2nd Quarter 2014 Volume 5, No. 2

Editorial

A Story of Courage and Perseverance, Revisited

Rémy M. Mauduit

Articles

Networking for Political Voice among Women in Disrupted Societies of the Middle East and Africa

A Preliminary Study

Cheryl Van Den Handel, PhD

Jennifer Edwards, PhD

Jacqueline Watson

Neopatrimonial African Capitalism?

Conceptual Adventures via John Kenneth Galbraith

Adam Sneyd, PhD

The Arab Uprising

State of Emergency and Constitutional Reform

Andrej Zwitter, PhD

China and Israel

Relations and Future Prospects

Aron Shai, PhD

Book Reviews

A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia

Aaron Friedberg

Reviewer: Alexander B. Gray

A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe

Michael Creswell

Reviewer: Mark Thompson

Adapt: Why Success Always Starts with Failure

Tim Harford

Reviewer: Lt Col Shannon W. Caudill

After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West

Ayse Zarakol

Reviewer: Emilian R. Kavalski, PhD

A Story of Courage and Perseverance, Revisited*

The day will come when man will recognize woman as his peer, not only at the fireside, but in councils of the nation. Then, and not until then, will there be the perfect comradeship, the ideal union, between the sexes that shall result in the highest development of the race.

—Susan B. Anthony

Half of humanity suffers from discrimination and violence everywhere in the world. Women in developing countries are hampered by many of the same concerns that affect females in other nations, but they face numerous other challenges to their physical and economic security, their rights, and their dignity. These barriers include poverty; illiteracy; a lack of rights; sociocultural and religious factors that legitimize and condone everyday violence; discrimination; and marginalization in the family, community, and public sphere. The failure of states to comply with national laws, corruption without fear of reprisal, dysfunctional public services, deeply ingrained patriarchal traditions, tribal cultures, and conservative social norms keep women—especially those from poor backgrounds—in the vicious circle of violence and insecurity, excluding them from public life. Since in many states, discrimination is enshrined in law, women are denied equal rights in marriage and divorce, child custody, inheritance, and so forth. Violence against females continues due to the absence of legislation prohibiting it, obstacles to justice, or the inaction of public authorities. The fact that the perpetrators of such brutality go unpunished helps create a culture of impunity that contributes to the repetition of these crimes. Recent surveys have shown that early and forced marriages; domestic and sexual violence; the mutilation of female genitalia; trafficking in women; forced prostitution; and the denial of access to property, work, education, inheritance, or health care remain widespread.1

However, women are not only victims but also the main actors in their own emancipation. Over three-quarters of African women still work in the agricultural sector—representing almost half of that labor force—and, according to experts, provide 70 percent of food production and handle 80 to 90 percent of the processing, storage, and transportation of food.2 In rural Africa, women work tirelessly from morning to night, but they often do not have the right to own land. By virtue of their hard work, presence in the informal sector, methods of clever organization, and production of food items, they represent economic and social agents of the first order in Africa. In some countries, it is not uncommon to find women holding the traditional male role—that is to say, providing for the family. Indeed, they sometimes even take care of their husbands financially.

In North Africa, women played an important role in the Arab Spring. In Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, they took to the streets in large numbers—well before the Islamists and other opportunists—to claim the right to democracy, social justice, and dignity. Inevitably, they faced exclusion from public life as well as discrimination and violence from extremist groups or security forces, who usually acted with impunity. Those women earned the right to participate in the political and decision-making process. Unfortunately, the risks of losing their gains are real because politicians who wish to cling to power will readily sacrifice women’s rights to conservative forces.

Gender equality should be everyone’s concern. In Africa, as elsewhere, such parity is essential to reduce poverty and stimulate economic growth. States should not only talk about it but also initiate governmental programs that address the root causes of in-equality. They can end the abuses against women by taking bold measures and adopting more effective laws that penalize all forms of discrimination—regulations supported by strict and appropriate prevention. Heads of state should be held accountable for compliance with their obligations to women.

In one of the main achievements of the World Conference on Human Rights (the Vienna Conference), this organization formally recognized, at the global level, that women’s rights are human rights, that they are universal, and that they should supersede cultural values particular to each culture/civilization. As long as women suffer from violence and discrimination worldwide, however, it is hypocritical and irresponsible to say that they enjoy fully and equally all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Promotion of women’s rights is inseparable from the advancement of human rights, democracy, and development.

Rémy M. Mauduit, Editor

Air and Space Power Journal–Africa and Francophonie

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes

1. See, for example, “The Epidemic of Violence against Women in Africa,” Rainbo Organization, accessed 14 April 2014, http://www.rainbo.org/the-epidemic-of-violence-against-women-in-africa

/; Mary Johnson Osirim, “Crisis in the State and the Family: Violence against Women in Zimbabwe,” African Studies Quarterly 7, nos. 2 and 3 (Fall 2003): 153–69, http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/v7/v7i2-3.pdf; and Thomson Reuters Foundation, Women’s Rights in the Arab World: The Worst and Best States for Women (London: Thomson Reuters Foundation, November 2013), http://www.trust.org/application/velocity/spotlight-extensions/womens-rights-in-the-arab-world/english/documents/final-results.pdf.

2. See, for example, Rori Kramer, “Gender and Agriculture: Unlocking Africa’s Potential” (Washington, DC: Women Thrive Worldwide, n.d.), http://womenthrive.org/images/agfactsheet.nov17

.pdf%20.pdf; Saquina Mucavele, “The Role of Rural Women in Agriculture,” World Farmers’ Organisation, accessed 14 April 2014, http://www.wfo-oma.com/women-in-agriculture/articles/the-role-of-rural-women-in-agriculture.html; and Steve Ember, “African Women Farmers Working for Better Lives,” Voice of America, 7 January 2014, http://learningenglish.voanews.com/content/agriculture-africa-women-farmers-plantwise-protection-pests-diseases/1823596.html.

*See Rémy M. Mauduit, “A Story of Courage and Perseverance,” Air and Space Power Journal–Africa and Francophonie 2, no. 1 (1st Quarter 2011): 3.

Networking for Political Voice among Women in Disrupted Societies of the Middle East and Africa

A Preliminary Study

Cheryl Van Den Handel, PhD*

Jennifer Edwards, PhD

Jacqueline Watson

*Dr. Cheryl Van Den Handel is an assistant professor of political science and president of the Faculty Council at Northeastern State University, Tahlequah, Oklahoma. She received her MA in international studies and PhD in political science from Claremont Graduate University. Dr. Van Den Handel’s current research is focused on the empowerment of women and their participation in peace building and politics in the Middle East and Africa.

Dr. Jennifer Edwards is an associate professor of sociology and coordinator of the Sociology Program at Northeastern State University. She received her PhD in sociology from Oklahoma State University in 2004. Her research interests include investigating the relationship between ritual and power in various cultural settings, social inequality, and gender roles. She has studied groups in England, Northern Ireland, and North Africa.

Jacqueline Watson received her BA in English and political science, summa cum laude, from Northeastern State University, where she is currently a graduate student. Her research concentrates on the politics of indigenous populations. She has studied groups in Brazil, the Sahara, and the Roma in Europe.

In 2003 a seemingly ordinary woman in Liberia mobilized the women of her country to regain peace and eventually elect a new government headed by Africa’s first female president. Across the Middle East in 2011, women played a very visual and vocal part in the Arab Revolution and continue to mobilize for women’s rights. At present, some African countries are struggling with social and political disruptions that threaten to bring down governments. This article asks if women can effectively act as agents of information diffusion about women’s issues throughout the Middle East and Africa to mobilize for peace and gain political voice. Secondly, it compares the efficacy of women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) with that of women in sub-Saharan Africa. We find that as women’s social networks establish themselves in one country, they diffuse regionally as proponents of conflict resolution and state rebuilding, resulting in growing civil society on the African continent. The pathways and mechanisms for mobilizing women socially and politically, however, remain little understood. Our preliminary article is a small study of 33 cases examining information pathways that occur through both woman-to-woman and women-to-public contact, which transmits information in a broader sense from women’s organizations country to country and to the international community. The study serves as our theoretical and descriptive focus for the larger project. At a later time, we will apply social network analysis and geographic information system (GIS) mapping to discover patterns of interaction and diffusion, seeking viable commonalities that may lead to a theory of women’s social networking and diffusion in conflict resolution.

Gender Roles, Culture, and Social Movement Theories

Gender roles represent a salient component of cultures throughout the world. As members of a culture and society, individuals are taught the importance of gender and the roles associated with being male and female. The question facing sociology and other social science disciplines is the degree to which gender is linked to social movement participation and leadership. This section explores the cultural significance of gender and its relationship to the development of and participation in social movements by discussing gender roles and culture, social movement theories, and MENA culture.

As stated previously, gender roles are significant and become so through the process of gender socialization, defined as “the process by which individuals learn the cultural behavior of femininity or masculinity that is associated with the biological sex of female or male.”1 Hence, as Linda Lindsey suggests, gender socialization emerges from a process of social construction reflective of culture, from which gender roles develop, thereby providing measures of social control.2

Because gender is related to culture and culture is related to social change, it is important to understand the role of gender in creating and/or perpetuating social change, which often occurs due to advances, class conflict, and political action. Hence, economic and political development may be related to changes in women’s status or family.3 Further, a framework developed by Janet Giele promotes understanding and assessing the position of women in different societies. The framework identifies six variables that represent significant factors in understanding women’s status: (1) political expression, (2) work and mobility, (3) family, (4) education, (5) health and sexual control, and (6) cultural expression.4 Social movements, then, are related to the concept of gendering consciousness.5 According to M. Bahati Kuumba, “Social resistance often fosters an awareness of gender roles and relations even when the target and ultimate objectives of the movement have nothing to do with gender equity.”6 Thus, gender struggles play a role in creating new types of action, affecting society at large.

Political sociology depends upon theories to guide research and analyze and interpret society.7 In regard to gender and social movements, several theoretical perspectives further the comprehension of social processes involved in the development of, participation in, and leadership of social movements. Kuumba notes that the use of sociological theory has emerged more recently to study women’s role in social movements.8 Three major theories address gender and social movements: (1) the political process model, (2) resource mobilization theory, and (3) new social movement theories.

According to the political process model, certain conditions exist that allow a social movement to develop and become successful. However, this theory has underemphasized the role of gender in regard to power relations, which play a role in creating political opportunities. This model also includes a subjective component: “Constructions of gender can mediate between social conditions and the movement by qualifying ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ perceived as a political opportunity.”9

Whereas the political process model focuses on political opportunities, resource mobilization theory emphasizes resources and the organizational structure that must exist in order for a social movement to be successful. Thus, this theory deals with official structures, tangible resources, and the rationality of organizers versus emotion and gender ideologies.10

New social movement theories depart from the class-based basis for activism. Rather, these perspectives address collective framing and identity, emphasizing social psychological components as well as subjective factors regarding social movement processes. As observed by Kuumba, “The fact that new social movement theories emphasize collective identity and social location, both of which are central to the construction of gender, makes them conducive to a gendered analysis, on one level.”11

The role of women is directly tied to status, a fact demonstrated in the MENA regions. Specifically, status related to domestic roles, education, and literacy reflects rates of success regarding women.12 Thus, “high fertility, low literacy, and low labor force participation are commonly linked to the low status of women, which in turn is often attributed to the prevalence of Islamic law and norms in Middle Eastern societies.”13 Further, the belief that women are different and inferior often creates barricades to their achievement and success. Hence, women are expected to refrain from roles considered inappropriate: “Women’s reproductive function is used to justify this segregation in public, their restriction to the home, and their lack of civil and legal rights.”14

Some areas in the MENA have seen the development of a strong working class and trade unions. Consequently, many types of movements (e.g., reform, religious, and so on) have emerged in these regions, and some of the most crucial agents of change—both legal and political—have been led by women.15

Women Leaders as Agents of Change

Can women make a difference in the face of seemingly never-ending conflict? Does the simple art of communication truly help ease tensions and foster cooperation for political change and peace? The women introduced here believe that the answer is yes. They hail from countries throughout the MENA and sub-Saharan Africa, developing networks to realize a common goal: peace. This section examines how these remarkable individuals seek to attain this collective, desired outcome on a country-by-country basis.

The Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel

Beneath the bellicose statements of politicians in both Israel and the Palestinian Territories, women have taken up the mantle of leadership in an effort to create peace within and between their nations. In Palestine, Issam Abdul-Hadi, Amneh Kamal Sulaiman, and Zahira Kamal are inspirations to Palestinian Arab women who are struggling to define their newly emerged identity in a global world.16 Abdul-Hadi attended the first Palestinian National Council, which led to creation of the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) in 1965, and was elected the union’s president—a position she still holds. She received the Ibn Rushd Prize for Freedom of Thought in 2000.17 In the refugee camps of Lebanon, Sulaiman suffered greatly yet worked her way to become a refugee camp adviser and deputy chairwoman of the GUPW. Amneh networks with refugees to organize social and patriotic work as she fights for peace. She is also a member of the Palestinian National Council.18 Kamal held the post of director general of the Directorate of General Planning and International Cooperation at the Palestinian National Authority from 1995 to 2005. As director general, she formed an interministerial coordination committee for the advancement of women. Zahira is also the founder of Palestinian Women’s Action, the first grassroots organization dealing with women’s empowerment issues. She is affiliated with many women’s nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in Palestine and has worked as a spokeswoman for the Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action in many countries, including Russia and the United States. Furthermore, she is a member of both Israeli and Palestinian Networking and the Jerusalem Link, two cooperating women’s centers located in east and west Jerusalem. Zahira has written extensively on women’s empowerment, women’s political participation, and the peace process.19

In Israel, theatre director Angelica Livne, playwrights Betty Shamieh and Misha Shulman, and actress Yael Drouyanoff promote peace through the arts and civil society.20 Livne is an advocate for peace through the arts, focusing on children of different religious and cultural backgrounds through the Rainbow Theatre. Involving children of all faiths, the theatre engages the children to use their bodies to narrate what goes on in the mind of an adolescent living in a country at war and to express their thoughts and desires to accept others and be accepted as they are.21 The stage is fast becoming a place for advocates of change in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Roar, a play by Shamieh, a Palestinian, highlights the experiences of a Palestinian family living in a Midwestern American city that has a large Arab community. Shulman’s play Fist examines the turmoil of an Israeli family whose son refuses to continue serving in the military because of the injustices he witnesses as a result of the occupation of Palestine. Founded by Drouyanoff, the Peace Child Israel project allows Jewish and Arab teens to act out their own versions of plays to dramatize the issues they face.22

Rela Mazali and Ronit Avni are civil society activists who promote peace. Mazali is one of the founding members of the New Profile Movement for the Civilization of Israeli Society, which promotes peace among young Israelis through mutual respect and understanding by challenging the militarization of Israeli education, creating public opportunities for discussion and learning, and providing young people who refuse to enlist in the military with information as well as moral and emotional support.23 Avni, Just Vision founder and chief executive officer, launched a program in 2003 designed to widen the influence of journalists, policy makers, and supportive communities by connecting them to one another. She publicizes the work of Israeli and Palestinian peace builders because she has observed that the media ignore these individuals and groups. Just Vision aims to highlight the work of these individuals and bring it into the mainstream. Thus far, the project has interviewed 180 civil leaders in Hebrew, Arabic, and English with the object of teaming up with educators to create curricula for the classroom that addresses how each person can become an agent of change.24

Women from both sides have participated in the Global Peace Initiative of Women Conference, which—since 2002—has explored peace initiatives between Palestinians and Israelis. The conference “was founded to mobilize spiritual and religious communities around the world to address key global issues, focused on climate change, the environment, promoting women’s leadership and interfaith dialogue.”25 During the summits held from 2002 to 2008, three facts became clear: (1) reconciliation is not a political exercise but an effort that will leave the past behind and build for the future, (2) women must have a leading role in the peace process, and (3) reconciliation is a people-to-people process that begins at the grassroots level.26

At this time, the political impact of the efforts discussed above on empowering women to wage peace between Palestine and Israel remains unclear. Certainly civil society must broaden among Palestinians, and women must become full partners in attaining peace and reconciliation. In Israel, it is equally unclear whether women and civil society peace groups are making any political gains towards peace.

Lebanon

Rather than peace, women’s groups in Lebanon emphasize their political and civil empowerment. Women in Lebanon can vote and run for office, enjoy freedom of speech and assembly, and may advocate for issues; however, they are heavily discriminated against in the area of public employment. Women find themselves lacking in empowerment in specific societal and human rights issues such as equal treatment under the law—particularly in the domestic arena.27 The Lebanese Council for the Prevention of Violence against Women has staged marches and other public protests while the Lebanese Women’s Council has organized conferences aimed at convincing both politicians and religious leaders to reduce legal restrictions and improve women’s access to political decision making.28

Women are poorly represented in Lebanese politics. Only elite families can seat a woman in parliament. Bahia Hariri, who holds one of only four women’s seats out of 143 in the Lebanese parliament, is head of the Education Committee in the Arab Parliamentarian Union and has taken on a number of pilot projects in varying fields of study. By utilizing those positions, she has committed herself to fighting to empower women and address gender inequality. Hariri strongly believes in developing partnerships between civil organizations and the government, at both the local and national levels, as a means of pursuing human development projects in Lebanon.29

Syria, Jordan, and Other Countries

Dr. Bouthaina Shaaban of Syria and Haifa Abu Ghazaleh and Laurice Hlass of Jordan have dedicated their lives to addressing social injustices that have befallen women in the Arab world. Dr. Shaaban is the author of three books about the lives of Arab women as well as the media and political adviser to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. Over the past 10 years, she has set a strong example for women who desire to enact reforms and who want to participate in Syrian politics.30 Through her work as regional program director at UniFem, Abu Ghazaleh has developed many programs and projects that support peace, women’s rights, and political participation. She strives to apply the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals, and the International Human Rights Legal Legislation to the organizations of which she is a member, such as the Jordanian Ministry of Education and the General Federation of Jordanian Women.31 Hlass has inspired many Jordanian women to further their education and improve their domestic situations. She reaches out to women, offering vocational and skills training at such NGOs as the Young Women’s Christian Association, where she is president, and the UN Relief and Works Agency, among others.32

Other significant women and women’s groups from Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Saudi Arabia are part of the case studies. Some of these include the Iraqi Women’s League and the Women’s Cultural and Social Society in Kuwait. Women leaders who have made significant social and political gains for women in the region include Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi, the first woman minister of the UAE, and Tiba Al Maoli, the first woman nominated for the Omani Legislative Council. As a member of the council, she helped draft the Silk Alqadi Law and the Al Ahwal Al Shakhseyya Law.33 Writer Laila Nabih Alnamani is a founding member of the Women’s Welfare Society in Saudi Arabia, which represents more than 35,000 individuals and provides a range of services and skills to improve the standard of living for women.34 Dr. Haifa Jamal Al-Lail, president of Effat University in Saudi Arabia, is directly involved in the development of women’s higher education in that country. She works with diverse organizations such as the Jeddag Chambers of Commerce and the World Economic Forum and has labored internationally to voice her concerns over stereotypes about Muslim women, the need for dialogue, and her commitment to peace.35

The “Arab Spring” Countries

Women’s rights and the viability of women’s groups vary greatly from one North African country to another. The gains of the past 30 years or so have largely been lost since the 2011 revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.36 Yet, women leaders and women’s rights organizations have been active in the two years hence.

Women’s rights issues engage more than 20 women’s groups in Tunisia, such as the National Union of Tunisian Women and the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women. Since June 1991, the Women and Development Committee has scrutinized development plans to guarantee respect for gender equality. The Center for Arab Women Training and Research, based in Tunis, promotes gender equality through advocacy and workshops.37

Award-winning women’s rights activist Dalia Ziada, executive director of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Egypt, is one of eight women leaders across the Arab world engaged in a movement dubbed the “Pink Hijab.”38 Although Ms. Ziada lost her run for parliament in 2011 as a candidate of the political party that she cofounded with other revolutionaries, she continues to train activists and bloggers from her organization.39 Other Egyptian women involved in the women’s rights movement are Rebecca Chiao, founder of HarassMap, a website that tracks sexual assaults and other violence against women by cell phone and Internet; activist Soraya Bahgat; and Abeer Abo El’ela from the media office of the National Council for Women. These women, who believe that attacks on women activists are increasing and deliberately launched as a defamation campaign against them, are instrumental in keeping political violence against women in the public light.40

Algeria and Morocco

Women’s rights in Algeria have improved since the 1970s but are hampered by religious and secular differences as well as women’s overall legal illiteracy. Women’s rights groups have grown in number since 2005 as more women are engaging in activism and civic involvement.41 Human rights activist Louisa Hanoun, leader of the Algerian Workers Party since 1990, has demanded the drafting of a new constitution that stipulates the irreversible adoption of democracy. In 2004 Louisa was nominated by her party and ran unsuccessfully as a presidential candidate; nevertheless, this was a watershed moment for women in Arab countries insofar as she was the first woman in the MENA region ever to do. Hanoun considers her action a breakthrough in the region with regard to the status of women.42

Women’s empowerment in Morocco resembles that in Algeria. The cultural setting there remains a major impediment to women’s socioeconomic advancement. Their productivity is undervalued in both the public and private sectors of the country. Fawzia Talout Meknassi—a journalist and director of the Press Marocaine, a leading Moroccan press agency—established the Salon for Mediterranean Women in 1997 and the International Forum for Women in 1999, which she also directs. Moreover, Fawzia is a staple figure of the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women. She believes that women’s progress in Morocco depends upon a radical change that must occur within the ethos of her country. Meknassi tirelessly works to see this change occur by creating social networks for the advancement of women.43

Award-winning Moroccan activist Najat M’jid is a member of the Commission on the Rights of the Child of the Moroccan Consultative Council on Human Rights. She is the founder and an active member of BAYTI, an NGO and the first program addressing the situation of Morocco’s street children. She is responsible in part for Morocco’s national policy on the protection of children. Najat was appointed the special rapporteur on the sale of children in May 2008 by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.44

Women’s Civil Society Networking in Africa

The main thrust of our research addresses how women network with other women for the purpose of gaining a political and social voice. How do they transmit information to women across borders? We also need to ask what inhibits information transmission and political success. Transmission via word of mouth is the simplest mode, but it does not necessarily lead to collective action. Winning political office as president, prime minister, or parliamentarian is a significant gain, but without the multiple voices of civil society, change remains problematic. Earlier we examined motivated women leaders and women’s groups who forge pathways for MENA women to obtain political voice and policy outcomes. This section examines the broader women’s civil society networks in Africa, their successes, and the difficulties they endure.

The approach to women’s human rights (gender violence and sexual discrimination) occurs in a fragmented, piecemeal manner using various international conventions. Gender-blind-centered justice and political decision making create an atmosphere of “justice-avoidance and evasion” by countries and regions, maintaining an abstracted view of postconflict and peace-building agendas that ignores women-specific issues.45

Dr. Annie Chikwanha found that problems with equal treatment in conflict resolution appear politically linked through long-standing cultural institutional arrangements such as traditional chiefs/elders/mediators (30 instances); armed forces and police (34 instances); local administration (17 instances); local courts (14 instances); family, friends, and neighbors (14 instances); and others to a lesser extent. She notes that women do not know how to obtain justice, that they lack literacy and access to technology because of limited information and high prices, and that they are culturally inhibited.46

The extent to which women’s initiatives are viable in obtaining justice and political voice is not clear. One can measure the number of seats they obtain in parliaments and track their civil society associations, but it is also necessary to undertake a study of these associations’ policy initiatives and follow a number of them to completion. Many NGOs assist women in conflict-ending and peace-building efforts, but the collection of data is neither harmonized nor coherent and, therefore, not comparable. Women’s networks, such as Akina Mama wa Afrika’s (AMwA) Women’s Leadership and Movement Building in Conflict and Post-Conflict Countries in Africa Project, are occasionally successful in their efforts to pass laws in various African countries. Women’s civil society groups struggle with sustainability due to a paucity of resources for capacity building and individual assistance.47 AMwA—a women’s advocacy network by and for African women between the ages of 25 and 45 that shares information, advice, and expertise—also reports that women’s rights activists are targets themselves because of their outspokenness and the nature of their work. Nevertheless, the agency of African women working for women remains paramount.

Inherent in the patrimonial societies of African nations is a failure of the African media to recognize the gender of female African leaders. Dismus Nkunda writes that “when Ellen John Sirleaf rose to the highest office of her country Liberia through a democratic election, this feat saw her being described as ‘the best man for the job.’ ”48 In Kenya a woman serving in the coalition government cabinet as the minister for justice was noted as “the only man in the coalition.”49 When women occupy positions of power that are not considered the domain of women or promote women’s issues and when patriarchal society refuses to recognize their leadership, Nkunda advises that women leaders need to continue to strategically engage society in “unpacking how social roles, norms and responsibilities continue to re-write narratives of women’s leadership.”50

AMwA offers lectures, training sessions, intergenerational dialogue, and workshops for the purpose of developing the next generation of women capable of taking leadership roles in society and politics. Information campaigns help to inform the general public about their organization and garner support for the women’s movement. AMwA engages these future leaders in the Women’s Leadership and Movement Building in Conflict and Post-Conflict Countries in Africa Project, supported by the MDG3 Fund, an initiative of the Dutch Foreign Ministry.51 The project seeks to train young women in feminist leadership “for effective participation and representation in decision-making processes in conflict situations” and to work for “gender responsive policies and programmes” in their respective countries.52

Western Africa

In the 1990s, women from Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea had already begun organizing themselves in groups to teach each other how to speak out for their rights and demand education. Shirley and Viola, Liberians who lived in the Oru-Ijebu refugee camp in 1995, began a women’s group in the camps to teach women their rights and facilitate their education. They hoped that someday women would properly organize themselves throughout Africa and cry for peace.53

When women organize themselves for peace, they significantly affect the peace process. The Mano River Women’s Peace Network, for example, began when women from the West African countries of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea desired to put an end to the suffering and fighting caused by conflict. They successfully participated in and influenced the outcome of the peace process in their region and within their respective countries by dispatching a delegation to appeal to the feuding heads of states and by staging sit-ins in Monrovia, Liberia.54

That country’s National Women’s Commission was founded in 1991 as an NGO with roughly 41 different women’s groups attached to it. The commission focuses on structures of women working at the grassroots level by providing funding and technical assistance; further, it serves as an intermediary among the women’s groups, country governments, and other international women’s groups.55 Through the commission, Liberian women started a program for abused women and girls, supplied legal aid and rights education, and generated income for female combatants and their families. Following that organization’s success in Liberia, women in Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea began their own branches in their home countries. One local women’s group, the Slipway Women Development Association, operates out of one of the poorest neighborhoods in Monrovia. Since its beginning, neighborhood women have held fund-raising rallies, and each week they attend the National Women’s Association meeting to discuss their issues.56

Eastern Africa

Women in war-ravaged Sudan have been actively working for peace, women’s empowerment, and development. Amna Abd El Rahman Abd El Rasoul is the founder and an active member of the Peace and Development Center in the Kedalu, one of the most underdeveloped areas of the country with no access to telephones, road networks, or marketing facilities. Because of the center’s concern with issues about women’s and children’s rights to education, the percentage of girls enrolled in basic schooling has significantly increased.57

Writer and founder of the Community Based Organizations, Bakhita Osman works for peaceful coexistence between multiethnic communities through her talents as a storyteller. Bakhita’s efforts to implement “the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) [sic] [goals], women’s empowerment, poverty alleviation, and establishing the culture of peace and coexistence in the Sudan” are hampered by a lack of financial resources, the unstable and violent atmosphere, and the political ideology of the rulers.58

Other women leaders who empower women to establish networks for peace building, gender equality, and equal political representation include Fatima Ibrahim, Ester Rahal, Rachael Paul, and Anita Amiro. Ibrahim, the first woman elected to the Sudanese parliament, is president of the Women’s International Democratic Federation, and “Mama Ester” Rahal is the first woman to represent the Nuba Mountain region in parliament. They are involved in policy regarding issues of gender equality in the decision-making process. With the Sudanese Women’s Union, they strive to support women’s participation in political life and the building of civil society.59 Activist Paul participated in concluding a peace agreement between North and South Sudan, ending the longest phase of the civil war.60 Singer, dancer, and actress Amiro is one of the pioneering women behind the Kwoto Cultural Center, whose work is prominently featured at international festivals and film competitions. She works to promote peace and reconciliation for the displaced citizens of Southern Sudan by giving them an outlet for the exercise of free speech through works of art.61

Information Pathways

The methodology for this preliminary study entailed collecting case-study evidence of the activities of individual women leaders and women’s civil society groups involved in peace building, women’s empowerment, and political activities promoting women. In the 33 cases, we examined leadership and organizational activities native to the African continent as well as those initiated from abroad and active on the African continent and in the Middle East:

Code

Pathway

Cases

WW

Woman to Woman

10

WP

Woman to Public

8

WI

Woman or Women to the International Community

9

WOW

Women’s Organization to Women

4

WOP

Women’s Organization to Public

7

W2G

Women to Government: Direct Involvement

4

Overlaps

9

Total Cases

33

In 27 of the 33 cases, information pathways occur through woman-to-woman contact (10 cases); woman-to-public (8 cases), which transmits information in a broader sense from woman-to-woman; and women-to the-international-community (9 cases), by which we mean transmittal between women from country to country. In 15 cases, we find transmittal from a women’s organization to women, to the public, and to the government. In eight cases, we have multimodal information transmission. In all cases, we do not yet have a count of how many women are reached, nor do we have a grasp of the reach from community to community. Since we can draw no substantive conclusions, it appears that information transmission woman to woman, even across borders, is the primary pathway—but not the only modality of transmission.

Conclusions

We tentatively conclude that women in African countries are much more politically active and successful in obtaining political voice than those in the MENA. While we can speculate that the nature of Islam may have some correlation with this observation, in African countries, Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Animist women labor side by side to achieve peace and political voice.62 So perhaps it is culture and society that matter. The nature of society in the MENA is patrimonial, as is much but not all of sub-Saharan Africa. These issues are important but were not addressed in this study. What about the numbers of women in parliaments? It is well known that women serving in governments and parliaments in the MENA are members of elite families—not always the case in sub-Saharan countries. Yet, those numbers are small and not good measures of the viability of women’s political voice.

Another conclusion holds that women organizing themselves in civil society groups and reaching out to other women enjoy more success than those who work on their own. Some men are involved in promoting women’s rights, empowerment, and voice, but the vast majority of successful women’s movements are by women only and for women only. The next steps in this research, which will help answer questions regarding diffusion and success, involve creating and sending out a survey that will allow us to discern the numbers of women reached and their location. To the greatest extent possible, we will also gather geocoordinates so that we can analyze this data using ArcGIS software and network analysis to story-map the findings.

Notes

1. Linda L. Lindsey, Gender Roles: A Sociological Perspective, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2011), 55.

2. Ibid.

3. Valentine M. Moghadam, Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 1–2.

4. Ibid.

5. Nikki Craske, “Women’s Political Participation in Colonial Populares in Guadalajara, Mexico,” in “Viva”: Women and Popular Protest in Latin America, ed. Sarah A. Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood (London: Routledge, 1993), 112–35.

6. M. Bahati Kuumba, Gender and Social Movements (Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2001), 20.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. See also Margaret Randall, Sandino’s Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle (Toronto: New Star Books, 1981); and Jo Freeman, “The Origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 4 (January 1973): 792–811.

9. Kuumba, Gender and Social Movements, 52–53.

10. Ibid., 54.

11. Ibid., 56.

12. Moghadam, Modernizing Women, 5.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. “Issam Abdul-Hadi,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=2087; “Amneh Kamal Sulaiman,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peacewomen.org

/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=2114; and “Zahira Kamal,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peacewomen.org/eng/friedensfrauen

_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=2090.

17. “Issam Abdul-Hadi.”

18. “Amneh Kamal Sulaiman.”

19. “Zahira Kamal.”

20. “Angelica Edna Calo Livne,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peacewomen.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=357; and Neil Ryan Walsh, Judy Kuriansky, and Lorenzo Toppano, “Kites Fly for Peace: Staging Palestinian-Israeli Peace,” in Beyond Bullets and Bombs: Grassroots Peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians, ed. Judy Kuriansky (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 185–87.

21. “Angelica Edna Calo Livne.”

22. Walsh, Kuriansky, and Toppano, “Kites Fly for Peace,” 185–87.

23. “Rela Mazali,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peacewomen

.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=681.

24. Ronit Avni, “Just Vision: In Search of Israeli and Palestinian Morning-After Leadership,” in Kuriansky, Beyond Bullets and Bombs, 167–70.

25. “GPIW Mission,” Global Peace Initiative of Women, accessed 25 February 2014, https://www

.posibl.com/gpiw--global-peace-initiative-of-women/our-dream-is-to-see-the-mission--vision-of

-gpiw-realized-through-partnerships-with-conscious-people-and-organizations-15875289.

26. Dena Merriam, “The Peace Candle and Beyond: Women as Partners in Innovative Projects for Peace in the Middle East,” in Kuriansky, Beyond Bullets and Bombs, 287–92.

27. Dr. Zeina Zaatari, “Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa—Lebanon,” Freedom House, 14 October 2005, http://www.refworld.org/docid/47387b6c2f.html.

28. Sameena Nazir and Leigh Tomppert, eds., Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship and Justice (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 155.

29. “Bahia Hariri,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=1232.

30. “Bouthaina Shaaban,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=2371.

31. “Haifa Abu Ghazaleh,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=1249.

32. “Laurice Hlass,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=327.

33. “Lubna Al Qasimi,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=153; and “Tiba Al Maoli,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peacewomen.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien

_gefunden.php?WomenID=2374.

34. “Laila Nabih Alnamani,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=1121.

35. “Haifa Jamal Al-Lail,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=299.

36. No information on women leaders and women’s groups in Libya is available.

37. Lilia Ben Salem, “Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa 2010—Tunisia,” Freedom House, 3 March 2010, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b99011cc.html.

38. Mike Echel, “Egypt’s Leading Female Voice for Change Warns That Revolution Is Backsliding,” Christian Science Monitor, 5 October 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2012/1005

/Egypt-s-leading-female-voice-for-change-warns-that-revolution-is-backsliding.

39. “Women in the Egyptian Revolution: An Evolution of Rights,” National Public Radio, 13 July 2013, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=201851115; and Hend Kortam, “Women’s Rights Groups Demand End to Defamation Campaigns,” Daily News Egypt, 5 May 2013, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/05/05/womens-rights-groups-demand-end-to-defamation-campaigns/.

40. Kortam, “Women’s Rights Groups.”

41. Nadia Marzouki, “Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa 2010—Algeria,” Freedom House, 3 March 2010, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b99012676.html.

42. “Louisa Hanoun,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=2276.

43. “Fawzia Talout Meknassi,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peacewomen.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=2280.

44. “Najat M’jid,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=2003; and “Ms. Najat Maalla M’jid,” United Nations Human Rights, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues

/Children/Pages/NajatMjidMaalla.aspx.

45. Annie Chikwanha, “Women’s Bodily Integrity, Peace and Security in Africa: ‘How Do We Level the “Battlefields”?,’ ” in Regional Consultative Meeting Report, ed. Christine Butegwa and Solome Nakaweesi-Kimbugwe (Kampala, Uganda: Akina Mama wa Afrika, 2009), 11–13.

46. Ibid., 13.

47. Ibid., 17.

48. Dismus Nkunda, “My Mother Is a Man,” in Butegwa and Nakaweesi-Kimbugwe, Regional Consultative Meeting Report, 20.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. See Butegwa and Nakaweesi-Kimbugwe, Regional Consultative Meeting Report.

52. Ibid., 9.

53. Funmi Olonisakin, “Liberia,” in Arms to Fight, Arms to Protect: Women Speak Out about Conflict, ed. Olivia Bennett, Jo Bexley, and Kitty Warknock (London: Panos, 1996), 29–47.

54. United States Agency of International Development, Women and Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Agency of International Development, 2007), 11, http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work

/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/cmm_women_and_conflict_toolkit_december_2006.pdf.

55. “Liberia,” NGO Directory, National Women’s Commission, UN.org, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/ngodirectory/dest/countries/Liberia.htm.

56. Olonisakin, “Liberia,” 29–47.

57. “Amna Abd El Rahman Abd El Rasoul,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peacewomen.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID

=1034.

58. “Bakhita Mohmed Osman,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peacewomen.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=798.

59. “Fatima Ahmed Mohamed Ibrahim,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://1000peacewomen.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=804; and “Ester Kuku Rahal,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peacewomen.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=802.

60. “Rachael Nyadak Paul,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=810.

61. “Anita Batris Amiro,” PeaceWomen across the Globe, accessed 12 February 2014, http://www.1000peace

women.org/eng/friedensfrauen_biographien_gefunden.php?WomenID=1036.

62. Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 2007); and Lehman Gbowee and Leymah Gbowee with Carol Mithers, Mighty Be Our Powers: How Sisterhood, Prayer, and Sex Changed a Nation at War; A Memoir (New York: Beast Books, 2011).

Neopatrimonial African Capitalism?

Conceptual Adventures via John Kenneth Galbraith

Adam Sneyd, PhD*

*The author is an assistant professor in Political Science and the International Development Studies program at the University of Guelph, Canada. He conducts research on the political economy of commodities. Governing Cotton, his 2011 book in Palgrave Macmillan’s International Political Economy series, analyzed how globalization might be altering the linkages between cotton production and poverty across Africa south of the Sahara. He is currently writing a book on the geopolitics of cotton for Polity Press’s Resources series. Over the past few years, he has pursued research on commodity challenges in Cameroon

Scholars have a wealth of riches at their fingertips that can be used to cut through the froth associated with many of the journalistic first drafts of the history of Africa’s ostensible economic booms. However, some insightful sources that could potentially help them do so are much less obvious than others. This article explores the prospects for bolstering analyses of capitalism in Africa through engaging with an analytical supplier whose outputs have simply not yet penetrated the market for knowledge on African political economies. It asks what the writings of John Kenneth Galbraith can bring to analytical tool kits already populated with the intellectual legacies of social scientists such as Max Weber. In doing so, it argues that various approaches, concepts, and insights that Galbraith developed or popularized can enhance our understanding of dynamics associated with capitalism in Africa. Employed in tandem with attention to neopatrimonialism, Galbraith can correct overly static representations of African politics and broaden analyses of the exercise of economic power. Africa assuredly has many diverse “capitalisms,” and his considerations could potentially have greater applicability in contexts where market forces now durably compete with “big men” to be the drivers of political and economic life. That said, Galbraithian attention to corporate power—and to the conventional wisdom and to poverty—can shed light on numerous pan-African commonalities. Galbraith’s work can also be fruitfully applied to assessments of the evolution and dynamics of capitalism in particular country settings that have previously been portrayed as neopatrimonial “paradise.”

The article commences below with a brief review of the literature on neopatrimonialism. It then discusses possible pan-African entry points for Galbraith through employing aspects of Timothy M. Shaw’s outline of the contours of Africa’s apparent economic renaissance.1 The article then presents a preliminary case study of Cameroon’s agro-industrial sector. This brief case underscores how Galbraithian attention to only one component of Cameroon’s developing agrifood and natural-resource capitalism complements and expands upon analyses that focus primarily upon neopatrimonialism. To do so, it draws liberally upon evidence the author collected over a five-month period on five separate research trips to Cameroon conducted between June 2010 and December 2013. In particular, it makes use of participant and direct observation in the country’s development research community and of insights gleaned from many informal conversations with public officials and private-sector managers.2 The conclusion summarizes possible rationales for greater future attention to John Kenneth Galbraith in the African context.

Neopatrimonialism: An Exceptional Lens on African Politics

The conceptual elaboration of neopatrimonialism has not occurred in a vacuum. As with many other contested development concepts such as democracy or poverty, it has come into use and has been refined within a starkly divided research context. According to one of the concept’s leading proponents, scholars of African politics have tended to take one of two approaches. In Patrick Chabal’s estimation, adherents to the first of these have tended to employ theories often applied to the rest of the developing world in their studies of Africa’s political economies.3 For their part, members of the second grouping have been inclined to hold that Africa is an exception or a unique case requiring separate study and theoretical development. This latter camp has been the primary source of scholarship that has honed in on neopatrimonialism. It can legitimately claim to have secured the concept’s prominence in the literature on African development challenges—or at least in the half of it that treats Africa as a development exception.

At its most straightforward, then, neopatrimonial rule in modern African nation-states is understood to be particularly pervasive within otherwise legal or rational administrative systems and bureaucratic institutions.4 Patrimonial practices in these systems or institutions are defined as activities that pervert formally or officially allocated powers. Where they occur, official actions are twisted away from the genuine public interest and privately appropriated. Put another way, distinctions between the public and the private break down as the personal agendas of heads of state and government, ministers, elected representatives, permanent secretaries, regulators, and lesser functionaries infuse and distort their public duties. Among other lamentable outcomes, experts in this field hold that neopatrimonialism has been especially conducive to the development of personalized and highly autocratic systems of rule and in-group enrichment.5 These scholars have also contended that the persistence of this hybrid or parallel governance structure has entrenched patron-client networks as the modus operandi of political and economic business-as-usual in Africa. This MO has in turn driven the appropriation of credit, grant, tariff, and tax income streams as well as the misallocation or disappearance of these funds via personalized disbursements and final consumption: the “eating” that has fueled Jean-François Bayart’s “politics of the belly.”6

Even the most trenchant critics of analyses that play up neopatrimonialism recognize that, at its best, contributions to this literature can offer much more than cynical Afro-pessimism. Aaron deGrassi, for example, has emphasized that users and abusers of the concept have shown an appreciation for “politics as politics.”7 As such, in his estimation, they have contributed to efforts to buck the mainstream US-based political science trend of treating politics as a “subset of abstract” rational-actor models. DeGrassi and others have also lauded the stress that many contributors to this literature have placed on understanding the linkages among states, economies, and societies in particular African places. This emphasis has promoted the development, execution, and publication of country case studies and pan-African research that captures local nuances and general trends associated with the phenomenon. From this body of work, it is clear that scholars who underscore neopatrimonialism have made significant contributions to our understanding of at least four interrelated areas. They have carefully mapped informality and its relations to formal institutions, articulated the centrality and mechanics of resource-redistribution networks, drawn attention to the persistence of corruption and the resilience of impunity, and placed the politics and operations of the state at the core of the analysis of African challenges and opportunities.

Regarding the first broad contribution of this literature, the recognition that formal and informal institutions exist simultaneously in Africa has drawn useful attention to the factors that constrain and enable political, economic, and social development. It has helped to correct unidirectional discourses within and beyond academia that considered African political economies essentially “dysfunctional.”8 In particular, Goran Hyden’s detailed effort to map the quasi institutionalization of informal practices in the context of big-man rule is a key contribution to understanding the mechanics of contemporary African economic governance.9 Through juxtaposing and elaborating the parallel presence of formal and informal African market norms regarding the type of exchange (impersonal versus face-to-face), the approach to rules (rule of law versus rules in use), the nature of exchange (contractual versus noncontractual), and other fundamentals of economic transactions, Hyden has enabled a reinterpretation of economic failure in Africa. In this light, specific African shortcomings or achievements can in theory now be linked to the relatively “successful” operation of particular informal or formal institutions. Articulation of this complex reality has challenged narratives that explicitly assert or implicitly assume that greater reliance on formal (Western) market governance norms will necessarily increase the frequency or extent of development “wins.” In the context of the intense new investor interest rigorously documented in the pages of Jeune Afrique, This Is Africa, African Business, and elsewhere, this contribution emphasizes that African political economies are highly differentiated. There is simply no guarantee concerning which particular aspect of the hybrid governance grammar will dominate where and when. As such, Hyden’s analytical tools could also be used to situate and contextualize the development prospects of Africa’s surging growth and the associated optimism in the business press.

Studies of neopatrimonialism have also made a significant contribution to understandings of resource-redistribution systems. In doing so, they have helped refine what exactly is unique about neopatrimonialism and have furthered the conceptual elaboration of associated or subsidiary phenomena such as clientelism, patronage, resource pooling, and self-defense systems, among others. At their best, contributors to this literature have distinguished the ways that neopatrimonial practice differs from patrimonial exchange relations.10 They have shown that the new aspect of patrimonialism in Africa is that exchanges between “big” and “little” men are generally no longer conducted on face-to-face bases. These exchanges are now typically executed through networks of brokers that link centers of political and economic power to outlying areas and vice versa. Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel have also drawn attention to the need for analysts to move away from using concepts such as clientelism and patronage interchangeably.11 They have implored contributors to the literature to recognize that patronage entails politically motivated and highly symbolic exchanges between individuals in positions of power to influence groups. On the other hand, clientelism, in their view, should be used to denote classic closed asymmetric exchanges between unequal individuals.12 Moreover, from William Reno’s work, we also know that resource-redistribution systems do not only suck resources from formal economic activities.13 In some cases, these systems are much more than rent-seeking pursuits that aim to manipulate the social or political context within which formal economic activities take place. Reno has shown that big men in various contexts have made many “successful” efforts to control economic activities through pushing them into the informal sector. The active informalization of markets has enabled high-level gatekeepers to distribute access to opportunities that would not have otherwise existed and to exercise greater control over populations subject to these measures.

The literature on neopatrimonialism has also enhanced our knowledge of how impunity continues to be fostered in the context of systemic corruption—and ultimately our knowledge of the nature of political power in Africa. On the former, contributors have documented the ways that postcolonial administrative systems have underperformed (or performed, depending on one’s point of view) vis-à-vis corruption.14 Scholars have shown the extent to which hybrid states have not assured the independence of anticorruption commissions and judiciaries and the pervasive “corruption with impunity” that has resulted.15 On the latter, we now know that political power is often “personal power” and that politics is typically considered a kind of business.16 We also know that these factors work against the emergence of issue-based political campaigns and the capacity, predictability, and reliability of governance institutions. Finally, from Chabal, we know more about the complexity and covert nature of all kinds of informal systems that contribute to giving “African political systems” certain relatively distinct features.17

This is not to say that analyses of neopatrimonialism in Africa have been perfect. Contributors to this literature have been called out for occasionally assuming a priori that neopatrimonialism is a consistently prominent phenomenon across each of Africa’s 54 sovereign states. Texts that have characterized African politics as essentially neopatrimonial in nature—and those that have used the term as a catchall explanation for Africa’s development challenges—have also been subject to increasing challenge.18 Additionally, critics have raised pointed questions about the empirical grounding of this literature. They have claimed that there simply have not been enough studies of neopatrimonialism to justify the pan-continental application of this concept. Some have also played up the inherent methodological challenges associated with observing and explaining informal activities.19 In so doing, they have underscored the difficulties of obtaining reliable data on patron-client relations and have raised the specter that some scholars in this context have been prone to stretch or misapply this concept. Critics have also leveled charges of Eurocentrism. Several have detected undertones of Western superiority in accounts that have associated neopatrimonialism with acute political disorder in Africa and that have implicitly assumed that the rolling out of “advanced” rational-legal bureaucracies would be innately preferable to the status quo.20

Finally—and perhaps most relevant to the purpose of this article—some critics have also decried what they see as a tendency for contributors to this literature to be self-referential. DeGrassi has characterized the insiders or cognoscenti in this field as an epistemic community. He has raised problems with the ways that the collective gaze of this group has obscured other political and social institutions that might be consequential for Africa’s development. Evidence for this characterization can be found in the recent calls to bring other “institutions back into the study” of Africa. In pushing for more historical and institutionalist explanations of African politics and a broadening of the community’s focus, scholars such as Stephen Orvis have underscored the intellectual perils of the group’s near-exclusive concentration on the development of a master concept.21

Applying Galbraith to Africa’s Political Economies

This article acts upon critical calls for greater attention to institutions through applying concepts associated with a celebrated economic institutionalist to a context which has typically been subjected to approaches that put politics first and that concentrate on neopatrimonialism. If deGrassi’s efforts to remedy the evident shortcomings of this literature have been to engage with another distinct body of work—scholarship on African agriculture—then this approach goes much further afield. It is essentially a preliminary attempt to seed the terrain with a few ideas about how to analyze Africa that might bear fruit but that would not otherwise bloom within a relatively gated epistemic community. The drive to apply several of J. K. Galbraith’s concepts to Africa and to Cameroon is rooted in the view that neopatrimonialism has a further shortcoming. Put simply, the self-referential quality of this scholarship has to date continued to preclude the introduction of concepts that could strengthen its analysis of economic power. All roads in this literature, so to speak, have led to the president. It is hoped that employing concepts previously underutilized in the African context could elucidate economic power dynamics that often fly under the radar in politics-first analyses. Through applying these ideas in a country that has been of particular concern to the cognoscenti in the next section, it is also hoped that something can be added to the work that has already been done on the contingent and context-specific neopatrimonial realities of political power in Cameroon.22

Through embracing a political economy premise, the article also aims to move beyond a static focus on political conditions and to shed analytical light on the budding dynamism of Africa’s (and Cameroon’s) political economies.23 The activities, interests, and linkages between highly entrepreneurial and globally oriented businesspeople on a continental scale are ripe for the application of a Galbraithian lens. Without a doubt, other great Western thinkers have been similarly imported or taken out of context and fruitfully applied to Africa. Hegel, Hobbes, Malthus, and especially Marx and Weber have informed various approaches to the studies of stagnation and the state in Africa. The question, then, is why scholars have continued to restrictively employ the legacy (or interpretations of the legacy) of the same select group of classic and more recent intellectuals. There are many stalwarts of a more modern vintage whose work in other contexts could be drawn upon to enrich analyses of conditions and prospects in the African Century. The attempt to draw upon aspects of one of those vintages articulated below should not be considered an effort to substitute a flawed master concept with an imperfect handful. Rather, this exercise aspires to fill in a few blanks through cherry-picking and employing pieces of Galbraith’s legacy.

Interestingly, Africanists who have concentrated on neopatrimonialism are not the only Africanist scholars who have not yet attempted to pick any low-hanging fruit from this garden. Among the political-economy-of-development crowd—Chabal’s other group of scholars seeking to understand African politics through employing theories that do not exclusively apply to Africa—even rigorous recent contributions to scholarship have not explicitly drawn upon Galbraith.24 This oversight is lamentable, but it is also understandable, given that Galbraith’s views on American capitalism and on military and corporate power are better known than his perspectives on mass poverty. That said, his assessment of the former is as germane as the latter is to a rough first cut at a Galbraithian take on Africa and on Cameroon.

Galbraith offers a wealth of potential points of departure from which one could attempt to understand the world of political economic power that is increasingly escaping the grasp of big men in Africa. Aspects of his life’s work direct our attention to the exercise of power that takes place beyond the strings which connect economic activities and those with ministerial responsibility to presidents, their immediate and extended families, their kin, and their real or imagined communities. To start, however, it must be recognized that this attempt to apply Galbraith in a new spatial and temporal context could pose the same sorts of problems that critics have flagged vis-à-vis efforts to import Weber’s patrimonialism to Africa. The notion that this towering figure of twentieth-century Western economic thought could apply at some level in Africa today assumes that his ideas might be workable. Similarly, efforts to resurrect his insights could suffer considerable shortcomings as regards methodology. Users of Galbraith—including the present author—could resort to anecdotal evidence in the absence of difficult-to-obtain hard or reliable data. Moreover, if others were indeed convinced to integrate some of his concepts into their work, there are no guarantees that the ensuing literature would avoid the self-referential qualities noted above.

Given these warnings, at the theoretical level, it seems that certain dimensions of the purported African “renaissance” offer sound rationales for at least considering greater engagement with Galbraith. Timothy M. Shaw has provided a commendable framework for mapping the contours of this renaissance. His work offers a handy guide to possible Galbraithian points of entry on a pan-African scale.25 For starters, if increasing numbers of African states can be characterized as “developmental,” as Shaw suggests, then it is possible that Galbraith’s concept of countervailing power could have many more potential applications.26 In Africa’s rising economies, consumer, nongovernmental, and worker efforts to challenge or countervail the control that organized economic power exerts over prices or costs are now prominent features of the political economic landscape. The recent South African mining actions and several successful civil society-backed consumer campaigns in stable African states attest that corporate power is being challenged in a growing number of countries where the threat of state failure has receded.

As increasing numbers of public and private companies controlled by or listed in a more diverse array of countries pursue direct investments in Africa, Galbraith can help us understand the similarities and differences between the priorities of these firms and, as a consequence, their possibly divergent implications for development. Put simply, his attention to both the protective (earnings) and affirmative (growth) purposes that managers serve enhances our capacity to draw better distinctions between direct investors involved in the new scramble.27

Take, for example, the recent engagements of the Airbus Group (formerly the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company) in Tunisia and of South Africa’s Tiger Brands in Nigeria.28 In the case of the former, Airbus Group has relocated an assembly plant to a special economic zone, primarily to control its costs and thereby ensure earnings. This investment from a corporation accustomed to exercising a significant degree of control over its suppliers and buyers can be characterized as serving a protective or defensive purpose. Given the protective underpinnings, the prospects for the development of forwards or backwards linkages from this plant differ considerably from those that might be associated with an investment linked more concretely to the growth of the firm through the expansion of sales. For its part, when the agro-industrial Tiger Brands acquired a majority stake in Nigeria’s Dangote Flour Mills in 2012, growth was the primary motivator. Through this acquisition, Tiger Brands essentially sought to secure a foothold in one of the fastest-growing consumer markets on the continent. It now commands a platform from which it can seek to increase sales through employing its proven power to persuade consumers to eat more packaged foods. This transaction has enhanced the prestige of Tiger’s management and will foster the expansion of Nigerian advertising and distribution firms downstream. The development implications of Tiger’s aggressive posture stand in stark contrast to those associated with the defensive and potentially footloose Airbus investment. Attention to these Galbraithian considerations consequently enables the prospects of the current foreign direct investment (FDI) “renaissance” to be mapped more clearly. His insights on management priorities could facilitate the development of more context-specific and contingent answers to Shaw’s pertinent question about just whom the African awakening currently serves.

Galbraith’s analyses of the multiple dimensions of economic power wielded by corporate bureaucracies can also be used as a tool to differentiate the many “varieties” of corporations that operate across the continent. These varieties are increasingly striking and are worthy of a brief, if incomplete, snapshot:

- • South African retailer Massmart has become a creature of Wal-Mart.

- • The Algerian (Sonatrach) and Angolan (Sonagol) state-owned oil and gas companies, respectively, command the largest and second-largest turnovers of any enterprises incorporated on the continent.

- • Many of Morocco’s national champions remain “family affairs.”

- • Through acquisitions or greenfield investments, publicly traded global telecommunications groups (France Telecom / Orange), consumer and capital goods producers (Nestlé, P&G, SAB Miller, GE), privately held shipping firms (CMA CGM), and transnational commodity traders (Cargill, Olam) have established, expanded, or are in the process of launching large subsidiaries.

- • Junior Australian, Canadian, and Chinese (state-controlled) mining firms have led a rush to create new joint ventures.

- • An expansionary Togolese bank (Ecobank) now prominently preaches the virtues of “pan-Africanism” in its public relations while global banks (Barclays) and members of the African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association—including the Abraaj Group, Helios Partners, and Bob Geldof’s 8 Miles—pursue buyouts across the continent.

Although not all of these “varieties” of corporate entities aim to serve African buyers or consumers, all ultimately are engaged in efforts that seek to secure or grow returns from the sale of goods or services. This reality constitutes a Galbraithian entry point. As more great organizations wish to protect and/or expand their earnings in more African places, one can readily apply Galbraith’s efforts to show that power in economic and political life lies increasingly less with the “supposedly sovereign consumer” or citizen.29 In particular, his insight that the very biggest corporations exercise considerable power over their prices, costs, consumers, suppliers, and governors can be employed to differentiate and develop taxonomies of the corporate milieu noted above. Future cross-sectoral or comparative case studies of corporations that attempt to distinguish companies based upon their capacities to control prices, costs, consumers, suppliers, and governors could yield a more robust picture of the opportunities and challenges facing efforts to make Africa’s economic revival more inclusive.

Recent research has indeed touched upon some of these considerations. Studies of the global agriculture industry and of corporate standards and social responsibility in this sector have shown us how corporate power is typically exercised over African agriculturalists and consumers of African products elsewhere.30 There is also a voluminous literature on corporate power and the extractive industry and its implications for governments, citizens, and consumers. That said, less has been written about the power exercised by expansionary retailers and service providers on a pan-continental basis, and no attempt has yet been made to map the multiple dimensions of Galbraith’s “forest” of corporate control and its implications for consumer sovereignty in Africa. Given the recent surge of efforts to influence consumption—such as the 2009 Helios-led buyout of a billboard company with a presence in at least 14 African countries—this oversight is no small matter. As increasing attention is drawn to the projection that the African population will grow from less than one billion people today to over two billion by 2050, it no longer seems appropriate to only scratch the surface of understanding the various varieties of companies.31 The capacity of African firms and global firms in Africa to control costs, plan prices, and influence consumers, governments, and suppliers varies within and between the agricultural, consumer, energy, industrial, mining, service, and telecommunication sectors. Recourse to Galbraith’s tool kit in particular places or on a pan-African scale could shed further light on this complexity.

With regard to another of Shaw’s renaissance contours, Galbraith also enriches analyses of Africa’s new and evermore intensive and extensive financial and trade relations with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and other emerging powers within and beyond Africa. He consistently argued that market power can be exercised by strong buyers against weak sellers as well as by strong sellers against weak buyers and that efforts to countervail this power are typically a self-generating force.32 In this light, it is not at all surprising that in 2013 the governor of Nigeria’s central bank interrupted a relatively consistent stream of fawning global business media coverage on China in Africa with an inconvenient comment.33 Encouraging Africans to “wake up” to the neocolonial reality of financial and trade relations with China, Lamido Sanusi urged Africans to fight their status vis-à-vis China as weak sellers of raw materials and weak buyers of consumer goods. To do so, he advised Africans to produce more of what they consume and to consume more of what they produce. Sanusi’s intervention was indicative of a bubbling undercurrent of thought on structural transformation that is only starting to coalesce into a movement to countervail the incipient power of Africa’s emerging financiers and traders.

Another of Galbraith’s political concepts—the concept of conventional wisdom—can be employed to explain the seeming lag of high-level government and business community push-back against the disproportionate strength of Africa’s new buyers and sellers. Why have African leaders seemingly greeted numerous high-quality and highly critical civil society and scholarly outputs on the topic with a shrug? How is it that repeated International Monetary Fund warnings about the threats associated with Africa’s possible overreliance on debt-fueled investments in export-oriented infrastructure have been sloughed off? The Galbraithian answer is that “considerable ritual and sanction” has guided African officials or private-sector professionals to “acceptable” interpretations of the unfolding of events.34 From the mutual praise and respect offered by officials at the various Summits of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation through the spirited and much-lauded defense of China in Africa offered up by Dambisa Moyo at the 2013 Mining Indaba, the climate of insider, practitioner, and “accepted” opinion has been unequivocally enthusiastic. As with other accepted patterns of thought and belief in social groups, members of this elite policy community have had strong professional incentives to believe in the conventional wisdom that China’s African engagements should be celebrated. Sanusi’s comment and a series of other intellectual contributions that run counter to this conventional wisdom have been snubbed. Yet, as Galbraith reminds, it remains a distinct probability that a confluence of events or tipping point of contrary knowledge will ultimately outstrip the usefulness of the currently acceptable interpretation.35 The dam of accepted commentary that currently holds back greater discussion of what is relevant as regards China is not impenetrable. An organized cadre of policy makers, civil servants, regulators, chief executives, bankers, and other potential investors seeking to countervail China’s economic power could put the axe to a barrage that civil society and academic heretics have been chipping away at for some time.

Beyond China, other BRICS and emerging powers such as Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have been greeted with similar waves of African and global applause. Galbraith’s incisive points on the myth of the sovereign consumer and on inequality and poverty enable the contextualization of such praise. These concepts can also be utilized to peel back the dynamics associated with the rise of these powers as sellers, investors, and financiers. On consumption, for example, the bulk of his “writing suggested [that] the obsession with private commodity consumption was an important cultural obstacle to progress.”36 As increasing numbers of firms based in the BRICS or other emerging markets execute their plans to sell more products in Africa, their activities bear increasingly upon consumer preferences. New armies of market researchers and testers, ad developers, sales and merchandising specialists, and product innovators and designers are being deployed across the continent. Their efforts aim to exercise to the extent possible the admittedly “imperfect” power that producers can wield over individual consumers.37 Galbraith’s insight that there are “important difference[s] between the general acquisition of tastes through social interaction and the systematic imposition of tastes to fit the needs of powerful vested interests” is especially germane in this context.38

The possibility that big-time sellers of any national or global origin are influencing consumer attitudes and even creating new wants among down-market, middle-class, and high-end consumers in ways that serve protective or affirmative corporate interests cannot be rejected out of hand. If some of these interventions foster new consumer obsessions, they could come at a significant opportunity cost for development—the diversion of disposable incomes away from individual savings or expenditures more demonstrably aligned with national or international social-development objectives. That said, consumer manias are not necessarily costly. Community and social enterprises, for-profit small and medium-sized entities, nonprofits, cooperatives, and bigger firms that peddle wares tailored to serve genuine individual or household needs can cater to real demand. To reiterate, African consumers are not necessarily marionettes. Big sellers of cold drinks, durable goods, housewares, luxury goods, personal-care products, and snacks are simply doing much more these days to affix a few strings to their backs. In a Galbraithian light, then, Africa’s vaunted mobile and information and communication technology revolution should not be viewed as a unidirectional engine of consumer choice.39 It too is a source of new strings. As a new consumer class rises through access to these technologies, it does so along a two-way street that has opened up many new possibilities for corporate persuasion and control.

Regarding inequality and poverty, Galbraith’s work in this area could assist efforts to assess and differentiate the footprint of direct investments and of imports and exports linked to emerging and more traditional powers. If his studies of American capitalism belied the notion that the “economic system has a tendency to perfect itself,” his writing on unequal development showed that the “system” tends to perpetuate inequitable and unequal outcomes.40 While Galbraith’s writing in this area was not highly original, he wrote with clarity and incisiveness to relate the factors that tend to keep poor people poor. In particular, he adhered to a variant of the poverty-trap perspective on the vicious poverty circle that impoverished people often confront. Referring to this negative feedback loop as an equilibrium of poverty, he argued that those scraping by at subsistence levels could not save enough to invest in innovative practices or technologies that would increase their incomes. In his estimation, any improvement in income among the poorest of the poor was more often than not “nakedly exposed to the [urgent] pressures of consumption.”41 Galbraith built upon his view that “an increase in income could set in motion the forces that would eliminate the increase and restore the previous level of deprivation” through discussing what he considered the principal factor that reinforced this feedback loop: the “absence of aspiration” in poor communities. He argued that “the poor . . . accommodate to their poverty,” just as the affluent “have accommodated their thoughts and expectations” to increasing income.42 In his view, poor people tended to rationally acquiesce to tough luck, but he noted that some even in the worst circumstances will not accommodate and will push to escape their poverty traps. Ultimately, Galbraith’s insights on both the equilibrium of poverty and on accommodation can be readily applied to the analysis of contemporary African knowledge challenges such as the need to know more about the poverty impacts of the growth of FDI inflows in 2012 to nearly $46 billion US.43

Returning to Shaw’s map, we can productively apply Galbraith to at least one further dynamic of the African Century. Regarding the “uneven regional incidence and impacts of the latest ‘global’ financial crisis,” Galbraith facilitates greater understanding of the possible implications of the new Afro-optimist narrative that the continent is fast becoming the global growth engine.44 As echoes of the crisis continue to resonate, the perception that Africa is booming builds upon the reality that most of the continent’s financial services firms have emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed. As such, a Galbraithian supposition in the present context would be that some of Africa’s banks (to greater or lesser extents) might have bypassed the postcrash surge of more intensive and extensive bank audits that occurred at the epicenter of the crisis. If research were to confirm the hypothesis that certain big African banking institutions have been subject to comparatively less oversight as new portfolio investments continue to pour in, then conditions could be auspicious for nominal growth in what Galbraith termed the bezzle: the stock of undiscovered embezzlement in the system.45 From this point of view, it is probable that spectacular growth in stock prices, in indices that track Africa’s frontier markets, and in Afro-speculation more generally has fueled a surge in the number of individuals who knowingly or otherwise emulate the methods of fraudsters such as Bernard Madoff or Ramalinga Raju. Simply put, Galbraith shows that market forces endogenously generate the bezzle. As such, embezzlement in Africa should not be exclusively viewed through the lens of neopatrimonialism: it can also be a market-driven phenomenon executed independently of relations to political power.

To reiterate, the literature on neopatrimonialism has placed patron-client relations at the core of the analysis of politics in Africa. It has eschewed abstract econometric modeling, mapped the simultaneous existence of formal and informal institutions, and highlighted the importance of redistribution networks linked to centers of political power. In so doing, it has provided an explanation for the resilience or persistence of corruption and presented considerable evidence which suggests that the state in Africa functions in unique ways. Galbraith, for his part, has directed attention to the exercise of market power and the efforts of those that are subjected to such power to countervail it. He has encouraged the analysis of management priorities and called for more assessments of the ways that big firms attempt to control their prices and consumers, influence their costs and their suppliers, and sway those that seek to govern their activities. He has also left us with the concept of conventional wisdom, an explanation for the persistence of poverty, and the idea that markets can self-generate embezzlement and fraud.

A Preliminary Application: Galbraith Goes to Cameroon

This section links the two somewhat disconnected conceptual discussions presented above. It does so through applying analytical insights from both to Cameroon’s political economy. Ultimately, it is argued below that attention to neopatrimonial realities—and to Galbraithian considerations—can fuel the development of more comprehensive understandings of the evolution and dynamics of capitalism in Cameroon than exclusive reliance on either approach. The presentation commences with a discussion of the country’s economic dynamism and then proceeds to briefly recount political phenomena that scholars of Cameroonian politics are quite familiar with: patron-client relations, formal and informal institutions, redistribution networks, and corruption. Subsequently, Galbraithian concepts are applied to a brief case study of Cameroon’s agrifood sector. The ensuing discussion hones in on market power and efforts to countervail this power and concludes with a few anecdotes on conventional wisdom and poverty maintenance. Through first recounting Cameroon’s political system and then the politics of corporate power in one of its economic sectors, this approach provides a picture of Cameroon’s political economy that is hopefully more nuanced than a politics-first or a solely economistic framework. Spatial considerations ensure that what follows is far from a complete analysis; it is simply a rough sketch of possible entry points to future theoretical and conceptual development.

To start it must be noted that capitalism in Cameroon is increasingly dynamic. This statement might seem counterintuitive, given that the national refinery (Sonara) and national petroleum company SNH remain the two biggest enterprises in the country.46 Cameroon’s continued dependence on its traditional low-value-added export basket of oil, timber products, cocoa, rubber, tea, cotton, bananas, and other commodities also appears to belie this statement.47 Nonetheless, these relatively static realities of income and wealth generation are not the whole story as regards the prospects for Cameroon’s political economy. Changes associated with flows of finance, trade, and direct investment over the past decade have started to shake up Cameroonian business-as-usual. On the former, loans from China Exim Bank have enabled the launch of numerous infrastructure projects, including construction of a new dam and a deepwater port, as well as widening of the principal highway between Douala, the commercial capital, and Yaoundé, the political capital. Beyond China, other “nontraditional” or emerging market sources of finance have facilitated the government’s drive to increase the stock of social housing in big urban centers and to pursue its other investment priorities.

In addition to Cameroon’s greater reliance on a more diverse array of foreign creditors, considerable shifts have also occurred in the composition and origin of the country’s imports. The relatively staid trade in European-origin agricultural equipment that dominated the Douala market for decades, for example, has fallen by the wayside. Fierce competition to sell lower-cost like products now prevails between importers and retailers of Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian-origin farm equipment.48 Similarly, cheap Chinese-origin motorbikes have largely relegated the Japanese competition to the low-volume higher end of the market and have undercut demand for used-vehicle imports. This change has been associated with a shift in income-generating opportunities as motorcycle taxis compete for business with the country’s shared taxi systems. Surging imports of genuine and knockoff versions of leading brand-name and down-market appliances, electronics, handsets, housewares, and clothing have also fundamentally altered the nature of retailing in the country. As the local supply of industrially produced consumer goods and jobs has dwindled, small-scale informal trading has become a source of considerable entrepreneurship.49 Numbers of small and medium-sized enterprises have accordingly grown, and numerous start-ups have been launched that have aimed to substitute specific imports with locally produced goods. For their part, new entrants in e-commerce have fundamentally altered the ways that many Cameroonians search for and procure higher-value foreign-origin products. As commercial and travel needs have surged in this context, Turkish Airlines has entered the market, and competition to challenge the dominance of Delmas Cameroun, a subsidiary of shipping group CMA CGM, has heated up in Douala.

As regards dynamism associated with FDI, Cameroon is now nurturing an embryonic mining sector. In 2012 the government became a participant in the multistakeholder Kimberley process diamond certificate scheme and subsequently launched production of industrial-grade diamonds through C&K Mining, its joint venture with South Korea. It also signed a mining convention with Cam Iron, a subsidiary of Australian-based Sundance Resources, to develop a massive iron ore project situated at Mbalam near the border with Congo-Brazzaville. Sundance seeks to tap the capital market to pursue this $4.7 billion US project and to secure partners to build the associated rail line and dedicated export terminal. FDI in agriculture has also been scaled up. A presidential decree has permitted Sud-Cameroun Hévéa, a subsidiary of the Singapore-listed plantation group GMG Global (a group that is itself majority-owned by Sinochem International), to develop a rubber plantation near the president’s ancestral village of Mvomeka’a. SG Sustainable Oils (SGSOC), a subsidiary of Herakles Farms (an affiliate of New York–based Herakles Capital), is also controversially developing a 20,000-hectare oil palm plantation in the country’s southwest region.50

Beyond land acquisitions, Somdiaa, a diversified agro-industrial firm, has made considerable investments in the process and production methods and capacities of its Cameroonian subsidiaries in sugar (Sosucam) and in wheat (SGMC). Foreign interest in developing the country’s capacity to clean and roast cocoa beans and to produce cocoa liquor and butter has also emerged. Additionally, prominent greenfield investments have also been made by foreign firms in other sectors. Nigerian-based Dangote has constructed a cement plant, and the Cameroonian subsidiary of Viettel has become the country’s third mobile network operator after South African MTN and France Telecom’s Orange Cameroun subsidiary.

Concepts associated with the literature on neopatrimonialism direct attention to the politics of the statics and dynamics of Cameroonian capitalism. In the immediate postindependence era through the early 1980s, President Ahmadou Ahidjo, a northerner and Muslim of Fulani descent, pushed for economic development through the pursuit of import-substitution industrialization. As this objective was put into practice, a vast patronage network that linked Cameroon’s linguistically and culturally diverse provinces to the center of political power emerged and thrived. Even so, a perception developed among many of the country’s 250 distinct ethnic groups that the Ahidjo regime’s strategy had favored northerners engaged in business and traditional rulers from the north who had become leading government figures. As Paul Biya, a Christian from the south, subsequently took power and applied liberal prescriptions to the economy from the mid-1980s, he directly challenged Ahidjo’s system. President Biya systematically shut the old regime’s clients out of positions of power and created new income and wealth-generating opportunities for southerners. In particular, new big men from the south gained access to credit, and “kleptocracy” (government by thieves) ensued as loans were not repaid, local banks failed, and hundreds of billions of Central African (CFA) francs leaked abroad.51 Subsequent privatizations also afforded many of the Biya regime’s cronies with new opportunities to produce and capture economic rents as they “ate” (asset stripped) former state-owned enterprises.

The emergence and perseverance of a southern-centric resource-distribution network over the past three decades have had considerable implications for the development of Cameroon’s northern regions. The persistence of food insecurity in the North and Extreme North, for example, is indicative of the externalities bred by the southern power base. While these regions experienced climate-related seasonal food-availability shortfalls prior to southern dominance, chronic malnutrition and poverty have become entrenched on pan-seasonal bases across the rural north in areas where these conditions were less prominent in the past.52 Moreover, if the World Bank’s numbers are to be believed, rich southerners who live in cities have been the primary beneficiaries of the government’s moves to subsidize fuel and suspend import duties on frozen fish, rice, and wheat in the wake of the global food crisis of 2008 and the outbreak of food-related riots.53 This urban bias—a trend first identified by Nicolas van de Walle—has also been compounded through a related government response to stock imported foods and hold periodic markets that sell food at prices targeted to undercut going market rates.54 In the aftermath of a preventable elephant slaughter at Bouba N’Djida national park and a spate of assassinations and abductions linked to foreign Islamists in 2012–13, Yaoundé was also criticized for failing to adequately address other northern challenges such as porous frontiers and social exclusion. Several northerners continue to be captains of industries such as beef and have also been permitted to become noteworthy political figures, but these personalities have not had strong incentives to address growing interregional inequity. Big-man politics in Cameroon have thus far seemed to endogenously generate such unbalanced outcomes.

The neopatrimonial notion that formal and informal institutions coexist in Cameroon similarly sheds light on a world of political economic thought and action that might otherwise remain cloaked in darkness. For instance, although the country is formally bilingual, the informal reality is that English speakers have long been second-class citizens. Anglophone civil servants with leadership potential have historically been shifted around the country to languish in lower-level positions, and the state-controlled education and media systems have aggressively promoted the use of French.55 On another and perhaps even more consequential front, broad swathes of the potential electorate now consider Cameroon’s formal elections a facade.56 President Biya has been in power for over three decades, and it has been more than 20 years since both Anglophones and Muslims in the western and northern regions rejected the results of the first multiparty election that returned him to power to no avail. Political “exhaustion,” “cynicism,” and apathy have set in with growth of the perception that informal power has perverted the official electoral system.57 Along parallel lines, the National Anti-Corruption Commission and corruption crusaders more generally continue to be subject to informal attempts to discredit, marginalize, and otherwise distort their work.58 In the aftermath of the leveling of corruption allegations at the president’s son Franck Biya in late 2012, for instance, contributors to state-controlled media ostensibly competed with each other to bring these claims into disrepute.

Correspondingly, the presidency’s campaign to root out high-level grand corruption, code-named Opération Épervier (Operation Sparrow Hawk), has been subject to ongoing political manipulation. Sparrow Hawk has implicated former prime ministers, secretaries-general of the presidency, ministers, and directors and managers of state-controlled agencies, firms, and regulatory bodies in several dozen cases of serious fraud and embezzlement. Over a dozen of these cases have now been tried in front of a judiciary that has been far from independent.59 Whether or not the anticorruption campaign itself has slowed the frequency of corrupt acts or reduced the number of undiscovered scams in the system (the bezzle) is simply not known. What can be said with certainty, however, is that in light of this reality, many average Cameroonians are questioning why they are paying taxes to a government that continues to chop or devour their money.60 As noted above, contributions to the political science literature typically treat Cameroon as a veritable neopatrimonial paradise. Very strong reasons exist for continuing to do so. But there are other reasons to think outside the box.

Galbraith famously drew attention to the implications of the market power wielded by the very biggest high-technology, industrial, and financial firms in the United States for the competitive model of the economy. In his estimation, the business of agriculture fell very much within the bounds of the old free-market model that no longer seemed to apply to the operations of the US air and space, automobile, banking, and defense industries. It might therefore come as a surprise for those familiar with Galbraith that his insights can be readily applied to the agro-industrial sector in Cameroon.

In addition to the major players noted above (SGMC, SGSOC, and Sosucam), the sector includes the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), the country’s biggest employer and most diversified plantation-to-table agribusiness. The CDC’s 2011 turnover of $143 million US was about double that of Socapalm, an extensive oil palm operation that is a subsidiary of the Bolloré group.61 SA (société anonyme) des brasseries du Cameroun, a brewery with a turnover nearly four times greater than the CDC’s, also falls within this sector, given its strong backwards linkages to domestic maize. La Société de développement du coton (Sodecoton), Nestlé Cameroun, and the Ferme Suisse oil palm operation round out the principal agro-industrial firms. Additionally, subsidiaries of global commodities traders such as Louis Dreyfus and Olam now source Cameroonian commodities, and Cargill, Sime Darby, and several other plantation specialists are considering investments in industrial-scale oil palm production and processing. Due to the fact that rubber firms are technically labeled as forestry companies, the operations of GMG’s two subsidiaries (Hévécam and the new Hévéa Sud) do not fall into this category. That said, their operations and those of the country’s new miners as well as its biggest foreign buyers and sellers could also be amenable to Galbraithian treatment.

Briefly then, many firms in Cameroon’s agro-industry have made extensive efforts to control their costs through nonmarket means. Those that have been granted new concessions for the production of foodstuffs over the past few years, for example, have pushed successfully to keep the fixed costs associated with their land leases and annual taxes below the averages paid in other sectors.62 Olivier De Schutter, the United Nations special rapporteur on the right to food, has also drawn attention to the human rights abuses that have ensued in places where plantation operators have made overzealous efforts to rein in costs associated with alleged crop theft. Worker efforts to organize have also been actively suppressed on numerous plantations where low labor costs currently prevail. Furthermore, most large agro-industrial firms have embraced only the lowest-possible-cost voluntary environmental standards or approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR) to mitigate or eliminate their externalities.63 On this front, SGSOC, for example, notably pulled out of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil in 2012. This firm now executes a go-it-alone approach to CSR through an in-house foundation. Firms in this sector have also sought to circumvent the one-off and recurrent costs of legal and regulatory compliance through wining, dining, and ultimately capturing ministers and regulators in Yaoundé. Taken together, the exertion of control over costs has predictably spawned a countervailing power. Community-based organizations, civil society groups, and supportive academics, lawyers, and policy advocates have coalesced into a movement that seeks to challenge the power of agribusinesses to minimize costs.64 Although the particular manifestations of this countervailing power have not yet dented cost-control efforts, they have entrenched an alternative wellspring of information and built a supportive global network.

Firms that produce industrial foodstuffs have similarly strived to control their prices. They have pushed hard for the maintenance or expansion of tariff regimes to protect their efforts to substitute prepared food imports with local products. For instance, Alexandre Vilgrain—president of the French Council of Investors in Africa and president and director general of Somdiaa, the parent of Sosucam—made prominent public calls for tariff escalation in favor of industrial food interests early in 2013. Behind the scenes, other Douala-based firms that produce processed, canned, or packaged foods have also sought formal and informal measures to exclude imports of cheaper European- and Asian-origin like products. Some have pushed for greater food-safety oversight of industrial food imports and challenged the “neocolonial” processed food trade through calling for voluntary export restraints. Expenditure-switching policies favoring the development of local industrial capacity, where successful, have generated durable employment and wealth generation. They have also conveniently alleviated or eliminated price competition. In this context, imported beer, canned vegetables, packaged cereals, processed coffee, and other convenience foods that can be produced and marketed locally have become foods for the relatively rich. The prices that average Cameroonians pay for manufactured food, where and when they can afford it, are consequently far from the textbook ideal. The extent of profiteering in this setting is not yet known. As such, the possibility that a disjuncture exists between the imperative of industrial development and its implications for the prices of basic consumer needs warrants further study.

Regarding supplier control, several firms have moved to secure stronger backwards linkages with farms or to bring their suppliers in-house. On the former, numerous domestic food-security experts have privately decried the scaled-up efforts of the country’s biggest brewers to secure their maize supplies. These individuals suspect that the production, sale, and marketing of maize in Cameroon are increasingly subject to the machinations of supply-hungry brewers. In this light, the private sector’s work to quench Cameroon’s thirst for beer rests upon market manipulation. Brewers have used their superior buyer power to divert supply to their mashers, boilers, and fermenters, and as a consequence, have raised maize prices for others who do not have as an extensive, well-resourced, or potentially threatening supply network. The maize-consuming public has inevitably suffered. With respect to the other supply-control trend, several agro-industrial businesses have pursued a variant of the CDC’s farm-to-table model. Chief executive officers have increasingly made the choice to directly control supply rather than rely on outgrower or contract-based production schemes. The predominant view fueling the land-acquisition trend is that direct control will better deliver the goods. From this perspective, supplier elimination through vertical integration is the preferred route to ensuring the subservience of crop supplies to downstream (industrial) imperatives.

Agro-industrial businesses have also made considerable efforts to control consumers in Cameroon. For example, the production, branding, and marketing of sports drinks—a product category that only several years ago commanded a negligible share of the cold drinks market—is now big business. Taking a page out of their beer advertisement playbook, brewers and other producers have filled the country’s billboards with sexual imagery trumpeting the purported merits of numerous brands. Given that the World Food Programme has warned that one in three families occasionally skips meals to scrape by, heightened demand for artificially colored, salty, and sugar-laden “premium” sports or energy drinks could be associated with stark opportunity costs. The creation and manipulation of consumer wants have also changed the ways that people access staples. Beyond Nestlé’s infamous efforts in this area, increasing numbers of Cameroonians now look to consume sugar that comes in packets and refined cooking oil that comes in bottles labeled with a female superhero. The extent to which these value-added products can be accurately described as conveniences for which revealed preferences exist is dubious at best. Sugarcane grows within a few kilometers of the major cities, and most urban dwellers have strong extended family and kin connections to rural areas where oil is produced at employment-generating artisanal scales.

While not universally malign, the power of private persuasion has had high public costs where and when the force-feeding of new tastes and desires has detracted from the capacity of Cameroonians to meet their needs resiliently. Fancy ads have assuredly sparked new desires that have spurred some individuals to break free from the routines that have fueled their accommodation to poverty. The intensive and extensive growth of Cameroon’s food-product advertising has been wasteful nonetheless. To paraphrase Galbraith, organized bamboozlement that has aimed to convince the already hungry to eat has necessarily bred inefficiencies and inequity.

Finally, regarding the conventional wisdom about this sector, agro-industrial members of the national business council (Gicam) and members of the French enterprise movement (Medef) have notably pushed for the country to rebrand its investment image. Even among members of the Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale, over the past decades Cameroon has been considered a relative FDI backwater. The regime has moved to countervail this portrayal through drastically reducing business start-up times and creating a one-stop national investment center. Since these reforms took effect, over half a dozen oil palm and other prospective agro-industrial investors have expressed new interest in establishing Cameroonian operations. Additionally, aiming to bury the old image, the government has waged an extensive public relations campaign in the global business media.65 The business-friendly conventional wisdom underlying this big push has been that agro-industrial investments will necessarily enable the realization of the growth and poverty objectives articulated in its national strategy and in the national “vision” document. Individuals and civil society organizations have unsurprisingly aligned against attempts to label the country an investment paradise. The old wisdom that the place continues to be a paradise for patrons now contests with a highly sanitized, investor-friendly account. More Galbraithian attention to flashpoints in the ongoing contest of ideas about agro-industrial FDI and development could help to inform a more workable and long-term strategy for the country in this area.

Conclusions

As William Easterly reminds, economists have had both adventures and misadventures in the tropics. There are no guarantees that future conceptual adventures with J. K. Galbraith in Africa will avoid unfortunate endings. As with all political economy scholarship, such research would potentially be subject to politicized use and abuse. It might also not tell us very much that is not already known. Scholars applying the legacies of Innis, Marx, or Polanyi, for example, might arrive at (or have already articulated) broadly similar insights to those presented above. The possible range of new ideas that could be gleaned through the further application of Galbraith’s “old” institutionalism might also be truncated, given the breadth of new institutionalist scholarship on Africa.66 Obvious perils are associated with ripping an intellectual resource out of context and processing it elsewhere for a new class of consumers. That said, good reasons exist for pursuing this export “model.” If anything, from a Keynesian-inspired perspective, it could at least increase the number of defunct economists, social scientists, and academic scribblers that are regularly conjured into life on the continent.

Galbraith helps to correct overly Afro-centric accounts of African development challenges and opportunities in the global capitalist system. In this manner, his work is far from unique. The “value added” comes from his attention to nominally private sources of economic power and resistance to the application of such power. In the literature on neopatrimonialism in Africa, when it comes to the exercise of power, the machinations of patrons and presidents are considered paramount. From Galbraith we have learned that this perspective might be necessary, but that it is clearly not sufficient. Market forces—and efforts to control those forces—can be and often are generated independently of formal centers of political power. As Galbraith’s history of the rise of the US air and space and defense industries reminds, as enterprises get bigger and more complex, they necessarily exercise more power over their buyers and suppliers. Africa is not and will not be immune from the rise of corporate power as its economic reawakening proceeds.

Further, the application of John Kenneth Galbraith’s work can draw attention to the management of consumer choice in Africa. His writing also raises the possibility that there is more to growth or shrinkage in the bezzle in Africa than the relative success or failure of anticorruption efforts. As more African entrepreneurs make more public calls for the enabling of market forces, Galbraith directs scholars to identify the ways that businesspeople privately seek to control or even eliminate markets. Beyond these possible avenues for future scholarship, Galbraith’s writing on poverty and on the rule of ideas and institutions more generally is a possible wellspring. It is up to others to decide whether or not the African renaissance needs a Galbraithian resurrection.

Notes

1. Timothy M. Shaw, “Africa’s Quest for Developmental States: ‘Renaissance’ for Whom?,” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 5 (June 2012): 837–51.

2. The University of Guelph’s College of Social and Applied Human Sciences financially enabled the first of the two research trips. A research grant from the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) Africa Initiative program (http://www.africaportal.org) made the latter three visits possible. The author also gratefully acknowledges the help and support of François Evina, Florence Munoh, and Ekane Ivo at the Yaoundé office of the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Lauren Q. Sneyd, Olufunso Somorin, E. D. G. Fraser, Carolyn Peach Brown, and other individuals who prefer to remain anonymous each made significant contributions to this research. None of the above-listed organizations or individuals bear responsibility for any errors in this text.

3. Patrick Chabal, “Power in Africa Reconsidered,” in The African Exception, ed. Ulf Engel and Gorm Rye Olsen (Hants, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 17–34.

4. Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 45, no. 1 (February 2007): 95–119.

5. Anne Pitcher, Mary H. Moran, and Michael Johnston, “Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa,” African Studies Review 52, no. 1 (April 2009): 125–56.

6. Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009).

7. Aaron deGrassi, “‘Neopatrimonialism’ and Agricultural Development in Africa: Contributions and Limitations of a Contested Concept,” African Studies Review 51, no. 3 (December 2008): 108.

8. See Morten Bøås, “Liberia and Sierra Leone—Dead Ringers? The Logic of Neopatrimonial Rule,” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 5 (October 2001): 697–723; and Diana Cammack, “The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?,” Development Policy Review 25, no. 5 (September 2007): 599–614.

9. Goran Hyden, African Politics in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 84.

10. Erdmann and Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered.”

11. Ibid.

12. For a discussion of closed, open, vertical, and lateral informal exchanges and their labeling, see Hyden, African Politics in Comparative Perspective, on the “economy of affection.”

13. William Reno, Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9.

14. Edgar Kiser and Audrey Sacks, “African Patrimonialism in Historical Perspective: Assessing Decentralized and Privatized Tax Administration,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636 (July 2011): 129–49.

15. Cammack, “Logic of African Neopatrimonialism,” 601.

16. Bøås, “Liberia and Sierra Leone,” 700.

17. Chabal, “Power in Africa Reconsidered,” 23.

18. DeGrassi, “‘Neopatrimonialism’ and Agricultural Development in Africa,” 109.

19. Erdmann and Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered.”

20. See Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston, “Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa,” 138; and, for example, see Chabal, “Power in Africa Reconsidered,” 31. One of the implicit targets of these critiques seems to be Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

21. Stephen Orvis, “Conclusion: Bringing Institutions Back into the Study of Kenya and Africa,” Africa Today 53, no. 2 (Winter 2006): 95–110. Orvis considers institutions to be sets of “rules, norms, or standard operating procedures” that are “widely recognized and accepted, structuring and constraining individuals’ actions in a particular arena” (ibid., 98).

22. See especially Nicolas van de Walle, “Rice Politics in Cameroon: State Commitment, Capability and Urban Bias,” Journal of Modern African Studies 27, no. 4 (December 1989): 579–99; and Jean-François Bayart, L’état au Cameroun (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979). For a more recent account, among others, see Piet Konings, Neoliberal Bandwagonism: Civil Society and the Politics of Belonging in Anglophone Cameroon (Bamenda, Cameroon: Langaa Research and Publishing Common Initiative Group [RPCIG], 2009).

23. For a recent review of the need for more political economy analyses, see Gabrielle Lynch, “The Economic Is Political and the Political Is Economic: Protest, Change, and Continuity in Contemporary Africa,” Review of African Political Economy 39, no. 134 (December 2012): 547–50. For evidence of Cameroon’s dynamism, see Business in Cameroon, accessed 31 January 2014, http://www.businessincameroon.com.

24. See, for example, Graham Harrison, Neoliberal Africa: The Impact of Global Social Engineering (London: Zed Books, 2010); Marcus Power, Giles Mohan, and May Tan-Mullins, China’s Resource Diplomacy in Africa: Powering Development? (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); and Graham Harrison, “After Orthodoxy: Governance and Development in Africa,” New Political Economy 17, no. 5 (November 2012): 657–98.

25. Shaw, “Africa’s Quest for Developmental States.”

26. John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952).

27. John Kenneth Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 93.

28. See Frédéric Maury, “Industrie: Sur Les Trace des Pionniers,” Jeune Afrique, Les 500 Premières Entreprises Africaines 32 (2013): 68–70.

29. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, xi. In this work, Galbraith revised his initial take on corporate power offered in The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967). Neoclassical economists had criticized his original account for seeming to portray consumers as mere “puppets” of Madison Avenue’s (m)ad men. He subsequently endeavored to show that some consumers on “main street” retain their sovereignty some of the time, emphasizing the dual or “bimodal” nature of the US economy and the limits of consumer choice in sectors where the great corporations exercised preponderant control. For an excellent review of this revision and account of Galbraith’s contributions and broader legacy more generally, see James Ronald Stanfield and Jacqueline Stanfield, John Kenneth Galbraith (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

30. For rigorous and more globally oriented analyses of this power, see Jennifer Clapp, Food (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012); and Stefano Ponte, Peter Gibbon, and Jakob Vestergaard, eds., Governing through Standards: Origins, Drivers and Limitations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

31. See, for example, William Wallis, “Africa Calling,” Financial Times, 11 March 2013, 6; and other contributions to the 2013 “Africa Inc.” series of FT articles and opinion pieces.

32. Galbraith, American Capitalism.

33. Lamido Sanusi, “Africa Must Get Real about Its Romance with China,” Financial Times, 12 March 2013, 9.

34. Stanfield and Stanfield, John Kenneth Galbraith, 97.

35. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 40th anniversary ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).

36. Stanfield and Stanfield, John Kenneth Galbraith, 231.

37. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, 137. These “armies” are certainly not subject to the exclusive control of the BRICS or other emerging market players. GE, L’Oréal, SAB Miller, and other global firms with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development roots are assuredly engaged in activities that aim to manage African consumers; as such, they are also ripe for efforts to apply Galbraith’s insights.

38. Stanfield and Stanfield, John Kenneth Galbraith, 103.

39. For an overhyped take on empowerment as well as information and communication technology, see Katrina Manson, “Continent Takes Lead in Mobile Revolution,” Financial Times, 15 March 2013, 17.

40. Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, 211.

41. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Nature of Mass Poverty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 45.

42. Ibid., 61. See also John Kenneth Galbraith, The Culture of Contentment (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992).

43. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Global Investment Trends Monitor, no. 11 (23 January 2013): 6.

44. See Shaw, “Africa’s Quest for Developmental States,” 840. For contributions to this perception, see “Special Report: Emerging Africa,” Economist, 2 March 2013; and David Fine et al., Africa at Work: Job Creation and Inclusive Growth (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, 2013), 1.

45. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955), 133.

46. Bernard Gauthier and Albert Zeufack, “Governance and Oil Revenues in Cameroon,” in Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction, ed. Paul Collier and Anthony J. Venables (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 27–78.

47. World Bank, Cameroon Economic Update, no. 3 (January 2012), http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/files/africacan/economic_update_issue_no_3_-_jobs_in_cameroon.pdf.

48. Personal communication, WFP and International Monetary Fund Country Offices, Yaoundé, 3 July 2012.

49. See Republic of Cameroon, Document de Stratégie Pour la Croissance et l’emploi (DSCE) (Yaoundé: Republic of Cameroon, 2009).

50. David Hoyle and Patrice Levang, Oil Palm Development in Cameroon (Yaoundé, Cameroon: WWF Ad Hoc Report in Partnership with IRD and CIFOR, April 2012).

51. Tatah Mentan, “Cameroon: The Political Economy of Poverty,” in Cameroon: Politics and Society in Critical Perspectives, ed. Jean-Germain Gros (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 112.

52. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, Addendum, Mission to Cameroon, A/HRC/22/50/Add.2, 18 December 2012, http://www.ohchr.org

/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A-HRC-22-50-Add2_en.pdf.

53. Lauren Q. Sneyd, Alexander Legwegoh, and Evan D. G. Fraser, “Food Riots: Media Perspectives on the Causes of Food Protest in Africa,” Food Security 5, no. 4 (August 2013): 485–97.

54. Personal communications, Samuel Nguiffo and Brendan Schwartz, July and December 2012.

55. Emmanuel Fru Doh, Africa’s Political Wastelands: The Bastardization of Cameroon (Bamenda, Cameroon: Langaa RPCIG, 2008).

56. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Cameroon Country Report (Gutersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012).

57. Joseph Takougang and Milton Krieger, African State and Society in the 1990s: Cameroon’s Political Crossroads (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 243.

58. See CONAC, Report on the Status of Corruption in Cameroon (Yaoundé, Cameroon: CONAC, 2012); and the coverage in the state-controlled media, including Armand Essogo, “Les Revelations de la CONAC,” Cameroon Tribune, 30 November 2012, 5.

59. Julie Owono, “Paranoia and Despair Rule Cameroon,” Al Jazeera, 8 July 2012.

60. Rogers Tabe Egbe Orock and Oben Timothy Mbuagbo, “‘Why Government Should Not Collect Taxes’: Grand Corruption in Government and Citizens’ Views on Taxation in Cameroon,” Review of African Political Economy 39, no. 133 (September 2012): 479–99.

61. Jeune Afrique, Les 500 premières entreprises Africaines 32 (2013).

62. Personal communication, Olivier De Schutter (on mission), at Kribi, Cameroon, 21 July 2012.

63. For an overview of CSR in Cameroon, see the dedicated section in GIZ, Shaping Corporate Social Responsibility in Sub-Saharan Africa: Guidance Notes from a Mapping Survey (Bonn: GIZ, 2013).

64. Brendan Schwartz, David Hoyle, and Samuel Nguiffo, Emerging Trends in Land-Use Conflicts in Cameroon (Yaoundé, Cameroon: WWF, CED, and RELUFA, 2012).

65. See, among others, “Cameroun: Potentialities en quête d’investissements” (advertisement), Jeune Afrique, Les 500 premières entreprises Africaines 32 (2013): 113–16; “Cameroon: The Window of Africa” (advertisement), Financial Times (US edition), 15 July 2011, 5; and “Cameroon’s Commitment to the Green Economy” (advertisement), Financial Times Special Report: Africa and the Green Economy, 20 June 2012, 1, 4–5. See also the government newspaper’s coverage of these ads: “Cameroon: Financial Times Hails Cameroon’s Environmental Progress,” Cameroon Tribune, 3 July 2012, http://www.allAfrica.com.

66. Colin Leys, “Rational Choice or Hobson’s Choice? The ‘New Political Economy’ as Development Theory,” Studies in Political Economy 49 (Spring 1996): 37–69.

The Arab Uprising

State of Emergency and Constitutional Reform

Andrej Zwitter, PhD*

*The author is chair for International Relations at the Department of Legal Theory, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Egyptian diplomats and Tunisian political parties have consulted him on matters of constitutional reform and state-of-emergency regulations in North Africa.

Ever since the creation of constitutions that recognize the concept of states of emergency, dictatorial regimes have used emergency powers to consolidate their position. This is not to say that the legal mechanism of the state of emergency exists only in those regimes. On the contrary, the state of emergency is a feature of the democratic state.1 Particularly during natural disasters (e.g., wildfires, tornadoes, etc.), governors in the United States declare states of emergency in the form of executive orders as a means of accessing federal emergency funds and/or mobilizing the National Guard. Because of this administrative function, state-of-emergency declarations happen in the United States more frequently than in other countries.2 Clearly, such declarations are subject to consideration by the executive branch. Its consideration is based on whether an event can be handled within the boundaries of ordinary laws and regulations or whether it requires emergency powers.

The strategic role of states of emergency imposed by repressive regimes, however, remains undisputed. Thus, although in a general emergency, laws are for the most part designed to give an extraordinary measure of flexibility and extended reach to the executive to cope with a crisis, their effective use and duration can suggest different goals, such as the repression of a regime’s enemies. Taking a look at the countries that recently experienced what is by now commonly known as the “Arab Spring,” one finds that states of emergency were often put in place to

• stabilize a political leadership that had lost (or never had) popular legitimacy,

• preventively deter protests and unrests by threatening martial-law sanctions,

• crack down on unwanted opposition and defenders of human rights, and

• circumvent human rights obligations that would otherwise limit administrative

detention and other powers of security and military forces.

Constitutionalism was a central theme in the Middle East / North Africa region at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century.3 It needed the Arab Spring to trigger new reform processes. With that phenomenon, starting in Tunisia in January 2011, the Middle East / North Africa in particular now experiences an unprecedented wave of political and constitutional reforms. If the latter are indeed to lead to more democratic and liberal states, then one of the crucial tests remains how nations perform in states of emergency.

This article presents current constitutional developments in the context of the Arab Spring, analyzing the prospects of democratic control and the rule of law from the view of constitutional arrangements concerning states of emergency. Each section briefly outlines the political and legal background of the country under consideration and then examines legal norms concerning the state of emergency. Countries covered for the purposes of this article are those that, due to the Arab Spring, are engaged in large-scale processes of constitutional reform: Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. First, though, the article identifies key elements of checks and balances that derive from the principles of democracy and the rule of law for emergency regulations.

Conditions of the Rule of Law and Democracy

Emergencies require states to act faster (with urgency) and/or more effectively (better) than is possible within limitations imposed by the law during normal conditions. Typically, we observe that dictatorial regimes can enact ad hoc legislation for concrete problems of the executive; processes of legislative decision making and execution are faster since no majority consensus is necessary; and checks and balances exert little control on the executive.4

If this is a recipe for effectiveness and efficiency, then liberal democracies have mainly four tools at their disposal to deal with emergencies:

1. moving legislative power to the executive;

2. granting extended administrative power to the executive (vis-à-vis the rights of the

citizen);

3. reducing the democratic control (checks and balances) over the executive;

4. installing accelerated judicial procedures (e.g., the martial law norm that civilians can

be tried before military courts).5

This results in the paradox that in order to protect the democratic state in times of crisis, the state has to become less democratic. In order for democracy to survive its state-of-emergency regime, modern constitutions impose limitations on emergency powers, particularly through the principles of democratic control, urgency, proportionality, and the rule of law.6 As one may observe in the Arab Spring countries, authoritarian regimes tend to violate these principles during states of emergency through the unnecessary declaration, the undue extension of emergency status, and/or the disproportional use of emergency powers. This is possible because constitutional checks and balances are not in place. The constitutional checks and balances that democracies have at their disposal to limit the abuse of emergency powers are as follows:

• parliamentary and/or judicial control of the executive’s emergency powers,

• necessity of the actions taken under or the extent of emergency powers,

• proportionality of emergency powers to the extent of the threat posed by

the emergency,

• time limit of emergency powers,

• guaranties against changing formal (i.e., laws that enable emergency powers)

laws and constitutional law in general,

• limited executive-legislation powers, and

• preservation of civil liberties.

The principal question addressed by this article is thus whether the constitutional reforms triggered by the Arab Spring will improve emergency regulations by making them less prone to misuse. The following case studies illustrate the constitutional-reform processes and proposals for reforming state-of-emergency laws.

Egypt

Egypt is one of the most prominent cases of the misuse of emergency laws. Effectively, Egypt has remained under declaration of a state of emergency since the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The state of emergency was lifted for an 18-month period in 1980 but was reimposed after Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. The state of emergency in Egypt derived from the Egyptian constitution and since 30 March 2011, from the constitutional declaration adopted by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).7

Both the constitution in the version of 2007 and the 2011 constitutional declaration referred to general law to determine the manner in which an emergency is declared (see Article 148, 2007 constitution, and Article 59, 2011 constitutional declaration). Notwithstanding calls from the European Union to end the state of emergency in full before the presidential elections on 23 May 2012, legal analyst Nathan Brown had already predicted that the SCAF would keep the state of emergency partially in force for some areas to prevent thuggery until it expired automatically on 1 June 2012.8

The automatic end of the state of emergency did not abolish the material law that guides its execution, which, as shown below, remains a serious concern. Furthermore, on 13 June 2012, Decree 4991/2012 was released, allowing military forces to detain people who violate certain provisions of the penal code (otherwise, only the police are permitted to do so) and thus fill a legal void until adoption of the new constitution.9 This action raised fears among human rights activists that the dreaded state-of-emergency norms would creep back into the new state.10

Regarding the constitutional drafting process, oppositional groups heavily disputed the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly as 12 liberals withdrew from it on 16 November 2012 after five Copts had already withdrawn. These withdrawals were the result of the Muslim Brotherhood not allowing discussion of all articles of the new constitution in the assembly.11 Furthermore, on 22 November President Mohammed Morsi issued a decree giving himself sweeping powers. One can see the reasons for this decree in the need to bring increasing instability under control and to counteract the Cairo Administrative Court’s referral of a case concerning the legality of the Constituent Assembly to the Supreme Constitutional Court. According to Article VI of the decree, “The President may take the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution.”12 Morsi’s decisions were to be final until election of the new parliament and not subject to appeal, according to Article II, but political pressure later forced him to withdraw from this hard-line position.13

Egypt’s new constitution (2012) was signed into law by President Morsi on 26 December 2012 after two rounds of polling resulting in an approval rate of 63 percent and a turnout of only 30 percent.14 After a military-supported popular coup d’état, the Egyptian constitution, in force for six months, was suspended by the army, which also ousted the Muslim Brotherhood’s president on 3 July 2013.15 New interim president Adly Mansour issued a provisional constitutional declaration of 33 articles in force until the preparation of a revised constitution on the basis of the 2012 document.16 The Committee of Ten (10 constitutional experts and judges) handed to the president a radically redrafted constitution, which a Committee of Fifty would discuss.17 However, the legitimacy of the Committee of Fifty, which supposedly represented all societal stakeholders, was not entirely undisputed.18 Regarding presidential powers, Brown predicted that they

might be whittled down constitutionally a bit in the amendments. Even in early 2013, courts had begun to interpret its authority a bit restrictively and, for all the charges of “Brotherhoodization” of the state, Morsi hardly seemed to be able to exert much control over the military and security services. His successor—unless he comes from those parts of the state—is likely to fare no better.19

In the meantime, the interim presidency declared a state of emergency on 14 August 2013 in order to provide the legal basis for the police to undertake two raids to clear Muslim Brotherhood protest camps.20 These raids killed about 600 and injured approximately 4,000 Morsi supporters.21

In 2006 President Hosni Mubarak promised to lift the state of emergency; instead, constitutional norms concerning the declaration of the emergency were amended, and it continued. Article 148—the key constitutional article guiding the declaration, presented on 26 February 2007 by a committee appointed by the SCAF—was amended in the revised constitution of 2007. It granted the president the power to declare a state of emergency, which needed to be submitted to the People’s Assembly for a decision within 15 days. The fact that Article 148 did not impose an absolute time limit made the permanency of the state of emergency possible.22

The proposed amendments, included in the latest 2012 constitution, would restrict the ability to impose a lengthy state of emergency and assign an absolute time limit to the emergency period.23 The amended text of Article 148 reduced the time of submission of the declaration to the House of Representatives to seven days and, if dissolved, would provide the Shura Council (the upper house) with the power to decide upon continuation of the emergency declaration. Furthermore, an absolute time limit of six months (extendable to one year upon public referendum) had been introduced.24 By comparison, the old regulations allowed the declaration to remain in force for up to three years.25 Despite these proposed amendments, which definitely improved parliamentary and popular control, it remains highly doubtful that such a constitutional regulation would satisfy both the requirements of checks and balances and the principles of the rule of law, as outlined above.

Emergency Law no. 162 of 1958—the material emergency law, triggered by a declaration of emergency—came into play again by a declaration of President Mansour on 13 August 2013 when clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and the police became more substantial.26 Among other provisions, this law provides the right to curb any civilian assembly, impose censorship, close stores, seize companies, and detain persons, forcing them to perform hard labor without trial for six months and fining them 40,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately $5,700 US).27 This implementation norm (Emergency Law no. 162 of 1958) holds the greatest potential for abuse and human rights violations if it is reinstated in a similar manner after the reform processes conclude. Currently, developments concerning the government’s effort to create a new emergency law are hotly disputed. According to nongovernmental organizations and news reports, the government intends simply to transfer many of the old regulations into ordinary criminal law and allow other regulations to remain the same while giving the law a new name: “Only in Egypt: you object to the Emergency Law, they change its name to the ‘protecting society from criminals’ law; you object to that and its name becomes the ‘safeguarding the gains of the revolution’ law.”28

With regard to constitutional emergency powers, the Committee of Fifty will have to take a particularly close look at the 2012 constitution’s powers of the president that scholars and some Egyptian diplomats consider even more extensive than those granted by the old constitution (compare Articles 101 [the right to propose laws], 104 [the right to object to laws], 146 [the right to declare war], 147 [the right to appoint civil and military personnel], 148 [the right to invoke emergency powers, see above], and 150 [the right to call for a referendum]). If the SCAF can keep favorable constitutional provisions as they currently are and if a strong presidential system remains the other power in the state, then the political stability of Egypt might become structurally weak. Possible constitutional options, which could ameliorate this structural breaking point of political conflict, could reduce presidential powers in favor of a stronger ministerial system balanced by parliamentary oversight (also over the military).

Moreover, the following articles surrounding state-of-emergency powers would need revision in order to comply with modern standards: 11 (regarding ethics, public morality, and public order); 48, paragraph two (censorship during war or public mobilization); 131 (the right to issue decrees with the force of law in urgent cases); and 215 (unclear role of a yet-to-be-established National Media Council). Article 131 in particular could prove dangerous since Morsi’s presidential decree foreshadowed a similar one that granted him absolute powers in November 2012 before the 2012 constitution came into force.

Libya

On 29 January 2011, Al Jazeera reported that the regime of Mu‘ammar Gadhafi in Libya had cancelled all football games, declaring a state of emergency and security alert at the beginning of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt out of fear that the unrest could infect Libya as well.29 Around 20 February, protests escalated in Libya leading to a de facto state of emergency due to internal armed conflict. At the end of February, Italy suspended a treaty of friendship forbidding warfare and military confrontation.30 On 17 March, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, acting under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, unanimously adopted Resolution 1973, imposing a no-fly zone over Libya, the freezing of assets, and an arms embargo. Moreover, it authorized

member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.31

On 27 October, the council decided unanimously to end the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Civilian Protection Mandate over Libya.32

The Kingdom of Libya was de facto established with the entry into force of the constitution on 7 October 1951, installing a constitutional and hereditary monarchy under King Idris. Given the time of its inception, this document was relatively progressive. As a control mechanism, it limited the king’s emergency powers by requiring approval of the parliament for their continuation.33

The Revolutionary Command Council issued the Constitutional Proclamation of 1969, the legal document in force after the government of King Idris was overthrown in that year, intending to replace it with a real constitution.34 That never occurred, however. The Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People, which created the General People’s Congress, existed parallel to the constitutional proclamation.35 That proclamation regulated both martial law (Article 24) and emergencies (Article 25): “The Revolutionary Command Council shall make decisions concerning martial law or the state of emergency whenever there is a threat to the internal or external security of the State and whenever the Revolutionary Command Council deems it necessary for the protection and defense of the Revolution.”36

In addition to these two documents, the Green Book, which laid out Gadhafi’s political philosophy, also became a quasi-legal/quasi-religious fundament of the Libyan state—an obligatory source of study for all Libyans. According to the first volume, a system of popular congresses and people’s committees—replacing the parliamentary system—would lead to the ideal form of direct democracy in accordance with what Gadhafi called “Third Universal Theory.”37

Although not indicated otherwise, the end of the NATO mandate seemed to mark the end of the state of emergency de facto externally imposed by the conflict. De jure, however, one might assume that the state of emergency either formally ended with the dissolution of the General People’s Congress and the passing of the new “Constitutional Declaration” on 3 August 2011 (see below)—or it did not end at all.38 A report in the April 2012 Malta Today clarified this constitutional confusion, noting that the Libyan government considered reinstating the state of emergency due to the risk of a renewed outbreak of violence.39 Such a declaration would have to happen on the basis of the transitional document, which Libya’s National Transitional Council passed on 3 August 2011 as a constitutional declaration, indicating no current declaration of a state of emergency.40 Formally, this would be a bit problematic since the declaration does not provide for emergency measures. The only basis of such a declaration would be Article 17, which in sentence three provides carte blanche in the form of a general clause: “The Transitional National Council shall be entrusted to guarantee the national unity, the safety of the national territory, to embody and circulate values and morals, to ensure the safety of citizens and expatriates, to ratify the international agreements and to establish the bases of the civil constitutional democratic state.”41 A draft of a new emergency law had already been published by the interim government, which, according to the Libya Herald, states that authorities are allowed to enact the following measures: “collect or confiscate weapons, ammunition and explosives; declare a curfew; . . . arrest and detain anyone believed to be a threat to public security or who is a repeat offender; . . . intercept communications and impose controls on the media; [and] declare any area to a military zone under the control of a military commander.”42

On 14 November 2012, the first elected government of Libya was sworn in replacing the interim government.43 A month later, on 17 December, Russia Today reported that the new government had declared a state of emergency for the southern regions of Ghadames, Ghat, Obari, Al-Shati, Sebha, Murzuq, and Kufra in order to bring them back under government control.44 On 16 July 2013, the General National Congress—the successor of the National Transitional Council—passed an electoral law to install the 60-member commission to draft the future constitution.45

Options for a draft constitution include using the 1951 constitution (in its form of 1963), which, according to Mohammed Ben Ghalbon, chairman of the Libyan Constitutional Union, has the advantage of already providing for a federal system and establishing the legal basis to reclaim Libya’s seat in the UN.46 Of course, many articles would have to be amended. Regarding use of the 1951 constitution’s state-of-emergency regulations, two provisions are of especial concern: Article 70—which gave the king the right to proclaim a state of emergency with only the parliament to check upon the continuation of the declaration—does not contain further limitations or other checks and balances, such as time or proportionality constraints. Furthermore, Article 195 would allow the suspension of constitutional provisions in times of emergency. Read in conjunction with Article 70 and with a view to the experience with the Weimar Constitution, the latter provision could be used to dissolve the parliament altogether and install a permanent state-of-emergency regime. This might require specific constitutional guaranties or, preferably, even the abolishment of Article 195. The federal-system option as provided by the 1951 constitution (removed by the 1963 amendments, which led to severe social instabilities), however, might offer a way out of the political deadlock caused by tribal politics and regional militias claiming their own role in the political process. But this option would prove viable only if it accounts for the political and economic changes of the last 60 years.47

Tunisia

Tunisia is a case of exception to the rule when it comes to the use and misuse of emergency powers. Although the country is ruled by an autocratic regime, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s powers did not stem from a continuation of emergency law to limit parliamentary control and extend executive powers. Before the latest revolution, the last instance of a state of emergency was the Bread Riots of 1984, under President Habib Bourguiba’s regime. After the government declared that prices for bread and other cereals would double and in protest of the repressive practices of the regime, turmoil began on 1 January 1984 all over the country. A demoralized police force appeared unable to control the protests, so on 3 January, declaration of a state of emergency allowed the deployment of army units, which used automatic weapons against crowds and barricaded the streets of Tunis to curtail violence, lootings, and destruction of symbols of the regime. According to reports, 89 Tunisians died in the disturbances, at least 938 others were injured, and more than 1,000 were arrested.48 Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali appointed Brig Gen Zine El Abidine Ben Ali as the director of national security within the Ministry of Interior. Despite contrary promises of the government, Ben Ali’s appointment led to more repressive policies and a security apparatus not dependent on emergency powers.49

Only on 14 January 2011, the day that President Ben Ali fled the country in the face of antigovernment protests, did he declare another state of emergency. Initially set indefinitely, this state of emergency was extended until October 2013.50 After attacks on the American Embassy, the state of emergency was perpetuated again on 5 October 2012.51 Until November 2012, the state of emergency was extended only 30 days at the time. However, on 1 November the Tunisian president prolonged it until January 2013—a fairly dangerous move, considering Tunisia’s current transitional process.52 According to political analyst Salah Eddine Jorchi, the decision was prompted by continuing social tension, gun smuggling from Libya to Tunisia, and risk to the tourist season.53 The continuation of emergency powers in the summer of 2013 stemmed from an ongoing military struggle with Algeria against the Uqba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, a group with alleged ties to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, occupying a stronghold on Mount Chaambi.54

At the time of this writing, the state of emergency in Tunisia remains in effect in accordance with the interim constitution, which gives the president unlimited emergency powers that rely for checks and balances on mere consultation with the president of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and the prime minister (Article 11, paragraph 7).55 This regulation derived from the old constitution (Article 46), adding only the limitation that the president was not allowed to dissolve the parliament or present a motion of censure against the government.56

The NCA, together with six commissions, worked toward finalizing the constitution. On 6 August 2013, the NCA suspended its work because of the political assassination of Mohammed Brahmi, a secular opposition member in the NCA, on 25 July 2013. His death constituted the second act of political assassination after the shooting of secular journalist Chokri Belaid on 6 February 2013, which led to a severe political crisis, a reshuffling in the government, and the resignation of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali (Ennahda).57 These events have added to an already disputed legitimacy of the Tunisian draft constitution, caused in part by the inclusion of norms referring to Tunisia as an Islamic state, a failure to include reference to international law, and the NCA’s refusal to accept advice from its own expert commissions.58

Unfortunately, the draft constitution’s regulation concerning the state of emergency in its various forms throughout August 2012, December 2012, and June 2013 has seen a progressive deterioration, making it little different from the old constitution of 1957.59 As in the latter document, Article 79 of the draft constitution of June 2013 provided that before the president can declare a state of emergency, he must consult the president of the parliament and the prime minister. The advice of these two representatives of the legislative and executive, however, is not binding. What remains in the current draft is one additional element to its predecessor—namely, the right of the president of the parliament or two-thirds of its members to refer the presidential emergency decree to the constitutional court after a waiting period of at least 30 days. Put very clearly, this waiting period is twice as long as the one regulated by the 2007 constitution of Egypt. In addition, the two-thirds majority required in the parliament presents an unusually high hurdle. In combination, these regulations would render the mechanisms of temporal limitation and parliamentary control almost useless. Further, in combination with the mere consultative function of the prime minister and president of parliament before the declaration of an emergency, the current draft constitution remains quite vulnerable to misuse. The only positive side is that with the declaration of an emergency, the parliament automatically goes into permanent session, potentially providing democratic control over the presidential emergency powers, thus counteracting the dissolution of the parliament by emergency powers (Article 79, draft constitution of June 2013). Its effectiveness as a control mechanism remains doubtful.

Article 17 (draft constitution of June 2013) provides a legal basis for using the army in support of civil authorities in cases of emergency. This provision might become particularly problematic because use of the regular military within the country is generally a disputed topic in the literature.60 Below constitutional level, Decree 78-50 of 1978 regulates the details of state-of-emergency declarations and emergency powers.61

Even though Tunisia is not one of the prime suspects that misused the declaration of a state of emergency, current constitutional reforms need to take a good look at the emergency regulations they want to become law. One must ascertain why a state of emergency was not declared until 14 January 2011 in an extremely repressive security state that suffocated all potential resistance at its roots.62 Considering the newly gained freedoms of the Tunisian people, the prevalent political instability, the threat of political assassinations and terrorist attacks, and the deep rift between Islamist and secular factions, the new constitution must take particular precautions with regard to a new emergency system. It must do so because both the current and old constitutional regulations completely lacked any control mechanisms, viable time limitations, or other constraints to the declaration and execution of emergency powers.

Conclusion

It is certainly not justified to state that all authoritarian regimes and less democratic states can impose states of emergency to their liking and without limitations. In general, one can distinguish between two rather clear-cut cases concerning the role of the state of emergency before, during, and—as it applies—after the Arab Spring. Egypt, on the one hand, was under a permanent, long-term state of emergency used to curb civil and political rights and to strengthen and protect an unpopular government against popular demands. After the coup that removed Mubarak from power, the state of emergency was deemed necessary to provide increased security as a means of dealing with protests that emerged after a continuation of struggles between secular and Islamist political powers. Thus, pre–Arab Spring Egypt constitutes a strong case for the misuse of emergency powers over an extended period of time. On the other hand, Tunisia under Ben Ali used quite different repressive tools of control, such as a very invasive security apparatus and detention laws that made the declaration of states of emergency less relevant. Pre–Arab Spring Libya, run by the arbitrary rule of an individual dictator, did not experience a legal, long-term state of emergency, which was not necessary due to the lack of a constitution.

When looking at how different constitutions formulate state-of-emergency laws, one finds quite diverse approaches. The Libyan 1951 constitution, just as the previous Egyptian constitutions, gives power to an individual—the king (and in Egypt, the president)—to declare an emergency and gives parliament the only real check against misuse. As it did before the revolution, Tunisia opted for a very ineffective consultation mechanism among president, prime minister, and president of the parliament. In all three cases, the parliament plays a role in determining the continuation of the state of emergency. One can see the weakest role of a parliament in the current Tunisian draft constitution, which requires the president of parliament or two-thirds of its members to wait for 30 days before referring the decree to the constitutional court.

Independently of the eventual outcomes, the constitutional reform process in all countries—specifically and tangibly in Egypt and Tunisia—was accompanied by a political fragility in which political assassinations and protests were able to destabilize new governments. In the above cases, one can identify several potential dangers that might accompany the transitional periods induced or accompanied by states of emergency:63

1. Transitional state-of-emergency rule becomes permanent or reoccurring:

Mubarak’s rule, similar to the situation in Algeria, testifies to the danger of state-of-emergency regimes becoming permanent. Even though Egypt and Tunisia seem to be in the process of genuine reforms, the political instability caused by political fragmentation and factions trying to hijack or derail these reform processes might lead to instabilities that could prompt a more permanent emergency rule to continue.

2. Acknowledgement that liberal institutions might not be sufficient to deal

with reoccurring instabilities: Political assassinations and similarly destabilizing events (terrorists in the Chaambi Mountains) could result in an overemphasis on powers of the executive, both in times of normalcy and emergency when redesigning the constitutions.

3. Utility of emergency powers for coups d’état and maintenance of power of

reactionary forces: The ambivalent role of Egypt’s military in intervening whenever it observes an unfavorable development must be observed with caution. Likewise, Algeria has experienced rule through emergency powers. Until the successful conclusion of a political and legal power transition, civil society will have to keep an eye open for attempts to seize power through events that would justify declaring the state of emergency anew.

4. Legal and political imprints left behind by old constitutional arrangements:

The suspension of Egypt’s 2012 constitution and the military installment of a new transitional regime threaten to delegitimize the reform processes. Tunisia’s perpetual state of emergency also weakens the popular legitimacy of the government. Furthermore, using the old constitutions as templates in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt might be a trust-instilling measure, but it risks perpetuating the weaknesses of the old constitutions. Like its Arab Spring brethren, Libya might use its 1951 constitution as a template. If it decides to do so, the introduction of functional Western and non-Western models of checks and balances will be necessary to reduce the likelihood of misuse of state-of-emergency powers. Libya might even opt for a federal system, which would transfer some emergency powers to the level of the provinces or states.

5. Individual abuses of emergency powers: Morsi’s presidential declaration,

with which he granted himself sweeping powers, remains a possibility in the 2012 constitution (see Article 131). Egypt has experienced the abuse of presidential powers, which causes the population to react with massive mobilization whenever it feels that the acts of presidents have gone too far. Consequently, installing a strong presidential system might not be advisable and could prove disadvantageous for legitimizing the position of presidents in Egypt’s future. The same might hold true for Libya.

Even if laws governing states of emergency seem well developed, the effectiveness of checks and balances in controlling emergency powers strongly depends upon the political setup of the state (composition of the government, exclusiveness of the police, and appointment of judges). The experience before and after the Arab Spring resulted in concrete legal change in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. However, in terms of the important role that the state of emergency currently plays in Tunisia and how the constitutional draft might regulate it, Tunisia becomes a case of concern regarding the misuse of emergency powers. Similarly for Egypt, one can predict that, given the political volatility and the constitutional draft currently discussed, state-of-emergency declarations and violence exerted under the legal justification of emergency powers will continue to haunt the Egyptian people, who are already weary of constitutional dictatorships. As for the state-of-emergency regulations becoming constitutional law in Libya, it is simply too early to make any predictions.

All current drafts and applicable constitutions—particularly the development of norms regarding powers that belong to state-of-emergency regulations (including the aspects of derogations of civil liberties during times of urgency)—need close scrutiny. Because the current constitutional systems are extremely prone to misuse, careful revisions as laid out in the theoretical framework above are indispensable.

Most countries revise their constitutions continuously. There is no reason and no need to expect the perfect constitution within such a short period of time. However, the importance of completing the first round of reforms with a constitution that preserves major liberties and is compatible with international law cannot be overstated. This is why it is imperative that the public remain observant of the abuses of executive powers and demand amendments and reforms when it is necessary for the greater good of the peaceful coexistence of citizens.

Notes

1. Andrej Zwitter, ed., Notstand und Recht: Im Überblick: Rechtstheorie, Völkerrecht, Europarecht, deutsches- und österreichisches Recht (Heidelberg: Nomos, 2012).

2. Based on ongoing research of the State of Emergency Mapping (STEM) Project at Research in Ethics and Globalisation (REG). “GSG [Globalisation Studies Groningen]-REG,” University of Groningen, accessed 13 August 2013, http://www.rug.nl/research/globalisation-studies-groningen/sections/reg/stem-_-state-of-emergency-mapping. All Website.

3. Hugh Roberts, “The Struggle for Constitutional Rule in Algeria,” Journal of Algerian Studies 3 (1998): 19–30.

4. Andrej Zwitter, “The Rule of Law in Times of Crisis: A Legal Theory on the State of Emergency in the Liberal Democracy,” Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 98, no. 1 (2012): 107.

5. Ibid., 108.

6. Ibid., 110.

7. “The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971 (As Amended to 2007),” Constitution

.net, accessed 6 March 2014, http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Egypt%20Constitution.pdf; and Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Constitutional Declaration 2011, adopted on 30 March 2011, World Intellectual Property Organization, accessed 6 March 2014, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en

/details.jsp?id=13112.

8. Marc Lynch, “Ending Egypt’s State of Emergency (Sort Of),” Foreign Policy, 24 January 2012, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/24/ending_egypts_state_of_emergency_sort_of. See also Al-Masry Al-Youm, “EU Urges Egypt to Lift State of Emergency before Elections,” Egypt Independent, 16 May 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/eu-urges-egypt-lift-state-emergency-elections.

9. “Mubarak-Era ‘Emergency Law’ Creeps Back into Egypt Politics,” Al-Monitor, accessed 24 February 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/06/the-state-of-emergency-is-return.html.

10. “Egypt Is a Military State! The Minister of Justice Decree Authorizes Military Police and Military Intelligence of the Judicial Arrest of Civilians,” AllAfrica, 13 June 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/201206140097.html.

11. Tamim Elyan, “Egypt Liberals Quit Assembly Drafting Constitution,” Reuters, 18 November 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/18/us-egypt-constitution-idUSBRE8AH0EO20121118.

12. “English Text of Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration,” Ahram Online, 22 November 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspx.

13. “Egypt Judges Call for Nationwide Strike,” Al Jazeera, 25 November 2012, http://www.aljazeera

.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/201211255459324484.html.

14. “Egyptian Constitution ‘Approved’ in Referendum,” BBC News, 23 December 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20829911.

15. Abigail Hauslohner, William Booth, and Sharaf al-Hourani, “Egyptian Military Ousts Morsi, Suspends Constitution,” Washington Post, 3 July 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egypts-morsi-defiant-under-pressure-as-deadline-looms/2013/07/03/28fda81c-e39d-11e2-80eb-3145e2994a55_story.html.

16. “Egypt’s Constitutional Declaration Issued, Defines Transitional Period,” Ahram Online, 8 July 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/76065/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-constitutional-declaration-issued,-defines-.aspx; and “Full Text of the July 2013 Egyptian Constitutional Declaration,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 6 March 2014, http://egyptelections

.carnegieendowment.org/2013/07/15/full-text-of-the-july-2013-egyptian-constitutional-declaration.

17. Gamal Essam El-Din, “UPDATED: Amended Draft of Egyptian Constitution Passed to President,” Ahram Online, 20 August 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79525

/Egypt/Politics-/UPDATED-Amended-draft-of-Egyptian-constitution-pas.aspx.

18. Maria Caspani, “Infographic: Egypt’s Constituent Assembly,” Thomson Reuters Foundation, 3 September 2013, http://www.trust.org/item/20130903155620-wae6d/.

19. Nathan J. Brown, “Mrs. Lincoln’s Egyptian Constitution,” Foreign Policy, 20 August 2013, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/20/mrs_lincoln_s_egyptian_constitution?wp_login

_redirect=0.

20. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Hundreds Die as Egyptian Forces Attack Islamist Protesters,” New York Times, 14 August 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/world/middleeast/egypt.html?pagewanted=all

&_r=0.

21. Maggie Michael, “Death Toll Soars to 638 in Egypt Violence,” Associated Press, 15 August 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/after-hundreds-killed-egypt-faces-new-uncertainty.

22. “Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 1971.”

23. “Amendments of the Constitution 2011,” Egypt State Information Service, accessed 6 March 2014, http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/LastPage.aspx?Category_ID=204; and Nathan J. Brown and Michele Dunne, “Egypt’s Draft Constitutional Amendments Answer Some Questions and Raise Others,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 20 February 2014, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/03/egypt%e2%80%99s-draft-constitutional-amendments-answer-some-questions-and-raise

-others.

24. Nariman Youssef, “Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated,” Egypt Independent, 12 February 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated.

25. Lisa Reynolds Wolfe, “Cold War Legacy: Egypt’s Emergency Law 162 of 1958,” Cold War Studies, 1 February 2011, http://www.coldwarstudies.com/2011/02/01/cold-war-legacy-egypts-emergency

-law-162-of-1958/.

26. Emergency Law no. 162/1958: Official Gazette of 28 September 1958, no. 28, Bis.; and “State of Emergency: What Does It Imply?,” Ahram Online, 14 August 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg

/NewsContent/1/64/79036/Egypt/Politics-/State-of-emergency-What-does-it-imply-.aspx.

27. “Emergency Law [no. 162/1952 in translation],” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed 6 March 2014, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/09/emergency-law.

28. “This was the reaction of lawyer and activist Malek Adly on his Twitter account.” Heba Afify, “The New Faces of the Emergency Law,” Egypt Independent, 22 October 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/new-faces-emergency-law.

29. James M. Dorsey, “Libya Bans Soccer Matches in Fear of Anti-Government Protests,” Bleacher Report, 30 January 2011, http://bleacherreport.com/articles/590352-libya-bans-soccer-matches-in-fear-of-anti-government-protests.

30. Nathania Zevi and Stacy Meichtry, “Italy Suspends ‘Friendship’ Treaty with Libya,” Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703796504576168774016612758.

31. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973, 3, par. 4.

32. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2016 (2011), S/RES/2016 (2011), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/567/10/PDF/N1156710.pdf?OpenElement.

33. “[Article 70,] Libya’s Constitution, Promulgated by the ‘National Constituent Assembly’ on 7th October 1951,” accessed 6 March 2014, http://www.libyanconstitutionalunion.net/constitution%20of%20libya.htm. The most substantial problem of this constitution would have been Article 195, which allowed for the suspension of its provisions.

34. “Libya - Constitution” (Adopted on 11 December 1969) (ICL Document Status 1992), accessed 24 February 2014, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ly00000_.html.

35. “Libya - Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People” (Adopted on 2 March 1977) (ICL Document Status 2 March 1977), accessed 24 February 2014, http://www.servat

.unibe.ch/icl/ly01000_.html.

36. “Libya - Constitution.”

37. Mu‘ammar Gadhafi, “The Green Book,” accessed 4 September 2013, http://web.archive.org

/web/20100820193107/http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8744/readgb.htm; and [Helen Chapin Metz,] “The Green Book,” Library of Congress, accessed 6 March 2014, http://countrystudies.us

/libya/80.htm.

38. John L. S. Simpkins, “Libya’s Legal System and Legal Research,” GlobaLex, January 2008, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Libya.htm.

39. Matthew Vella, “Libya Mulls Declaring State of Emergency,” Malta Today, 5 April 2012, http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/en/newsdetails/news/world/Libya-mulls-declaring-state-of-emergency-20120405.

40. “Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage: The Constitutional Declaration,” passed by the Interim National Transitional Council on 3 August 2011, publicly announced on 10 August by Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, vice president, http://portal.clinecenter.illinois.edu/REPOSITORYCACHE/114/w1R3bTIKElG95H3MH5nvrSxchm9QLb8T6EK87RZQ9pfnC4py47DaBn9jLA742IFN3d70VnOYueW7t67gWXEs3XiVJJxM8n18U9Wi8vAoO7_24166.pdf.

41. Ibid., 5.

42. “Congress Draft State of Emergency Law Published,” Libya Herald, 27 September 2012, http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/09/27/gnc-draft-state-of-emergency-law-published/.

43. Marie-Louise Gumuchian and Ali Shuaib, “Libya Swears in First Elected Government,” Reuters, 14 November 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/14/us-libya-government-swearing-idUSBRE8AD15F20121114.

44. “Libya Declares Emergency Law in Southern Regions,” Russia Today, 17 December 2012, http://rt.com/news/libya-south-borders-emergency-164/.

45. Rhiannon Smith, “Women Left Behind As Libya’s Constitution-Drafting Moves Forwards,” OpenDemocracy.net, 22 July 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/rhiannon-smith/women-left-behind-as-libyas-constitution-drafting-moves-forwards.

46. Mohammed Ben Ghalbon, [“I Call Upon the Transitional Council to Adopt the Constitution of the Independence Era,”] Asharq Al-Awsat, 13 June 2011, http://www.libyanconstitutionalunion.net

/aaa25feb2011.htm#aaa4eng.

47. Duncan Pickard, “Libya’s Constitution Controversy,” Foreign Policy, 5 September 2012, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/05/libyas_constitution_controversy.

48. “The Riots of 1984 and Their Aftermath,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 24 February 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/tunisia/politics-1984.htm.

49. Ibid.

50. “Tunisia: President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali Forced Out,” BBC News, 15 January 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12195025.

51. “Tunisia Extends State of Emergency,” Press TV, 5 October 2012, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/10/05/265018/tunisia-extends-state-of-emergency/.

52. “Tunisia Extends State of Emergency after Attacks,” Gulf News, 1 November 2012, http://gulfnews.com/news/region/tunisia/tunisia-extends-state-of-emergency-after-attacks-1.1097153.

53. Sana Ajmi, “State of Emergency in Tunisia Extended until the End of This Month,” Tunisia Live, 1 April 2012, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/04/01/state-of-emergency-in-tunisia-extended-to-next-april/.

54. Tam Hussein, “Tunisia’s Militant Struggle: Elusive Militants of Chaambi Mountains Could Be Linked to Algeria,” Huffington Post, 1 August 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/tam-hussein

/tunisias-militant-struggle_b_3687394.html; and Jamel Arfaoui and Walid Ramzi, “Jebel Chaambi Heroes Describe Border Horror,” Magharebia, 31 May 2013, http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles

/awi/reportage/2013/05/31/reportage-01.

55. Loi constituante n°2011-6 du 16 décembre 2011, relative à l’organisation provisoire des pouvoirs publics, Centre pour le contrôle démocratique des forces armées, accessed 6 March 2014, http://www

.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/30479.

56. Tunisian Constitution (Adopted on 1 June 1959) (Amendment on 12 July 1988) (ICL Document Status 1991), accessed 24 February 2014, http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ts00000_.html.

57. Roua Khlifi, “Ennahdha Deems Decision to Suspend NCA ‘Coup d’Etat,’ ” Tunisia Live, 7 August 2013, http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/08/07/ennahdha-deems-decision-to-suspend-nca-coup

-detat/.

58. Ridha Jenayah, interview by the author, Sousse, Tunisia, 26 July 2013. Dr. Jenayah, a professor of public law, was chairman of the NCA Media Commission of Experts [S/Commission des experts chargés de la réforme des médias au sein de la Haute Instance chargée de la Réalisation des Objectifs de la Révolution / HIROR].

59. “Preliminary Draft Constitution of the Tunisian Republic” (published by the National Constituent Assembly the week beginning 13 August 2012), Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL

-REF(2012)035-e; “Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia” (unofficial English translation produced by United Nations Development Programme in Tunisia), 14 December 2012; and “Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia” (unofficial French translation produced by United Nations Development Programme in Tunisia), 1 June 2013. Dr. Amor Boubakri, University of Sousse, provided the author with both unofficial UNDP translations.

60. See Jana Hertwig, “Staatsnotstandsrecht in Deutschland,” in Zwitter, Notstand und Recht, 111–59.

61. Décret n°78-50 du 26 janvier 1978, réglementant l’état d’urgence, Centre pour le contrôle démocratique des forces armées, accessed 6 March 2014, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28159.

62. Christopher K. Lamont and Héla Boujneh, “Transitional Justice in Tunisia: Negotiating Justice during Transition,” Politička Misao: Croatian Political Science Review 49, no. 5 (2012): 32–49.

63. These five points are loosely based on Rossiter but modified regarding their applicability to Arab Spring countries and constitutional reforms. Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 294–97.

China and Israel

Relations and Future Prospects

Aron Shai, PhD∗

*The author is the rector of Tel Aviv University and the Shoul N. Eisenberg Professor for East Asian Affairs. He has authored several books on China, including The Fate of British and French Firms in China, 1949–54, and the biography Zhang Xueliang: The General Who Never Fought.

When Israeli leaders arrived in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in recent years, they found an ancient country with a new outlook. Indeed, over the previous years, China had reached a decision not to content itself any longer with foreign expressions of admiration for its unprecedented building boom or impressive production and trade figures, praise that inevitably smacked of paternalism and even condescension by the developed world toward a backward country. Instead, China, which is rising geopolitically (no longer only economically) and is a nuclear weapons state that arouses major anxiety among many policy makers in the United States, is now in the midst of a distinct transformation. It is focused on the need to translate the astonishing results of its Open Door economic policy, adopted in the early 1980s, into global diplomatic influence. The extravagant Olympic Games and the Expo projects are just two more strides toward that goal. The visits of Chinese leaders in the past few years to South America and Africa are likewise a partial expression of this new thrust that is not merely a matter of pride and prestige. Rather, it is also intended to secure the political influence that will allow China to entrench itself in various corners of the world and, perhaps more significantly, in the global consciousness and enhance its gains in the international arena. Thus, it seems that the global struggle over raw materials, waged until the outbreak of the 2008 economic crisis, was a foreshadowing of the confrontation—economic and diplomatic—of the coming decades.

In view of the underlying fundamental confrontation between China and the United States over materials, geopolitical achievements, and—increasingly—political-diplomatic hegemony in various global cockpits, in recent years it is quite clear that the United States has become increasingly entangled in its own economic morass. The huge budget deficit led to a massive increase in debt, both at home and abroad.1 The multi-billion-dollar bailout plan has to an extent added to the domestic deficit. As the government is spending far more than it receives in taxes on defense spending (including, of course, involvement in Pakistan and Afghanistan), the American economy, unlike the Chinese, is simply overburdened by strategic expenditures funded by borrowing at home and abroad. Moreover, not only is the government spending more than it earns but also the national savings rates have fallen. The subprime crisis in the real estate sector has ignited an additional crucial threat to the American economy. Is the American economy indeed the “Biggest Ponzi Scheme”?2

In light of this situation, it seems quite obvious that the United States cannot expect to dictate its political line to China. In some respects and at particular junctures, it seems that Beijing even intimidates the planners in Washington by building a delicate yet firm response to Washington’s intent to check China’s global interests. Beijing continues to become a presence in South America, Africa, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and many other countries.3 Recently, China had also intervened in the civil war in Syria, when on 4 October 2011, alongside Russia it had vetoed a Western-drafted resolution which would have threatened the Syrian government with targeted sanctions if it continued military actions against protestors.4 In August–September 2013, in view of the Syrian government’s chemical attacks on its own civilians and the US intention to take action against Syria, Russia and China made it quite clear that they would use their veto power in the United Nations (UN) Security Council to again block resolutions condemning Bashar al-Assad’s regime, let alone striking Syria. Earlier, according to Middle Eastern officials, Syria’s air force utilized intelligence provided by China to bomb a Western weapons shipment on its way to arm the Syrian rebels.5

Even though it would have liked China to assume a mere secondary role in the Middle East, Beijing seems to continue to invest in the region and be increasingly involved there. These are undoubtedly crucial developments to be reckoned with. Similarly, China can boast impressive economic indicators. Its economy has reached significant annual growth even though recently a certain decline is discernible. It is the world’s second-largest economy by nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and by purchasing power parity.6 It is the world’s fastest-growing major economy, with growth rates averaging 10 percent over the past 30 years.7 It seems that China could become the world’s largest economy (by nominal GDP) sometime as early as the 2020s. Since the beginning of the reforms applied in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the number of Chinese who live above the poverty line has increased dramatically, and by 2012 the per capita income had grown to $6,076 (international $9,233 in purchasing power parity). China’s foreign reserves are about $3.3 trillion (the highest number in the world), and its saving rate is incredibly high—about 50 percent of the GDP.8 While these indicators are widely acknowledged, one should not perhaps totally discard the “collapse of China” theory, one that prevailed prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis. Nor should one overlook contradictory data that calls China’s optimistic scenario into question.

More than a decade ago, in his book The Coming Collapse of China, Gordon Chang argued that a case can indeed be made that China would dominate Asia and thereafter the rest of the world.9 China has the necessary potential and vision to achieve that goal and has thereby sought the recognition to become a power equal to the United States and the European Union on the international scene. Nonetheless, Chang ventured that China was a paper dragon on the verge of collapse. Among the indicators that encouraged his conclusion were the high corruption within the Chinese Communist Party and its government; the “armies of unemployed” who roamed the country; the dominating yet non-cost-effective state-owned enterprises and banks with their nonperforming loans; and the budget deficit that mushroomed in the years preceding the publication of Chang’s book. According to Chang, even the opening of China to the World Trade Organization did not augur well but would “shake China to its foundations.”10 In short, China’s leaders could by no means prevent what he regarded as a deterministic process, a “tragedy” in the making.

In the course of over a decade since Chang’s book was published, his pessimistic predictions have not materialized. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, for example, has not incurred the foreseen damage, let alone a national collapse. Nonetheless, some circles have continued to embrace Chang’s basic thesis. Alternative Perspective Newsletter adopted a similar line. A detailed article repeated the argument that available data posed serious questions as to predictions and extrapolations signaling China’s promising future.11 The following facts were underlined: more than 50 percent of Chinese international trade is led by foreign direct investment (i.e., conducted by foreign-invested enterprises); more than 50 percent of Chinese international trade consists of intracompany trade; and China is often the last link of the global supply chain, thereby having trade deficits with almost every economy in East Asia even though it had large trade surpluses vis-à-vis the United States (and to a lesser extent vis-à-vis the other developed economies). A large percentage of Chinese international trade consisted of trade in raw materials, intermediate inputs, and semifinished goods and services rather than finished products. In addition, China suffers from a fast-growing wealth gap and from a large income disparity between the rural and urban population; in 2012 13.4 percent of China’s population lived below the poverty line.12 (However, it should be noted that in 2011 China set a new poverty line at 2,300 renminbi—approximately $363. This new standard is significantly higher than the line set in 2009; as a result, 128 million Chinese are now considered below the poverty line.)

A very gloomy forecast regarding China was published in 2011 by Nouriel Roubini, who criticized China’s infrastructure projects, which in his opinion are completely uncalled for in a country at that level of economic development. Roubini also predicts that China’s current “overinvestment” will prove deflationary, both domestically and globally, and that once increasing fixed investment becomes impossible—most likely after 2013—China will undergo a sharp slowdown.13

Of course, one could add additional discouraging data: until the outbreak of the 2008 crisis, at least 150 million rural workers had drifted between the villages and the cities, many subsisting through part-time, low-paying jobs; furthermore, one demographic consequence of the one-child policy is that China is now one of the most rapidly aging countries in the world. Another long-term threat to China’s growth, it can be argued, is the deterioration in the environment—notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table, especially in the north. China likewise continues to lose arable land due to erosion and economic development.

Yet, when one weighs the two schools with their respective calculations and the entirely different conclusions reached, it seems that, overall, the prospects for China’s optimistic future hold greater weight. This is so since China has managed to check and balance counterproductive global waves working against it. Both the Olympic Games and the 2010 Expo seemed to help it advance economically and politically and overcome domestic difficulties; additionally, the central government has taken drastic measures to counterbalance and overcome the negative repercussions of the 2008 world crisis. There is no doubt that the relative absence of true civil society and the regime’s successful neutralization of potential popular pressure enable the establishment to surmount major opposition quite successfully. Chinese top leaders seem determined to improve the country’s economic performance. They are taking actions such as Xi Jinping’s and Li Keqiang’s visits to the most impoverished areas in China while pointing to the work that should be done to reduce poverty and financial gaps.14 The employment rate has grown, and the minimum wage has risen 20 percent since 2010. In addition China’s antipoverty alleviation programs were regarded a success story as the reform-oriented economy lifted 500 million out of poverty in the last three decades.15

In light of the overall arguments presented, Jerusalem should give serious thought to the option of periodically reassessing Israel’s familiar China policy. Perhaps the traditional line between mere “maintenance” or “service” of Israel’s relations with China and qualitative upgrades should be crossed. A more assertive China policy should be adopted. Israel might do well to encourage Beijing’s deeper involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as in the strong tensions between Jerusalem on the one hand and Damascus and Tehran on the other.

It can be argued that, as far as global international relations are concerned, Sino-Israeli relations are not so significant. US-China bilateral relations, the China–India–United States triangle, or even Beijing’s dynamic role in the UN Security Council is by far more noteworthy. Nonetheless, Sino-Israeli relations are important, especially considering Israel’s military-strategic role and position in the Middle East equation. Beijing is deeply interested in being fully involved in the peace process. This can be clearly seen, for example, by the fact that it appointed its own special envoys on the Middle East issue. Beijing also seems to hope to continue enjoying Israel’s potential to serve as one of China’s main suppliers of advanced technology and perhaps even, once again, military supplies.

A 60-Year Retrospective

Two ancient nations, cradles of rich civilizations, are geographically situated at opposite ends of the Asian continent.16 There is China, which can claim an unbroken history of development on its own land, and there is Israel, which has experienced what can be described as a virtual form of continuity—a ceaseless striving over millennia of exile to return once again to its ancient homeland.

Before the PRC was formed, the Republic of China under the Guomindang regime had established relations with the founders of the Jewish state. These relations continued after Israel declared its independence in 1948 and were expressed in China’s active support for Zionism. Following diplomatic contact with Zionist activists, pre-Communist Nationalist China was one of the 10 nations to abstain from the historic 1947 vote of the UN General Assembly to partition Palestine. The abstention by Nationalist China in fact helped to create the two-thirds majority needed to pass the decision, which demonstrated international legitimacy for the creation of the State of Israel.

A few months after achieving independence, Israel received formal recognition from Nationalist China. Not long afterwards, on 9 January 1950, following the Communist victory on mainland China and the declaration of the People’s Republic, Israel took the surprising and even daring decision to recognize the new regime, thus becoming the first country in the Middle East and the seventh in the West to take such a bold diplomatic initiative during the Cold War. From then on, Israel-Taiwan relations were conducted at the unofficial, nongovernmental, and chiefly commercial level.

Israel’s recognition of the PRC was not reciprocated by Beijing. Minister for Foreign Affairs Zhou Enlai merely acknowledged receipt of the Israeli telegram of 9 January. On behalf of the Central People’s Government, he extended greetings to Moshe Sharett, Israel’s foreign minister but left Israel’s diplomatic move unilateral.

This was the situation when the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950. On 2 July, the Israeli cabinet decided that Israel should support the UN resolutions concerning the war. While Sharett and other members of the government called to support South Korea politically and diplomatically, David Ben-Gurion startled his cabinet colleagues by proposing to contribute a contingent of Israeli soldiers to the UN command. This support, he believed, should be extended on the grounds that if Israel genuinely considered this aggression, it should send troops to join the UN forces. Ben-Gurion was overruled by his ministers, but later Israel demonstrated its support by dispatching medical aid and food for civilian relief to the UN forces in Korea. Accordingly, it was now indirectly confronting China.

The goal underlying Israel’s identification with the UN resolutions was to help stop Communist aggression in Korea, and its contribution to the UN forces represented a first step away from nonidentification with the West and toward alignment. It can certainly be defined as a strategic decision, a crucial point in Israel’s embryonic relationship with China. Relations between the two countries were now an integral part of a far wider circle of global considerations.

Interestingly, in other spheres Israel maintained its earlier pre–Korean War policy toward the PRC. Thus, for example, on 19 September 1950, Israel’s delegation at the UN General Assembly voted to allow the PRC to assume China’s seat at the organization. In this move, Israel joined a bloc of 15 member states striving toward the common goal of legitimizing the Communist regime. With the exception of 1954 (due to personal disagreement or misunderstanding between Abba Eban and Sharett), Israel’s UN delegation continued for several years to advocate Beijing’s legitimate right to China’s seat in both the General Assembly and the Security Council. It thus followed countries such as India that clearly distinguished between supporting US policy on Korea and having a fundamentally favorable policy toward the PRC.

The years 1953–55 were crucial for Sino-Israeli relations and nonrelations. In late 1953, after the Israeli delegation opened in Rangoon, Burma, and with reduced tension on the Korean Peninsula, the PRC ambassador in Rangoon, Yao Zhong-ming, contacted David Hacohen, his Israeli counterpart. Hacohen believed that his presence in Rangoon would place him in a position where he could assist in normalizing Israel’s relations with Asian countries, particularly those with China. What interested Hacohen very much was to promote trade between the two countries. Gradually, the dialogue between the two ambassadors grew wider in scope and became practical and constructive, with fruitful exchanges of ideas for economic and commercial cooperation increasingly evident between them. Hacohen also met with Zhou Enlai when the latter visited Rangoon.

In late January 1955, Israel dispatched a commercial mission to the PRC. An almost mythical vision of an El Dorado–like Chinese market gripped Israel, especially within the Israel Trade Union Federation (Histadrut), where Hacohen was one of the leading figures. The delegation visited Shenyang in Manchuria, where it held important discussions with high-ranking Chinese officials; it seemed that Israel had reached an encouraging new turning point promising closer ties between Beijing and Jerusalem.

However, it was not long before the renewed relationship between the two capitals deteriorated once more. This time the obstacle, at least for the PRC, was not Korea but the April 1955 Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia (and possibly the administrative preparations preceding the conference), whose architects decided to exclude Israel and Taiwan and indeed actually boycotted them. Afro-Asian solidarity, which had strengthened during the conference, was immediately followed by closer ties between the PRC and the Arab world, especially Egypt. This in turn led to the almost total cessation of any positive developments in PRC-Israel relations.

A year later, the Suez War broke out, and Beijing accused Israel of serving the imperialist cause. PRC-Israeli relations were frozen for a long time, and the era of nonrelations began (during which the Israeli Communist Party was the only Israeli body to stay in ongoing contact with the Chinese). At the same time, Israeli decision makers could hardly ignore warning messages from Eban, the Israeli ambassador to Washington. He argued that further evenhandedness in Israel’s policy toward China as advocated by Ambassador Hacohen could irreparably damage US-Israel relations. After thoroughly debating the question, the cabinet rejected Hacohen’s “evenhandedness” in favor of the Western (American) stance on the PRC, which was largely nurtured by the atmosphere of the Cold War. The diplomatic freedom that Israel had enjoyed until then—maintaining a de facto nonaligned foreign policy—simply evaporated. In Israel a fierce political and diplomatic debate has waged since, regarding what became known as “the missed opportunity.” This debate continued even after 1992 when Israel and China agreed on full diplomatic relations.

Neither the 1956 Suez War nor the 1967 Six Day War saw any discernible improvement in PRC-Israeli relations. On the contrary, the decade witnessed only growing PRC support for Arab and Palestinian causes.

Only in 1979, during the border war between the PRC and Vietnam, did a new era dawn for Israel-PRC relations. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which found itself in an extreme state of crisis over its failure to dispatch the Vietnamese forces effectively, sought military and technological assistance, preferably from suppliers with experience in Soviet-made arms—especially suppliers capable of upgrading their materiel. Ironically, Israel was one of the few countries able to meet the PRC’s urgent needs. Well acquainted with Soviet-made arms captured in the Middle East wars of 1967 and 1973, the Israeli military industry had incorporated highly impressive enhancements in the somewhat outmoded Soviet armaments. Shoul N. Eisenberg, a cosmopolitan Jewish businessman and entrepreneur who enjoyed exclusive privileges as an intermediary between Israel’s military industries and the PRC, played a substantial role.17 During this period of military cooperation between the two armed forces, Israel supplied the PLA with upgraded T59 tanks, originally Soviet-designed and reequipped with 105 mm guns.18 Now, relations with Israel seemed to be of increasing significance. It was the beginning of the path leading toward the establishment of proper relations.

Coinciding with Beijing’s predicament, certain fresh developments took place on the Arab-Israeli diplomatic scene that smoothed the way for improved Sino-Israeli cooperation. In 1977 President Anwar Sadat of Egypt visited Israel, and in 1979 a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was signed. From then on, China’s relations with the Palestinians declined, and Israel-PRC relations steadily improved despite fierce criticism from Beijing regarding Israel’s repeated incursions into Lebanon.

The period 1989–91 saw significant strides forward in Sino-Israeli relations. A Chinese tourism office opened in Tel Aviv, and an Israeli academic mission opened in Beijing.19 Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union; China’s push for modernization and its growing belief in Israel’s ability to further this objective; the belief in the myth of the American Jewish lobby; strained relations with the Palestinians; and the 1991 Gulf War, when Israel was attacked by Iraqi Scud missiles and refrained from retaliation, all combined to serve as a catalyst for the normalization of ties between the two countries. In addition, as a Security Council member seeking involvement in the Middle East peace process, the PRC was very aware that without full diplomatic relations with Jerusalem, Israel would simply refuse to accept Beijing as a legitimate power.

Bilateral Relations since 1992

In 1992 Israel and China established full diplomatic relations. After embassies were opened in Beijing and Tel Aviv, economic and commercial ties between Israel and the PRC grew, at first moderately and later more rapidly. Israeli technologies in fields such as hi-tech, chemical industries, communications, medical optics, and agriculture were exported from Israel to mainland China. Sino-Israeli trade (around three-quarters of which comprises Chinese exports to Israel) climbed quite impressively in 2006 to approximately $3.8 billion. In 2008 the figure reached $5.53 billion (including diamonds), catapulting China to a significant position among Israel’s trading partners. Though affected by the global financial crisis, by 2009 trade had reduced by only 17 percent (to approximately $4.5 billion, including diamonds) and in 2010 showed a quick recovery with a growth of 48 percent—to $6.78 billion. In 2011 it grew by 19 percent and in 2012 by 32 percent, compared to 2010. The 2013 number is estimated at $8 billion.20 Imports to Israel amounted to $5.4 billion in 2011, and Israel’s exports to China were $2.7 billion.21

The China trade excludes business with Hong Kong even though much of it is redirected to the mainland. Thus, the actual trade figures are higher than officially announced. Past figures do not include Israel’s lucrative arms sales to China. In the Cold War years of the 1970s through the early 1980s, these sales, according to outside observers, amounted to $3–4 billion. These clearly could not continue following the pressure exerted on Israel by the American administration.22

Fortunately for Israel, the Chinese are interested in more than just military hardware; therefore, prospects exist for increased civil trade. China is interested in continued access to Israel’s advanced technologies, particularly in the areas of agriculture, telecommunications, and defense. Israel’s Global Environmental Services was involved in a $5 million water purification project in Chinese Inner Mongolia. China is also especially interested in solar energy technologies.

Israel’s biggest export to China is hi-tech, and several established companies have entered the Chinese market. As with other countries, entry into the Chinese market has not always been easy for Israeli companies; in fact, the amount of money that Israeli companies have lost in China has yet to be studied.

At times Israel was China’s second-largest arms supplier after Russia, providing Beijing with a range of weapons including electronic components for tank communication, optical equipment, aircraft, and missiles. Besides the income, Israel also hoped that its sales of military technology would secure Beijing’s agreement not to sell specific weapons to Israel’s enemies in the Middle East. However, this arrangement placed considerable strain on American-Israeli relations, especially since Israel receives more American aid than any other country in the world. Indeed, since 1992 the US government has expressed concern over the transfer of native Israeli and derivative American military technology to the PRC, a concern publicized with regard to the Patriot Air and Missile Defense System, the Lavi jet fighter, and the Phalcon and Harpy aircraft.23 As for transactions regarding Patriot missiles, American suspicions were never proved and consistently and adamantly denied by Israel.

The PRC’s lack of access to advanced electronic and information-gathering equipment has long plagued the Chinese military. In the mid-1990s, Israel agreed to sell China the Phalcon, an Israeli-developed, sophisticated airborne radar system—with a price tag of $250 million per plane. This improved Airborne Warning and Control System—early warning radar surveillance aircraft—would allow Chinese commanders to gather intelligence and control the aircraft from a distance. However, Israel’s decision to sell the aircraft to the PRC raised serious concerns at the Pentagon. Initially the Clinton administration urged Israel to cancel the delivery and curb other weapons sales to the Chinese military. Later, it put heavier pressure on Jerusalem.

Eventually in July 2000, despite repeated assurances to China that it would honor its promise to sell the Phalcon regardless of pressure from Washington, Israel cancelled the transaction. Announcement of the cancellation came following Jiang Zemin’s visit to Israel in April 2000, notwithstanding the several guarantees from Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak that the deal would go through. Not surprisingly, Israel’s breach of promise along with the deep mortification of the Chinese leader led to a diplomatic rift between Jerusalem and Beijing.

The Phalcon fiasco provoked heated debate in Israel. Officially Israel claimed that Washington had not been clear enough as to its objection to the transaction. As far as Jerusalem was concerned, this was the origin of the misunderstanding with the US administration. Eventually Israel paid the Chinese $319 million, part as a refund for the deposit paid by the Chinese and part as compensation for the cancellation of the whole deal. The sum agreed on by the parties was in effect an escape for Israel, given Beijing’s original demand for $630 million in expenses and another $630 million as indirect compensation. This would have totaled $1.26 billion, a sum that Israel would have found almost impossible to pay.

Like the Phalcon, Israel’s Harpy drone, an unmanned assault aircraft, was exclusively the product of Israeli technology. Like the Phalcon, the Harpy could be invaluable to mainland China over the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan itself. Apparently both the United States and China lagged behind Israel in the technology used in this drone. In 1994 Israel sold the Harpy planes to Beijing and in 2004 and 2005, contracted to service and repair the drones (or parts thereof), which indeed arrived in Israel for this purpose.

The Pentagon objected to this move even though it was part of the signed contract between Jerusalem and Beijing. The Americans believed that Israel intended not only to service the Harpy aircraft but also to upgrade them although Israel denied this. Late in 2004, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan visited Israel. This visit, the first by a high-ranking official after the Phalcon affair, increased American suspicions as to Sino-Israeli relations and sparked opposition to the Harpy deal. Again the security of Taiwan was Washington’s main anxiety. The Americans demanded that Israel not return the Harpies to China even though they were undoubtedly Chinese property. Eventually it was by no means clear whether Israel returned the Harpies without servicing them or whether the planes were ever returned at all. In any event, Jerusalem agreed to pay the Chinese considerable sums in compensation. Moreover, in early September 2005, the director general of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, Amos Yaron, left the ministry following American demands that he resign. Although Israel’s foreign minister Silvan Shalom expressed regret over the whole affair, the Harpy episode reduced American-Israeli relations to their lowest ebb since the case involving Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard broke 20 years earlier.

Explicit rules regarding the transfer of technologies to China have since been agreed on or, more precisely, dictated to Israel by Washington. Moreover, the Americans have imposed restrictions on Israeli exports to China of large and small equipment as well as components that might be suitable for military and civilian (dual use) purposes. According to Chinese sources, the new regulations greatly impede civilian exports to China since all items must be scrutinized, checked, and double-checked for compliance with American demands before they can be dispatched to mainland China. Despite scrupulous compliance checks, there are no guarantees that contracts will be met, and the Chinese are uncertain that Israeli contracts will be concluded. Moreover, Beijing could always impose sanctions on Israeli enterprises not only on the mainland but also in Hong Kong. This would indeed be a grave blow to Israeli exports to other parts of the world as well since other countries may feel unsure regarding a possible US embargo, which would inflict serious damage on Israel’s export trade.

Improved Israeli-PRC relations have failed to deter Beijing from exporting arms to Israel’s potential enemies such as Iraq and Iran. Rather, China took full advantage of the protracted hostilities between the Gulf states, a practice that continued in different guises for a long time. Indeed, especially in light of the Second Lebanon War, it became clear that a new reality has emerged regarding China, Israel, and the Middle East. The PRC is now at the forefront of military technology. Furthermore, Israel is concerned about the sale and transfer of Chinese advanced weapons to nonstate organizations, dramatized acutely by an incident on 14 July 2006.24 A missile fired by Hezbollah early in the Second Lebanon War damaged the Israeli warship Hanit, a Saar 5–class missile ship off Lebanon, killing four Israel Defense Forces sailors. It was assumed that elite Iranian troops helped fire the missile, a Chinese-made C-802 Silkworm land- and sea-launched antiship missile sold to Iran a decade earlier.

The signs of a certain lull or even a regression in Sino-Israeli cultural relations followed on the heels of two outstanding successes: the visit by the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra to Beijing in 1995 and the exhibition on traditional China hosted by the Israel Museum in Jerusalem in 2001 over four months. This exhibition was unprecedented in the number of original exhibits brought specially from China. At the exhibition site, an art festival was conducted that included operatic scenes, acrobatics, dance, and various other traditional activities.

In the fall of 2000, an exhibition on the life of Albert Einstein was scheduled to visit five Chinese cities.25 The exhibition was eventually cancelled when the Chinese Ministry of Culture insisted on removing three facts relating to the famous physicist’s biography: that Einstein was Jewish, that he supported the creation of the Jewish state, and that Israel’s first prime minister invited him to be Israel’s second president, a position the elderly professor declined. Faced with heightening Arab-Israeli tension, China perhaps lacked the motivation to deflect the barrage of Arab criticism that would inevitably follow an exhibit highlighting Einstein’s ties with the Jewish state.

Nonetheless, both Israel and China remain committed to cutting-edge technological cooperation. At about the time of the Phalcon-deal cancellation and the Einstein impasse, China signed an agreement of almost equal value to the Phalcon contract for Israeli-made HK1 and 2 satellites to broadcast the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. It provided a good example of China’s ability to draw a distinction between its economic and diplomatic dealings. Understanding this aspect of Chinese behavior and mentality explains apparent disparities within the relationship, such as growing criticism still prevailing in official circles of Israel’s policies toward the Palestinian Authority alongside the conclusion of impressive financial contracts with Israeli companies to deliver hi-tech equipment.

On the whole, between 2002 and the 2005 Harpy affair, bilateral relations and commercial ties between the two countries proceeded uneventfully. An Israeli military mission visited China, and a Chinese mission visited Israel; the Chinese deputy prime minister visited Israel, and Israeli Knesset members visited China; a Sino-Israeli dry lands research center continues with its collaborative studies; and joint research projects were pursued in China’s westernmost province.

By 2013 educational and academic ties between the two countries had certainly proved themselves. Chinese students study and conduct their respective fields of research in local universities. At Tel Aviv University, for example, the Confucius Institute is active not only in academic research but also in teaching the Chinese language to members of the community, including school students. An increasing number of Israeli students travel to China and study in various provinces, exposing themselves to the Chinese language, culture, and particular disciplines, including Chinese medicine. Indeed, the various exchange programs between the two countries and between their respective academic institutions testify to constructive and productive results. There is no doubt that on both official and popular levels, reciprocal acquaintance with the two societies is growing in an impressive manner. One very apparent feature in this respect is the growing numbers of Chinese books, mainly novels and translations of classical philosophy, that have been introduced to the Hebrew reader. Likewise, Israeli works concerning Judaism, Jewish history, modern Israeli literature, and the Middle East have been translated into Chinese and are spreading in intellectual circles. Chinese Internet sites focusing on Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict are also quite common.

Gaining a Foothold in the Middle East

September 2000 saw the outbreak of the second intifada. Like most of the world, the Chinese government has been and is still highly conscious of the threat of global terrorism. Thus, even though it has shifted toward greater support for the Palestinian cause and harsher criticism of Israel’s actions in the Palestinian areas, Beijing was conscious of its own issues vis-à-vis its Uyghur population—namely, the predominantly Muslim residents in Xinjiang province—and the terrorist threat it entails.26 Early in July 2009, serious riots broke out in Ürümqi, the capital city of that remote northwestern province. After about 200 people were killed and about 1,800 injured, the government enforced curfew in most urban areas and restricted cell phone and Internet services. Even prior to the July crisis, some Palestinian circles have made statements effectively calling Xinjiang “occupied” territory. China knows that advocating a strict right to self-determination for Palestinians and Israeli Arabs may well backfire and affect the delicate situation in Xinjiang and Tibet (another problematic province as far as Beijing is concerned).

On the whole, by the beginning of 2006, following the legislative elections victory by Hamas in the Palestinian Authority and the intense concern in the United States about Iran’s nuclear energy program and a Middle Eastern arms race, China’s policy on these matters has demonstrated relative moderation. China was prepared to accommodate the new leaders in Gaza and the government in Tehran, yet at the same time it became gradually more involved in the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict and sent troops on a peacekeeping mission to Lebanon, joining UN observers there.

Another example of China’s Middle East policy emerged from the visit by China’s former foreign minister Yang Jiechi to the Middle East in late April 2009. In his discussions, he called for progress in the Middle East peace process. “‘We call upon all parties involved in the issue to take positive and trust-building measures to stabilize the situation, and pave the way for the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian talks,’ said Yang at a press conference after meeting with the Palestinian National Authority . . . Chairman Mahmoud Abbas.” He also offered a more comprehensive perspective on the greater conflict arena and said that China would like to see the launching of the Israel-Lebanon, Israel-Syria peace negotiation as soon as possible.27

He repeated China’s policy when he met Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, saying that China was ready to provide assistance to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Indeed, as the top Chinese diplomat noted, China hoped to play a constructive role in the resolution of the Middle East issue.28

On 26 April 2009, while in Damascus, Yang, testifying to China’s interest in serving an active role in the region, issued a five-point proposal to advance the Middle East peace process. “As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China will continue to maintain close communication and coordination with parties concerned to play a constructive role in pushing for a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the Middle East issue,” he said after presenting the proposal.29

Despite the declarations and the presence of its special envoy, China’s input in the Middle East has been hardly felt until recently. Its default position is to a great extent pro-Arab in view of its energy interests and its traditional political and ideological interests in Third World countries. It seems that dependence on Middle Eastern oil is considerable.30 No wonder, therefore, that China has on the whole adopted an accommodating policy toward the Arab world and Tehran. Some even say that China’s geopolitical power would increasingly hinge on access to the Middle East’s vast oil supplies. Another interesting fact shows that many Middle Eastern and African states selling oil or oil concessions to China are buyers of Chinese weapons. Arms sales have given China an opportunity to gain a foothold in the region and perhaps strategically develop long-term connections in order to secure its growing energy interests.31

However, by the beginning of the second decade of the 2000s, one could notice a relative improvement in Sino-Israeli relations regarding defense and security matters. Between 12 and 16 June 2011, Israeli defense minister Barak made a visit to China—the first visit of its kind in over a decade. Undoubtedly this was an important breakthrough in Sino-Israeli relations since 2000. Barak met with his Chinese counterpart, the chief of staff, and the deputy prime minister and made an official inspection at some military sites. Despite the absence of any indication that concrete agreements were reached regarding the sales of arms or military technology transfer, one should note that three weeks following Barak’s visit, it was learned that Israeli industries would participate in an international tender concerning the establishment of a factory for manufacturing executive jet planes in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. In the tender, initiated by the Chinese Aviation Industry Corporation, Canadian and American companies participated alongside Israeli firms.

On 14 August 2011, Chen Bingde, the Chinese chief of staff, arrived in Israel. He met with President Shimon Peres, Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Binyamin “Benny” Gantz, chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces.32 Strategic matters, collaboration in various technological fields between the two countries, and the international tender were most probably discussed.

It can be said that summer 2011 signified a turning point in Sino-Israeli relations. This trend continued through 2012 and 2013 despite Beijing’s fierce criticism of Israel’s November 2012 “Pillar of Defense” military operation in Gaza. In August 2012, the Qingdao guided-missile destroyer, the Yantai guided-missile frigate, and the Weishan Lake comprehensive supply ship of the 11th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force under the Navy of the Chinese PLA arrived at the Haifa Port in northern Israel for a four-day-long friendly visit.33 It was the first time for Chinese naval ships to visit Israel. Israeli officials also visited China, one such visit taking place in July 2013 when Naftali Bennett, minister of industry, trade, and labor, met with Chinese officials such as the National Development and Reform Commission’s deputy head. As a former entrepreneur himself, Bennett tried to solve the sensitive issue of foreign ventures in China and help Israeli companies penetrate the Chinese market.34 Prior to this visit, Prime Minister Netanyahu visited China in May—the first visit by an Israeli prime minister since Ehud Olmert’s 2007 trip. Netanyahu met with Premier Li Keqiang, and the two leaders decided to set up a special work group to study bilateral economic and social cooperation. They also signed cooperation documents in such fields as agriculture, technology, finance, and education.35 Netanyahu reiterated that China was an essential engine for continued Israeli economic growth: “We don’t need to compete. . . . If we join our efforts, we can have competitive dominance in the world.”36

During the Israeli prime minister’s visit, Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president, conducted his own tour of China. The Chinese thus made it crystal clear that they would no longer leave the Middle East peace process to the United States and Europe alone. The new leaders, Li and Xi, seem to have adopted a subtle shift in conducting their foreign policy—one that would allow China to emerge not only as a leading economic power but also as a prominent diplomatic authority. China would thus need to address sensitive issues—mainly those relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—and maintain good relations with both Israel and Palestine. Beijing’s idea, which never materialized, to make the two leaders meet while on Chinese soil seems to have been a clear indication of its future moves. Interestingly, Netanyahu’s visit was preceded by reported Israeli strikes against Syrian military sites. In order not to spoil the visit, Chinese spokeswoman Hua Chunying expressed restrained criticism of the strikes and avoided naming Israel. Xi and Li, on their part, stressed during their meetings with Netanyahu the need to create the desirable conditions that would enable restarting negotiations between the two parties with the view to advance peace in the entire region.37

Beijing’s foreign policy shift may have its own effect on traditional cordial relations between Washington and Jerusalem. Following Netanyahu’s visit, it was reported that he had succumbed to pressure exerted by Beijing and prevented a former Israeli intelligence official, Uzi Shaya, from testifying in a certain trial to be held in New York. The case involved the Bank of China, which had apparently acted as a conduit for cash used to carry out a Palestinian terrorist attack in which an American citizen had been killed. The victim’s parents decided to sue the bank, having guarantees from the Israeli government that relevant Israeli officials would testify in the trial. The Chinese authorities most probably threatened to cancel Netanyahu’s visit unless he prevented the crucial testimony.

According to some analysts, at a time when relations between Beijing and Washington seemed strained over issues of cybersecurity and theft of intellectual property, Netanyahu chose China. American senators and the victim’s family naturally criticized the decision, but to this day Israel has not been asked to pay a real price for this incident. Chinese officials described Netanyahu’s visit as “determining the direction [Sino-Israeli] the relationship will take in the coming years, elevating ties to a new level.”38 The questions to be asked are whether Jerusalem had not repeated the mistaken path it had taken in the arms-sale fiascoes from a decade earlier. Doesn’t the fact that the Chinese showed no interest in resolving the dispute peaceably and that they actually dictated their line to Israel serve as a sign of what will come? Isn’t the new, more-involved line in China’s foreign policy a symptom of an authoritarian, assertive, and demanding price tag?

International Perspectives and Future Prospects

Prior to the outbreak of the world financial crisis, Chinese historians studied the rise and fall of great powers such as Spain, imperial Britain, and even the United States. An updated version of their research was presented to members of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and shown as a 12-part series on television. After all, China has itself become an empire (albeit without colonies) and a major international power although international public opinion has yet to internalize this development. China amassed foreign currency reserves, and if Beijing decided, for example, to transfer a large part of its investments into euro-denominated holdings and did so cautiously and thoughtfully, it could do considerable damage to the American economy. Indeed, China has become a major factor capable of influencing the fate of the world’s leading power, not to mention other countries.

After the end of the Cold War, it became a commonplace that the bipolar international system no longer existed and that the United States, the sole superpower, maintained an almost two-decade-long, unshakable hegemonic position. This common belief seems not to have taken into account China’s “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi), especially apparent prior to the present global financial crisis.

Thus, as far as Israel’s grand strategy is concerned, China’s economic-financial performance and the prospects for a tangible, global, diplomatic strategic rise ought to arouse serious thinking as to the future priorities of its global orientation. In addition, China’s drive to seek scientific and technological cooperation and even multilateral security arrangements with countries such as Israel that are considered US allies could potentially be a serious bone of contention between China and the United States. Only when repercussions are felt in the Middle East would those issues become urgent for Israel.

Should China’s appetite for natural resources increase again, it might re-create deep anxiety in Washington and lead to a dangerous if not historical crossroads with ripple effects on Israel and the Middle East. Indeed, historically speaking, the clashes among two contending powers emanating from a search for mere living space or a battle over survival can lead to quite unfortunate results. Just as in the critical juncture during the Korean War, Israel might find itself in a situation with formative and far-reaching implications.

Israel has come a long way since the late 1970s when its Foreign Ministry, facing budgetary cutbacks, decided to close Israeli missions in Hong Kong and South Korea. In those days, Israel’s Eurocentric orientation was so strong that the appointment of yet another diplomat in Paris or New York was seen as much more urgent than maintaining delegations in emerging East Asia countries.

A consulate general in Guangzhou was opened in March 2009 to enhance cooperation between Israel and four important provinces in southeast China—Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian, and Hainan—populated by about 220 million people in an area 30 times the size of Israel. A new consular mission is planned in Chengdu. Measures such as stepping up cooperation in agriculture and technology for peaceful purposes and promoting Chinese tourism to Israel are designed to double and even triple the volume of Sino-Israeli trade. They seem necessary in view of the limitations on Israeli strategic exports to China currently imposed by the United States. These and possible sanctions imposed by Beijing, under specific circumstances on Israeli enterprises, could mean a grave blow to Israeli exports elsewhere in the world as well. Therefore, prospects for increased China-Israel trade are far from assured, and hopes cherished in Jerusalem regarding bilateral trade relations may not materialize.

A drastic change of course by Jerusalem vis-à-vis China could be seen as an unwise and premature move that could risk what Israel has at hand—namely, Washington’s full sympathy and support. As for the disappointment regarding trade with China, again one can argue that, given the rigid constraints imposed by the American administration following the Phalcon and Harpy affairs, Jerusalem finds itself in an impossible position and has to continue to accept the American demands/requests unconditionally. Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether more imaginative and creative steps should be tried.

From the Chinese viewpoint, improved relations with Israel and the Jewish people risk bringing into focus China’s difficulty with its Muslim minority, an issue reminiscent of Israel’s past dealings with India. Robust Sino-Israeli relations are also likely to jeopardize China’s relations with the greater Muslim world and hamper its growing dependence on Middle Eastern oil producers. On the other hand, closer China-Israel links could benefit Sino-American relations.

In light of the narrative and thesis presented here, and despite the various constraints, it seems that significant steps should be taken to further improve Sino-Israeli relations and enable Jerusalem to benefit from ever-closer relations with Beijing. Israel should try to gradually venture an alternative, cautious, fresh policy toward China. Its decision makers must internalize the emerging global situation, especially in light of the possible scenario that not one hegemonic power but two (or three) will be present in the international arena. Indeed, in the emerging bipolar or tripolar world, China will be cast as a major actor.

As already mentioned, it seems that Israel should periodically reassess its overall China policy. While it could certainly expect an increase of its exports of civilian products and technologies to the PRC, the renewing of exports of military materiel there is unlikely, at least for the foreseeable future. Even the export of products with dual-use characteristics appears difficult. Jerusalem should likewise conduct a serious examination and see whether all proper efforts have been exerted to enhance trade with China. Removal of administrative obstructions relating to trade with China is most urgent. Also, concrete steps to strengthen pro-Israeli sentiments still prevailing among Chinese intellectuals and within wide circles of the Chinese public must be taken. Israelis in various fields should approach young, promising Chinese likely to become China’s next reservoir of leadership both at the national and regional levels and seek further collaboration and enhancement in “neutral” fields—agriculture and sciences included. Strengthening of informal, academic, and research contacts with various relevant quarters in China is also of utmost importance.

A quiet yet substantial transformation is taking place at present in the international arena, and decision makers in Jerusalem should be careful not to disregard it. They should even take more daring steps toward Beijing, though at times this seems impractical.

Notes

1. See, for example, Paul Rivlin, “The Economic Melt-Down (1): America,” Tel Aviv Notes, 28 October 2008.

2. See, for example, Terry Burnham, “Economist Warns We’re Unable to See the Coming Economic Collapse,” PBS Newshour, 11 July 2013, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/07/ben

-bernanke-as-easter-bunny-why-the-fed-cant-prevent-the-coming-crash.html; Tyler Durden, “40 Stats That Show the U.S. Economy’s Real Collapse over the Past Decade,” Zero Hedge, 18 July 2013, http://www.zerohedge.com/node/476588; and Michael Snyder, “The Biggest Ponzi Scheme in the History of the World,” The Economic Collapse (blog), 23 June 2013, http://theeconomiccollapseblog.com/archives

/the-biggest-ponzi-scheme-in-the-history-of-the-world.

3. The Internet includes numerous articles and sources on this issue. See, for example, “China Must Protect Iran Even with WWIII,” Press TV, 22 January 2012; Manochehr Dorraj and Carrie L. Currier, “Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a Changing World,” Middle East Policy 15, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 66–80; Gordon Mathews and Yang Yang, “How Africans Pursue Low-End Globalization in Hong Kong and Mainland China,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 41, no. 2 (2012): 95–120; “Africa and China: More than Minerals,” Economist, 23 March 2013, http://www.economist.com/news

/middle-east-and-africa/21574012-chinese-trade-africa-keeps-growing-fears-neocolonialism-are

-overdone-more; Katherine Koleski, Backgrounder: China in Latin America (Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 27 May 2011), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites

/default/files/Research/Backgrounder_China_in_Latin_America.pdf; and “China’s Economic Rise Provides Mixed Benefits for Latin America,” News America Media, 2011, http://newamericamedia

.org/2011/01/latin-america-divided-over-ties-with-china-growing-suspicions-over-chinese-presence-in-latin-america.php.

4. “Russia Will Not Allow Libya-Style Military Intervention in Syria,” Middle East Online, 1 November 2011, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=48833.

5. Aaron Klein, “Syria ‘Used Chinese Intel to Bomb’ U.S. Arms Shipment,” WND, 7 January 2013, http://www.wnd.com/2013/07/syria-used-chinese-intel-to-bomb-u-s-arms-shipment/#Hzt8yqql4

VJBYIwY.99.

6. “China,” International Monetary Fund, accessed April 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs

/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2012&ey=2018&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=924&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CGGXWDG_NGDP&grp=0&a=&pr.x=41&pr.y=17.

7. “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects,” International Monetary Fund, accessed April 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=1980&ey=2018&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=40&pr1.y=0&c=924&s=NGDP_RPCH%2CPPPPC&grp=0&a=.

8. World Bank, accessed August 2013, http://www.worldbank.org; “Reserves of Foreign Exchange and Gold,” CIA World Factbook, accessed August 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2188rank.html; and International Monetary Fund, accessed August 2013, http://www.imf.org. “According to Goldman Sachs projections, the Chinese economy will overtake that of the United States in 2027, and by 2050 will be almost twice the size. This—together with the rise of India, in particular—will bring down the curtain on the age of the west. . . . Instead of western universalism, we will find ourselves living in an increasingly unfamiliar world in which nonwestern cultures, and above all China, will be the dominant influences.” Martin Jacques, “Welcome to China’s Millennium,” Guardian, 23 June 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/23/china-martin-jacques-economics.

9. Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001).

10. Ibid., xviii.

11. Shukla Madhukar, “A World Deceived by ‘Numbers/Facts,’ ” Alternative Perspective (blog), 11 August 2005, http://alternativeperspective.blogspot.com/2005/08/world-deceived-by-numbers-facts

.html.

12. “China: Population below Poverty Line,” Index Mundi, accessed August 2013, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=ch&v=69.

13. See Nouriel Roubini, “China’s Bad Growth Bet,” Project Syndicate, 14 April 2011, http://www

.project-syndicate.org/commentary/roubini37/English. For other pessimistic forecasts regarding China, see, for example, A. Gary Shilling, “Why China’s Heading for a Hard Landing, Part 3,” Bloomberg, 28 June 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-28/shilling-why-china-is-heading-for-a-hard-landing-pt-3.html.

14. “China Still Has 200 Million Poor below Poverty Line,” Economic Times, 31 December 2012, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-31/news/36079605_1_wealth-gap-li-keqiang-poverty-line.

15. “China Road Map,” IEG World Bank, accessed August 2013, https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org

/ieg-search?keys=CHINA%20ROAD%20MAP%202030.

16. This part is based on numerous primary and secondary sources, including the Israeli and Chinese foreign offices as well as Aron Shai, “China and Israel—Strange Bedfellows, 1948–2006,” in China and Antiterrorism, ed. Simon Shen (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007), 147–62; and Aron Shai, Israel and China (forthcoming).

17. In 1987 the Israeli government decided to foster trade relations with China, and Amos Yudan was elected to manage this operation by establishing COPECO, a commercial company in Hong Kong. The company was very instrumental in the future establishment of commercial relations between the two countries.

18. The T59 is a Chinese-produced version of the ubiquitous Soviet T-54A tank. It formed the backbone of the Chinese Army until the early 2000s.

19. This was headed by Prof. Joseph Shalhevet (appointed 1990). In 1992, when diplomatic relations with the PRC were established, he served as Israel’s cultural attaché. Israel’s consulate general in Hong Kong, headed by Reuven Merhav, was most instrumental in preparing the ground toward the establishment of Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations.

20. According to Naftali Bennett, the minister of industry, trade, and labor, during his visit to China. See the Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor website, accessed August 2013, http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/exeres/D46E2959-B545-4D7E-9DFD-239906B520C9.htm.

21. See, for example, Israel Trade.org, http://www.israeltrade.org.cn; Tamas.gov, http://www.tamas

.gov.il; and memoranda sent to the author by the trade representative to China, Embassy of Israel, Beijing, 8 August 2008 and March 2009.

22. Indeed, the China-Israel trade between January and April 2009 decreased by 18 percent in comparison to the same period in 2008. Israel Export and International Cooperation Institute, accessed 7 July 2011, http://www.export.gov.il/eng/HomePage/.

23. The Internet includes many references to this issue. For a summary and some interpretation, see Shai, “China and Israel.”

24. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 July 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism.

25. See, for example, Shai, “China and Israel.”

26. For more on Xinjiang in this context, see, for example, Colin Mackerras, “Xinjiang and the War against Terrorism,” in Shen, China and Antiterrorism, 91–112; and Yitzhak Shichor, Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations, Policy Studies 53 (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2009), http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/10349/ps053.pdf?sequence=1.

27. “Chinese FM Urges Resumption of Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks,” China View, 23 April 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-04/23/content_11238582.htm.

28. See, for example, China Daily, http://www.mp3-mp4-ipod.cn/china/2009-04/24/content_7711957

.htm; and “Israeli President Meets with Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi,” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland, 23 April 2009, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/xwdt/t558942.htm.

29. See “Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Makes Five-Point Proposal to Promote Mideast Peace Process,” accessed 28 October 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/wjbz/2467/t559690.htm.

30. For more on this topic see, for example, China Daily, accessed 28 October 2013, http://www

.chinadaily.com.cn.

31. William Pentland, “Did the U.S. Invade Iraq to Contain China?,” Forbes, 7 January 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/01/07/did-the-u-s-invade-iraq-to-contain-china/.

32. See, for example, Yaakov Katz, “Chinese Army Chief Due in Israel Next Week,” Jerusalem Post, 8 August 2011, http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=232878.

33. Chen Dianhong and Mi Jinguo, “11th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Returns Home after Visiting Israel,” People’s Daily Online, 21 August 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/7918

352.html.

34. Ministry of Economy (in Hebrew), 8 July 2013, http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/exeres/D46E2959

-B545-4D7E-9DFD-239906B520C9.htm.

35. Li Xiaokun, Cheng Guangjin, and Chen Weihua, “China, Israel Boost Cooperation,” China Daily, 9 May 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/09/content_16486378.htm.

36. Herb Keinon, “The Symbiosis of China and Israel,” Jerusalem Post, 11 May 2013, http://www

.jpost.com/Features/Front-Lines/A-match-made-in-heaven-312722.

37. Multiple reports on the visits. See, for example, Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, “China Dips a Toe into Middle East Peace,” New York Times, 8 May 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09

/world/asia/china-dips-a-toe-into-mideast-diplomacy.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y&_r=2&; Keinon, “Symbiosis of China and Israel”; and Alex Pevzner, “China Offers Subtle Signals of Encouragement for Netanyahu,” Times of Israel, 10 May 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/china-offers-subtle-signals-of-encouragement-for-netanyahu/.

38. Sam Chester, “Netanyahu Favors Chinese Interests in Terror Case, Causing Dismay All Around,” Tablet, 20 August 2013, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/141261/netanyahu-chooses-china?all=1.

A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia by Aaron Friedberg. W. W. Norton, 2011, 384 pp., $15.00.

Aaron Friedberg, professor of politics at Princeton University and former national security advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney, has produced a thorough examination of the past, present, and future trajectories of the US-China relationship. Friedberg has combined a sweeping diplomatic history with a mainstream center-right appraisal of the security, economic, and political prospects facing the world’s two largest economies.

Given the author’s unassailable credentials in the academic and policy-

making elite, it is remarkable how often Friedberg finds himself in stark opposition to the prevailing consensus of Washington’s foreign policy community. He is loathe to accept the view held by nearly 60 percent of Council on Foreign Relations members that China and the United States are destined to become strategic partners or even allies. Rather, Friedberg posits a future bilateral relationship characterized by increasing competition across the spectrum, and particularly in the diplomatic and security realms.

Significantly, and at odds with many in US foreign policy circles, he sees a future competition with China driven as much by ideological fissures as the cold logic of geopolitics. In examining US foreign policy since 1945, he notes the tremendous difficulty faced by presidents forced to convince a skeptical US public of the good intentions of undemocratic and often repressive regimes. Given the emphasis placed by US political culture on the internal characteristics of foreign governments and the unlikelihood (not to mention inadvisability) of this altering in the foreseeable future, Friedberg predicts an inherent tension between a democracy-promoting United States and a demonstrably undemocratic China. Until the Chinese Communist Party is replaced by a regime whose internal composition is more compatible with US values, Friedberg sees the two countries on course for sustained rivalry.

Nowhere is this anticipated rivalry more pronounced than in the security and diplomatic chessboard of the Western Pacific. Friedberg’s analysis is particularly strong in its appraisal of the diplomatic balance in the Asia-Pacific and the precarious position in which the United States finds itself, confronting both China’s advantage of geographic proximity and its own looming fiscal constraints. While Friedberg avoids a programmatic discussion of the capabilities needed for sustained US presence in the region, he is clear as to the larger security challenges facing the United States and the political implications of a real or perceived diminution of US power. An examination of the region’s current balance finds China holding the mantle of “strong horse,” with weaker states intertwined economically, wary of China’s growing might and penchant for belligerent rhetoric and fearful of the US relative economic and military decline. Friedberg notes that security developments in the region, and particularly Beijing’s broad-based and opaque military modernization, are calling into question US staying power and the durability of the US-built international order in East Asia.

The antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) challenge posed by China’s multispectrum defense modernization represents a fundamental threat to the US alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific. Although he tends toward generalities in the area of specific defense acquisitions, Friedberg is cogent on the threat emanating from Beijing’s fast-paced development of platforms capable of directly challenging US access to the waters and airspace of the Western Pacific. US power in the region, as demonstrated during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, is predicated on the ability of Navy carrier strike groups to freely access areas of potential conflict to deter and, if necessary, reverse attempts to alter the regional balance. Capabilities like China’s antiship ballistic missile, which could force US carriers and their relatively short-range complement of aircraft from China’s coastal waters, represent more than simply the acquisition of another weapons system. By potentially limiting the US ability to project power in the Asia-Pacific, Beijing will force allies from Japan to the Philippines to Taiwan to reevaluate their place in the US-led alliance system.

Ultimately, Friedberg’s analysis contends that US military power undergirds the power of its alliances and partnerships in the region, which in turn sustains the liberal international order that has given rise to East Asia’s unprecedented peace and prosperity. China, confronted with US allies surrounding its vital sea lanes and an economy dependent on oceanic commerce vulnerable to the US Navy’s predations, represents an alternative model of regional leadership. In Friedberg’s telling, so long as Beijing remains a closed, authoritarian political system, the chances of prolonged competition with the United States remain virtually certain. Absent domestic political reform that would leave the US public and political leadership significantly less suspicious of its intentions and internal processes, Friedberg foresees a century dominated by Sino-US rivalry in an evolving competition to shape the regional balance in East Asia and perhaps beyond.

Friedberg’s narrative is concise and evenly balanced between a recitation of the bilateral relationship’s postwar history and a series of astute predictions for future prospects. In particular, his emphasis on the need for the United States to execute a serious and prolonged program of regional diplomacy while investing in the game-changing technologies required to sustain US military strength in the Asia-Pacific is particularly apt. By writing from a holistic and somewhat general perspective on the Sino-US relationship, Friedberg is able to shed important light on the tectonic forces that will shape the regional security environment for years to come.

Alexander B. Gray

Defense Analyst, House of Representatives

A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe by Michael Creswell. Harvard University Press, 2006, 256 pp., $66.00.

Florida State University professor Michael Creswell’s A Question of Balance: How France and the United States Created Cold War Europe examines a topic of considerable interest to scholars of Cold War politics and strategy as well as European integration: the contribution of France to the postwar European international order. In 1940 Nazi Germany cast France down from a world power to  a virtual nonentity in the council of nations. Yet after World War II, France would once again become an important actor by securing a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations, playing a leading role in European integration, and exploding its own atomic bomb in 1960. The contribution of the French Fourth Republic (1947–58) to this tale of French resurgence has been contested by historians. At first they viewed it as an unfortunate prelude to the true work of resurgence undertaken by the Gaullist Fifth Republic (1958–present). It was blamed for both the loss of empire and the reduction of France to the status of an American puppet incapable of having its interests respected. Particularly important in this latter regard was the German problem (the status of a defeated Germany within Europe). The French were seen as having been forced to swallow the rehabilitation and rearmament of Germany in the 1950s despite their misgivings.

With the opening of crucial private paper collections and government archives in France to academic research, new works began to appear in the 1990s that challenged these earlier negative assessments of the Fourth Republic. In the first wave of this revisionism appeared the challenge to the view that France was simply an American puppet, shorn of independent initiative in the international arena. Instead, this wave of revisionism emphasized the indispensability of France to American Cold War plans and the leverage that this granted to the French in works like Irwin Wall’s The United States and the Making of Postwar France (1991). More recent works have endorsed even more enthusiastically the international policy of the Fourth Republic. William Hitchcock’s France Restored (1998) broke new ground by maintaining that far from being a pawn in the Cold War, the France of the Fourth Republic was a key player, largely responsible for the shape of the Western Europe that emerged in the 1950s.

A Question of Balance continues this trend of positive reassessment. The focus of this historic monograph revolves around the quarrel between the American and French governments over the rearmament and reintegration of West Germany into Western Europe in the 1950s. Only five short years after the end of the Second World War, with the Cold War reaching new heights of intensity following the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950, American secretary of state Dean Acheson proposed to his North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners that West Germany should contribute troops to the alliance. What followed is familiar in its broad outlines. A reluctant France countered in October 1950 with a plan for a supranational army that would ultimately morph into the European Defense Community (EDC). Despite having proposed this plan, after years of delay and indecision, the French National Assembly scuttled it in August 1954. Nonetheless, a few short months later the same national assembly endorsed the Paris Accords that permitted West Germany to supply troops to NATO.

Earlier historians have viewed this episode as a tale of French obstructionism that ultimately culminated in the triumph of American policy priorities. Creswell, however, seeks to put to rest definitively the view that France was forced by the United States to accept German rearmament against its will. Instead, he is careful to point out that given the military imbalance between Soviet and NATO forces in Western Europe, France’s political and military leadership accepted the necessity of German rearmament. This was a dispute over its timing and character, not whether or not it should occur. Creswell persuasively argues that France’s political leadership succeeded in compelling the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to accept its preferences for German rearmament. French decision makers held out until the conditions emerged that allowed them to accept German rearmament on their terms. Crucially, these terms included long-term Anglo-American military commitments to continental Europe and the assurance that France would maintain the military lead over its neighbor thanks to a prohibition against German possession of nuclear weapons (p. 6).

In a remarkable demonstration of concision, the author weaves together the French, American, German, and British dimensions of this complex tale into a short book. The result is a work that should at last end the simplistic view that French leadership in the 1950s opposed German rearmament altogether and that French policy must be understood simply as a series of intricate maneuvers to avoid the inevitable. Instead, Creswell shows us that the French German policy was far more realistic, sophisticated, and ultimately successful than earlier works have argued.

One does wonder, however, if Creswell overstates the triumph achieved by the Fourth Republic’s international policy with the Paris Accords and the Western European Union. It is true that the French succeeded in delaying German rearmament until both its timing and its nature seemed more appropriate to the French—although more by fumbling than by conscious design. Nonetheless, one of the central dilemmas of French defense policy remained unresolved: the balancing of its European and overseas interests. As the author ably demonstrates, the French state’s ability to ensure its military superiority over a rearmed Germany and thus remain the backbone of NATO forces in Europe (with all the political influence that would flow from such a position) was a central concern throughout the entire Pleven Plan–EDC episode. The inability to do so while the Indochina War dragged on was often at the heart of the reluctance of the military leadership to embrace these defense integration schemes. With the Paris Accords and the creation of the Western European Union, France at last agreed that Germany would be permitted to form 12 divisions. Yet with the outbreak of the Algerian War on the heels of the Indochina War, France’s ability to surpass this figure remained in jeopardy. Indeed, with French forces continuing to be diverted from Europe, the new Bundeswehr steadily replaced the French Army as NATO’s spearhead in Europe. Thus, at least in this one area, the timing of German rearmament still remained far from ideal for France.

The author draws his conclusions from an impressive archival foundation that runs to four pages in his bibliography. He has consulted all of the relevant government documents and private papers in France, the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, and Switzerland. This clearly written and exhaustively researched work clarifies the dizzyingly complex EDC affair. It is to be highly recommended to those interested in the early years of NATO and the European integration as well as American and French military and Cold War strategy in the 1950s. It shows that gone forever are the days in which Cold War Europe can be understood simply in terms of American designs and European resistance.

Mark Thompson

Stephens College

Adapt: Why Success Always Starts with Failure by Tim Harford. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011, 309 pp., $27.00.

In Adapt, Tim Harford argues that the three essential steps to successful innovation and adaptation are “to try new things, in the expectation that some will fail; to make failure survivable, because it is common; and to make sure that you know when you’ve failed” (p. 36). At first blush this statement seems like a blinding lightning bolt of the obvious. However, Harford’s book provides an exposé of modern-day complexity and how good ideas are often strangled in their crib by bureaucracies that are threatened by any new thinking that challenges the status quo. In making his point about adaptation, he examines some of the world’s most daunting problems: counterinsurgency, climate change, financial crisis, and global poverty.

Harford is an economist by education and specialization. His book The Undercover Economist was part of the new wave of economics and idea books that broke ground by making statistical analysis more accessible to the masses and challenging readers to conceptualize problems differently. Books like Blink and Freakonomics fit this trendy genre. He attempts to break complex subjects into digestible and logical time lines to lay bare the mistakes of key leaders and corporate cultures.

Adapt is a fun read, and Harford is a great storyteller. However, the inherent political nature of topics like climate change and global poverty may leave the reader doubting the applicability of his case studies to other problem sets. The author is on surer ground when he tackles topics where his economics background lends more credence. His discussion of Darwinian selection, evolution (i.e., adaptation), and experimentation is thought-provoking. His comparison of financial bankruptcies to extinction modeling is interesting. While discussing military themes, Harford does hit on a piece of military history worth recounting for those interested in airpower—the story of the Spitfire fighter plane of World War II lore. He concludes that victory in the Battle of Britain with the Spitfire was due to a culture of creativity and risk taking by a small group of aircraft and propulsion engineers financed by an eccentric, risk-taking millionaire. The key was an organizational culture that encouraged and rewarded forward thinking at the risk of failure.

However, if you are a reader who is familiar with the Iraq campaign and the implementation of the counterinsurgency strategy, Harford’s narrative on Iraq will leave you dissatisfied. His opening salvo delving into the topic of adaptability and failure is a case study on the US military and its many mistakes in Iraq. He begins with a play-by-play of the Marine Corps’s Haditha incident in which 24 Iraqi civilians were killed in November 2005, a horrific scene eerily reminiscent of the March 2012 report of a rogue Soldier killing 17 civilians in Afghanistan. To illustrate his point about bureaucratic leaders, he focuses the spotlight on former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld and asserts that Rumsfeld’s watch was marred by poor assumptions, micromanagement, an inability to admit error, and, ultimately, a failure to adapt.

His examination of Rumsfeld is akin to a piñata that has been knocked down and trampled: the party is over and the candy is all gone. This is ground that has been covered and recovered by so many authors that it offers little new to the military reader. To read Tim Harford’s assessment of Iraq is to provide a Cliffs Notes version of Thomas Ricks’s Fiasco and The Gamble, sprinkled with narration from Greg Jaffe’s The Fourth Star. His examination of the Vietnam War opens no new insights into Pres. Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, or the military writ large. His depiction of Vietnam appears to be an abbreviated version of H. R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty but misses the point that Vietnam under Johnson was not simply a story about a failure to adapt but, as McMaster succinctly puts it in his closing argument, a story of “arrogance, weakness, lying in the pursuit of self-interest, and, above all, the abdication of responsibility to the American people” (p. 334).

A fundamental question for the military reader is, how does one create a learning organization—one that encourages experimentation and failure and promotes those who take smart risks? This is where an examination of counterinsurgency tenets and organizational culture is more relevant to the task. Adapt and learning are key words in today’s military lexicon. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, the seminal doctrine used by American and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, uses the word adapt 89 times but mentions the word learn or learning 179 times, for it is the learning that leads to the ability to adapt to new circumstances or information.

So, how does one create a learning organization that rewards thoughtful risk taking and the process of learning from mistakes (or “failure” in Harford’s vernacular), which leads to improved adaptability? Military professionals interested in these issues would do better to read Edgar Shein’s Organizational Culture and Leadership, Carl Builder’s seminal work The Masks of War, or any of the aforementioned books on Iraq than Harford’s views on global warming, poverty, or warfare. Conducting institutional self-examination and gaining an understanding of organizational culture best inform leaders on ways to create the trust needed for experimentation, innovation, and adaptability. In searching for a final thought on this book, I am reminded of something a colonel told me when I was a young captain during a meeting in which I clearly missed the mark: “What you just said is interesting but not relevant.” And so goes my recommendation for this book: interesting but not terribly relevant—to the military reader.

Lt Col Shannon W. Caudill, USAF

Air Command and Staff College

After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West by Ayse Zarakol. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 312 pp., $90.00.

The increasingly independent international agency of countries such as China, Brazil, India, and Turkey in global affairs has led many commentators to argue that we are witnessing the emergence of a “world without the West.” They suggest that the patterns and practice of international politics are being transformed by rules, norms, and institutions whose origin is not in the West. Thus, the ongoing financial crisis affecting both sides of the Atlantic seems to confirm this palpable perception of a decline in the significance of Europe and North America. Most observers take this to herald a qualitatively new condition in world affairs often labeled simply “a shift to the East” in international politics.

History tends to confirm the novelty of these nascent global dynamics. For at least 200 years, the rivalry over structural power in global politics has tended to be “the great game” of Western actors. Thus, the so-called Oriental/Third World/developing nations have been the plaything of Western whims—either as mere observers (at best) or as victims (at worst). In both instances, however, agency (especially, global agency) was not a feature of their international identity. Instead they were assumed to be passive recipients of the Western gaze/rule/aid as scripted by the templates of colonialism, the Cold War order, and democratization.

In this context, the growing prominence of non-Western agency has challenged both the perception and centrality of Western actors in international politics. At the same time, such agency vividly demonstrates that non-Western actors are just as willing and skilled to engage in the global playground as Western ones. Yet, as Ayse Zarakol argues, the mainstream acknowledgment of this new reality generally tends to overlook the way in which non-Western states have learned to live with the West in the wake of their “defeat.” Zarakol, an assistant professor of politics at Washington and Lee University, provides one of the most thoughtful accounts of this experience to date.

According to Zarakol, the non-West has consistently and deliberately been stigmatized in the mainstream discourses of international relations. This seems to have positioned them as perennially stuck between the frameworks of external perceptions and their internalized reflections. Only recently have commentators begun to seriously question the pervasive associations between “Eastern, backward, Asian, Muslim, uncivilized, barbaric, etc.” ways of life (p. 3). In this setting, Zarakol demonstrates the relational nature of this derogatory labeling of non-Western actors and reveals poignantly that stigmatization is “as much [about] the internalization of a particular normative standard that defines one’s own attributes as discreditable, as it is a label of difference imposed from outside” (p. 4). This acknowledges the significance of the strategic storytelling of non-Western actors that seems to have been accorded little attention (if not entirely occluded) in the mainstream accounts of global affairs.

Through the exploration of the complex narratives underpinning the dynamics of international politics, Zarakol uncovers attitudes about self and other that do not transpire in conventional accounts of trade figures, geopolitical interests, and security threats. Looking particularly at the experience of Turkey, Japan, and Russia after their “defeats” by the West—for Turkey, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; for Japan, its demise in World War II; and for Russia, the breakup of the Soviet Union—Zarakol contextualizes the role of othering as a central feature of the patterns and practices of world affairs. Indicative of who is positioned inside a community of international interactions or excluded from it, the non-Western other provides both a context and tangible frame of reference for the simultaneous recognition and projection of the identity and dominance of Western international actors in global politics.

The framing of non-Western actors as the perennial others of international affairs has created the facilitating environment for the legitimation of different forms of Western intervention and supremacy. Thus, non-Western actors have consistently been denied their subjectivity in international life. As a result of such consistent projection of the perceptions, attitudes, and feelings of Western actors onto the non-West, the life of non-Western actors is marked by a palpable identity struggle. As Zarakol presciently observes, “while it is extremely difficult to live up to the standards of modernity—which, despite its universal language, has undeniable Western origins and therefore carries certain assumptions about proper social and institutional configurations—without feeling inauthentic, it is almost impossible to be authentically non-Western” (p. 5).

Turkey, Japan, and Russia offer conspicuous indications of this constant identity limbo of being torn between East and West. Zarakol demonstrates that, depending on the context and the issue, Ankara, Tokyo, and Moscow have on occasion actively attempted to appropriate this marginal status as leverage in positioning themselves as either symbolic bridges linking different geopolitical interests or robust shields against complex threats and uncertainty. More often than not, however, the uncertain (and sometimes, pariah) international identity of countries such as Turkey, Japan, and Russia has led them to perceive it as a weakness that needs to be overcome by siding with one side over the other.

Thus by drawing attention to the overlooked impact of stigmatization on the patterns of international interactions and the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion that dominate the practices of world affairs, Zarakol has made a thoughtful contribution to decentering the discipline of international relations. In this respect, her exploration has both epistemological and ontological implications: On the one hand, it has direct bearing on the ways in which we study international politics (especially the identity, roles, and agency of non-Western actors); and, on the other hand, it actively contributes to the explanation and understanding of global life as constituted by multiple, coexistent, and interrelated worlds. Therefore, Zarakol’s book is expected to be of immense interest to the growing cohort of students and scholars of non-Western international relations. At the same time, her rarely erudite, yet extremely accessible account of the complex dynamics of world politics is likely to benefit all of those interested in international history, political theory, development studies, and comparative politics.

Emilian R. Kavalski, PhD

University of Western Sydney, Australia

“The views expressed in these book reviews are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense.”

Table of Contents

00Contents-E

01Editorial-E

02VandenHandel-E

03Sneyd-E

04Zwitter-E

05Shai-E

06Bookreview-E