ASPJ Africa and Francophonie
Winter 2009 Inaugural Issue

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Editorial

ASPJ — Africa and Francophonie

Welcome to the inaugural issue of *Air and Space Power Journal–Africa and Francophonie* (*ASPJ–A&F*).

Air and Space Power Journal has published journals in English, Spanish and Portuguese since the 1940s. Editions in Arabic and French were launched in 2005, and a Chinese edition followed in 2007. Recognizing the importance of Africa and the broad French-speaking areas in the world, we are proud to announce the birth of *ASPJ–A&F*, a refinement of the current French edition. The enhanced edition will continue to reflect Air University's philosophy of openness and transparency to the global community, which is the foundation of the Air Force Research Institute's vision and mission. This evolutionary publication will inherit the French-language ASPJ's network of libraries, research centers, government agencies, embassies, and so forth, in 103 countries, as well as a wide range of audiences in 32 francophone countries. The Africa and Francophonie edition will be published in French and English for readers in the African continent and French–speaking world: more than 80 countries.

Like its predecessor, *ASPJ–A&F* embodies the spirit of democratic ideals, intellectual independence, critical analysis, vigorous and scholarly research, and realistic methodologies. It continues the US Air Force tradition of intellectual curiosity unconstrained by scope, subject matter and prevailing thought relative to air, space and cyberspace power and employment. The new journal covers all areas of activity of the world's air forces and the armed forces in general, as well as their operational environment, both national and international.

Air University and the Air Force Research Institute are proud of their history of developing air, space, and cyberspace power-projection concepts applicable to mutual national security and defense worldwide. In addition, the University and the Institute are fortunate to possess the capability to advance those conceptual tenets through vigorous research and education programs that span the professional military education continuum. We believe that professional development is greatly enhanced by the free exchange of information, ideas, and viewpoints with our allies and friends. Critical thought, intellectual discussions, and scholarly writing relative to the military profession increase the range of potential solutions to the international challenges faced by our armed forces. Air University schools are internationally regarded for developing warrior-scholars, and the various editions of the *Air and Space Power Journal* provide a credible and well-recognized forum for advancing the innovative and rigorously tested ideas of our students. The *Journal* also provides an excellent venue for extending the international security dialogue globally, and we therefore encourage our readers to employ these publications to enrich that dialogue. We welcome the opportunity to consider unsolicited work from our readers.

All editions of *ASPJ* encourage and promote professional dialogue among the world's airmen and soldiers in order to showcase the best ideas to be exploited by air and space forces fulfilling national and international objectives. Our goal is to provide a forum for aviators, members of the armed forces and specialists in African Affairs and Francophonie to discuss subjects of common interest; stimulate new ideas that will make the best use of air, space and cyberspace power; and encourage military professionalism.

This new publication reflects the importance we place on our military and civilian colleagues. We believe we can greatly benefit from their innovative and strategic thinking. It focuses on the specific needs and various interests of African and French-speaking militaries around the world. Again, we encourage our readers to recognize the importance of global engagement in the current international environment and to employ the *ASPJ–A&F* to spur that necessary engagement. We hope to exchange ideas, compare experiences, and explore new opportunities with the airmen, soldiers, and experts from all countries with the aim of advancing the skills of the world's armed forces.

There are a wide range of relevant and important ideas that must be examined in depth—even debated vigorously— at a time when the military profession is undergoing significant changes to its perspective, equipment, structure, and probable methods for conducting future operations. I therefore hope that our exchanges, which are the substance of this journal, would be frank and open.

ASPJ–A&F seeks to maintain openness and share knowledge with the world. It is a forum where different currents meet. We do not want to promote a preconceived idea or advocate a ready-made concept; rather, we are committed to providing the most accurate possible reflection of the world's armed forces. We are witnesses, not judges. Accordingly, *ASPJ–A&F* does not collate negative reviews—or polemic—nor is it journalism. That is why we chose simply to provide reading materials and entrust our readers with judgment and critique. Because this role also applies to other cultures and languages, we will continue to publish articles of substance as well as thought pieces, leaving the floor open to academics, aviators/soldiers of all ranks, experts, and civilian/military decision makers of various opinions and nationalities. In reality, this openness is a certain vocation of quest and discovery.

Rémy M. Mauduit, Editor
Air & Space Power Journal—Africa and Francophonie
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The Requirement for a Future Strategy

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> *We must also look at the world as it is, not as we'd like it to be, and we must acknowledge that much of the world does not necessarily see us as we would see ourselves. And we must look clear-eyed beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Only with that understanding can we determine where we want to go and how we want to get there. But as this vision develops, we must keep in mind that it is no good if we cannot provide the means to achieve it, nor is it useful if it is not a realistic fit with the rest of the world.*
>
> —Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), 10 July 2008

First of all, I want to take this opportunity to thank former Air Force secretary Mike Wynne and Gen Buzz Moseley for their many contributions to our Air Force. Among these contributions are the establishment of the Air Force Research Institute, the *Strategic Studies Quarterly* and ASPJ *Africa & Francophonie*. We will do our best to live up to their great expectations.

Today, our Air Force is the best in the world. However, to remain the best we must take on some of the most critical challenges we have ever faced—especially with regard to modernization. Having said that, in my view, the most significant challenge all of us in the military face today concerns developing a unifying strategy that will guide our contributions to solving the problems our nation confronts. This challenge has at least two components.

First, our leaders must institute a balance between meeting the needs of the present and preparing for those of the future. This is not an either/or proposition; both are essential strategic tasks. Our country finds itself in a particularly difficult era with respect to this strategic component because of the immediacy of the present conflicts and the ill-defined nature of the future threat. Achieving our strategic objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan after removing the regimes in those two countries has required our forces to develop new skills and operating concepts in the crucible of irregular warfare. While critics may argue about the decision to become involved militarily or about the pace of progress, no one can dispute that US and coalition forces have demonstrated unparalleled operational flexibility in adapting to the post–9/11 environment. That adaptation has provided the fledgling democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan time and security to organize and start the process of resolving core issues for their societies. Regardless of the justifiable pride in our progress, we must seek to do even better in the near term. We must also integrate the lessons from this experience into our Services so that they become part and parcel of our doctrines, organizations, and capabilities.

Regarding the future, our challenge is to present to our national leaders a realistic assessment of the threats we expect to face. With the fall of the Soviet Union, our national security planning lost its focal point. Instead of a single enemy against which to plan, program, and budget our military capabilities, we now find few states that confront our interests and capabilities directly in the same way the Soviets had. Instead, we see failing states,

humanitarian disasters, genocides, transnational criminals, and the rise of transnational terrorism. The picture becomes even more complicated with the addition of interconnected trends spawned by globalization, environmental degradation, global demographic imbalance, and energy and resource scarcity. This stream of nontraditional challenges came into sharp relief in the form of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001—we are no longer in just a post–Cold War era, we find ourselves also in the post–9/11 era. But as important and immediate as the complex threats that coalesced into the terrorists attacks of 9/11 are, their immediacy can tend to obscure potential threats from nation-state adversaries. To repeat, this is not an either/or proposition—our national security depends on fielding capabilities and forces to cope with the full range of security challenges.

The second component of our strategic challenge involves presenting options that provide national leaders and operational commanders the flexibility to gain a return on our Services' investments in training, organizing, and equipping. This is an intellectual challenge that requires us to question our preconceived notions of how best to employ military capabilities to serve the national interest. It requires integrating policy development with planning and programming rather than dealing with those essential activities as if they were divorced from each other and from the ends of strategy and national defense. This intellectual activity requires research, discussion, debate, and engagement with a wide range of public policy, strategy, academic, and defense professionals. On occasion we will find that our partners in these discussions will disagree with our perspectives—that is part of the process. We need to be effective and knowledgeable advocates of our positions as Airmen as well as sufficiently confident to listen carefully to the range of perspectives presented by those outside our community or technical specialties. Our charge is to synthesize the best options for securing the nation by engaging with the most creative, perceptive, professional, and thoughtful people who, like us, dedicate themselves to providing for our nation's security.

Research, debate, publication, outreach, and engagement are some of the lines of operation that converge into solutions to these components of strategy. Those of us in the military, in the government, and in academia must evaluate our progress, question our assumptions, and propose creative alternatives that help us confront the complex challenges of today's and tomorrow's global security environment. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* and ASPJ *Africa & Francophonie* are one forum for these exchanges to take place—I look forward to participating in these engagements as we move ahead. ❑

Remarks to the Ghanaian Parliament

Accra International Conference Center, Accra, Ghana (West Africa)

Barack H. Obama, President of the United States of America

Good afternoon, everybody. It is a great honor for me to be in Accra and to speak to the representatives of the people of Ghana. I am deeply grateful for the welcome that I've received, as are Michelle and Malia and Sasha Obama. Ghana's history is rich, the ties between our two countries are strong, and I am proud that this is my first visit to sub-Saharan Africa as President of the United States of America.

I want to thank Madam Speaker and all the members of the House of Representatives for hosting us today. I want to thank President Mills for his outstanding leadership. To the former Presidents—Jerry Rawlings, former President Kufuor—Vice President, Chief Justice—thanks to all of you for your extraordinary hospitality and the wonderful institutions that you've built here in Ghana.

I'm speaking to you at the end of a long trip. I began in Russia for a summit between two great powers. I traveled to Italy for a meeting of the world's leading economies. And I've come here to Ghana for a simple reason: The 21st century will be shaped by what happens not just in Rome or Moscow or Washington, but by what happens in Accra, as well.

This is the simple truth of a time when the boundaries between people are overwhelmed by our connections. Your prosperity can expand America's prosperity. Your health and security can contribute to the world's health and security. And the strength of your democracy can help advance human rights for people everywhere.

So I do not see the countries and peoples of Africa as a world apart; I see Africa as a fundamental part of our interconnected world, as partners with America on behalf of the future we want for all of our children. That partnership must be grounded in mutual responsibility and mutual respect. And that is what I want to speak with you about today.

We must start from the simple premise that Africa's future is up to Africans.

I say this knowing full well the tragic past that has sometimes haunted this part of the world. After all, I have the blood of Africa within me, and my family's, my family's own story encompasses both the tragedies and triumphs of the larger African story.

Some of you know my grandfather was a cook for the British in Kenya, and though he was a respected elder in his village, his employers called him "*boy*" for much of his life. He was on the periphery of Kenya's liberation struggles, but he was still imprisoned briefly during repressive times. In his life, colonialism wasn't simply the creation of unnatural borders or unfair terms of trade—it was something experienced personally, day after day, year after year.

My father grew up herding goats in a tiny village, an impossible distance away from the American universities where he would come to get an education. He came of age at a moment of extraordinary promise for Africa.

The struggles of his own father's generation were giving birth to new nations, beginning right here in Ghana. Africans were educating and asserting themselves in new ways, and history was on the move.

But despite the progress that has been made—and there has been considerable progress in many parts of Africa—we also know that much of that promise has yet to be fulfilled. Countries like Kenya had a per capita economy larger than South Korea's when I was born. They have badly been outpaced. Disease and conflict have ravaged parts of the African continent.

In many places, the hope of my father's generation gave way to cynicism, even despair.Now, it's easy to point fingers and to pin the blame of these problems on others. Yes, a colonial map that made little sense helped to breed conflict. The West has often approached Africa as a patron or a source of resources rather than a partner. But the West is not responsible for the destruction of the Zimbabwean economy over the last decade, or wars in which children are enlisted as combatants. In my father's life, it was partly tribalism and patronage and nepotism in an independent Kenya that for a long stretch derailed his career, and we know that this kind of corruption is still a daily fact of life for far too many.

Now, we know that's also not the whole story. Here in Ghana, you show us a face of Africa that is too often overlooked by a world that sees only tragedy or a need for charity. The people of Ghana have worked hard to put democracy on a firmer footing, with repeated peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested elections. And by the way, can I say that for that the minority deserves as much credit as the majority. And with improved governance and an emerging civil society, Ghana's economy has shown impressive rates of growth.

This progress may lack the drama of 20th century liberation struggles, but make no mistake: It will ultimately be more significant. For just as it is important to emerge from the control of other nations, it is even more important to build one's own nation.

So I believe that this moment is just as promising for Ghana and for Africa as the moment when my father came of age and new nations were being born. This is a new moment of great promise. Only this time, we've learned that it will not be giants like Nkrumah and Kenyatta who will determine Africa's future. Instead, it will be you—the men and women in Ghana's parliament, the people you represent. It will be the young people brimming with talent and energy and hope who can claim the future that so many in previous generations never realized.

Now, to realize that promise, we must first recognize the fundamental truth that you have given life to in Ghana: Development depends on good governance. That is the ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, for far too long. That's the change that can unlock Africa's potential. And that is a responsibility that can only be met by Africans.

As for America and the West, our commitment must be measured by more than just the dollars we spend. I've pledged substantial increases in our foreign assistance, which is in Africa's interests and America's interests. But the true sign of success is not whether we are a source of perpetual aid that helps people scrape by it's whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change.

This mutual responsibility must be the foundation of our partnership. And today, I'll focus on four areas that are critical to the future of Africa and the entire developing world: democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful resolution of conflict.

First, we must support strong and sustainable democratic governments.

As I said in Cairo, each nation gives life to democracy in its own way, and in line with its

own traditions. But history offers a clear verdict: Governments that respect the will of their own people, that govern by consent and not coercion, are more prosperous, they are more stable, and more successful than governments that do not.

This is about more than just holding elections. It's also about what happens between elections. Repression can take many forms, and too many nations, even those that have elections, are plagued by problems that condemn their people to poverty. No country is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves or if police can be bought off by drug traffickers. No business wants to invest in a place where the government skims 20 percent off the top or the head of the Port Authority is corrupt. No person wants to live in a society where the rule of law gives way to the rule of brutality and bribery. That is not democracy, that is tyranny, even if occasionally you sprinkle an election in there. And now is the time for that style of governance to end.

In the 21st century, capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are the key to success—strong parliaments; honest police forces; independent judges; an independent press; a vibrant private sector; a civil society. Those are the things that give life to democracy, because that is what matters in people's everyday lives.

Now, time and again, Ghanaians have chosen constitutional rule over autocracy, and shown a democratic spirit that allows the energy of your people to break through. We see that in leaders who accept defeat graciously—the fact that President Mills' opponents were standing beside him last night to greet me when I came off the plane spoke volumes about Ghana; victors who resist calls to wield power against the opposition in unfair ways. We see that spirit in courageous journalists like Anas Aremeyaw Anas, who risked his life to report the truth. We see it in police like Patience Quaye, who helped prosecute the first human trafficker in Ghana. We see it in the young people who are speaking up against patronage, and participating in the political process.

Across Africa, we've seen countless examples of people taking control of their destiny, and making change from the bottom up. We saw it in Kenya, where civil society and business came together to help stop post-election violence. We saw it in South Africa, where over three-quarters of the country voted in the recent election—the fourth since the end of Apartheid. We saw it in Zimbabwe, where the Election Support Network braved brutal repression to stand up for the principle that a person's vote is their sacred right.

Now, make no mistake: History is on the side of these brave Africans, not with those who use coups or change constitutions to stay in power. Africa doesn't need strongmen, it needs strong institutions.

Now, America will not seek to impose any system of government on any other nation. The essential truth of democracy is that each nation determines its own destiny. But what America will do is increase assistance for responsible individuals and responsible institutions, with a focus on supporting good governance—on parliaments, which check abuses of power and ensure that opposition voices are heard; on the rule of law, which ensures the equal administration of justice; on civic participation, so that young people get involved; and on concrete solutions to corruption like forensic accounting and automating services strengthening hotlines, protecting whistle-blowers to advance transparency and accountability.

And we provide this support. I have directed my administration to give greater attention to corruption in our human rights reports. People everywhere should have the right to start a business or get an education without paying a bribe. We have a responsibility to support those who act responsibly

and to isolate those who don't, and that is exactly what America will do.

Now, this leads directly to our second area of partnership: supporting development that provides opportunity for more people.

With better governance, I have no doubt that Africa holds the promise of a broader base of prosperity. Witness the extraordinary success of Africans in my country, America. They're doing very well. So they've got the talent, they've got the entrepreneurial spirit. The question is, how do we make sure that they're succeeding here in their home countries? The continent is rich in natural resources. And from cell phone entrepreneurs to small farmers, Africans have shown the capacity and commitment to create their own opportunities. But old habits must also be broken. Dependence on commodities—or a single export—has a tendency to concentrate wealth in the hands of the few, and leaves people too vulnerable to downturns.

So in Ghana, for instance, oil brings great opportunities, and you have been very responsible in preparing for new revenue. But as so many Ghanaians know, oil cannot simply become the new cocoa. From South Korea to Singapore, history shows that countries thrive when they invest in their people and in their infrastructure; when they promote multiple export industries, develop a skilled workforce, and create space for small and medium-sized businesses that create jobs.

As Africans reach for this promise, America will be more responsible in extending our hand. By cutting costs that go to Western consultants and administration, we want to put more resources in the hands of those who need it, while training people to do more for themselves. That's why our $3.5 billion food security initiative is focused on new methods and technologies for farmers—not simply sending American producers or goods to Africa. Aid is not an end in itself. The purpose of foreign assistance must be creating the conditions where it's no longer needed. I want to see Ghanaians not only self-sufficient in food, I want to see you exporting food to other countries and earning money. You can do that.

Now, America can also do more to promote trade and investment. Wealthy nations must open our doors to goods and services from Africa in a meaningful way. That will be a commitment of my administration. And where there is good governance, we can broaden prosperity through public-private partnerships that invest in better roads and electricity; capacity-building that trains people to grow a business; financial services that reach not just the cities but also the poor and rural areas. This is also in our own interests—for if people are lifted out of poverty and wealth is created in Africa, guess what? New markets will open up for our own goods. So it's good for both.

One area that holds out both undeniable peril and extraordinary promise is energy. Africa gives off less greenhouse gas than any other part of the world, but it is the most threatened by climate change. A warming planet will spread disease, shrink water resources, and deplete crops, creating conditions that produce more famine and more conflict. All of us—particularly the developed world—have a responsibility to slow these trends—through mitigation, and by changing the way that we use energy. But we can also work with Africans to turn this crisis into opportunity.

Together, we can partner on behalf of our planet and prosperity, and help countries increase access to power while skipping—leapfrogging the dirtier phase of development. Think about it: Across Africa, there is bountiful wind and solar power; geothermal energy and biofuels. From the Rift Valley to the North African deserts; from the Western coasts to South Africa's crops—Africa's boundless natural gifts can generate its own

power, while exporting profitable, clean energy abroad.

These steps are about more than growth numbers on a balance sheet. They're about whether a young person with an education can get a job that supports a family; a farmer can transfer their goods to market; an entrepreneur with a good idea can start a business. It's about the dignity of work; it's about the opportunity that must exist for Africans in the 21st century.

Just as governance is vital to opportunity, it's also critical to the third area I want to talk about: strengthening public health.

In recent years, enormous progress has been made in parts of Africa. Far more people are living productively with HIV/AIDS, and getting the drugs they need. I just saw a wonderful clinic and hospital that is focused particularly on maternal health. But too many still die from diseases that shouldn't kill them. When children are being killed because of a mosquito bite, and mothers are dying in childbirth, then we know that more progress must be made.

Yet because of incentives—often provided by donor nations—many African doctors and nurses go overseas, or work for programs that focus on a single disease. And this creates gaps in primary care and basic prevention. Meanwhile, individual Africans also have to make responsible choices that prevent the spread of disease, while promoting public health in their communities and countries.

So across Africa, we see examples of people tackling these problems. In Nigeria, an Interfaith effort of Christians and Muslims has set an example of cooperation to confront malaria. Here in Ghana and across Africa, we see innovative ideas for filling gaps in care—for instance, through E-Health initiatives that allow doctors in big cities to support those in small towns.

America will support these efforts through a comprehensive, global health strategy, because in the 21st century, we are called to act by our conscience but also by our common interest, because when a child dies of a preventable disease in Accra, that diminishes us everywhere. And when disease goes unchecked in any corner of the world, we know that it can spread across oceans and continents.

And that's why my administration has committed $63 billion to meet these challenges—$63 billion. Building on the strong efforts of President Bush, we will carry forward the fight against HIV/AIDS. We will pursue the goal of ending deaths from malaria and tuberculosis, and we will work to eradicate polio. We will fight—we will fight neglected tropical disease. And we won't confront illnesses in isolation—we will invest in public health systems that promote wellness and focus on the health of mothers and children.

Now, as we partner on behalf of a healthier future, we must also stop the destruction that comes not from illness, but from human beings—and so the final area that I will address is conflict.

Let me be clear: Africa is not the crude caricature of a continent at perpetual war. But if we are honest, for far too many Africans, conflict is a part of life, as constant as the sun. There are wars over land and wars over resources. And it is still far too easy for those without conscience to manipulate whole communities into fighting among faiths and tribes.

These conflicts are a millstone around Africa's neck. Now, we all have many identities—of tribe and ethnicity; of religion and nationality. But defining oneself in opposition to someone who belongs to a different tribe, or who worships a different prophet, has no place in the 21st century. Africa's diversity should be a source of strength, not a cause for division. We are all God's children. We all share common aspirations—to live in peace and security; to access education and opportunity; to love our families

and our communities and our faith. That is our common humanity.

That is why we must stand up to inhumanity in our midst. It is never justified—never justifiable to target innocents in the name of ideology. It is the death sentence of a society to force children to kill in wars. It is the ultimate mark of criminality and cowardice to condemn women to relentless and systemic rape. We must bear witness to the value of every child in Darfur and the dignity of every woman in the Congo. No faith or culture should condone the outrages against them. And all of us must strive for the peace and security necessary for progress.

Africans are standing up for this future. Here, too, in Ghana we are seeing you help point the way forward. Ghanaians should take pride in your contributions to peacekeeping from Congo to Liberia to Lebanon, and your efforts to resist the scourge of the drug trade. We welcome the steps that are being taken by organizations like the African Union and ECOWAS to better resolve conflicts, to keep the peace, and support those in need. And we encourage the vision of a strong, regional security architecture that can bring effective, transnational forces to bear when needed.

America has a responsibility to work with you as a partner to advance this vision, not just with words, but with support that strengthens African capacity. When there's a genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems—they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response.

And that's why we stand ready to partner through diplomacy and technical assistance and logistical support, and we will stand behind efforts to hold war criminals accountable. And let me be clear: Our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold in the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa, and the world.

In Moscow, I spoke of the need for an international system where the universal rights of human beings are respected, and violations of those rights are opposed. And that must include a commitment to support those who resolve conflicts peacefully, to sanction and stop those who don't, and to help those who have suffered. But ultimately, it will be vibrant democracies like Botswana and Ghana which roll back the causes of conflict and advance the frontiers of peace and prosperity.

As I said earlier, Africa's future is up to Africans.

The people of Africa are ready to claim that future. And in my country, African Americans—including so many recent immigrants—have thrived in every sector of society. We've done so despite a difficult past, and we've drawn strength from our African heritage. With strong institutions and a strong will, I know that Africans can live their dreams in Nairobi and Lagos, Kigali, Kinshasa, Harare, and right here in Accra.

You know, 52 years ago, the eyes of the world were on Ghana. And a young preacher named Martin Luther King traveled here, to Accra, to watch the Union Jack come down and the Ghanaian flag go up. This was before the march on Washington or the success of the civil rights movement in my country. Dr. King was asked how he felt while watching the birth of a nation. And he said: "It renews my conviction in the ultimate triumph of justice."

Now that triumph must be won once more, and it must be won by you. And I am particularly speaking to the young people all across Africa and right here in Ghana. In places like Ghana, young people make up over half of the population.

And here is what you must know: The world will be what you make of it. You have

the power to hold your leaders accountable, and to build institutions that serve the people. You can serve in your communities, and harness your energy and education to create new wealth and build new connections to the world. You can conquer disease, and end conflicts, and make change from the bottom up. You can do that. Yes you can because in this moment, history is on the move.

But these things can only be done if all of you take responsibility for your future. And it won't be easy. It will take time and effort. There will be suffering and setbacks. But I can promise you this: America will be with you every step of the way—as a partner, as a friend. Opportunity won't come from any other place, though. It must come from the decisions that all of you make, the things that you do, the hope that you hold in your heart.

Ghana, freedom is your inheritance. Now, it is your responsibility to build upon freedom's foundation. And if you do, we will look back years from now to places like Accra and say this was the time when the promise was realized; this was the moment when prosperity was forged, when pain was overcome, and a new era of progress began. This can be the time when we witness the triumph of justice once more. Yes we can. Thank you very much. God bless you. Thank you. ❑

Stay Out

Why Intervention Should Not Be America's Policy

James Wood Forsyth Jr.
B. Chance Saltzman

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate security discourse. With thousands of lives lost and billions of dollars spent, few issues merit more attention. Yet it is worthwhile to remember that these wars, like all wars, will end. And when they do, policy makers will come to terms with a harsh, albeit forgotten, reality: The ruling of distant peoples, as George Kennan so aptly put it, is not "our dish." The United States should steer clear of "an acceptance of any sort of paternalistic responsibility to anyone be it in the form of military occupation, if we can possibly avoid it, or for any period longer than is absolutely necessary."[1] Simply put, intervention might have been our fate, but it should not be our policy.

From a practical perspective, the US experience with intervention has not been a happy one. Guatemala, Iran, Cuba, and Vietnam add up to a bad scorecard, and recent events have continued this negative trend. What is exceptional about America's recent interventions, however, is how well they have camouflaged a fundamental truth about international politics: The greatest dangers in the world stem from the greatest powers, the smallest from the smallest ones. And make no mistake; intervention operations to rid the world of terror are a short-run concern. In the long run, the balance of power among states in the world poses the greatest challenge to US security and, in this regard, the United States is in a precarious position. Large-scale economic changes, together with ongoing wars, have placed the United States in a relatively weaker position with respect to its rivals than it was eight years ago. In economic terms, the costs have been staggering, with estimates as high as $3 trillion. In military terms, even if the United States were to achieve its war aims, American forces are less capable than they were in 2000.[2] Continual deployments, along with the accompanying wear and tear on personnel and equipment, have left the American military in desperate need of replenishment. As the new administration has made clear, coming to terms with these structural challenges will be demanding.[3] Harder still is trying to find another case that rivals or even approximates the United States' relative decline, the pitch and speed of which appear unusual.

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While the decline is real, it is important to stress that the United States remains the most powerful nation in the world, and the choices it makes today will affect it in the future. As recent history illustrates, global change can come quickly and only somewhat predictably. The dramatic end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union serve as stark reminders of the timing and tempo of international life. The strategic insight of those events should not be lost on policy makers: Great powers rise slowly but can fall quickly. As the United States positions itself for the coming years, it is worth noting that there are potential challengers on the horizon. With the world's largest population and a promising economy, China is the dominant power in Asia. In Europe, it is Germany. Both dwarf regional rivals and have the capacity to dominate them should they ever decide to do so. With respect to its neighbors, India is equally strong, while Russia's power, especially if measured in terms of megatonnage, is matched only by the United States. In the world of tomorrow, America might rue the day when it chose to make intervention its most pressing security concern. How the United States responds to pressures to intervene could determine the fate of the nation.

The debate about intervention will continue to be fueled by those who believe liberty and wealth can cure the world's ills. Concerns will also be heard from those who shy away from the use of force unless it is used to right a wrong. It is important to stress that while liberty is preferable to all other options and poverty remains a scourge on the human race, neither fostering liberty nor ending poverty can secure world peace. The facts are these: Democracies have fought many wars, and the wealthier ones tend to fight more than most, which is another way of saying that the history of world politics is primarily a history of inequality. Policy makers would do well to recognize this, lest the United States finds itself intervening to right wrongs in interesting places throughout the world to no avail.

Curbing the Demand for Intervention

Curbing the demand for intervention hinges on several factors, not the least of which is the choices statesmen make regarding international order. In establishing and sustaining international order, great powers have two options. They can dominate rivals, or they can accommodate them. Should a state choose to dominate rivals, making its security contingent on its ability to surpass all others, it will enter into what has historically proven to be a poor game, in which the costs of domination are severe. Should a state choose to accommodate rivals, making its security is contingent on its ability to balance against others, it will enter into what has proven to be a somewhat less poor game, in which the costs of balancing are less. Statesmen know this in advance, which is why shrewd states seek accommodation.

International Order and Failed States

Few issues threaten international order more so than failed states. That is the central claim of Thomas Barnett's popular book, The Pentagon's New Map. Barnett argues that the United States cannot be made safe at the expense of others. In this increasingly interconnected world, "our vulnerability is not defined by the depth of our connectedness with the outside world but by the sheer existence of regions that remain off-grid, beyond

the pale, and unconnected to our shared fate."[4] These regions are the same ones where we find failed states. Barnett's answer to the failed-state problem is daring and audacious: serve as bodyguard to the rest of the world. The task is not perpetual war, as some might have it. Rather, the United States is to "serve as globalization's bodyguard wherever and whenever needed throughout the Gap." Due to the enormity of the task and the associated risks if things go poorly, one had better pause and ask why.

That failed states are a reality comes as no surprise. The number of states has been steadily increasing for the past 50 years. In 1958, the United Nations recognized 81 states in the world; by 2008 that number had grown to 192.[5] In economic terms, more firms means more failures—in a competitive world, one should expect nothing less. That states are failing, however, is not the problem. The problem is, failed states are a nonproblem getting too much attention. The recent stand-up of the US Africa Command, or AFRICOM, is an indicator that US leaders take Barnett's call to intervention seriously. Established in February of 2008, AFRICOM is designed to solve regional issues before they become more acute, recognizing that "peace and stability on the continent affects not only Africans, but the interests of the United States and the international community as well." It will do this by building partnership capacity and serving as the lead coordinating agency with considerable involvement from the Department of State and other agencies concerned with the future of Africa. As lofty as it sounds, AFRICOM is an unnecessary extension of US power and resources into an area of the world that is, from a security perspective, not terribly important.

What Barnett and the founders of AFRICOM overlook is that some states pose severe security concerns while others do not. Failed states are located far away from the United States. They tend to be poor with scant natural resources and few, if any, powerful friends. Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan are good examples. Since international security is determined by the global distribution of material capabilities, expressed in terms of economic and military power, it stands to reason that those interested in international order ought to concern themselves with states that have the capacity to upset the distribution of material capabilities. And failed states have little chance of doing that. The 2008 Failed States Index lists 20 states that are critically unstable.[6] Of those, only two, Pakistan and North Korea, pose serious security concerns. The typical failed state has a GDP of $39 billion, which equates to about 1 percent of Germany's GDP, 10 percent of Norway's, and approximately 50 percent of Myanmar's. If we were to add up all 20 GDPs of the states on the index, the combined GDP would be slightly higher than that of the Netherlands.[7]

Nonetheless, the idea that failed states pose a threat to international order remains durable. In large part, this is due to the popular wisdom that correlates failed states with terrorism. Failed states, the logic goes, are related to terrorism in that they serve as safe havens for terror groups. There is, however, little evidence to support this. In fact, the ideal conditions in which terror groups flourish are found in those states with severe political and religious repression, growing economies, and uneven economic development.[8] Furthermore, those states with a declining economy (poor and getting poorer) are the least conducive for harboring terror organizations.

In other words, low-income states with growing gross national incomes are nearly four times more likely to support terror organizations than those with declining economies. This is especially so when uneven income distribution accompanies growth. Under such circumstances, the tension between the life people live and the one that they might expect appears stark. Over time, this relative deprivation leads to an increase in frustration, making conditions ripe for terrorist exploitation. This point is worth stressing: poor states with growing national incomes bear watching; those with falling ones do not.[9]

In the case of failed states that have been exploited by terror groups, there are a number of extenuating circumstances to consider. Afghanistan illustrates this point when one considers that the contemporary history of Afghanistan is not a trite history of a failed state that chose to harbor terrorists. It is a complex history involving two great powers that, through intervention, neglect, or the combination of both, assisted in the ruining of a country and their relations with it. As a result, the Taliban government came to power and got cozy with some bad people for reasons that one may never understand. Other states might be tempted to do the same. But will they? If successful states tend to imitate others, that does not appear likely. Afghanistan is one of the poorest states in the world. With a per capita GDP of $800, a life expectancy of 42 years, and a mortality rate of 250 per 1,000 live births, it is the brand name for failure. Why would any state want to imitate that?

Moreover, it is hard to imagine how AFRICOM or any international organization could have prevented such failure. States, like firms, succeed and fail; one should not be surprised. That is not to suggest that all failures are the same. While it is true that should some states fail they would pose grave challenges to international order, few, aside from Egypt, are in Africa. A failed Russia, because of its size and resources, immediately comes to mind. Pakistan and North Korea would also pose immense challenges. What these states share in common, however, is not a special propensity for failure but nuclear weapons, which are more than capable of upsetting the distribution of material capabilities throughout the world. In these instances the United States, as leader of a coalition, might have to intervene to secure nuclear materials and weapons should the governments collapse, which is another way of saying that the international community must get serious about counterproliferation. The point is small, the implications enormous. Some states pose substantive challenges to international order, others do not.

International Order and Terrorism

Terrorism is the second issue thought to threaten international order. Terrorists think strategically, as evidenced by the fact that they play their deadly game to win in the long term. They offer a glimmer of hope to the forlorn and destitute, while attempting to force states to come to terms with their demands. They also live in secrecy, which is another reason why they are so problematic. No one can trust them, not even those who hide and comfort them. In short, terrorists pose strategic problems for states, but terrorism has never significantly upset international order. From this perspective, terrorism is a domestic security issue, not an international one, as the term *homeland security* suggests.

When thinking about the terror problem, however, it has become common to exaggerate its importance by downplaying what has been the traditional problem for states, namely, war. During the past 200 years, war has decimated empires, laid waste to countries, and claimed millions of lives, while terrorism, its horrendous nature aside, has claimed far fewer lives. In way of comparison, 625 people died as a result of international terror in 2003; 35 were Americans. This figure is less than the 725 killed during 2002. As these numbers make clear, terrorism is a weapon of the weak; and while terrorists have incredible will, they do not wield incredible power.

This is not meant to downplay the importance of deterring acts of terror or stopping terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, should the day come when terrorists gain access to WMD, they will, in all likelihood, acquire them from men or women who live in states. States remain the most important actors in international life because they monopolize the most destructive power in the world. How statesmen choose to use that power when dealing with terror is yet another important challenge that they face.

It has become common to suggest that terrorism cannot be deterred, but a growing consensus is emerging around the notion that, in fact, it can. But what of intervention—does the evidence suggest it can solve the terror problem? On the contrary, a positive relationship appears to exist among terror and intervention. That is, as intervention increases, so do terror incidents. As far back as 1997, the Defense Science Board noted a correlation among what it called an "activist American foreign policy" and terrorist attacks against the United States. Ten years later, this became more apparent as suicide terror rose in places it was never seen before. Prior to America's intervention, there were no reports of suicide terrorism in Iraq. In 2003 there were an estimated 25 attacks. By 2004 that number had grown to 140 and in 2005 had ballooned to an estimated 478, claiming an untold number of lives. By the end of 2005, there were an estimated 200 attacks and by the following year, that number had increased another 50 percent to almost 300.

That intervention yields terror comes as a surprise, and it is too soon to conclude that there is a causal argument to be made. Nonetheless, while more research in this area is required, one analyst has shown how terror can be thought of as a reaction to the presence of occupation forces. More specifically, it has been used successfully to compel democracies to withdraw their forces from territories that terrorists claim as their homeland. In this regard, suicide terror appears to be an effective punishment strategy, and intervention, with its accompanying boots on the ground, merely creates more targets for the terrorists. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that even in those cases where terror has been effective, it has altered the order of local politics, not international ones.

International Order and Genocide

Since 1945 the international community has vowed to end genocide, but as Cambodia, Rwanda, and Darfur attest, the international community is painfully slow to act against states that commit it. This is as true today as it was when Hitler's Germany launched an all-out attack on Europe's Jews. In this regard, the Holocaust remains a hard test for all arguments regarding genocide, particularly the idea that intervention can stop it.[10]

In a peculiar way, Raul Hilberg recognized this and wrote about it in his massive account of the destruction of the European Jews. As he noted, "The task of destroying the Jews put the German bureaucracy to a supreme test," and the technocrats solved this problem by passing the test.[11] Meticulous in detail and majestic in scope, Hilberg's interpretation forces readers to come to terms with the perpetrators. What makes them so disturbing is not found in their extraordinary nature but in their ordinary one. "We are not dealing with individuals who had their own moral standards," he argued. The bureaucrats' moral makeup was "no different than the rest of the population." How to explain the large-scale killing operation that put to death more than six million? "The Germans overcame the administrative and moral obstacles to a killing operation."[12] It was in their bones, and intervention was no match for its ferocity.

Before it was all done, the Germans had constructed a massive bureaucracy, along with a language that had meaning across all levels of authority that dehumanized the victims and rationalized killing. To suggest that an intervention could have stopped them from doing so seems dubious. How could force be used to destroy a bureaucratic structure that existed not only in the minds of the participants but in their bones as well? It would seem that intervention, in this case, could do little to end the killing. It might have halted things momentarily, but because genocide was in the perpetrators' viscera, ending the genocide in Europe took a war that was as brutal as anything we have to compare it with.

To recognize genocide, condemn it, and hold perpetrators accountable through the enforcement of international law is vital for the civilized world, and in this regard, to suggest that intervention can stop it trivializes its nature. Any attempt to end the lives of a group of people because they are different is a crime and should be dealt with accordingly. The crime is one of aggression, because in the face of aggression, neither peace nor rights can exist. The wrong that the perpetrator commits is to force men, women, and children to flee or fight for their lives, which legally puts genocide into the domain of war. Genocide might be civilization's fatal flaw in that it does not upset the material basis of international order, but its presence makes a mockery of international community. Policy makers would do well to understand that to rid the world of genocide, states must be willing to go to war; nothing short of war can stop it once it has begun.

A World without Intervention

Suppose, as the result of a cataclysm, all of our scientific knowledge about international politics were lost, save for one sentence to be passed on to the next generation. What would it say? It would read as follows: *States, regardless of their internal composition, goals, or desires, pursue interests they judge best.* In pursuing interests, shrewd statesmen understand the important differences between international and domestic factors, especially when it comes to establishing and maintaining international order. In international politics, material factors and historical forces shape and constrain the behavior of states, not domestic ones. This has been missed by interventionists who have sought to reshape international politics by meddling in the domestic politics of countries as diverse as Guatemala, Iran, Cuba, and Vietnam. Why? Interventionists fail to see the great, albeit tragic, continuities of international

life, which is a life of inequality, conflict, and occasionally, war. Instead they downplay reality, attempt to transform it, or both by choosing to ignore these harsh, yet real, concerns. The intervention in Iraq, which was billed as something that would not only reshape the politics of that country but the politics of the Middle East and hence the world, has failed to do so. For these reasons, policy makers would do well to embrace reality and eschew intervention. What might this mean for policy?

Moving away from an interventionist foreign policy would allow policy makers to focus on security issues that have been neglected for the past several years. Failed states, terrorism, and genocide are serious problems worthy of attention, but they have never upset international order and pose no serious threat to do so in the immediate future.[13] Nuclear weapons, however, do pose such challenges, and the recent move by the United States to address its nuclear arsenal and posture reflect a growing consensus that there are more important things to deal with than intervention.

Similarly, policy makers would do well to pay attention to the changing nature of the international political economy to gauge how the US economy might stack up in the new world of winners and losers. An affordable force structure that is balanced and capable of deterring and compelling will prove to be more useful in the long run than one primed for counterinsurgency.

Lastly, by recognizing the limits of intervention, a renewed sense of humility might be brought back into security discourse. Perfect security can never be achieved, but states can squander their power in its pursuit if they are not prudent. Kennan had a deep understanding of this: The ruling of distant peoples is not "our dish." Let us remove it from the menu in the years ahead. ❑

Notes

1. George Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 19.

2. The United States can afford to spend more than most and assume more risks than others because of its relative power. However, the more often a state uses its force, the weaker it becomes.

3. Defense secretary Robert Gates' new budget priorities clearly reflect this idea.

4. Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 298.

5. United Nations, "List of Member States," http://www.un.org/members/growth.shtml.[12] Strategic Studies Quarterly ◊ Summer 2009

6. Fund for Peace—A Nonprofit Research and Educational Organization, *2008 Failed States Index*, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/.

7. World *Bank, 2007 World Development Report—Gross Domestic Product*, http://econ.worldbank.org.

8. In a detailed analysis of the political, religious, and economic factors most prevalent in states affiliated with terrorist organizations, it was found that the convergence of repressive politics, a homogenous religious population, and a growing, albeit uneven, economy produced conditions most supportive of terrorist organizations.

9. B. C. Saltzman, *Liberty and Justice for All: The Democracy Project and the Global War on Terrorism*, masters thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, 2005.

10. Some of the most creative thinking regarding the use of force and genocide stems from the work of Dr. Douglas C. Peifer. See his *Stopping Mass Killings in Africa* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2008) for an interesting argument regarding airpower and genocide. While I am sympathetic with the spirit and intent of his research, I remain skeptical as to its practicality.

11. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1961).

12. Ibid., 205.

13. The obvious exceptions being a war to end genocide or a terrorist with WMD, as previously stated.

The Iraqization of Africa?

Looking at AFRICOM from a South African Perspective

Abel Esterhuyse

Introduction

The South African government has openly expressed its opposition towards the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM).[1] What's more, South Africa presents its position on AFRICOM as representative of the country as a whole, but particularly on behalf of a group of African countries—the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—which holds an aversive stance towards US plans in this regard.[2] This does not represent a radical change in South Africa's ruling African National Congress's (ANC) general policy stance towards the United States over the last 10 or more years. While this is not the place to dissect South Africa's policy towards the United States in general, it is important to ask critical questions about the legitimacy of the South African government's position—and that of some other African countries—towards AFRICOM. The discussion is an effort to examine some of the considerations that underpin this scepticism about US motives towards Africa.

From a military operational perspective, Africa presents a geographical challenge, especially for conventionally minded militaries with questionable success in fighting small wars. In the past, US policy and military communities implied sub-Saharan Africa when they referred to "Africa." North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, andTunisia) was treated as part of the Middle East and Europe rather than as part of Africa. American constituencies concerned with Africa tend to focus on sub-Saharan rather than on North Africa. This divide exists even in the minds of most Americans. Many Americans refer to themselves as "Afro-Americans" as if Euro-Africans or Arab-Africans do not exist, and as if Afro-Americans have closer ties with the African continent than their fellow Americans. The division between North and sub-Saharan Africa has created some problems for the US armed forces in recent years, especially in countries such as Chad and the war-torn Sudan that straddle the regional divide.[3] Within the context of this reality, it became increasingly difficult for the US armed forces to deal with Africa in its totality. The divide between North and sub-Saharan Africa made some geographical sense, to the extent that a desert is often more of an obstacle than even an ocean. In most cases, the Mediterranean represents an easier obstacle to negotiate than the Sahara.

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Africa did not feature in the US military command structure until 1952, when several North African countries were added to the responsibilities of the US European Command because of their historic relationship with Europe. The rest of Africa was not included in any US command structure until 1960, when US concerns over growing Soviet influence in Africa led to the inclusion of sub-Saharan Africa in the Atlantic Command. In 1962 sub-Saharan Africa was given to Strike Command. When Strike Command was transformed into Readiness Command in 1971, its responsibility for Africa was resolved. In 1983, Cold War priorities led the Reagan administration to divide responsibility for Africa between three geographical commands—European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command.[4] On 6 February 2007, the US president announced the formation of a US Africa Command as part of the Unified Command Plan.[5] AFRICOM is to be established by 30 September 2008. An initial operating capability would have been in place in Stuttgart, Germany, by August 2007, well before the official starting date. Of course, what the actual "operating capacity" will entail is subject to the advancements of the establishment of the command by that time.

Is This Something Mutually Beneficial?

There are a number of ways to think about the creation of AFRICOM. The most obvious would be to look at its creation from a realist perspective. Such a perspective accepts that the United States has vital and other interests in Africa to protect or extend. For the extension or protection of these interests, the US military needs to develop command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and other capabilities to ensure military operational success on the African continent. In view of possible vital US interests in Africa, the creation of AFRICOM would be of strategic importance to the United States, and it would not necessarily have to consult with Africa or anyone else about the creation of such a command. This would allow the United States the luxury of building and structuring the command according to its own needs. Of course, a realist approach is inherently unilateral, nationalistic, and competitive by nature, and there is a very real danger that it may be perceived as aggressiveness by the United States within Africa. In addition, realist thinking contains the risk that Africa may view the creation of AFRICOM as a potential threat to the extent that it may undermine US interests in Africa.

The truth is that there is doubt about US interests in Africa among African leaders.[6] Indeed, Africa is perhaps the only sizable inhabited geographical region that has not recently been considered as vital to US security interests. To state it bluntly, until very recently the United States had hardly any concrete, material interests in the continent.[7] This highlights the need to downplay the realist approach and for the United States, on the one hand, to be much more cautious in dealing with Africa and, on the other hand, to have a more consultative approach with Africa in the development of AFRICOM. This also requires the US polity and bureaucracy to cultivate support within the United States for the creation of AFRICOM. A more consultative approach is rooted in the notion that while clear identifiable interests provide policy with a solid foundation and coherence, a lack thereof normally leads to ambiguity, debate, and vulnerability to changing political moods.

For years, there have been discussions within the US Department of Defense about the merits of some kind of Africa Command.[8] By the middle of 2006, the

previous secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, established a planning team to advise him on requirements for establishing a new unified command for the African continent. He made a recommendation to President Bush, who then authorized the new command on the same day Rumsfeld left office.[9] During the announcement of the establishment of AFRICOM, the new secretary of defense, Robert M. Gates, outlined the function of the command as "oversee[ing] security cooperation, building partnership capability, defense support to non-military missions, and, if directed, military operations on the African continent."[10] Gates alleged that the command would enable the US military to have a more effective and integrated approach than the current command setup in which three geographical commands are responsible for Africa. He called this three-command structure an "outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War."[11] Some scholars therefore argue that AFRICOM will shift US involvement in Africa from a reactive to a proactive commitment.[12]

The US government is facing increasing domestic and international pressure to play a more prominent role on the world's most troubled continent. The creation of AFRICOM received strong support from both parties in the US Congress, and there is an increase in interest groups lobbying for support for African countries in the United States.[13] Since the 1993 "Blackhawk Down" incident in which 18 US servicemen were killed, the US government in general has arguably resisted the pressures to provide tangible military support to peacekeeping or other missions in Africa. Two recent challenges were instrumental in drawing the attention of US politicians and bureaucrats to "the globe's most neglected region."[14] The first is the failed state of Somalia, which has a tradition of links to Islamic militants, such as al-Qaeda. The second is the crisis in Sudan, where UN figures estimate that more than 400,000 people have died from ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region.[15] The decision to create AFRICOM reflects—without any doubt—a rise in US national security interests on the continent.

There are numerous examples where the direct military involvement of a superpower in a particular region had been accepted because it was based on a mutually beneficial relationship. US involvement in Europe during the Cold War is the most obvious example. It is therefore important to distinguish between two sets of benefits. Firstly, there are the minor, almost secondary, benefits for Africa that may flow from the establishment of AFRICOM to serve primarily US security interests. Secondly, there are the geostrategic mutually beneficial payoffs for Africa and the United States in the creation of AFRICOM that should be clear from the outset. However, from an African perspective, this mutually beneficial relationship in the creation of AFRICOM is not apparent. Consequently, the US decision to create AFRICOM is saying more about its own fears and geostrategic position than about its interests in Africa. This particularly relates to US concerns about the growing Chinese involvement in Africa, the US war on terror, and the growing US need for oil from Africa. A more detailed analysis of these three considerations provides a clear indication that the US decision to create AFRICOM is driven by negative considerations from Africa rather than by positive interests in, or spin-offs for, Africa.

According to the independent global organization, Power and Interest News Report, Sino-African trade has risen from about $3 billion in 1995 to $55.5 billion in 2006.[16] On a macro level, there are increasing trade, defense, and diplomatic relations between African countries and

China. The economic and security support for the Mugabe regime is but one example in this regard, with China's investment in Sudan's oil industry and the cozy relationship with its regime as another.[17] These two examples are also a demonstration of what China is willing to do (or turn a blind eye to) in order to advance Chinese influence in Africa. The macro relations are augmented by interaction of a micro kind in the sense that almost every small town in the most remote places in Africa these days can boast about its Chinese shop! In 2006, for example, China hosted a conference in Beijing, which drew 43 African heads of state and representatives from five other African nations—more African leaders than would normally attend an African Union summit on the continent. The Chinese president toured Africa during February 2007 at the time of the announcement of the creation of AFRICOM. It was his third visit to Africa in as many years.

It may be true that China's policy motivations and intentions are typical of a large and growing superpower and that, because of this, the United States does not regard China's emerging interest in Africa as a security threat.[18] It may also be true that the United States does not have many interests in Africa. However, China is reemerging as a major economic, diplomatic, and military entity on the world scene, with a particular geostrategic interest in African resources and markets. The United States is obviously very much concerned about the growing interaction and cooperation between Africa and the "dragon with a heart of darkness."[19] China is obviously not very interested in encouraging democracy, good governance, and transparency on the African continent. Consequently, the recent agreements on defense, economic, technical, and other forms of cooperation between China and Zimbabwe will be under scrutiny in Washington.[20]

Though China is an alternative to US influence in Africa, the judgement is still out on the nature of Chinese involvement in Africa.[21] Africa's preference is saying as much about Africa as it is saying about China, and can most probably be linked to issues such as the militarized image of US foreign policy in Africa and the availability of Chinese support without too many attached labels. The US military has always been an important part of US foreign policy to the extent that the military is in some circles often seen as the leading US foreign policy agency. From this perspective, the creation of AFRICOM could be seen as an important first step in increasing US foreign policy presence and capabilities in Africa as a means to counterbalance growing Chinese influence. Steven Morrison, the director of the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, argues that through the creation of AFRICOM, the United States is trying to gain a foothold on the continent for "intensifying competition with China, India and others for influence and for access" and because of "rising commitments with respect to global health in Africa."[22]

The world has changed dramatically since 9/11 and the rise of the threat of international terrorism in the West. How ever, in view of the strategic situation facing US forces and their allies in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, the strategic effectiveness of the war on terror and the strategic competence of those conducting the war are still in doubt. This doubt is linked to the question as to whether the Western world in general, and the United States in particular, is, indeed, more secure because of the war on terror thus far. In Africa, the creation of AFRICOM is seen as "the official arrival of America's 'global war on terror' on the African continent."[23] The United States is obviously looking towards Africa as a potential source of internatio-

nal terrorism. The intelligence communities of most Western countries are scanning the world—including Africa—for new international terrorist threats. African countries in general are uncomfortable about the possible conduct of both overt and covert US intelligence operations within their borders. Of course, the US government and its allies are also looking for coalition partners in the war on terror in Africa. The creation of AFRICOM will serve both purposes to the extent that it will provide easier access for the United States to Africa in the conduct of intelligence operations and the cultivation of strategic partners for the war on terror.

The bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania serves as a stark reminder of the international terrorist threats that the United States is facing in and from Africa. The threat of international terrorism in Africa and its links with the al-Qaeda movement again came to the fore with the more recent suicide attacks in Algeria and Morocco.[24] The volatility of the African continent provides fertile breeding grounds for extremists, criminals, and, ultimately, international terrorists in terms of recruiting, training in uncontrolled areas, and providing a sanctuary from where they may operate. This volatility of the African continent is rooted in challenges such as extreme poverty, corruption, internal conflicts, border disputes, uncontrolled territorial waters and borders, warlords, weak internal security apparatuses, natural disasters, famine, lack of dependable water sources, and an underdeveloped infrastructure. It is easy to convince individuals to support terrorism against the West if they face a bleak future in these kinds of environments when it is contrasted with the situation in most Western countries, in general, and the United States, in particular, using the old method of relative deprivation. However, it is extremely important to note that though poverty, instability, and volatility do not necessarily breed terrorists, nations with weak civil societies, poor law enforcement, and a weak judicial system are vulnerable to penetration and exploitation by international terrorist groups.[25]

It is the increasing US interest in African oil that underpins the often heard argument in Africa that the United States is using the war on terror as an excuse to get access to African resources.[26] It is true, however, that the attacks of 9/11 and the consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had a definite impact on the relations between the United States and the Arab world. A recent report by retired US Army general Barry McCaffrey on the war in Iraq notes that the "disaster in Iraq will in all likelihood result in a widened regional struggle which will endanger America's strategic interests (oil) in the Mid-East [sic] for a generation."[27] The slumbering tensions between the United States and Iran are a manifestation of this growing regional struggle. Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 2006 should also be evaluated against what had happened in Iraq and the change in the balance of power in the Middle East brought about by it. Clearly, a general situation of distrust and suspicion has been created between the Arab world and the United States—rooted in the 9/11 hostile action by members of the Arab world and the military action by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the continued US support for Israel.

It is against this background that the United States is looking at the oil reserves of the world in general, and specifically in Africa, to lessen its dependence on oil production from the Middle East. The diversification of the US oil interests over the last 10 years made Africa's oil increasingly more important. This concerns the oil

production of the continent itself, but particularly of the west coast of Africa. Africa owns about 8 percent of the world's known oil reserves, with Nigeria, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea as the region's leading oil producers. Seventy percent of Africa's oil production is concentrated in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea, stretching from the Ivory Coast to Angola. The low sulphur content of West African crude oil makes it of further strategic importance.[28] The Gulf of Guinea, including Angola and Nigeria, is projected to provide a quarter of US oil imports within a decade, surpassing the volume imported from the Persian Gulf.[29] By 2003, sub-Saharan Africa was providing the United States with 16 percent of its oil needs.[30] This has risen to 20 percent in 2007.[31]

The rise in US energy needs is bound to continue. At the same time, the war in Iraq will, in all likelihood, result in a widened regional struggle that will endanger America's strategic oil interests in the Middle East. This will impact the strategic importance of African oil for the US market.

Difficulty of Understanding the US Politico-Military Bureaucracy

One of the major challenges for Africa in dealing with the United States about the creation of AFRICOM is the difficulty of understanding the nature of US politics, especially the unique intricacies that are found in any political-bureaucratic system. This particularly concerns the role and personalities of individual US politicians and bureaucrats. It is this factor that very often leads to doubts about how much political and bureaucratic support there is for a particular US policy initiative in Africa and, consequently, how serious the United States is about a given policy direction—specifically in the absence of any serious US interests in Africa. Policy, in many cases, is nothing more than a declaration of intent by politicians.[32] Ultimately, it depends on the energy and support within the wider public and bureaucratic environment for the transformation of an intention into action (i.e., the execution of such a policy).

From this perspective, the declared intention of the Bush administration to create AFRICOM is dependent on the US bureaucracy, in general, and the military bureaucracy, in particular, to transform the intention of an Africa Command into a workable US military C4I structure. If there is no strong support in the bureaucracy for a declared policy intention, it may slow the process down by not infusing it with the necessary energy. In some circles the creation of the Africa Command is seen as a policy initiative of the Bush administration as a whole and of Rumsfeld, in particular. There are, therefore, serious doubts in these circles as to whether the creation of AFRICOM will survive the Bush administration. There are also some questions as to the amount of support there is within the US military for the creation of such a command.[33]

The other side of this truth, however, is that bureaucracy has staying power and that once AFRICOM has been created, it will become increasingly difficult to change direction. This is of primary concern to the US military's organizational or institutional interests in AFRICOM. Once US military personnel have started to build their careers on the availability of certain career paths for "African specialists," the military bureaucracy will develop a vested interest in maintaining such career paths. In practice, this means that once military personnel have reached general rank by being African specialists, it will become very difficult to change direction. Bureaucratic interests can, indeed, be a very

important factor for the generation and development of national interests in a region, and it is often very difficult for outsiders, Africans in particular, to develop a clear understanding of the role of the US bureaucracy in this regard.

Until now, US policy concerning the majority of African countries was to a large extent the responsibility of the bureaucratic middle echelons in Washington practicing the art of bureaucratic conservatism. These bureaucrats operated within a framework of three guidelines: don't spend much money; don't take a stand that might create domestic controversy; and don't let African issues complicate policy towards other, more important, parts of the world.[34] This bureaucratic approach to US policy formulation led to a situation where the United States very often lost interest in Africa and, indeed, had to "rediscover" Africa at several junctions during the post–Second World War era.[35] However, there is the potential that high-level military bureaucratic concerns about maintaining interests in Africa may have a definite influence on the nature and sustainability of US policy towards Africa. This becomes even more important considering the reality that the US military is often the leading US foreign policy institution.

From a US policy implementation perspective, the US bureaucracy is perhaps no different than any other bureaucracy in the sense that its structures and programs have a very "stovepiped" nature. An expert on African affairs in the United States, Dr. Dan Henk from the USAF Air War College, for example, noted that US engagement with Africa has often reflected rather different approaches and intensities between the US Department of State, the US Agency for International Development, and the US Department of Defense. This very often results in some confusion about US interests, objectives, and motives.[36] AFRICOM, with its envisioned interagency character, will without a doubt positively influence US policy coordination in Africa. Not only will it ensure greater efficiency, it will also definitely contribute towards higher effectiveness of US policy initiatives in Africa—benefiting both the United States and African countries. The promise that the creation of AFRICOM will result in informed, consistent, coherent, and sustained engagement by the United States in Africa is something that ought to be welcomed throughout the continent.

Providing Military Support to Africa

Many (perhaps most) of the US actors involved in setting up the new command believe that AFRICOM will be significantly different from other combatant commands. It will have a much more robust "interagency complexion." From the outset, the planners have had a much greater interest in "soft power" issues such as health, infrastructural rehabilitation, the environment, economic development, security-sector reform, conflict attenuation, and other human security angles.[37] This arrangement is rooted in the belief that diplomatic, informational, and economic actions will be more critical in achieving US foreign policy objectives in Africa than the use of military force.[38] However, it also raises a question about a more proactive and preventative approach in protecting and extending US security and other interests in Africa, in contrast to the very cautious and defensive approach that has defined the US security involvement in Africa until now. AFRICOM, though, is not planned as the typical combatant command. Such an approach is appreciated, given the often very destructive nature of outside military involvement on the continent in the past. However, it should be

recognized that there are also some dangers to an approach that underplays the role of the military in Africa.

The image of US foreign policy in many parts of Africa is informed by US military actions in other parts of the world, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is an image that is strongly associated with the US military in general and the aggressive use of military force in particular. This very aggressive and "militarized" image of US foreign policy stands in stark contrast to the efforts by everybody involved in the creation of AFRICOM to downplay the hard-core military role of US military forces in Africa and to highlight the nonmilitary and soft-power roles of AFRICOM. This raises two kinds of questions in Africa. Firstly, will the US developmental and humanitarian assistance to Africa be militarized through a deliberate effort to put the military in charge of these activities? Related questions include, should the creation of AFRICOM be viewed as much more than interagency cooperation? Does AFRICOM represent a militarization of nonmilitary US support to Africa? Where is this militarization of humanitarian and other human security actions leading? These types of questions should be linked to the difficulty of understanding the US bureaucratic and military jargon in Africa. What, for example, is implied by "stability operations" in Africa?[39] Secondly, is the United States sincere with Africa about the creation of AFRICOM? The general image of US foreign policy in the world does not correspond with the declared intention of the United States with the creation of AFRICOM. This should be linked to the question as to why AFRICOM should be different than all the other US geographical commands in other regions of the world. Is this not a form of discrimination or disparagement? What about the argument that the US military is ensuring a "soft landing" for AFRICOM in Africa by placing the emphasis on the soft-power issues in the creation of the command?[40] How long will the soft-power approach last before AFRICOM shows its true character and Africa or certain countries in Africa will be "Iraqed"?

These questions should be viewed against the urgent need for hard-core military developmental and other forms of military support in Africa. It is a widely recognized fact that one of the biggest challenges African countries face since independence is the lack of military professionalism. This often reveals itself in challenging civil-military relations to the extent that coup d'états have colored the political landscape of many African countries since independence. Military unprofessionalism in Africa is linked to a number of causations, such as subnational or ethnically based recruitment, military corruption, the development of parallel security apparatuses such as presidential guards, and domestic military deployments.[41] From this perspective, it will be disastrous if AFRICOM does not take the need for the development of military professionalism in Africa seriously. However, one of the primary causes of military unprofessionalism in Africa has been the influence of foreign military support in times of crises. In many cases, external support translates into a lack of urgency within African militaries because of the guarantee of a bailout that is provided by foreign military powers. This reality leaves an open question pertaining to the kind of soft-power military support that AFRICOM will provide to African militaries. It serves as a warning against an overemphasis of nonmilitary angles of military support in the creation of AFRICOM.

AFRICOM, in supporting African militaries, should place the emphasis on the creation of capacity, not the provision of capacity. In developing capacity, it is important for the US military not to come to the

table with blueprints by being prescriptive or dogmatic—what had worked in America and other places in the world will not necessarily work in Africa. In short, Africans may be uncomfortable with the enforcement of US military doctrine on Africa. There are relatively well-developed doctrines within Africa—in most cases an interesting blend of old colonial doctrines combined with those of the United States and the former Soviet Union. This specifically relates to insurgency and counterinsurgency doctrines since Africa has been involved in these kinds of wars for the last 50 years or more. The challenge for the US military is to capture these doctrines through an understanding of the African historical tradition. It is seen as a history from below, rooted in a strong oral tradition.[42] In view of the strategic situation confronting the United States in Iraq and elsewhere, learning from the African unconventional experience in an unconventional way may be not such a bad idea. In return and in exchange for ideas, Africa may benefit from more conventional US military expertise, hardware, and simulation technology in the building of African military capacity.[43]

However, this brings another important consideration to the fore, namely the lack of enthusiasm of African militaries towards outside military support. This pessimism towards military support is linked, in many cases, to the exploitation of Africa's lack of military resources. A shortage of resources is a critical vulnerability of most African militaries. Outside military support may provide African militaries with vital resources. However, their sustainment, in most cases, remains in the hands of those who supplied them since African militaries don't necessarily have such technological capabilities and skills. Africans cannot maintain the military resources that are provided, and a culture of dependency is created. Consequently, many Africans see the military-industrial complexes of the industrialized countries of the world, the United States in particular, as a major motivation for involvement in Africa and other parts of the world. The economies of supplier countries are further developed while, in many cases, destruction is exported to Africa, increasing African dependency.

In addition, it is important for AFRICOM not to be seen by Africans as an effort by the United States to replace the continental, regional, and military structures—the regional standby forces in particular—that have been created by Africans themselves or are in the process of development. In fact, the United States can play a major role by enhancing these structures on a continental and regional level and exploiting these structures for capacity building in Africa and its different regions. Africa may benefit from the development of interoperability within regional structures. The United States, when working through regional and continental structures, will be able to follow a multilateral approach by engaging the militaries of several African countries simultaneously and by being a silent partner.[44] Being the silent partner may not always serve the media-orientated approach of the US military. However, silent partnership may serve AFRICOM's higher-order strategic objectives in Africa. This may imply, for example, that AFRICOM provides logistical platforms or opportunities for training and education while exploiting the availability of well-trained and educated African instructors.[45]

Confronting African Challenges

There is increasing pressure from within Africa to allow it to solve its own problems. There are even suggestions of a "United States of Africa"—though this may sound, and most probably is, a bit farfetched.[46] However, the underlying message is one of "we want to take ownership

of our own destiny" and that for too long Africa's future has been dictated by outsiders. This especially concerns the roles of Britain, France, and Portugal during the Colonial era and the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. It further translates into an increasing uneasiness of the people of Africa with Western and other influences (sometime interferences) in general and US influences (or interferences) in particular. The image of the United States, in particular, as a bully of the small, the weak, the defenseless, or the underdog has been strongly reinforced by the US invasion of Iraq. This is linked to the view of the United States as part of the "haves" and African people as the "have nots."

These views should, however, be tempered with the reality that one of the biggest challenges Africa and other parts of the global community dealing with Africa face is African solidarity. African solidarity most probably reached its apex with the creation of the African Union (AU) where, unlike the European Union, being part of Africa is the only qualification to become a member. This does not mean that there are no differences of opinion in the AU. However, its formation is a reflection of solidarity, especially as far as issues such as anticolonialism and Africanism are concerned.[47] Nonetheless, the road to African solidarity is rife with pitfalls. Africa's inability to address the Zimbabwean issue properly is but one example of the dangers of African solidarity. African solidarity very often results in a tendency to be very critical about what Western governments in particular—including the United States—are doing on the African continent. Yet, at the same time, Africans in general and African governments, in particular, look forward to how they can benefit from Western and US involvement on the continent.

The US government has clearly thought long and hard about the creation of AFRICOM, and aforementioned arguments have undoubtedly been raised in initial deliberations. This is most probably the reason why the focus of AFRICOM will predominantly be on antiterrorist operations and humanitarian aid. AFRICOM, it is stated, would focus far less on preparing troops for major combat in its area of responsibility. The emphasis would rather be on military training programs to help African governments secure their borders, to guard against crises such as Darfur, and to contain deadly diseases such as AIDS and malaria. This is also the most likely reason for why the four-star general commanding AFRICOM is to have a civilian counterpart from the State Department to help coordinate the nonmilitary functions of the US government in Africa.

The people of Africa know that wherever you find the antelope, you will most probably also come across its most serious adversary, the African lion. There is fear in some circles on the African continent that Africa will be Iraqed—that is, that US efforts to protect itself against international terrorism from the African continent will, in fact, exacerbate the problem. This fear is rooted in the notion that a strong US military presence in Africa will draw the attention of its enemies and that, as in the Cold War, Africa will once again become the battlefield for the power and military struggles of the great powers—the United States and China, for instance, and particularly the US military and its international terrorist enemies.[48] This argument should be linked to the plan eventually to locate the command headquarters of AFRICOM somewhere on the African continent. There is no question that the country or countries that will host the headquarters of AFRICOM, or parts thereof, will also expose itself or themselves to the kinds of threats that presently face the United States.

The US way of war and the African way of war are diametrically opposed. US military doctrine is rooted in winning decisive battles through overwhelming use of conventional military technology. As in the case in Iraq after the battle for Baghdad, the US military often finds itself in a situation where the decisive battle or battles have been won, but not necessarily the war. The result is that in at least two occasions during the last 50 years, the US armed forces were sucked into indecisive, low-intensity wars.[49] Most conflict in Africa is unconventional by nature, being fought by second-or third-generation technology. This often results in indecisive, drawn-out, anarchic types of community wars with no decisive outcome.[50] It is precisely this kind of conflict that the US armed forces steer away from, especially since their experience in Vietnam and, even more so, after their more recent experience in Iraq. It is also the kind of conflict that in 1993 resulted in the Somalia syndrome after the catastrophe in Mogadishu and most probably led to US reluctance to become militarily involved in Africa. In Africa this reluctance contributes to a "runaway" image of the US military. This image was reinforced by the United States' unwillingness to become involved in human tragedies such as the Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Darfur crises. Compare that, for example, with US political and military efforts during the 1990s to solve problems in the Balkans—a geographical region in which, it is believed, the United States also did not have much political and economic interests.

Reluctance to contribute in solving complex emergencies in Africa reinforces the view in Africa that the United States is quick to showcase its successes and contributions to African security. However, the United States is not seen as a power with the courage to commit itself to deal with complex security and other challenges in Africa on a sustainable basis. Linked to the notion that it will only become involved in a region if it can gain economically, the general image of the US military in Africa is one of disdain. The US military lacks credibility in some parts of Africa and very often is seen as a legitimate target. In the past, this frequently resulted in the US military becoming the victim of bad publicity in Africa. AFRICOM may become an important vehicle to sustain US involvement in Africa and, by doing so, to contribute towards a more positive image of the United States and its military in Africa. As a result, the creation of AFRICOM may be the first real test for sustainable US involvement in Africa.

The creation of AFRICOM is eventually closely linked to the question as to whether there is recognition by the US government and its military that the future of war in the "age of terror" would primarily be irregular. During the 1990s, the United States was in the exceptional position that, as the world's only remaining superpower, it could choose where and for whatever reason to intervene militarily. There was at the same time no lack of opportunity to act as the world's policeman since widespread conflict of an anarchic nature appeared all over the globe, from the Balkans to Central Africa, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union (Chechnya). In most cases, these conflicts did not really impinge on vital US interests, nor did they have the potential to ignite the outbreak of a third world war.[51] As a result, there was no real conflict that was important enough for the United States to act decisively. That was until 9/11—the day on which the United States became part of the "coming anarchy."[52] It may be good to remember that the initial article on the coming anarchy by Kaplan in the Atlantic Monthly was primarily based on his experiences as a journalist in Africa.[53] This led to an obvious conclusion for this argument. If the United States really wants to be successful in its war on

terror, Africa has to be part of the solution. In the end, Africa's problems—whether the United Sates and its military like it or not—have indeed became America's problems. The creation of AFRICOM may be a small recognition of this reality.

Some Implications

Africa presents a challenge to any modern conventionally minded military force. The creation of AFRICOM makes military sense if the US military wants to be successful in its military endeavours on the African continent. There are also other strategic advantages for the United States and its military in creating AFRICOM. For the United States, the most obvious advantage will be the close interaction with African realities as well as with the people of Africa. It is hoped that such interaction will translate into a better understanding of African dynamics and intricacies both in the US bureaucracy and amongst the US public at large. It will most definitely allow the United States the ability to develop a better intelligence picture of Africa. Included in this intelligence picture will be a better interpretation of the threats that confront the United States in and from Africa.

The most obvious advantage that flows from the United States having a better intelligence picture of Africa is the opportunity to exploit market and other opportunities that arise. Furthermore, it will be able to better secure itself through a proactive, preventative approach to international terrorism in Africa—dealing with problems before they arise. US military presence on the African continent will empower the United States to better communicate with Africa on a military-diplomatic level and, in doing so, will ensure greater understanding in Africa and African militaries of US military endeavours in Africa and the world over. There is no question that antagonism may develop in certain parts of Africa as a result of a US military presence on the continent. Judging by the recent comments by the South African minister of defense, these antagonisms may have their origins in certain African countries and regional structures that, for historic reasons, are very critical of what the United States is doing in the world, and particularly in Africa.[54] These antagonisms may also have their origins outside of Africa. This specifically relates to the growing Chinese diplomatic and economic involvement in Africa. A cloud of vagueness surrounds Chinese military involvement in Africa, and more so the extent to which it is undermining US military involvement in Africa. The question is whether African political and strategic culture will allow African leaders the room to exploit the best of what China and the United States bring to the African table.

The creation of AFRICOM will raise Africa's strategic profile in the United States as well as other parts of the world. African militaries are to benefit from the creation of AFRICOM in terms of military-diplomatic opportunities and the transfer of military expertise and other more tangible military means. This includes help that the US armed forces may provide in the development of a unique military professional ethos in African militaries, the transformation of African defense management to be more accountable and transparent, and the further enhancement of African peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction capabilities.

The US military has to overcome a number of obstacles in the creation of AFRICOM, both in Africa and the United States. On one side of the Atlantic, the United States has to deal with an aggressive, militarized image of US foreign policy linked to the history of unsustainable US military involvement. This image is rooted in a very

real fear in certain parts of Africa that it may become the victim of Iraqization. This undermines US military credibility and makes it a legitimate target. On the other side of the Atlantic, given the bad publicity of the US military in Africa in the past, the Somalia syndrome may still dictate US military thinking and attitudes. Fortunately (or unfortunately), this is the world of strategy where policy, emotion, and change reign.[55] ❑

Notes

1. The author would like to thank Dr. Dan Henk from the USAF Air War College for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of the article.

2. Wyndham Hartley, "Southern Africa: More U.S. Soldiers Not Welcome in Africa, Says Lekota," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 30 August 2007, http://allafrica.com/stories/ 200708300344.html. The ambiguity or dualism, to be precise, in the South African government's position towards the US military is, of course, reflected in the reality that at the same time that the minister of defense was making these statements, the South African Navy was involved in exercises off the South African coastline with a contingent of the US Navy. These exercises between the South African and US militaries follow in the wake of the announcement on the creation of AFRICOM.

3. Michael Clough, *Free At Last? US Policy toward Africa and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 1.

4. Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 16 May 2007), 10.

5. The White House, "President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa," Office of the Press Secretary, 6 February 2007, http://www.whitehouse .gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070206-3.html.

6. Ibid.

7. Clough, *Free At Last?* 3.

8. For example, see Richard G. Catoire, "A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan," *Parameters* 30 (Winter 2000–01): 102–17.

9. Jackie Northam, "Pentagon Creates Military Command for Africa," *NPR* (*National Public Radio*), Morning Edition, 7 February 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7234997.

10. US Department of Defense, "DoD Establishing US Africa Command," *DefenseLink*, American Forces Press Service, http://www.defenselink.mil/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=2940.

11. Ibid.

12. Northam, "Pentagon Creates Military Command for Africa."

13. Jim Lobe, "Africa to Get Its Own US Military Command," Antiwar.com, 1 February 2007, http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=10443.

14. Sally B. Donnelly, "Exclusive: The Pentagon Plans for an African Command," *Time*, http://lib.store.yahoo.net/lib/realityzone/UFNAfricancommand.mht. 15. Bryan Bender, "Pentagon Plans New Command to Cover Africa," *Boston*

15. Bryan Bender, "Pentagon Plans New Command to Cover Africa," *Boston Globe*, 21 December 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2006/12/21/pentagon_plans _new_command _to_cover_africa.

16. Simon Tisdall, "US Moves in on Africa," *Guardian*, 9 February 2007, http://www .guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,2009098,00.html.

17. Gary Leupp, "We're Taking Down Seven Countries in Five Years: A Regime Change Checklist," *Dissident Voice*, 17 January 2007, http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Jan07/Leupp17.htm.

18. Jim Fisher-Thompson, "U.S. Official Dispels 'Alarmist Views' of China in Africa," *USINFO*, Bureau of International Information Programs, US Department of State, 16 February 2007, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=February& x=200702161420311E JrehsiF0.6760828.

19. Philippe D. Rogers, "Dragon with a Heart of Darkness? Countering Chinese Influence in Africa," *Joint Force Quarterly* 47 (4th Quarter 2007): 22–27.

20. This was confirmed in a presentation by Amb. David H. Shinn, adjunct professor of international affairs, George Washington University (lecture, South African Military Academy, Saldanha, 28 August 2007).

21. M. Rossouw, "Mbeki Verdedig China se Involved in Afrika," *Die Burger* (Cape Town, South Africa), 4 June 2007, 6.

22. Northam, "Pentagon Creates Military Command for Africa."

23. Hartley, "Southern Africa."

24. J. Ferreira, "Terrorisme Beleef Oplewing in Noord-Afrika," *Die Burger*, 13 April 2007, 6.

25. James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner, "US Military Assistance for Africa: A Better Solution," The Heritage Foundation, 15 October 2003, http://www.heritage.org?Reasearch?africa/bg1697.cfm.

26. Lt Col Gary Lloyd (chief military observer for the African Mission in Sudan), interview by the author during visit to the South African Military Academy, Saldanha, 23 August 2007.

27. Gen Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, retired, to Col Michael Meese, professor and head, Department of Social Sciences, US Military Academy, West Point, NY, internal memorandum, subject: After-Action Report: Visit [to] Iraq and Kuwait, 9–16 March 2007, (submitted) 26 March 2007, http:// media.washingtonpost.com/wp-rv/nation/documents/McCaffrey_Report_032707.pdf.

28. Chietigj Bajpaee, "Sino-US Energy Competition in Africa," *Power and Interest News Report*, 7 October 2005,

http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=378&language_id=1.

29. Tisdall, "US Moves in Africa."

30. Carafano and Gardiner, "US Military Assistance for Africa."

31. Lobe, "Africa to Get Its Own US Military Command."

32. See, for example, the discussion by John Garnett, "Defence Policy-Making," in John Baylis et al., *Contemporary Strategy II* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987), 2.

33. This particular point was raised by a number of US delegates at the 33rd International Congress of Military History in Cape Town, 13–17 August 2007, where an earlier draft of the paper was read.

34. Clough, *Free At Last?* 2.

35. Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2.

36. See the discussion of this phenomenon in Dan Henk, "The Environment, the US Military, and Southern Africa," *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 98–117.

37. Dr. Dan Henk, Air War College, e-mail message to author, 30 July 2007.

38. Bender, "Pentagon Plans New Command."

39. Testimony by Mark Malan, "AFRICOM: A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?" before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, at the hearing entitled *Exploring the U.S. Africa Command and the New Strategic Relationship with Africa*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 1 August 2007, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2007/MalanTestimony070801.pdf.

40. A concern that was expressed by Col Johan van der Walt (senior staff officer, Peace Support Operations [UN] of the South African National Defense Force), telephonic interview by the author, 28 August 2007.

41. Herbert M. Howe, *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States* (London: Lynne Rienner Pub., 2001), chap. 2.

42. Mluleki George, South African deputy minister of defense (speech, official opening of the 33rd International Congress of the International Commission for Military History, Cape Town, South Africa, 13 August 2007).

43. Lloyd, interview.

44. The US military, fortunately, does understand the importance of working through regional and continental structures. For an example in this regard, see "Africa: U.S. Military Command to Seek Value-Added Capabilities for Africa," *The News*, 4 October 2007, http:// allafrica.com/stories/200710040767.html.

45. Ibid.

46. Liesl Louw, "Verenigde State van Afrika: AU Begin Praat," *Beeld*, 2 July 2007, 10.

47. For an excellent exposition of the tension in South African foreign policy between democracy on the one hand and Africanism and anticolonialism on the other, see Laurie Nathan, "Consistency and Inconsistencies in South African Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 81, no. 2 (March 2005): 361–72.

48. L. Scholtz, "Sal Afrika se Gras Weer Trapplek Word?" *Die Burger*, 9 February 2007, 8.

49. See the discussion of this phenomenon in Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 129–33.

50. CAPT Larry Seaquist, US Navy, retired, "Community War," *Proceedings*, United States Naval Institute, August 2000, 56–59, http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/seaquist_community_war.htm.

51. Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (London: Routledge, 2007), 223.

52. Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreamsof the Post ColdWar* (New York: Random House, 2000).

53. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet," *The Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 2 (February 1994): 44–76, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/199402/ anarchy.

54. The South African minister of defense stated explicitly that more US soldiers are not welcome in Africa. See Hartley, "Southern Africa." The roots of this anti-American sentiment by the South African government are not very clear. It may have an ideological connection with the ruling party in South Africa, the ANC, having its roots firmly "on the other side of the hill" during the Cold War era. It may also have a historical dimension with the US support to Euro-African minorities clinging to minority rule in many African countries during the Cold War. Current policies may also be of influence with the US strategy of preemption and other more aggressive and militarized approaches in its foreign policy that are seen as neo-imperialism in Africa. From an economic perspective, it is possible to argue that South Africa may view growing US influence in Africa as unfair competition. From an international political perspective, South Africa has some strange "friends" and is clearly aligning itself with countries that the United States will not be comfortable with, including Cuba and Iran.

55. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

Do We Want to "Kill People and Break Things" in Africa?

A Historian's Thoughts on Africa Command

Robert Munson, Lieutenant Colonel, USAFR

A common mantra within the military is that the mission is "to kill people and break things." The military is ultimately a heavily armed organization dedicated to the protection of the United States by killing enemies and destroying their means to wage war. This certainly played out many times during World Wars I and II, but what about Vietnam or even Iraq right now? Was Vietnam won by completing this mission? Can Iraq be won this way? While this slogan motivates the military, the task to "kill people and break things" is not the mission the US government gives the military most of the time.

Let me juxtapose this view with a poignant insight from my time in West Africa at the US Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria. In December 2001, during the military operations in Afghanistan, I worked in the Office of Defense Cooperation. Besides the military cooperation aspects of my job, I oversaw the completion of two humanitarian assistance projects started under my predecessors. One of these projects entailed building a small extension to a maternity clinic run by the Catholic Church on the outskirts of Abuja. When it came time to open the project, I helped the diocese of Abuja arrange a large grand-opening celebration with the local archbishop as one of the speakers. At the end of his speech, the archbishop grabbed not only the audience's attention but mine as well when he explained how he had never thought the US military "did anything except bomb people. I now know you also build clinics to help people."

Break things or help? This is a significant question to consider in light of the formation of the new Africa Command (AFRICOM). President Bush gave Secretary of Defense Robert Gates the responsibility for creating the new command and Gen William E. Ward was named the first commander. AFRICOM became fully operational as an independent unified command on 1 October 2008. Break things or help? These two views on the mission of the US military must ultimately agree on one all-encompassing goal—the new organization should, in all cases, support the attainment of US foreign policy. The archbishop's view

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illustrates how US policy will be better served by a new AFRICOM, which is based on multilateral operations with the African conditions in mind rather than relying on the long-standing, somewhat erroneous view of the US military as an armed instrument only to wage the big wars. To support these multilateral operations, the command needs to truly be an interagency construct rather than a military organization with a few actors from other agencies included for effect. It is imperative that the policymakers recognize this and shift the organization's emphasis during the initial stages of AFRICOM's development before it becomes a solidified military organization with a life of its own—hence, on a path not easily altered.

Why? and How?

The two important questions that need to be answered are "why" and "how" the complete organization should be created and structured. From the beginning, the goal should be to establish an organization that not only supports American foreign policy but that also takes into consideration the unique African conditions. We cannot simply adapt a structure or method of operations from another part of the world with minimal alterations (e.g., recreating European Command or Pacific Command) without looking at regional history, culture, and diversity. Only then can we propose a coherent, logical structure.

Why do we need an AFRICOM? The simple answer is "to support American policy in Africa." US African policy, across the government, has been disjointed in the past due to the fact that few officials in the US government felt the continent was strategically important. While this may change in the future, we should not anticipate a great transformation of policy. Such a transformation would mean that the United States would shift its emphasis away from the traditional ties with Europe, the growing ties to Asia, and the conflicts in the Middle East. Since this is not likely to happen, the best we can hope for is that Africa would be an important element within the realm of *expanded* American interest abroad. Certainly an AFRICOM that coordinates the *military* policy across the continent is valuable, but this is only one small element of the whole US interaction with Africa.

In the March 2006 *National Security Strategy*, former President Bush emphasizes that in Africa "our strategy is to promote economic development and the expansion of effective, democratic governance so that African states can take the lead in addressing African challenges."[1] These goals rest on effective interaction through many elements of foreign policy, not just the military. African countries that are democratic and economically prosperous will not require as much security assistance and will make better American partners when we need support, political or otherwise. Thus, AFRICOM's sole concentration on Africa should help weave many disparate elements of US foreign policy into one more-coherent package, but this is only possible when AFRICOM's structure includes all important elements of this policy.[2]

How do we establish an AFRICOM? The most important issue here is consideration of current and future financial means. The whole US government has a limited budget, and a new command in a less strategically important area of the world (at least from the American standpoint) would not likely be any different. The importance of Africa will likely fluctuate based on the policies of the day, but for consistency and planning purposes, we should make the realistic assumption that financial means will be limited. Therefore, it will be imperative to maximize efficiency and cooperation with other nations. These would include our European allies and our histo-

rically close friends like Senegal and Kenya, as well as the regional powers of Nigeria and South Africa, which quite consciously follow their own interests.

With these two facts in mind, I would propose two principles (or "realities") on which AFRICOM should be structured:

> *Principle 1*: American interests and efforts must coincide with those of our traditional allies and partners in Africa.
>
> *Principle 2*: The military effort must be integrated with the political and developmental efforts across the continent.

In general, the second principle emerges from the first based upon the realistic assumption of constrained financial resources. This assumption is especially valuable for it forces the new command to work synergistically within the US government and with foreign partners.

Interagency Command

With these two principles in mind, my first proposal is for AFRICOM to evolve into a *true interagency command*, not remain merely a military command with a few nonmilitary trappings. This command would have three equal main components: the military, a political element, and a section devoted to development. Despite the military title of "command" and the current focus of the secretary of defense on AFRICOM, we must refocus the effort to include all important elements of foreign policy equally. If there were a better word to replace "command" in AFRICOM, it should emphasize the nonmilitary missions and deemphasize the military aspects. Perhaps one should begin with the organizational model of an embassy rather than a military organization! While this may not be easy at this stage of the game, congressional or presidential action could enable the formation of a new type of organization with a larger or even dominant civilian role. Higher-level action is imperative sooner rather than later, for the longer the command's bureaucracy is in place, the harder changing the structure will become.[3]

Within the AFRICOM structure, other offices that deal with such issues as trade,



Figure. Proposed AFRICOM Organization.

legal, or environmental cooperation will likely be included, but at a lower organizational level than the three main branches of military, political, and developmental. For example, the emphasis on business relationships (e.g., in the guise of Department of Commerce attachés) would fit well under the umbrella of the developmental organization. The private interests would buttress development and expand it into many sectors that the government cannot hope to enter with its limited means. Similarly, an organization such as the Environmental Protection Agency working within the developmental component would be able to assist with environmental problems accompanying African industrial development.

Ultimately, the military component must understand that it supports the political goals in US foreign policy, and in AFRICOM these goals (referring to Principle 1 above) will likely be tempered and shaped by those with whom we work. For example, fighting terrorism is one of our top priorities, but most African countries see terrorism as less pressing, and many do not see it as an important issue—in most instances development trumps everything else. Although the developmental efforts of the US government currently fall under the State Department in the guise of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), one must consider giving USAID's efforts equal footing with the political efforts. This move would give USAID its full significance in a place where it can achieve maximum impact and do the most good—for the African countries and thus, by extension, for US policy.

A second example concerns the US need for resources. The United States is concerned about access to raw materials in Africa, particularly oil. This is a hot-button topic for the rest of the world; much of the world believes we are in Iraq only for the oil. Unfortunately, US politicians have not done much to allay this accusation. Resources are important, but most governments—regardless of political persuasion—will continue to sell to the highest bidder. This is especially true with resources available from multiple suppliers. Thus, we can regard access to oil and other natural resources as merely a second-tier priority and not emphasize it. On the other hand, African countries are generally interested in guaranteed markets for their agricultural products, something we can potentially assist with, but outside the military structure.

Based upon and expanding from the two stated principles above, six factors clearly call for this proposed macro-organization of AFRICOM: budget, access, trust, operations, example, and history. Each of these factors clearly argues for a true interagency command synergistically combining the strengths of each of the three main elements—military, political, and developmental.

1. *Budget.* This will be constrained; thus, all attempts should be made to make operations as synergistic as possible (Principle 1). We must be ready to work with allies more than in name only in actual operations, basing, and planning. On one hand, we must coordinate our activities with NATO allies traditionally active in Africa. This would primarily be the French and, to a lesser extent, the British, along with other allied European nations increasingly devoting resources and manpower to the continent. In general, many American interests in Africa, such as promoting stability and democracy while providing emergency humanitarian assistance, parallel those of European nations. On the other hand, we should work closely with our African partners, accepting their assistance and guidance at appropriate times. This will not only help to conserve our resources, but working with our African partners will help us to assist them in furthering their own interests.

A good example here would be US cooperation that facilitates peacekeeping operations (PKO). As in many past PKOs under the United Nations or other organizations, African nations tend to be willing to contribute troops but need assistance with logistics—equipment, supplies, and transportation. The United States could potentially save money by getting African nations to contribute in support of US-favored PKOs, but only if we reciprocate by assisting in PKOs that African nations would like to undertake themselves but are not as important in US foreign policy. If we look back at the West African peacekeeping operations in Liberia beginning in 1990, the US military directly assisted in airlifting troops into Liberia only in 1997 in preparation for the elections.[4] Arguably, the West African peacekeepers could have been more effective had they had more direct access to reliable logistical support.

An interagency command could assist budgetary efforts by combining the short-term military efforts with the long-term efforts of other US government organizations. In the realm of peacekeeping, USAID has often been involved in post-conflict demobilization and reintegration, something which naturally follows from the PKOs and would more efficiently use funds if all the stages, from initial deployment of troops to final reintegration of the combatants, were planned together.

2. *Access.* For any operations we need access to people, facilities, and partners' willingness. The French have established air bases in central and western Africa that they have used in the past; we could likely use these if we would cooperate with the French. Furthermore, access to ports, other airports, and additional infrastructure would be eased when we work alongside our African partners in helping to solve their problems. An America which appears to be a neo-imperial power will not be greeted as warmly or willingly (except with large payments—see budget point above) as someone who will help them solve what they see as their problems.

Additionally, working closely with the French or other partners would give us access to networks that we might normally find difficult to join. The French, over the years, have developed personal networks in French-speaking Africa, which could be useful in the achievement of American foreign policy goals if we partner with them. For example, the various American antiterrorism operations in the Sahel have been fairly effective in cooperation with the local governments, but their effectiveness would likely have been increased had we had long-term relationships with the African partners and the French, all of whom have been in that region much longer than the United States has even shown interest. Similarly, easy access to nonmilitary organizations, specifically nongovernmental organizations, would likely be eased with significant civilian participation in the command.

3. *Trust.* Not only will frequent contacts over long periods of time increase interpersonal trust and, by extension, trust of US motives in Africa, but an organization that is not purely military will inspire trust by bringing different American viewpoints and capabilities to the table. The US military is known for coming in, solving a problem, and then leaving. Numerous American military operations in Africa have been short-term and only partially solved the problems. For example, in Somalia the US military quickly left after a small number of US Army Rangers were killed in October 1993. In 1994 the US military helped evacuate Western nationals from Rwanda but withdrew rather than intervening in the genocide. In 2003 American Marines briefly landed in Liberia to provide security but left after only two months. The American military, while effective at the

designated mission, provided little lasting assistance to the local people.

If we look at the period from 2001 to the 2007, US European Command (EUCOM) conducted 14 exercises and seven different named operations in Africa to support African nations.[5] Six of the exercises were short-term medical assistance missions (e.g., MEDFLAG), which provided needed assistance but ended after a short period of time—hardly the basis for establishing relationships for long-term cooperation. Similarly, EUCOM's two earthquake-relief operations (to Algeria and Morocco) certainly assisted people but established no long-term contacts. On the other side of the coin, the number of military-to-military training operations (two) and exercises (six) provided a limited amount of contact, which would neither allow relationships to fully develop nor continue over time, except in very limited circumstances. EUCOM similarly had a number of ongoing efforts with African nations (such as humanitarian assistance projects and humanitarian mine action, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, and other basic support to regional organizations), providing limited additional contact. One could argue that a military-dominated AFRICOM might expand these efforts, but with the budget constraints, this would be unlikely.

Not surprisingly, officials in many countries are inherently suspicious of American military capabilities. We have the military capability to do much, ranging all the way from the large land operations of the first Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom to precision strikes launched from B-2s flying halfway around the world, to small, covert operations. While we may not have the desire to intervene in African nations in such ways, a purely military organization brings up images of past US operations. For example, many Africans know our history of overt military interventions in Latin America and the less overt governmental changes supported by the United States, such as the US- supported coup in Iran in 1953 that brought the Shah to power. Similarly, US military capabilities for surveillance (i.e., spying) are publicly known and raise eyebrows with the suspicion that they might be directed at our African partners. In a commentary for the US military's journal *Strategic Studies Quarterly,* in the previous article and in this issue of ASPJ Africa and Francophonie, the South African Abel Esterhuyse echoes the very real fear within some circles in Africa that the creation of AFRICOM could signal the militarization of American policy in Africa and emphasizes the charge that the United States is using the war on terror to get access to African resources.[6] These are two fears that a military organization cannot easily dispel.

Conversely, the civilian State Department and USAID are known more for their long-term focus and the training of their personnel to work with foreign partners, including the acquisition of better language skills, than those within the military. Both of these agencies are comfortable in taking time to build personal relationships with other officials, and they tend to remain in the region longer, maintaining these personal bonds and facilitating work between nations on a civilian basis. The military can capitalize upon the long-term perspective of the other American elements to gain and maintain the trust of its African partners and expand contacts from just military-to-military (Principle 2). In many countries, the military is not always very popular due to the history of coups, military rule, or civil wars (e.g., Congo, Uganda, and Liberia) so US-African operations will often be met with skepticism without the trust generated by the civilian US officials working alongside.

4. *Operations*. Historically, very few US operations in Africa have been strictly force-on-force fighting but instead have been operations of mixed character, such as humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuations, or training (as discussed above). All of these mixed operations have a significant political and developmental component to them; thus, the military needs to work with other sectors of the US government and also diverse sectors of our partners' governments (Principle 2). An AFRICOM built to integrate the three American components will maintain coherency in the operations and serve the interests of the local African partners without much more cost on our part. Furthermore, the military can, and often does, function as an enabler of the other two elements of American power—politics and development (especially with, but not limited to, airlift). Ultimately, the military's structure must be built to support American foreign policy, not just to operate autonomously.

Somalia in 1993/94 provides a good example to support this point. Operation Restore Hope began as a humanitarian assistance mission, carried out by the military, which then became a military mission of hunting down clan leaders. The military mission failed and President Clinton essentially cancelled the whole mission. Understanding the situation better and being more willing to talk to the clan leaders, both diplomatic tasks, might have prevented the escalation of military violence, which led to eventual mission failure.

5. *Example*. On a continent with a history of military coups we do not want to demonstrate that a pure or overwhelmingly military structure in Africa can work alone (Principle 2). An American military organization locally subordinated to a civilian boss and working with civilian organizations provides an American example of the place of the military in society and would help to discourage military interventions. On the more practical side, when the US military's operations are closely coordinated with the American political and developmental components, the span of contact within the partner African government will be wider, strengthening the other governments against the power of their own militaries.

During the 1960s and 1970s, many within Africa and abroad saw the military as a modernizing force in African society. Thus, segments of African populations supported military coups, and the United States often looked away when they occurred. Subsequently, the militaries proved not to be as capable at governing as believed. Currently, the US military is very proficient at accomplishing even civilian taskings (e.g., policing, distributing food assistance, providing medical services, advising governments). Despite this capability, we do not want to encourage African militaries to believe they can do everything alone and thus potentially encourage political intervention. An AFRICOM with a civilian leadership will show the proper place of the US military in society.

6. *History*. Unlike in Europe after World War II where the United States was establishing a command (the eventual EUCOM) in a defeated Germany, the United States will be attempting to work with many proud, independent African governments. To successfully base US forces in Africa, the United States must approach the Africans as equals and work with them so that the relationship is mutually beneficial (Principle 1). The United States cannot be seen as an occupying power as the colonial era still remains fresh in the minds of many Africans. Additionally, the images of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ongoing counterinsurgency in Iraq will remain relevant in Africa for a long time, illustrating suspected American colonial intentions. Thus, the best plan combi-

nes political and developmental operations that deemphasize the military component.

We must remember that struggles and wars of liberation remain fresh in the minds of many African leaders, and the United States often stood on the "wrong side" of the conflict. During the Cold War, the United States supported the white-majority government in South Africa, afraid that the African National Congress (ANC) had communist sympathies. Now the democratically elected ANC is in power, and many within the party remember our support of the other side. Similarly, the United States supported Portugal in its ill-fated attempt to quash the liberation struggles in Mozambique and Angola and then supported unpopular but "anticommunist" insurgent movements: RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola. The generations of African leaders are changing, but the United States is remembered more as a supporter of the colonial status quo rather than as an anticolonial power.

The South African Abel Esterhuyse makes the point that the US creation of AFRICOM "is driven by negative considerations from Africa rather than by positive interests," which includes a potentially renewed great-power competition in Africa between the United States and China, harkening back to the Cold War days.[7] This fear just reemphasizes the importance of an AFRICOM with the emphasis across all three pillars—military, political, and developmental. Competition between the United States and China in the developmental (and perhaps political) realms could be used by African nations to advance their own aspirations and improve their economies, while military competition would likely just lead to militarization and destruction as during the Cold War proxy conflicts.

Location: Addis Ababa

Focusing on the recent history of independent Africa, at least the headquarters of AFRICOM should be located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Intra-African squabbles aside, this city has been the focus of the African pursuit of independence and unity. Ethiopia was never colonized, and the red, yellow, and green of the Ethiopian flag are recognized as the Pan-African colors. Addis Ababa best embodies the concept of "Africa" as a single continent with its own unique African interests. The African countries themselves chose this city as the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 and its successor organization, the African Union (AU), at its establishment in 2001. American policy supports the regional and Pan-African efforts of the AU, including its attempts at peacekeeping.

On the practical side, relations between the United States and Ethiopia are good, which would help to ease establishment of a nascent headquarters. Certainly one could argue that the infrastructure in Ethiopia would not easily support a large command structure, but the headquarters does not necessarily have to be a large organization—only big enough to provide effective interaction with the African Union. Addis Ababa is already the location of many embassies; therefore, another embassy-sized structure would not place too much additional burden on this city.

The civilian commander of AFRICOM should be the US ambassador to the African Union. Not only is this diplomat already representing the United States at the continental level but, as discussed above, is also a civilian and would emphasize the American tradition of civilian control of the military. While the appointment of this diplomat to lead a partial military organization may call for congressional or presidential action and

the change to US laws, it is hardly a new concept since both the president and secretary of defense, the two top leaders of the military, are both civilians.

While the headquarters of AFRICOM would be in Addis Ababa, the various diplomatic, military, and developmental subcomponents could be spread throughout the continent, closer to the more functional regional groupings. All military subcomponents would necessarily be colocated with diplomatic and developmental elements, emphasizing cooperation and civilian oversight. At the lower levels, the military components would ideally be paired with countries where similar capabilities exist to encourage cooperation (Principle 1).

Taken as an example, the air subcomponent should be headquartered in a country with a robust capability to support American and partner operations, probably a country with its own operational air force. This headquarters could simply be a minimally-manned standby base like those in Eastern Europe or have a small number of permanently stationed aircraft. Above all else, the air subcomponent would need transport aircraft to best support the policies of the United States and its partners. Transport, instead of fighter or reconnaissance aircraft, would emphasize cooperative projects and deemphasize militarization. Needless to say, the number of American assets stationed in Africa would likely be very low at any time, but permanent basing of some sort would cement the US relationship with the African countries, signal our intention to remain involved over the long term, and enable the command to operate independently.

Expanding from this central hub, the air subcomponent should perhaps have representation in each regional area (i.e., West Africa in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] or southern Africa working with the South African Developmental Community [SADC], etc.) to support partner operations. If the United States were to permanently base C-130 transport aircraft in Africa, it would make sense to station them with another air force operating the same aircraft. US and African personnel could share experience and training and assist each other during periods of high operations.[8] This would be valuable for both the US and African air forces. US forces could perhaps provide a greater quantity of equipment and higher technical proficiency, while the forces of the African nations would provide language skills, regional knowledge, and an enthusiasm for operating in the local area.

Conclusion

The formation of AFRICOM is currently underway, but as it evolves in the years ahead it must come out from under the purview of the secretary of defense (hence, a military-centric organization) and become a true interagency organization. It will hopefully then be an organization that meets not only American needs but also those of our partners in Africa—a true multilateral effort.

What sort of perception of the United States do we want to give to Africa? In the spring of 2003 during military operations in Iraq, I was in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and talked to many regular Tanzanians while doing my own historical research.[9] One subject which often came up was the impending US military operations in Tanzania. Many believed the new, very spacious US Embassy under construction was meant to be a military base. While my observations were hardly scientific, I got the impression that many Tanzanians saw the United States as a potential threat. Tanzania is an area of the world where we would objectively have little reason to interfere. However, the Tanzanians from their perspective saw their country as, naturally, very important to the United States

and a potential target! Policymakers and AFRICOM planners must never forget that popular consciousness and local perceptions will always overrule announcements and press releases.

As we move away from Operation Iraqi Freedom and the international perception of the United States as a unilateral actor, we should try to return to the American image produced after World War II. After this cataclysm, the world did not see the United States as a conquering behemoth, intent on imposing its views on the rest of the world, but instead as a country willing to work multilaterally to solve the world's problems. The United States earned this reputation through its participation in the establishment of many consultative and functional bodies with representation from many nations. Above all, the United Nations served as a beacon of hope, but so too did international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, military alliances, and the Marshall Plan in Europe. The United States helped to establish many of these organizations to contain the Soviet Union; but through the often nonmilitary focus, it generated good will and achieved other-than-military objectives, thus advancing American security policy. For example, the Marshall Plan led to exactly the result we wanted—a stable, prosperous, democratic Western Europe. This prosperous Europe could, incidentally, support the United States in the security realm through NATO. While the situation is not quite the same in Africa today, our expanding relationship with African countries deserves the same dedication across the spectrum of the government so that it expands positively into the future. As the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (September 2006) declares: "In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas."[10] In this vein, we want the African countries to see the United States as coming to help, not to break things, for only in this way will the relationship grow and stay strong in the years ahead! ❑

Notes

1. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, March 2006), 37.

2. See Abel Esterhuyse, "The Iraqization of Africa? Looking At *AFRICOM* from a South African Perspective," *Air and Space Power Journal Africa and Francophonie*, Inaugural Issue (Winter 2009): pp. 21-34. Esterhuyse looks at the realist perspective of the creation of AFRICOM. This perspective is key since policymakers usually sell new initiatives like AFRICOM to the American public on how it will benefit the United States (e.g., the importance of Nigerian oil to the US economy). This is perhaps unavoidable, but we also must realize that military officials tend to share this realistic perspective; thus, they will approach the construction of the new command to serve these ends and therefore emphasize the security issues.

3. I realize that this simple schematic will likely raise many more questions than it answers. Similar diplomatic posts in Europe, for example the US Mission to NATO and the US Mission to the European Union, already offer some insight into the possibilities and challenges this proposal for AFRICOM might face. Additionally, an important issue not discussed here includes AFRICOM's relationship to the various US embassies throughout Africa. These are all important questions to be addressed but do not detract from the argument here for a *true* interagency organization.

4. See the historical summary of US European Command operations at http://www.eucom.mil/english/Operations/history.asp.

5. Ibid.; and http://www.eucom.mil/english/Exercises/main.asp. Note: I have not counted the two 2002 noncombatant evacuation operations (Central African Republic and Côte d'Ivoire) since they are designed to rescue Americans and not to assist the African countries.

6. Esterhuyse, "Iraqization of Africa?" 21.

7. Ibid.,21.

8. The basing pattern here could mirror the experience gained in the USAF's "Total Force Initiative" in which the USAF stations various active duty, reserve, and Air National Guard units together. In this way, for example, the active duty units benefit from the experience resident in the reserve forces.

9. That I was doing historical research on a topic unrelated to military or defense issues is important since I did not initiate the conversations about the US military or US-Tanzanian relations.

10. Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, Septemebter 2006), 7.

Stabilization, Peacebuilding, and Sustainability in the Horn of Africa

Stephen F. Burgess

Stabilization, peacebuilding, and sustainability in an unstable and famine-prone region like the Horn of Africa are predicated on a holistic approach that addresses environmental degradation, conflict, and their interrelationship.1 They posit a set of options intended to bring sustainable development as well as security from conflict and struggles over scarce resources. This approach is especially salient in the Horn of Africa because the region combines high levels of environmental stress (manifested in periodic famine and struggles over diminishing arable farm and grazing lands) and conflict (interstate wars, civil wars, and communal clashes).2 The region is also one in which environmental disasters (especially famine) and conflicts have been interrelated.

This article addresses the problems of peacebuilding, sustainability, and stabilization in the Horn of Africa and the interrelationship of environmental degradation, instability, and conflict. It assesses the extent to which degradation causes instability and focuses on the spiraling effect of natural disaster, degradation, and conflict on famine, destabilization, and conflict. It examines efforts, especially in Somali pastoral areas of Kenya and Ethiopia, to mitigate environmental degradation and conflict as well as extremism and terrorism. Thus, a sustainability and stabilization assessment is used to examine environmental degradation, conflict, and their interrelationship and what can be done to overcome degradation and conflict.

The Horn of Africa Region

The "core" of the Horn of Africa refers to the area adjacent to where the "Horn" juts into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean and includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The core features a cultural clash between "lowland" Islamic pastoralists from Somali, Oromo, and other ethnic groups and "upland" Orthodox Christian farmers from Amharic and Tigrayan ethnic groups. The struggle between uplanders and lowlanders has been going on for several hundred years and has centered on control over land and wealth.[3]

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Figure 1. Political map of Horn of Africa region. (Borders of the disputed regions of Darfur, the Ogaden, Somaliland, and Puntland indicated here are approximate and are included for orientation purposes only. Some overlap exists between the claims of Somaliland and Puntland along their shared border. The inclusion of such labeling does not represent or imply recognition by the author or by any agency or department of the US government.)

The larger Horn refers to countries that have close relations with or are rivals of the core states, especially Sudan and Kenya, and to a lesser extent Uganda. Sudan is especially important because of its rivalry for the past century and a half with Ethiopia. Sudan features a core group of Arab-speaking Muslim farmers from the banks of the Nile and surrounding areas who have managed to control (often with force) vast outlying sections of the country composed mostly of nomadic pastoralists and some farmers. The struggle between Sudan and Ethiopia began with the Mahdi in the late nineteenth century and resumed in the 1950s with the independence of Sudan. Ethiopia tended to back southern Sudanese rebels who were fighting against Sudanese government attempts to "Arabize" and "Islamize" them. Sudan tended to back Eritrean separatists who were fighting for independence and against Ethiopian annexation.

Kenya fits into the Horn because of its relations with Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Kenya was a British settler colony from which the British projected power during the colonial era and attempted to control pastoralist areas in the north of the country (including Somali pastoralists). Kenya has been a peacemaker in the region, especially in Somalia and Sudan. Uganda fits into the Horn because of its relations with Sudan and Kenya and its pastoralist population (in the northeast) who move across borders. In addition, the Blue Nile and White Nile both flow through the region.

The Horn of Africa features pastoralists, drylands, and semiarid topography (80 percent of the more than five million square kilometers). Sixty-two percent of land in the Horn of Africa is occupied by pastoralists, who are 12 percent of the population of the region and who live on semiarid land with a lack of water.[4]

All of the states mentioned came together to create the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in the mid-1980s to deal with famines, which were afflicting the region.[5] In the mid-1990s, the IGADD became the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and became a peacemaking body, playing a role in the end of conflicts in southern Sudan and Somalia and authorizing the development of an early warning system to prevent or stop environmental degradation and conflict.[6]

The Horn is greatly influenced by Egypt, which has had long, close relations with the region. Egypt's primary concern has been guaranteeing the free flow of the Nile for national survival and ensuring navigation through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has influence over Sudan and Somalia and has exported its version of "Wahhabist" Islam to the Horn. Yemen is just across the strategic strait (the Bab el-Mandeb) from the Horn and takes an interest in its affairs. Yemen has also been a crossing point for al-Qaeda from the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn.

Islamic extremism exists in the Horn of Africa and has flowed down from the Arabian Peninsula. Osama bin Laden was welcomed to Sudan in the early 1990s by Islamist leader Husain al-Turabi and built al-Qaeda there. In 1996 the Sudanese regime asked bin Laden to leave. In 1993 Islamic extremists arose in Somalia in opposition to US, UN, and Western intervention. Today extremism persists among some members of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and foreign Islamic fighters have been fighting the Ethiopians. However, it is uncertain if

al-Qaeda has made serious inroads into Somalia. In Kenya and Tanzania, the discontent of coastal Muslims who have been neglected by regimes dominated by non-Muslims from the interior led some to join al-Qaeda and participate in the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2002 attacks on an Israeli hotel and airliner in Mombasa.[7] At issue is the degree of al-Qaeda presence today, especially in Somalia and coastal Kenya and Tanzania. In previously religion-tolerant Ethiopia, reports have asserted that both Islamic extremism (especially Wahhabism) and Orthodox Christian fundamentalism are growing.[8]

Stabilization Challenges and State Failure in the Horn of Africa

State failure in the Horn of Africa has provided considerable material for research and literature.[9] Somalia is the most obvious case.[10] State disintegration in Uganda under Idi Amin in the 1970s and Milton Obote in the early 1980s is also well known.[11] In Sudan, the central government has tried to "conquer, Arabize, and Islamize" the South for most of half a century, as well as ethnically cleanse Darfur and subdue other outlying regions, instead of seeking to build legitimacy—this has constituted state failure in those regions.[12] Less obvious cases of "partial failure" include Ethiopia in the Somali Ogaden, Kenya in the Somali Northeast, and Uganda in the Acholi North (facing the Lord's Resistance Army).[13]

At the macro level, the Horn of Africa is a difficult region in which to build and sustain states. There are widely differing topographies (mountains, savanna, and desert) and modes of production (commercial and smallholder agriculture and pastoralism). Before the European colonial powers arrived, there were only two significant states extant—Amharic-Shoan Ethiopia and Mahdist Sudan.[14] Boundaries drawn and colonies created in the late nineteenth century have remained sources of contention. The colonial legacy is one in which relatively strong states (e.g., Ethiopia, Sudan, and British settler Kenya) were surrounded by nonstate groupings (mainly pastoralists). Indirect colonial rule in Uganda and Sudan meant little integration of ethnic groups, especially pastoralists. The division of Somalis into five colonial territories helped to accentuate clan fissures.[15]

In the Horn of Africa, pastoralists resisted state intervention and controls such as boundaries, fencing, and pest eradication programs and did not need states as much as farmers did.[16] In general, there was little environmental control or agricultural extension and livestock control in the region. Thus, there was little positive institutional interaction between pastoralists and states. Therefore, the tasks of post-independence state building and regional integration were difficult in the vast lowland expanses of the Horn.[17]

In the 1950s and 1960s, Ethiopia annexed Eritrea—which led to war—and came into rivalry with newly independent Sudan and Somalia, which set the stage for a range of destabilization activities. Ethiopia supported rebels in the southern Sudan, while Sudan supported the Eritrean liberation movements. Somalia laid claim to the Ogaden in Ethiopia, which led to an invasion and war in 1977–78. Somalia's defeat and subsequent Ethiopian subversion contributed to state decline, failure, and collapse. These rivalries paved the way for state failure, especially for Somalia and Sudan, regime change in Ethiopia, and the indepen-

Figure 2. Topographical map of Horn of Africa region

dence of Eritrea. After Eritrea became independent in 1993, it quickly came into conflict with its erstwhile ally, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime in Ethiopia.

At the intermediate level, all states in the region have suffered problems with institutional viability and state weakness. Patronage networks developed and then shriveled in Somalia and Sudan in the 1960s and 1980s, leading to state failure. In Kenya under Pres. Daniel Arap Moi (1978–2002), patronage networks shrunk and ethnic conflict over land intensified, bringing warnings of possible state failure.[18] In the 1960s Ugandan president Milton Obote shut out the predominant Buganda kingdom from patronage networks and

removed the Kabaka as head of state, which led to Idi Amin's 1971 military coup and state disintegration.[19]

At the micro level, all states in the region have suffered from shocks of various sorts—including famine, economic downturns, and revolution—which contributed to state failure. The Ethiopian famines of 1973 and 1984–85 contributed to regime changes (the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991). In the late 1970s, the revolutionary Dergue regime instituted land reform and attempted to radically reorganize farming, which disrupted traditional agricultural systems and productive capacity.[20] The disruption and famine gave impetus to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, which came to power six years later. The Somalia famine of 1991–92 was partly the result of state failure and conflict. The rise of clan warlords, who used food to empower themselves, made the reconstitution of the Somalian state all but impossible.[21]

Stabilization Challenges in Somalia

The case of state failure and collapse in Somalia (1990 to the present) is the most pronounced of any in Africa and the world and has been examined thoroughly by a number of scholars.[22] At the macro or structural level, the principal problems have been pastoralist clans who have long contended for resources, the colonial misdivision of Somalis, and the resulting irredentism. Pre-colonial Somalia was characterized by pastoralist clans who contended over water holes, grazing lands, and livestock and who raided sedentary agriculturalists—poor social capital for the building of nation-states.[23] In the scramble for Africa, Italy took southeastern Somali areas, while Britain took northern and southwestern Somali areas and Ethiopia took the western Ogaden region.[24] The Italians did little to build colonial administration and infrastructure from 1900 to 1941, while the British put little into the north (Somaliland) from 1900 to 1961 and the south that it governed from 1941 to 1961.

From independence in 1961 until 1969, small elites struggled to create a successful Somali state but were unable to control contention and political chaos. They established patronage networks that drowned in a sea of corruption. They promised the recovery of Somali lands in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti but were unable to bring about the irredentist promise of a larger Somalia.

The military coup of 1969 and the Siad Barre dictatorship were reactions to the weakness and corruption of the new Somali state and the civilian elites' inability to bring promises to fruition. The Barre regime made a concerted effort to strengthen and extend the state's reach (e.g., they attempted to transform pastoralists into fishers) and build the Somali nation. The adoption of "scientific socialism" helped to bring Soviet assistance, including large amounts of military aid. In 1977 and 1978 Somalia used that military aid to invade Ethiopia and take the Ogaden. Defeat in 1978 dealt a blow to the Barre regime from which it never recovered.

At the intermediate level of institutional viability and state weakness, dictator Siad Barre established patron-client relations in the 1970s (with the help of Soviet aid) with the various clans. However, after the defeat in 1978, the switch from Soviet to American patrons, and economic downturn in the 1980s, the regime narrowed the range of clan clients until only Barre's sub-clan of the Darod clan was benefiting.[25] In April 1978 the Somali Salvation and Democratic Front launched guerrilla

operations in southern Somalia with Ethiopian support. In 1981, the Somali National Movement launched a campaign in the north that would lead to the nominal independence of Somaliland in 1991. Repression by the regime's security system did not prove effective and actually backfired, increasing violent opposition. Siad Barre refused to negotiate with the opposition and reacted by narrowing his power base to three sub-clans of the Darod clan.[26]

At the micro level, the United States suddenly withdrew aid to the Barre regime in 1988 as the Cold War was coming to an end. The evaporation of resources crippled the state and enabled the rebels' advance, which led to regime failure in the course of 1990 and collapse in January 1991. Siad Barre continued to refuse to negotiate, even as opposing rebel groups closed in on the capital, Mogadishu.

After the collapse, the inability of opposition movements and clans to reach agreement led to the failure of the Somalian state and the rise of the warlords.[27] The failed state and clan warfare in Somalia immediately had ramifications for environmental sustainability and the welfare of Somalis. The great Somalia famine of 1991–93 was a direct result of state collapse and the conduct of the warlords. Warlords seized food from Somali farmers and relief agencies and used the proceeds to buy weapons, provide patronage, and grow in strength. With no state, fights over grazing lands and water holes went unresolved. As clan warfare intensified, there was no state to step in to resolve disputes. The interconnectedness of state failure, warfare, and environmental degradation and famine became clear.

Efforts were mounted to reconstitute the Somalian state, but all failed. In 1993, the United States and the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) tried to gain agreement on rebuilding the state. The special representative of the UN secretary-general and chief of mission, ADM Jonathan Howe, and his advisors were determined to take a "bottom up" approach to reconstituting the Somalian state. In March 1993, they negotiated an agreement with a range of local leaders to build local governments, then provincial governments, and then the central state. However, Howe and his colleagues attempted to circumvent the powerful warlords after already agreeing in principle to a "top down" power-sharing arrangement among them. The warlords rejected the bottom-up approach and mounted an insurgency that eventually drove the United States and the United Nations out of Somalia.[28]

After US and UN withdrawal, the warlords continued fighting each other in and around Mogadishu for more than a decade. In contrast, peace prevailed in Somaliland (in the north of Somalia), which declared independence in May 1991 and held democratic elections in 2003. However, Somaliland has failed to win recognition as a sovereign state. In 1998, Puntland (in the northeast of Somalia) declared autonomy from Mogadishu under Pres. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and has remained relatively peaceful (though there have been clashes with Somaliland forces over the contested Sool region). In 2004, Yusuf was elected by his peers as president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for all of Somalia. Elections were held in Puntland in January 2005, and Mohamed Muse Hersi was voted president.

After 1993, peacemaking in Somalia fell to the IGAD under Kenyan and Djiboutian leadership. In 2004 the TFG and Somali Transitional Federal Parliament

(TFP) were formed and elected President Yusuf. Each of Somalia's four major clans was allocated 61 seats in the parliament, while an alliance of minority clans received 31 seats. The TFP and TFG agreed on a charter for the reconstitution and governing of the Somali state. A split occurred between President Yusuf's group (based in the Darod clan) and a Mogadishu-based faction (mainly the Hawiye clan). At the beginning of 2006, the split ended, and the TFG moved to Baidoa, Somalia.

In early 2006, the Islamic Courts Union arose as an armed group and by June defeated the warlords in and around Mogadishu. By September the ICU controlled much of Somalia outside Somaliland and Puntland as well as Baidoa, where the Ethiopian army protected the TFG. In December 2006, the Ethiopians launched a counteroffensive and drove the ICU out of Mogadishu and other major centers. In February Uganda sent 400 troops as an advance contingent of 1,600 peacekeepers to Mogadishu as part of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM); Nigeria, Ghana, and Malawi failed to send peacekeepers because of continuing violence. In March the TFG moved to Mogadishu, which was rocked by violence that drove tens of thousands out of the city. Eritrea, in its feud with Ethiopia, has armed and trained the ICU as part of a coalition dedicated to driving the Ethiopian army and the TFG out of Somalia. At issue is whether or not the TFG can survive and the Ethiopian army can be replaced by African Union (AU) peacekeepers.

Francois Grignon, Africa director of the International Crisis Group (ICG), finds that the conflict in Somalia is a greater challenge than the conflict in the African Great Lakes region (including the Democratic Republic of the Congo). He has been pessimistic about the prospect of Ethiopia holding Mogadishu for the TFG and even more so about the Ethiopian army being replaced by AU peacekeepers or a new Somalian army.[29] Lt Col Scott Rutherford, US defense attaché to Kenya, observed that the longer Ethiopia meddles in Somali affairs, the longer it will take the TFG to become independent.[30]

Stabilization Challenges in Sudan

Sudan is a state that has failed though it has never collapsed. Since independence in 1956, the government in Khartoum has been unable to achieve legitimacy in vast outlying areas of Africa's largest country. Instead, the regime has mostly engaged in repression, which has devastated the South and other areas. The civil war in the South, 1955–72 and 1983–2005, has contributed to massive dislocation of farmers and pastoralists and to famines that have killed hundreds of thousands of people (as well as livestock). Planted landmines have inhibited agricultural and pastoral activities in many parts of the South. Genocide in Darfur has brought even greater dislocation and death in a shorter period of time.[31]

At the macro level, the slave trade (especially in the nineteenth century) by the Arab North in the African South (and other regions) created hegemonic relations that have endured until today.[32] In the 1880s and 1890s, the Mahdist state fought against nonbelievers in outlying regions that it claimed. The British inherited the tensions and minimally managed Sudan as a "condominium" of Egypt, with the goal of protecting the Nile and the Suez Canal. For much of the period, the North and the South were separate entities. However, as independence approached in the early 1950s, they were thrown together by the British. In the

early 1950s, the northerners' old hegemonic tendencies reemerged as they attempted to spread Islam as the religion and Arabic as the language of instruction in the South.[33]

In the two North-South civil wars, the rebels were supported at various times by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and other states.[34] At the institutional level, the Sudanese government excluded the South and other regions from patronage networks that were established under successive dictators and during brief electoral democratic interludes in the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. From 1972 to 1983, peace prevailed—the only period in which Sudan emerged from state failure. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, growing indebtedness led to state decline.[35] During the 1980s, a series of economic shocks and the resumption of the North-South civil war in 1983 led Sudan to sink back into state failure. In 1989, Gen Omar al-Bashir staged a military coup, which deepened state failure. The Islamist military regime intensified its war against the South, with help from growing oil revenues in the late 1990s, but was unable to defeat the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement and army. The impasse and intervention by international peacemakers in the early 2000s led to the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which went into effect in July 2005 and which promises a referendum for the South in July 2011 to decide whether to become independent or remain part of Sudan. The future of North-South relations remains uncertain.[36]

The same symptoms of state failure that the Khartoum regime had exhibited towards the South could be observed in its relations with Darfur and other outlying regions. In 2003 and 2004, the government dispatched the janjaweed—pastoralist militias who were already struggling with Darfur farmers over diminishing land[37]—to ethnically cleanse Darfur so that various rebel movements would lose their base of support. Also, the janjaweed militias have many mercenaries.[38] The result has been a genocide in which hundreds of thousands have been killed or raped and millions displaced since 2003–04 and in which widespread atrocities have continued ever since. As in the case of the South, the intervention of international peacemakers has been required to put an end to Khartoum's abusive behavior.[39]

Francois Grignon finds that the CPA between North and South Sudan is in danger. Darfur is a dramatic humanitarian catastrophe, but it is really a smokescreen for the real power struggle between North and South. However, if Khartoum loses Darfur, it stands a good chance of losing the South.[40] Solomon Gomes of the AU Peace and Security Commission finds that the Northern Sudanese are "playing for time" and that the AU and international community must be wary of Khartoum-sponsored militia groups in southern Sudan and must be prepared for the secession of the South followed by a resumption of hostilities by Khartoum. If the South secedes, Darfur will seek the same route.[41] Gomes notes that Khartoum accepted aspects of the Darfur Peace Agreement and now the hybrid UN/AU force. However, the problem now is persuading the government and the fractious Darfur rebel movements to meet and discuss. In the meantime, the violence and humanitarian catastrophe continue.

In regard to stabilizing Somalia and Sudan, Gomes observes that the Peace and Security Commission (as the "locomotive" for action) has the responsibility to inform the Peace and Security Council

and the entire AU membership regarding the "pulse" in conflict zones. However, the commission is understaffed and limited in taking action. It provides reports, for example, from Sudan and Chad but cannot take action. Another problem is a lack of authority; for example, the AU has called on all rebel movements to leave Chadian territory but has been unable to enforce its request. Gomes believes that the AU should leverage support for Chad's interests from France and the European Union (EU). The diplomatic track on the Chad-Sudan conflict has been slow to materialize and has only come to fruition lately through French leadership.[42]

Stabilization Challenges in Ethiopia's Ogaden Region

Since annexing the Ogaden in the late 1800s, the Ethiopian state has traditionally failed to reach out to pastoralists in the Somali Ogaden region and to other pastoralists, including Oromo and Borana herders.[43] The problem of weakness and failure has been based upon the bias of the Ethiopian state in favor of highland Ethiopian Orthodox farmers versus lowland Islamic pastoralists. Also, Ethiopian suspicions about the loyalties of Ogaden Somalis rose in the 1960s, reached a crescendo during the 1977–78 Ogaden war, and have persisted ever since.

In 1991, the Tigrayan-dominated Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front regime took power and instituted a system of ethnic federalism that promised autonomy and self-rule to the Ogaden Somalis, Oromos, and others.[44] If properly instituted, ethnic federalism would have enabled the various ethnic pastoralist groups to look after their own development needs. However, the EPRDF regime has kept a tight rein on the federal regions, especially since the 1998–2000 war with Eritrea. The lack of autonomy helps to explain the revived insurgencies of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Basic government distrust of Oromos and Ogaden Somali pastoralists continues in spite of ongoing projects for the lowlands and pastoralists by government and international development agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Meanwhile, the number of people and livestock continues to grow, as do sustainability and stabilization challenges.[45]

The ONLF and OLF continue to operate against the government and its forces. The killing of nine Chinese oil workers and 65 Ethiopians by the ONLF showed a level of sophistication that points to Eritrean involvement.[46] The escalation of hostilities in the Ogaden has created a humanitarian crisis in which pastoralists are finding it increasingly difficult to survive.[47] The massacre of oil workers has led Ethiopia to increase its military operations, made aid programs difficult to sustain, and caused problems for government officials and international aid agencies. The International Committee of the Red Cross has been experiencing trouble, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been considering pulling out of the Ogaden, even though the humanitarian situation has deteriorated rapidly.[48]

Stabilization Challenges in Pastoral Areas of Kenya and Uganda

Kenya has had particular problems relating to Somali pastoralists in eastern Kenya. In the 1960s, Somalis fought against incorporation into Kenya and were regarded as either nationalist secessionist guerrillas (by Somalis) or merely bandits (by the government). In the

colonial era, the British did not incorporate Somalis living in Kenya into the prevailing order. At independence, the British reversed previous colonial policy and decided to force unity among disparate ethnic groups (including Somalis) in Kenya. In 1961 the establishment of the Republic of Somalia inspired Somali political leaders in Kenya to rally for secession from Kenya and incorporation into Somalia. Subsequently, the Somalian government supported the *Shifta* ("the lawless"). Eventually, the *Shifta* depended too much on Somalia and lost its internal drive for self-determination.[49] The *Shifta* war has colored Kenya's relationship with pastoralists from the 1960s onwards and helps to explain (along with a number of other factors) state failure to deal with growing populations and development problems that have threatened the way of life and ecosystems in much of the north of the country.[50] The same hostility applies in Uganda's National Resistance Movement regime's relations with the Acholi and pastoralists in the north of the country, due partly to the two-decade-long struggle with the Lord's Resistance Army.[51]

A fundamental problem for both Kenya and Uganda is that the regimes are based around ethnic groups engaged in farming in the south of their respective countries that have trouble relating with other groups, especially pastoralists. Lt Col Scott Rutherford, US defense attaché to Kenya, notes that the Muslim population there has been marginalized by the government. For example, the Swahili population along the coast has a special passport, which is a mark of government distrust. The vast majority of Muslims are not extremists but have felt oppressed by the Kenyan government. US-Kenyan cooperation in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) has further marginalized them.[52]

Stabilization Challenge: The Ethiopia-Eritrea Confrontation

A fundamental problem for the EPRDF regime is the fact that it is based on the Tigrayan ethnic group, which is less than 10 percent of the population.[53] In the May 2005 elections, the regime was surprised by the strength of the opposition and, according to EU observers, rigged the results.[54] The confrontation with Eritrea is another problem for the EPRDF regime, and thousands of Ethiopian troops remain in the vicinity of the frontier. The war ended in 2000, and the Boundary Commission's decision was rendered in 2002. However, Ethiopia has refused to accept the awarding of the village of Badme and contested territory to Eritrea, which threatens a resumption of hostilities if resolution is not achieved.[55] Eritrea is playing a destabilizing role in the Horn of Africa, supporting the Islamic Courts Union and other movements that oppose the Transitional Federal Government and the Ethiopian presence. Ethiopia has thousands of troops tied down in Somalia trying to protect the TFG. Eritrea has moved thousands of militias and troops into the demilitarized zone bordering Ethiopia, thereby increasing the chances of an incident escalating into another all-out war. In regard to Sudan, Ethiopia has become very dependent on Sudanese oil and will be cautious in relations with Khartoum.[56]

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains the major stumbling block in the stabilization of the Horn of Africa according to Grignon of the ICG.[57] Solomon Gomes of the AU Peace and Security Commission asserts that the AU views Ethiopia-Eritrea as the most serious

crisis that it currently faces.[58] The animosity between the Eritrean president and the Ethiopian prime minister is a major obstacle to peace and impacts the whole region. The Eritrean president is isolated, which renders peacemaking difficult.

Gomes observes that in attempting to stabilize the Ethiopia-Eritrea standoff, the commission and the AU Peace and Security Council have not done enough. The AU heads of state have tried quiet diplomacy, without success. The Algerians mediated from 1998 to 2000 but cannot be called on again. Libya's behavior has been erratic in attempting to mediate. South African president Thabo Mbeki and Ghanaian president and current AU chairman, John Kuofour, have tried to mediate without success. At the moment, the IGAD is an organization in name only due to politics, and Eritrea's withdrawal from the body has undermined its credibility. Pres. in the Horn of Africa Mwai Kibaki of Kenya is not well enough to mediate. Tanzania and the United States should both do more. The United States signed the Algiers Agreement in 2000 as a guarantor and is obliged to do more. At the moment, the United States is too focused on Somalia and the war on terrorism. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) forces have been reduced, while Ethiopia and Eritrea have lots of forces near the temporary zone and Eritrea has sent militias into the zone.[59]

Radical Islamist Stabilization Challenges

Radical Islamists are said to be hiding and operating on the Kenyan coast and in Somalia. Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) civil affairs personnel are conducting projects on the Kenyan coast to try to win hearts and minds and assuage fears, but Islamic residents are not responding. The local population is not turning extremists over to Kenyan government authorities or to US personnel. Islamists are thriving on the protection of the local population. They are securing funds and can travel freely between Kenya, Somalia, Yemen, and the Gulf states (e.g., Oman). The security situation in Kenya is no better than at the time of the 1998 embassy bombings, in spite of the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI). The Pakistani population in Nairobi is also a source of concern. In the ranks of the irredentist Somali movements (e.g., the ICU and the ONLF) are radical Islamists trying to defeat Ethiopia and establish an Islamist state. Eritrea is backing the Islamists against Ethiopia. However, Eritrea would not try to stage an Islamist attack on the CJTF-HOA in Djibouti like the attack on Chinese and Ethiopian oil workers in the Ogaden.[60]

The situation in Nairobi and Mombasa is better than in 2006, when there was a stream of reported threats. Nine years since the embassy bombings, the region is as volatile as ever. Zanzibar remains a problem. Kenya has not made much headway—the border is porous, and northern and coastal Kenya are largely ignored by the central government. The border is closed in the northeast; it is difficult to handle Somali refugees, and there is little international pressure on Kenya to do something about them. There are no terrorism laws on the books in Kenya yet because of the December 2007 elections.[61]

Peacebuilding-Sustainability-Stabilization Challenges

Taken together, peacebuilding, sustainability, and stabilization manifested in the interrelationship between war and

famine have been devastating in the Horn of Africa. Already noted was the close relationship between famine, conflict, and the undermining of regime legitimacy in Ethiopia in 1973–74 and 1984–85 as well as in Somalia in 1991–93. Drought and dependence on foreign aid, along with corruption, undermine sustainability and legitimacy. Global warming is affecting the region, but direct evidence of warming causing conflict is difficult to confirm. For example, a study of the Turkana in northern Kenya did not find a direct link.[62]

Among pastoralists, sources of conflict include scarce resources such as water holes and grazing lands, particularly during times of extreme hardship.[63] Desertification (caused in part by climate change) has contributed to conflict among pastoralists. There is conflict between neighboring ethnic groups in pastoral areas that often crosses borders, mainly because of cattle raiding.[64] Previous analysis has discussed the underlying reasons for conflict, including a lack of infrastructure to support pastoral livelihood.[65] In addition, promoting sedentary agriculture can cause alienation among pastoralists who are being forced to give up a generations-old lifestyle.

In regard to pastoralists and sustainability and stability, their level of support for Islamic extremism/terrorism is open to question. In Somalia (and to a lesser extent Sudan), it could be said that sustainability and stabilization challenges have created dissatisfaction among Muslim populations and have opened the door to at least tolerating Islamic extremism/terrorism even if not supporting it.

In Ethiopia, desertification and declining grazing lands have led to impoverishment of Somali and Oromo pastoralists, disaffection, and declining legitimacy of the state. In areas with large clans, there is plenty of conflict over land and resources and strong and continuing ethnic tensions. In the area where Somalis and Oromos border each other, there is lots of conflict and fighting.[66]

Some disaffected Somali pastoralists in Ethiopia have supported continued destabilization of the Ogaden by the ONLF against Ethiopian security forces. The sustainability and stabilization crises in the Ogaden could open the door to safe havens for Islamic extremists and could conceivably generate recruits. The same could be said of some Oromo pastoralists and support for the OLF.

Conflict appears to be decreasing in northeastern Kenya, but structural problems remain. With good rains, there is less conflict over natural resources. There have been drought and famine over the past two years.[67] Drought has caused a recent spike in pastoralist unrest. Pastoralists have restocked their livestock after drought by raiding other livestock from farming areas to the south. Somali pastoralists in Kenya identify more with Somalia than with their country of residence.[68] Historical neglect at the pastoral level compounded by lack of understanding by elites leads to conflict. Land titling is unpopular with pastoralists and has led to a groundswell of political dissent. In the meantime, irrevocable damage has already been done.[69]

In Moyale, on the Kenya-Ethiopia border, local politicians are being divisive and have helped to create new political divisions among pastoralists along ethnic lines. Previously, several generations had lived peacefully together and intermarried.[70]

Coastal populations have been discriminated against by the central government. The problem goes well beyond environmental sustainability. Political factors alienate the population. This is a region with a rapidly growing popula-

tion maintaining the same practices. Therefore, the people will become increasingly alienated, and it is uncertain what will they do. As for al-Qaeda, it is a mystery not well understood, especially in East Africa.[71]

In Sudan, population displacement, lack of governance, conflict-related resource exploitation, and underinvestment in sustainable development, all produce sustainability and stabilization challenges. There are five million internally displaced persons (IDP) and international refugees (Sudan has the largest population of IDPs).[72] Competition over oil and gas reserves, the Nile River waters, and timber, as well as land use issues related to agricultural lands, are factors in the instigation and perpetuation of conflict in Sudan. Confrontations over range lands and rain-fed agricultural lands in the drier parts of the country demonstrate the connection between natural resource scarcity and conflict. In northern Darfur, high population growth, environmental stress, land degradation, and desertification have created the conditions for conflicts, which have been sustained by political, tribal, or ethnic differences. This is an example of the social breakdown that can result from ecological collapse.[73]

Stabilizing and Peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa

In overcoming state failure and stabilizing the Horn of Africa, the approach must be sophisticated—managing macro, intermediate, and micro levels and forging a range of partnerships from the United Nations to African regional organizations and from states in the region to NGOs and to the United States and the European Union.

In stabilizing the Horn of Africa at the macro or structural level, the Horn is the only region in Africa where the structural solution of secession (i.e., Eritrea, southern Sudan, Darfur, and Somaliland) seems to be a realistic option that could make matters more peaceful rather than increasing bloodshed (e.g., Nigeria). The question is: Should secession be allowed to run its natural course? Or, should the international community encourage compromise solutions (e.g., federalism or confederation)? Thus far, secession has only been allowed in the case of Eritrea, where the Eritrean People's Liberation Front won military victory and where a friendly (at that time) Ethiopian government agreed.

At the intermediate level, building state capacity and institutional viability remains an ongoing process in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, involving international aid agencies and NGOs. The three states have a long way to go before they can provide services to all of their people. In Somalia and Sudan, the issue is one of reconstituting the state through either peacebuilding or neotrusteeship. Thus far it seems that neotrusteeship is too costly for the international community and will be perceived as neocolonial in Africa. Thus, a gamble will be made on lower-cost peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In regard to managing micro-level challenges (short-term shocks), the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) has developed policies for sustainability, food security, conflict resolution mechanisms, and an early warning system that is intended to ameliorate the impact of state weakness and failure and environmental disaster.[74] However, the IGAD early warning and prevention capabilities are only in their initial stages. Problems with the IGAD early warning system include the fact that three key countries

(Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia) are not involved and the system remains focused on low-level pastoral conflicts in northern Uganda and northern Kenya. Furthermore, measures for resolving conflicts over resources in Uganda and Kenya have not been implemented.[75]

The Golden Spear Disaster Management Center provides early warning to 11 African states. Regional organizations and governments need to have the political will to act and fund early warning and prevention.[76]

Standby Capability

Member states of the IGAD and the East African Community (EAC) are building the East African Brigade of the African Standby Force (ASF) to intervene to stop state failure and its consequences. However, the "Eastbrig" has fallen behind its western and southern counterparts because Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda have been slow to cooperate and implement prior agreements. In fact, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) brigade of the ASF, led by South Africa, has already deployed to Darfur ahead of the Eastbrig. In any event, the UN will play the lead role in Southern Sudan and appears to be assuming leadership in Darfur.[77]

The ASF's biggest problems are logistics and sustainability within the AU framework. Within the African Union, there is little vision regarding where the ASF is headed. For example, the military planning cell has drafted terms of reference for its missions, but AU administrators do not seem to know that the planning cell exists. Thus, a sustainable ASF remains a dream. African states contribute less than one percent of their defense budgets to fund the ASF and support staff. Most support comes from the United States and the European Union. A Marshall Plan for Africa is needed to overcome this deplorable situation.[78]

According to Marcel LeRoy of the EU, the EU provided €243 million in support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in Darfur from 2004 to 2007. The AU deployed AMIS with hope and heart, not with plan. The EU cannot withdraw support, which would lead to the collapse of AMIS and massive looting. The switch to a hybrid AU/UN Darfur mission may help, but there will still be problems. The EU is more reluctant to fund AMISOM in Somalia and the AU Peace and Security Commission because of the AMIS experience.[79]

Stabilizing Somalia and Peacebuilding

Top-down and bottom-up approaches to overcoming state failure have been implemented in Somalia. Since 1993, one bottom-up approach has NGOs working with Somali groups and civil society.[80] A second bottom-up approach was undertaken by the "Islamic Courts." Islamism arose in the 1990s and was manifested in the Islamic courts that were founded to administer sharia law and justice in an anarchic environment. They formed the Islamic Courts Union, defeated the warlords in May 2006, and established control of Mogadishu and large swaths of southern Somalia until being defeated by Ethiopian forces backing the Transitional Federal Government in December 2006.[81]

Another approach has been multilateral and top down, with the IGAD, led by Kenya, bringing various Somali elites together to establish the TFG and then sending them back to Somalia to assume control with Ethiopian assistance.[82] It is uncertain whether this approach will succeed or if bottom-up approaches will pay dividends. It is also uncertain whether Somaliland will ever become part of

Somalia again or if it will become independent, as appears to be the prevailing sentiment. Reconciliation talks between the TFG and the Islamic Courts were held twice in 2007, but no progress was made. The problem of Ethiopian troops as a "lightning rod" in Somalia remains.

According to Solomon Gomes of the AU Peace and Security Commission, Somalia is high on the AU list of countries to stabilize. The AU did not want to go into Somalia until the UN Security Council guaranteed logistics. However, Uganda jumped into Somalia, while Ghana, Nigeria, and Malawi did not. If four countries had sent four battalions, it would have sent a visible message, but the situation on the ground makes it difficult for the Ugandans to sustain peacekeeping operations. In the peace process, a "carrot and stick" approach is needed, and the ICU must be made stakeholders.[83]

Peacebuilding in Puntland, Somaliland, and Somalia requires a longtime horizon. Shifting political, military, and social dynamics demands up-to-date knowledge and understanding of the situation on the ground to facilitate peacekeeping. Institutions that the NGO Interpeace helped build in Puntland and Somaliland have helped keep peacebuilding going. Ingredients for success include bringing stakeholders together, creating institutional dynamics, and providing technical assistance and support. Pastoralists must be made part of the stakeholder process. For example, nomads were consulted before the date was set for the recent Somaliland elections.[84]

An early warning system has been established all over Somalia consisting of partnerships with organizations that have contacts and offices throughout the country. Since Somali nomads are found all over Somalia and in parts of Ethiopia and Kenya, mobile education systems and clinics are the answer to the cross-border dilemma. Somalis and other pastoralists live for movement. Therefore, regional integration is very important. An IGAD framework has been set up to enable the informal sector to benefit from regional integration, especially pastoralists, and to make a contribution to environmental sustainability.

The TFG is not the permanent solution for Somalia. The reconstruction of Somalia is an ongoing process in line with the tasks given by the 2004 charter. Reconciliation talks between the TFG and the ICU must be used as a springboard to the next stage. The international community must push for a settlement in Somalia and needs to bring other countries and organizations into the process.[85]

Interpeace is continuing to conduct extensive public consultations, workshops, forums, and stakeholder dialogue on issues essential to peace-building and state reconstruction. As there was no central government, it adopted a regional approach—setting up projects in Puntland (Garowe), Somaliland (Hargeysa), and south-central Somalia (Mogadishu). In Somalia, the Center for Research and Dialogue, with the help of the traditional elders, has sucessfully facilitated a number of reconcilitation processes among major clans in the region. Work is being carried out on the ground by three nonpartisan partner organizations that promote peace and reconciliation in Somalia. After months of reconciliation and power sharing among clans, people of the Bakool region went to the polls to vote for local and regional authorities, including the governor, district commissioners, and regional and district councilors. The region became the second area in Somalia to elect its officials through a community-based, participatory process.

According to Francois Grignon of the ICG, reconciliation negotiations must open the door to legitimate claims by clan representatives. A third-party facilitator is needed to negotiate between the TFG and the ICU. Trade control is a factor in the negotiations. A disarmament process has to be included in negotiations. Since fear is entrenched in Mogadishu, confidence-building measures need to be agreed upon and implemented.[86]

In Somalia, Islamic activists have taken advantage of the absence of a central government and ascendancy of the ICU. For now, a possible Islamist onslaught has been pushed into the background. A number of things are needed to prevent people from joining Islamist movements. There should be no guarantee that the lifestyles of protagonists will be maintained if and when peace comes. The Islamists will be victims of peace and will continue to act as spoilers. At the moment, Djibouti is playing the mediator role. It is difficult to see if Somalia's problems can be overcome. There is a need for the international community to strike a fair balance to help stabilize Somalia. Reconstitution of the state is crucial, as is political will. Then the United States and others can come into support, playing a facilitative role.[87]

It appears that the US Department of State is providing support for the TFG government because US policy makers do not want to be involved in Somalia again. With no presidential directive, there has been no US action. Western partners are waiting for the United States to act. Somali reaction to Ethiopian intervention has been strong and negative. Intervention in Somalia is costing Ethiopia politically and economically. Ugandans want their peacekeeping force to be Africanized and brought under the UN umbrella so that resources can start to flow their way. Nigeria failed to send a force because of internal problems. Ghana decided that the situation was too volatile and is not sending a force. The Burundians are sending more than 1,000 troops, but they need to be trained and equipped. In regard to building the capacity of the AU Peace and Security Commission to do military planning, there are 1,000 positions, only 500 personnel, and 350 quality people. With AMIS and AMISOM plus operations planned for the Comoros, Chad, and the Central African Republic, the AU has its hands full. The AU has no expertise in large-scale peace-support operations. The EU wants to have a voice but is not giving sufficient funds. The AU has a lack of fiscal capacity.[88]

In Somali areas, the various streams of Islam and Islamist movements are affecting the entire Horn. What happens in Somalia provides opportunities for Islamism to emerge in different forms and spread. In Somalia, the sources of Islamism include Wahhabi extremism due to Saudi funding. Wahhabists have been taking students to Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the last 15 years. In dealing with Islamism, there must be a recognition that Islamism is not going to stop. Thus, a long-term approach must be taken. The moderate voice within Islam must be enhanced, for example, with investment in moderate madrassas.[89]

Stabilizing Sudan

The future of Sudan remains just as uncertain as that of Somalia. Whereas it seems difficult if not impossible to reconstitute the Somali state, the problem with Sudan is the concentration of power in Khartoum. As the oil boom continues, Khartoum will continue to reap the lion's share of the benefits, will grow in power, and will become increasingly capable of preventing the South and Darfur from seceding.

Popular opinion in the South and Darfur indicate that the optimal approach would be to allow the South to secede in 2011 and provide the same option for Darfur. The two regions have been brutalized by Khartoum, and it is hard to visualize their remaining part of even a confederation. The problem is that Khartoum will not allow secession without a struggle. As for the rest of Sudan, federal arrangements would be most suitable, but it is difficult to see how Khartoum could be persuaded to accept constitutional changes.[90]

According to Gomes, peacebuilding efforts are ongoing in southern Sudan. First, there is a need to disarm all militia groups in the South. Second, the international community must take seriously the possibility of the South seceding.[91]

International actors need to think ahead to the 2011 Sudan referendum and the possibility of southern Sudanese independence. The Saudi government is working to influence actors in the region to help to stabilize Sudan. In Sudan, the ruling Congress Party and the associated National Islamic Front are making concessions for peace, but it is uncertain if they will follow through. The Bashir regime has sidelined the Wahhabi faction that used to dominate the government but is also reluctant to yield to international pressure.[92]

If Khartoum gets the lion's share of resources, it may be prepared to let southern Sudan become independent. The Sudanese "Arab" mind-set has been to make peace when it suits them; otherwise, they wage war.[93]

Grignon, of the ICG, says there is a great need to stabilize Somalia and Sudan and to create a level where differences can be regulated. Peacemakers must find centers of gravity and create equilibrium in the region. A new (or revitalized) regional security architecture would help in Sudan and Somalia. The IGAD supported negotiations in Sudan and Somalia, but it needs to be strengthened to promote dialogue in the region. There is no good alternative to a regional peace process because of the connectivity of conflicts.[94]

Stabilizing Ethiopia vs. Eritrea

Resolving the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation is a daunting task, especially now that the two countries are fighting in Somalia.[95] Even if the border issue is settled, the confrontation will not end because the pride of national leaders and their survival is the main issue, not borders. Pres. Issaias Afwerki had exaggerated expectations that Eritrea would be the Singapore or Malaysia of the Horn of Africa and would become a dominant political, economic, and technological center. He assumed that the Eritrean Defense Force was invincible. As a result of dashed expectations, Eritrea has not been flexible.[96]

The US role has been and will continue to be crucial in Eritrea-Ethiopia talks. Unfortunately, the US preoccupation with its alliance against terrorism has relegated the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation to the background. The Boundary Commission decided to "virtually" demarcate the boundary, as neither side would allow access for physical demarcation. This decision led Eritrea to demand the withdrawal of UNMEE peacekeepers from its territory, which began in March 2008.[97]

According to Grignon, the international community should not attempt to reengage via Libyans and other actors that have been associated with Eritrea in negotiating an end to the confrontation. Instead, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia should be called upon to put pressure on the two parties. Peacemakers have to take

into account Ethiopia's internal dynamics and constraints on the regime.[98] Prime Minister Meles Zenawi cannot make major concessions because of pressures from Ethiopian nationalists. Gomes believes that peacemakers should be using back channels. Uncontested areas along the border should be demarcated, with disputed areas left until later.[99]

Kenya as an "Anchor State" in the Horn of Africa

Kenya is an industrializing state and is relatively stable and democratic. According to noted scholar and development expert Michael Chege, the democratic Kibaki regime has made great strides; for example, helping to reduce poverty by 10 percent between 2003 and 2007. He believes that Kenya is becoming an economic dynamo as well as a center of peace and stability. There are concerns about the possibility of Sudan and Somalia dissolving into even greater chaos. However, Kenya will probably follow the reactive stance that it assumed in the past, even if its interests in southern Sudan are harmed. Finally, Islamic extremists on the Kenyan coast remain a cause for concern.[100]

Kenya remains engaged in the diplomatic process, including Darfur negotiations, recognizing that the region is very unstable. According to Brigadier Maurice Walugu of the Kenyan Ministry of Defense, there are two levels on which Kenya deals with Sudan—the political level of negotiating with the Sudanese government and the practical military level—as the peace process (e.g., the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South) does not guarantee results in reducing conflict or the number of internally displaced people. Although the Sudanese government does not seem willing to accept change in Darfur, Kenya remains engaged.[101]

Peace in Somalia is the main focus of Kenyan military engagement. Some parts of Somalia have been stabilized. The role of the Kenyan military is to participate in line with AU rules of engagement to advise, train, coordinate, and liaison. Kenya is working with Uganda, Ethiopia, and Djibouti to limit collateral damage in Mogadishu as well as to control the influx of terrorist groups and with the United States on Somalia, antipiracy operations, and sea lanes regulation. Kenya is willing to train Burundian peacekeepers for service in Somalia. However, Kenya cannot send its own peacekeepers because it borders on Somalia and because peace has not been secured. Djibouti is trying to defuse the Somali conflict as well as the Ethiopia-Eritrea confrontation.[102]

In regard to the Eastbrig of the ASF, Kenya is hosting the planning elements and the independent mechanism for coordinating security and socioeconomic development. The headquarters of Eastbrig is in Ethiopia, and, according to Brigadier Walugu, Kenya enjoys good partnership with Ethiopia. Kenya is ready to respond to contingencies thanks to US and EU training and support. Kenya has peacekeepers in UNMEE, alongside Jordanian forces, the only forces remaining between Ethiopia and Eritrea.[103] Kenya does not want to be in Somalia because "frontline states" are not supposed to operate there. As for the Ugandan peacekeepers, Walugu believes they were not deployed too early in Somalia; just too few troops and not enough support. The problem is deploying into Somalia. It takes a lot of time and considerable risk.[104]

As for dealing with Kenyan pastoralists and communal conflict, Walugu likened the Kenyan army to the 7th Cavalry in the western United States. It takes time to

educate and change the culture of people (i.e., pastoralists). The drilling of boreholes and the development of water resources and pastures can help to contain the conflict.[105]

In the operations against the Islamic Courts Union, the Kenyan military joined with the Ethiopians on occasion, which caused tensions. The Ethiopians were not easy to deal with and blamed the Kenyans when something went wrong. The planning cell is on Kenyan real estate.[106]

Ethiopia as an "Anchor State" in the Horn of Africa

Besides intervening with troops in Somalia, Ethiopia has sent peacekeepers to three different peacekeeping operations and is prepared to send more. At the moment, cordial relations exist between Ethiopia and Sudan, partly because Ethiopia is importing oil from Sudan.[107]

EU and US policy towards the EPRDF regime is necessarily "nuanced."[108] After the rigging of elections and shooting of students in May 2005 and the trial of opposition leaders in November 2005, the EU and the United States downgraded some ties. With the 2006 intervention in Somalia, full relations have been restored. However, Congress recently sanctioned a number of regime leaders for the 2005 events. Ethiopia is disappointed at not being compensated by the United States for its intervention and peacekeeping role in Somalia in 2007.[109] In fact, Ethiopians cannot leave Somalia without a guarantee of security, so the costs continue to mount.

Ethiopian nationalists believe that the best approach to stabilizing the Horn of Africa is to bring Eritrea under control—through regime change if necessary. They want the United States to support the TFG in Somalia with billions of dollars. Nationalists want universal recognition of Somaliland as an independent state (with the ulterior motive of further dividing Somalis). They want a united democratic federal Sudan and believe that secession of the South is destabilizing. They demand that the United States induce Egypt to negotiate with Ethiopia over sharing Blue Nile water.[110]

Ethiopian moderates note that, following 11 September 2001, the Horn of Africa attracted more attention as a region perceived to be a base for radical Islamists and terrorists. Ethiopia was thought to be a target, and Somalia and Sudan were suspected of sponsoring terrorists. One of the problems has been governance failure in most of the countries in the region. For example, Ethiopia cannot build national consensus. Sudan has improved since the CPA in 2005, but Darfur remains a disaster.[111]

Regional Organizations as Partners

Stabilization and peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa have involved considerable efforts at peacemaking by IGAD states, the AU, the UN, and the United States. The UN has mounted peace and stability operations between Ethiopia and Eritrea and in Somalia (which failed in 1993–94) and southern Sudan, and the African Union has done so in Darfur and Somalia. In the Horn of Africa, the IGAD must be rejuvenated as a forum in which disparate member states air their differences (aiding stabilization efforts) and work to prevent humanitarian disasters by addressing sustain-ability challenges. The East African Community has demonstrated even greater potential to build cooperation for sustainability and stabilization. The Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) has been working on economic and sustainability challenges and is moving to work on issues of stabilization.

According to Ambassador Wane of the African Union Peace and Security Commission, a regional approach is needed, given the interconnection of conflicts. The problem is that the IGAD is dysfunctional due to political differences.[112] According to Walter Knausenberger, the COMESA is more dynamic and promising than the IGAD.[113]

The IGAD has been playing a mixed role in stabilizing the Horn of Africa for two decades. The Intergovernmental Association on Development was founded in the wake of the 1984–85 Ethiopian famine, and a main priority was dealing with drought and desertification that helped to bring about famine and instability in the region. In the early 2000s, the IGAD played a role (along with Kenya and the United States) in the resolution of the North-South conflict in Sudan and in negotiating a transitional federal government for Somalia, which moved back to the country in February 2006 and attempted to establish authority from Mogadishu in 2007. A conflict the IGAD does not have the capacity to resolve is the continuing confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the wake of the 1998–2000 war, which has spilled over into Somalia and has affected the entire region.[114] Only UN peacekeepers are preventing a resumption of hostilities, while Saudi Arabia and Algeria are being suggested as possible mediators.

The COMESA has helped to reduce tariffs among member states and boost intraregional trade, which has helped Kenya and several other states prosper. Trade in livestock and animal products has been demonstrated to help pastoralists become more prosperous in the Horn of Africa.[115] The biggest problem continues to be the low level of African trade. A second problem is the plethora of organizations to which states belong.[116]

Promoting Sustainability, Stabilization, and Peacebuilding

Policies that could promote sustainability, stabilization, and peacebuilding include the development of federalism, improving the lives of pastoralists, and regional early warning and intervention. Programs include expanding and strengthening the IGAD-CEWARN early warning and action system and programs that aim to build links between pastoralists and governments in Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Kampala, including the building of wells, schools, and clinics and the provision of marketing centers for the buying of herds. International aid programs are enabling the building of schools and clinics and helping to extend the presence of states in previously ungoverned regions. Stakeholders include state and nonstate actors, international governmental organizations (e.g., the IGAD), and NGOs. A participatory approach to project development and implementation should be promoted, and local pastoralist institutions such as trading associations and peace committees should be built. Pastoral self-governance should be strengthened.[117]

Moderate forces exist among the Somalis; they need to be understood, strengthened, and supported. Somalis as a group are not susceptible to extremist philosophy, but if forced to choose sides, they will go with the Islamists, even though Somalis are not strict Sunnis. The key is to provide economic growth equitably and to engage with people who know the area.[118]

The Kenyan government requires a mind-set change in relation to Somalis and other politically marginalized groups to move towards sustainability stabilization. The government needs to be properly engaged but thus far has taken a divisive approach, making issues political

as well as resource based. Pastoralists must be assisted in managing the excessive growth of population and animals. Ways must be found for herders to move to other pasture and water areas so that conflict can be avoided with sedentary agriculturalists. Visual tools, including ones that show ethnic overlay, trade routes, and markets, have been developed to assist pastoralists and enable them to deal with resource and pasture access issues. Access to the political process is essential to providing pastoralists with voice and participation at the national and provincial levels. Fifty percent of the GDP in Kenyan agriculture comes from pastoral activities throughout the country; so, the marginalization of pastoralists is partly due to misperceptions. Marginalization is now being overcome by technology—with cell phone access (cell phone towers in the rural areas), pastoralists now have access to market information. Alternative access means rural banking and livestock sales can develop. Funds can go into other entrepreneurial areas besides livestock. Therefore, providing access to economic resources and development is the best counterterrorism initiative.[119]

The RELPA (Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas), managed by the Nairobi regional office of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), is attempting to promote sustainability and stabilization in pastoralist areas with a number of NGO partners.[120] One such partner is the NGO "Pact," which works with partner NGOs and the USAID for conflict mitigation and provides conflict resolution training to deal with pastoralist water disputes and subclan conflicts.[121]

RELPA represents sound thinking, is a step forward, and is intended to use a joint programs approach. It is regional, integrated, and comprehensive, which is essential because pastoralism is regional and boundaries do not constrain groups. The task for RELPA is to make steps forward. Thus far, there have been procurement issues and delays. RELPA needs more than two years' funding to be effective. Thus far, livelihood interventions have not had the impact desired, as they have not addressed or understood underlying conflict dynamics among pastoralists. In any case, it is unlikely that the RELPA approach and "alternative livelihoods" programs can mitigate support for Islamic extremism and terrorism.[122]

A consortium of groups has formulated a cross-sectoral program across borders. Case studies in Ethiopia and Kenya indicate that there is now better reporting response regarding conflict, early warning, and drought (this is difficult to do in Somalia). The Integrated River Basin Management Project works with the private sector. There is a need for resources to provide access to safe water. In addressing issues of education and health, mobile schools and clinics have been proposed in pastoral areas. The health issue is vital—a quarter of the pastoralist population has acute malnutrition compounded by a lack of stable health service and good hygiene.[123]

The IGAD-CEWARN early warning mechanism holds promise for preventing conflict among pastoralists as well as famine. The IGAD-CEWARN, established in 2001, has lacked strategic direction; however, state-of-the-art software is its strength. There are 52 sets of selected indicators of communal variance, areas reported, media reporting on conflict, and environmental context. Field monitors provide weekly reports on specific incidents as they happen. Information flows to the national level and to the IGAD-CEWARN, but lack of government action is a major weakness. The well-established response mechanism needs to be programmatically designed and developed. Another problem is the

diverse source of funds (60 percent from the USAID, 30 percent from the German GTZ, and only 10 percent from member states).[124]

The Ugandan government has used daily reports from the IGAD-CEWARN to deal with problems of drugs, arms, and human trafficking by pastoralists. The Ugandan government adopted a disarmament strategy with NGO funding. The Ugandan army was used to disarm the pastoralists. Many community members died as a result (Karamojong in the Karamoja region).[125] The IGAD-CEWARN needs to work at early warning and conflict management among pastoralists at a lower level. Then, it can be developed to manage bigger conflicts and disasters involving states.[126]

Interpeace partners in Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland have initiated various efforts to prevent environmental devastation, notably uncontrolled tree cutting for charcoal. This began during the late 1970s by refugee influxes from the Ogaden in neighboring Ethiopia but was further aggravated by a lack of governance following years of prolonged conflict.[127]

Conclusion

The Horn of Africa is one of the world's most fragile regions; only West and Central Africa surpass it in terms of state failures and instabilities. This article underlines the importance of a regional focus on the problem of state failure and the danger of conflict spillover. In regard to a sustainability assessment, clearly failed states cannot deal with environmental degradation and disaster. Disasters (e.g., famines) and the lack of sustainability contribute significantly to state failure. State failure means that struggle over resources occurs in a state of anarchy and results in a downward spiral.

The macro-level or structural factors are important in explaining sustain-ability and stabilization challenges. The clan-based Somali society made state building difficult in the 1960s, made state collapse possible, and is making state reconstitution even more difficult in the 2000s. In Sudan, long-standing historical and cultural differences between Khartoum and outlying regions led to state failure from the outset. In Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, the center of power has rested in agricultural centers, with pastoralists the outsiders. The intermediate or institutional level also helps in explaining sustainability and stabilization challenges. Certainly, in the case of Somalia, institutional mismanagement and state weakness contributed to failure. In Sudan, discrimination against outlying regions was important, but the impulse to subjugate those regions was even more significant. State weakness helps to explain why pastoralists in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda did not receive adequate attention, but the structural divide was more important.

The Horn of Africa is one region of the world where short-term shocks have played a significant role in creating acute sustainability-stabilization challenges. The susceptibility of the region to drought, overpopulation, and famine has brought several cataclysmic events that have contributed to state failure. Sudden changes in conflicts, such as the rebel success in Somalia in 1990, led to state collapse. The sudden defeat of Somali forces in 1978 in the Ogaden had a crushing effect on the Siad Barre regime.

Clearly there is a gap on the continuum of state failure between (1) state collapse in Somalia, (2) failure by Khartoum to deal with its outlying regions in a peaceful and fair way, and (3) failure of Ethiopia and Uganda, and to a lesser extent Kenya, to relate to and provide services to pasto-

ralists. State failure and sustainability and stabilization challenges in the Horn have been distinctive and unusual.

This article has extensively examined sustainability challenges, including climate change, population growth, and desertification, as well as water shortage, famine, and rivers that are linked with conflict. It has demonstrated that there is a degree of interrelationship among ethnic conflict, weak states, and interstate rivalry, as well as extremism, terrorism, and sustainability challenges. It has focused on a specific problem of sustainability stabilization—the challenges facing Islamic pastoralists who may be attracted to Islamic extremism and terrorism—as well as solutions.

This article has offered solutions at the macro level (e.g., the reduction of greenhouse gases and improving education and employment to reduce birthrates) and at the micro level (e.g., development projects for pastoralists, farmers, and women, as well as the development of market infrastructure, local governance, and tree planting). Stabilization measures were also examined, including early warning and preventive action, peacemaking, and peace and stability operations, as well as peacebuilding, development and trade, and the role of anchor states and a range of organizations. The article confirmed the utility of peacebuilding and stabilization and promoting sustainability together.

Threats in the Horn of Africa from sustainability and stabilization challenges are moderate in severity. Certainly, the threats from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region and from Iraq and Iran are much greater. The 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania indicate that there are threats and that actions to build peace and bring greater sustainability and stabilization to the region will advance wider security. Somalia and Somalis are the focus of efforts to prevent ungoverned areas and underdeveloped pastoralists from being used by extremists. The development of a coordinated approach among diplomats, development experts, and defense personnel to bring sustainable development to Somalis and to help reconstitute the Somalian state could bear fruit if sustained over the long run.

In this regard, this article has identified a range of intervention policies and programs as well as tools and technologies that could increase sustain-ability and stability and delay, defer, or prevent failure. The article also identified the range of stakeholders, including state and nonstate actors (intergovernmental organizations and NGOs). The article determined their likely reactions to stabilization and sustainability efforts, as well as their willingness to accept constructive roles in the process of sustainable development or the likelihood that they will oppose efforts. The task of winning over partners to assist the Horn of Africa in achieving sustainable development and stabilization is very difficult and requires an ongoing effort to change structures and attitudes. ❑

Notes

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4. Mebrate Woldentensaie (research and training officer, the Conflict and Early Warning Response Mechanism [CEWARN] of the IGAD, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), interview by author, 31 May 2007.

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13. Kevin Ward, " 'The Armies of the Lord': Christianity, Rebels, and the State in Northern Uganda, 1986–1999," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 31, no. 2 (May 2001): 187–221.

14. Harold Golden Marcus, *A History of Ethiopia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 63–76; and Christopher Clapham, "Ethiopia and Somalia," in *Conflict in Africa*, Adelphi Paper 93 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), 3–23. One could also count Buganda and other kingdoms in what is now Uganda as significant pre-colonial states.

15. Burgess, "African Security."

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Saving Darfur

Seductive Analogies and the Limits of Airpower Coercion in Sudan

TIMOTHY CULLEN, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF

By any measure, the humanitarian crisis in Darfur is a tragedy. In 2003 an unexpected rebellion in the remote states of Darfur drove the Sudanese government in Khartoum to initiate a brutal counterinsurgency campaign destroying thousands of villages and killing hundreds of thousands of Darfuris, many of them women and children.[1] In a region of over 6 million people, nearly 2.7 million Darfuris remain "internally displaced persons" with an additional quarter of a million eking out their existence in refugee camps across the border in Chad.[2] Thousands of humanitarian workers risk hijacking, abduction, and attack from armed assailants to care for and feed those affected by the conflict.[3]

Although the level of violence has declined drastically since 2004, attacks on villages in Darfur by janjaweed militia and government forces continue. Campaigns in the region have been especially brutal, with the government using helicopter gunships and Antonov cargo aircraft to terrorize civilians with bullets and "barrel bombs" filled with explosives and metal shards.[4] The atrocities and tactics of the government of Sudan have received significant attention from the media, humanitarian organizations, and a plethora of Hollywood celebrities, yet the international community remains focused on diplomacy rather than decisive actions.[5] Many of the community leaders in al-Fashir, the capital of Northern Darfur, have shaken the hands of more than a dozen heads of state, yet the United Nations (UN) struggles to provide half of the 26,000 authorized peacekeepers for the embattled region.[6]

Unilateral sanctions and engaged diplomacy were the primary methods used by the Bush administration to confront Sudan's president Omar Hassan al-Bashir, but America's involvement may escalate due to the election of Pres. Barack Obama. Like Pres. George W. Bush before him, President Obama has called the actions of the Sudanese government in Darfur "genocide" but added that the United States should set

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Figure 1. Le Soudan. (Réimpression à partir de http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/sudan.pdf.)

up a "no-fly zone" over the area.[7] Members of the former Clinton administration and foreign policy advisors for the Obama campaign have also compared the intransigence of al-Bashir to the actions of former Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic. In 2006 Susan Rice (the current US ambassador to the UN) argued that al-Bashir's refusal to accept UN peacekeepers called for the destruction of the Sudanese air force and likened the proposed air campaign to the 1999 victory in Kosovo.[8] A coalition of NATO countries did establish no-fly zones and conduct air strikes for humanitarian operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, but are those conflicts helpful analogies for the current situation in Darfur? How should the air campaigns in the former Yugoslav republics guide the new administration's strategy in Darfur? Wars, specifically the most recent wars, have traditionally dominated the minds of political leaders.[9] The purpose of this analysis is to examine America's most recent humanitarian interventions where no-fly zones facilitated peacekeeping operations and to explore how they could shape courses of action, theories of success, and potential policy options for Darfur.

After a brief introduction to the history of the Darfur crisis and the role of analogies, airpower, and coercion in humanitarian interventions, this article compares the presumptions, likenesses, and differences of the current conflict to three seductively similar humanitarian operations in the 1990s: Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, Operation Deny Flight in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. Not unlike the atrocities initiated by Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic, the actions of al-Bashir from 2003 to 2004 are truly horrific. Unless there is an immense shift, however, in the nature of the Sudanese conflict and the overarching geopolitical landscape, a no-fly zone and air strikes are unlikely to provide the justice or response desired by the Obama administration. On the contrary, military actions under current conditions have the potential to drastically increase the level of human catastrophe in the region and implicate the United States in a conflict it will find difficult to escape.

The Darfur Crisis

Darfur's massive political, security, and humanitarian crisis is the complex product of armed factions from Chadian civil wars, the civil war between Arab Muslims in North Sudan and African Christians in South Sudan, and local conflicts over dwindling resources due to overpopulation and desertification. The flashpoint for the conflict occurred in April 2003 when an alliance of Islamic rebel movements and African tribes led coordinated attacks on an air base and other military outposts in Darfur. The rebels blew up government transport aircraft and helicopters, captured the base commander, and executed 200 Sudanese army prisoners despite their surrender.[10] The timing of the attacks was deliberate and costly for the predominantly Arab Sudanese government, which was negotiating a power-sharing agreement with the liberation movement in South Sudan after two decades of civil war. The African movement in Darfur hoped to gain its fair share of national wealth and security after decades of cyclical drought, years of neglect from the central government, and violent encroachment of farmland by former Chadian rebels and Arab herders.[11] The government did not anticipate the threat from its poor Wes-

tern relatives, and the repression of the uprising was brutal and swift. Al-Bashir's regime could not rely on the Sudanese army to crush the insurrection because most of the recruits and noncommissioned officers were from Darfur.[12] Instead, the government made a deal with armed bands and Arab tribes in the region. The camel-herding tribes could pursue their territorial ambitions in Darfur in return for suppressing the rebellion.[13] What followed was an ethnic-cleansing campaign or "counterinsurgency on the cheap."[14] From 2003 to 2004, janjaweed militia routinely surrounded and burned rebel villages after Sudanese aircraft had bombed and strafed the inhabitants. In the process of clearing villages, militiamen often raped girls and women, killed livestock, and tossed small children back into burning houses.[15]

Nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the international community reacted with horror to the atrocities, but a response to the outbreak in violence was difficult to coordinate. Many feared the conflict could derail peace negotiations for the civil war in the South, which had killed over two million people over the previous two decades.[16] The United States and NATO countries could not commit the large number of troops or accept the casualties and commitment necessary for a ground operation in Darfur because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, so the international community pursued a wide range of diplomatic initiatives targeting al-Bashir's regime from 2004 to 2007.[17] Major efforts included improving the access of humanitarian organizations, orchestrating the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan, negotiating the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement between the government and rebel factions, seeking the prosecution of leaders for war crimes in the International Criminal Court (ICC), and deploying underequipped, outnumbered African Union (AU) and United Nations peacekeeping forces.[18] Executing a clear and coherent strategy in Darfur was difficult given the sheer size of the region, scope of the conflict, and the multiplicity of actors and objectives.

Similarities of the Darfur Crisis with Dominant Analogies

The conflict in Darfur is a problem that regional experts, policy makers, and humanitarian organizations have struggled with for years. Understanding and describing the underlying context of the crisis is difficult. Gérard Prunier, a prolific author, historian, and expert on East Africa, warns readers in his book on Darfur that "everything does not make sense."[19] As President Obama begins to shift his focus from domestic to international issues, his administration will attempt to make sense of the situation in Darfur. Public comments from his foreign-policy advisors suggest that his administration will use historical analogies to facilitate analysis of the conflict and to advocate forceful action.[20]

Unfortunately, there are identifiable and systematic biases in the use of historical analogies.[21] In many cases, decision makers fail to analyze key presumptions behind historical analogies and are predisposed to "plunge toward action" and advocate misguided policies that administrations could have avoided with closer inspection.[22] Operations Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, and Allied Force are irresistible and dangerous analogies for the Darfur crisis because the conflicts have many similarities, some of which are inherent to humanitarian interventions. The campaigns in northern Iraq, Bosnia-

Herzegovina, and Kosovo addressed grievances common to many intrastate conflicts in the 1990s: the rebellion of marginalized peoples denied their share of political power and wealth of the state. They also featured incompetent governments that used racial or ethnic divisions to divide and suppress the rebellion, with the United States and its allies using airpower and military force to confront the suppressors.[23] In 1997 the Clinton administration called this type of humanitarian intervention "complex contingency operations" and specifically distinguished the campaigns in Bosnia and northern Iraq from other low-level military actions like hostage rescues, counterterrorism missions, or interventions due to natural disasters.[24]

Common Coercive Challenges

Coercion was a major component of these "complex contingency operations," yet the characteristics of humanitarian interventions made coercion difficult.[25] Coercion is the use of force, either threatened or actual, "to induce an adversary to change its behavior."[26] Coercion was necessary in northern Iraq and the Balkans to deter belligerents from disrupting aid organizations and to compel the oppressive governments to remove underlying causes of the conflict. To be successful, the enforcement of a no-fly zone in Darfur would have to overcome three common challenges of executing a coercion strategy during humanitarian operations: low strategic interest, competing coalition objectives, and nonstate actors.

Low Strategic Interest. One of the major challenges for a military intervention in Darfur is that the United States has little or no strategic interest in the region, which could result in tentative domestic support for a prospective military campaign. Sudan is no longer a terrorist threat. The government of Sudan once welcomed Osama bin Laden to its country, but since the 9/11 attacks, the regime has cooperated with intelligence agencies and supported US counterterrorism efforts.[27] US interests in Darfur are predominantly humanitarian, and an intervention in Sudan must overcome the stigma of America's experience of another humanitarian operation in Somalia. That intervention killed 18 service members, compelled the administration to remove US forces from the country in six months, and affected the administration's calculus of subsequent interventions in the Balkans.[28] Obtaining broad public support for an intervention in Darfur will be difficult because of the lack of strategic interests in the region and the potentially high political cost of military operations in Africa.

Competing Coalition Objectives. If the United States is to intervene militarily in Darfur, it will most likely participate as a member of a coalition to provide the legitimacy, ground troops, and donors necessary for military action and humanitarian support. While the participants in the operations in northern Iraq and the Balkans were primarily from NATO countries, the UN peacekeeping forces in Darfur consist of soldiers provided by member states of the African Union and combat engineers from China.[29] The overextension of the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan increases the imperative to obtain broad international support for additional operations in Darfur. The United States will have to manage the competing interests and objectives of potential donor countries if the campaign is to be as effective as Operation Provide Comfort and the NATO campaigns in the Balkans.

Nonstate Actors. The nature of the belligerents was also a major factor in

the Balkan conflicts and is especially important in Darfur. Many of the perpetrators in intrastate conflicts are nonstate actors and have loose connections with governments that may or may not sanction their tactics. Due to the disintegration of the Yugoslav army, Milosevic's regime and political leaders recruited gang members, soccer hooligans, and criminals to help government forces ethnically cleanse Balkan communities.[30] In Darfur, janjaweed militias provide a similar service. The word janjaweed originated in the 1960s as a pejorative term used to describe poor vagrants from Arab tribes.[31] Now it describes a makeshift organization of more than six different armed groups that receive support from Sudan's military intelligence agency. Few agree on the precise makeup of the janjaweed, and the organization is difficult to locate and identify, especially from the air in an area the size of France. Limits on the use of force during humanitarian operations combined with lax ties between the central government and perpetrators make coercion difficult, even when the culprits are easy to find.

Common Coercive Mechanisms

An effective strategy in humanitarian operations requires coercive mechanisms or processes by which threats generate concessions from the adversary.[32] Common mechanisms include eroding the powerbase of the targeted government, creating unrest within the population, decapitating leaders of the regime, weakening the strength of the country as a whole, and denying adversaries the ability to accomplish their objectives. The challenges of humanitarian operations invalidate many of these options, however. The campaigns in the Balkans and northern Iraq successfully used two: denial and powerbase erosion. Both mechanisms could play a large role in the enforcement of a no-fly zone in Sudan.

Denial. Nullifying an opponent's strategy by reducing its ability to accomplish its objectives is denial. Some denial strategies "thwart the enemy's military strategy for taking and holding its territorial objectives, compelling concessions to avoid futile expenditure of further resources."[33] This was the case for Operation Deny Flight, which tried to deny Bosnian Serbs the ability to terrorize and conquer Bosnian Muslim and Croatian villages during the Bosnian war. After Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted to secede from the Yugoslavian Federation in 1992, Bosnian Serb irregulars attacked Bosnian Muslim and Croat villages with air support from the Yugoslavian air force.[34] The Bosnian Serbs hoped to force Muslim and Croat civilians out of Serb-controlled territory and establish a Serbian Republic of Bosnia. Operation Deny Flight established a no-fly zone over the battlefield to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from using their ground-attack fighters and helicopter gunships to support their ethnic cleansing campaign. Sudan also has fighters, bombers, and helicopter gunships, and as late as May 2008, the Sudanese government used an Antonov medium bomber to strike a village in North Darfur.[35] A robust no-fly zone over Darfur could prevent such attacks and enforce a 2005 UN Security Council resolution forbidding "offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region." [36]

Powerbase Erosion. The other common mechanism used by the United States and its allies in northern Iraq and the Balkans is powerbase erosion. This mechanism attempts to undercut the control and leadership of a regime by attacking the political elites and cliques that support it.[37] During Operation Provide Comfort,

Saddam Hussein was extremely sensitive to air strikes against high-value targets in Baghdad, and the coalition maintained a squadron of long-range attack aircraft in Turkey to act as a credible threat to his regime.[38] In Operation Allied Force, NATO attacked military-related industries, utilities, and other targets in Belgrade to foster elite discontent and erode popular support of Milosevic. Some argue that mounting pressure from political elites, civilian oligarchy, and army leadership contributed to Milosevic's yielding to NATO demands.[39] Obama's advisors suggest similar threats could coerce Sudan's leadership and that the "credible threat or use of force" is the "one language Khartoum understands."[40]

Common Coercive Instruments

The United States has numerous tools at its disposal to trigger coercive mechanisms and to begin the process by which threats generate adversary concessions. Examples include air strikes, invasion, nuclear retaliation, economic sanctions, political isolation, and insurgency support.[41] The high cost of many of these instruments makes them unsuitable for humanitarian operations, however. The strategies for Operations Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, and Allied Force relied primarily on three: airpower, economic sanctions, and political isolation.

Airpower. No-fly zones and air strikes are common military instruments for US humanitarian operations because of their flexibility and relatively low cost. As Eliot Cohen remarked, "Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment."[42] US air strikes, including the northern Iraq and Balkans conflicts, rarely result in friendly casualties. The air campaign for Operation Allied Force lasted 78 days with zero battlefield casualties. Airpower can also contribute to denial and powerbase reduction strategies and has the ability to expand or contract the level of destruction to suit the needs of the coercer. Because airpower is cheap, flexible, and seemingly successful, air strikes have become a standard form of intimidation for the United States. Former Clinton advisors Susan Rice and Anthony Lake cite the administration's 1998 cruise missile strike in Khartoum as a primary reason why al-Bashir's regime cooperates with the United States on counterterrorism.[43] Airpower is a seductive component of many analogies for the Darfur crisis because of perceptions that it is effective and easy to use.

Economic Sanctions and Political Isolation. Coalition air forces in northern Iraq and the Balkans did not operate in isolation from other coercive instruments. Sanctions and diplomatic measures reinforced air threats by imposing costs and denying benefits for the regimes of Saddam and Milosevic. A comprehensive economic embargo of Iraq and an international coalition of countries that included Arab nations completely isolated Saddam during Operation Provide Comfort.[44] The UN passed a series of economic sanctions against Bosnia and Serbia during the Balkan conflicts, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia indicted high-level Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic during the respective air campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo.[45]

If applied for Darfur, airpower in Sudan will also operate within the context of economic sanctions and indictments by the International Criminal Court. In 1993, the United States designated Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, which subjects the country to restrictions on foreign assistance. UN Security Council Resolu-

tions (UNSCR) 1556 and 1591 prohibit the transfer of arms to the government of Sudan in Darfur as well as to rebels in the area.[46] UNSCR 1672 targets sanctions against four individuals: two rebel leaders and two representatives of the Sudanese government.[47] In 2007, President Bush expanded the 1997 sanctions imposed by the Clinton administration. Both regimes applied unilateral restrictions on imports and exports, restricted financial transactions to and from Sudan, and froze assets of the Sudanese government. The ICC also indicted several mid-level antagonists in the conflict for genocide and recently issued a warrant for al-Bashir's arrest for war crimes and crimes against humanity.[48] Any military action in the Darfur crisis will have to operate in conjunction with a myriad of economic and diplomatic measures attempting to coerce the government of Sudan.

Differences of the Darfur Crisis from Dominant Analogies

The surface similarities between Operation Provide Comfort, the Balkan conflicts, and Darfur suggest possible airpower solutions to the crisis, prospects for success, and anticipated challenges. However, "more often than not, decision-makers invoke inappropriate analogues that not only fail to illuminate the new situation but also mislead by emphasizing superficial and irrelevant parallels."[49] The remainder of this article anticipates irrelevant parallels between the analogous conflicts and the Darfur crisis and examines key presumptions that sustain them. Figure 2 (p. 91) summarizes the findings.

Operation Provide Comfort

Operation Provide Comfort was one of the most successful humanitarian operations in history. After the Iraq War, a Kurdish uprising and subsequent government repression drove over 400,000 refugees into the mountains along the Turkish-Iraqi border.[50] In response, coalition forces successfully defended the Kurdish refugees from Iraqi forces, aided their return to a safe zone in northern Iraq, and airlifted massive amounts of humanitarian supplies to the region. A key presumption emerges from the campaign: a similar operation could aid Darfuri refugees in Chad and "save Africans." The circumstances surrounding Operation Provide Comfort were exceptional, however, and the United States will find it difficult to recreate two conditions that made the return of Kurdish refugees in Iraq a success: a strong strategic interest to solve the refugee crisis and a demonstrated ability to apply force in the region.

Differences in International Interests. Unlike Darfur, the return of refugees to their homeland in Iraq was of vital interest to the United States and key allies. The Kurds are a large, disgruntled minority in Turkey, and an influx of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees was a significant security threat. Turkey publicly invited the allies to intervene in the crisis and closed its borders, trapping the refugees in the mountains in the middle of winter.[51] A month earlier, Pres. George H. W. Bush had urged the Iraqi people to "take matters in their own hands" and "force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside."[52] Material support of the subsequent rebellion by the United States was nonexistent, however, and the Iraqi military crushed Kurdish guerrillas with the help of helicopter gunships and fixed

wing fighter bombers flying in defiance of UNSCR 686.[53] The security needs of an important ally and media images of Kurdish suffering compelled the administration to respond with air-dropped supplies only seven days after the crisis began. Within weeks, coalition forces established a security zone in northern Iraq. Within seven weeks, the humanitarian operation completely repatriated the Kurds from the Turkish border region.[54]

In contrast, the motivations for intervention in Darfur are almost completely humanitarian. The 250,000 refugees on the border with Chad are only a security threat for the region itself, and media coverage of the human suffering is light. Ninety-six percent of the deaths in the Darfur crisis occurred between 2003 and 2004, and news of the genocide almost disappeared after North and South Sudan signed the CPA in January 2005, ending 21 years of civil war.[55] There was an uptick in coverage prior to the 2008

Summer Olympics in Beijing and the 2008 presidential elections, but the most recent coverage focused on the impending indictment of al-Bashir by the ICC.[56] The population of refugee camps has stabilized, but the security associated with them remains an issue. Since January 2008, bandits and assailants have killed 11 humanitarian workers, abducted 170 staff members, and hijacked 225 vehicles in Darfur.[57] Despite the violence, major powers have not committed military resources to secure refugees and humanitarian personnel in the region. Perhaps the lackluster support of the one million Kurdish refugees who fled to Iran instead of Turkey is more revealing. Iran received just over half the total international assistance for Kurdish refugees despite its protection of a refugee population almost triple that of Turkey.[58]

Differences in Credibility. One primary reason why Operation Provide Comfort was able to deter Saddam's regime from disturbing the return of Kurdish refugees was because the United States and its allies credibly demonstrated the "skill and will" to apply force.[59] The operation began only two months after Operation Desert Storm, which included a devastating air campaign that crippled Saddam's forces. Many of the weapons, soldiers, and procedures were still in place to threaten the regime. Ground forces were also available to distribute supplies, provide security, and expand the safe zone for the eventual return of Kurdish refugees. The United States inserted 5,000 troops into the region, and the commander of the combined task force, LTG John Shalikashvili, met personally with Iraqi military representatives positioned along the border of northern Iraq to dictate the terms of the intervention and the scope of the safe zone.[60] A day after the meeting, Marines on the ground directed mock air strikes on Iraqi positions and compelled Iraqi forces to leave the area.[61] NATO aircraft and 2,500 troops on alert in southeastern Turkey also provided a deterrent when UN agencies and NGOs assumed responsibility for delivering humanitarian aid.[62] The weakness of the Iraqi military and the credible integration of air and ground forces by the United States and its allies against a conventional foe were critical to the success of Operation Provide Comfort.

The history of military intervention and coercion in Darfur does not include skill and resolve in the application of force, especially against the myriad of nonstate parties to the conflict. Twice the UN has authorized peacekeeping forces for the Darfur crisis. In June 2004, a UN Security Council resolution created the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), a force of 7,500 soldiers and police from African

nations tasked to monitor a verbal cease-fire agreement and to "provide a safe and secure environment for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees."[63] Unfortunately, the mission's mandate, rules of engagement, and numbers were completely inadequate to complete the task. Outgunned and underresourced, the mission could not even challenge rebel roadblocks as they tried to protect 34 refugee camps, some with over 120,000 inhabitants, in an area the size of France. The UN approved a second "hybrid" peacekeeping force of 20,600 AU and UN forces in August 2006 to augment AMIS with greater numbers and a stronger mandate, but the group had difficulty protecting itself, let alone refugees.[64] In September 2007, AU forces ran out of ammunition as hundreds of rebels in trucks overran their base in eastern Darfur, seizing tons of supplies and heavy weapons.[65] For future military instruments to be successful in Darfur, they will have to overcome pessimism created by years of unwillingness by the international community to move beyond neutral peacekeeping and mediation in Sudan.

Operation Deny Flight

UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia also suffered from a deficit in credibility, but the United States and NATO were able to overcome the impotence of Operation Deny Flight with Operation Deliberate Force. Beginning in the summer of 1992, Serb aggression and support of an ethnic cleansing campaign by Bosnian Serbs inspired the UN to impose comprehensive sanctions against Serbia, deploy UN peacekeepers, and task NATO to enforce a no-fly zone within Bosnian airspace.[66] The use of force, however, even in defense of UN peacekeepers, was "highly circumscribed" during Operation Deny Flight, and Bosnian Serbs took advantage of the UN's indecisiveness to gain territory and terrorize the civilian populace.[67] The fall of Muslim safe area Srebrenica, use of UN hostages to deter NATO reprisals, and potential for a UN withdrawal from Bosnia prompted the United States to lead an escalated air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs from August to December 1995.[68] Covert supply of Bosnian Muslims and air strikes strategically timed with Bosnian Muslim and Croatian ground offensives shifted the balance of territory in the region. Territorial losses and the prospect for removal of sanctions compelled Milosevic to negotiate terms to end the conflict.[69] The indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic for war crimes also enabled a US envoy to isolate the Bosnian Serb "spoilers" from cease-fire talks, which helped Americans negotiate and employ the Dayton peace accords.[70]

A key presumption that emerges from Operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force is that timely air strikes and the indictment of war criminals can facilitate negotiations and the development of a viable cease-fire agreement. Two differences in the Darfur conflict make this generalization unlikely if the United States uses a similar strategy against the Sudanese government. For one, the Darfuris seek security guarantees and a greater share of national wealth, not independence from a greater Sudan. Second, a coercer must factor the related and potentially more destabilizing North-South conflict into any strategy for peace in Darfur.

Differences in Objectives. Independence was the objective of the parties in the Bosnian conflict. On 1 March 1992, a parliamentary majority of Muslim and Croatian delegates followed the lead of Slovenia and Croatia and voted for independence from Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serbs

rejected the referendum and, dreading subjugation by Bosnian Muslims and Croats, executed their contingency plan for self-determination and seceded.[71] The expansion of regional boundaries and control of territory became the primary goal of the three belligerent groups. The United States and its allies successfully coerced the Bosnian Serbs into accepting the terms of the Dayton accords, because combined air and ground offensives denied them the ability to achieve their goal. The effects of economic sanctions and indictments by the International Criminal Tribunal also isolated the Bosnian Serbs from their primary source of military strength, Serbia, and compelled Milosevic to act as a third-party coercer.[72] The objectives of independence and the control of territory were important aspects in the dynamics of coercion in the Bosnian war.

The objective of the Darfuris is not independence but physical protection, political access, and a greater share of national wealth. The rebellion is a reaction to the negligence of the Sudanese government, which failed to secure Darfuris from violent abuse by Arab tribes even before the government's tacit support of the janjaweed.[73] This negligence and "the hegemony of the northern and central elites to keep Darfur and other peripheral regions marginalized" form the core of Darfuri grievances.[74] Darfur, landlocked and overpopulated, has few natural resources and cannot survive as an independent country without significant help. Some argue the region is poorer today than it was in the late 1800s due to years of drought and overgrazing.[75] Ruling Arabs in North Sudan do not favor an independent Darfur because they need the predominantly Muslim population in the North to balance the Christian population in the South. The international community fears an independent Darfur because of the massive amount of aid and sponsorship it would require to sustain the region. Independence is not a viable option for major players in the Darfur conflict. Ultimately, the long-term survival of Darfuris depends on the cooperation and support of the Sudanese government, making it difficult to apply pressure to the ruling regime.

If the United States seeks to coerce al-Bashir's regime with airpower, the impending indictment of the Sudanese president for war crimes is also problematic.[76] The International Criminal Court's arrest warrant gives Sudan's president additional incentive to consolidate power and to resist demands that remotely threaten the stability of his regime. Since his indictment by the court, al-Bashir has expelled 13 aid organizations he accuse of abetting the international case against him. [77] The leader of Sudan's intelligence service recently called for the "amputation of the hands and the slitting of the throats" of Sudanese people who support the charges.[78] Al-Bashir's loss of control or his apprehension by a UN operation could result in prosecution and humiliation at The Hague. The objective of al-Bashir is to remain in power, and the source of his power and influence—oil—is not susceptible to airpower.[79] In the case of Darfur, criminal indictment by the ICC conflicts with coercion strategies that seek concessions by al-Bashir and his government.

Differences in Priorities. Regional issues were certainly important factors in the negotiations to end the Bosnian war, but a resolution to the Bosnia conflict remained the priority of the United States and international community. Richard Holbrooke, the lead US negotiator at Dayton, was sympathetic to the plight of Albanians in Kosovo but believed addressing the topic was counterproductive to

achieving a peace agreement.[80] Granted, Croatia's 1995 offensive in Krajina played a large role in America's strategy to end the Bosnian conflict. Territorial gains "strengthened Croatia as a strategic counterweight to Serbia" and helped NATO "forge a Croatian-Muslim alliance as a military counterweight to the Bosnian Serbs," but the United States directed its coercive efforts against Serbia for a resolution in Bosnia, not satellite conflicts in Croatia or Kosovo.[81]

In contrast, the Darfur conflict has historically been subordinate to the civil war in Sudan. In 2004, despite the violence and atrocities in Darfur, the policy of US, British, and Norwegian negotiators was to proceed with the CPA between North and South Sudan while the Darfur crisis remained unresolved.[82] The 2005 agreement established a "confederal system" of two regional governments: one in North Sudan dominated by al-Bashir's National Congress Party and a semiautonomous government in South Sudan controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement.[83] The agreement includes a timetable for multiparty elections in 2009 and a referendum on southern independence in 2011.[84] The agreement also requires an equal distribution of oil revenues from the North to the South, which controls the vast majority of oil-producing territory. Last year, skirmishes along the border and the suspension of oil-revenue payments almost sparked a full-scale war, but cooler heads prevailed.[85] Upsetting the military balance between North and South Sudan with an intervention in Darfur could result in a larger, more deadly civil war with even greater humanitarian repercussions. Perhaps an aspect of the Bosnian conflict that is more enlightening is how the Dayton peace process and perceptions of neglect by the Kosovo Albanians led to violence in Kosovo and Operation Allied Force.[86] Military solutions for the Darfur crisis risk reigniting the North-South civil war.

Operation Allied Force

The third and final analogy examined for the Darfur crisis is Operation Allied Force, which for many is one of the most successful air campaigns in history. In response to the violent persecution of Albanians in Kosovo, NATO initiated the air operation to coerce Milosevic into accepting the terms of failed negotiations at Rambouillet. The terms were "the Serbs out; NATO in; the refugees home; a cease-fire in place; and a commitment to work for a peace settlement."[87] The operation lasted much longer than expected, and NATO aircraft were unable to stop the Serbs' ethnic cleansing campaign; yet, after 78 days of air strikes, Milosevic succumbed to NATO's demands. NATO was ultimately successful because air strikes demonstrated an ability to threaten the powerbase of Milosevic's regime, and the Serbians were unable to inflict any substantial costs on the United States or its allies. The Kosovo conflict is a seductive analogy for proponents of military intervention in Darfur, because the United States led the operation "to confront a lesser humanitarian crisis" against "a more formidable adversary" and "not a single American died in combat."[88] The key presumption is that it is possible for US airpower to extract concessions from an authoritarian regime with modest costs and without a strong commitment to ground forces. Two major differences between the Kosovo and Darfur crises make this presumption faulty: the source of power for al-Bashir's regime is revenue from Sudan's oil industry, not an industrialized economy, and international interest in Sudan's oil reserves will

make it difficult to isolate and coerce the regime.

Differences in Powerbase. To maintain order when under air attack and economic hardship, dictatorial regimes often use the media and repressive police and security forces to maintain order. Serbia's leadership was no exception during Operation Allied Force, and Milosevic used Serbia's political machine, media, and security forces to stoke Serb nationalism, eliminate independent media, and place disgruntled military leaders under house arrest.[89] The engine for Milosevic's powerbase and influence was Serbia's industrial economy, which was especially vulnerable to systematic air strikes by an advanced air force.[90] The economically advanced society suffered years of economic sanctions due to the Bosnian war, and the prospects for reconstruction were meager because of international isolation. After a NATO summit in Washington, where leaders of the organization celebrated its 50th anniversary and renewed their resolve to win the Kosovo war, NATO expanded its coercion strategy and targeted the powerbase of Milosevic's regime.[91] By the end of April 1999, air strikes cut Serbia's economy in half, and on 28 May, 80 percent of Serbians lost electrical power due to the destruction of power facilities in Serbia's three largest cities.[92] NATO's willingness to escalate the conflict and severely threaten Serbia's industrial economy played a large role in the coercion of Milosevic and the success of Operation Allied Force.

Al-Bashir's National Congress Party and northern elites also use an extensive party organization, politicized national civil service, and hundreds of thousands of agents and informants to maintain security and power in Sudan. A bureaucracy of over two million Sudanese control the day-to-day operations of the state, but unlike Milosevic in 1999, al-Bashir's regime uses billions of dollars in oil revenues to tend and influence its elite constituency.[93] Sudan's five billion barrels of proven oil reserves and potential for much more also insulate the country from international economic pressures.[94] Despite harsh unilateral sanctions by the United States, Sudan's economy grows almost 10 percent a year.[95] Since 1998, al-Bashir has focused on developing Sudan's oil wealth, and his vision has helped the regime accomplish its primary objective of staying in power. Sitting on top of a fortune while facing criminal indictment abroad and retaliation at home, al Bashir's regime is "prepared to kill anyone, suffer massive civilian casualties, and violate every international norm of human rights to stay in power."[96] Unless strikes are concurrent with an oil embargo supported by the rest of the international community, the government of Sudan will prove extremely difficult to coerce with airpower, because air strikes and no-fly zones do little to threaten Sudan's most valuable natural resource.

Differences in Political Isolation. In addition to economic vulnerability, diplomatic isolation prevented Milosevic and his regime from executing an effective countercoercion strategy against NATO during Operation Allied Force. Despite the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian war, and years of economic sanctions, Milosevic probably expected the plight of Serbia to arouse sympathy in Russia, a fellow Slav and Orthodox country. To Milosevic's dismay, Russian president Boris Yeltsin never gave him anything beyond verbal support during the Kosovo war for several reasons. Yeltsin and other Russian officials did not personally like Milosevic. They were tired of his making promises he could not keep and never forgave him

	Synopsis of Conflict	Key Presumptions	Likenesses to a Military Intervention in Darfur	Differences from Darfur Conflict
Operation Provide Comfort (Iraq)	A broad coalition of states defended Kurdish refugees from Iraqi forces and aided their safe return to Kurdistan.	A similar operation could aid Darfuri refugees in Chad.	The international coalitions confronted incompetent governments that used racial or ethnic identities to divide, control, and oppress their populations. Low strategic interests, competing coalition objectives, and elusive nonstate actors posed significant challenges in the coercion of the targeted governments. The coalitions used two coercive mechanisms: denial and power-base erosion. The coalitions used three coercive instruments: airpower, economic sanctions, and political isolation.	Return of Darfuri refugees is not a vital interest to the United States and its allies. The international community has not demonstrated the desire or ability to apply force effectively in Sudan.
Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia)	Economic sanctions, legal, indictments, and air strikes strategically timed with Muslim and Croat ground offensives compelled Milosevic to negotiate with NATO.	Timely air strikes and indictments could aid cease-fire negotiations in Darfur.		The objective of the Darfuris is not independence but physical protection, political access, and a greater share of national wealth. Concerns about the Darfur conflict are subordinate to the resolution of the North-South civil war.
Operation Allied Force (Kosovo)	While suffering zero combat casualties, a massive air operation compelled Milosevic to withdraw Serb forces from Kosovo.	Airpower can extract concessions with modest costs and without a strong commitment of ground forces.		Sudan does not have an advanced industrial economy that is sensitive to air strikes. Sudan in 2009 is not as politically isolated as Serbia in the 1990s.

Figure 2. Similarités et différences entre le Darfour et des opérations humanitaires analogues.

for his support of the 1991 coup against Yeltsin and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev.[97] Russia's reputation and economy were also too weak to risk a costly confrontation with the West or provide Serbia with advanced antiaircraft missiles to "massacre" NATO aircraft.[98] Both Yeltsin and Milosevic expected the NATO coalition to fracture as the war dragged on, but NATO's resolve hardened, along with talk of NATO expansion. Three weeks into the air war, Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin, a former premier with strong ties with the United States, to negotiate an end to the war. He was not fond of Milosevic, and after negotiating a peace plan with the G-7, Chernomyrdin traveled to Belgrade and coldly told Milosevic to accept the proposal or air strikes would escalate.[99] NATO's growing strength and ability to attack Serbia with impunity compelled Milosevic's only ally to act as a third-party coercer on behalf of NATO. Russia's abandonment of Serbia and Serbia's isolation from the rest of the international community were critical to Milosevic's acceptance of G-7 demands.

Al-Bashir has stronger ties with the international community, primarily because of extensive foreign investment in Sudan's oil sector and the potential for billions of dollars in additional development. Despite extensive economic sanctions by the United States, numerous countries invest in Sudan, including Arab countries and several of America's allies. France, Jordan, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom all have equity stakes in Sudan's oil blocks.[100] India and Malaysia also have large investments in the country, but Sudan's most powerful political and diplomatic partner is China.

In 1959 Sudan was the fourth African nation to recognize the People's Republic of China. The countries have had a good relationship ever since, and in 1994, al-Bashir invited Chinese companies to develop Sudan's nascent oil sector.[101] China accepted the offer and nurtured a relationship with Sudan beneficial to both countries. China used Sudan as a bridgehead for investments in the rest of Africa. Sudan rapidly developed its oil industry and used the proceeds to strengthen state security and procure weapons. China's $8 billion in pipeline, refineries, and basic infrastructure is a substantial incentive to support a strong and stable Sudanese government. China uses its position on the UN Security Council to soften initiatives that could weaken al-Bashir's regime and to abide by Beijing's philosophy of noninterference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states.[102]

Mismatches between the rhetoric and enforcement of UN resolutions after the Darfur atrocities highlight the difficulty of using economic sanctions and political isolation as instruments to erode al-Bashir's powerbase. The first UN resolution written specifically for Darfur is Resolution 1556 (30 July 2004), which required the Sudanese government to disarm the janjaweed in 30 days. The only enforcement mechanism in the resolution was to impose an arms embargo against the Darfur region, not against Sudan itself. Little changed in March 2005 when the Security Council passed Resolution 1591, which applied travel bans against four antagonists on both sides of the conflict but did not condemn or extend sanctions to the Sudanese government or the oil industry.[103] China, Russia, and the Arab League opposed America's stronger proposals because of economic self-interests and skepticism of humanitarian arguments that the United States and others could use to encroach on their national

sovereignty.[104] Unless the security and humanitarian situation changes drastically in Sudan, the United States will find it difficult to apply effective coercive measures against al-Bashir's regime, especially since the international community was unwilling to condemn the Sudanese government immediately after the height of atrocities in Darfur.

Policy Implications for Darfur

Operations Provide Comfort, Deny Flight, and Allied Force are seductive analogies for proponents of a humanitarian intervention in Darfur because these campaigns featured suffering refugees and the successful coercion of a malevolent dictator with a preponderance of airpower. Using these operations as analytical tools to determine the political initiative required for a humanitarian response in Darfur is imprudent, however. The wide range of actors, competing interests, relatively low priority of the Darfur crisis, and the unfavorable geopolitical landscape make it tough to generate the international consensus necessary for a legitimate military intervention. Several influential nations, including China, invest heavily in Sudan's oil industry and prefer a strong and stable Sudanese government to ensure a reasonable return on their investments. Compelling powerful China in 2009 to turn its back on its gateway to the African continent will be much more difficult than convincing the comparatively weak Russia to ditch Milosevic in 1999. The hypocrisies of US intervention in Iraq and its subsequent overextension in the Middle East also propel lesser powers and the Arab League to oppose international activism and the abuse of the "responsibility to protect" to justify interventions.[105] Still others are opposed to military solutions to the Darfur crisis because of potential damage to the North-South peace process and the threat to humanitarian aid operations. Due to conditions internal and external to the Darfur conflict, the United States will have to expend considerable amounts of political capital, significantly more than in the 1990s, to secure UN or even NATO approval for a humanitarian intervention using military forces.

Theoretically, the United States could act unilaterally and hope a large portion of the international community or the UN blesses the operation retroactively, as in Kosovo. Perhaps President Obama and his secretary of state believe a true no-fly zone and nothing more is sufficiently benign to resist international criticism, yet is imposing it enough to prevent the Sudanese government and its proxies from terrorizing villages in Darfur?[106] A small demonstration of American airpower compelled Iraqi security forces to leave Zakho in Kurdistan; why would not a similar demonstration work against the janjaweed in Darfur?[107] The problem in Darfur is that a no-fly zone would provide no compelling reason for the janjaweed to leave. The offensive advantages provided by explosive 50-gallon drums kicked out the back of a cargo plane are relatively minor, even against defenseless villages. It is easy enough for the local Arab tribes, militia, and Chadian rebels that comprise the janjaweed to remain where they are, with or without American aircraft flying overhead. Their only alternative is to become refugees themselves. A no-fly zone is not imposing enough to convince people to leave what they perceive to be their homeland.

Maybe the "no-fly zone" advocated by President Obama is more than that. Perhaps he intends to follow the advice of the US ambassador to the United

Nations and sprinkle air strikes on Khartoum and on air bases to compel al-Bashir's regime to reign in the destabilizing janjaweed.[108] The problem is who will do the reigning in? The regime enlisted the help of the janjaweed in 2003 to conduct its counterinsurgency campaign because it did not have the military forces to do so itself. There is no reason to believe it does now, either. Maybe the advocates of extensive air strikes believe that the devastation could be costly enough to compel al-Bashir to try a little harder. If so, their hopes are unfounded. Sudan's extensive oil reserves are perfectly safe underground, and air operations targeting the janjaweed, when they can be found, will do little to threaten the regime. In addition, the indictment of al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and overtures for "regime change" fail to assure the president that the cost of capitulation is acceptable, no matter how devastating the air attacks. Unless it is prepared to remove al-Bashir with brute force using friendly ground forces or rebel proxies, the United States will have to offer the president a credible alternative to surrender for an air campaign to be successful.[109]

In addition to the meager prospects of success, the costs associated with the employment of coercive airpower in Darfur could be enormous. The Sudanese will execute counterstrategies to neutralize threats and to create problems for the United States and opposing forces.[110] The presence of thousands of humanitarian aid workers, two million displaced persons, a precarious peace with South Sudan, and extensive economic ties with China provide Sudan an excellent deterrent. If deterrence fails, the regime has numerous ways to create pandemonium and threaten the efficacy and domestic support for the intervention. The recent expulsion of relief organizations that provide 40 percent of the aid in Darfur and lack of response by the United Nations is a relevant example.[111] The desire to recycle airpower strategies in Darfur and the execution of counterstrategies by al-Bashir's regime could spin Sudan out of control and put the Obama administration in the unenviable position of having to explain to the American public how a few good intentions led to a catastrophe.[112]

Instead of risking escalation and disaster to reconcile past injustices, America's strategy in Sudan should focus on the future. In accordance with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Sudan will conduct multiparty elections in 2009 and a referendum in 2011 to determine whether South Sudan will secede. Should South Sudan split from the rest of the country, which most likely it will, North Sudan will lose 80 percent of its proven oil reserves, a vastly more credible threat to al-Bashir than air strikes.[113] Blocking South Sudan's vote for independence, contesting the results, or suspending oil revenues is tantamount to war, and the subsequent carnage could dwarf that of the Darfur conflict. The United States needs to provide positive inducements and assurances that the 2009 and 2011 elections are in the best interest of the Sudanese government. Allowing China to pass a Security Council resolution to defer the indictment of al-Bashir is a good place to start. The indictment is counterproductive and does little to deter the parties in the conflict from conducting operations they deem necessary for their survival.[114] The United States could also offset the losses in revenue anticipated by the secession of South Sudan by lifting sanctions, allowing Sudan access to US oil refining technology, and facilitating Sudan's exploitation

that is resistant to the effects of airpower in the long term. When threatened, al-Bashir can use the tentative peace of Sudan's civil war, upcoming elections, and two million internally displaced persons as a deterrent. US military intervention and the failure of that deterrent could spark another civil war, and in the words of one African diplomat, "If the North and South return to war, it will unlock the gates of hell."[117] This is hardly the objective of airpower for peace enforcement, and the United States does not have the desire or capability to play games of brinkmanship with al-Bashir. The United States needs to give al-Bashir tangible assurances that cooperation with the international community will result in his survival, a pledge that American airpower cannot provide. ❑

Notes

1. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced," (Washington, DC: GAO, November 2006), www.gao.gov/new.items/d0724.pdf, 8, 17.

2. Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (BDHA), *Sudan—Complex Emergency, Situation Report 8* (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 27 January 2006).

3. Katherine J. Almquist, *The Continuing Crisis in Darfur, Testimony before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, 23 April 2008.

4. Human Rights Watch and Leslie Lefkow, *Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 17; and Human Rights Watch, *Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 24.

5. Jim Wallis, "Truth and Consequence," *Sojourners Magazine* 36, no. 8 (2007); and Alex de Waal, "The Humanitarian Carnival: A Celebrity Vogue," *World Affairs* 171, no. 2 (2008).

6. de Waal, "Humanitarian Carnival," 5; and United Nations, "If Given Adequate Support, Robust Deployment of African Union–United Nations Hybrid Force Could Contribute to Security in Darfur, Security Council Told," *US Fed News Service, Including US State News* (2008).

7. Straus Scott, "Darfur and the Genocide Debate," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 1 (2005); and Robert G. Kaiser, "Iraq Aside, Nominees Have Like Views on Use of Force," *Washington Post*, 27 October2008, A-4.

8. Susan E. Rice, Anthony Lake, and Donald M. Payne, "We Saved Europeans. Why Not Africans?" *Washington Post*, 2 October 2006, A-19.

9. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 266.

10. Gérard Prunier, *Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide*, 3rd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 96.

11. Ali Haggar, "The Origins and Organization of the Janjawiid in Darfur," in *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, ed. Alex de Waal (Cambridge, MA: Global Equity Initiative; Justice Africa, 2007), 70.

12. Prunier, *Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide*, 97.

13. Alex de Waal, "Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect," *International Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2007): 1040.

14. Alex de Waal, "Darfur: Make or Break for the African Union," *Africa Analysis*, no. 453 (2004).

15. Prunier, *Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide*, 100.

16. BDHA, *Sudan—Complex Emergency*.

17. James Kurth, "Legal Ideals Versus Military Realities," *Orbis* 50, no. 1 (2006): 87; Prunier,*Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide*, 8; and de Waal, "Darfur and the Failure," 1043.

18. de Waal, "Darfur and the Failure," 1043.

19. Prunier, *Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide*, 1.

20. After the Sudanese government expelled 13 humanitarian relief organizations from the region, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said, "This is a horrendous situation that is going to cause untold misery and suffering for the people of Darfur, particularly those in the refugee camps. The real question is what kind of pressure can be brought to bear on President Bashir and the government in Khartoum to understand that they will be held responsible for every single death that occurs in those camps?" Peter Baker, "Adding Pressure to Sudan, Obama Will Tap Retired General as Special Envoy," *New York*

Times, 18 March 2009; and Rice, Lake, and Payne, "We Saved Europeans."

21. In *Analogies at War*, Yuen Foong Khong examines how decision makers use analogies to order, interpret, and simplify policy options and argues that the psychology of analytical reasoning makes it difficult but not impossible to use analogies properly in foreign affairs. Khong finds that decision makers often persevere with incorrect analogical lessons despite contradictory evidence because they are unable to ignore "enormous similarities." Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 13, 257.

22. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May propose a "mini-methods" technique to separate the "known" from the "unclear" and "presumed" when contemporary problems compel decision makers to use fuzzy analogies to facilitate analysis and advocate action. This study uses their technique to analyze the similarities and differences between recent examples of no-fly-zone enforcement and the crisis in Darfur. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (New York; London: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1986), 33, 273.

23. Daniel Byman and Stephen Van Evera, "Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes of Contemporary Deadly Conflict," *Security Studies* 7, no. 3 (1998): 4.

24. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (White Paper), *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations* (Washington, DC: White House, 1997).

25. Ibid.

26. Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*, RAND Studies in Policy Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1. Chapter 7 analyzes the challenges of applying military force in humanitarian interventions.

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Regime Change: A U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11 by Robert S. Litwak. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, 424 pp., $65.00.

This first-class historical narrative belongs to a unique literary genre that can be called "the history of the present." As post–9/11 events have continued to unfold, phenomena rarely visible in early 2002 now appear routinely in the world press. Litwak has rekindled the glow of the immediate past, skillfully discerning the underlying contour of an age of crisis and confrontation. But *Regime Change* does not idly chase each day's events, a domain rightly reserved for journalists and commentators. Instead, Litwak has distinguished his work from a mere anecdote. What makes it history is his placement of events in relation to a global process, charting both continuity and change as US policy makers confronted an unfamiliar strategic context.

The author's motivation for the current treatment of this topic was the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack by al-Qaeda and the war in Iraq. Echoing the paradoxical conjunction of US primacy and vulnerability, he shares the belief that the United States, as the single remaining superpower somewhat gifted with the responsibility for global leadership, cannot have a "stand alone" perspective. Instead, effective strategic decisions must flow from a managed process that produces a perspective through consensus that is broader than any single nation might possess.

The Bush administration's policy of unilateralism, preemption, and regime change has been likened to Newton's third law of motion, which states that if a change is introduced into a system—from the outside or inside—that change unsettles its stability, and a counteraction is triggered by the powerful mechanisms of conservation. Specifically, these policies have provoked considerable counteraction from conservative forces, and as Sunni insurgency actions in Iraq now indicate, efforts to impose change by force have provoked a more violent and damaging reaction than the initial disturbances would have suggested.

Professor Litwak is a knowledgeable political historian concerned with mass movements, security, and international relations. As such, he did not construe his subject narrowly; rather, his narrative style shows a flair for devising imaginative or innovative critiques with accurate and effective ways to fulfill the major requirements of analysis. The author works in a somewhat information-rich environment. His references come from an unusually diverse set of sources. The key ideas here are coherence and narrative guiding the organization of his observations into meaningful structure and pattern.

Litwak traced the origin of regime change as an acceptable international relations conceptual framework to two exceptional instances—Vietnam's 1978 intervention in Cambodia to overthrow Pol Pot and Tanzania's 1979 incursion into Uganda to help opposition forces oust dictator Idi Amin. Both cases involved archetypal rogue, outlaw, or pariah states of the pre–1980 period. The international community, according to him, turned a blind eye to violations of the norms of national sovereignty and the violation of state borders; ironically, by contrast, the United States was unable to get international backing for its 2003 military action to override Iraqi sovereignty and overthrow Saddam Hussein and his regime. In spite of the near successes of the current endeavors, it still implies that a very different political game is in the making and is already, to a large extent, practiced.

On preemption, the author linked two instances from the Cold War era associated with preemptive use of force in counterprolifetration policy: the US consideration in the early 1960s of a preventive strike on China's nuclear weapon facilities and Israel's June 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor. But, how has the global community responded to these pioneering approaches? On the negative side,

there are a variety of problems inherent in the treatment of regime change and preemptive military strikes. Litwak poses a lot of questions for policy makers that are as good as biblical catechism of old.

Nevertheless, the concept has become a way to overcome the troubling external behaviors of rogue states and to develop international order that promotes responsible behavior, escaping the diplomatic logjam that often characterizes the pursuit of bilateral relationships. Taken together, the new course depicts a new historical drama on a global stage, like a three-act play that may be repeated many times with different sets and casts. Barring any likely constraint, the global community has only three prototypes—preemption, regime change, and behavioral change—from which to choose.

The author examines the circumstances under which nations attribute behavior either to stable disposition of leaders or to historical characteristics of the country. Accordingly, the decision to terminate Libya's WMD programs in December 2003, just eight months after the fall of Baghdad, offered an example of apparent bias in causal attribution. The Bush administration was quick to attribute the Libyan course change as a vindication of its muscular nonproliferation strategy. Disagreeing with this assumption, Litwak sought to demonstrate that when a country's actions are consistent with US desires, the most obvious explanation in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary is that US policy effectively influenced the decision. In analyzing the reason why Libya acted the way it did, the author offered that the basis for Qaddafi's change in proliferation intention was the Bush administration's willingness to eschew regime change in Libya and instead offer a tacit assurance of regime survival.

On the whole, Litwak's analyses were in some instances handicapped by the lack of adequate information. Observations confined to the top of the decision-making hierarchy cannot not yield much insight into regimes' trajectories. In Iraq, the most dynamic events are taking place outside the Ba'ath party, in the social sphere, well beyond the view of political scientists. Above all, the US regime change experiment in Iraq has shown that the amount of information available is greater in hindsight than in foresight. The author contends that collective efforts rather than unilateral actions, such as those toward Iraq, are essential for combating al-Qaeda and for effectively addressing the ongoing crises with North Korea and Iran.

Regime Change does not address why US intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, understood the North Korean and Iraqi political landscape so poorly and as such could not initiate the US onslaught in Iraq when they were called to act. On the other hand, Litwak offers clear insight on the nonstate sponsors of terrorism that hardly demand further explanation. However, the dimension and potential of this nexus of terrorism, especially its political aspect, is still poorly understood. For instance, while the Pakistani government restricts US intelligence officers' access to its self-acclaimed father of its nuclear technology, A. Q. Khan, for political reasons, he has been linked to the transfer of uranium centrifuges to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. But one thing is clear: the global antiterrorism war needs a structure that can match its complexity. In many ways—sometimes overt, sometimes covert—the contemporary intelligence network has evolved a strong system pressuring the "nuke" black market economy.

By surveying the longer stretch of historical policy developments in these key states, professionals who seek profound understanding of the call of our time will find Litwak's Regime Change an irresistible compendium of materials to undertake the complicated task of understanding the challenges of the historical era that began in the recent past.

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Electoral Systems and Democracy edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, 245 pp., $18.95.

Electoral Systems and Democracy is an anthology of selected articles from the quarterly, Journal of Democracy. Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institute of

War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, and Marc Plattner is vice president for research and studies at the National Endowment for Democratic Studies. Diamond and Plattner also serve as co-editors of the journal. This is the 18th in a series of Journal of Democracy books, which usually publish papers from a specific gathering. This book is different, spanning a 15-year period from 1991 to 2006 to explore electoral systems—a topic of continuing interest in the journal.

Diamond and Plattner have assembled in a single source a firm foundation for reflection and further research on electoral systems. It is clearly aimed at the political scientist and assumes a high level of familiarity with the subject at the outset. The central theme winding through each chapter is comparison of the two major approaches to electoral systems—plurality and proportional representation. The field is moderately technical, and this book has some jargon sprinkled throughout. The layman will have difficulty following the intricacies of the opening arguments, as the authors assume the reader's familiarity with various electoral schemes such as first-past-the-post, single transferable vote, single nontransferable vote, and list-proportional representation, among others.

Electoral Systems is arranged in three sections: I. Electoral Systems and Institutional Design; II. Is Proportional Representation Best?; and III. Country and Regional Experiences. It begins with an excellent 16-page introduction that clearly lays out their approach to the topic. As a well-developed single-source resource, the book describes the various approaches to planning and conducting democratic elections, highlighting objectives election planners may choose to pursue and the tension between those objectives. Examples include representation that closely mimics the voting of the population, keeping radical fringe elements out of legislatures (or ensuring they have a voice), and encouraging moderation in policies to appeal to the widest audience. Understanding these diverse objectives and the inherent tensions among them will be important to military officers working in governmental policy positions in support of nascent democracies. This book illustrates why there is no one best approach to elections and describes two major camps of political scientists who see the same evidence in very different ways. That difference of opinion is the focus of the second section.

The question, Is proportional representation best? is the focus of the second section, but underlies the entire book. The core of this section is a pair of articles labeled "classic" by the editors in their introduction. "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies" by Arend Lijphart and "The Problem with PR" by Guy Lardeyret come from the Winter 1991 and Summer 1991 editions of the journal and present two sides of the question. Much like Friedman's and Ramonet's "Dueling Globalizations" in Foreign Affairs (Fall 1999), these articles both argue with each other and past each other. Three articles follow, each referring to these arguments. Unfortunately for the reader looking for a simple solution, much is left unresolved, reflecting the reality of the state of the art.

Just when you think you cannot stand any more of the same back and forth between squabbling PhDs, the book shifts to specific country examples. Here the academic arguments are brought to life, even as the squabbling continues, albeit somewhat abated. Having trudged through the two weighty preceding sections, even the lay reader will get a lot out of this section. It opens with two articles dealing with Latin America, the first focusing on Uruguay and the second on the entire region. The next article, entitled "Why Direct Election Failed in Israel," provides a fascinating look at the intricacies of Israeli democracy that seldom make the newspaper. It does a very good job of presenting a historical look at how and why direct election came to Israel and what actually happened—and why the original thinking was wrong. The next article compares the experiences of Japan and Taiwan, showing similarities and differences while highlighting the relative uniqueness of their journeys compared to the rest of the democratic world. As one might expect, the book closes with articles

about Afghanistan and Iraq—the most visible ongoing democratic conversions—which provide a useful behind-the-scenes look at the theory and maneuvering in recent elections in both countries.

This is a timely book. At the time of this review, the United States is working its way through the 2008 presidential primaries, and this book unintentionally calls to mind the strengths and foibles of the US electoral system. In the longer term, given the Bush administration's focus on democratization, it reminds the reader that democracy is more than elections, and elections are more than simply scheduling a campaign and a vote. Largely focused on electoral approaches for developing democracies, there is nevertheless ample evidence of recent electoral change in established democracies as well.

Electoral Systems will not likely turn up in aircrew alert areas or base libraries. As a book by specialists for specialists, its application to the military professional is limited. Nevertheless, for individuals destined for a year in an Iraqi or Afghani governmental ministry, this might be a good use of preparatory time. For the reader interested in the pitfalls and promise of democracy as part of life-long learning, this may prove invaluable.

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