by the North Vietnamese.[16] The highways were rapidly repaired by simply filling in the bomb craters with native clay soil and the railroads with steel rails, ties, and crushed gravel pre-positioned along the full length of the roadbeds. More challenging were the bridges, but on this subject Salisbury cites some impressive examples of North Vietnamese ingenuity:

> If the bridge was completely knocked out, a pontoon was put into service. The pontoons could not have been simpler in concept or easier to put into place. They were made by lashing together the required number of shallow flat-bottomed wooden canal boats, of which there were countless numbers available along the canals and streams. These sturdy boats, three feet wide and perhaps sixteen feet long, made an excellent bridge. A surface of cut bamboo poles was laid across them, without even being lashed or nailed in many cases. Or, if available, a surface of bamboo planks. The trucks lumbered over the pontoons with a roar as their wheels hit the loose poles, but the pontoons seemed sturdy enough to bear the heavy traffic.[17]

The boats and bamboo were positioned in the vicinity of every bridge and could be put into place in a matter of hours. Moreover, these temporary structures could quickly be removed and hidden in the morning to minimize damage from air raids and reinstalled in the evening to handle the nightly truck traffic.

The problem of keeping the railroads open was more difficult since the trains could not run across pontoons, but here again native ingenuity came into play:

> If the rail line was blocked by destruction of a bridge or trackage, bicycle brigades were called up. Five hundred men and women and their

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Rubber production bombed

High on the priority list of targets for Eighth Air Force daylight bombing during World War II were Germany's largest rubber factories at Hanover. . . . The great Vahrenwalder-Strasse tire factory (facing page) was bombed by both the RAF and the Eighth's heavy bombers, by the latter on 26 July 1943; twenty-one direct hits resulted in smoke columns as high as 22,000 feet in the air.

> bicycles would be sent to the scene of the break. They would unload the stalled freight train, putting the cargo on the bikes. Each bicycle would handle a six-hundred pound load, balanced across the frame with a bar. The bicycles would be wheeled, not ridden, over a pontoon bridge, and on the other side of the break a second train would be drawn up. The cargo would be reloaded and moved on south.[18]

In addition to the above, Salisbury observed the grand scale to which fuels, supplies, and equipment were dispersed to make them less vulnerable to air attack. "Indeed, in all the time I rode about the countryside I think I was never more than two or three minutes out of sight of some kind of supplies and equipment which had come to rest in the most unlikely setting."[19] Fifty-five-gallon drums in which petroleum was stored, repair equipment, and crates containing weapons, munitions, and other hardware were randomly dispersed throughout the fields, rice paddies, and villages. Naturally this dispersal was costly to Hanoi in



terms of both manpower and materiel, but it was a price she willingly paid to continue the war effort.

Although only 15 percent of North Vietnam's gross national product was provided by industry, portions of the industrial sector were also dispersed, and many city residents were evacuated to the countryside. In the main, however, North Vietnam depended on imports from the Communist bloc for industrial products. Whereas Germany substituted alternate processes and materials to satisfy her industrial needs, North Vietnam substituted foreign aid to satisfy hers. In one sense the North Vietnamese operated much as the Dutch, who in the sixteenth century defended themselves successfully for more than eighty years against the strongest arms in Europe. Having few natural materials themselves, the Dutch employed their greatest resources, which as Nef cites were "the sea with its inlets, the good harbors and rivers, and the inland waterways which they built . . . to get from Sweden, northern Germany, England, and Scotland the materials which they needed to defend themselves."[20] Both nations substituted foreign production for their own. In this sense, North Vietnam functioned more as a logistics funnel than as a production base for operations in the south.

Some production, of course, did take place, but this was more in the nature of simple consumer essentials improvised by small-scale industry and handicrafts. A Hanoi news report, for instance, claimed that in one province "the population has collected 27 tons of bomb and rocket fragments to be worked on by the local smithies, who turned them into more than 16,000 plowshares."[21] If true, this is another example of the substitution effected by the North Vietnamese for limited natural resources.

The North Vietnamese also seem to have handled their manpower problems quite adequately. With the passage of time, of course, tasks that are novel at first and must be met with untested people become routine. As a result of this alone, by 1966 Hanoi probably had a substantial and valuable investment in learning, practice, and experience.[22] Moreover, the quality of the manpower base was further improved through formal training programs provided both in-country and abroad.[23] Whatever technical skills that still remained in short supply were imported from other Communist nations.[24]

An adequate supply of labor was assured through several programs. Curtailment and suspension of nonessential civilian activities released some workers for the war effort, but it appears that the most common practice was to exact double duty from the laborers. In-country combat tasks were performed on top of, rather than instead of, other employment. Production workers in plants substituted as air defense gunners during air raids. Beside each production position was a rifle, and when the siren sounded, the workers would grab their rifles and take up posts at the windows and on the roof to fire back at U.S. planes. Agricultural workers in the countryside substituted as repair crews when called on by local authorities to assist in repairing bombed-out roads and railroads. Salisbury even cites what would appear to be an extreme example of North Vietnamese Air Force pilots' arising at 4 A.M., working in the rice paddies for three or four hours, and then flying their planes against the Americans.[25]

This may not be so far-fetched given the specialized and constrained pattern of the U.S. air campaign at that time. In fact, the air strikes, normally conducted near midday, fashioned the whole lifestyle around Hanoi. Commercial activity thrived from 5 to 8 A.M., after which the shops closed and did not open again until late afternoon. By 6 P.M. activity was again at a high level, and the streets, beer parlors, and bars were jammed.[26]

Salisbury's observations lead one to believe that there was still considerable slack in the North Vietnamese labor force in 1966. Ob-

viously, commercial and recreational pursuits had not been greatly curtailed. He also noted that there had been an increase of from 80,000 to 100,000 high school students and from 35,000 to 46,000 college students in the last year.[27] Although these students participated in part-time agricultural and military functions, they were still an untapped labor source for an all-out effort. It is, of course, difficult to determine how many persons were engaged either full or part-time in war-related activities in North Vietnam, but one Rand analyst guessed that it might run from 1 to 1.5 million men and women, including the military. If this is true, only about 10 to 15 percent of the able-bodied adult population was so occupied.[28]

Most industrial and logistics processes require some combination of labor and capital as inputs. Within limits one can be substituted for the other. As an example, human portering, in many situations, is a viable alternative to rail or truck transport. If capital has been destroyed or is in short supply, a nation with a sufficient manpower base will normally turn to more labor-intensive methods to maintain a given level of output. The bicycle brigades employed to transport supplies past destroyed railroad bridges and the very labor-intensive dispersal techniques cited by Salisbury are two good illustrations. With an apparently abundant labor force, the North Vietnamese were able to effect many such substitutions in their continuing support of the conflict in the south.

Some Comparisons

There exists a general consensus that the bombing of the north from 1965 until November 1968 failed to alter significantly North Vietnam's ability or will to continue the war in the south.[29] What then went wrong? Why was the world's greatest power unable to bomb an essentially second-rate nation into submission? Most experts feel that it was primarily due to three factors. First, North Vietnam supported operations in the south mainly by functioning as a logistics funnel: a majority of the equipment and supplies came from other Communist nations. Second, as indicated above, North Vietnam possessed a manpower base of sufficient size to effect any labor-intensive substitutions that were required for continuation of the war. Finally, the volume of supplies needed in the south was so low that only a small portion of the capacity of North Vietnam's redundant and flexible transportation system was required to maintain the flow.

There also can be no denying that the gradual escalation of the bombing campaign gave the North Vietnamese time to improvise, adjust, and develop the necessary countermeasures that in large measure attenuated the bombing impact. Note, for example, the following excerpt from a 1967 North Vietnamese military analysis on the same subject:

> The might of the U.S. Air Force lies in the fact that it has many planes, modern technical means, bombs and bullets, and available airfields in Thailand and South Vietnam, and at-sea. It can attack us from many directions on many targets, under different weather conditions, by day and by night. However, given their political isolation and the present balance of international forces, the U.S. Air Force is compelled to escalate step by step, and cannot attack the North massively and swiftly in strategic, large-scale, surprise bombings. Our North Vietnam can gain the time and circumstances necessary to gradually transform the country to a war footing, to further develop its forces, and to gain experience in order to deal the U.S. Air Force heavier blows.[30]

Time, then, becomes the essential factor that dilutes the effect of strategic warfare. Only when an economic system is critically strained and time is running out can the type of bombing campaigns described in this article succeed in achieving their affirmed results. This can be illustrated with the three target systems that received the most concentrated attacks in Southeast Asia: the hydroelectric power complexes; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage facilities; and lines of communication (the transportation system).

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Vietnam, 1967

In Vietnam, USAF B-52s (facing page) dropped bombs from extremely high altitudes on unsuspecting ground troop sanctuaries, keeping enemy forces on the move. . . . Frequent targets of concentrated attack were petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage facilities and transportation systems. At the Thai Nguyen barge construction area (below) bridge sections and POL tanks were assembled.



In the almost four-year bombing campaign, over 80 percent of the central electric generating capacity of North Vietnam was either destroyed or rendered inoperable; yet there was sufficient redundancy in the system to permit the most essential operations to be continued. Possessing only a limited industrial base, North Vietnam, of course, did not require a huge amount of electric power. Moreover, all critical elements of their military and governmental agencies had alternative means of generating electricity. Even during the large B-52 raids in December 1972, when all of Hanoi's major power sources were rendered inoperable and the capacity available from the national power grid was reduced by some 75 percent, electricity continued to be supplied to priority users, such as selected government buildings, important industrial installations, and foreign embassies.[31] In summary, then, the essential requirements for electric power did not put an overbearing strain on the remaining

capacity, and the redundancy in the system permitted the North Vietnamese to substitute for destroyed and damaged power elements.

The results against POL storage facilities were similar although the underlying substitution mechanism was quite different. North Vietnam had no capability to generate additional POL internally; however, she could obtain the required stocks elsewhere. This is illustrated in the assessment of the concentrated POL strikes conducted in 1966. Although the intelligence community estimated that 70 percent of North Vietnamese storage capacity had been destroyed, it concluded, "There is no evidence yet of any shortage of POL in North Vietnam and stocks on hand, with recent imports, have been adequate to sustain necessary operations."[32] The North Vietnamese were able to supplement their reduced reserves immediately with imports of more POL products. Outside aid was substituted for a missing source of supply, and operations were continued.

Contrast these results with those achieved against the German synthetic oil industry by Allied air strikes during World War II. Coming as they did in the last year of the war, when POL was critically needed by the Germans in their effort to halt advancing Allied ground forces, these strikes severely crippled the German war machine. The oil industry was large and costly, and there was insufficient time to develop an alternate source of supply. Consequently, the German war effort rapidly collapsed..

The third target system, lines of communication, received by far the greatest weight of effort during the war in Southeast Asia. Strikes against lines of communication were conducted not only around Hanoi and Haiphong, the general area on which the previous discussion has concentrated, but also in the lower panhandle of North Vietnam above the demilitarized zone and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail of southern Laos, where strikes were concentrated after the November 1968 bombing halt in North Vietnam. Although the strikes against the industrial base and energy sources already described might more appropriately be termed strategic bombardment, strikes against lines of communication fell into the interdiction category. These strikes took two forms: attacks of delay against the railroad and road network itself and attacks of destruction against vehicles and supplies on the network. The purpose of these strikes was to reduce the flow of men and materiel to a level below that at which offensive operations in the south could be maintained.

Since the initiation of air interdiction missions during World War II, these strikes have been the most controversial of all. Unless they are executed concurrent with major ground operations in which the enemy is forced into a high expenditure rate, it is difficult to prove that they significantly influence the outcome of a battle. Notable successes were registered during World War II and the first year of the Korean conflict, but with the advent of protracted war in which there is no clear outcome, it has been virtually impossible to establish a positive payoff for these strikes. Guerrilla warfare requires only a minimum of supplies, and since the option to fight or withdraw remains open, the volume and timing of replacements are not vital to success.

Although the true impact of interdiction in Southeast Asia may never be known with certainty, I feel that it was within the range of North Vietnamese tolerance.[33] Admittedly, political restraints against a full-scale interdiction effort, including naval blockade, mitigated somewhat the impact of the U.S. effort. Yet, Communist needs in South Vietnam were not great—not more than 50 tons a day were required from the Ho Chi Minh Trail—and they could easily make whatever adjustments were necessary within their logistics system to keep this amount flowing and accumulate a surplus for future operations.

To be sure, the North Vietnamese were fighting a protracted war, and a protracted war

implies time. With time, substitution becomes a viable option. Temporary structures replace destroyed bridges, bypasses circumnavigate interdicted route segments, and men and materiel are diverted from less essential to more critical functions. The operations and repair activities observed by Harrison Salisbury were characteristic of North Vietnam's efforts along these lines. The North Vietnamese transportation capacity was more than adequate for the type of war they were fighting, and time was not a critical factor. This set of circumstances was quite different from the one in which the Germans found themselves during the final year of World War II. According to Olson:

> The German railroad industry was strained to the maximum near the end of the war by the demands at the front and the extra transport required because of the dispersal of factories subject to the bombing attack. Thus, when this industry was bombed repeatedly and mercilessly, the Germans had nothing to turn to but canal transport, truck transport, and air transport. But by this time the Nazi beast had been cornered: the canals were breached at the same time, while trucks could not run for lack of oil and the allies had control of the air.[34]

As with the German oil industry, time had run out, and the opportunity of substitution had been foreclosed.

OF THE primary target systems struck in Germany during World War II, the most notable successes were scored against the synthetic oil and transportation industries. Both of these industries were large and costly, making them difficult to replace. Perhaps even more important is that the weight of effort against these industries came in the final year of the war when the German economic system was severely strained. Following the successful Allied invasion of Normandy, German forces were heavily committed on two fronts, and the resulting demands placed on the German war machine were tremendous. There was insufficient time remaining to create substitutes for these industries even if the capability existed. The situation was quite similar to that in which Japan found herself at the end of World War II. Faced with a highly compressed, intensive bombing campaign against her industrial base and an impending Allied invasion which she no longer had the means to repel, Japan soon capitulated.

Primary elements in the conduct of warfare, then, must be both the time and ability to effect successful substitutions. Given these two factors, a nation can go a long way toward mitigating the impact of the most devastating bombing attacks. And so it was with the North Vietnamese. Only in the latter part of 1972, after strikes against the north were resumed and the flow of imports was restricted, was there any evidence of a reduction in the North Vietnamese ability or will to continue the fight. But by that time the North Vietnamese Army had suffered severe losses in an imprudent invasion of the south.

As Olson makes quite clear in his evaluation of target selection during the Combined Bomber Offensive, "it was not that air power could not destroy what it set out to destroy: the problem was rather that what it destroyed was not after all indispensable. The fault was not one of airmanship, it was one of economics."[35] Given time, a resource they possessed in abundance, the North Vietnamese were able to make those substitutions necessary to their continued participation in the conflict. Surely, the cost of operations increased as one type of labor, good, or process was continually substituted for another, thus giving rise to the law of diminishing returns. Yet, for the most part, labor was plentiful, and materiel needs could be satisfied through increased imports. Whatever costs were incurred could be paid by cutting down on nonessential production and consumption.

History is replete with examples such as those described. Most industrial and logistics

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



The substitution principle

The North Vietnamese made any adjustments necessary to continue the fight. Air attacks along Route 1A (top) pitted the road, but it was soon repaired and cargo trucks waited at the ferry crossing. . . . Trucks cross over a pontoon bridge (below), bypassing the bombed out Dong Lac highway bridge. . . . Although repeated bombings had destroyed the bridges and roads along this important North Vietnamese supply route (facing page), bypass routes were quickly constructed, including new bridges.

systems were far more resilient than originally assumed. Prewar assessments on substitutability have been predicated almost entirely on the availability of materials and processes existing in peacetime economies. Only when wartime necessity forces their discovery do many substitution possibilities become known.[36] Equally important, however, is that most assessments have also failed to make adequate allowance for the mitigating effect of time. Consequently, strategic plans based on these assessments have not succeeded, at least to the degree originally conceived.

What is called for is a return to the concept of the blitzkrieg. The blitzkrieg model would appear to be the logical foundation on which to base U.S. conventional war strategy. The greatest successes of both air and ground forces in modern times have come in short, intense combined arms campaigns: the German blitzkriegs of World War II, the Normandy invasion, and the Six-Day War in the Mideast, to name a few. This suggests that military doctrine should be structured so that air power is used in conjunction with other forces in fast and dramatic moves which give no opportunity for the principle of substitution to come into play. It was with such a strategy that Hitler quickly conquered almost the whole of Europe. And it was when he deviated from this strategy that he began to fail.

This lesson does not appear to have been lost on the Russians. Most experts now agree that Soviet forces in Europe are structured to fight a very short, intense war. The high concentration of armor in the Soviet force structure, the high ratio of combat-to-support units, a military doctrine that emphasizes rapid advance into enemy territory—all lend credence to this assessment. Moreover, recent qualitative and quantitative improvements have added to the Soviet's quick-strike offensive capability.

It is imperative that NATO forces be structured and positioned to halt the kind of blitzkrieg that the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces are designed to fight. Otherwise we may have insufficient time to bring in reinforcements and make the substitutions necessary for continued combat operations in the event of an invasion of Western Europe. As Senator Sam Nunn has stated, "There is no point in being able to bring full defensive weight to bear in 60 days if a force cannot survive the first 20."[38] This means that the blitzkrieg should form the cornerstone of our defensive, as well as offensive, strategy. Not only must our forces be able to launch blitzkrieg offensives, they also must be able to repel them.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 129.
2. Ibid., p. 27.
3. Ibid., pp. 26-28.
4. Ibid., p. 239.
5. Mancur Olson, Jr., "American Materials Policy and the 'Physiocratic Fallacy,'" *Orbis*, Winter 1963, pp. 682-83; hereafter cited as "American Materials Policy."
6. Burton H. Klein, *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959). See pages 225-38 for a fuller treatment of material cited herein.
7. Ibid., p. 229.
8. Ibid., p. 236.
9. Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Economics of Target Selection for the Combined Bomber Offensive," *The Royal United Service Institution Journal*, November 1962; hereafter cited as "The Economics of Target Selection." I am indebted to Olson for much of the discussion that follows.
10. John K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (New York: The New World Library, 1958), pp. 131-33.
11. Ibid., p. 132.
12. As with ball bearings, the Germans were able to alleviate many shortages by improvising and substituting plentiful for scarce resources. Copper was saved by substituting iron radiators for copper radiators in motor vehicles and by cutting the amount of copper used in U-boats and locomotives by 50 and 90 percent, respectively. Alloys using scarce metals, such as nickel and molybdenum, were replaced with alloys using plentiful metals, such as vanadium, in critical products like gun tubes. For other substitutions, see Olson, "American Materials Policy," and Edward S. Mason, "American Security and Access to Raw Materials," *World Politics*, January 1949.
13. Olson, "The Economics of Target Selection," p. 313.
14. Ibid., p. 132.

15. Albert Speer believes that the campaign against the ball bearing industry would also have been successful if it were not for the long pauses between the major raids of August 1943, October 1943, and February-March 1944 in which some production was restored. This is, however, but another example of time's role in strategic successes and failures. Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 339-41.

16. Harrison E. Salisbury, *Behind the Lines—Hanoi* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 86-91.

17. Ibid., p. 88.

18. Ibid., p. 89. Although railroad repair was more difficult than road repair, the North Vietnamese maintained the railroads in case gasoline and oil imports were cut off. Locomotives were fueled with local coal and wood.

19. Ibid., p. 91.

20. Nef, p. 117.

21. Quoted in Oleg Hoeffding, *Bombing North Vietnam: An Appraisal of Economic and Political Effects* (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, RM-5213, December 1966), footnote, p. 29.

22. Ibid., p. 15.

23. North Vietnamese sources claimed that nearly 80,000 technical workers and cadres were graduated in North Vietnam in 1965 and that 5000 North Vietnamese were being trained in Communist countries, Ibid., footnotes on pages 8 and 16.

24. An estimated 40,000 Chinese engineers and construction workers, for example, were employed on the railroads. Ibid., footnote, p. 8.

25. Salisbury, p. 145.

26. Ibid., pp. 113-14.

27. Ibid., pp. 129-30.

28. Hoeffding, p. 7.

29. *The Pentagon Papers: The Senator Gravel Edition*, vol. IV (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

30. Quoted in Patrick J. McGarvey, *Visions of Victory: Selected Vietnamese Military Writings, 1964-1968* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), p. 156.

31. Herman L. Gilster and Robert E. M. Frady, *Linebacker II USAF Bombing Survey* (Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, April 1973), pp. 12-14.

32. *Pentagon Papers*, vol. IV, p. 111.

33. Herman L. Gilster, "Air Interdiction in Protracted War:An Economic Evaluation," *Air University Review*, May-June 1977.

34. Olson, "The Economics of Target Selection," p. 313.

35. Ibid., p. 310.

36. Carl Kaysen, *Notes on the Strategic Air Intelligence in World War II(ETO)*, (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation, R-165, October 1949), pp. 14-15.

37. Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultz, editors, *Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 63-70.

38. Reported in the *Baltimore Sun*, November 2, 1976, p. 6.

Military strategy (working definition): The manner in which one chooses to use military force to deter war or to achieve the desired outcome of war. Military strategy translates the abstractions of doctrine into practical application after due consideration has been given to policy considerations, one's military capability, and the threat environment.

Colonel Thomas A. Fabyanic
Air War College

DÉTENTE AND AN ADEQUATE AMERICAN DEFENSE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
JOSEPH W. KASTL



On the eve of his visit to the United States in June 1973, Secretary Brezhnev asked his advisers what he should seek in America. One adviser recommended cars, another computer factories, still another atomic power stations. No, replied Brezhnev thoughtfully, I'll just ask them to build us Communism.[1]

WHAT is détente? Are the Russian and U.S. versions different? And is détente compatible with long-range U.S. defense interests?

Détente is a popular catchword in international relations; while it now perhaps has passed from official favor,[2] it still serves to convey instantly a well-understood attitude toward complex world relationships. Will détente prove advantageous to the West in the long run? This continues to generate significant and heated debate, both within and outside the U.S. military community. In any event, the subject is of seminal importance to the military profession: Détente (or something similar to it)

represents a fact of life that influences our foreign policy and our defense posture today.

In analyzing détente, I propose to divide the subject into three parts: (1) defining the term more specifically, given the realities of 1979; (2) viewing détente as it is seen by both those who support or reject it; and (3) weighing the pros and cons of détente, vis-à-vis long-term American defense interests.

Defining Détente Today

Read the 1950s rhetoric of the Cold War—few would disagree that the pendulum has swung from a clear-cut contest of strength to some new relationship based on an essential equivalence of strength between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Today, ideological purity apparently has mellowed into pragmatism, economic issues often influence events far more than purely military considerations, and bizarre, novel friendships and crosscutting coalitions thrive.

It is a cockeyed world: parochialism, regionalism, and cosmopolitanism flourish side by side. It is an alienated world: four "faiths" that promised much — secular humanism, technology, orthodox Christianity, and orthodox Marxism—no longer appear, in the eyes of many, to motivate humanity. And it is a world of confusion: political transformations are so radical that the nation-state, which dominated five centuries of history, no longer may be either the driving force or the highest expansion of political activity.[3]

Given this sort of world, what does détente mean? Beyond the generally accepted idea of a relaxation of tensions, it is extremely difficult for Western commentators to concur in any one definition of détente. To some, détente is:

- an ever-changing attitude of negotiated accommodation to avoid nuclear war, provide for nuclear arms agreements, and contain Soviet global power.[4]
- an overdue recognition of the realities of foreign policy.[5]
- an attempt to transcend historical and ideological differences so as to address a common problem: how to slow down the spiraling arms race.[6]
- an effort to embed our adversary in a network of cooperative agreements while maintaining (but restraining) U.S. military power;[7] or
- a guise, which, lulling the U.S. into a lack of vigilance, permits the Soviet Union to surpass us militarily.[8]

Does détente have a different meaning in the Soviet world? Perhaps. Many would assert that to the Soviet leadership détente is merely another method—albeit one less dangerous—of continuing the class struggle. As proof, they point to Chairman Brezhnev's February 1976 speech before the 25th Soviet Congress. Essentially, the Soviet interpretation of détente assumes a lessening of the forces of war paralleled by increasingly mutually advantageous cooperation between states with different social systems; nonetheless, détente does not abolish the rivalry of the ongoing class struggle as a sacred duty of Marxism.[9]

Contradictory Conclusions

Thus far, few might dispute the basic facts stated. Yet, when an interpretation of these facts is attempted—particularly when we ask, "What should the U.S. do next?"—analysts begin to reach clearly contradictory conclusions.*

progressives

Progressives generally insist that America now safely may explore beyond the rigid, doctri-

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*Lest labels such as "conservative" or "liberal" semantically interfere with exposition of contrasting viewpoints, I will refer to those generally in favor of détente as *progressives*. Often, they are centrist or liberal in viewpoint, believe the Cold War is past, and assume that—given a changing political world—a new methodology for dealing with the Soviets is in America's best interests. In opposition to them stand those who might be called *loyalists*. Generally, they are traditional or conservative in outlook, adhere to the basics of the predétente era as furnishing time-tested U.S. responses to unchanging Communist aspirations, and view détente with great suspicion in the face of Soviet military growth.

naire approach of the Cold War era. They believe that the twin tensions of Soviet ideology and Russian military adventurism have subsided, and viewing the contest as a death struggle with godless communism is a travesty. To the contrary, the real world is one where socialism is a fractured monolith, with Soviet ambition compromised by the shadow of nuclear war.[10] Moreover, it is a world where the Russians have discovered that neither raw military power nor foreign aid and cultural diplomacy permit the Kremlin to dictate other nations' decisions. Instead, today's world is far more influenced by monetary considerations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Common Market—areas where, incidentally, the Soviet Union has little say so.[11] Therefore, say the progressives, now is the time when wise leadership can draw the Soviet Union into the ranks of cultured international nations, sensitive to the needs of constraint, discipline, and cooperation.[12] Détente thus becomes a methodology for managing the East-West rivalry. True enough, America must maintain sturdy military defenses, but they should be spare and no greater than the basic levels necessary for adequate national security.

loyalists

To thinkers of more traditional persuasion, Soviet intentions and capabilities are crucial, and they remain ominous. There is every fear that the Soviets are seeking nuclear superiority; in turn, this resurrects the dangers of either nuclear confrontation or, more likely, Soviet expansion through international blackmail.

The future might be bright, loyalists argue, if only Soviet military programs reflected a live and let live attitude. Yet, quite the contrary is evident; notice how General George Brown commented in the introductory remarks to his FY79 Posture Statement that Soviet force improvements "have been deliberate, steady, and impressive."[13]

The Soviets still spend 40 percent more than the West on military forces, 250,000 troops still occupy central Europe, and there is little evidence that the Russians have surrendered their aspirations of world domination. In the face of this, say some traditionalists, the "siren song of the pacifists and U.S. unilateral disarmament advocates" is particularly disturbing, for it would cause an uninterrupted slide into second place and imperil our freedoms. The most telling point of recent Kremlinology is not Chairman Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the 25th Congress but rather the remark he is supposed to have made after the Helsinki meeting:

> . . . trust us, comrades, for by 1985 . . . a decisive shift in the correlation of forces will be such that . . . we will be able to exert our will whenever we need to.[14]

Therefore, traditionalists conclude, détente represents a classic case of self-delusion.[15] True, the Soviets so far have not lacked prudence, but they are building up to a nuclear war-winning primacy. If they someday choose to bully us, the West will face a painful dilemma: nuclear war or American surrender.[16]

not all black or white

In fairness, few on either side of the discussion would dismantle a strong and viable military force.[17] Nevertheless, what separates the two schools of thought—and what is at the heart of their argument—is the degree to which the Soviets may be trusted today.

Generally, progressives belittle a Soviet first-strike intention as "more or less mythological."[18] Given the present Soviet leadership, the U.S. can successfully persuade the Russians to recognize a bipolar world and forego Soviet preeminence. Over time, outmoded communist doctrine will be chipped away, strengthening East-West accommodation.[19] In contrast, loyalists insist that a major risk indeed exists, that progressives naïvely misapprehend true Soviet intentions, and that the struggle must

continue between a messianic, expansionist Russian state and the West.[20]

Is Détente in the American Interest?

The rhetoric of John Foster Dulles—or even of Kennedy—is out of style; today, the U.S. seldom strides across the international scene, intrepidly announcing that we will neither be outgunned nor bullied. And no longer do we feel compelled to respond to events, however minor, everywhere in the world.

Yet is the world truly changed, or does a virulent communism remain ready to rush forward if we show a willingness to meet it half way?

Consider the alternatives. If war has become an unworkable option, détente can be an excellent approach. We could begin achieving the sweet dream of eventually beating swords into plowshares. No longer fearing capitalism, the Soviets could relax. It is conceivable that Europe could be "demilitarized," thus barring a European conflict from leading the major powers to the abyss of war, as in 1914. The East European Warsaw Pact nations could gradually wrest from the Kremlin greater freedom of action and move toward polycentrism. Russia could delight in technology, consumerism, and commercial ties with the West. We could create a cooperative world. A diminished U.S. military budget would afford greater domestic succor and concomitant greater freedom of action for free enterprise. (Then, to turn the phrase around, Coca-Cola, IBM, and American farm know-how would "bury" the Russians, not the other way around.)[21]

Yet to traditionalist thinkers, we risk too much in a unilateral stand-down. Our national security interests are jeopardized by détente, since nothing has evidenced a Russian willingness to demilitarize. To the contrary, détente suggests we may be willing either to abandon our allies or even forsake our own vital interests. If Russia finds that détente involves a commercial war of influence but sees herself losing, traditionalists think she may launch on military adventurism out of exasperation or overreaction. Then, too, détente also suggests strongly to some that we condone a permanently divided Germany or Korea. More tellingly, détente carried the danger that the U.S. might draw down its arms and defensive alliances to a point where the West is too weak to resist a major Soviet military initiative.[22] Alexander Solzhenitsyn asserts the traditionalist fear quite tellingly:

> Now, of course, they have become more clever in our country. Now they do not say "we are going to bury you" anymore, now they say "détente."
>
> Nothing has changed in Communist ideology. The goals are the same as they were, but instead of the artless Khrushchev, who could not hold his tongue, now they say "détente."[23]

ferreting out Soviet intentions

What are the Soviet Union's true, long-term intentions? As suggested earlier, the division between loyalists and progressives essentially turns on this.

One is reminded of the old Indian story of the emerald test. Allegedly, one can discover if a stone is an emerald by dipping it in acid. If the acid eats away the stone, the candidate truly was an emerald. But to run the test, the stone must be destroyed.

It is the same way with the Russian intentions. If we seek accommodation, we have entered into a type of emerald test. Addressing this matter, progressives would reason that the Soviets do not aspire to world conquest today; so long as we maintain a sufficient military force, the Kremlin hardly seeks to occupy the United States. Thus, say these commentators, America now may lower its military guard, reconcile itself to a blander, less proselytizing communism, and enjoy the good life. If the Russians bluster from time to time, it should be chalked up to mere rhetoric—no more than jousting with words.

After all, Christians and Moslems coexisted for centuries; so can these two isms.

The nagging trouble with the argument is this: If we emphasize negotiating, putting aside Cold War slogans and armament, and moving from confrontation to collaboration, we may have at least dipped into the acid bath. What if our stone truly is an emerald? What if the Russians really do intend to bury us?

AS WE continue the search for peace, it might be well to keep several points in mind.

- Regardless of whether personal analysis of the data results in a progressive or loyalist viewpoint, we must realistically plumb Soviet intentions and measure Soviet capabilities. We simply cannot assume peaceful and restrained behavior by a potential adversary. In short, idealism must be paired with pragmatism.
- We must hedge our bets—at a minimum, with equivalent military might which cannot be trumped by new technology advances.
- We must analyze new political initiatives—strategic arms limitations, mutual force reductions, demilitarization—in detail; ours must, however, never be a passion for arms control or peace at the price of our integrity. On the other hand, neither must we be so rigid that we cannot accommodate to genuine offers of reduction and limitation of arms.
- We must recognize that the basic teachings of Clausewitz as to the meaning of war and of Mahan on geopolitics continue to hold telling significance in the nuclear era.
- Finally, we must nurture our unique national heritage and our will to survive as a proud world leader. Without chauvinism or overemotionalism, there is great room for reemphasizing the role of patriotism and the unique American contribution to world freedom. Indeed, it can be argued that in the broad historical perspective, the Soviets are the Sparta of the new era and we the Athens. After all, we have promoted an amazing degree of individual freedom and potential, consistent with the minimum necessary political discipline to prevent anarchy. And on the international scene, we have fought world wars when our shores were not yet directly threatened, then bound up the wounds and healed our former enemies, and ultimately sought a united and peaceful world by offering a fetching, openhanded friendship to all.

In no-nonsense terms, we have an idealistic streak in our American character that is both admirable and well worth preserving. It follows that, in the final analysis, there is a stark contrast between *us* and *them*. In our historical past, we had disagreements between Adams and Jefferson; our ruling leader sent his opponent philosophical letters, and in retirement they became cordial correspondents. In their historical past, they had disagreements between Trotsky and Stalin; it would appear that their ruling leader sent his opponent an assassin—all the way to Mexico.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Cited in Theodore Draper, "Appeasement and Détente," *Commentary*, February 1976, p. 2.
2. James R. Schlesinger, "The Evolution of American Policy towards the Soviet Union," *International Security*, Summer 1976, p. 42.
3. See Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 109–10, 213; Robert Legvold, "The Nature of Soviet Power," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1977, pp. 52–53.
4. Schlesinger, pp. 41, 46.
5. One of many definitions listed in Richard Rosecrance, "Détente or Entente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, p. 464.
6. Suggested by Keith A. Dunn, "Detente and Deterrence: From Kissinge to Carter," *Parameters*, vol. VII, no. 4, 1977, p. 46.
7. R. J. Rummel, "Détente and Reality," *Strategic Review*, Fall 1976, p. 34.
8. Robert Constant et al., "Is Détente in the American Interest?" cited in *Détente and Defense*, edited by Robert J. Pranger (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), p. 212.

9. This may be merely Soviet propaganda, intended for home consumption. Leonid I. Brezhnev, Report to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 24 February 1976, cited in Pranger, p. 188. Overall, the Soviets appear to view détente with clearer vision than does the West. Writing in a Russian journal, A. Nikonov stresses that detente has come about primarily due to the increased power of the Soviet Union; that peaceful coexistence does not lessen the ongoing class struggle; and that the aggressive nature of imperialism, to Soviet eyes, remains untamed. A. Nikonov, "Military Détente and the Transformation of International Relations," *World Economics and International Relations*, June 1977, pp. 28–39, reprinted in *Soviet Press, Selected Translations*, Nos. 77°9, and 77°10, Directorate of Soviet Affairs, Air Force Intelligence Service, September and October 1977.

10. Legvold, p. 70.

11. Legvold, pp. 55–58.

12. Helmut Sonnefelt, "Russia, America and Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978, p. 291.

13. General George S. Brown, *United States Military Posture for FY 1979*, 20 January 1978, p. 19.

14. Ira C. Eaker, "The Disarmament Conspiracy," *Air Force Times*, 2 January 1978, pp. 15–16.

15. See generally the remarks of George J. Keegan, Jr., in "Soviet Strength and Fears," *World Issues*, October-November 1977, pp. 22, 24, 29.

16. Rummel, pp. 39–41.

17. See, for example, the views of Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Elusive Parameters of Détente," *Orbis*, Winter 1976, pp. 1344–57; Frederic H. Hartmann, "The Détente Debate," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1977, p. 40; Statement of Secretary of Defense Brown, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Release, 15 September 1977, p. 8; Legvold, p. 71; Schlesinger, pp. 42–43. For a far more optimistic view of Soviet intentions ("For some time, the Soviet Union has not been a revolutionary state; its conservatism is obvious not only in its foreign policies but in the nature of its economy and social life"), see Alan Wolfe, "The Trilateralist Straddle," *The Nation*, 31 December 1977, p. 713.

18. Hartmann, p. 40. Perhaps the strongest condemnation of the loyalists comes from Bernard T. Feld. He argues that the nation is being blanketed by "one of the most insidious campaigns in recent history: an attempt to turn the clock back to the worst days of the Cold War." Mr. Feld insists that it is "demonstrably clear (to all but far-out hawks and ignoramuses) that the current situation is quite the reverse" of loyalist claims—i.e., the American nuclear arsenal is clearly superior to that of the Russians. The article cautions that we may be entering a new, spiraling nuclear arms accumulation. Bernard T. Feld, "Where Is the Present Danger?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1978, p. 28.

19. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," cited in Pranger, pp. 68–70.

20. Marvin Stone, "The Nation's Security," *U.S. News & World Report*, February 1978, p. 76; Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1976, p. 1; Rummel, pp. 38–40.

21. See generally Seyom Brown, pp. 9, 23.

22. Ibid., pp. 20, 48, 59, 65, 86.

23. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "America: You Must Think about the World," cited in Pranger, p. 243.

The word "détente" can be simplistically defined as "the easing of tension between nations." The word is, in practice, however further defined by experience, as those nations evolve new means by which they can live with each other in peace. . . . We seek a world of peace. But such a world must accommodate diversity—social, political, and ideological. Only then can there be a genuine cooperation among nations and among cultures.

President Jimmy Carter
Statement made in address
at Naval Academy Commencement
Exercises, 7 June 1978

Let me say a word first about détente. I think clearly détente is a two-way street. It's a street on which there must be a recognition of the concerns of the other party and action that is consonant with such a recognition.

Secretary Cyrus Vance
Statement made on "Face the
Nation," CBS, 30 April 1978

GETTING TRAFFIC MOVING ON NATO'S TWO-WAY STREET

MAJOR DENNIS M. DRUMMOND

Don't tell me what we're doing wrong in NATO. Tell me what we should be doing that's right.

GENERAL DAVID C. JONES[1]

NORTH Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standardization has a lot in common with the weather. That is, everybody seems to be talking about standardization, but, unlike the weather, something is being done about it. The Department of Defense now has an adviser to the Secretary of Defense for NATO affairs, and Congress has spelled out U.S. policy in the 1977 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act:

> It is the policy of the United States that equipment procured for the use of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardized or made interoperable with that of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[2]

Across the Atlantic, the European members of NATO are banding together in an Independent European Program Group to pursue cooperative efforts. In addition, the United States and four NATO countries have chosen the F-16 as a common fighter. However, still more must be done. Duplicate development and logistics efforts are costing the alliance $11 to $27 billion a year. Incompatibility of ammunition, communication, fuels, and other equipment means a less effective NATO.

Recent DOD initiatives have been a step in the right direction, but the Europeans are wary. They see standardization as a "two-way street," with a greater percentage of European participation. To them, standardization does not necessarily mean "Buy American." Moving traffic both ways on that two-way street will require more than policy statements. No one nation can do it alone, but, obviously, the United States must take the lead by clearly demonstrating its commitment. That commitment must be broadly based and expressed in a vehicle that can move quickly, is flexible, and is fair to all NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic. In this article, I propose a NATO Defense Cooperation Act, which could be just the vehicle needed.

NATO and Standardization

The call for standarization of Allied Forces' equipment is almost as old as the alliance itself. In 1949, the Military Production and Supply Board was established "to promote coordinated production, standarization and technical research in the field of armaments. . . ."[3] This was not a serious problem in the early years, since the United States supplied most of the military equipment. But as the European countries recovered from the war, they began to produce more of their own weapons. Destandardization became the rule despite efforts by NATO commanders to coordinate developments. National considerations, especially economic factors, took precedence over alliance interests.[4] Standardization efforts continued, but with less emphasis. Success with standardization agreements (STANAGs) was limited because they addressed standardization of components rather than major weapon systems. The withdrawal of France, with its large defense industry, from active military participation in NATO in 1966 further fragmented European cooperation. The next few years saw the United States turn away from Europe to Vietnam and its particular requirements.[5] Despite these setbacks, NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) continued to encourage cooperative research and development, and it has several working groups dealing with future requirements. The CNAD has produced several joint projects, including the British-German-Italian Tornado, a multi-role combat aircraft, and the NATO Sea Sparrow, a shipboard defensive missile system now under way for seven nations. Other multinational programs, such as the Roland short-range air defense missile, the F-16 fighter, and the Jaguar attack aircraft, have evolved outside the CNAD structure.[6]

Since the early 1970s, the NATO countries have reawakened to the need for standardization and the potential benefits of such a move.



The F-16 has been chosen by the U. S. and four other NATO countries as a common fighter plane.

The modernization of the Warsaw Pact forces combined with pressures on Allied defense budgets to drive home the point that the NATO Allies can no longer afford to go their separate ways. Senators Dewey Bartlett and Sam Nunn highlighted the military problem in their 1977 report on "NATO and the New Soviet Threat." They concluded that interoperability and standardization must be relentlessly pursued, since failure to do so serves only the interest of the Warsaw Pact.[7] NATO commanders, too, are aware of the military benefits of standardization. In November 1971, Air Marshal Sir Harold Martin, Commander 2d Allied Tactical Air Force, told a House of Commons committee that the ability to rearm aircraft at Allied airfields would increase the operability of the force as a whole by 200 to 300 percent.[8]

Effectiveness is just one side of the coin. Duplication of effort in research and development, production, and logistics is siphoning away precious resources. No one really knows the cost of these parallel efforts, but estimates run from $1 billion[9] to $2 billion [10] in research and development alone, and from $11 billion[11] to $27 billion[12] in the total amount wasted each year in the alliance.

Recognition of the military and economic costs of not standardizing has led to a reaffirmation of the 1949 goal. In May 1975, the Eurogroup Defense Ministers,[13] the NATO Defense Planning committee,[14] and President Gerald R. Ford addressed the need for more standardization. In his speech at the NATO summit, President Ford described NATO's primary task as maintaining a strong and credible defense through more effective use of defense resources. He stated:

> We need to achieve our long-standing goals of common procedures and equipment. Our research and development efforts must be more than the sum of individual parts. Let us become truly one in our allocation of defense tasks, support and production.[15]

In the four years since these words were

spoken, policies have been shaped on both sides of the Atlantic to further standardization. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in London in May 1977, with the participation of heads of states and governments, concluded that "Allies are determined to cooperate in all aspects of defense production." One aim was "to develop a more balanced relationship between European and North American members of the Alliance in the procurement of defense equipment."[16]

The commitment of the European allies to improved cooperation is shown in the progress of the Independent European Program Group. One of the group's primary goals is to further standardization and interoperability. It has begun to work toward this goal by selecting as candidates for cooperative programs those items of equipment with common replacement schedules in several countries.[17]

U.S. policy has been spelled out in a variety of ways. Probably the most significant is the gradually increasing commitment expressed by Congress through legislation. One of the first steps was a 1974 requirement that the Secretary of Defense assess the loss of effectiveness in NATO caused by the failure to standardize.[18] In 1976, Congress adopted the policy statement on standardization quoted earlier. It also provided an exception to the Buy American Act for equipment to be used in Europe by authorizing the Secretary of Defense to determine that buying such equipment in the United States is inconsistent with the public interest. The law also directed the secretary to report to the Congress any procurement of a new major system that is not standardized or interoperable with the equipment of other NATO members.[19] As a result of a request by the Department of Defense, the prohibition on buying specialty metals overseas was relaxed in 1977 by exempting purchases made to further NATO standardization and interoperability or to comply with offset agreements.[20]

The Department of Defense has also promoted standardization. As early as 1963, it had published DOD Directive 3100.3, "Cooperation with Allies in Research and Development of Defense Equipment." In November 1975, the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, noted the need for renewed emphasis of those earlier policies and directed full consideration of standardization in weapon systems, particularly those systems in support of NATO.[21] Recent guidance has been very specific, as in the March 1977 Defense Planning and Programming Guidance:

> All Service development and procurement programs . . . will include NATO standardization and interoperability goals as fundamental considerations. . . . Cost-effectiveness of systems . . . should be evaluated on a NATO-wide basis. . . .[22]

In August 1977; Ambassador Robert W. Komer was assigned as Adviser to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for NATO Affairs, with the task of pulling together all the strands of NATO policy and programs and advising the secretary on "how best to proceed with initiatives to strengthen NATO's defense posture."[23]

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has also been on the road, taking the message of NATO standardization to the people. The theme is repeated across the country: "We aim for more standardization of equipment . . . more of a 'two-way street' in defense procurement."[24] "There certainly will have to be greater United States purchases from European sources. . . ."[25] ". . . standardization of equipment and training is essential."[26]

The policy seems clear on both sides of the Atlantic, but policy is not necessarily practice. It must be implemented, and the objective must be considered together with the roadblocks standing in its way. Is the objective really standardization? There is general agreement that full standardization is neither necessary nor desirable. Standardization will not occur overnight, but intermediate steps toward compatibility, interoperability, and standardization are necessary now. There must

be room for specialization to support special missions, but when there is a common mission, forces must be capable of reinforcing and supporting each other.[27] Since nations have different needs, replacement schedules, and budgets, each item must be analyzed to determine whether standardization is crucial.[28] But standardization as a philosophy must be considered in the aggregate. Because of European sensitivity to U.S. dominance, the U.S. approach to standardization should take advantage of both American *and* European



That the United States is committed to standardization and interoperability with Europe is exemplified at least in part by U.S. production of the Franco-German Roland short-range missile. This tank-mounted antiaircraft system includes a radar disc that detects aircraft eleven miles distant.

technological and industrial strength.[29] Thus, the immediate objective is not full standardization but improved cooperation.

Yet there are a number of roadblocks, including restrictions on technology transfer for security or commercial reasons;[30] competing foreign policy objectives (reducing worldwide arms sales conflicts with increased transfers in the name of standardization);[31] foreign military sales procedures that do not recognize the special nature of cooperative programs;[32] and protectionistic economic policies that virtually scuttle coproduction programs.[33] These roadblocks on both ends of the "two-way street" are not really the problems. They are only symptoms of what Dr. Walter LaBerge, NATO's former Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, calls a lack of dedication in finding a solution.

> As far as I can see from my office in Brussels, the leaders of the Alliance are not seriously studying how to provide the environment that allows the nations on each side of the ocean to share their efforts.[34]

Dr. LaBerge is searching for an environment that fosters teamwork. He notes that standardization cannot be legislated or dictated,[35] but that is not the objective. The goal is an environment to promote better cooperation, and I believe the enviornment can be legislated.

The Approaches

Three basic approaches toward creating the needed environment are the NATO common defense market, the Defense/Commercial Balance, and the Technology Exchange. Each must be examined in terms of timeliness, flexibility, and fairness.

The first proposal considers the NATO alliance on a macroeconomic rather than a project-by-project basis. Citing the 1941 Hyde Park Agreement between the United States and Canada as an example of a viable form for a common defense market, Thomas Callaghan projected this structure onto the NATO scene. He envisions a structure in which the participants are not mired in requirements, industrial property rights, or duties and taxes; broad goals are established; and the projects sort themselves out. The three-pronged American initiative would address a North Atlantic common defense market, cooperation in civil technology (especially energy), and open (barrier-free) government procurement. The common defense market would be formally established through a treaty, but cooperative effort would begin immediately. Treaty terms are outlined and goals established for full implementation in twelve years.[36]

Callaghan's approach has attracted a great deal of attention. In a 1975 report for the Department of Defense, Ambassador Komer stated that it provided the bold initiative needed to lift the issue to the level where statesmanship can operate. However, he also recognized that the United States, with its non-NATO needs, might be the slowest to accept and that other efforts were needed.[37]

The common defense market might provide the appropriate environment, but it would require time to evolve. One could argue that the negotiations for the treaty would create the initial environment, with interim objectives for equitable two-way traffic further developing the proper atmosphere. This may be true, but the United States cannot create the atmosphere unilaterally. Objectives for U.S. purchases from NATO countries would be established through negotiations. Experience with allocating F-16 subcontracts in Europe has shown the complexity of the task.[38] Once negotiations were complete, any U.S. commitment to buy X percent of its advanced weapons from other NATO countries would reduce flexibility of action for the United States. This factor, combined with political pressures and technological considerations, renders this approach implausible.[39]

The second approach is the Defense/Commercial Balance. As described by Charles Wolf in a Rand Corporation paper, this ap-

proach links trade liberalization to standardization in NATO. As an alternative to the often inefficient quid pro quo offset agreements that are part of weapons sales like the F-16, Wolf suggests lowering barriers to nonmilitary exports by NATO members to the United States. Commercial sales to the United States would be used to balance defense sales to Europe. He identifies certain fields, such as electrical machinery, where European cost and supply might meet U.S. demands. The proposal includes three elements:

> 1. A "NATO-round" of trade liberalization to help create an environment in which standardization can proceed more effectively;
> 2. Encouragement of joint bidding by American and European firms on *defense* R&D and procurement contracting;
> 3. Removal of Buy American restrictions on U.S. government *non*-military, as well as, military procurement.[40]

The first, and major, part of the proposal is the most difficult to implement. Wolf himself identified time, legal obstacles, and the traditional disconnection between economics and defense as problem areas. Dr. LaBerge has identified a more serious flaw: diverting U.S. funds to the commercial market would destroy the financial base considered by the European defense industry to be critical for technology development and, ultimately, survival.[41] In the interest of fairness, the approach requires more emphasis on cooperation.

The Technology Exchange is somewhat less idealistic than the other two approaches. The flow of traffic on the two-way street would be primarily a flow of ideas and drawings. This can be done through licensing agreements. A 1977 study for the Department of Defense examined licensing of production as a means toward greater cooperation and standardization. The study concluded that it was "a primary and workable mechanism for increasing interoperability or standardization."[42] It is working now: the U.S. production of the Franco-German Roland and European production of the F-16 are the most obvious examples. Flexibility of action is retained, and both sides can maintain their labor and technology bases, assuming the existence of a cooperative environment.[43] The study on licensing recognized hurdles, such as technology transfer and economic issues, and it identified some administrative steps by which the Department of Defense could "facilitate greater use of licensing."[44] However, this approach has no overall framework for the greater emphasis in the future.

NATO Defense Cooperation Act

The appropriate initiative to build the framework could take several forms. Defense studies of groups of potential cooperative projects, presidential pronouncements, or more congressional hearings on standardization are possibilities. But since foreign policy is a joint responsibility of the executive and legislative branches, the two branches should act together to send an unmistakable message through passage of a NATO Defense Cooperation Act. This act would consolidate legislation related to NATO standardization and provide the framework for working with NATO partners in cooperative development, production, and logistics programs.

Besides expressing the U.S. commitment, the proposed act would help to fill a void in existing legislation. Section 1 of the Arms Export Control Act states:

> . . . it remains the policy of the United States to facilitate the common defense by entering into international arrangements with friendly countries which further the objective of applying agreed resources of each country to programs and projects of cooperative exchange of data, research, development, production, procurement, and logistics support to achieve specific national defense requirements and objectives of mutual concern.[45]

Despite the lofty policy statement, the Arms Export Control Act only authorizes sales; it is silent on cooperative effort.

The NATO Defense Cooperation Act would address the other areas in five chapters: policy, development and procurement, logistics and support, review and approval, and general provisions.

The first chapter would restate U.S. policy and consolidate in one place the concepts expressed in the Arms Export Control Act and the various authorization acts discussed earlier. This chapter would also address the special relationship between the United States and NATO; this relationship serves as a basis for the unique procedures in the act and exceptions to other law. It would cover such thorny areas as third-country exports of coproduced items. (Because of overcapacity in production, the Europeans rely heavily on exports. Restrictions on such exports would benefit intra-European cooperation at the expense of the United States.)[46] This chapter could also spell out preferences for various approaches, such as multinational programs versus international consortiums bidding on national programs. Finally, it would assign responsibilities for implementation and describe the relationship of the act to the Arms Export Control Act.

Chapter Two, "Cooperative Development and Procurement," would outline the framework for cooperative efforts. It would authorize bilateral or multilateral arrangements in a format appropriate to the type of agreement and cover payment and credit terms. Because of the variety of possibilities, no single form would be prescribed, but there would be established principles that would apply either to allied efforts in the United States or to U.S. efforts overseas. The key to this chapter is that it would reinforce the theme of cooperation.

According to Dr. LaBerge, "Europeans complain that U.S. Foreign Military Sales regulations frequently cause disagreeable working relationships."[47] They prefer to be treated as partners rather than customers. One major bone of contention is the administrative charge of three percent levied on most sales to cover estimated costs of administering the programs. By agreement, the surcharge was not applied to certain NATO countries with whom the United States had substantial cooperative efforts. But, in 1976, the Congress made "an appropriate charge for administrative services" mandatory on all sales. By prohibiting surcharges or administrative charges except as agreed on in NATO STANAGs, and by establishing workable concepts for joint efforts in Europe and the United States, this chapter could go a long way toward demonstrating U.S. commitment to true cooperation.

The next chapter would contain provisions relating to logistics and support. It would address overseas procurement of supplies and services for U.S. forces in NATO countries and cross-servicing of NATO units.

The fourth chapter would provide for appropriate congressional review and approval of specific programs, perhaps using dollar thresholds similar to those now in the Arms Export Control Act. The current thresholds of $7 million for major defense equipment and $25 million for defense articles and services could be increased to $25 and $50 million respectively for NATO or NATO countries. Congress would still receive annual reports listing all programs exceeding $1 million and could continue to receive the annual standardization progress reports from the Secretary of Defense.

The fifth and last chapter is perhaps the most important chapter in the proposed act. In addition to administrative sections dealing with the effective date and definitions, this chapter would repeal or amend conflicting legislation. The legislation falls into several categories. In the first category are the various NATO policy statements that would be superseded by Chapter 1 of the NATO Defense Cooperation Act. In the second category are those provisions of law that should be repealed to provide a consistent policy on NATO cooperation. These, for example, include the constraints on foreign

research and development contracts and the prohibition on the purchase of foreign buses.[48] The last category includes all the laws that must be amended to exempt NATO, such as the Buy American Act, the annual procurement and specialty metals restrictions, and the Arms Export Control Act, as it relates to foreign military sales. This final chapter is the capstone of the act.

When it is passed, the NATO Defense Cooperation Act will serve two purposes. It will focus the attention of the President and Congress on the entire NATO standardization question, rather than on pieces of it. And it will signal our NATO partners that the United States is firmly committed to a two-way flow of traffic on the transatlantic highway.

Air Command and Staff College

Notes

1. General David C. Jones made this remark during a visit to Air University (ATC), Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in January 1978.
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3. *NATO Facts and Figures*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Information Service, 1976, p. 27.
4. U.S., Department of Defense, *Rationalization/Standardization within NATO: A Report to the U.S. Congress by the Secretary of Defense*, 31 January 1976, pp. 49-50.
5. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *NATO Standardization: Political, Economic, and Military Issues for Congress*, prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Committee Print (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 11-12.
6. *Rationalization/Standardization*, 1976, p. 51; U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "The Federal Republic of Germany the Seventh Nation to Join NATO Sea Sparrow Project," News Release 61-77, 15 February 1977.
7. U.S., Congress, Senate, "NATO and the New Soviet Threat," *Congressional Record*, vol. 123, 25 January 1977, p. S1417.
8. Thomas A. Callaghan, *U.S./European Economic Cooperation in Military and Civilian Technology*, revised edition (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), p. 35.
9. Joseph Luns, Secretary General of NATO, quoted by Keith Williams, "20th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly," *NATO Review*, February 1975, p. 21.
10. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Peter Hill-Norton, "NATO in 1975: The Military Issues at Stake," *NATO Review*, April 1975, p. 11.
11. Callaghan, *U.S./European Cooperation*, p. 37.
12. Elliot R. Goodman, "The Puzzle of European Defense: The Issue of Arms Procurement," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Winter 1976/1977, p. 479.
13. "Eurogroup Communique," *NATO Review*, June 1975, p. 31.
14. "Defense Planning Committee Communique," *NATO Review*, June 1975, p. 28.
15. U.S., President, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 5 June 1975, p. 576.
16. "North Atlantic Council Final Communique," *NATO Review*, June 1977, p. 20.
17. Luciano Radi, "A European Initiative for Cooperation in the Armaments Field," *NATO Review*, June 1977, pp. 8-9.
18. *Legislation*, vol. II, pp. 18-19. (Public Law 93-365, Sec. 802).
19. *Legislation*, vol. II, pp. 16-17. (Public Law 94-361, Sec. 802).
20. *Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1978*, Public Law 95-111, Sec. 823. (91 Stat. 904).
21. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *European Defense Cooperation, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Research and Development and the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, pp. 165-66.
22. U.S., Department of Defense, *Planning and Programming Guidance (U)* (Secret), 11 March 1977, p. III-26.
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25. Harold Brown, "To Strengthen the American Alliance: The Better Training and Equipment in NATO Forces," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 15 June 1977, p. 525.
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30. U.S., Department of Defense, *Rationalization/Standardization within NATO: A Report to the U.S. Congress by the Secretary of Defense (U)* (Secret), 18 January 1977, p. 66.
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38. Edward H. Kolcum, "Fighter Effort Tests Collaboration Effort," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 2 May 1977, p. 44.
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40. Charles Wolf, Jr., *"Offsets," Standardization, and Trade Liberalization in NATO*, Paper P-5779 (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1976), p. vi.
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42. Robert A. Gessert et al., *NATO Standardization and Licensing Policy—Exploratory Phase*, vol. I (McLean, Virginia: General Research Corp., 1976), p. 27.
43. LaBerge, p. 6.
44. Gessert, p. 31.
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46. Brownlow, p. 12.
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MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

CAPTAIN JAMES S. SEEVERS

THE changing officer evaluation system used by the United States Air Force has been the cause of much discussion, criticism, and frustration. This article is a proposal to apply proven management techniques to any formal evaluation program and increase employee motivation while improving the appraisal process. It is a review of one of the widely used, and also widely misused, concepts—management by objectives (MBO).

Behavior science studies have long emphasized the need for objective feedback in terms of constructive criticism and justified praise. Too frequently, individuals have been counseled about their performance following formal reporting periods, and then only superficially. In order to meet the challenges that come with a management position, a supervisor must be constantly aware of the performance and potential of his people and genuinely concerned about their professional development. Proven techniques and management concepts can assist today's Air Force manager in meeting these challenges, among them MBO.

management by objectives

The management by objectives concept, although a basic technique, has many interpre-

tations. The application of this technique often succeeds or fails because of these interpretations. As a basic review of MBO, George S. Odiorne, director of the Bureau of Industrial Relations at the University of Michigan, provides the following definition:

> . . . the system of management by objectives can be described as a process whereby the superior and subordinate managers of an organization jointly identify its common goals, define each individual's major areas of responsibility in terms of the results expected of him, and use these measures as guides for operating the unit and assessing the contribution of each of its members.[1]

Management by objectives is not a new technique. It was introduced as a supplementary management tool by Alfred Sloan in the early 1950s; however, Peter Drucker is credited with making it a central management concept in his classic management book, *The Practice of Management*, in 1954.[2]

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, MBO seemed to emerge as the dominant tool for organizational management. But many applications met with failure. The concept was challenged, and many cast it aside as a theoretical idea that could not be applied in practical situations. The causes of failure were in the implementation; they were not inherent in the basic procedure.

One of the primary causes of failure was the inability to separate objectives from good intentions. Drucker states, "We can't start talking objectives until we know what they are. The things we desire are not objectives. . . . When you do not figure out the real objectives, you substitute procedure for thinking."[3] Drucker also adds, "Management by objectives works if you know the objectives. Ninety percent of the time you don't."[4] Confusion results from replacing objectives with other organizational desires, such as values, policies, programs, and tasks.

Criticism of the MBO process often points to the presumed infallibility of the objectives. Managers tend to forget that objectives are often established without sufficient information and may become invalid due to increased knowledge or changes in external factors. Objectives must be specifically defined to be used as the criteria with which to measure progress. Nevertheless, they must be flexible enough to respond to changing conditions. In his book, *Muddling Through*, Roger Golde supports this observation:

> The very term "objective" acts to reinforce the set of false expectations and feelings of inadequacy. "Objective" implies something independent of the mind—something "real" or "actual," the very opposite of "subjective." We talk as if we are managed and controlled *by* these concrete things called objectives. Nonsense! We do not serve objectives, it is they that serve us. It is we who are in charge; it is management that creates and controls objectives, not the other way around. When progress toward an objective is checked along the way, unfavorable results are just as likely to indicate *a need to modify the objective* as to alter the type of actions being taken.[5]

Unfavorable results, whether because of poor objectives or improper action, often result from a lack of understanding by the people involved. In commenting on the need for communication in today's highly educated military organization, Captain James M. Grant warns, "Introducing MBO without first educating people to the concept of participative management is to ensure the failure of the program."[6]

Literature and seminars on delegation, MBO, and participative management repeat over and over again the following statements concerning objectives: (1) Objectives should be specific; (2) objectives should be complete, fully specifying what is desired; (3) objectives represent "ends"; they should be separated and distinguished from "means" for attaining the objectives; and (4) objectives should be stated in terms that permit measurement of progress toward them.[7]

In addition to these mechanics of the MBO process, the manager must be thoroughly aware of another, and perhaps more critical, factor in the success of the measurement process. That factor is the effect on individual

behavior and attitudes of such a strong emphasis on results. This emphasis is the main selling point of MBO; however, to certain types of employees, it may seem extremely threatening. Lieutenant Colonel Darryl Freed points out that even in an atmosphere of trust and confidence, employees who are extremely insecure, who have retired on the job, or who have focused their energies in a different direction, may perceive MBO as a threatening technique.[8]

This threat should be countered with education and communication. Once proper objectives have been established and an atmosphere of participation and cooperation has been created, MBO is well on the road to success. There are, however, other roadblocks that may occur during the process. Thomas P. Kleber cites several additional reasons why this technique has failed in the past. Probably one of the most significant causes cited is the lack of effective feedback.[9] Feedback is the central theme of this article, since it is the bridge that connects task-oriented management by objectives and appraisal by results.

feedback and communication

Feedback and communication, the central arteries of any organizational life system, are critical in the MBO process. Management by objectives is based on clarity of communication, and a successful manager dedicates his time to reinforce the multidirectional communication flow. As one of the fundamental steps in the MBO process, Freed cites a mutually arranged system of feedback to both manager and employee on employee progress.[10]

Scott Myers used the following illustration to emphasize the need for a system of feedback:

> Suppose you were to be in a bowling competition, with a $100 prize to the one with the highest score. To make things interesting, a curtain is halfway down the alley so that the bowlers can't see the pins or the scoreboard. The experiment shows that an adult can bowl for about three frames but then becomes frustrated in not knowing how he is doing. And yet, every day in organization life, people roll the ball and knock down the pins, but do not get any feedback.[11]

Satisfactory and timely feedback is a shared responsibility. It calls for managerial alertness as well as employee interest. Marion Kellogg adds, "For best results, it should be focused on a specific incident or incidents. . . . The point is to make the giving and receiving of feedback a useful, interesting experience for all involved rather than a here-we-go-again event."[12]

As an analogy, it is interesting to review the repetitive steps in the adult learning process: (1) the gathering of information, (2) the application of the information, and (3) feedback concerning the success of the application. Translating these steps into the work environment, managers' decisions about employee improvements represent learning goals. According to Kellogg, the manager's tasks in this situation include finding ways to: (1) move the employee to commit himself, (2) give the employee the information he needs in order to make the change or improvement, (3) provide him with opportunities to apply the information, and (4) give him timely and useful feedback for each successive try.[13]

the evaluation process

The development of human capabilities usually includes a formal evaluation process; however, the manager is teaching his subordinates as well as grading them. "The management that emphasizes grading and discipline without thought to the growth and development of its personnel may be a decaying management."[14]

Unfortunately, the evaluation process is often considered an end rather than a means for development. Managers must recognize that appraisal is a subjective judgment made on incomplete information. This judgment can be sharpened, however, by narrowing the scope

of information reviewed. Irrelevant information can only make the evaluation process more difficult and have an adverse effect on the final report. The manager must also become involved in the evaluation process long before the formal performance report is due. Well in advance, he must share with the individual employee the reason for appraisal and the characteristics or objectives on which the evaluation will be based.

Too often, managers get caught in the popularity trap. In order to maintain employee loyalty, they feel they must avoid criticism by limiting verbal communication to favorable comments and save unfavorable appraisals for written, and often confidential, reports. If the boss really wants to be kind, what he tells any employee will be consistent with the written record, and both will be honest, fair, direct, and objective.

Direct verbal feedback must be tempered, however, with understanding of individual personalities and needs. Many organizational problems stem from management's inability to cope with different kinds of people, and from its failure to realize the complexities of employee motivation. Golde points out that many people say they want feedback, when what they really want is "favorable" feedback.[15] Managers must emphasize the value of constructive criticism as well as favorable feedback. Feedback, favorable or otherwise, satisfies a dual purpose: evaluation and motivation. "Because management is receptive to information input and feelings, members of the team are motivated to contribute their knowledge and their suggestions. This communication is further enhanced by management giving feedback to employees on a regular basis."[16]

Performance appraisal and the feedback resulting from it should not be considered a chore but an opportunity to expand mutual understanding and increase employee effectiveness. One method of accomplishing these goals is to apply the concepts of MBO.

appraisal by objectives

Appraisal by objectives, the application of MBO techniques to performance appraisal, is not a new concept. This method of personnel evaluation followed closely after Drucker's introduction of MBO. The definition offered by Theos A. Langlie in the *Encyclopedia of Management* shows the similarity of this approach to the processes previously discussed:

> . . . the preparation by the subordinate appraisee of written statements covering his understanding of the objectives of (a) his superior's job; (b) his own job; (c) the proper criteria of performance from his viewpoint; (d) the situation, including problems to be overcome; and (e) his plan of action to accomplish the objectives. This report is discussed with the supervisor for purposes of communication, analysis, modification or approval, and appraisal.[17]

The development, application, and results of this technique and MBO are so similar that most articles on MBO would need only be modified to refer to the individual instead of the task and the discussion would remain valid. The objectives of the individual are a function of the objectives of the larger unit of which he is a part; therefore, personal development should be a major part in any MBO program. But appraisal by objectives can also be applied independent of task-oriented MBO.

MANY of the benefits of each technique are the same. Mark Silber and V. Sherman comment on the integration of organization and employee goals:

> Organization élan, the spirit of achievement, is based on the integration of organization and employee goals—that is, a congruence between the organization's objectives and the individual interests and talents. Such a congruence engenders a closer identification of the employee with the system. A climate of achievement is also generated by mutual trust and goal setting between the employee and his immediate manager.[18]

The climate of achievement, like organizational morale, is not a factor that is easily measured, but the resulting productivity and efficiency are readily identified.

As with MBO, a successful program with the communication necessary to achieve desired results requires commitment and dedication. In order for the manager to communicate his expectations effectively, he must invest the time required to learn the perceptions, work values, and objectives of his employees. Through this knowledge, the manager can achieve desired results in productivity by achieving what Drucker terms "worker-responsibility." "Indeed, one of the major contributions of management by objectives is that it enables us to substitute management by self-control for management by domination."[19]

Communication and feedback take many forms in an organization. Informal feedback is just as critical as the formal evaluation process. Kellogg states, ". . . the single most important contribution to excellent performance lies in the informal, day-to-day interaction between an employee and his manager."[20] Silber and Sherman support the need for communication as follows:

> Both the organization and the individual require vehicles for accurate and relevant performance feedback. Toward those ends, an organization should devote time and care to monitoring its performance feedback loops. Otherwise everyone operates in a void—an organizational fog.[21]

It would be repetitive to review many of the determinants of success or causes of failure for the appraisal by objectives technique since they are the same as those discussed during the review of MBO. Langlie provides an excellent discussion of the chain reaction that can occur when a program of appraisal by objectives is implemented without adequate preparation.

> If the planning is unrealistic, the implementation will be disappointing, and the appraisal may then be inadequately descriptive of the employee's qualities. Nevertheless, this approach is not only sound for appraisal purposes, it is or should be a standard operating procedure in fulfilling the management functions of planning, leading, and measuring.[22]

Does this chain reaction occur in the Air Force community? If so, it is certainly not because of a lack of knowledge concerning the functions and principles of management.

MBO is not foreign to Air Force managers. From initial professional military education through senior service schools, the need for clearly defined objectives and adequate communication is repeatedly emphasized. Lessons learned in the academic environment, however, seem soon forgotten.

The management by objectives appraisal technique is not a panacea for all the problems of the Air Force performance evaluation system. It is, however, a tool to enhance the manager's effectiveness and increase objectivity in the evaluation process.

It is time to look beyond the evaluation paperwork and examine the application of the system and procedures used.

Offutt AFB, Nebraska

Notes

1. John J. Tarrant, *Drucker: The Man Who Invented the Corporate Society* (Boston: Cahners Books, Inc., 1976), p. 78.
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3. Ibid., p. 82.
4. Ibid., p. 257.
5. Roger A. Golde, *Muddling Through: The Art of Properly Unbusinesslike Management* (New York: AMACOM, 1976), pp. 71-72.
6. AFRP 11-1, *TIG Brief*, 19 November 1976, p. 4.
7. Golde, p. 59.
8. Air Command and Staff College, Course 1B, Lesson 5, *Managerial Techniques* (Air University: Extension Course Institute, 1974), p. 34.
9. Ibid., p. 31.
10. Ibid.
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12. Marion S. Kellogg, *What to Do about Performance Appraisal* (New York: AMACOM, 1975), p. 35.
13. Ibid., p. 45.
14. Silber and Sherman, p. 100.
15. Golde, p. 47.
16. Silber and Sherman, pp. 84-85.
17. Carl Heyel, editor, "Performance Appraisal (Merit Rating)," *Encyclopedia of Management* (New York: AMACOM, 1975), p. 693.
18. Silber and Sherman, p. 46.
19. Peter F. Drucker, *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 440.
20. Kellogg, p. 34.
21. Silber and Sherman, p. 44.
22. Heyel, pp. 699-700.



"YOU *WILL* IMPLEMENT MBO!"

and other reasons the program has not worked in the military

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
PHILIP J. PERLES, USA

I mean to insure that in each of the various Federal Programs objectives are achieved.

JOHN F. KENNEDY, 1963

IN 1977, a representative group of 251 lieutenant colonels and colonels from all services were surveyed to determine their experiences in management by objectives (MBO) and their opinions regarding the effectiveness of the MBO concept.[1] At the time of the survey, the officers were on active duty, and all of them responded openly to the questions posed in the survey. The officers were asked first to describe their experiences with MBO techniques. Of this group, 137 had prior experience in MBO programs, and the 114 remaining had had no MBO experience. Those with prior MBO experience were asked to describe their best and worst MBO experiences and to comment generally on the overall value of the programs. Officers with no prior MBO experiences were asked to express theoretical opinions regarding the value of goal-oriented programs.

Fifty-two (or 46 percent) of the 114 officers *without* MBO experience felt that MBO strategies theoretically represent sound man-

agement practice. Sixty-two (or 54 percent) expressed the opposite judgment for two significant reasons: that such approaches cannot work effectively because of the rank structure, perceived role of the leader, and top-level support; and that MBO approaches are unworkable because of the military way of doing business—uncontrollable variables, such as rapid personnel turnover, crisis management, and time constraints.

How do these theoretical assessments compare with the opinions of the 137 officers *with* MBO experience? A dismal 8 (or 6 percent) unequivocally supported this management strategy, and 43 (or 31 percent) found the experience of little or no value. One can argue that the remaining 86 (or 63 percent) also fall into this category except that these officers qualified their statements with the hedge that "the techniques failed, but might have succeeded if. . . ."

These officers' best and worst experiences with MBO provide still another interesting excursion. Almost unanimously the descriptions of the best experiences cited the opportunity to define objectives more clearly because of more open communication and formal statements of organizational goals. One should note that many officers took a negative, rather venomous approach to this particular question (e.g., "There *was* no best experience!").

The responses regarding worst experiences read like a who's who of Dale D. McConkey's "20 Ways to Kill Management by Objectives."[2] Variations of poor implementation top the list. Such experiences as excessive paperwork, unrealistic goals, poor follow-up, and lack of top-level involvement were mentioned no fewer than 74 times. The perception that MBO programs are no more than exercises in paper shuffling was expressed 17 times. The question of whether such programs are even workable in a military environment because of rapid changes in personnel, crisis management, and basic inflexibility arose 19 times. While it might be argued that these same officers were responsible for the failure of the programs, it nonetheless bears out, to some extent, the fears of those officers who had only speculated on the potential dangers of such programs.

SUCH empirical data support the observation that, except in isolated instances, MBO in the military community is anything but a raging success. Why? Certainly, this popular management tool contains all of the elements necessary to improve the effectiveness of any organization—participation, support, communication, clear goals, and job satisfaction; they are bywords of success in any arena. But the basic question is: Can and should MBO be made to work in the military environment?

There can be little disagreement that military organizations have always depended on objectives. Objectives are the catalysts for choosing tomorrow's chores and drawing up next year's budget requests. They provide continuity, put all members of the organization on the same track, and provide an excellent medium for transition in a time of ever-increasing personnel turnovers. When one recognizes that the military consists not of whipping boys and mindless sheep but of people with individual needs and motivations, the direction of an organization through a participative, self-actualizing approach appears to represent a sound policy. In fact, one can argue that systematic goal setting is the very essence of an effective organization. Indeed, the hit-or-miss alternative to establishing objectives is an extremely unpalatable choice. Can an institution even survive without a clear understanding of its goals? It seems that the military, with its diminishing resources, expanding missions, and loving attention to such planning matrices as the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) and zero base budgeting (ZBB), would seize on the industry-proven tool of management by objectives. But such has not been the case.

Apparently three major classes of problems work against the successful operation of MBO in a military environment. First, there are universal dangers inherent in any MBO effort within the public or private sector. Second, serious problems arise in implementing the concept of MBO in the public sector. Finally, MBO presents a special class of problems in the unique atmosphere surrounding the military.

universal dangers

Regardless of the environment, most MBO programs share several weaknesses. First, top-level managers, as a rule, are not equipped for the multiple roles necessitated by an MBO program. Today, the average supervisor in a fighter squadron or a branch of the IBM Corporation does not customarily administer discipline at one moment and then enter a conciliatory atmosphere of contract negotiation at the next moment. On the other hand, subordinates customarily perform their jobs according to the requirements of their supervisors. True, most subordinates can be reoriented, but there is little doubt that this is the general atmosphere pervading contemporary superior-subordinate relations.

A second universal imbalance lies in the manner of making the decision to implement an MBO program. This decision is basic to everything that follows, and it is certainly not participative! Contracts and other alien techniques that comprise an MBO program seem inconsistent with this ominous beginning. A new management technique is announced, followed by a four-hour mandatory training session, and, just that quickly, one is engulfed in a new way of doing business. Here again, a little thought and a fair degree of finesse can eliminate these problems of implementation. However, as noted earlier 74 officers experienced in MBO cited poor implementation as a major weakness in MBO programs.

Finally, cohesion obviously cannot be dictated. In some extraordinary but temporary circumstances, even the most disheartened and poorly disciplined subordinates will group together to "take that hill" or to meet a deadline. Over the long-term, however, the conditions of the organization must be conducive to such an atmosphere of mutual cooperation.

problems in the public sector

Much has been written about the MBO approach in the public sector. These writings suggest all of the usual do's and don'ts, as well as a host of rules for dealing with the unique arena of the public servant. However, I have no knowledge of outstanding success stories of any scope anywhere in the federal government.[3] This perception is enhanced when one perceives MBO in such classical terms as joint identification of objectives, mutual support, and participative methods. The *Air Force Personnel Plan* (AFPP), for example, uses an excellent listing of milestones, systematically reviewed by the Executive Council and purportedly operating with the full support of the elite of the Air Staff.

I do not share John W. Gardner's strong indictment of public servants, when as Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, he said: "When you figure out how to hold a middle level bureaucrat accountable, it'll be comparable to landing on the moon." Middle level bureaucrats are a more responsive group than that described by Mr. Gardner. However, his statement does encourage thought on the nature of the public servant, his security needs, his motivation, and even his competence in some instances. Indeed, these factors contribute to the failure of MBO programs in the federal sector.

In a superb article written for *MSU Business Topics*, Edward J. Ryan, Jr., a faculty member at Nichols College, points out some of the defects of MBO in the public sector.[4] This article summarizes a previous study of 71 high-level government officials in the Internal

Revenue Service, the Civil Service Commission, the Department of Justice, and similar organizations. Since he conducted the study two years after these agencies implemented MBO, Dr. Ryan recognizes that his conclusions may be premature, but I do not believe that time will alter his findings.

The conclusions of the study suggest a drastic failure of MBO where it has been implemented in federal agencies. It strongly implies, for example, that highly placed officials consider MBO as nothing more than semantics and faddism—another name for the planning-programming-budgeting system. They also express resentment that MBO has been forced on their departments by presidential edict in a manner that leaves implementation open to broad interpretation. Perhaps their most important reservation lies in their attitudes about the permanence of the programs. There was widespread feeling that the MBO will evaporate as soon as the brains and brawn behind the program in the Office of Management and Budget move on. In retrospect, their hesitation to embrace the MBO initiative seems justified. Thus far, President Carter has said nothing about MBO; he prefers instead to emphasize ZBB as a way of life.

Dr. Ryan identifies rapid turnover, statutory requirements, organizational rigidity, ineffective reward systems, and poor accountability as factors that retard MBO as an effective management tool in the federal sector. Of these factors, I consider rapid turnover of presidential appointees and the ineffective federal employee reward system as particularly critical.

Incentives in the private sector for solid, long-term organizational improvements are much more effective than is the appointment system in the federal sector. A new secretary or agency chief is an extension of the person who appoints him. In practical terms, his charter is to direct his organization in a way that most politically favors the position of his employer. The system thus becomes conducive to short-term, politically motivated objectives rather than broadly based management improvements. And to compound this problem, the short tenure of appointees works against the establishment of innovative or controversial objectives.

Professor Richard Rose of the University of Strathclyde in Scotland has, for several years, conducted research on the relationship of the White House with various executive agencies. Professor Rose concludes that the prospects for strengthening MBO within the federal government are dim.[5] He cites the statutory nature of objectives, division of power between the executive and the legislative branches, and lack of personal or political incentive to become concerned with management reform.

A second critical problem in successfully implementing MBO in the public sector is the problem of an ineffective reward system in relation to MBO programs. There are simply no incentive awards to encourage the MBO process to work. Rank and file public servants are more secure in their jobs than their counterparts in industry. Their pay will scarcely be affected by anything accomplished in terms of innovative management processes. They are content to do the best job of which they are capable and to follow the directions established by their supervisors. This is not necessarily wrong, and it certainly is not intended as criticism of public servants. Indeed, everyone has known a few public servants who have retired on the job and who would not be amenable to change of any sort, but these individuals are very much the exception. I refer primarily to those dedicated but compartmented public servants for whom MBO, organizational effectiveness, job enrichment, and the like hold little opportunity for personal reward.

Dr. Ryan draws some rather strong conclusions concerning MBO in the federal government.[6] He suggests that:

- Federal participation in MBO has been overpraised and oversold;

- A wide gap exists between prescribed programs and programs actually in effect;
- Despite White House pressure, federal agencies simply have not seriously pursued MBO nor accepted it when implementation was directed; and
- Widespread acceptance of MBO at the federal level is not likely.

problems unique to the military

> Leadership remains the essential skill of the tactical military commander. . . . there is no way to *manage* a . . . battalion up a hill in a fire fight.[7]

One often hears the statement that the military is an institution rather than an occupation. Thus, military professionals may be justly proud of their unique sense of commitment, special traditions, wartime heroics, and unswerving loyalties to the mission and to superiors in the chain of command. However commendable these traditional attributes, they run counter to a program of management by objectives, particularly when they are added to the problems already discussed. The authoritarian personality, the formal nature of the rank structure, and the trend toward centralized control present barriers of such formidable proportions that they destroy any practical hope for a successful MBO program in the military environment.

The authoritarian personality. The cigar-chomping, desk-pounding colonel is alive and well! He retains command of broad functional areas; his subordinates generally admire him, but they .are terrorized in his presence; he makes seat-of-the pants judgments, and he suboptimizes within the particular segment of the organization he serves. For example, if one asks a senior-level Marine about his MBO program, he will forcefully state that his charter is to fight and that he takes management into consideration only insofar as it conforms to his objective of achieving victory over the enemy.

This person has been described in kinder terms as one who is high in authoritarianism and low in the need for independence, who does not respond well to job enrichment or participation in the planning function, and who neither functions nor feels better in such an environment.[8] I suggest that this individual represents the most serious threat to the implementation of MBO in the military. A brief scenario should illustrate this point: a military manager reluctantly agrees when he is ordered to cooperate in an MBO program. His immediate reaction, perhaps unconsciously, is to subvert the program. Having earned a reputation as a task-oriented authoritarian, he demands a fully cooperative team effort from his staff and at the same time admonishes them not to be concerned about disciplinary measures if they fail to meet stated objectives. Business continues as usual until the quarterly review of progress, which is conducted in a manner that has variously been described as the pink-slip technique and the brass-knuckles approach to management. Although this scenario may stretch the real world just a bit, such an atmosphere is prevalent in the modern military community. It results not in harmony but, rather, in what Harry Levinson describes as intense hostility, resentment, and distrust between managers and their subordinates.[9]

In addition to creating such a climate, our military manager frequently adopts a technique that outwardly supports MBO, but, in fact, is one in which he relinquishes none of his authority. By this ploy, he simply chooses a subordinate to assume the full administrative burden of the program. The manager's responsibilities thus take the form of admonitions to his staff to cooperate and periodic glances at the paperwork stemming from the program as he anticipates his own higher level review. Either way, this common type of military manager ensures that the MBO program cannot succeed.

The formal structure. Closely related to the problem of achieving a proper MBO climate are the psychological effects of the formal military structure on the environment for

participative management. Such an environment is incompatible with the godlike image encouraged in senior military officers, personality-centered effectiveness appraisals, formal decision briefings, and emphasis on physical standards and their effect on performance. One may argue that such phenomena have no relationship to the methodology used to manage an organization. I submit that they are so closely interwoven that they render any truly participative program unworkable. However tough the MBO philosophy, it remains totally different from traditional military philosophy. Primary concern with satisfying the manager in such an environment overshadows any unbiased action to formulate and accomplish commonly established objectives. I emphasize that I am neither criticizing the structure nor advocating change. I submit that we must stop deluding ourselves into thinking that we can engage in MBO while we reinforce the structure just described.

A third category of problems that militate against the successful adoption of MBO in a military environment relates to the trend away from autonomy and toward centralized control of even the most critical decisions. MBO implies that participative involvement will allow for immediate, on-the-spot decision-making to handle a given crisis, but such a methodology opposes the existing chain of command premise in the military. The growing library of regulations, codes, and similar directives has reduced the role of commanders at all levels. The effect of this trend on management participation at lower levels is to render such techniques a myth. Institutional objectives and procedures determined at the top leave little room for flexibility at the working levels.

THE combined effects of the dangers common to most MBO programs plus the unique problems in the public sector and further complicated by the military style of management are indeed discouraging. The question is whether the results are worth the expenditure of measurable and unmeasurable resources. From the practical standpoint, there is a preponderance of evidence against such a program in the military. The few organizations that have achieved success in MBO probably had the least need for such techniques. The vast majority of DOD organizations with ongoing MBO programs are achieving far less than their resource outlays justify.

The message of this article is not complicated. With few exceptions, military managers must change their way of thinking and behaving for MBO to be a success. Such changes cannot be legislated. The military, therefore, must be content with letting MBO be used where it fits the personalities of the people involved and discontinue immediately the practice of forcing it on other, less receptive persons. Humanistic programs will never come about by top-level decree.

University of California
Davis, California

Notes

1. At the request of the survey team, I cannot specifically identify the group surveyed. I recognize that the survey is not statistically valid because of the limited number of people surveyed. I feel, however, that the views expressed are representative of the population in question.

2. *Management Review*, October 1972, pp. 4-13.

3. The apparent success of the program at the Contract Management Division (CMD), Air Force Systems Command, might be considered one exception. At CMD, staying power appears to have overcome resistance, and their effort is described in glowing terms in some circles.

4. Edward J. Ryan, Jr., "Federal Government MBO: Another Managerial Fad?" *MSU Business Topics*, Autumn 1978, pp. 35-43.

5. For an excellent treatment of MBO implementation in the federal government and current trends see Richard Rose, "Implementation and Evaporation: The Record of MBO," *Public Administration Review*, January/February 1977, pp. 64-71.

6. Ryan, pp. 42-43.

7. Andrew P. O'Meara, Jr., "Who Commands Today's Army? Managers or Leaders?" *Army*, August 1975, p. 16. Emphasis added.

8. Victor Vroom, *Some Personality Determinants of the Effects of Participation* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960).

9. Harry Levinson, "Management by Whose Objectives?" *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 48, no. 4, 1970, pp. 125-34.



MBO AT THE MICRO LEVEL

a case study

CAPTAIN MICHAEL F. TURNER

MANAGEMENT by objectives (MBO) is traditionally used as a manager's tool to develop mutual goals with his subordinate managers in support of overall organizational goals. The boss and his subordinates participate in interviews to agree on performance goals that will achieve the objectives of the organization.

As an Air Force captain responsible for the unit administration section of a munitions maintenance squadron, I felt that an MBO program would produce results at the office workers' level.

The unit administration staff consisted of a master sergeant in charge of administration; a staff sergeant chief clerk; two senior airmen; an airman first class; and a basic airman. The morale and attitude of these six people seemed relatively low in July 1977, when I decided to implement an MBO program. The following problems influenced my decision to attempt management by objectives:

- Morale and enthusiasm for work were low.
- Goals were not clearly established.
- Statistics for administrative functions

were low for Airman Performance Reports (APRs), orientation of newcomers to the organization, hospital appointment scheduling and attendance, and paperwork accuracy.

- The clerks complained that the chief clerk was not communicating with them or taking the time to explain the work.
- Two clerks had been involuntarily discharged during the previous year.
- The clerks were limited in diversity of experience and work performed.
- Most of the major functions were either directly accomplished or closely monitored by a captain, master sergeant, and a staff sergeant.

Before implementing an MBO program, I realized that the clerks needed more than a goal-setting program. They needed jobs that were more stimulating and motivating. How, then, could these office jobs be improved?

Job enrichment, changing jobs to make them more meaningful and fulfilling, was the answer. A job is not enriched by merely changing the tasks or functions to be performed by the employee. I told the clerks that the following factors constitute an enriched job:

- A real change in the job, not just adding more tasks;
- complete responsibility for a job;
- training in the new area of responsibility;
- control and decision-making authority for the specific job area; and
- job results going directly to the employee as feedback.

Dr. Rensis Likert, in his book *Human Organization: Its Management and Value* and in published articles,[1] demonstrates the benefits of a participative group method of leadership for making decisions affecting employees. I agree with Likert that, where possible, employees should have a say-so in decisions affecting them. Since these clerks spent a third of their time on the job, it made sense to ask them what they would like to do on the job.

Asking the clerks *what* they wanted to do to enrich their jobs tied into the MBO approach of *what* goals they wanted to follow. Motivation and commitment are tied to a person's perception of making a personal, voluntary choice to follow a course of action.

As long as all of the office functions were somewhat equitably assigned, what difference would it make who did a job, so long as he was capable and motivated? Perhaps a lower-ranking clerk could do better a job that he wanted than could a higher-ranking NCO who did a job strictly from necessity. It was decided that interviews would be held to let clerks request the job responsibilities most meaningful to them.

A natural tie-in developed between MBO and job enrichment. A series of three interviews between supervisor and subordinates resulted in common goals plus an agreement on enriched job descriptions.

The key element in the program's success was the total involvement and commitment of all the clerks. I presented a short seminar on MBO and job enrichment. Then, the chief clerk interviewed his subordinates.

In the initial interview, the clerks expressed their job preferences from a list of administrative duties. In most instances, an individual requested some of his current duties but with more total responsibility for a job task. In addition, the chief clerk was surprised to find that nearly every clerk asked to assume more difficult and time-consuming responsibilities.

In the second interview, each supervisor and subordinate agreed on a job description and discussed possible goals. Here, job enrichment and MBO complemented each other. In every instance a clerk was given increased responsibility and new duties. Concurrently, goals were discussed by the individual and the supervisor that related to overall objectives.

I interviewed the master sergeant noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and found him somewhat at a loss because many of his former duties were to be assumed by the chief clerk and younger personnel. He suggest-

Continued on page 49

SURVIVAL IN THE MANAGEMENT JUNGLE

CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT C. P. WILKSON

Usually, by the time an enlisted man starts replacing his initial clothing issue, he has picked up a smattering of management techniques. By the time those cuffs start to fray, a few catch phrases have worked their way into his consciousness. Even after all the schools, these same phrases, like a shiny toy, are all that remain. Knowing you are a 9-9 supervisor or Maslow's hierarchy of needs may make you sleep better at night, but there is a possibility that neither will replace common sense.

Twenty-two years of scar tissue have given me my own rules. All of them were learned painfully; some like a bolt of lightning between the eyes, others after hours of laborious reasoning as to why I failed. I present them here in the hope they may stimulate some thought on our management techniques.

- Be true to yourself. During your Air Force experience you will be tempted to become cynical. Everyone fails at something and is congratulated or achieves a hard-won goal and is ignored. People often say one thing and do another. This is just human nature—the difference between people and machines. Accept it as such and press on.

- Listen. You will be doing more of this as a manager than any other single activity. Listen to what your boss says and do that, not what you think he or she should have said. Listen to your subordinates. They, too, have minds and something to offer. Nothing will lose loyalty to you faster than looking up after a subordinate has spilled heart and soul and muttering, "What did you say?" You are telling them they are not worth listening to.

- Be specific. If you are giving directions and want a specific goal, say so. Unless you have a Michelangelo on your staff, don't say "paint the ceiling" and be surprised by the result. On the other hand, if a subordinate gives you an idea, do one of three things: accept it, reject it, or ask for more time to think about it.

Noncommittal hums may get you out of an awkward situation but probably into one much worse. The well-placed grunt will be interpreted as a yes or no—as you will find to your surprise when your name is mentioned as a backer of a half-baked plan casually mentioned in the hallway.

- Accept defeat gracefully. Present your side of any situation forcefully, but once a decision has been made, embrace it. If you had the final say, your boss would not have been involved in the process. Nowhere in your contract with the government does the clause "except when I disagree" appear. If you continue to react negatively after a decision has been made, it will reflect in the work and attitude of your people. Your subsequent failure should be expected.

- Always assume that any task you give out will be done wrong. This is not being cynical. It is a way of ensuring that you avoid unpleasant surprises. Build feedback into every job you set, anything from coordinating on a draft to insisting on seeing the first of a finished product. This will reinforce two ideas in your subordinates: that you are interested in what they are doing and that you really want them to do it. Your routine checking will be accepted as just that, routine. It will not be resented as prying. A fallout benefit will be that you just might learn something new about the job.

- Do not take yourself too seriously. This way when someone punctures the balloon of your pomposity, the hiss will not be quite so loud.

Cannon AFB, New Mexico

ed that he also needed some job enrichment and volunteered to be unit career adviser. His request was granted. He also moved into a private office farther from the administrative section, to allow the chief clerk more direct responsibility for decisions.

The third and final interviews resulted in agreement on objectives or goals. By this time, the clerks had found ample opportunity to air complaints and make suggestions to a supervisor who had previously been "too busy to listen." They began to be more open with both supervisors and each other about positive approaches to improving attitudes and solving work-related problems.

One of the most noticeable changes of the program was the delegation of authority to the lower-ranking clerks. In nearly every instance, the job functions of the office were given to lower-ranking individuals. Table I illustrates the shift in duties after the job enrichment/MBO interviews.

By February 1978, the program had produced notable results. Because of the transfer of some of our personnel, we started the cycle all over again. To measure the results of the previous seven months (July 1977-February 1978), I will refer to statistics furnished by the base personnel office as well as comments of the clerks themselves.

Tables II and III depict the improvement made by the APR Monitor and the Individualized Newcomer Treatment and Orientation (INTRO) Monitor.

The APR statistics in Table II are especially significant, considering that in June 1977 there were 19 late APRs in the squadron. The senior airman who assumed responsibility for APRs set a goal to achieve "0" late and "0" incorrect reports by November 1977. She achieved the goal a month sooner.

The figures in Table III show a frustrating trend during the first five months. The clerk

Table I. Delegation of office jobs to lower levels

Duty	Before	After
telephone control monitor	Capt/MSgt	SSgt
meal card control monitors	MSgt/A1C	A1C
functional area documentation manager (shift made 6 months earlier)	Capt	MSgt
TDY orders clerk	SSgt	SrA/A1C
distribution clerk	SSgt	A1C
customer account representative	SSgt/Sgt	SrA
INTRO monitor	Sgt	Amn/A1C
file clerk	SrA	A1C
OER/APR monitor	MSgt	A1C
awards and decorations monitor	Capt	A1C
administration punish monitor	A1C	A1C
message OCR monitor	SSgt	A1C
leave clerk	Amn	Amn
security clerk	SSgt	Amn
commander's call arrangements	Capt	SSgt

month	submitted	late	incorrect
July 1977	24	4	1
August	29	1	4
September	55	0	2
October	34	0	0
November	20	0	0
December	23	0	1
January 1978	34	0	0

Table II. Airmen Performance Reports

Table III. Individualized Newcomer Treatment and Orientation (sponsor) program success

	requested sponsor		received sponsor kit and commander's letter		
	yes	no	yes	no	%
July 1977	6	1	3	4	57
August	14	2	8	8	50
September	23	0	6	17	26
October	22	3	11	14	44
November	15	1	8	8	50
December	10	4	12	2	86
January 1978	7	2	8	1	89
February	13	10	19	4	83

involved stated that newcomers were not receiving sponsor kits because they were arriving from Air Force technical schools before the unit received a request for a sponsor. He solved the problem by sending a package to the technical school as soon as assignment information was received from the Central Base Personnel Office.

The annual dental appointment no-show rate also improved. The no-show rate averaged 14 percent throughout 1977. Finally, because of an administrative change initiated by the Health Scheduling Monitor in our office, the no-show rate plummeted to 3 percent for the months of January and February 1978.

Other areas difficult to measure statistically also improved, including correspondence processing, typing accuracy, publication management, and office security practices.

However, the most beneficial results of the application of job enrichment and management by objectives techniques were the improved motivation and communication in the office. The administrative clerks who had previously complained about their supervisor's lack of communication with them made the following comments:

"Talking with supervisors increased and helped us understand what was expected of us."

"I could talk to my supervisor and you [administration officer] to tell where you were coming from."

"I didn't really like my job much until I got involved."

"Supervision was much better. Supervisors talked to you more—made you want to do better."

"Felt more recognition when my job was clearly defined; you could help others with their jobs. Others could see what I was doing."

"Morale and communication improved."

The following comments regarding goals were made:

"We stressed to reach goals—wanted to do a good job."

"Looked forward to getting feedback. I changed procedures in the INTRO program to help me reach my goal."

The implementation of the program required patience from supervisors to allow the clerks to overcome the initial lack of knowledge in their new jobs. However, this patience paid off as noted in the cited statistics and comments.

MANAGEMENT by objectives and job enrichment are not a panacea for problems in all office situations but applied together will likely improve communications, delegation of work, commitment, and participation. When office clerks participate in forming their own job descriptions and commit themselves to achieve objectives, the human element and production factors improve.

The attempt to apply the principles of MBO and job enrichment in the munitions maintenance squadron unit administrative section reaped obvious benefits. The results of our program lend support to modern management theories that emphasize group participation and communication.

In our experience, we found it desirable to start the job enrichment interviews and MBO program cycle over again after about seven months. Although changes provided more stimulating work for our clerks, the best timing for change will vary, depending on the organization. Whether in an office or other work setting, employees who participate in job enrichment and goal-setting will probably contribute more to organizational objectives.

Rhein-Main AB, Germany

Note

1. See "Management Styles and the Human Component," *Management Review*, October 1977, pp. 23-28, 43-45.

in my opinion

AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS

stone walls or stone bridges?

MAJOR RICHARD J. OLIVER

Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out.

ROBERT FROST "Mending Wall"

JAMES RESTON once wrote: "The conflict between the men who make and the men who report the news is as old as time." In ancient days, the bearer of bad tidings was often stoned to death. Nowadays, his descendant, the newsman, is more mercifully often merely "stonewalled." Undoubtedly, some newsmakers still yearn for the ancient rite.

The basic issue remains—whether to build stone walls or stone bridges; whether to obstruct the newsman or build avenues of communication. I propose that, for communication, stones are more productively used in bridges than in walls.

The stonewalling of newsmen, like any art form, is practiced in varying degrees and manners, and sometimes it even goes unrecog-

nized by the practitioner. Stonewalling can be applied with thoughtless ignorance or cunning intrigue. The most common form of stonewalling is the simple maneuver of delay, in the hope that a reporter will lose interest and his question die a quiet death. Derivative forms are the invalid denial of information and release of misinformation. While the "big lie" tactic itself is rare, its alter ego, the half-truth, is more prevalent; and thus the concepts of truthfulness and honesty often part company.

Official Air Force public affairs policy in responding to unclassified news media queries, both favorable and unfavorable, runs counter to the rites of stonewalling. This policy can be summarized as maximum disclosure with minimum delay. Often, however, the newsman who bears bad tidings in the form of a perceived unfavorable news query finds this policy reversed to minimum disclosure with maximum delay. By design or by default, the newsman is, in effect, stonewalled.

Many Air Force commanders, from squadron level to top echelon, perceive the need for communicating with newsmen but often show a predilection for modified bridges—modified so that the good news gets out and the bad news is not quite so available. Certainly, the Air Force is not the only practitioner of the art of stonewalling, but it does exist in the Air Force as well as elsewhere. For those who doubt it, ask local newsmen.

At the heart of this issue is not whether stonewalling exists but, rather, the answers to three key questions: Why does it exist? More important, why should it not exist? And most important, how can it be corrected? The purpose of this article, then, is to discuss this timeless trilogy. The target is current and prospective Air Force leaders and commanders, the critical players in the military-media relationship.

WHY does stonewalling exist? There are a number of reasons for resistance to full cooperation with the press, particularly when unfavorable publicity is anticipated as the product. These reasons can be categorized into two primary areas: fear of exposure and inexperience in dealing with the news media.

Fear of exposure covers such elements as exposure of mistakes, errors, scandals, misdeeds, accidents, and other potential embarrassments. Nobody likes to have his indiscretions aired in public.

Suppression of adverse news can also be motivated by an ill-conceived notion of protecting the Air Force image. The reasons can even range to more personal motives, such as fear of detrimental effect on promotion. As former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs William I. Greener, Jr., phrased it to Air War College students: "Too many generals have in the past lived by Socrates' observation, 'It is the mark of a good general to reveal the good and hide the bad'; rather than Alexander Hamilton's conclusion, 'It is a government of the people. They will govern best when given the facts.' "[1]

Granted, it is a rare individual who will admit a mistake or indiscretion, and even more rare is the person who will volunteer it before public exposure. Aside from whether one accepts truth as its own reward, there are more pragmatic reasons for cooperating with the media, even under adverse circumstances—real or imagined.

On his visits to Air University forums, Brigadier General H. J. Dalton, Jr., Director of the Air Force Office of Information, has reminded his audiences "While a commander may survive and recover from many unpleasant experiences in his career, from plane crashes to IG visits, he will rarely survive the mishandling of a public affairs crisis."[2] Often, however, it appears that commanders misinterpret the phrase "public affairs crisis"; they become more fearful of the "public affairs" than the "crisis." By responding to the wrong stimulus with stonewall tactics, they unwittingly produce a larger crisis. The point is, the crisis

itself is often not the problem but *how* the crisis is handled with the media. The public will generally allow for mistakes and even blunders, but they will rarely accept deceptions, half-truths, and cover-ups—or the appearance of same.

The second broad area of noncooperation with the news media relates to inexperience in how to deal with them. Most commanders rise to their positions from line jobs, where they have little interaction with the press; consequently, they are unversed in media relations. Such statements as "It's none of their business" and "They have no right to question me" are prime examples of this naïveté. Probably, General William T. Sherman reflected this attitude best in 1864 when he stated: "They are a set of dirty newspaper scribblers who are a pest and shall not approach me."

This inexperience is evidenced by commanders who decry efforts by the media to make news of events that they personally consider unnewsworthy and even detrimental to "fostering good order and discipline." William Randolph Hearst's definition of news, while not universally accepted, certainly expresses a point: "News is something somebody wants suppressed—all the rest is advertising."[3] Suffice it to say, news is the information that the media wish to report; whether a commander disagrees rarely has any impact.

This dichotomy in perception of what constitutes news was aired during a military-media symposium at the Naval War College:

> . . . many of the War College students considered the news media's proper role to be that of cheerleaders for the military. Time and again, the news media was chastised for failure to report "what's right" with the military and the country. Newsmen responded by saying that it's what's unusual that makes news, and the unusual is often unpleasant.[4]

One can make an interesting comparison between this "cheerleading role" for the media and Lenin's totalitarian theory of the press:

> The prime mission of the press is not to inform, but to propagate Communist ideas and popularize the measures of the Soviet government. In America, the critics, especially those in the Nixon government, put it another way: the press should report what's right about America, not what's bad. It should be constructive, not destructive. The point is, the difference is not substantial.[5]

Failure to comprehend the newsman's role, then, is another product of inexperience in media relations. Whereas a reporter may be many things to many people, a cheerleader he usually is not. Most newsmen perceive themselves in the multiple roles of watchdogs, judges, and independent, objective observers of events. Further, newsmen cherish the same Constitution that the military is sworn to defend, particularly the First Amendment. As Justice Hugo L. Black commented on the freedom of the press in the Pentagon Papers case:

> In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press could remain forever free to censure the Government.[6]

While many commanders may recognize their lack of experience in dealing with the press, there are others who consider themselves well versed in handling the press but are not. In this category belong the self-styled media experts who are dedicated and devout believers in the tenets of stonewalling. The prevalent attitude in this group is "Why give the press any information; they're just going to screw it up anyway with distortions and deceptions."

Followers of this philosophy may find little comfort in Thomas Jefferson's much quoted comment that, "were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." The press critics, however, can also note that Jefferson did not consistently champion the need for a free and accessible press. On another occasion, he wrote: "The man who

never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them, inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer to the truth than he who is filled with falsehoods and errors."

No one, not even the press itself, would deny that mistakes and errors are sometimes made—often more times than journalists care to admit. This susceptibility to error reflects that they, too, are human and liable to the same inadequacies as others. Then, again, if reporters had free and complete access to requested information, perhaps errors could be reduced.

Basically, then, stonewalling—to differing degrees and in various forms—is still alive and well in today's Air Force.

WHY should stonewalling *not* exist? An interesting point about this question is that it should not require an answer in the first place. However, stonewallers, whether at the neophyte or journeyman level, tend to find little wrong in the practice of stonewalling.

The most definitive case against stonewalling can be built on the grounds that it is against all official policies and regulations—Air Force, Department of Defense, and presidential. And while the policy and guidance are not new, they are continually reaffirmed. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in a 1977 memorandum to the military departments and agencies, wrote:

> President Carter has pledged a new openness in government. The President's commitment to candid communications with the American people is firmly rooted in the conviction that, given the facts, they will make wise decisions. . . . Information will be made fully and readily available unless release is precluded by statute (as in application of the Privacy Act or the Freedom of Information Act) or is precluded by current and valid security classification.[7]

Air Force regulations have promoted this policy for many years. In line with this commitment, it must be emphasized that the media and the American public not only have a need to know, they have a right to know. Former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara recognized this obligation when he stated: "The people of this nation, in whose name and by whose ultimate consent all high government officials serve, have both the need and the right to be thoroughly informed on decisions."[8]

Clearly, there can be little doubt what official Air Force policy is and that stonewalling plays no role in that policy. Realistically, though, few people are naïve enough to believe that all regulations are always followed in both letter and spirit. One can usually find a Catch-22 to subvert any policy. Beyond adherence to regulations, however, there are even better rationales for applying stones to bridges than to walls.

One such rationale is based on a physical law—when a vacuum is created, something will rush to fill it. As Theodore N. Vail of the Bell Telephone Company stated many years ago, "If we don't tell the public the truth about ourselves, somebody else will."[9]

The fact is, absence does not breed silence. If a commander refuses to respond adequately to an unfavorable news query, the reporter will usually obtain the information elsewhere, be it accurate or not. The crucial point is that when this occurs not only has the Air Force lost its credibility and compromised its integrity, it has also lost the opportunity to relate its side of the story and perhaps put the release into a better perspective.

This leads to another important consideration—credibility. Credibility, like morale, takes time and effort to foster and nurture and is subject to easy decay. Further, credibility's primacy should be virtually unquestioned, for it is the bedrock on which all else is built in media relations. If trust and confidence are not established and maintained with the media, and through them to the general public, then the entire information program of the Air Force is in jeopardy. Not only will people doubt the responses of Air

Force leaders to unfavorable queries but favorable releases will also be tarnished and suspect. Stonewalling is not just slightly detrimental, it can be the very generator of credibility gaps.

Taking the positive viewpoint, one might well consider that maintaining good relations can facilitate Air Force goals:

> Given the responsibility of a free press to provide the public with a complete and unbiased reportage of all elements of governmental activity—including the military—and given the military's apparent interest in assuring maximum public understanding of its function, it seems obvious that the reduction or removal of real or imagined obstacles to the flow of military news is both desirable and necessary.[10]

Perhaps this beneficial aspect is best summarized by General Dalton, who succinctly states: "We need the media more than they need us."[11] For example, if the Air Force is to maintain zero-draft recruiting goals, or obtain support for military funding or against military unionization, it needs the support of the media to help convey such viewpoints to the American public and Congress.

As a closing argument against stonewalling, it should be recognized that its practice is self-defeating, often in the short-term, definitely in the long run. Once initiated, stonewalling often becomes its own master. The attempt to cover an embarrassing incident behind a stone wall usually results in bad becoming worse.

WITH the realization that stonewalling exists and why it should not, the most important question remains—how to correct it? While there is no magical solution, no formula or checklist that will provide instant and guaranteed relief, there are remedial measures. However, the recital of a common-sense litany of media do's and don'ts would serve little purpose by itself. A checklist functions only as an abbreviated memory device. Its value is predicated on a deeper comprehension and acceptance of the particular operating systems—be they aircraft or media. Accordingly, recognition and acceptance of five key understandings or concepts is crucial to the enhancement of media relations.

Primary among this quintet are two basic understandings, both closely interrelated and stated very simply. First, the propensity to stonewall does exist. Second, the need to correct it is worth the effort. Without acceptance and understanding of these two basic premises, there is no correction, for there is no recognition of the problem.

The third major understanding is recognition that corrective efforts must come primarily from within. Admittedly, it is difficult to perceive and correct a problem if one is part of the problem. As that learned observer Pogo once stated with remarkable insight: "We have met the enemy—and he is us." It is somewhat futile and unproductive to castigate a newsman for unfavorable publicity. He does not cause a problem; he merely reports it.

The fourth understanding is recognition that an adversary relationship does exist between the military (and others) and the media. The media's role is to test, investigate, and challenge governmental decisions; but the relationship can be productive instead of antagonistic. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, then president of the Naval War College and now Central Intelligence Agency director, identified the proper relationship in his closing remarks at a military-media symposium:

> I feel the adversary relationship is a healthy one and in the best interests of a free and effective media. . . . (We) must be prepared to go at least 70 percent of the way toward meeting the media in this adversary relationship. . . . What we need and desire is that the military-media adversary relationship be characterized by mutual respect and candor.[12]

The fifth and final understanding is that no matter how well one may build stone bridges, he is not going to be successful with *all* newsmen on *all* occasions. Yes, Virginia, there are Darth Vaders in the universe—unscrupulous journalists who may report

insidious fabrications. Fortunately, such reporters are few in number and usually are well recognized for their biases by the public. Also, even the good journalists will "blow it" periodically.

Finally, the adage "Be honest, be truthful, be quick" is particularly relevant to unfavorable publicity. Bad news cannot be suppressed forever; it will get out eventually. Then one has to contend not only with the original bad news but the alleged cover-up. William Greener expresses the solution to mitigating the negative story very simply: "My answer is quit figuring out *how* to say it, and try it simply and straightforward and as quickly as possible."[13]

Probably the best overall advice for a commander on this subject is to use the information officer (IO)—and use him (or her) effectively. A qualified IO is more than one who plans open houses, attends chamber of commerce meetings, and ghostwrites columns for the staff. He is also trained and skilled in public affairs and in working with the media. In essence, the IO is the stonemason for the bridges. However, the architect must be the commander, for information is a functional responsibility of command.

To be effective, the IO needs the opportunity to earn the complete trust and confidence of the commander. The IO should not be relegated to reciting a commander's self-conceived responses but rather be involved in the policy and decision-making process. He should be allowed to offer public affairs guidance and advice, even advice that may not be popular.

As a final observation on dealing with public affairs problems, if the IO or the commander needs additional guidance, it is readily available. There is no such thing as a commander's private public affairs problem—it is an Air Force problem. For press problems of national significance, cases under litigation, or other irregular situations as well as the routine, Command, Air Force, and Department of Defense IOs are on call 24 hours a day.

ONE final challenge remains—will Air Force leaders and commanders correct stonewalling? The answer should be obvious. William Greener expresses it well:

> You can teach a rat to go through a maze in three hours. If he touches one bar he gets an electric shock, and if he touches the other bar he gets a piece of cheese. And for 19 years the United States Air Force has persisted in touching the bar that gives them the shock. There is an absolute syndrome that says "Within government, we are afraid of the press." It's amazing. I say, "Why are you afraid of the press?" and the answer is, "Because they hit us on the head." My answer to that is if you have someone that hits you on the head once every week, it seems to me that sooner or later you would say to yourself, "I wonder what it is I must do to stop that guy from hitting me on the head?" And the answer is very simple: step up and tell the truth, and tell it quickly.[14]

Maximum disclosure with minimum delay must become more than a token expression; it must be an ingrained characteristic of the professional Air Force. In the final analysis is the recognition that stones will not lie dormant. They must either be used in bridges or walls, and the problem with stone walls is while "they" cannot get in, neither can we get out.

Hickam AFB, Hawaii

Notes

1. William I. Greener, Jr., speech delivered during Media-Military Symposium, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 30 November 1977.
2. Brigadier General H. J. Dalton, Jr., interview at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 27 September 1977.
3. Martin D. Carter, *An Introduction to Mass Communications, Problems in Press and Broadcasting* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1971), p. 127.
4. Lee Ewing, "The Military-Media Battle: A Step Toward an Understanding," *Air Force Times, Family Supplement*, 21 February 1973, p. 4.
5. John Tebbel, *The Media in America* (New York: Crowell, 1974), p. 379.
6. Arthur Macy Cox, *The Myths of National Security: The Peril of Secret Government* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 119.
7. Harold Brown, *Commanders Digest*, 1 September 1977, p. 2.
8. James Aronson, *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV, and Radio* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), p. 62.
9. Major F. William Smullen, "Accountability at West Point," *Military Media Review*, vol. 4, no. 2, 1977, p. 4.
10. Major John Duncan Williams, "Interaction: The Military and the Media," *Air University Review*, November-December 1974, p. 58.
11. Brigadier General H. J. Dalton, Jr., interview at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 27 September 1977.
12. "Military-Media Symposium at the Naval War College," *Naval War College Review*, January-February 1973, p. 50.
13. William I. Greener, Jr., speech delivered to Public Relations Society of America, New York University, July 13, 1978.
14. Ibid.

AMERICA, WORLD POLICEMAN?

Dr. Alvin D. Coox

THE editor of a broad-spectrum collection of essays must possess imagination, discipline, and stamina. Robin Higham of Kansas State University, the impresario who has orchestrated a number of anthologies, evinces these qualities to a large degree. His idea of building a book around the long-standing dilemma of American intervention or abstention abroad and of demonstrating that the problem transcends the military dimension was certainly sound.† But, as with any collection, Higham's must address the question of whether it will stand the test of time or succumb to the fate of yesterday's newspaper.

Despite its copyright date, the substance of *Intervention or Abstention* unfortunately does not go beyond 1972. Consequently, in this fast-moving decade, no contributor was able to address events that have bedeviled American foreign policy in recent years: the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the civil war in Lebanon; the collapse of South Vietnam and the aftermath in Indochina; the crises in Angola, Mozambique, Biafra, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rhodesia, and South Africa; or the new problems of international terrorism and the safeguarding of endangered oil-producing regions. By the same token, instances of outdated allusion include the matter of Portugal in its erstwhile African colonies.

The infusion of continuity into a collection is usually best achieved by bridges between selections. Higham provides no bridges, no separate conclusions, and no index. Passages in his 19-page introduction may puzzle some readers (American landings in the Dominican Republic in 1965 "raised all the old liberal resentments at home that have their roots in the attitudes to British redcoats of colonial days"). Other readers will find portions of the introduction insulting to their intelligence ("The attack on Pearl Harbor was an affront that could not be ignored") or silly (Richard Nixon was able to "reestablish the traditional American-Chinese ties in a new Union Pacific"). Feeblest of all is Higham's verdict that, in sum, the United States finds itself faced with "the twin dilemmas of intervention or abstention, or even a bit of both at the same time."

The case histories selected for examination include expected episodes: P. Edward Haley on Mexico (1914) and Dominica (1965); Norman A. Graebner on Manchuria (1931-32); Theodore A. Couloumbis and M'Kean M. Tredway on Greece (1944-70); and P. Wesley

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†Robin Higham, editor, ***Intervention or Abstention: The Dilemma of American Foreign Policy*** **(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1975, $14.75), 221 pages.**

Kriebel on Korea (1950-53). The Vietnam War, however, is examined from bipolar standpoints: domestic pressures for abstention (Ted Goertzel) and surrogate intervention through alliances and air power (Donald J. Mrozek). Dennis Deutsch considers the Palestine question only during the time frame of 1944-48, focusing on American domestic pressures for intervention besetting the president. Economic factors receive the attention of Janice J. Terry—abstention vis-à-vis the Aswan Dam; and of James C. Carey—intervention affecting Peru and Chile. William L. Richter injects the term "relative abstention" in his consideration of India and Pakistan. A useful historiographical overview leads off the collection: Kenneth J. Hagan on the historical significance of American naval intervention. To his credit, Higham limited Kansas State University collegial participation to Carey, Mrozek, and Richter.

The volume as a whole lacks definition of terms. Couloumbis and Tredway act on their own by carefully explaining, in a footnote, their use of the terms "influence," "intervention," "interference," and "penetration." Haley defines intervention and treats the conceptual gap between belief and reality briefly. The editor does require from each contributor a bibliographic note and suggestions for further research. Only Couloumbis and Tredway supply footnote citations to the text.

The value of collected essays is enhanced when the contributors adhere to the assigned topic. I found the piece by Couloumbis and Tredway, however useful, to be relatively more centered on domestic developments inside Greece than on external American considerations. Discrepancies also appeared between the assessment of the importance of American public opinion in Deutsch's probing of Zionist and other lobbying pressures and in Graebner's survey of American press reaction to the Hoover-Stimson policy. In the latter case, one wonders about the editorial importance, in larger terms, of the *St. Paul Dispatch*, the *Norfolk Virginia-Pilot*, or even the *Brooklyn Eagle*. Deutsch has been outdistanced by events, as he acknowledges in his postscript; viz., "Today we have a Republican administration (traditionally more responsive to large corporate concerns than Zionist interests) and a Jewish secretary of state."

As for Goertzel's essay, some will find it excessively polemical, as in his oration stating that

> while the business elite which led America into Vietnam is still largely in control of foreign policy, we may hope that they have learned that domestic progress and tranquillity are at least as important to the security and well-being of the [United States] as imposing anti-Communist dictatorships on small nations around the world.

This Vietnam-era rhetoric brings to mind John Whitney Hall's wry comment that "the problem with argumentative overkill is that it inhibits further inquiry."

IT WILL be noticed that none of Higham's contributors featured the most sensational case involving an American decision to intervene or to abstain, one which brought the world to the verge of nuclear holocaust for the first time: the Cuban imbroglio of 1962. Herbert S. Dinerstein has performed a masterful analysis of the triangular American-Soviet Russian-Cuban confrontation in his *The Making of a Missile Crisis*.† To a certain extent it is unfair to conjoin the Higham and Dinerstein books, apart from topical interlocking. Higham could allow each of his authors only 15 to 20 printed pages, whereas Dinerstein has the luxury of 238 pages of text,

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†Herbert S. Dinerstein, *The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, $14.95), 302 pages.

35 pages of statements and thematic analysis, 20 pages of footnotes, and 8 pages of index.

Dinerstein is an established scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and the author of four books on communism and the Soviet Union; he has explored his topic by intensive study of Russian and Spanish language as well as English sources. He writes with assurance, wit, and skill. Minor grammatical idiosyncrasies and some poor proofing are counterbalanced by clever expression and a rich vocabulary; e.g., gravamen, mental furniture, dubiety.

The Making of a Missile Crisis offers far more and a bit less than the title implies. An entire chapter is devoted to the Guatemalan emergency of 1954, which is soon seen to contain the seeds of subsequent crisis in the Caribbean. "Prophylactic intervention had removed the danger of Guatemala becoming socialist," writes Dinerstein, "but it smoothed the path for Cuba to adopt socialism." In other words, "the tactical Soviet defeat in Guatemala constituted a strategic defeat for the United States." The author then devotes a surprising amount of space to the unfolding and inner workings of the Cuban Revolution, the embrace of Cuba by the Soviet Union ("Khrushchev looked to the new world to redress the balance of the old"), and Fidel Castro's ultimate donning of communist garb. Only two chapters treat Nikita Khrushchev's introduction and removal of Russian missiles in Cuba.

The strength of the Dinerstein book is, therefore, the making, not the dismantling, of the great crisis of 1962. Although few new facts are introduced by the author, he dissects questions of perception, mythology, leadership, and decision-making with rare skill. Like the best of teachers, he enlightens the reader about semantics and terminology, such as Soviet-Russian use of the words for provocation and economism, the differences between golden bridge, brinksman, and bargaining-counter strategies, the implicit distinction between menace, warning, and threat, and the primary duty of the professional historian to pose the right questions. The range of allusion and illustration is impressive: the early modeling of communist parties on the Roman Catholic Church, and the comparability of Castro's political self-conversion to the dynastic-religious flexibility of Henry of Navarre and Henry VIII of England.

The Cuban crisis is examined in the world context: Berlin, the Congo, Laos, the U-2 fiasco, and the overall U.S.-Soviet military balance (or imbalance). Dinerstein's text abounds with quotable passages and sage deductions. His thematic analysis of the Soviet government's statement of 23 October 1962 and of press editorials in *Krasnaia Zvezda (Red Star), Literaturnaia Gazeta, Pravda,* and *Izvestiia* could be used profitably as required reading in courses on international relations, psychological warfare, and diplomatic history. Dinerstein also draws on a privileged source to describe a Soviet naval experience in facing down a French warship's little-known effort to intercept weapons bound for the National Liberation Front (FLN) during the Algerian war—an apparent Russian precedent for coping with the American naval quarantine of Cuba in 1962.

Postulation of a direct relation between political and military power, Dinerstein argues, is simplistic. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted war in 1962; they "frightened each other into their senses—a rare instance in the history of human folly." The Soviet leader, like Kennedy at the Bay of Pigs, "realized that he had been deceived by his own hopes and decided to cut his losses." The prerequisite had been that each party cease to act on "putative judgments of the other's intentions."

Is THE United States still to wear the badge of self-appointed world policeman? Dinerstein, for one, is convinced that the domino theory is ready for retirement. From a reading of the Higham collection and the Dinerstein mono-

graph, I think that we can agree with the latter's contention that the United States and the U.S.S.R. have "harmed the other remarkably little" since World War II; "the most grievous wounds have been self-inflicted. Exaggerated fears or misplaced confidence have produced a veritable catalogue of disasters." Within that catalogue, no case history, not even that of Korea or of Vietnam, is more unsettling than the Cuban crisis, centering on a defiant island regime, a mere 90 miles from Florida, which evoked John Kennedy's grim warning: the United States would "regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response."

Yet had the advent of the nuclear missile age invalidated John Buchan's comments on American intervention or abstention, or on a potential enemy's mischief making, in the three and more decades after *The Courts of the Morning* appeared in 1929?

> [America's] hand might be forced [one of Buchan's characters observed] if anything went wrong in the American continent itself, because of her Monroe Doctrine.... [Foreign complications] would be very awkward for her, and possibly very dangerous, and she would resolutely keep out of them, unless they occurred, so to speak, opposite her front yard, in which case she would be bound to intervene. Therefore, if any one wanted to do her the worst kind of turn, he would stir up trouble in some place like South America.

Were Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Castro, one wonders, all fans of John Buchan? "The shark is frightened," Castro jeered, "and is asking the other little sardines to devour the ex-sardine, Cuba." Perhaps Castro deserves this last bit of piscatorial bravado. After all, like the latter-day descendants of Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung, he achieved his lifelong objective, at great risk: to extract tacit but effective recognition of his country's independence, in spite of the mighty American policeman whose global beats alternated between intervention and abstention.

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

DÉTENTE, DETERRENCE, AND THE DILEMMA OF NATIONAL SECURITY

DR. JOE P. DUNN

FEW issues are as vital as the current discussion over American defense policy. Many military spokesmen and defense scholars charge that America's military might is eroding. Détente appears a one-way street. They contend that the Soviets use détente merely as guise to deter U.S. military development, while the Russians continue full-scale military commitment. The critics allege that American policy in recent years has been disastrous: SALT I emasculated U.S. strategic supremacy; the B-1 and other weapon decisions limited military options; and current manpower policies such as the all-volunteer military are expensive failures. Military unionization lurks on the horizon, and even one of the future cornerstones of our strategic defense, the cruise missile, is a subject of negotiation. Current trends portend serious dangers. The current administration, as did its predecessors, denies that the situation is as catastrophic as the critics suggest.

Doubtless, the Soviet Union aspires to military superiority. The Soviets' military ascendancy in recent years is undeniable. Unquestionably they have employed détente as a successful tactic. Yet their desire for détente is more than charade. The essential question, however, is whether the United States has slipped dangerously behind the Soviets militarily, or have we maintained what Kissinger referred to as "essential equivalence" and Carter calls "rough equivalence"?

The debate is too often political and polemic rather than nonpartisan and analytical. It rages in the political arena, in the popular press, and in an ever increasing list of pseudoscholarly books. Fortunately, it exists on a higher plane as well. Groups such as the United States Strategic Institute and the National Strategic Information Center are leading scholarly voices of protest.[1] They are matched by an equally impressive array of government defense analysts and academic and think-tank scholars. Several important books on the topic of détente and deterrence have appeared in the last few years. Three of the books reviewed here speak to this issue on a scholarly plane. The other study addresses the antecedents of the present condition: the growth of a national security deterrence mentality during the origins of the Cold War.

A HOST of books on the origins of the Cold War emerged in the late sixties and early seventies. Their ideological tone and their quality varied greatly. Most were written before the opening of State and Defense Department documents for the crucial postwar years. Even the best of these studies must be read in this light. The so-called "revisionists" dominated the field. Their perspectives and conclusions varied, but all challenged the basic

assumptions held by the "traditionalists" or "orthodox" explanations of the Cold War. Primarily, they questioned the axiom that the Soviets bore the major, if not the total, guilt for the emergence of postwar hostilities. They contended that an aggressive American policy was far more than reaction to Soviet expansion. Different authors assigned various levels of responsibility and blame to the United States. The more extreme found the U.S. guilty of capitalist imperialism and thus totally at fault for the Cold War.

The revisionists raised new questions, electrified the issues, and inspired a second wave of scholarship in response to their allegations. Cold War traditionalists such as Herbert Feis, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Hans Morgenthau, and George F. Kennan offered new works accepting some revisionist points but primarily taking them to task.[2] By the early seventies so many different positions existed in the historiographical debate that the old categories of traditional and revisionist were no longer adequate. Revisionists ran a wide gamut from mildly liberal to Marxist radical. Some early revisionist works that had caused significant stirs, such as Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy,* had been proved shoddy even by fellow revisionists.[3] A second wave of revisionist scholarship appeared more substantial: less dramatic, more scholarly, and better researched. Gabriel Kolko established himself as the leading radical exponent, and Thomas Patterson ranked as one of the soundest scholars of the less radical revisionists.[4]

Meanwhile, an exceptional postrevisionist study emerged, John Lewis Gaddis's *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947.*[5] The book received rave reviews, won several prestigious awards, and inspired new terms such as "neotraditionalist" or "neorevisionist" (depending on the persuasion of the critic). The book, which attempted to analyze the full diversity of factors responsible for the Cold War and to explain rather than to assess blame, quickly became the classic in the field. Several Ph.D. dissertations and books in the Gaddis model followed.

Few research areas are as potentially prolific as the Cold War decade. Government archives are now open for years into the early fifties. The amount of material available is overwhelming. Dozens more major studies of the origins of the Cold War and the Cold War decade should appear in the next few years. No work can hope to be definitive; the topic is too dynamic, too vast. The best that the scholar can aspire to is that for a brief moment his book may have its day in court, its contributions fairly assessed.

DANIEL YERGIN stands at this point.† First written as a Ph. D. dissertation at Cambridge University in 1974, his book *Shattered Peace* received significant publicity when published in 1977. It has been called, with some justification, the best study of the origins of the Cold War to emerge since Gaddis's book. Unquestionably, it is a balanced, perceptive, and insightful work. Definitely in the Gaddis model, the study attempts to move beyond the questions of responsibility and guilt to investigate the complex interplay of international politics that resulted in the Cold War. As the author states, "This is not a book for those who want a simple story, a morality play, a confirmation of prejudices, or a rationalization for or against present-day policies."

Yergin's major purpose is to explain the development of the Cold War mentality that he calls the national security state. He focuses on

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†Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, $15.00), 528 pages.

the interplay between policy-makers, their perceptions, and the basis for the hard decisions rendered. He asks: "Was not some form of détente—some explicit ground rules—possible earlier, much earlier? Why did diplomacy fail and confrontation become a way of life?" He can examine only the Western side of the story. No nation is so open and forthright with its diplomatic material as is the United States. Soviet materials remain totally closed.

The author's concentration on top policy-makers reminds one of Lloyd Gardner's *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949.*[6] Yergin's book, though, is a much better researched, fairer, and more balanced account. Still, he too may overplay the role of key individuals and not give enough attention to less tangible factors such as bureaucratic inertia and national sentiment.

Yergin contends that two competing assumptions, two world views, two perspectives on how to interpret and react to the Soviet Union, vied for supremacy after World War II. He coins the terms the "Riga" and "Yalta" axioms as shorthand for the two approaches. The Riga axioms, named after the interwar American observation post in the capital of Latvia, where the infant American Soviet Service developed, represented a hostile attitude toward cooperation with the Soviets. Later, hardliners such as George F. Kennan, Joseph C. Grew, Loy Henderson, and Charles E. Bohlen interned in Riga. To Yergin the term stands for the realpolitik, hardline, anticommunist approach that triumphed in the Truman administration.

The Yalta axioms, reflecting the spirit of the Crimean conference in early 1945, represented the Wilsonian or liberal internationalist tradition dominant in America for most of the first half of the century. This position, best exemplified by Franklin D. Roosevelt and later Henry A. Wallace, viewed Russia as a traditional Great Power, a difficult nation but one with which the U.S. could deal if patience and understanding were employed.

Yergin states that neither alternative had a monopoly on truth. In the end, however, the Riga axioms prevailed and provided the base for the national security state. The Yalta axioms, the basis of détente, lay dormant. The author feels that the possibilities for diplomacy and accommodation were not played to the fullest. Policy-makers exaggerated the "range and degree of the Soviet challenge" and the "immediate military threat" to the United States. They operated on the premise that it was safer to act on the worst possible assumption. Accordingly, the United States armed itself, assumed unilateral defense of the Free World, and rejected any compromise with Soviet objectives. Compromise was defined as appeasement, a doctrine proved bankrupt by the war.

As he judges, Yergin admits that the historian has the advantage of hindsight in his assessment, and he does not bear the responsibilities of the moment that weigh so heavily on participants. Still the historian has the obligation to search out the truth and judge as the facts dictate; but he must be fair, honest, and compassionate toward beleaguered participants. Above all, the historian must not attempt to force the record to conform to preconceived notions nor to support his current political desires. Yergin admirably meets these standards.

I have some problems accepting Yergin's model entirely. It seems too pat, too simplistic. But this is a good book, an interesting study that makes a significant contribution. It will not replace Gaddis, but it is a fine companion piece.

THE other three books deal with the current problems of policy-makers. Professor Patrick M. Morgan of Washington State University critiques current deterrence theory and assesses the proper role of deterrence in

present national security.† The book is a theoretical study. Morgan begins with the classic *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* by Alexander George and Richard Smoke as he strives to develop an adequate definition of deterrence.[7] He then discusses the mechanics and dynamics in practice. Finally, he turns to the proper role in foreign policy. The author believes that too much emphasis has been placed on strategic nuclear deterrence. He explains that despite its seeming logic it can easily fail and nuclear war result. Confidence in it is misplaced: "The key contribution of a theory of deterrence should be to point out how it works, and thus how tenuous it can be, to encourage steps to reduce the damage if it fails, and ultimately to encourage efforts to move away from reliance on deterrence."

Morgan concludes that nuclear deterrence has become less and less sensible. Yet deterrence theory has not kept up with the present reality. It proposes what the author considers oversimplified crises decision-making models, which may intensify the possibilities of tragedy by erroneously convincing participants that they are in control of the situation. Finally, it rationalizes excessive nuclear capacity, "justifying overkill capacities that expand the possible costs of war without thereby enlarging the national security." Morgan is particularly interested in bringing proliferating nuclear armament under more stringent control. He asserts that the great powers have excessive stocks of unnecessary strategic weapons, which invite higher levels of destruction should deterrence fail. As he claims: "There really is 'overkill' and it really is senseless."

As an alternative, Morgan advocates greater emphasis on conventional military capabilities. While these forces have minimal deterrence value against the Soviet Union, they play a major role in support of allies and in situations where nuclear deterrence is not functional. These weapons have been and can be employed in confrontation situations. Unfortunately, Vietnam contributed to an adverse climate for limited war and conventional capacity. The frustrations and mistakes of Vietnam intensified reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Morgan's book raises some interesting points. It poses several dilemmas and important questions, but it provides little practical guidance. The author knows the literature in the field; he argues impressively. But like many theoretical propositions, it sounds better on paper than in practice. His case is premised on certain assumptions that other defense experts would challenge. For one, he misunderstands overkill, as the next study will demonstrate. The book has certain scholarly interest, but it merits less serious practical consideration.

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, Associate Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, an Associate of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, and one of the nation's leading students of strategic power, offers the converse to Morgan's argument.†† The thrust of Luttwak's excellent study is the efficacy and necessity of nuclear strategic deterrence. He declares that despite its dangers the balance of terror works. However, he fears that deterrence is endangered as American strategic power is falling behind the Soviets. While he stresses the complexity involved in assessing comparative

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†Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1977, $6.00), 216 pages.

††Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and Political Unity* (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1976, $3.00), 70 pages.

strategic power, he postulates conclusions on the current balance.

First Luttwak details why a "minimum deterrence force" is inadequate. Such a limited force could deter the Soviet Union from a direct "out of the blue" attack on the U.S. by promising retaliatory destruction of Soviet cities and the prevention of any Soviet counterforce effort. But this kind of situation is not likely to occur. Both adversaries realize that mutual destruction would be the end result. A more likely scenario would involve attacks on American allies or against U.S. forward base systems. With a minimum deterrence force, the U.S. would have to employ forces slated for the ultimate defense of the homeland (the Armageddon capacity so to speak) to respond to this situation. Minimum capacity does not allow flexibility of response. Obviously, more force than just that to protect the homeland is necessary; the question is how much excess.

Luttwak explains that a nation must have forces capable of responding to every possible challenge by hostile nations without encroaching on the forces designated in the last resort to annihilate the enemy homeland. The amount of force necessary is relative to the potential of the enemy. Overkill could exist only when one nation's power is excessive after preparing for every logical eventuality. The United States does not enjoy such security; thus the popular overkill metaphor is naïve, a myth perpetrated by those innocent of power realities. Finally, Luttwak notes that nuclear strategic power plays a role in international politics beyond its use only in warfare. Power gives a nation options in many realms.

The bulk of the book details the comparative strategic weapons balance of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although he employs pages of charts and tables, Luttwak explains that mere numbers themselves mean little. The Soviets' obvious numerical advantage codified in the SALT I agreements is not conclusive evidence that they have strategic superiority. Comparisons based on any one criterion are misleading. Far too much of the debate on the strategic balance revolves around such simplistics. One cannot assess the balance without addressing variables such as throw-weight, vulnerability, flexibility, number of independent warheads, and reliability of systems. Despite Soviet buildup and numerical advantages, American technological superiority has maintained parity. Luttwak points out that this is a precarious kind of security. The Soviets are fast closing the gap and have surpassed the U.S. in several critical areas. He questions whether the United States can continue to stake security on technological superiority over the Soviets. Undoubtedly were he writing today, he would be even more dubious.

The author also notes that the Soviets have proved more effective negotiators than the Americans. The Russians employ their numerical advantages as bargaining chips. While they accept any U.S. concessions, they concede little themselves without quid pro quo. They have been most effective in extracting trade-offs for any action taken. They tend to maintain outdated missiles in their arsenal until they can garner concessions from the U.S. to deactivate them. The U.S. approaches weapon systems from a military and economic standpoint; cost effectiveness is important. The Soviets are more interested in the international political role their weapons play, what they can gain in negotiation, than in the impact military spending has on the domestic economy.

Luttwak concludes with a brief discussion of the U.S. strategic bomber force. He is a strong exponent of the strategic bomber and the B-1. He argues that few weapon systems have the capability and flexibility of the B-1. Finally, he injects a plea for greater emphasis on civil defense, a major Soviet concern but a low American priority.

Although slightly dated, as are all studies in this area the minute that they come off the press, this is an outstanding book, a succinct, clear, scholarly treatment of a complex and vital subject. It should be widely read.

FINALLY, we turn from strategic to tactical nuclear weapons. In January 1976 the National Strategy Information Center, an organization committed to serious study of national security issues, met in private conference to consider the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. The resulting book contains an introduction by eminent military historian and analyst Bernard Brodie, an article by Samuel T. Cohen and William R. Van Cleave, and a summary of the conference discussion.†

Brodie begins with a brief history of the changing doctrines of tactical nuclear weapons. Since the Korean War, strategists have wavered back and forth and still today have not worked out an accepted doctrine. Military commanders appear to be ambivalent. Brodie cautions that the Soviets are prepared for tactical nuclear warfare and would probably employ it in any strike into Western Europe. Yet NATO remains wedded to a conventional response to conventional warfare.

Cohen and Van Cleave develop these points further. They emphasize that NATO has neither coherent doctrine nor strategy for tactical nuclear weapons. Neither is NATO postured to withstand nuclear attack. Revamping to defend against such a possibility requires fundamental changes in force posture and structure as well as logistics practices. It is dangerous to believe that the same forces organized, equipped, and trained to fight a nonnuclear war can shift automatically to a nuclear posture if the necessity arises.

The remainder of the book consists of questions posed by National Strategy Information Center president and conference chairman Frank Barnett and a series of unattributed responses. The consensus definitely supports NATO's employment of tactical nuclear weapons.

This is a difficult book to evaluate. The topic is important, and the study makes a contribution; but it barely scratches the surface of the issue. More important, its concern may be a bit passé as NATO is moving toward a more tactical nuclear capacity.

THE Carter administration and those following will continue to grapple with these vexing issues. An intense national security debate will continue to rage in Congress, among civilian and military experts, and in the larger public arena. Détente and deterrence are controversial and difficult problems. Correct answers and effective policy are essential, but the problems are much easier to define than to solve. We will continue to exist in a world of ambiguity and uncertainty. One truth rings clear—as General Hoyt S. Vandenberg expressed it, ". . . the only war a nation can really win is the one that never starts." That is what deterrence and détente are all about.

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Notes

1. For the thinking of the United States Strategic Institute, see any issue of their journal, *Strategic Review*. The National Strategic Information Center publishes extensively: agenda papers, strategy papers, and other book length offerings. The best expression of their thought on current defense issues is Francis P. Hoeber, David B. Kassing, and William Schneider, Jr., *Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1979* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1978).
2. See Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Norton, 1970); Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, *Origins of the Cold War* (Waltham, Massachusetts: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970); and George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967).
3. Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Vintage, 1965).
4. See Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York: Random House, 1968); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Thomas G. Patterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
5. John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
6. Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970).
7. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

†*Toward a New Defense for NATO: The Case of Tactical Nuclear Weapons* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1976, $2.00), 61 pages.

ASIA

image and reality

DR. JAMES H. TONER

Apparently human beings have a stubborn attachment to old beliefs and an equally stubborn resistance to new material that will upset them.

ROBERTA WOHLSTETTER[1]

IT is, of course, impossible to distill the behavioral research of the past two or three decades into a single shibboleth. Still, if one had to reduce that research into its gist, perhaps there would be agreement about this chief principle: human beings see things pretty much as they want to see them. One need not know the arcane argot of seasoned social scientists—who are sometimes given to elaborate explanations of defense mechanisms and of cognitive dissonance—in order to recognize that human beings tend to accept whatever data reinforce their beliefs and tend to reject whatever data subvert those beliefs. Students of military intelligence will be reminded of the work of Roberta Wohlstetter and others who have lucidly demonstrated that responsible statesmen and high-ranking officers are as susceptible to wishful thinking as are any other people.[2] According to Wohlstetter,

> There is a good deal of evidence, some of it quantitative, that in conditions of great uncertainty people tend to predict that events that they want to happen will happen. Wishfulness in conditions of uncertainty is natural and is hard to banish simply by exhortation—or by wishing.[6]

That the tendency to wishful thinking is not something just recently diagnosed by some social psychologist is attested to by the Apocryphal Book of Sirach (written about 200 B. C.): "Empty and false are the hopes of the senseless, and fools are borne aloft by dreams. Like a man who catches at shadows or chases the wind, is the one who believes in dreams." (34:1-2) Not for nothing has the renowned American civilian strategist Bernard Brodie testified that "good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology."[4]

Most Americans are of European descent. We feel comfortable with most European manners, customs, religions, and languages. We even felt comfortable, in one rather odd application of that adjective, fighting certain Europeans during the world wars. Such is not the case, however, with respect to Asia. Relatively few Americans are of Asian descent. We feel less comfortable with most Asian manners, customs, religions, and languages. And one need hardly dwell on the "discomfort" of the Korean and Vietnamese Wars. Americans simply do not have a good understanding of Asia. Even in the midst of the Pacific War in 1942, for example, a poll indicated that 60 percent of the American people could not locate China on a map. And, at a meeting in the State Department in 1945, the U.S. Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., is said to have asked one of his subordinates to tell him where Korea was.

Even to the American reading public, Asia is sometimes—I hate to use this hackneyed word—"inscrutable." Whatever fault there is for such inscrutability as exists is manifestly not that of the Asians; it is, rather, a blatant discredit to us Americans that we should for so long persist in viewing Asia and the Asians through stereotypical spectacles. To some, it seems as though the more they look at Asia, the more it shifts, defying their Occidental understanding.

Since the Spanish-American War of 1898, which led to direct American involvement with Asian political and military affairs, the United States has been a protagonist on the Oriental stage. While we have been reluctant to relinquish our role, we seem to know relatively little about the script. The Asian continent covers about a third of the world's land area and has about three-fifths of the world's people (about 2.5 billion). American diplomatic and military policy toward Asia has too often been characterized by a rampant ethnocentrism or provincialism. Because we so often tend to see in Asia precisely those images we want to see, rather than the realities that are there, one can greet with some enthusiasm serious books about Asian politics. Scholarship alone cannot cure American myopia toward the Far East, but it may provide us a new prescription for glasses through which we can take a fresh look at the forty-one nations of Asia.

THE book *Dragon and Eagle*† is a worthwhile collection of fourteen essays that deal, primarily, with China. As the editors of the volume point out, ". . . the American interest is an increasingly prosperous and informed China, able and willing to contribute to the creation of a stable world order." That is the tone of the essays in the book. The China scholar will find little here that is seminal, but the serious, general reader will find essays that are clear, concise, and cogent. Useful, too, is a fourteen-page bibliography. One should note that, while political prudence dictates American conversation with China, human decency itself requires that Americans not behave supinely—one is reminded of the etymology of the word "kowtow"—before the government of Hua Kuo-feng, the Chinese Communist Party chairman. In a recent column, William F. Buckley, Jr., in describing the current situation in China with regard to the human rights of the 800 million people there, said: "The scandal is so egregious—the persecution of Chinese people is on a scale so awesome, so awful—that inevitably what one would expect to happen has happened: we have all got used to it."[5] In short, in dealing with contemporary China, the statesman must deal with political realities as they are, in hopes of eventually bringing into existence his image of things as they should be. *Dragon and Eagle*, while too bland about events in the 1984 we call China, is nonetheless a book to be commended to scholar and generalist alike.

EVEN though the Korean War has been over—actually, it is only in recess—for a quarter of a century, we still do not fully understand such things as how the war started or how the war will (finally) end. *The Korean War*, edited by Francis H. Heller,†† makes a genuine contribution to our efforts to come fully to grips with the American role in the Korean War of 1950-53. The book is a record of a conference convened in early May 1975 at the

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†Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam, editors, *Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Relations: Past and Future* (New York: Basic Books, 1978, $13.50), 384 pages.

††Francis H. Heller, editor, *The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977, $13.00), 251 pages.

Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. The papers given and the remarks made by such scholars, diplomats, and soldiers as Lawrence Kaplan, John E. Wiltz, Robert Simmons, Richard Leopold, Matthew B. Ridgway, J. Lawton Collins, W. Averell Harriman, Clark M. Clifford, and others will be of interest to students of the Korean War and of the early 1950s. With the exception of the essay by Wiltz, "The Korean War and American Society," which is a good general essay on the impact of the Korean police action on the United States, this book will be of most use to close students of that war. Although some of the remarks of the participants may be new to scholars, there is little in this volume that is not generally available elsewhere.

THIS is generally true, too, of the study by Chin O. Chung.† The single value of the Chung book, which probably will not be of interest to the general reader, is that it collects in one place the history of the rather strained relationships among Pyongyang, Peking, and Moscow. The Chung study does raise the question of which leaders, Chinese or Russian, were perceived by North Korean President Kim Il-sung as being the closer to his own interests and desires.

It is interesting to speculate, as peripherally these three books do, on the probable state of affairs in the world had General MacArthur not driven to the Yalu in late 1950. The United States had informed the Chinese that the United Nations command had no intention of invading China. The idea—customary for American statesmen—was that if the threat of misunderstanding between the U.S. and China could be obviated, then conflict would be impossible. As Stanley Hoffmann has observed, "Americans like to judge others by their actions or capabilities, but to be judged on their intentions."[6]

As Gabriel Almond once put it,

> . . . [A] genuine diplomatic virtuosity in the United States cannot develop without a thorough understanding of the uniqueness of cultures and nations and their component parts. Each nation and culture reacts according to its special history, social structure and values.[7]

But this was the heart of the problem with the American drive on the Yalu; administration leaders simply did not appreciate or understand the Chinese frame of reference.[8] Americans customarily expect people in other countries to act like Americans. During World War II, for example, President Roosevelt and Secretary James Byrnes continued to hope, even in the face of disappointment, that Soviet leaders would react "like Americans" to offers of compromise.[9] President Roosevelt was intent on getting Stalin to accept "Christian ways and democratic principles" and in getting him to adhere to the Atlantic Charter.[10] The explanation of what George Kennan has referred to as "our inveterate tendency to judge others by the extent to which they contrive to be like ourselves,"[11] may in part be explained because since the time of Andrew Jackson, Americans have been so much alike.[12] This particular political and sociological phenomenon inspired Tang Tsou to write:

> With these predispositions [a political tradition insulated from the experience of social revolution and continuous and deep social cleavages], American observers and commentators looked at China, a country which is particularly difficult for Westerns to understand precisely because of her rich cultural heritage and long history. They tended to define and reconstruct Chinese things in terms of an American image and to judge affairs by American standards—a natural tendency in all peoples which was aggravated in the United States by the moral unanimity and uniformity of the American society.[13]

In short, because the administration expected the Chinese to act like Americans, it devised a policy of dangling mellifluous assurances that

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†Chin O. Chung, *P'Yongyang between Peking and Moscow* (University, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1978, $15.00), 230 pages.

the U.N. army would surely stop short of Chinese territory. American leaders were simply unable to relinquish their rather paternal attitude toward the Chinese;[14] they were unable intellectually to grasp—let alone empathize with—the new political reality in China;[15] and they were unable to understand, even for a moment, that the Chinese government looked on the United States as the heir to imperial Japan.

As John Spanier put it, "Since American declarations of goodwill were estimated as constituting sufficient assurances for China's Communist leaders, the latter's threats of intervention were considered as bluff."[16] Perhaps the principal reason that China was not taken seriously by the administration, either militarily or diplomatically, is because the administration expected the Chinese to view the world through American eyes; the Chinese had the temerity to use their own eyes. Gabriel Almond has written that ". . . our foreign policy must be informed by an anthropological appreciation of cultural differences."[17] In Korea, manifestly, it was not.

The advance to the Yalu was, to a great extent, the result of a mistaken image that administration leaders had of China. That image was a product of national stereotyping, much the same problem that presented itself before World War II when many Americans subscribed to the idea that all Japanese wore thick eyeglasses and so could not see well enough to fly planes.[18] This patently ridiculous notion of national stereotypes should not for a moment be confused with efforts to understand those cultural imperatives exercising influence on national policy. As with charity, the place to begin the study of those cultural imperatives is at home. David McLellan's summary is to the point:

> There is a real danger of attributing the Korean tragedy to a deadlock in role-playing and thereby of ignoring the part which human passion and prejudice play in political affairs. There is also a danger of minimizing the limitations of American experience and of overlooking dangerous underlying social and psychological tendencies in American foreign policy. The advance to the Yalu is a prime example of an American propensity to take the righteousness of its actions for granted and to ignore the objective reality which its behavior represents to others.[19]

Serious books that help us comprehend the situations of others are invariably worthy of attention, and it is in that spirit that one can pursue with profit the works by Chung, Heller et al., and Oksenberg et al. Books like these help drive home the point succinctly made by Stanley Hoffmann: "To put it bluntly, a prerequisite for effective foreign policy is awareness of the foreignness of other nations, of the fact that they have objectives and concerns, experiences and expectations, reflexes and memories different from our own. Good diplomacy knows not only how to thwart irrevocably hostile designs but also how to accommodate differences."[20]

By discerning realities, instead of complacently subscribing to mere images or to idle dreams, we will learn to understand others—and ourselves—much more clearly. The poet Robert Burns wrote:

> Oh wad some power the giftie gie us
> To see oursels as others see us!
> It wad frae monie a blunder free us,
> An' foolish notion.

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Notes

1. Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 393.

2. The genre of books dealing with psychological considerations in military and diplomatic policy-making is wide-ranging, both in scope and substance. An excellent example would be Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1973); a mediocre work would be William Blanchard, *Aggression American Style* (Santa Monica, California: Goodyear, 1978).

3. Wohlstetter, p. 397.
4. Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 332.
5. William F. Buckley, Jr., "On the Right," *National Review*, 25 November 977, p. 1385.
6. Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 175.
7. Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 23.
8. See Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 213, 215.
9. Almond, p. 149.
10. William C. Bullit, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," *Life*, August 30, 1948, p. 94.
11. George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (New York: Mentor, 1951), p. 111.
12. See Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955), p. 302.
13. Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 588.
14. See John Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go to War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 95-97.
15. Tsou, p. 235. An excellent little collection of essays was edited by J.C. Farrell and A. P. Smith, *Image and Reality in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).
16. John Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (New York: Norton, 1965), p. 98.
17. Almond, p. xxx.
18. Thomas A. Bailey, *The Art of Diplomacy: The American Experience* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 216. For valuable background, see Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), or his article "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics*, April 1968, pp. 454-79.
19. David S. McLellan, "Dean Acheson and the Korean War," *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1968, p. 39.
20. Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or The Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 322.

POTPOURRI

Politics and History: Selected Essays by Raymond Aron, collected, translated, and edited by Miriam B. Conant. New York: Free Press, 1978, 274 pages, $15.95.

Beyond the smoke, statistics, and polemics of the SALT II debate, there is a question that lies at the very heart of international relations. That issue concerns the role of force in the contemporary environment. Many political scientists (see Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane's *Power and Interdependence* and Stanley Hoffmann's *Primacy of World Order*) now argue that force has lost its utility in international politics and that military power alone no longer determines the hierarchy among nations. Raymond Aron, a leading political realist of the twentieth century, rejects such thinking as a theory of hope, not reality. In the book *Politics and History*, his essays provide students of the arms debate with seminal information on the role of force in history.

> There is no prohibition against attempting to define international society on the basis of the state of peace instead of the risk of war or against considering tests of strength and military competition as exceptional situations rather than essential features of international relations. . . . But considering the long history of complex societies . . . any definition that fails to take account of the basic characteristics of international relations, which is rooted in the legitimation of the resort to force, neglects both a constant factor in civilizations, one that has had tremendous effects on the course of history and the human meaning of military activity. (p. 176)

Aron's rather pessimistic (realist?) view of man and the course of international relations is based on his historical analysis. In these selected essays he explains why one must pursue history to truly understand the contemporary world. His studies concentrate on the interaction of historical experience and political will. He believes that it is our perception of the past that shapes our will to act in the future. The message he offers is unequivocal: "If men have no consciousness of what they are and have been, they do not attain the dimensions proper to history."

Politics and History offers several chapters of especial interest to the military professional, such as "The Philosophy of History" and "The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought." The overall level of Aron's writing, however, will require the average reader to scale unaccustomed heights. For those who would understand the theoretical arguments behind the realist view of international relations, however, the book is essential.

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The Last Half-Century: Societal Change and Politics in America by Morris Janowitz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978, 583 pages, $25.00.

Professor Morris Janowitz's *The Last Half-Century: Societal Change and Politics in America* is a thought-provoking treatise, which focuses on the notion of social control. Janowitz defines "social control" as "the capacity of a social group, including a whole society, to regulate itself." (p. 3) Self-regulation, according to the author, permits us to escape coercion by others, but its maintenance implies a set of "higher moral principles beyond those of self-interest." (p. 3)

Utilizing systemic analysis, Janowitz provides an overarching view of the major trends since the post-World War I era in American society—indicators of the levels and effectiveness of social control. These major trends are political participation, social stratification, military institutions, and war; all are underlying sources of disarticulation as societies transcend from the industrial to the advanced industrial status.

The United States is the focus of Janowitz's study, although other Western societies are also examined. His basic hypothesis is that Western democracies have tended to be weak and political regimes unable to resolve conflict. In other words, parliamentary institutions continually face increasing difficulties in mediating conflict and resolving social and economic strife. This conflict does not stem from governance by elites but is endemic in a society that disperses political influence and thereby mitigates the creation of meaningful majorities to govern

effectively. It is, however, through political parties and, in general, the electoral system that citizens are allowed to articulate their needs and achieve their goals.

Industrial societies today make continuous demands for an expanded government role despite their eroded confidence in political institutions and parties. Why? Not because of economic, psychological, or societal factors; nor because individuals have lost interest in politics. Rather, it is a result of complex governmental structures which make it "more and more difficult for the individual citizen to calculate his self-interest." (p. 547) Agencies for effective social control are not on the horizon.

According to Professor Janowitz, the mass media highlight "the vulnerabilities of the citizenry to appeals and content which weakened personal control." (p. 363) He pointedly criticizes television reporting and advocacy journalism as failing to contribute to the clarification of a citizen's political self-interest; they are "more likely to strengthen mistrust and suspicion." (p. 548) Accordingly, the mass media do not generate consensus or coordination. Furthermore, they fail "to contribute adequately to the articulation of the institutional sectors of society and to contribute to the socialization required for effective social controls." (p.363) As a result, the consumers of mass media see themselves as victims of forces they are unable to control.

As Janowitz sees it, society must have the capacity to regulate itself within a moral framework that transcends self-interest. Is this possible? Perhaps! On the other hand, is there a need for a leader? Perhaps an enlightened leader? Janowitz, at this point, is not at all clear whether social control requires a "social controller," but it would appear that he leans in this direction as a necessity for implementing and completing societal tasks. The more fundamental considerations that should be examined are the types of institutions, rules, regulations, and social and interpersonal relations that will create a more viable society. Janowitz believes that social scientists can assist in this institutional building enterprise that is so necessary.

This book, in my opinion, is Professor Janowitz's major work. It is relevant and fascinating yet a difficult text to assimilate. In it Janowitz has synthesized empirical social science research of the last fifty years in a very coherent fashion, providing the reader with an excellent backdrop for better understanding advanced industrial society.

Professor Janowitz has written this work for his students. Although it is a synthesis of political and sociological research, he cautions his readers that "this is a difficult and at points tedious task." (p. xi) "Therefore, 'sophisticated' scholars and 'hardened' critics must proceed through this volume at their own risk." (p. xi) It is a risk, in the end, well worth the effort required to digest this impressive work.

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A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 by Alistair Horne. New York: Viking Press, 1978, 640 pages, $19.95.

To Americans seeking insights, answers, and lessons from our tragic years of the Vietnam War, Alistair Horne offers a solid historical precedent in his brilliant analysis of the Algerian War—a war rich in parallels to Vietnam. Rather than let the passage of time dilute the rendering of historical fact, he has profited from the cooling of emotions and from interviews with former leaders on all sides of this bitter struggle to present a study of revolutionary conflict that shows the motivation of fellah, Frenchman, "Pied Noir," and "Para" in memorable objectivity.

Horne sees as basic to an understanding of Algeria an appreciation of the semantic complexities that separated the Algerians and the French. For one the war was "the Revolution," for the other "La Guerre D'Algerie," a war to maintain the territorial integrity of metropolitan France.

The Algerian War was a long one, as was the U.S. presence in Vietnam. From his perspective as one of England's finest contemporary historians, Horne analyzes the Algerian War as seven separate, coincident wars: the fighting war; the political struggle for the moderate middle ground; a civil war between Algerians; an internecine struggle with the National Liberation Front (FLN); a battle of wills between the French Army in Algeria and Paris, ending with the overthrow of the Fourth Republic and the revolt of the generals against de Gaulle himself; the "Pied Noir" and Organization of American States' cabal against France and fellah

alike; and, last, the propaganda war for the sympathies of the world, including the people of France.

Horne skillfully sketches native Algerian frustration at French half-measures in response to political aspirations; the weary reaction of a France, which had not known peace since 1939; the bitterness of a French Army which, faced with an "un-winnable" conflict, found the tactics and will to turn the situation around; the radicalization of the "Pieds Noir" and their effect on the army; the corrosive effect of institutionalized torture on all parties; the political action teams that held out the hand of friendship to loyal Algerians and, at times, helped to have the FLN "on the ropes"; and then the final negotiations at Évian, where de Gaulle knew he had to yield and saw all his bargaining counters slip through his fingers as FLN persistence and single-mindedness won the day.

Combining the pace of an adventure story with the detail and precision of a scholarly case study in public policy, Alistair Horne has assembled one of the finest studies of a "war of national liberation" ever written. It is to read and studied by anyone seriously interested in comprehending modern warfare in its political setting.

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Bomber Pilot: A Memoir of World War II by Philip Ardery. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1978, 226 pages, $9.95.

The formula for a good war novel traditionally has four elements: an unusual main character, many perils, other interesting experiences, and a triumphant ending—all of these written in an eloquent style. While a number of novels incorporate most of these elements, few memoirs do. Since World War II, the two best memoirs of the strategic bombing operations against Germany to appear are Bert Stiles's *Serenade to the Big Bird* and Keith Schuyler's *Elusive Horizons*. Now, almost 35 years after the close of that conflict, a new memoir on a par with these two has been published.

Philip Ardery's *Bomber Pilot* contains all the elements noted above. First, Ardery was different from the average crew member in World War II. He was older, entering the air arm in 1940 at what seemed like the ripe old age of twenty-six. He was also better educated, with a bachelor's degree from the University of Kentucky and a law degree from Harvard. Further, he had much more flying experience than the average bomber pilot of the war, having amassed 1800 flying hours, 1000 in heavy bombers when he joined his combat unit. Second, Ardery flew B-24s with the 389th Bomb Group during the hottest portions of the air war over Europe, flying his first combat mission on 6 July 1943 and his last on 6 June 1944. His flight log includes such famous missions as the low-level raid against Ploesti on 1 August 1943, Vegesack on 8 October 1943, Gotha on 22 February 1944, and Berlin on 8 March 1944. His recollections from the pilot's seat of both the Ploesti and Berlin missions are especially well done and valuable to students of the European air war. A strong point of the book is Ardery's viewpoint, not only as a combat flyer but also as a squadron commander and as a staff officer at both the group and wing level. Third, his glimpses of stateside training, his marriage one day before Pearl Harbor was attacked, wartime Britain, and tenting in Africa complement the powerful scenes from the cockpit. Fourth, the author overcomes other difficulties during his overseas service besides German flak and fighters; he rises in rank and position and survives the war, body and soul intact. Finally, the book is well written, for Ardery combines a novelist's eye and poet's touch. The material is interesting in its own right but is enhanced by the author's ability to fit it all together.

One could hope that this book will spur other veterans of the "big war" to dig out their old letters, diaries, and memories. Even if they do not approach the excitement and eloquence of this effort, they may have the stuff from which history is written. Perhaps such material could be sent or willed to the Air Force Academy for historical research. *Bomber Pilot* is highly recommended for anyone interested in war or World War II and especially for those interested in the air war. You will not be disappointed.

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Airships for the Future by William J. White. New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1976, 160 pages, pictures, charts, glossary, $8.95.

William J. White's *Airships for the Future* combines a history of airships, a technical description of their construction and operation, and an argument for their future use. His history is interesting and concise but not the complete or final word on airships and dirigibles. The technical description of the construction and operation of airships provides the layman with a basic understanding of airship principles, and the heart of the book gives White's view of the present and future uses of lighter-than-air craft.

White, however, overstates the case for the airship. Today, he says, modern material technologies allow for greater rigid or semirigid airship strength that can withstand high wind loads and gusts in inclement weather. White feels that a stronger rigid airship design can permit the construction of behemoth airships for commercial use that would be even greater in size than the giants of the past like the *Hindenburg, Akron, Macon*, and *Shenandoah*. He believes the potential lifting capacity of the proposed super airships could make them profitable. In the age of scarce energy, the helium-filled airship could lift several thousand tons of cargo over long distances, inexpensively.

White's argument, founded on a detailed cost study and on the wishes of a lighter-than-air aficionado, is less than convincing. He offers no real proof that airships could move bulk cargo cheaply or that such craft can be actually built to withstand the weather forces that destroyed the airship industry two generations ago. His conclusion that "we now stand at the threshold of a new airship technology" is only partially valid. True, modern technology may enable a stronger airship frame, but White presents little proof that it could work as he advocates.

As an airship picture book, this work encourages the readers in flights of fancy. As a credible argument for future employment of the airship, the book is hardly convincing. A commercial or military user of air freight services might well be skeptical. The book really is but the wishes and daydreams of a hobbyist turned lobbyist for the rigid airship.

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The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon by Gunther E. Rothenberg. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978, 245 pages, appendices, bibliography, index, $12.50.

With this volume, Professor Rothenberg adds to his reputation as military historian. His purpose is to sketch the trends and changes in warfare during the Napoleonic era. He performs his task superbly, for the work is an extremely well written and informative look at a dynamic and important period of military history.

Rothenberg begins by giving an outstanding summary of the strategy, tactics, and conduct of the limited warfare practiced in Europe during the century preceding Napoleon. Chapter three, "The Soldier's Trade," is perhaps the most enlightening and well-written section of the book, showing what a typical battle looked, sounded, and felt like to the participants and why the confusion produced by the smoke and fury of battle is called the "fog of war." He describes the standard weapon employed in these battles, the musket, in fascinating detail, along with its method of use and misuse. Pre-Revolutionary battle had been characterized by an exchange of brutal, unaimed volley fire at close range. It took years of rigorous discipline to induce soldiers to withstand such fearful combat. The conscripts of the French revolutionary armies did not have such training and discipline; something had to be done to compensate for this lack. The answer to many appeared to be the column formation rather than the line. The column lacked the firepower of the line but seemed to offer greater mobility and shock effect. It also seemed to require less training. The author discusses the relative merits of the line and column and demonstrates, somewhat surprisingly, that it was the deadly firepower of the British line that eventually reigned supreme in battle over the massed columns of the French.

Another particularly well-done section describes the strategy and tactics of a typical Napoleonic campaign. Diagrams illustrate Napoleon's classic maneuvers at Jena, Ulm, and Waterloo. The description of this complex subject is unusually clear.

Rothenberg also examines the organization, strategy, and tactics of Napoleon's main enemies: Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia. As he points out, Napoleon had a tremendous influence on these very armies he had previously so decisively

defeated. The vanquished learned from their conqueror, and, eventually, it was the Napoleonic system that was used to defeat Napoleon. In reality, however, these changes and reforms were of limited duration. Using British, French, German, and Austrian sources, Rothenberg points out that although Napoleon seemingly revolutionized tactics and strategy, his legacy is basically a conservative one. The French Revolution and Napoleon precipitated enormous social and economic as well as military change, but the rulers of Europe were not willing to reform their armies entirely along the French pattern if the price to be paid included social reform as well.

In summary, this book is an outstanding study of military strategy and tactics in the age of Napoleon. It should be the first book read by anyone wishing to study warfare during this era. The prose is clear, the documentation thorough, and the insights numerous.

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An Aerospace Bibliography compiled by Samuel Duncan Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978, 341 pages, $4.50.

An Aerospace Bibliography, sponsored by the Office of Air Force History, is an updated version of the original *Annotated Bibliography* by Carl Berger and Mary Ann Cresswell in 1971. This continuing project of the Office of History is a major service to the community of military scholars, and no student of air power history or of military affairs in general can afford to be without it. Also, it must be added that the work is still imperfect, and readers who note defects would do us all a favor by bringing them to the attention of the compilers.

An Aerospace Bibliography uses a topical organization and is divided into thirty-eight subjects. Though the proliferation of categories and subcategories leads to a bit of duplication, such an organization probably does facilitate the researcher's work. The bibliographer's task is necessarily an eclectic one, and, thus, he is always vulnerable to criticism on what he has included and what has been left out—and very often such criticism is merely pedanticism as selection is a matter of judgment or personal taste. Still, one would think that the category "Women in Aviation" would by now contain more than just three books and one article.

More serious are the several technical defects in the book. On page 12, de Seversky's *Victory Through Air Power* is credited to Basil Collier; on page 281 this journal is cited as a quarterly though it has been bimonthly since the early sixties; and the same mistake is made again on page 226, where the *Air University Review* is erroneously cited as the *Air University Quarterly Review*. On pages 16 and 212, the renowned Basil H. Liddell Hart was given credit for having written "The Employment of Tactical Air Power," which was written by Captain Michael O. Wheeler for the *Review*. Ordinarily it is bad form for a reviewer to dwell on the mechanical faults of a book rather than its substance. In this case, however, the imperfections are numerous enough and the special purpose of the work is such that they should be removed in subsequent editions.

A strong feature of the volume is its end matter. Included are a bibliography of bibliographies, a list of relevant reference works, and an excellent summary of the special collections available to the scholar of air and space affairs. Also included are lists of magazines, journals, and the like having special relevance to the field and two competent indices, one on authors and one on subjects. This end material is well conceived to enhance the value of the book as a tool for researchers in various fields. That value is so great that I recommend that every serious military scholar acquire this bibliography and that the Office of Air Force History continue its impressive effort to make subsequent editions even more accurate and comprehensive.

D.R.M.

Dropshot: The United States Plan for War with the Soviet Union in 1957 edited by Anthony Cave Brown. New York: Dial, 1977, 330 pages, $11.95.

Even before V-J Day, U.S. defense officials began planning their postwar military establishment, believing the Soviet Union would be America's most likely adversary in the coming years. With this view, staff planners conceived a number of war

plans after 1945 covering various contingencies. These early war plans, however, were not highly developed, and only after the Berlin blockade of 1948 did the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) agree to an integrated war plan for all the services. At the time, few thinking Americans would have been surprised or alarmed had they realized the existence of war planning—Pearl Harbor was less than a decade past.

In the early 1970s, the JCS began declassifying much of their official record to include parts of war plans drawn up between 1945 and 1950. Suddenly Cold War historians gained access to documents many had only dreamed of seeing, documents which provided new insights into a neglected element of cold war studies—military capability. The JCS files also gave authors an opportunity to edit and publish extensive primary material of interest to both scholars and the general public. Anthony Cave Brown's *Dropshot* is such an effort.

In a single JCS folder at the National Archives, Brown found a largely declassified war plan. The JCS had prepared the plan in 1949 predicated on a possible war in 1957 between the Soviet Union and the United States. "Dropshot," code name for the plan, became the title of Brown's book, which is essentially a reproduction of the war plan. As editor, Brown offers a twenty-nine-page introduction explaining the cold war climate and providing background for "Dropshot's" development. He inserts editorial notes throughout to clarify points or to share his interpretations.

Brown's effort suffers from two flaws. First, he fails to inform the reader about war planning in general. Fundamentally, nations draw up war plans preparing to gain objectives by military means or, more usually, to defend their interests and security—specifically, by responding to an adversary's offensive thrust. Unfortunately, Brown paints a dark aura around the routine function of war planning.

To this feeling of suspicion and misunderstanding, Brown adds rash statements and dashes of sensationalism. He questions the Joint Chiefs' motive for declassifying the war plan and making it available to the general public. He also expresses astonishment that the United States would have such an "offensive plan"; one, if revealed, could not "endear America to Russia." To suggest either nation should not have prepared war plans or did not realize its adversary had done likewise may reflect naïveté on Brown's part but is more probably an attempt to shock the reader.

As the prologue draws to an end, Brown contends that war was always imminent between 1946 and 1949. For support, he cites a 1977 study by the Brookings Institution, which lists Soviet and American actions since 1945 that might have precipitated war. (Ironically, the large numbers of incidents only confirms the wisdom in war planning.)

Brown does, however, bring forth a very valuable and critical point, one that most Cold War scholars have neglected. He is shocked, and rightly so, that in all probability Strategic Air Command (SAC) could not have achieved its objectives given its force structure in 1949. On this point, Brown is correct; a comparison of SAC's strength before the Korean War and the ambitious objectives of "Dropshot" will lead nearly all readers to the same conclusion.

Despite the work's tone, *Dropshot* is a contribution to the scholarly community—it provides a useful document to historians unable to visit the National Archives and to sift through the JCS documents. But had Brown taken greater care with his prologue and had he refrained from inserting a sense of high drama, indignation, and sensationalism, his work would be more credible.

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Famous Fighters of the Second World War by William Green. Second revised edition. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976, 276 pages, $9.95.

This new edition of an old classic should be a welcome addition to the airman's bookshelf. *Famous Fighters* contains concise, well-illustrated narratives of the development, production, modification, and significant improvements of twenty-eight fighter aircraft of the Second World War. Combat operations are briefly summarized.

Compared to the 1957 printing, the new edition adds ten aircraft and incorporates a number of large cutaway drawings. The texts of the articles are unchanged, however.

The employment of air power rests in great part on the capabilities and the utilization of inanimate

machines. Too many aviation books concentrate on such peripheral matters as markings and war stories, devoid of a hardheaded look at the airplane as a technological instrument of war, flown by men who must pit the performance of their craft against the asymmetric performance of the enemy. William Green has always established the opposite standard. *Famous Fighters* is a book that describes the nuts and bolts of aircraft technology as it came to the air battlefields of World War II. The aircraft reflect the abilities and shortcomings—political, industrial, doctrinal—of the warring nations that constructed them. The Me-262, for instance, was hampered by Hitler's insistence that it become a "blitz bomber." The roughhewn construction and easy maintainability of the Yak fighters represented Russia's "no frills" approach to aircraft design (as does the MiG-25 today). The British Gladiator reflected the traditional doctrine of British fighter planners in the 1930s. In telling these stories, Green writes with rare skill and an eye for lessons learned. Any airman can study the book for profit as well as enjoyment.

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The Missing Man: Politics and the MIA by Captain Douglas L. Clarke, USN. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1979, 121 pages.

The Missing Man is the initial product of a new publishing effort by the Research Directorate of the National Defense University. The author of the present volume, now at the National War College, was a fighter pilot in the Vietnam War, though he never was a prisoner or missing in action (MIA). His study looks at the MIA problem through an examination of the manner in which the services administer their status determination processes and an analysis of the way domestic and international politics affected the whole affair.

Captain Clarke is forthright in his conclusion that the MIA issue was used by the Nixon administration to deflect the criticism of antiwar groups away from itself and consequently increased the agony of grieving families and created later political dilemmas for itself and the two succeeding administrations. The use of the issue for short-term political gains built up the expectation among MIA families and their friends that a more or less complete accounting for the missing would be forthcoming. Clarke argues that such an accounting has never been possible for past wars and that it could not be done now. Thus, the expectations are forlorn hopes; they cause unnecessary grief, and they limit the flexibility of current U.S. policy in Asia.

The Missing Man is a worthy first effort and is recommended reading for the professional officer.

D.R.M.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Strategic Implications of Enhanced Radiation Weapons: A Preliminary Analysis" by Dr. Donald M. Snow, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, as the outstanding article in the July-August 1979 issue of the *Review*.

the contributors

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

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