Lt Gen Frank Andrews and the Role of Airpower in Hemispheric Security

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Gen Dwight Eisenhower had big shoes to fill when news concerning the death of Lt Gen Frank M. Andrews circulated throughout the Pentagon.[1] In his eulogy to the aviator, Gen George C. Marshall placed him in a select category that included the nation's few great captains.[2] Such high praise from someone with demanding standards directed toward an individual whose life was cut short so early in the war raises the question, What made Andrews so important? Although historians often designate him a proponent of an independent air force that would conduct strategic bombing or as Eisenhower's predecessor, they overlook his talent in conducting combined operations.[3] Compared to his fellow aviators, Andrews possessed over a decade's experience in the regular Army prior to earning his wings. A cavalryman by trade, he later served as a general's adjutant and received advanced training and education from the US Army's Command and General Staff School and the War College, making him a

rarity among his fellow pilots.[4] This background had considerable bearing on his promotion to head the newly formed General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force. Traditionally, historians emphasize the latter's role in the service's transition to independence but give short shrift to its vital participation in joint operations with Army and Navy forces.[5] Mobility exercises conducted throughout the country in the GHQ Air Force's first two years of existence demonstrated its importance, forcing aviators to come down to earth and recognize problems associated with combined operations in all types of weather involving a variety of air and land assets—aspects with which Andrews was familiar.

His experience and advanced training made him an exceptional leader with a diverse background and knowledge of Army tradition yet a forward-thinking individual who maintained a broad perspective and who understood the necessity for reform as a means of dealing with modern battle conditions. One sees this attitude in his assessment of armor tactics following the Army's Louisiana maneuvers in 1941. Serving as Marshall's G-3 (Operations), Andrews appreciated the need for mobility, speed, and firepower—elements vital for success in mechanized warfare. Upon conclusion of the maneuvers, he sided with armor proponents who advocated creation of the first mobile armored division independent from infantry or cavalry.[6] In a day and age when disciples of airpower incessantly preached aviation's superiority and decisiveness, Andrews's recognition of the value of armor in modern warfare demonstrated his multifaceted approach to combat, indicating his appreciation of integrated operations requiring versatility, flexibility, and responsiveness to threats. Airpower represents one facet of the force multiplier that, when implemented as a whole, makes it decisive. His ideas concerning modern warfare, whether on the ground or in the air, went against conservative norms.

Andrews's leadership proved crucial to bringing about revolutionary changes in the conduct of military operations in concert with airpower despite enormous resistance to change from political and military establishments.[7] Accordingly, in 1941 Marshall appointed him theater

commander—the first Airman to hold this position—giving him responsibility for Caribbean Defense Command, which included Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Isles, Trinidad, the Panama Canal Zone, and the Galapagos Islands.[8]

Axis Threat and Hemispheric Security

The growing tide of war revealed the increasing presence of totalitarian elements from overseas who attempted to infiltrate Latin America. Impressed by fascism's rapid success in Europe, many individuals there believed that Great Britain would fall next. This movement made inroads when Sociedad Colombo Alemana de Transporte Aéreo (SCADTA), a German-owned and -operated air service, increased its presence throughout South America, specifically designing many of its aircraft for dual use in either a civilian or military capacity.[9] Later estimates from 1940 put the total number of miles flown by this airline at more than three million.[10] Reports from Panamanian authorities revealed that in excess of 1,200 German nationalists had recently established businesses and preferred renting apartments in lieu of hotel rooms.[11] Even Mexico was not immune. Covert agents spent large sums of cash entertaining officials and made inquiries about the regional geography, showing particular interest in the coastline.[12]

Fascist threats had now arrived at America's very doorstep, highlighting the military's inability to adequately protect the Panama Canal, which the Navy relied upon to shift assets economically from one ocean to the other. This situation underscored the irony that America's most vital point of defense lay outside its borders. Earlier military assessments publicized in *Time* magazine drew attention to the canal's vulnerabilities. Firstly, sabotage could damage or destroy the locks. Secondly, a carrier-launched strike could smash the locks or breach the dam located at Gatun Lake, thereby draining the water crucial for its operation. Lastly, enemy forces could establish a foothold in Latin America by launching a combined and systematic attack against military installations on the isthmus.[13] In the absence of naval assets, the

best alternative clearly demanded expansion of the canal's defensive perimeter to 2,000 miles by utilizing airpower.[14] Confronting the possibility of a British defeat, the United States adopted a worst-case-scenario mentality, applying diplomatic, economic, and military measures to stem the tide.

Having served as Marshall's G-3 officer for a little more than a year, Andrews was directed to take command of air assets located within the Panama Canal Zone. Wasting no time, he conducted an extensive 6,000-mile inspection of air facilities throughout the theater, conferring with area commanders to determine needed improvements. Although construction of bases remained on schedule, enhancements to the theater's communication grid lagged considerably due to bureaucratic paperwork and conflicts among the various sectors.[15] Submitting his report to Lt Gen Daniel Van Voorhis, the theater commander, on 18 February 1941, Andrews listed seven principles:

1. Deny establishment of hostile bases in the Western Hemisphere.
2. Defeat adversaries by air action against their air assets and establishments.
3. Oppose the operation of any hostile air force through the use of airpower.
4. Operate against hostile land and naval forces that threaten vital US interests.
5. Operate in close coordination with ground forces.
6. Operate in close coordination with naval forces.
7. Operate in lieu of or in support of naval forces when the fleet is not situated to operate effectively against enemy forces.[16]

This action called for unified command and control of all Army air assets in the Caribbean.[17] Emulating the German Luftwaffe's tactics in Norway in May 1940, Andrews established the Army's first air-mobile strike force, combining infantry with air transport to respond instantly with a substantial force to any attack.[18] Appreciating England's air

defense and its reliance on radar during the blitz, he patterned his newly formed Caribbean Air Force on that model.[19] However, because Andrews and Van Voorhis did not have a good working relationship, Marshall requested that the latter relinquish command early and promoted Andrews to theater commander.[20]

The American Lake

Upon taking charge of Caribbean Defense Command on 19 September 1941, Andrews encouraged the men under his command

> to shoulder together the burden of preparing yourselves for whatever eventuality time may bring. Whether your job is in the air or on the ground, it is this spirit of teamwork which has made possible the progress which has been made and which still must be made. World War II has clearly demonstrated that teamwork between air, ground and sea forces is the primary requirement for military success. May we ever keep in mind, in the Panama Canal Department and the Caribbean Defense Command, an appreciation of this fundamental principle.[21] (emphasis in original)

His promotion to theater commander proved significant for several reasons. Firstly, the command was the largest one at the time that involved both ground and air troops. Secondly, Andrews's assumption of command marked the first use of the policy of grouping all elements under an officer of a branch most likely to bear the brunt of operations in that area. Thirdly, for the first time, an individual from the Air Corps commanded a theater. Moreover, at no other time in American history had defensive operations included expansion to foreign countries.[22]

Andrews restructured his command by dividing it into three sectors: Panamanian, Puerto Rican, and Trinidadian. Sector commanders were responsible for defense and training in their respective areas. Recognizing the requirement for a strong air defense in the face of impending war, the general instituted fighter air patrols.[23] Aircraft patrolled frequently, especially on the Pacific side of the Canal Zone where Andrews believed that attacks on the canal would most likely occur. He ensured the presence of antiaircraft batteries on all the islands and

requisitioned additional radar sets to cover the Pacific and monitor air traffic in Colombia.[24] With the help of Gen Harry Ingles, his chief of staff and an experienced signals officer, Andrews rectified the communications problem so that area commanders could speak to one another and with Andrews's headquarters. This action established a communications grid spanning the distant islands, including countries in Latin America.[25]

US Air Force File Photo

***Second from right*: Lt Gen Frank Andrews inspecting communications (Puerto Rico, 1941)**

In keeping with the philosophy of hemispheric defense, Andrews improved and expanded the numerous airfields in the Caribbean theater. On Marshall's behalf, he conducted a series of negotiations with Ecuadorian officials, establishing a base on the Galapagos Islands. Completed in late 1942, the airfield broadened the defensive perimeter of the Panama Canal, extended the range of aircraft over the Pacific Ocean, and closed gaps in the patrol route.[26] Andrews consistently demonstrated his knack for diplomacy by patiently negotiating with several other Latin American states, each with its own agenda, ultimately establishing an "American Lake" within the Caribbean theater.[27]

These alliances produced a defensive ring around the canal and maintained the southern air route vital for the support of Allied forces in North Africa once America joined the fray. Furthermore, his efforts to revitalize good relations with Latin American countries paid dividends in the long run—witness their consent to the deployment of US military assets to the region of Surinam, an area known for its bauxite, a valuable resource critical to the production of high-grade aluminum.[28]

Although efforts to complete defensive measures remained unfinished when the nation entered World War II, Andrews held two significant advantages. For one, possession of a unified command facilitated combined operations, demonstrating his understanding that the mission to guard the Panama Canal and the Caribbean demanded the use of all available assets. Additionally, his collegial relationship with Marshall eliminated any possibility of misunderstanding his commander's intent.[29] With Marshall's support, Andrews united all Army Air Corps assets under a single command to protect the approaches to the canal and monitor activities in Latin America.[30] Furthermore, he conducted productive mock exercises to maintain readiness.[31]

Operation Neuland: German Submarine Warfare in the Caribbean

Despite securing the Canal Zone, Andrews could not prevent early successes of the German U-boat campaign against Allied shipping in the Caribbean. Simultaneously defending the Panama Canal with scant resources and maintaining vigilance across the vastness of the Caribbean proved impossible. Compounding the problem was the fact that American naval strategy, concentrating on the Pacific, miscalculated the ability of the British Royal Navy to thwart attacks in the Atlantic. Furthermore, the Air Corps and Navy had continually grappled over coastal defense and were now paying the price for their intransigence.[32] Consequently, between February and May 1942, US forces suffered a temporary setback, losing 46 ships totaling more than 219,867 gross tons.[33]

Its Pacific Fleet at the bottom of Pearl Harbor and faced with demands to supply beleaguered forces in the Pacific, the Navy had few resources to spend chasing submarines, let alone assist the Air Corps.[34] Yet, that service remained critical of the Air Corps's performance in the Caribbean and initially declined to share intelligence or allow the Air Corps to fly beyond its jurisdiction.[35] Recognizing the need to maintain a semblance of unity and having learned from earlier experiences, Andrews publicly expressed a sense of cooperation between the two services while privately venting to Marshall.[36] However, this did not prevent others like retired Army colonel Hugh Knerr, Andrews's former chief of staff at GHQ Air Force, from speaking openly. Free from military censure, Knerr blasted the Navy's failure to support Andrews's mission in the Caribbean:

> The average sixty year old admiral contemplates the tortures of hell a lot more cheerfully than he contemplates being commanded by an Army general. The area around the Windward Islands is obviously an area that anyone responsible for the defense of the canal would like to know is being patrolled most carefully, but General Andrews has no authority to direct the patrolling. He supplies the bombers, but they cannot leave the ground without the permission of the admiral who shares the Navy sentiment that Army aviation stops at the shoreline.
>
> Pearl Harbor is a bloody monument to divided responsibility, but even now it remains a three way split command between Admiral Nimitz, the Navy's district commander, and Army airman Lt. General Delos Emmons. The simple solution to this never ending problem is to give absolute authority to one man in each theater of war.[37]

The protest had its desired effect, and the American public, many of whom had sons serving in harm's way, quickly clamored for a formal military investigation and urged cooperation.[38]

With the canal secure, Andrews quickly shifted his assets to address the U-boat menace. Having a unified air command helped. In an ironic twist, he relied upon the twin-engine B-18 Bolo, a lightly armed aircraft that he had lobbied against in favor of the B-17 Flying Fortress.[39] Initially, these aircraft proved ill equipped to deal with U-boats, and air crews—indoctrinated to fly at high altitudes—occasionally failed to

spot their prey. Undeterred, Andrews ordered these aircraft retrofitted with low-altitude bombsights, radar, and depth charges. Most importantly, he instituted a rigorous patrol schedule conducted at lower altitudes and implemented square search patterns in relays after encountering the enemy.[40]

Adherence to the fundamentals paid off over time, reflected by the experience of Kapitänleutnant Werner Hartenstein. Attempting to repeat the success of the previous summer, Hartenstein and his U-156 returned on 2 March 1943 and experienced the difference firsthand. They did manage to escape but not before B-18s damaged the U-boat's fuel tanks, leaving an oily trail for the Navy's PBY flying boats to follow. They sank U-156 the following day.[41] Coincidentally, negative reaction to casualties suffered by the local population at the hands of the Germans meant that the Axis was also losing the ever-important battle of hearts and minds.[42]

Over time, American industrial production caught up with demand, making longer-range aircraft like the utilitarian B-24 Liberator more available. Eventually the Navy, in addition to adopting the British convoy system, assumed responsibility for antisubmarine patrols. Rewarded for his efforts, General Andrews was transferred to North Africa in November 1942 and given the task of uniting the disparate air assets throughout the Mediterranean and combining them into US Army Forces in the Middle East.[43]

Photo courtesy Cpl Charles Henry Allert

B-24D (serial no. 42-63800), attached to the 3rd Bomb Squadron, Sixth Air Force, remained in service throughout the war performing antisubmarine patrols in the Caribbean. Paint removal and replacement of standard propellers improved performance at lower altitudes, thus demonstrating the US military's adage of adapt, improvise, and overcome.

Proficiency through experience allowed the Air Corps to drive off attacks.[44] Andrews's insistence on the fundamentals recognized that numbers mattered and that the protection of ships was more important than sinking submarines. The latter operated best on the surface, so forcing them to remain submerged to evade aerial detection allowed vital Allied cargo to reach its destination safely.[45] Additionally, the absence of air conditioning made life aboard U-boats uncomfortable in the heat of the Caribbean. Prolonged subsurface operations depleted the submarine's batteries, prevented acquisition of fresh air, and diminished the crew's overall performance. Unable to surface and recharge batteries or obtain fresh air—even at night—for fear of detection by aircraft, the U-boats were forced to withdraw.[46]

The greatest challenge confronting Andrews involved synchronizing his operations between Army and Navy components that for decades remained thoroughly indoctrinated to operate within their own service standards. Fortunately, leadership, time, and the realities of the situation prevailed to the point that both services reconciled their differ-

ences.[47] However, the same cannot be said of the Axis, which failed to exploit initial successes due to disputes over naval strategy and a lack of cooperation among the military services.[48] Failure to develop what we today consider second-generation technology meant that U-boats sailing off to war in 1944 were essentially the same as those of 1940. By the time the revolutionary type XXI arrived, it was too late. Conversely, the Allies continually enhanced radar, communications, and weapons platforms.[49] Furthermore, Germany's failure to capitalize on initial efforts to influence political, economic, and social elements within Latin America culminated in a rejection of fascist power previously embraced in that region. Faced with Andrews's talent for adaptation, aggressive countermeasures, tact, diplomacy, and vigorous pursuit of a collaborative policy, Operation Neuland ceased after less than a year.

Conclusion

America's brief, limited experiences during World War I account in part for its slow maturation in aviation early in the next world war. A cultural mind-set that obsessed over the costs of defense, coupled with a preference for isolationism, resulted in significant developmental delays and deterred creation of a sound, unified aviation strategy. Despite previous training and education, American commanders were overwhelmed by the rapid expansion and complexities of a new global war that surpassed anything in their imagination. Thus, commanders sometimes made mistakes or miscalculations, revealing either personal imperfections or the limitations of technology; however, this process also separated the leaders who learned from their experiences from those who could not. The events of the Caribbean campaign demonstrated that General Andrews, although an advocate of airpower, did not confine its use merely to high-altitude precision bombing. The numbers vindicate the importance that he placed on combined operations. Historian Orlando Pérez notes the recording of more than 23,000 transits between July 1941 and June 1945, an average of 16 per day. The unhindered movement of troops and equipment between

the Atlantic and Pacific proved invaluable to the Allied war effort.[50] Further, Andrews's antisubmarine campaign secured valuable bauxite in Surinam and the vital southern air route to Europe.

Unfortunately, his promotion to theater commander of Europe in February 1943 was short lived. Perishing in an aircraft crash in Iceland on 3 May 1943, Andrews never saw the fruit of his efforts.[51] In the wake of his death and hasty funeral arrangements, his nephew recalled promises from officials to honor the general's legacy at war's end.[52] Greater events transpired in the interim, however, quickly overshadowing his tragic end.

US Air Force file photo

Recovery of bodies from crash site in Iceland

In his essay "The Air War in Europe, 1939–1945," Richard Overy describes the air strategy instituted by the Allies in World War II as a "general strategy" which, unlike that of the Axis, did not limit its use or dilute its resources. Furthermore, he observes the current historical shift from emphasis on bombing campaigns to air operations, exemplified by Andrews's efforts in the Caribbean during 1941–42.[53] Airpower's significance lay not in its decisiveness but in its versatility, and Andrews was the first and foremost US commander to demonstrate this difference.

Granted, other great aviation leaders emerged during World War II, but none of them became theater commander in an active war zone.

Pigeonholing Andrews as a proponent of strategic bombing or as a crusader for air independence mirrors Overy's argument and overlooks the fact that his best talent lay in operational planning. The general understood that securing the Panama Canal, the natural resources in Latin America, and the southern air route to Africa were essential to hemispheric defense—more so than airpower itself. Only by emphasizing operational control and by maximizing technology, cooperation, and forethought could the Allies take this first step in the long road to victory. ✪

Notes

1. Associated Press, "Downed in Iceland: Plane of Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe Falls in Wild Spot, Staff Officers with Him; Methodist Bishop-Chaplain on Flight during Global Tour of American Bases; Gen. Andrews Dies in Iceland Crash," *New York Times*, 5 May 1943, 1.

2. DeWitt S. Copp, *Frank M. Andrews: Marshall's Airman* (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2003), 26.

3. Despite all the accolades bestowed upon Andrews by contemporaries and historians alike, no major historical works about him exist. The crash of his B-24 destroyed not only the man but also many of his personal documents. In 2004 E. Thomas Woods began working on *Andrews: Life of a Leader*, in which he emphasizes the general's leadership and courage of conviction with regard to airpower. DeWitt S. Copp's books *A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events That Shaped the Development of U.S. Air Power* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980) and *Forged in Fire: Strategy and Decisions in the Air War over Europe, 1940–45* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982) offer the closest biographical sketch. Copp later published *Frank M. Andrews: Marshall's Airman* (see note 2), which highlights his aviation talents and leadership. He pays particular attention to the close relationship between Andrews and General Marshall and its impact on US preparedness. Separate articles by David T. Zabecki ("Frank Andrews Was the Architect of U.S. Air Power Who Might Have Commanded Allied Forces on D-Day," September 1998) and E. Thomas Wood ("The Man Who Would Be Ike: What If Frank Andrews Had Survived His 1943 Air Crash?," May/June 2010) for *World War II Magazine* emphasize Andrews's effective leadership and cooperative personality; however, they spend much time contemplating the "what ifs" had General Andrews survived. Conversely, H. O. Malone adeptly focuses on "what was" in "The Influence of Frank Andrews," *Air Force Magazine* 85, no. 2 (February 2002): 84–88, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2002/February%202002/0202andrews.pdf. He credits the general's gradual commitment to an airpower strategy that would lead to establishment of the US Air Force. John Shiner demonstrates Andrews's role in organizing airpower militarily in "Birth

of the GHQ Air Force," *Military Affairs* 42, no. 3 (October 1978): 113–20. Shiner credits Andrews for his leadership and notes that he was well respected by ground and air staff alike.

4. James P. Tate, *The Army and Its Air Corps: Army Policy toward Aviation, 1919–1941* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1998), 192.

5. Wireless to the *New York Times*, "Attack on Ponce Ends War Game: Puerto Rican National Guard Defends City as Marines Occupy Near-By Hills," *New York Times*, 4 March 1938, 24.

6. Christopher R. Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1991), 22–23.

7. Nelson Andrews, "Nelson Andrews Discusses Frank Maxwell Andrews," Leading Voices, Lipscomb University, 10 November 2010, audio clip, 55 min.,16 sec., http://leadingvoices.lipscomb.edu/commonground/Nelson_Andrews_Discusses_Frank_Maxwell_Andrews/.

8. George C. Marshall, "Letter to Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews," 14 October 1941, *Marshall Papers*, no. 2-577, http://www.marshallfoundation.org/Database.htm.

9. Nazi Victories News Reports by Russell B. Porter, special cable to the *New York Times*, "German Propaganda in Colombia Seen as Winning Conservatives: Fifth Columnists among Influential Part of Community Developed—They Spread Nazi View That U.S. Is Helpless," *New York Times*, 17 August 1940, 7.

10. Central Intelligence Agency, *Importance to the US of Latin American Civil Air Transport*, historical file ORE 22-49 (Langley, VA: Central Intelligence Agency, October 1950), 11. Document declassified 21 July 1992.

11. Special Cable to the *New York Times*, "Ecuador Is Sifting German Activities," *New York Times*, 25 August 1940, 28.

12. Russell B. Porter, special to the *New York Times*, "Nazi Agents Found Busy in Mexico, Viewed as Threat to U.S. Defense: 5th Column Network Reported Sowing Hatred for U.S., Planning Sabotage and Opening Way for Aid to Invading Forces; Busy Agents Spend Freely; Army Officers Approached; Official Resistance Stiffened; Landing Fields Available; Major Threat to Defense," *New York Times*, 28 August 1940, 6.

13. This mirrored the various naval fleet exercises conducted during 1923–40 and involved both conventional and nonconventional tactics. See Albert A. Nofi, *To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 52–55, 62–63. In 1930 the US Army published a field assessment of the Panama Canal: Joseph Hamilton Grant, *A Study of the Influence of Military Geography upon the Defense of the Panama Canal Zone* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff School, 1930), 36–39. See also "National Defense: The Strategic Geography of the Caribbean Sea," *Time* 36, no. 5 (29 July 1940): 37–39.

14. "National Defense."

15. Wireless to the *New York Times*, "Stresses New Bases in Canal Air Defense: Gen. Andrews Completes 6,000-Mile Tour of Inspection," *New York Times*, 30 January 1941, 11.

16. Kathleen Williams, *Air Defense of the Panama Canal, 1 January 1939–7 December 1941*, Army Air Force Historical Studies, no. 42 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Army Air Force Historical Office, 1946), 139–40, http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090602-096.pdf.

17. Ibid., 141.

18. "First Air Troops Formed in Panama: Specially Trained Battalion Organized as Aerial Vanguard of Swift-Striking Force; New Trend to Air Power: Military Aviators Believe Reinforcements Could Be Sent Quickly to Aid New Unit," *New York Times*, 27 July 1941, 24.

19. Copp, *Forged in Fire*, 117–18.
20. Copp, *Frank M. Andrews*, 18–19.
21. Williams, *Air Defense of the Panama Canal*, 197.
22. Daniel P. Hagedorn, *Alae Supra Canalem—Wings over the Canal: The Sixth Air Force and the Antilles Air Command* (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Co., 1995), 25–26.
23. Williams, *Air Defense of the Panama Canal*, 181.
24. Charles Morris Brooks, *Guarding the Crossroads: Security and Defense of the Panama Canal* (Colombia [?]: P & P Group, 2003), 158.
25. Karl G. Larew, "December 7, 1941: The Day No One Bombed Panama," *Historian* 66, no. 2 (June 2004): 284–85.
26. Paul H. Harrison, "Study of the U.S. Air Forces' Galapagos Island Base," 28 October 1947, http://www.galapagos.to/TEXTS/USAF1947.HTM.
27. Harold Callenderbalboa, "C.Z., Our Vital Ditch: Mighty New Defenses of Panama," *New York Times*, 18 May 1941, SM8.
28. C. H. Calhoun, special cable to the *New York Times*, "Latin America Backs U.S. Vigilance: Troops at Surinam Seen a Service of Good Neighbor," *New York Times*, 30 November 1941, E5.
29. Comparatively speaking, dialogue between Marshall and Andrews was cordial (see examples 2-062, 2-219, and 2-577) whereas with Eisenhower it was instructional (see examples 3-338, 3-339, and 4-172). Marshall's tone and candor indicate deference toward Andrews, who previously outranked him during Andrews's stint as chief of GHQ. Consider the fact that during the same period of time, Eisenhower was a major serving as MacArthur's aide. *Marshall Papers*, http://www.marshallfoundation.org/Database.htm.
30. Associated Press, "Army Air Forces Unified for Canal and Caribbean," *New York Times*, 15 June 1941, 34.
31. Copp, *Forged in Fire*, 196–97.
32. John F. Shiner, "The Air Corps, the Navy, and Coast Defense: 1919–1941," *Military Affairs* 45, no. 3 (October 1981): 113–20.
33. A. Timothy Warnock, *The Battle against the U-Boat in the American Theater*, US Army Air Forces in World War II (Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1993), 13.
34. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Securing Orient Aid Routes Is Navy Job: Problem of Pacific War Supplies Is Held Greater Than That of Arming Britain across the Atlantic," *New York Times*, 27 January 1942, 13.
35. Ibid.
36. Copp, *Frank M. Andrews*, 10–11, 16.
37. "Army & Navy: Indictment of the Navy," *Time* 39, no. 22 (1 June 1942): 46, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,790546,00.html.
38. "Letters to the Editor," *Time* 40, no. 12 (29 June 1942): 5.
39. CAPT Arthur H. Wagner and Lt Col Leon E. Braxton, *Birth of a Legend: The Bomber Mafia and the Y1B-17* (n.p.: Trafford Publishing, 2012), 160.
40. Hagedorn, *Alae Supra Canalem*, 70–73.
41. William Wolf, *Douglas B-18 Bolo: The Ultimate Look; from Drawing Board to U-Boat Hunter* (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2007), 156–57.
42. C. H. Calhoun, special cable to the *New York Times*, "Submarines Plague Caribbean Coast: Their Forays Raise Storm of Hostility against Axis," *New York Times*, 2 July 1942, E4.
43. Copp, *Marshall's Airman*, 23.

44. Arthur Ferguson, *The AAF Antisubmarine Command*, Historical Study no. 107 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Army Air Force Historical Studies, April 1945), 213–15, http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090522-043.pdf.

45. Special cable to the *New York Times*, "Canal Defenses Stronger, Gen. Andrews Says; Calls Anti-Submarine Measures 'Successful,'" *New York Times*, 18 July 1942, 5.

46. Holger H. Herwig, "Slaughter in Paradise," *Naval History* 24, no. 1 (February 2010): 7.

47. A memorandum established an interservice committee on aerial antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The Air Corps relinquished its B-24s to the Navy, which agreed to pick up ASW duties. George C. Marshall, "Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations," 15 June 1943, *Marshall Papers*, no. 4-014, http://www.marshallfoundation.org/Database.htm. Additionally, prior to formal agreement, both services were collaborating on ASW tactics. See LTC Clinton Burrows, A-2, "Monthly Intelligence Report," AAF Antisubmarine Command, New York, February 1943, 7, 18–19, 25–26, 30–32.

48. Herwig, "Slaughter in Paradise," 5–7.

49. Ibid., 4.

50. Orlando J. Pérez, "Panama: Nationalism and the Challenge to Canal Security," in *Latin America during World War II*, ed. Thomas M. Leonard and John F. Bratzel (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 71.

51. Milton Bracker, "The New Boss of the ETO: General Andrews, Flying Officer, Comes to the European Theatre of Operations via Panama and the Middle East," *New York Times*, 28 February 1943, SM10.

52. Andrews, "Nelson Andrews Discusses."

53. Richard Overy, "The Air War in Europe, 1939–1945," in *A History of Air Warfare*, ed. John Andreas Olsen (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010), 50–51.

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