


# GOOD OUTFIT

**The 803rd Engineer Battalion  
and the Defense of the Philippines, 1941–1942**



**Paul W. Ropp**



## **Good Outfit**

# **The 803rd Engineer Battalion and the Defense of the Philippines, 1941-1942**

PAUL W. ROPP

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*Congratulations on niece and nephew. I hope Nephew Paul will never have to live the life of his Uncle Paul.*

*—International Red Cross message,*

*Sgt. Paul A. Kloecker, Cabanatuan Prisoner of War Camp, to Mr. and Mrs. Henry C. Kloecker,*

*August 1943.*





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## Foreword

Paul Ropp's extensively and meticulously researched volume, including interviews with many of the surviving participants, highlights the incomplete status of many installations in the Philippines in late 1941, especially with regards to the aviation establishment. His account of the 803rd Aviation Engineer Battalion (the equivalent of a modern squadron) helps to explain airpower's poor showing in the opening stages of World War II, and underscores the importance of investing in an adequate infrastructure before the opening of hostilities. While Generals Lewis Brereton and Douglas MacArthur cannot be excused for allowing their heavy bomber fleet to be destroyed on the ground, the inadequate dispersal sites and incomplete early warning network contributed substantially to their destruction, and the primitive facilities negatively affected aircraft attrition and availability rates, leading to the loss of the Philippines and one of the greatest military defeats in the United States's history. Perhaps the greatest irony is that all of the hard work the 803rd did after arriving in the Philippines only served to improve landing grounds later put to use by the Japanese occupiers in attacks on American forces who returned to liberate the Philippines three years later.

After Japanese ground troops overran their air bases, many members of the 803rd became first combat engineers and then combat troops, helping defend the Bataan Peninsula, before enduring the horrific trials of the Bataan Death March and Japanese prison camps. Sadly, far too many perished as a result of harsh imprisonment by the Japanese, including deaths on the notorious "hell ships" that redistributed prisoners of war throughout the crumbling Japanese empire. The roster in Appendix A listing the fate of each man in the battalion is a sobering read. Those who assume support personnel will always remain secure in rear areas would do well to heed the battalion's cautionary tale and remember the endurance of Ropp's uncle, 1st Sgt Paul Kloecker, who survived the notorious prison camp at Cabanatuan, famously liberated in the "Great Raid" by US Special Forces and Filipino allies in February, 1945. A few of the men even escaped captivity and served as guerrillas, following the example of fellow engineer and legendary guerrilla leader Wendell Fertig, who refused to surrender and operated behind Japanese lines until American forces liberated the islands in 1945. Similarly, the 803rd's leadership, many of them only recently inducted from civilian life such as Lt Edmund Zbikowski,



## FOREWORD

experienced trials they could not have imagined and struggled to meet the demands of their new profession in an austere environment before ultimately making the supreme sacrifice in the line of duty. Their efforts provide both a cautionary as well as inspirational story for junior leaders preparing themselves to lead Airmen in the nation's defense.

Ropp's account also demonstrates the difficulty of conducting logistics and force support in a contested environment. The Japanese ability to isolate the Philippines, as contemplated in modern iterations of anti-access area denial (A2AD) doctrine was decisive and the trials of the 803rd provide a case study in stark detail. It also emphasizes the importance of developing host-nation engineer capabilities in security force assistance missions, as the 803rd was stretched attempting to provide trained personnel and expertise to the rapidly mobilizing Filipino units. Together, Americans and Filipinos fought valiantly to defend the islands against an overwhelming foe, hopefully for the last time in history.

The book reveals the skill and courage of Air Force engineers, without whom the employment of airpower would be impossible. From building and maintaining runways required for modern aircraft to constructing dispersal sites, fuel farms, and ordnance dumps to building the essential infrastructure to support working, dining, and living spaces for Airmen, aviation engineers are an essential enabler of airpower. Airmen could not have successfully supported Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom without the remarkable efforts of the RED HORSE civil engineer squadrons, lineal descendants of the Aviation Engineer battalions described in this volume, who built and maintained Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, and other locations around the Arabian Gulf. While modern airpower typically operates from large, fixed sites, future employment could require more temporary bases in the face of ubiquitous surveillance, or "lily pads" for remotely piloted aircraft. Thus, the expeditionary mindset and the challenges it entails are likely far more relevant to future combat than a cursory reading of an 80-year-old tale might suggest.

For generations, warriors have studied the past to gain insights into the present and help prepare for the future. It is in this spirit that Air University Press is proud to publish *Good Outfit*.

DR. CHRISTOPHER REIN  
Managing Editor, Air University Press

## About the Author

**Paul W. Ropp** has had a lifelong interest in the defense of the Philippines during World War II because of a familial connection: his uncle and namesake, Sgt Paul A. Kloecker, was a noncommissioned officer in the Engineer Battalion (EB). Ropp earned a bachelor of arts degree from Ohio University in 1965. He returned for graduate work in history with a specialization in Southeast Asia. Subsequent doctoral studies at American University also concentrated on Asia. Immediately after earning his master of arts degree, he began a career at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), first as a political analyst focused on the Republic of the Philippines and then as an editor of finished intelligence studies concerning Southeast Asian issues. Later, he was involved in intelligence collection operations. The work resulted in his selection for the CIA's senior executive service. Ropp also had a parallel career as an intelligence officer in the US Air Force Reserve. In the process, he completed both Air Command and Staff College and Air War College as a nonresident student. Official and personal travel provided Ropp the opportunity to tour many of the sites where the 803rd EB developed and maintained airfields and infrastructure in central Luzon, Bataan, and Corregidor during late 1941 to early 1942. From 2006 until its dissolution in 2009, Ropp served as the executive secretary for the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor. He is the author of two peer-reviewed, published articles on the 803rd EB: "Thomas Delamore and the Defense of the Philippines: Heroism, Bureaucracy, and Fate," and "Saga of the 8-Inch Guns in the Defense of the Philippines," both in the *Journal of America's Military Past*.



## Preface

A major challenge in documenting the history of smaller military units such as the 803rd EB, Aviation (AVN) Separate (SEP), is to avoid developing a mere chronological outline or an archive of facts. To a certain extent, former members of the 803rd EB already accomplished that goal. In his memorandum, Brief History of Company A,” Capt Robert Montgomery provided an excellent chronology that extended beyond the actions of Company A—one company of the 803rd—to provide an outline history of the entire battalion. With his article “The 803d Engineers in the Philippine Defense,” Capt Samuel A. Goldblith expanded on Montgomery’s work, including further detail and insight. Additionally, several autobiographies highlight personal experiences that supplement earlier chronologies: Goldblith (*Appetite for Life: Autobiography*), Col Herbert W. Coone (*The Sequential Soldier*), Pvt T. Walter Middleton (*Flashbacks: Prisoner of War in the Philippines*), and Pvt John M. Zubay’s “We Ate the Rice, Bugs, and All,” a chapter in Richard David’s *They Say There Was a War*.

Still the history of the short-lived 803rd EB, AVN SEP—the first of a new type of US Army engineer unit to be deployed to a theater of operations and the first to be committed to combat—remained incomplete and dispersed among these various sources. The goal of this study is to document the history of the original 803rd EB from concept—its constitution in February 1941 and activation in June 1941—to its deactivation with the surrender of Corregidor on 6 May 1942.

The critical addition is the linkage of changes in national security policy, political and military, that drove the formation of the 803rd and its deployment to the Philippines. Also important are the tactical military decisions that governed the battalion’s assignments, activities, and movements while in the Philippines. Summary chapters were added to provide context, perspective, and focus on the environment in which the 803rd was formed and functioned. Those chapters are mainly based on secondary sources but also supplemented with documents and interviews to narrow the focus to the 803rd Engineers. These sections are not the detailed analyses of US national security policy before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines or the command decisions of US Army Forces in the Philippines. Others have already undertaken that broader task with masterful results. They include Herbert Feis’s *The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War between the United States and Japan* and the US Army’s *History*

## PREFACE

of the *US Army in World War II* volumes by Louis Morton and Mark Skinner Watson on strategy, the fall of the Philippines, and prewar planning. Karl Dod detailed the Army engineers in *The War against Japan*. Focusing on the US Army Air Corps (after June 1941, the US Army Air Forces USAAF, Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate contributed to and edited *The Army Air Forces in World War II*. This multi-volume series is essential reading for US Army Air Corps and USAAF planning, deployments, and early operations. Recently, William Bartsch added to this impressive collection with his *December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor*, which includes new detail, personal perspectives, and atmospherics. Most of these studies mention the 803rd EB and its involvement in defense of the Philippines—some in passing and some with more detail. However, as might be expected, those broad-ranging histories could not detail in depth the story of a single battalion.

The second objective of this study is to provide names and document the actions of as many individual members of the 803rd EB, regardless of rank—officer, enlisted, and selectees or draftees—whether positive or negative in terms of service. With this study, granular detail such as names and actions is possible. There is a definite need to document for two reasons. First, personnel in the lower ranks tended to be overlooked in the broader studies. Second, experiences with the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor—a veterans' service organization that disbanded in 2009—demonstrated that many descendants were still searching for information on relatives who fought in the Philippines. The absence of information was because personnel died during the war, and other veterans did not want to discuss their horrific experiences with those who had not gone through the same ordeal.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, in the spirit of full disclosure, the driving force for this effort came from a longstanding interest in discovering what decisions and actions had taken my uncle and namesake, Sgt Paul A. Kloecker, to the Philippines and what he had done there.

The term “the devil is in the details” applies easily to the documentation of the history of the 803rd EB. Since the research and especially footnotes of others aided my research greatly, the obligation is to continue that pattern with additional detail on exactly where the documentation can be located. Thus, the footnotes are longer and more detailed than in most other histories of the defense of the Philippines. The fabric of the story involved weaving snippets from multiple sources to develop, I hope, a somewhat fluid narrative.

The key documentary sources are in files at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), in College Park, Maryland, and at the Dwight David Eisenhower Library and Museum. Additional details are in the personal papers of Maj Gen Hugh J. Casey, MacArthur's chief engineer, at the Humphreys Engineer Center in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. When I began my research, these papers were in what was referred to as the "Casey Files." The other primary references come from several biographies or autobiographies of officer and selectee personnel, as well as numerous interviews with the few remaining survivors. Most of them were in their 80s when they agreed to talk about their wartime experiences. The interviews—conducted by this author and others from several oral history programs—were most revealing, not only in terms of the facts uncovered but also for their perspective. Those veterans provided essential personal experiences that confirmed, complemented, and provided a human dimension to official documents. Unlike the memoirs of senior officers—Gen Douglas A. MacArthur's *Reminiscences*, for example—the men speaking in interviews tended to underestimate their contributions to the defense of the Philippines. They continued to note that they did not surrender, but instead, they "were surrendered." The common remark was "someone had to do it," and the stoic reaction of men who had survived the Great Depression before enduring three and a half years as prisoners of war (POW).

The internet was a useful tool for verification of names, ranks, and dates but only when reviewed critically against primary and reputable secondary sources or when websites provided access to original documents not available elsewhere (e.g., the 4th Marine Regiment's operational journal).

One result of the research was the correction of a few minor factual errors and oversights in larger-scale histories of the defense of the Philippines (e.g., the 803rd's participation in the last line of defense on Bataan).

A second result might be the use of history to add perspective to the analysis of current and future issues, "forward spin," as John F. Cady, my thesis advisor at Ohio University, continually stressed.

PAUL W. ROPP  
September 2019

## PREFACE

### Notes

(All notes appear in the shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. Woznick, *Captured Honor: POW Survival in the Philippines and Japan*. Woznick documented the early attempts of Philippine defenders to talk about the horrific experiences they endured—especially as POW—and the general public’s aversion to the realities of war. In a relatively short period, veterans learned to avoid making comments to outsiders or gloss over the facts and confine themselves to sharing experiences only with fellow veterans of the Philippine Campaign. This was a major reason for the foray afforded by the annual conventions and regional meetings of the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor and the annual reunions at Fontana Village in North Carolina.

2. See Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal, in *United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services, The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1958), 109–24, for a discussion of the conversion effort, and Ernest J. King, *The U.S. Navy at War, 1941–1945: Official Reports to the Secretary of the Navy by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N.* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1946), 29 for background on the Seabees.

3. Coll et al., *Troops and Equipment*, 107–24.

4. Coll et al., *Troops and Equipment*, 56.



## Acknowledgments

Numerous people provided the substantive and moral support that brought this book to completion after a long period of gestation. The fraternity—no other term would be appropriate—of Bataan buffs assisted my efforts greatly. Among the most notable supporters was the late Scott Harrison, a friend and colleague at the Central Intelligence Agency. He first suggested this project. John Hicks, great nephew of 1st Sgt Clifton O. Snodgrass of Company B, graciously shared the results of his independent research on the 803rd, particularly documents related to the battalion's formation, and provided insightful critiques of my early drafts.

Veterans of Bataan and Corregidor, most of whom are no longer with us, were most patient in sharing their stories with me, an honor seldom granted at the time to an “outsider.” Among the relatives of those veterans, the late Elizabeth Leggett Shirley provided excerpts of letters that her husband, 1st Lt James L. Leggett Jr., the battalion personnel officer, sent in route to and from the Philippines, as did Ed Fries, nephew of battalion commanding officer, Maj Frank Fries. Irene Wonneman provided the diaries and notes of her late husband George. My wife Gayle also came to know these veterans and their spouses and to understand the reason behind my quest to document their history. Charles Bogart expanded and published a study of MacArthur's Inland Seas Defense Plan, an effort that was originally to include the use of 8-inch railway guns. He generously allowed access to newly found archival information and reviewed the chapter on the disposition and use of the 8-inch guns in the defense of Bataan and Corregidor.

Historians at the Engineer History Office, Humphreys Engineer Center, Virginia, particularly Eric Reinert, Dr. Michael Brodhead, and Dr. James Dunn, led the way through Maj Gen Hugh Casey's personal papers and pointed the way to other documents and photographs related to the defense of the Philippines.

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## Introduction

In the history of the US Army Corps of Engineers (COE), the 803rd EB, AVN SEP is unique. It was one of the first of three of a new type of engineer company (EC) (engineer aviation) that the War Department constituted (or authorized) in February 1941, as US preparations for war gained momentum. It then became one of the first five companies that the COE expanded and redesignated as a battalion in late June 1941. The 803rd was not the first aviation engineer unit deployed to a “foreign” post (i.e., outside the continental United States). Technically, that honor belongs to the 462nd Aero Squadron, an Army Air Service engineer unit deployed to France to construct airdromes near the front lines during World War I. Among the World War II deployments, the 804th, 805th, 807th, and 809th ECs, AVN SEP were assigned to Hawaii, the Panama Canal Zone, Alaska, and the Philippines, respectively. This was before the main body of the 803rd EB arrived in Manila. The 809th was later integrated into the 803rd. Before the battalion’s deployment to the Philippines, a detachment from the 803rd became the first aviation engineers to deploy to a territory not under US control (three sites in Canada and possibly one on Greenland) in what became the European Theater of Operations. It must be noted that the various detachments functioned as a construction unit and built air weather stations rather than as aviation engineer detachments developing airfields.

In the Pacific Theater of Operations, the 803rd was the first engineer aviation battalion to engage in combat operations in World War II—two engagements in Bataan and one in Corregidor.

With the surrender of the Philippines on 6 May 1942, the 803rd became the first EB to be deactivated. It was the shortest-lived of World War II’s engineer aviation battalions. Although Army maneuvers in Louisiana during September 1941 provided a proof of concept for engineer aviation units, the 803rd was the first in World War II to validate the idea in both a theater of operations and in combat. By contrast, the first US Navy SeaBee units—which replaced private contractors for the construction of Navy facilities—were authorized on 28 December 1941 and deployed into war zones in February 1942. The battalion also provided an excellent case study in US mobilization efforts in the US Army COE. It demonstrated rapid and innovative conversion from a small military organization to what historians have termed “civilian corps” of the US Army. This is because of its forma-

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tion and activities in the immediate prewar period and participation in the first phase of US involvement in World War II. The battalion's history also reflected the efforts of the Army, generally, and the COE, specifically, to allocate scarce resources against numerous priorities in the early days of the preparedness movement and initial stage of the war.<sup>2</sup>

The achievements of the 803rd EB in defense of the Philippines reflected both the prewar planning of the US Army and COE and the capability of battalion leadership and personnel to adapt to the situation at hand. Within the limits of resources available at the time, the COE successfully shuffled funds and staff to create and deploy new units such as the 803rd. The battalion had to contend with lack of funds, an impromptu training regime, shortages of construction equipment and personnel, and spur-of-the-moment deployments while still organizing. Those obstacles combined with the high priority attached to its initial project assignments in the Philippines. Furthermore, the onset of war drove the battalion to chart a path that neither the established pattern the COE envisaged nor the course that other engineer aviation battalions followed thereafter.

At the beginning of its short history, the 803rd EB adhered fairly closely and successfully to plans and criteria that the US Army COE had developed for aviation engineer units. The COE approach was to build skeletal companies and battalions, select and integrate troops with engineering and construction skills, and then combine them to quickly form efficient operational units. The battalion drew on a cadre of regular and reserve officers—a few with civil engineering backgrounds but most with other technical skills—and experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from other engineer units. The bulk of its troops, nevertheless, were those inducted through the Selective Training and Service Act of September 1940 (“selectees”) and identified by the Army general classification test as having experience or training in engineering and construction or the capability for that type of work. Training for the 803rd was uneven and opportunistic, driven more by the initiative and imagination of the battalion commander than by formal guidance and support from the COE.<sup>3</sup>

Two months into its tenure at Westover Field, the 803rd began to diverge from the COE and USAAF model, a trend that accelerated from that point. Organizationally, the 803rd was the only engineer aviation unit to integrate selectee personnel into its main body while in transit to and after arrival in the Philippines. It was also the only

unit to gain an additional company, the 809th EC, while in a theater of operations. In its initial projects—which involved facility improvement and construction—airfields were all designed as permanent facilities to handle the massive air reinforcement of the Philippines. This pattern fit all deployed engineer aviation battalions at the time. However, the 803rd's approach to tasking differed. The priorities that the US Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) set in the Philippines forced the 803rd to follow the pattern taken by the 809th at Nichols Field. It assigned one company for each airfield rather than focusing the battalion on one airfield at a time, as the COE had initially planned. Consequently, individual companies operated with a high degree of autonomy. Equipment shortages within the 803rd, as well as in the Philippines, caused a shuffling of construction machinery among the companies of the 803rd.

The Japanese attack and invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 wrought further changes to the 803rd's method of operations. Rather than building airfields behind the lines of advancing US Army forces, the 803rd Engineers were part of a defensive force. They were charged with developing, maintaining, and defending emergency airstrips to the rear of retreating forces and close to the front lines. The rapid depletion of aircraft of the Far East Air Force (FEAF) and USAFFE's defensive requirements pushed the 803rd into the repair and maintenance of Bataan's critical but primitive road system, the expansion of the peninsula's trail network, the installation of coast artillery (CA), and participation in combat engineer tasks. In effect, the 803rd morphed into a general service engineer battalion. In the process, subordination to the theater Army Air Force (AAF) component, a founding concept for aviation EBs, atrophied. Thus, during the sieges of Bataan and Corregidor, the battalion operated under an amorphous chain of command.<sup>4</sup>

The theme that paralleled the activation of both the 809th EC and the 803rd EB was to affect the US decisions to, first, strengthen the defenses of the Philippines against the Japanese, and, second, to attempt the development of an offensive force, centered on the B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bomber as a deterrent to Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia. Both hastily deployed to the Philippines; they were among the few US military organizations to participate in both shifts in those aspects of US national security policy in late 1940 and 1941.

FEAF leadership was not satisfied with the pace of construction on the airfields to which the 809th and 803rd were assigned. However,

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Clark Field remained operational throughout its expansion process; Nichols Field resumed operations in October 1941, and airstrips at O'Donnell and Del Carmen Fields were sufficiently complete to allow for limited operations at the start of the war. Of the latter two, only Del Carmen served as a base for military aircraft, the P-35As of the 34th Pursuit Squadron.

With the invocation of War Plan Orange-3 (WPO-3), which provided for withdrawal to Bataan, the 803rd was among the first US Army units leading the way into the peninsula. It built airstrips capable of handling a dwindling number of combat aircraft and, somewhat quixotically, to support anticipated air reinforcements from the US. The first series of airstrips in Bataan Province included Barrio San Jose, Dinalupihan; Hermosa; Orani; and Pilar. All were quickly made operational and just as quickly abandoned. Retreat farther south on Bataan brought, first, the responsibility to expand, maintain, and repair Bataan and Cabcaben Fields and, later, to maintain and repair Mariveles Field. The three fields remained in operation until the surrender of Bataan.

Withdrawal to a Reserve Battle Position (RBP), the second and last line of defense, in late January 1942, brought further modifications to the 803rd's mission. Its duties during the two-and-a-half-month siege of Bataan focused on maintaining the primitive road system that encircled the peninsula. The roads were essential for communications and movement of troops and supplies. Throughout the siege of Bataan, all companies took on a variety of other assignments far removed from their original mission. They included the transportation and installation of heavy artillery (e.g., 8-inch guns and 155 millimeter [mm] *Grande Puissance Filloux* [GPF] heavy artillery) and movement of rice mills to the staffing of jerry-rigged armored naval cruisers.

All the companies of the 803rd participated in front line combat operations, the first time that aviation engineers were employed in that function during World War II. Although the original concept envisioned aviation engineers as technicians with weapons, the lack of training in the combat arms limited the effectiveness of the 803rd. Within the battalion, Company A was committed to combat twice. The first time was at Quinuan Point in the "Battle of the Points" during late January 1942, and the second was in the final defense of Corregidor, May 1942. Consequently, Company A suffered the most casualties; about 50 percent of its personnel were killed or wounded in action (WIA). The other three companies were involved in the last battle for

Bataan along the Alangan River line on 8–9 April 1942. Their efforts at the Alangan River remain a subject of controversy, plagued by vagaries of after-action reporting, most of which were prepared in POW camps, differing perspectives of participants interviewed after the war, and incomplete reviews of the facts surrounding the 803rd's actions.

The shuffling of personnel in both the battalion command positions, in its companies, or to USAFFE and Philippine Army (PA) billets, all standard practices on Bataan, continued until the surrender. The battalion also worked through an ambiguous chain of command. This involved USAFFE, primarily the personal and continual intervention of Brig Gen Hugh J. Casey, USAFFE chief engineer, the Philippine department engineer, and FEAF. Neither challenge had a noticeable impact on the battalion's performance. The main obstacles to performance were, as was the case for all military units on Bataan and Corregidor, casualties, malnourishment (starvation), and disease.

Fundamentally, the War Department was forced to hastily dispatch two separate units in two separate deployment—first the 809th and then the 803rd—totaling 670 enlisted men and selectees and 26 officers who were poorly trained and ill-equipped. This is a commonality the 803rd shared with many units sent to the Philippines after mid-1941. Yet their achievements earned the battalion two Presidential Unit Citations, and numerous engineers were awarded the Silver Star, Bronze Star, and Purple Heart medals. Company A earned an additional Presidential Unit Citation for its efforts on Corregidor. Of the battalion's total complement, an estimated 385 officers, enlisted men, and selectees (55 percent) did not live to return to the United States after liberation. Some were killed in action (KIA), but many more died of diseases in POW camps or on ships transporting them from the Philippines, or were murdered by the Japanese.

Unfortunately, the surrender of US forces in the Philippines (US-FIP) and the subsequent deactivation of the 803rd precluded the transfer of experience-based knowledge to the engineer aviation units that followed the 803rd into theaters of operations during World War II.



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### Notes

1. See Coll et al., *Troops and Equipment*, 109–24, for a discussion of the conversion effort, and Ernest J. King, *The U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945: Official Reports to the Secretary of the Navy by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N.* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1946), 29, for background on the Seabees.
2. Coll et al., *Troops and Equipment*, 107–24.
3. Coll et al., *Troops and Equipment*, 56.

## Chapter 1

### Development of Engineer Aviation Units

The concept of aviation engineers as part of the Army's force structure re-emerged in 1939. The chief of the Army Air Corps requested authority to organize soldiers with construction skills to repair, camouflage, and defend airfields. In August 1917, the Army had constituted the 462nd Aero Squadron as the first Army construction unit dedicated to airfield construction for the Army Air Service overseas. The squadron prepared landing fields behind the front lines in France, cutting weeds and scraping out sites. Fields were made as level as possible and grass was planted. Plows, scrapers, graders, rollers, and tractors were used when available. One history of civil engineers with the Air Force noted, however, because of experience gained during World War I, Army Air Service leaders:

argued that it was "absolutely vital" that construction materiel, as well as construction personnel, be controlled directly by the Air Service in war zones. They observed that dedicated aviation forces were needed to prepare airfields and to relocate buildings from one airdrome to the next without the added delay of seeking authority from engineers further up the chain of command. When engineers were not dedicated to airfield construction, they often were out constructing other military requirements, such as bridges or roads, just when they were needed to support the Air Service. In those instances, non-specialized troops assigned to all skills in the Air Service often were pressed into service to accomplish these tasks.<sup>1</sup>

However, after World War I, the Quartermaster Corps was responsible for all military construction, including airfield construction. Military officers, as well as high-level civilian officials in the War Department, were concerned that the Quartermaster Corps could not handle the widening scope of construction activities in the face of the Army's rapid expansion during 1939–41. They advocated for allowing the Corps of Engineers (COE) to take responsibility for airfield construction, even though the Corps had little expertise or experience in heavy construction or in maintenance and supply to support construction activities. At the initiative of the War Department, the first formal step in the creation of aviation engineer units designated explicitly for Air Force work came in September 1939. It started with the assignment of one officer and a small detachment of enlisted personnel to the General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force, to prepare

plans and specifications “peculiar to Air Corps needs,” according to early history. GHQ had operational units, as opposed to the Air Corps, which managed training activities and materiel. The reasoning was that the COE’s far-ranging civilian projects had not prepared engineers for military airfield construction. Defining the concept, Brig Gen John J. Kingman, assistant chief of engineers (CoE), military division, separated the construction of airfields in forward areas from the development of permanent facilities in rear areas. He proposed creating an aviation engineer regiment (ER) to focus on “hasty methods of utilizing existing facilities for landing fields, [sic] or improvising new ones” and general service regiments for more extensive projects.<sup>2</sup>

Germany’s early successes in Europe with mobile warfare (lightning war [*blitzkrieg*]) with airpower as an integral element caught the attention of the US Army COE. They acted as a catalyst for change in almost every type of US engineer unit. In the case of aviation engineers, the COE noted the German use of specially trained engineers, the so-called “men with the black tabs,” to build tactical airfields close to the front lines. Addressing a concern dating back to the World War I experience, the COE and the Air Corps began immediately to adapt and expand the concept for a new type of US Army engineer unit—one that would work closely with Army Air Corps units to build or grow tactical airfields in theaters of operation. This would be done quickly and to conceal, defend, and maintain them. Initially, the COE proposed to use the regiment as a basic aviation engineer unit. By September 1941, when the 803rd Engineer Battalion (EB) Aviation (AVN) Separate (SEP) deployed to the Philippines, the aviation engineer mission was still taking shape, and the battalion had become the standard aviation engineer unit for overseas assignments.<sup>3</sup>

## Early Planning

Beginning in 1939, the Air Corps developed and continually revised plans for the expansion of its air combat groups. Its planners were trying to translate Pres. Franklin Roosevelt’s sweeping but general statements on plans and objectives into precise military terminology. An interim result by mid-1940 was the establishment of the 54-group plan under the first aviation objective. It provided the basis for the airpower development plan until the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Congress approved the Army appropriation bill for Fiscal Year (FY) 1941 in June 1940—the funds allowed the Air Corps to complete construction that Congress authorized in 1939—to expand the ranks of enlisted personnel, to increase the number of authorized aircraft, and to enlarge pilot training to 7,000 men per year. In a supplemental appropriation on 26 June, spurred by the rapid collapse of France in the face of the German blitzkrieg, Congress voted additional funds to increase the Air Corps's enlisted strength yet again. Shortly after that, the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps submitted the so-called 54-group plan to provide for 54 combat groups and six transport groups with 4,006 tactical aircraft assigned to those units. With limited funds and personnel, only 41 combat groups could be organized at that time. Not until October 1940 did Congress appropriate money for the remaining combat groups. Except for the accompanying increase in pilots, both programs were undertaken simultaneously under the Army's first aviation objective. Expansion of the combat strength required an increase in pilot flying training from 7,000 pilots annually for the 41-group strength to 12,000 pilots a year for the 54-group strength.<sup>4</sup>

The development of engineer units working closely with the Air Corps proceeded in conjunction with the military build-up that accelerated in 1940. The engineers' position was that the Quartermaster Corps, which was responsible for construction on Army facilities, could not construct Air Corps facilities, particularly those in operational theaters, as quickly as would be necessary. By that time, among other challenges, the issue of the defense of Alaska—particularly against the possibility of Japanese air attacks—moved to the fore, and the requirement for new airfields became more critical. As the Quartermaster Corps was building Ladd and Elmendorf Fields, the Civil Aeronautics Administration proposed to construct two new staging fields in the panhandle of Alaska. To speed those projects, particularly the field at Annette, Lt Gen John L. Dewitt—commander of the Fourth Army based in San Francisco and thus responsible for the defense of Alaska—made a case for the COE to take over the work then being handled by the Quartermaster Corps. With the necessary approvals in hand, in late August, the COE dispatched two battalions from the 28th ER AVN and two companies of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) to Annette. There, they began the construction of a base complete with two paved runways, a seaplane ramp, hangars,

docks, roads, housing, and warehouses. Company B of the 28th ER AVN moved to Yakutat in late October to begin work on the airfield.<sup>5</sup>

On 9 September 1940, the president approved a transfer of all Army construction and real estate functions and personnel to the COE. The incremental transition began in mid-November, when all Air Corps projects except those in the Canal Zone, moved to the COE. The formal transfer of functions was active on 16 December as directed by War Department Circular 248, 4 December 1941. In early January, following the agreement of the previous November, Air Corps projects in Hawaii—where the Quartermaster Corps was making progress on airfield development—moved to the COE. Shortly after that, the 28th ER AVN took over responsibility for construction of Ladd and Elmendorf Fields in Alaska. In August, the COE succeeded in making the argument for taking over airfield projects in the Panama Canal Zone. It assigned work on proposed airfields and air warning stations to two companies of the 11th ER. The 805th EC AVN SEP arrived on 5 March 1941 to assist with the projects and was redesignated a battalion in June.<sup>6</sup>

However, even with those few additions to its workload, as Karl Dod pointed out, the COE could not keep pace with the demands of the Air Corps. A 20 February 1941 Air Corps memo on aviation engineer responsibilities included the statement: “The percentage of engineers at present allotted is too small to accomplish even the above activities [i.e., the congressionally-authorized preparedness activities].” By then, the COE was already working in tandem with the Air Corps to overcome the problem of inadequate personnel. The Selective Training and Service Act of September 1940 had just started funneling selectees into Army basic training in large numbers. As part of the process, by 15 February, the Air Corps plans division asked the CoE for recommendations on how to meet the requirements of the 54-group program, as well as a possible expansion beyond the 54 groups.<sup>7</sup>

The COE’s response outlined recommendations “for successive expansions of aviation engineers” to meet the minimum and maximum strength requirements for the 54-group plan—based on regiments as opposed to companies and battalions. At the same time, the engineers also provided minimum and maximum requirements for a 100-group plan that was sent to the Air Corps on 4 March 1941.

**Table 1.1. Projections for aviation engineers, 54-Group Plan**

Aviation Engineers	Authorized	Strength	Minimum for 54-Group Plan	Strength	Maximum for 54-Group Plan	Strength
United States						
GHQ Air Force Reserve (AFR)	Unit: 21st ER	1,100	Unit: 21st ER	2,132	21st ER	2,132
Northeast Air District (NEAD)	Unit: 803rd EC SEP	160	Unit: ER (less 2 battalions)	860	Unit: ER (less 1 battalion)	1,496
Southeast Air District (SEAD)	Unit: 810th EC (Colored) SEP	200	Unit: 803rd ER (less 2 battalions)	860	Unit: 803rd ER (less 1 battalion)	1,496
Northwest Air District (NWAD)	Unit: 28th ER (less 2 battalions)	440	Unit: ER (less 2 battalions)	860	Unit: ER (less 1 battalion)	1,496
SEAD	Unit: 808th EC SEP	160	Unit: ER (less 2 battalions)	860	Unit: ER (less 1 battalion)	
HQ GHQ AF	HQ Detachment (DET)	7	Unit: HQ DET	9	Unit: HQ DET	28
HQ NEAD	Unit: HQ DET	4	Unit: HQ DET	6	Unit: HQ DET	11
HQ SEAD	Unit: HQ DET	4	Unit: HQ DET	6	Unit: HQ DET	11
HQ NWAD	Unit: HQ DET	4	Unit: HQ DET	6	Unit: HQ DET	11
HQ Southwest Air District (SWAD)	Unit: HQ DET	4	Unit:	4	Unit:	11
Foreign Service						
Alaska	Unit: 807th EC SEP	160	Unit: Regiment (less 2 battalions)	860	Unit: Regiment (less 1 battalion)	1,496
Hawaii	Unit: 804th EC SEP	160	Unit: Regiment (less 1 battalion)	1,496	Unit: Regiment	2,132
Panama	Unit: 805th EC	160	Unit: Regiment (less 2 battalions)	860	Unit: Regiment (less 1 battalion)	1,496
Philippines	Unit: 809th EC SEP	160	Unit: Regiment (less 2 battalions)	860	Unit: Regiment (less 2 battalions)	860
Hawaii	Unit: HQ DET	5	Unit: HQ DET	7	Unit: HQ DET	8

Aviation Engineers	Authorized	Strength	Minimum for 54-Group Plan	Strength	Maximum for 54-Group Plan	Strength
Panama	Unit: HQ Unit: DET	5	Unit: HQ DET	7	Unit: HQ DET	8
Puerto Rico	Unit: HQ DET	5	Unit: HQ DET	7	Unit: HQ DET	8
Puerto Rico	Unit: 806th Sept Co	160	Unit: Regiment (less 2 battalions)	860	Unit: Regiment (less 1 battalion)	2,132
Total		2,898		10,562		15,692

## Concept and Mission

Lessons learned in Army maneuvers of 1940 pushed the COE to change General Kingman's original proposal and convert a general service regiment into an engineer aviation regiment. The new regiment, based on a table of organization developed by General Kingman, was a unit designed for general engineering work—as was the case with engineer units assigned to infantry and armored battalions—but subordinate to the Air Corps. It consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters company, a service company, and three battalions. The regiment's total complement was 79 commissioned and warrant officers and 2,207 enlisted personnel. Each battalion in the regiment was organized into a headquarters company, and three companies designated according to Army nomenclature by the letters "A," "B," and "C," all equipped with sufficient construction equipment to allow for independent work. The COE considered the new units combat rather than service units. Although their primary mission was to build or improve airfields, the COE believed that the units would operate without support from other ground troops in areas where frequent enemy attacks were expected. Further, they would be called on to defend airfields during enemy attacks and clear enemy forces from surrounding areas.<sup>8</sup>

Development of the mission and mission statement for aviation engineers began with the activation of the 21st ER, Langley Field, Virginia. Almost immediately after the assignment of engineer aviation personnel to GHQ Air Force, to which the aviation engineers were subordinate, the Air Corps requested a clear definition of the responsibilities of engineer aviation troops. This was a necessary first

step in developing doctrine. The War Department adjutant general's office (AGO) noted that "the question [was] the natural consequence of the recent creation of aviation engineers, the transfer of all Air Corps construction activities from the 'constructing quartermaster' to the COE during FY 1942, and the unfamiliar distinction between the military and civil organizations and functions of the Corps of Engineers."<sup>9</sup> The AGO made initial recommendations, and the War Department then issued a policy statement explaining that the COE was responsible for:

- All work on the construction of Air Corps stations except Panama, instead of the Quartermaster Corps; and
- All work, except communications systems, in any theater of operations (emphasis original), including airdromes and their maintenance but excluding maintenance of airdromes in peacetime and procurement of maintenance equipment.<sup>10</sup>

The AGO further stated that the maintenance of airdromes during peacetime and in the continental United States (Zone of the Interior) in wartime was a shared function of the Air Corps and the Quartermaster Corps. The policy added that engineer aviation troops were "general engineer troops with a peacetime mission to develop the technique[s], equipment[,] and organization for the rapid construction, repair, camouflage, and defense of landing fields, as well as the training of cadre for the expansion of engineer aviation units in time of war." The AGO policy statement highlighted an important issue that continued to affect aviation engineer units: "The small percentage of engineer troops with the GHQ Air Force precludes the use of aviation engineers on any work properly belonging to other types of units and not consistent with [the mission AGO outlined], except as a training measure."<sup>11</sup>

The Air Corps staff quickly asked the chief of the Air Corps to concur formally with the functions that the AGO had proposed. With more specificity, the staff outlined the following duties as being assigned to aviation engineers "in *any* Theater of Operations" (emphasis in original). It reflected the COE's goal of aviation engineers as both technicians and combat personnel:

- Construction or improvement of "advanced airdromes"—presumably meaning auxiliary and temporary airfields in forward combat areas;



- Development of semi-permanent landing-strip mats;
- Camouflage of Air Corps installations and advanced airdromes;
- Assistance with the “anti-mechanized” defense of advanced airdromes by obstructions, demolitions, and hasty fortifications.<sup>12</sup>

Stressing the “need to differentiate [military airfields in theater] from the usual commercial airport or permanent peacetime Air Corps station,” Col Stuart C. Godfrey, then assigned as air engineer to GHQ Air Force, wrote in late 1941 that military airfields in combat were conspicuous and vulnerable to bombers. They needed to be rendered less visible. Preferably, air forces would operate from smaller fields with aircraft dispersed in pens around the area or on adjacent fields rather than on a parking apron.<sup>13</sup>

Colonel Godfrey’s elaboration of the mission was geared to Europe, the focus of US national security policy at the time and the location where the Army had numerous observers, rather than the jungles that the Pacific War would envelop. Thus, the mission statement emphasized that aviation engineers were not to be used for peacetime construction or for maintaining airports, except for training exercises. Even in a theater of operations, engineer aviation units would not necessarily be used for airport construction. Instead—when speed was essential, and the utilization of existing facilities or improvisation of new ones was necessary—they would engage in “pioneer” work on more advanced airdromes. Echoing the AGO outline, Godfrey said the primary mission of aviation engineers was not only to build but also to maintain fields in flying condition. That mission also encompassed repair of combat-related damage instantly, especially areas damaged by aerial bombardment. More permanent facilities in the rear area were still to be assigned to engineer service regiments.<sup>14</sup>

Refinement of the mission and expansion of the responsibilities for aviation continued throughout the war. Studying the use of aviation engineers in the Pacific Theater, Lt Col Natalie M. Pearson pointed out “the idea that the aviation engineers would primarily work on airstrips was flawed. These engineers would later have their mission expanded to building roads, ports, and bridges, as well as fighting as infantry.”<sup>15</sup>

In his development of a mission statement, Colonel Godfrey also addressed the qualifications needed among aviation engineers. They were to be both technicians and combat soldiers. As technicians, they would improve or build advanced airdromes together with all appur-

tenances: runways, landing strips, shelters, parking areas, and internal routes of communication. Aviation engineers would also assume responsibility for gas- and bomb-proofing essential parts of airdromes. Godfrey also advanced the idea that aviation engineers would be responsible for camouflaging advanced airdromes and Air Force installations. As combat soldiers—Colonel Godfrey used the term “trained rifleman and machine gunners”—they were to be “prepared to take an active part in the defense of airdromes” by assisting with the anti-mechanized defense of advanced airdromes, construction and protection of roadblocks, defense against ground attacks, vertical envelopment (i.e., parachute landings), and air attacks. For defensive actions, aviation engineers would come under the command of the officer charged with base defense and operate similarly in defensive operations. Still, Colonel Godfrey said that incoming enlisted and selectee personnel would undergo standard engineer basic training at engineer replacement training centers at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The experience of the 803rd EB showed—and an Air Force historian has since pointed out—the actual training of aviation engineers was “uneven” at best. As experience in the Pacific demonstrated, Godfrey erred somewhat in theorizing that the aviation engineer units would usually be located well behind the front line, and “the combat function will be the exception rather than the rule.”<sup>16</sup>

Proof of concept for aviation engineers came during Army maneuvers in Louisiana from 15 to 28 September 1941. The formal mission statement for the exercises was:

This maneuver will afford, for the first time, an opportunity to test the capabilities and limitations of [engineer] aviation troops working with air forces in the field. The designated engineer units were to be equipped with organizational equipment, designed for earthmoving and other work on airfields.<sup>17</sup>

Headquarters company and Company C, 2nd Battalion, 21st ER, plus the battalion headquarters and Company C, 810th EB AVN Colored, were the engineer units designated to participate in the maneuvers. Both units were subordinate to First Air Force, Mitchel Field, New York, as was the 803rd EB. Although Headquarters, First Air Force, advised the 803rd of details on the maneuvers, it excluded the battalion from participation, presumably because it was still in the early stages of formation. Personnel of the 21st and 810th traveled by motor convoy from their respective posts at Langley Field, Virginia, and MacDill Field, Florida, to western and southern Louisiana and

eastern Texas for the exercise. The route used by the 810th was 937 miles from MacDill Field to Lake Charles, Louisiana. The heavy equipment of the 21st moved by rail, as was standard commercial practice for distances over 200 miles. Using hastily prepared plans, they improved and maintained maneuver landing fields, including runways, taxi strips, parking areas, and access roads, and removed obstacles as their primary tasks. Other exercises included providing concealment for the airdrome, shelters for personnel and planes, and defensive works for protection against air and ground attacks. Generally, the COE viewed the exercise as a success. However, one observer noted that the two-week deployment before the maneuvers was not adequate. With the time limitation, the engineers focused on their primary tasks to the detriment of the secondary functions. Reflecting on the situation being encountered in the Philippines, the one “serious obstacle” evident to the COE was the procurement locally of replacement parts and construction materials not available in the engineer depot.<sup>18</sup>

## Unit Development

The prototype engineer aviation unit was the 21st ER AVN. It was formed at Fort Benning, Georgia, in June 1940, by redesignating the 21st ER General as a “unit of the GHQ Air Force Reserve.” The 21st then moved to Langley Field, Virginia. The regiment’s organization (e.g., activation of 3rd Battalion’s Headquarters Company), basic training of selectees, and acquisition of equipment under the supervision of the commanding general (CG) of Langley Field continued into June 1941. By mid-June, the 21st was organized into three battalions, a headquarters, and a service company. At Langley Field, the regiment focused on training and becoming equipped “to take the field with the least delay as the engineer component of an expeditionary force.” It engaged in barracks construction, experimental works on runways—including the use of steel mats, on which the COE had been working since 1939—and development of camouflage techniques for airdromes.<sup>19</sup>

The lack of personnel slowed the formation of additional aviation engineer units. As of November 1940, the Corps of Engineers had a quota of 2,898 enlisted men for service with the Air Corps. On 22 November 1940, Brig Gen Henry “Hap” Arnold, chief of the Air

Corps, and Maj Gen Julian Schley, CoE, agreed that the engineer strength allowed under the quota was inadequate. For example, the 28th Engineer AVN Battalion was reactivated on 1 July 1940 but recruiting for it had not started until the previous April. Recruits came primarily from the Fourth Corps (Southeastern United States). The 21st Engineer AVN Regiment provided the cadre or nucleus of 60 men. The two officers envisioned an aviation engineer unit “of some sort,” actually a mix of regiments, battalions, and companies, in each of the four air districts covering the United States and five “foreign” stations. (“Foreign stations” included Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.) They recommended an increase in the quota for enlisted personnel 6,318, a figure more than double the existing strength.<sup>20</sup>

**Table 1.2. Proposed engineer aviation allocations, November 1940**

Unit	Station	Enlisted Strength
GHQ Air Force	Bolling Field, Washington, DC	3
HQ, Northeast Air District	Hartford, Connecticut	5
HQ, Southeast Air District	Drew Field, Tampa, Florida	5
HQ, Northwest Air District	Spokane, Washington	5
HQ, Southwest Air District	March Field, California	5
HQ, Hawaii Department Air Force	Honolulu	5
HQ, Panama Canal Zone Air Force	Albrook Field	5
HQ, Puerto Rico Air Wing	Borinquen Field	5
21st Engineer Aviation Regiment	Langley Field	2,000
To be determined (TBD) Engineer Aviation Regiment (less two battalions)	Westover Field, Massachusetts	780
(TBD) Engineer Aviation Regiment (less 2 battalions)	MacDill Field, Florida	780
(TBD) Engineer Aviation Regiment (less 2 battalions)	March Field, California	780
(TBD) Engineer Aviation Regiment (less 2 battalions)	McChord Field, Washington	858
(TBD) Engineer Aviation Battalion (less 2 companies)	Hickam Field, Hawaii	254
(TBD) Engineer Aviation Battalion (less 2 companies)	Albrook Field, Canal Zone	254

Unit	Station	Enlisted Strength
(TBD) Engineer Aviation Battalion (less 2 companies)	Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico	254
(TBD) Engineer company AVN (Separate)	Anchorage, Alaska	160
(TBD) Engineer Company AVN (Separate)	Nichols Field, Philippine Islands	260

*Source:* Memorandum, Brett to AGO, 29 November 1940. Subject: Additional engineer (aviation) personnel for the Air Corps *Source:* Memorandum, Brett to AGO, 29 November 1940. Subject: Additional engineer (aviation) personnel for the Air Corps.

The Air Corps and COE further recommended that the Army expedite the designation of these units and allotment of personnel, allocate sufficient funds for the construction of additional barracks and facilities, and move the specified units to the designated stations “as soon as availability of housing and personnel permit.”<sup>21</sup>

Action on the Arnold-Schley proposal for the constitution of engineer aviation companies followed quickly, but the challenge of staffing those new units continued to plague unit activations. Later, when selectees (draftees) from the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 became available, the COE used experienced engineer personnel as the “cadre” or nucleus for the newly formed engineer units, as had been the case with the 28th, and augmented individual units with selectees. Thus, personnel for the engineer aviation companies established in the first tranche had to come from existing engineer units. The original concept that Brig Gen John J. Kingman, then acting CoE, outlined on 6 January 1941 in a memo was for the 21st ER AVN to supply enlisted personnel for the planned 807th EC AVN, Yakutat, Alaska, and for the 2nd Battalion, 28th ER AVN to furnish personnel for a planned 809th EC AVN. However, at the time the 21st ER AVN was heavily involved in the construction of barracks and did not have any engineers to spare. Consequently, “to expedite airfield construction in Alaska as much as practicable,” Kingman proposed to increase the strength of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 28th ER, which was engaged on the expansion of MacDill Field as “on-the-job” (OJT) training during the second half of 1940 before moving to Yakutat, to 160. This was accomplished by taking 70 enlisted men from the 2nd Battalion, 28th engineers. He then proposed to designate Company B as the 807th EC AVN SEP when additional personnel were available. The term “separate” meant that aviation engineer units organization-

ally would operate independently of a regiment with sufficient equipment for their assigned tasks. Under that concept, the 2nd Battalion, 28th Engineers, was also to provide 90 enlisted men to a redesignated Company B, 2nd Battalion, at Annette Island, Alaska. Kingman's proposal continued with an alternate recommendation for staffing the 809th EC AVN SEP, albeit without mention of the company's eventual assignment to the Philippines. With the contribution of the 28th Engineers to the 807th EC AVN, he recommended that the 21st ER AVN furnish cadre for the 809th, but not before June 1941, when selectees would become available.<sup>22</sup>

At the same time, the War Department agreed with most of Arnold-Schley's November 1940 recommendations, if not with Kingman's January 6 proposal, and authorized on 4 February 1941 the assignment of engineer aviation personnel to GHQ Air Force and the headquarters of the four US-based air districts. However, given continuing personnel constraints, it authorized or "constituted" only three of the recommended nine engineer aviation units, all company strength (160 enlisted personnel): the 808th for March Field, the 803rd for Westover Field, and the 810th Colored for MacDill Field.<sup>23</sup> All the new units, except the 810th, were to be staffed with 150 engineers from the 21st ER AVN and brought up to strength with selectees. The 810th drew on the 41st ER General Service, Colored, Fort Bragg, for its enlisted personnel. By 1 March, the Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) had reduced the cadre that the 21st was to supply the 808th EC because it was "unduly large." The 1 March OCE memo also outlined the augmentation of engineer aviation units beyond the 1941 mobilization plan by adding five more separate companies: 807th, Alaska; 804th, Hawaii; 805th, Puerto Rico; and 809th, Philippine Islands. The companies were to consist of five officers and 160 enlisted or selectee personnel organized into a company headquarters, a service platoon, and two operating platoons. Included in the equipment used by each company were various types of grading machinery, rollers, tractors, earthmovers, and other heavy units.<sup>24</sup>

April 1941 marked several important milestones for aviation engineers. In late March 1941, the general staff authorized an expanded force of 6,318 aviation engineers to be assigned to the Air Corps. On 19 April, Gen George C. Marshall, Army chief of staff, approved the increase, as Schley and Arnold had previously recommended in November 1940. The 4th, 6th, and 8th Divisions were directed to provide personnel positions for the increase by eliminating positions

for basic privates. The personnel action was but one of several that the War Department put forth to balance a pressing demand for trained engineers against a limited supply until the flow of selectees began to arrive from basic training. Marshall also directed the War Department's budget and legislative planning branch, including \$1,605,000 for airdrome construction in the upcoming supplementary budget estimates. Informal internal communication provided additional insights on Marshall's decision, pending a formal announcement. The increase was to apply to both US and "foreign" stations. The increased number of engineer aviation enlisted personnel was based on the premise that keeping the 21st ER AVN in reserve and assigning one battalion (separate) to each of the numbered air forces in the continental United States. Under that scheme, the 21st ER was allowed to recruit 1,959 men. The remainder of the increase was organized into three separate battalions of 625 men each at Westover, MacDill, and March Fields. A battalion of the 28th Engineers was assigned to Air Force Combat Command (AFCC), as well, for possible reassignment to the Second Air Force at March Field. When reorganized in June 1941, the USAAF initially had two subordinate organizations: The Air Corps retained responsibility for training and materiel, and AFCC replaced GHQ Air Force to take responsibility for operational forces.<sup>25</sup>

Initial planning by the COE showed a preference for the regiment as the basic organizational unit or, more specifically, companies that would be expanded into regiments. The focus then shifted to the formation of aviation engineer battalions. Lt Col Rudolph P. Smyser, who had just completed a tour as an observer in the United Kingdom, recommended the organization of engineer aviation battalions rather than regiments. Based on the European experience, he argued that one single battalion would have the capability to build one airfield in a reasonable amount of time. Discussion of the concept persisted through late 1941. During early May 1941, Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons, commander, GHQ Air Force, supported the War Department's move toward battalion-sized engineer aviation units and away from regiments and companies. He urged a review of the entire program considering the British experience in France. British efforts, he contended, showed that a force of 800 to 1,000 engineers was the minimum required for the construction of an airdrome with runways in six weeks. Since the essential requirement of airfield construction projects was speed, the employment of units smaller than a battalion would delay

completion “beyond the period when the field can be of use.” Thus, Emmons proposed the battalion as the basic unit for aviation engineers and supported the concept of a “separate” unit, independent of any regimental organization. With that line of reasoning, Emmons argued for a structure of one regiment and eight “separate” battalions for the 54-group plan. For the additional 27 groups, four more battalions would be necessary, according to Emmons. In his proposal to the chief of the Air Corps, Emmons said the plan had been discussed with the CoE and had his approval. Ultimately, Kingman’s proposal for the planned expansion of aviation engineers included the provision of one regiment in GHQ reserve, one battalion in each of the four US air districts, and battalions, where possible, for foreign bases. By October 1941, the COE had determined that for overseas deployments, battalions would be more manageable and sufficient for their assigned tasks. Later in the war, the COE resumed the formation of additional regiments in the US with the belief that it was the better unit composition and more efficient way for training aviation engineers.<sup>26</sup>

Colonel Godfrey, Emmons’s air engineer from mid-1941 to early 1942, noted that one standard separate battalion could start several fields at once. Still, the project would take longer, unless additional labor and equipment were available locally. To operate as the COE had planned, the battalions contained additional and heavier construction equipment than any other EB in the COE.<sup>27</sup>

Emmons and Godfrey agreed about the drawbacks of employing engineer aviation companies. Godfrey stated that when limited personnel were available, a few separate aviation companies had been organized to meet the needs of unique localities. One example, although not cited by Godfrey, was the case for the assignment of the 809th EC AVN SEP to the Philippines to work on the expansion and improvement of Nichols Field, Manila. Other engineer aviation companies were assigned to Panama, Puerto Rico, and Alaska (the 805th, 806th, and 807th). However, he argued that “the separate company is not a suitable organization for general use in a theater of operations.”<sup>28</sup>

In the area of personnel, the reaction to the April 1941 increase in aviation engineer strength was not entirely positive. Pressing the issue, Emmons wrote to Major General Arnold on 5 July that the increase in personnel for GHQ Air Force, while inadequate, would permit the activation of several units. He had wanted a progressive addition to 19,994 enlisted men for the formation of additional units. Still, the War Department had stated earlier that it lacked the person-



nel to meet his request for new engineer aviation units. Emmons noted that the number of engineers allotted to GHQ Air Force (4,378) would not be sufficient to staff the 803rd EC AVN SEP, then being reformed as a battalion. Presciently, he pointed out that by 1 September 1941, GHQ Air Force would have only 2,751 aviation engineers available to it and that the “number will be decreased further if task forces [were] meanwhile dispatched overseas.” Emmons finished with a series of recommendations:

- Bring the 803rd EB, Westover Field, to full strength;
- Activate the 808th EB at March Field;
- Provide for one additional engineer aviation battalion.<sup>29</sup>

Mentioned, but not highlighted in the 23 April 1941 memo, the AGO announced the changes in engineer personnel were the result of the disbandment of selected aviation engineer companies and their subsequent activation as battalions, as well as constitution and activation of a few more engineer aviation companies. The new battalions were to be the 802nd at Fort Glenn, Alaska (1 July 1941); 803rd at Westover Field, Massachusetts (8 July 1941); 804th at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii (21 July 1941); 805th at Albrook Field, Canal Zone (28 June 1941); and 810th Colored at MacDill Field, Florida (26 June 1941). The earliest activations and assignments of engineer aviation battalions to airbases outside the continental US reflected the limited defense perimeter then favored for the Pacific: Alaska-Hawaii-Canal Zone, as outlined in the just developed (May 1941) War Plan Rainbow 5. The 809th EC AVN SEP was constituted, activated, and assigned to the Philippines on 24 May 1941.<sup>30</sup>

The new units went to work immediately. The 806th EC AVN was assigned to Borinquen Army Airfield, Puerto Rico. The 802nd EB began work on the extension of Annette Island Army Airfield, which opened for operations in March 1942. The 807th at Anchorage, Alaska, remained an EC until February 1942; however, it was on the 1 March 1941 list of companies to be reactivated as a battalion. As of late July, the 807th had orders to lengthen two existing runways and begin work on a third at Yakutat, Alaska. Within two weeks, the field had limited runway capabilities.<sup>31</sup>

## Equipping Aviation Engineer Units

The general principle in the COE was that construction requirements would define the aviation engineer units. They would build advance airfields 20 to 70 miles behind the front, generally remain at a single location for an extended period, and not be required to keep up with advancing columns. Further, one battalion should be responsible for the construction of one new airfield, and additional battalions would be used for maintenance and extension of fields. Organizationally, the “separate” engineer aviation units would be situated with and subordinate to the USAAF. A headquarters company was to be organized for each air force. The command structure placed aviation engineer units in an ambiguous position between the COE, which had little control over its personnel, and the USAAF, to which the engineers were attached and from which they received their tasking. While sound in theory, the realities of war provided a challenge for the contending parties, as demonstrated by the experience of the 803rd on Bataan.<sup>32</sup>

As initially proposed, aviation engineer units were to have an inventory of construction equipment more extensive than other engineer units. The battalion table of organization and equipment (TO&E) included 220 pieces of heavy equipment. General-purpose machinery was preferred over more specialized machines. The heavier construction machinery (e.g., 12-cubic-yard scrapers) initially planned for an aviation ER was omitted in favor of lighter, more transportable equipment. Also, in the battalion’s inventory were standard sets of carpenter, demolition, and “pioneer” or hand tools. Some specific machines such as asphalt and concrete tools, rock crushers, draglines, and floodlight, were also included in the TO&E. The commanding officer allocated personnel and equipment among the various companies. For example, a battalion was issued only one complete set of equipment for soil-cement stabilization for use among its companies. Later, the Air Corps successfully pressed for a revision to the TO&E that eliminated paving machinery. They argued that given the aircraft involved, turf runways were sufficient for advanced bases.

Further defined, separate engineer aviation battalions were not to be equipped for the topographic, camouflage, and supply activities that were typical elements of an ER. Armament consisted of pistols, rifles, and anti-aircraft (AA) machine guns. The new M1 Garand semi-automatic rifles were authorized for aviation engineer units.

Still, delays in obtaining the more modern weapons forced the original units to use vintage M1903 bolt-action Springfield rifles.<sup>33</sup>

By October 1941, the organization of the separate battalions provided significantly more equipment than initially available to the 21st ER AVN at the beginning of that year. The TO&E for separate battalions was supposed to have 25 machine guns for airdrome or air-base defense, as opposed to none in the TO&E for previous organizations. The heavy equipment inventory increased from three to six motorized road graders and added three 3.5-cubic-yard scrapers, two 0.5-cubic-yard gasoline-powered shovels, and nine more bulldozers, ranging from the lighter Caterpillar Model D4 to the heavier D8. The first aviation engineer units such as the 803rd, had to contend with shortages of heavy equipment.<sup>34</sup>

**Table 1.3. Equipment engineer aviation battalion**

Item	Quantity
<b>Armament</b>	
Machine Gun	25
Rifle	504
Pistol	193
<b>Car, sedan</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Compressor, air, motorized</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Disk, harrow</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Distributor, asphalt, motorized</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Generator, electric, 5 kilovolts w/skids</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Grader, road</b>	
Leaning-wheel, towed	1
Motorized, diesel	6
<b>Mixer</b>	
Concrete, 14 cubic feet, towed	3
Road material	1
<b>Motorcycle, solo</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Plow</b>	
Disk, heavy	3
Tractor	3
<b>Pump</b>	
Centrifugal	2
Diaphragm	1
<b>Repair unit, mobile</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Roller</b>	
Rubber-tired, motorized	1
Sheepsfoot, triple	1

Item	Quantity
Tandem, 10-ton, motorized	2
<b>Rooter, medium</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Scraper, carry-all</b>	
3.5 cubic yard	3
8 cubic yards	3
<b>Shovel</b>	
Gasoline, 0.5 cubic yard	3
Push D-4 Tractor	3
Tank, 750-gallon with skids	1
<b>Tank, 250-gallon, water</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Tractor</b>	
Diesel, D-4, w/dozer	3
Diesel, D-4 w/dozer & trailer	3
Diesel, D-7, w/trailer	3
Diesel, D-8, w/dozer	1
Gasoline, rubber-tired	1
<b>Trailer</b>	
One-ton	16
Eight-ton	6
Fifteen-ton	5
Twenty-ton	1
<b>Trencher, vertical boom</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Truck</b>	
Ambulance	1
Quarter-ton, general-purpose	4
Half-ton, command	6
Half-ton, pick-up	12
Half-ton, radio	1
One-and-half-ton, cargo	1
One-and-half-ton, dump	62
Two-and-half-ton, cargo	3
Four-ton, cargo	
Four- to five-ton, dump	10
Six-ton, cargo	
<b>Water supply equipment, portable</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Welding set</b>	
Electric, motorized	1
Oxyacetylene, portable	1
<b>Well drilling set, portable</b>	<b>1</b>

Source: Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 193.

In addition to personnel shortages, the first aviation engineer units faced the challenge of inadequate funds for training. The air staff rejected a 15 July 1941 AFCC request for additional training funds for on-the-job (OTJ) training at the bases where engineer aviation units were assigned. Stating “no Air Corps funds were available for the training of aviation engineer units along the lines recommended,” the air staff suggested instead that engineers “might be used in connection with the construction of runways on air stations [already] in progress or hereafter built.”<sup>35</sup>

After the mid-year flurry of activity, it was not until mid-September 1941, that the USAAF gained approval for plans to activate four more engineer aviation battalions, “2 white and 2 colored,” for duty with the AFCC on or about 1 November 1941. The caveat was that “no funds [would] be available for the provision of housing for these Engineer Aviation Troops [*sic*] until Supplementary Budget Legislation [*sic*] has been approved by Congress.”<sup>36</sup>

At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, only two aviation engineer battalions were on duty in the Pacific Theater: the 804th on Oahu, Hawaii, and the 803rd in the Philippines. The first American engineer reinforcements, the 808th left for Australia from the US in late December 1941. The more experienced 810th EB AVN Colored and the newly formed 811th EB AVN Colored departed for Australia in late January. The two battalions were then deployed to and compiled an impressive record on New Caledonia. Those EBs were directed by Brig Gen Hugh J. Casey, who had overall command of the 803rd Engineers on Bataan and Corregidor. The newly arrived engineer aviation battalions with skilled personnel and specialized equipment supported tactical advances with airfield construction for fighters and bombers. They played an essential role, tactically and strategically, in MacArthur’s island-hopping strategy in the Southwest Pacific.<sup>37</sup>

#### Notes

(All notes appear in the shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

1. Hartser et al., *Leading the Way: The History of Air Force Civil Engineers, 1907–2012*, 10–11. Citing Brig Gen William T. Meredith, USAF, retired, who was the assistant for facilities management, office of the assistant secretary of defense (installations and logistics) during 1970–73.

2. Pearson, "Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II," 14; Brig Gen John J. Kingman quoted in Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 18; Col Stuart C. Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," *The Military Engineer*, 33 no. 193 (November, 1941): 487; Lt Col Walter E. Lorence, "Logistics in World War II: Engineer Phase, October, 1945," National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Record Group (RG) 77 [Corps of Engineers], Entry 1011, Box 369, 1, 13; Col C.C. Elebash, "Was It the Air Corps or Army Air Forces in WW II?," <http://www.aafha.org/>.

3. Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 18–25; Adjutant General (AGO), Headquarters, Air Combat Command to all units of the Air Force Combat Command, memo, 2 August 1941, Subject: Aviation Engineers – Information (with attached translation from the German entitled "The Men with the Black Tabs"), RG18 (USAAF), Decimal 312.1, Box 30; Pearson, "Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater," 14; Hartser et al., *Leading the Way*, 11. With the reorganization of June, 1941, the USAAF was created with the Army Air Corps and the AFCC (formerly GHQ Air Force) as subordinate elements. See James Lee Cate, E. Kathleen Williams, and Louis E. Asher, "The Air Corps Prepares for War," in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume I, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939–August 1942* (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 114–15 (hereafter cited as *Plans and Early Operations*).

4. Craven and Cate, "Forward," and Frank Futrell, "The Development Of Base Facilities," both in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 6, Men and Planes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), xi, xxvi and 130-31, respectively (hereafter cited as "*Men and Planes*").

5. Karl C. Dod, *US Army in World War II, The Technical Services, The Corps of Engineers: The War against Japan* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966), 19–22, 25–29, (hereafter cited as *The War against Japan*).

6. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 25–29.

7. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 31; Maj Ivan L. Foster to Col [Robert] Olds, [plans division, office of the chief of the Air Corps], memo, 20 February 1941, Subject: Duties of Engineers as Shown in Attached Study; Lt Col Muir S. Fairchild, Air Corps plans division, to CoE, memo, 15 February 1941, Subject: Revised Basis of Allotment, Engineer Troops with the Air Corps, both in NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2, Box 30.

8. Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 487–491; "The Second Battalion, 28 Engineers (AVN), MacDill Field, Florida," *Air Corps News Letter (ACNL)* 23, no. 19 (October 1940): 18–19, <https://media.defense.gov/>; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 24–25, 34, 127.

9. Col Harry L. Twaddle, acting assistant chief of staff, to chief of staff (CoS), memo, 7 February 1941, Subject: Function and Responsibilities of Corps of Engineers in Maintaining Airdromes, NARA RG18, Decimal 321.1, Box 30; AGO to CG, all armies, army corps, divisions, GHQ Air Force et al., memo, 18 March 1941, Subject: Functions and Responsibilities of Corps of Engineers in Maintaining Airdromes, NARA RG18. See also Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 314–386.

10. Col Harry L. Twaddle, acting assistant chief of staff, to CoS, memo, 7 February 1941, Subject: Function and Responsibilities of Corps of Engineers in Maintaining Airdromes, NARA RG18, Decimal 321.1, Box 30; AGO to CG, all armies, army corps, divisions, GHQ Air Force et al., memo, 18 March 1941, Subject: Functions and Responsibilities of Corps of Engineers in Maintaining Airdromes, NARA RG18. See also Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 314–386.

11. Twaddle to CoS, 7 February 1941, memo, Subject: Function and Responsibilities of Corps of Engineers in Maintaining Airdromes; AGO to CG's, all Armies, Army Corps, Divisions, GHQ Air Force et al., memo, 18 March 1941, Subject: Functions and Responsibilities of Corps of Engineers in Maintaining Airdromes; Futrell, "The Development Of Base Facilities," in Craven and Cate, eds., *Men and Planes*, 129.

12. Foster to Olds, memo, 20 February 1941, Subject: Duties of Engineers as Shown in Attached Study; Capt Joseph S. Edgerton, "Maneuvers Under Way in South, Air Forces Playing Major Role," *Air Forces News Letter (AFNL)* 24, no. 15 (September 1941): 1–18. The Seabees were also based on the premise that would be "not only skilled construction workers but trained fighters as well." See Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, *U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945* (Washington, DC: US Navy Department, 1946), 29.

13. Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 488–89.

14. Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 488, 490; Pearson, "Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II," 24. See also John E. Fagg, "Aviation Engineers in the War with Japan," in Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. VII: Services around the World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. US Air Force Historical Division reprint 1983), 276 (hereafter cited as "Services around the World").

15. Pearson, "Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II," 24.

16. Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 488–89; ACNL 22, no. 19, 19; Dr. Ronald B. Hartzler, "A Look Back at Black Aviation Engineer Units of World War II." Tyndall Air Force Base, 27 February 2013, <https://www.af.mil/>.

17. First Air Force, Annex No. 3 [Engineer Annex] to Administrative Instructions [for September 1941, Louisiana maneuvers], draft, 16 August 1941, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum, Box 669 (hereafter cited as "DDE Box 669").

18. Annex No. 3; Hqs, First Air Force, to commanding officer (CO), 803rd Engineer Battalion, memo, 17 July 1941, DDE, Box 669; Hqs, Third Air Task Force, office of the engineer, Lake Charles, Louisiana, to CO, 803rd Engineer Battalion, memo, 11 September 1941, Subject: Overland Movement of Troops, DDE, Box 669; Col Dwight F. Johns, "Maneuver Notes of Aviation Engineers," *The Military Engineer* 33, no. 193 (November 1941): 495–97; Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 490; Pearson, "Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II," 23; Capt Edgerton, "Maneuvers Under Way in South, Air Forces Playing Major Role," 18.

19. Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 487–491; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 24–25, 34, 127; Hqs, GHQ Air Force, to CG, Langley Field, memo, June 11, 1941, Subject: Organization and Training of 21st Engineers (Aviation), Lt Col Dwight F. Jones, CO, 21st Engineers, to CG, Langley Field, 2nd Indorsement (Ind.), 14 June 1941; and Hqs, GHQ Air Force, to CG, First Air Force, Mitchel Field, memo, 16 May 1941, all in DDE, Box 669.

20. Maj Gen George H. Brett to AGO, memo, 19 November 1940, Subject: Additional Engineer (Aviation) Personnel for the Air Corps, NARA RG18, Decimal 322.03, Box 30; Pearson, "Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater," 14; Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 488–89; ACNL 22, no. 19, 18.

21. Brett to AGO, 29 November 1940, memo, Subject: Additional Engineer (Aviation) Personnel for the Air Corps.

22. Brig Gen John J. Kingman to AGO, memo, 6 January 1941, Subject: Increase in Strength of Engineer Aviation Units in Alaska, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 221; ACNL 23, no. 19 (October 1940): 18–20.

23. Please, neither the author nor Air University Press endorse the use of the term “colored.” This is what the unit was named during this time period.

24. AGO to CG, Air Force, memo, 4 February 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units, NARA RG165, Entry 281, Box 109; Maj K. F. Hortford, OCE, to AGO, memo, 1 March 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 221. “Brevities,” ACNL 24, no. 4 (15 February 1941): 17. ACNL reported only on the organization of the 805th, 806th, and 807th engineer companies.

25. Twaddle to ACoS [Assistant chief of staff], G-1, G-4, war plans division (WPD), memo, 23 April 1941, Subject: Augmentation [of] Engineer (Aviation) Personnel, NARA RG 165, Entry 281, Box 77; MLG [not further documented, GHQ, Air Force Combat Command], memo for the record (MFR) with handwritten annotations, 25 April 1941, no subject [telephone conversation with Maj Gen Arnold’s office]; and Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons, Commander GHQ Air Force, to Chief of the Army Air Forces, memo, 5 July 1941, Subject: Additional Aviation Engineer Troops, NARA RG18, Decimal 322.4, Box 30; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 25; Elebash, “Was It the Air Corps or Army Air Forces in WW II?”

26. Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 25, citing a letter from Lt Col Smyser, 318–319; Emmons to AGO through chief of the Air Corps, memo, 7 May 1941, Subject: Engineer Service with the GHQ Air Forces; NARA RG 18, Decimal 322.4, Box 30; Emmons to chief of the Army Air Forces, 5 July 1941, memo, Subject: Additional Aviation Engineer Troops; Godfrey, “Engineers with the Army Air Forces,” 488–89; Lt Col C.L. Adcock, OCE, to ACoS, G-4 [Army], memo, 3 October 1941, Subject: Organizational Equipment for Corps and Army Units of the Philippine Army, NARA RG77, File 400.34 (Philippine Department).

27. Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 24–25, 314–15; Godfrey, “Engineers with the Army Air Forces,” 489–490; Godfrey, Stuart Chapin at Generals.dk, <http://www.generals.dk/>.

28. Godfrey, “Engineers with the Army Air Forces,” 488–89.

29. Emmons to chief of the Army Air Forces, memo, 5 July 1941, Subject: Additional Aviation Engineer Troops.

30. Twaddle to ACoS, G-1, G-4, WPD, Tab C attached to memo, 23 April 1941, Subject: Augmentation Engineer (Aviation) Personnel; Shelby L. Stanton, *Order of Battle: U.S. Army in World War II* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), 582 (hereafter cited as *Order of Battle*); AGO to CG, Hawaiian Department, memo, 24 May 1941, Subject: Subject: Constitution and Activation of the 809th Engineer company, Aviation (Separate); AGO to CG’s Fourth Army, Hawaiian Department, Ninth Corps Area, and San Francisco Port of Embarkation, memo, 18 June 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units [804th], both in NARA RG77, Entry 390, Box 353; Louis Morton, *US Army in World War II, War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command—The First Two Years* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000), 46 (hereafter cited as *Strategy and Command—The First Two Years*).

31. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 10; AGO to CG’s Fourth Army, Hawaiian Department, Ninth Corps Area, and San Francisco Port of Embarkation, memo, 18 June 1941. Borinquen Army Airfield subsequently became Ramey Air Force Base.

32. Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 24–25, 56.

33. Pearson, “Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater,” 14; Godfrey, “Engineers with the Army Air Forces,” 489–490; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 24–25, 56, 316; ACNL 23, no. 19 (October, 1940): 19.

34. Godfrey, “Engineers with the Army Air Forces,” 488; Pearson, “Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater,” 21, said the TO&E provided for 21



machine guns and three 0.5 cubic yard shovels. See *ACNL* 23, no. 19, 18–20, which detailed personnel and equipment issues for the 2nd Battalion, 28 Engineer AVN Regiment, at MacDill Field.

35. Brig Gen C.W. Russell, CoS, headquarters, Air Force Combat Command, to chief of the Army Air Forces, memo, 15 July 1941, Subject: Funds for Training of Engineer Units (Aviation), NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2, Box 30; chief, air staff, routing sheet, 31 July 1941, Subject: Funds for Training Engineer Units (Aviation), NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2, Box 30; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 127.

36. R. P. C., [not further identified, headquarters, Army Air Forces], G-1 [personnel], memo, 16 September 1941, Subject: Activation of Four Battalions [of] Engineers Aviation, NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2, Box 30.

37. Pearson, 21, “Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater,” 41–42. See also Ulysses Lee, *United States Army in World War II, Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966), 594–96 (hereafter cited as *The Employment of Negro Troops*).

## Chapter 2

# From Acquiescence to Defense of the Philippines

## War Department Planning

Writing in August 1941, Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow, acting assistant chief of staff (ACoS), war plans division (WPD), succinctly summarized US defense policy concerning the Philippines: “From 1922 [the conclusion of the Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty] until late 1940, our policy with regard to the Philippines was to maintain existing strength but undertake no further permanent improvements except as a measure of economy.” During the interwar period the WPD conducted several studies of the situation and by 1939 recommended consideration of three possible courses of action:

- Maintain the status quo;
- Withdraw forces from the Philippines and East Asia, then designate the “Far East,” and establish a defensive line along the 180th Meridian from major bases in the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, and Alaska; or
- Build a force in the Philippines sufficient to enforce US policies and protect US interests in East Asia.

The minimum reinforcements necessary to provide a “reasonable chance of successful defense,” WPD opined, included a composite air wing, one infantry division, and 2,300 additional harbor defense troops.<sup>1</sup>

The Philippine Department, the US Army component responsible for the defense of the Philippines, had essentially recommended the second option in 1933 before the colony gained commonwealth status because of the islands’ feeble defense structure. A year later, the War Department decided to maintain military strength at then-existing levels, “depending on the availability of funds,” but, as Gerow later repeated, “to expend no further funds on permanent improvements.” Army chief of staff (CoS), Lt Gen Douglas MacArthur approved that position. The War Department adhered to that policy and position until 1939 when it again came under question. At that time, Brig Gen George V. Strong, ACoS, WPD, outlined the above three op-

tions in a provocative memorandum to then-Army CoS Gen George C. Marshall. He “noted” them belatedly but took no action. In a 2 March 1940 memorandum, Strong then seemingly modified his earlier position and recommended against an increase in Army aviation assets in the Philippines because national policy precluded “the peacetime reinforcement of the Philippine garrison [i.e., ground and harbor defense troops] so as to afford a reasonable chance for self-sustained defense.” Using Strong’s memo, General Marshall then rejected a proposal, first surfaced by the Navy in February 1940, to increase Army aviation in strength in the Philippines. In that discussion, the Army Air Corps then projected that a composite air wing of 441 combat aircraft would be necessary for the “proper defense” of the Philippines. Even as its preparedness program moved forward, the United States lacked the funds, materiel, and workforce to reinforce the Philippines. It struggled to do this while at the same time providing material support to the United Kingdom (UK) for its battle against Nazi Germany, always viewed as a greater threat to US national security. A significant point in Strong’s 1939 options, nevertheless, was his documentation of the requirement for one composite air wing should the modernization of defenses and augmentation of the Philippine garrison be undertaken. He strengthened that statement in the WPD’s 2 March 1940 recommendations to General Marshall: “. . . under the conditions existing, the principal reliance would be placed on air-power [original emphasis] not only to deter an attack on Luzon [*sic*] but to defeat one if made . . .”<sup>22</sup>

### Enter Grunert

US policy and resource constraints notwithstanding, when outspoken Maj Gen George Grunert assumed command of the Philippine Department in June 1940, he began immediately to agitate against “ap-  
peasement and catering to Japan” and to campaign for improving the defenses of the Philippines. During July to August of 1940, General Grunert sent at least eight warning reports and recommendations to the War Department asking for modern bombardment and pursuit aircraft, more pilots, an air warning system, and more airfields. Maj Gen Henry H. Arnold, chief of the Air Corps, rejected the delivery of modern pursuit aircraft, Grunert’s most pressing need. Instead, he promised only three Douglas B-18 Bolos, obsolete and underpowered

twin-engineer bombers, and four Stinson O-49 Vigilant twin-seat observation aircraft—but not until 1 July 1941. General Arnold’s response showed that he had to contend with the same issue that confronted all the military services at the time: lack of personnel and lagging production of aircraft during a time of rapid expansion of US military forces. He could not send planes and pilots to the Philippines without “depleting tactical units being formed or by taking them from pilot training activities.” The ever-diplomatic General Marshall shortly thereafter promised Grunert that he would investigate the issues that Arnold had raised while repeating his previous comments on the urgent requirements for men and materiel that he faced.<sup>3</sup>



Source: NARA RG18, 18-AA-184-137704.

**Headquarters, Philippine Department, Ft. Santiago, Manila, 1938**

## **Recognition of the Japanese Threat**

As the debate between Grunert and the War Department began, Japan’s increasingly aggressive actions in Southeast Asia caused the US to initiate a corresponding series of increasingly firm counteractions. The pattern of Japanese action and US reaction intensified. Ultimately, it culminated with the attack on Pearl Harbor and the US declaration of war. A late July 1940 change in US policy required that

exports to Japan of aviation gasoline, lubricants, and scrap iron and steel be licensed. Ironically, at the time, iron and steel exports to Japan were decreasing, while overall supplies available for US and British industry needs were declining. However, Japan was attempting to increase purchases of US petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), supplies that the State Department thought that the Japanese would stockpile on Hainan Island, China, in preparation for military action to the south. On 24 September 1940, after prolonged negotiations and with pressure from Germany, Vichy France allowed Japan to occupy military maintenance bases and three airfields in French Indochina (current day Vietnam). The action took place despite a 4 September warning to Japan from the United States. Also, on 24 September, Japan became a member of the Axis by signing the Tri-Partite Pact, a 10-year military and economic alliance with Germany and Italy that pledged mutual aid in the event of war with a nation not yet a belligerent, a warning aimed principally at the United States.<sup>4</sup>

### **New Emphasis on Defense**

Concern in both the State and the War Departments over Japan's actions led to a review and further hardening of policy toward Japan. During September, Congress also passed the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 that authorized a peacetime draft. Amid that maneuvering (26 September), Pres. Franklin Roosevelt responded with the first economic sanctions designed to pressure Japan: a ban on US exports of all scrap iron and steel outside the Western Hemisphere except to the UK, effective 6 October 1941. At a 17 October meeting, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, a former governor-general of the Philippines (1927–29), and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox revisited with General Marshall the February 1940 suggestion by the Navy to increase Army aviation assets in the Philippines. Stimson and Knox were Republicans newly appointed to the cabinet. More strident than most others in the Roosevelt administration about countering Japanese expansionism, they pushed to protect the Asiatic Fleet, which was scheduled to move from Shanghai to Manila in mid-October 1940. General Marshall had just promised to send Grunert the modern pursuit aircraft he had requested, but not until August. While still rejecting the bulk of Grunert's requests, he and Secretary Stimson developed a plan to divert 40 Seversky EP-1 aircraft—designated as

the P-35A in the Air Corps inventory—from delivery to Sweden and instead reallocate them to the Philippines. The decision formally reflected the realization that the United States was unprepared for a two-ocean war. The question was whether it should attend first to its national security or divert scarce resources to the Philippines.

Further, production from US industry was still not at a capacity sufficient to meet able to meet Army and Navy requirements. The P-35 was the first all-metal aircraft in the Army Air Corps inventory with retractable landing gear and an enclosed cockpit. The planes sold to Sweden carried heavier armor and more weaponry than their US Army Air Corps analogs. They had a four .50-caliber machine guns (i.e., an extra gun on each wing) and could carry ten 100-pound bombs.<sup>5</sup> And they were still considered obsolete by that time.

On 17 October, the Air Corps submitted a plan for transferring the 17th Pursuit Squadron from Selfridge Field, Michigan, and the 20th Pursuit Squadron from Hamilton Field, California, to the Philippines. The Army quartermaster then released the 40 P-35A, and the Army operations division issued the movement orders to the two US-based pursuit groups to which the squadrons were attached. The 20th reached Manila on 23 November, and the 17th arrived on 4 December. The transfer was a limited effort to bolster Philippine defenses based on resources then available. Pursuit aircraft were still viewed as an extension of AA artillery and not as an offensive weapons platform, as they would become later in the war. Yet that action did not signal a significant change in the primary US policy, as shown by General Arnold's request to the War Department after the approval of the transfer the pursuit aircraft to the Philippines: "the strength of the Air Corps [should] be increased by two Pursuit Squadrons in order that the combat strength of GHQ Air Force [might] not be depleted."<sup>6</sup>

Reviewing the prospects for the development of engineer aviation units in late November 1940, Arnold, by then an ACoS for air, and Maj Gen Julian Schley, CoE, agreed that because Army engineer strength at the time was inadequate, provisions should be made for the use of engineer aviation units for close support of air operations in each of the four US-based air districts and five "foreign stations." One of the foreign stations was Nichols Field, Manila, for which an as-yet undesignated engineer aviation company (separate) was proposed.<sup>7</sup>

Momentum for further defensive measures appeared to build after the transfer of the two pursuit squadrons. On 26 December 1940, with General Marshall's approval, the WPD wrote that approval of

General Grunert's proposals, which the War Department had previously rejected for lack of funds, men, and equipment, had become possible without jeopardizing other defense priorities. WPD recommended augmentation of the Philippine Scouts (PS) and the 31st Infantry Regiment US, the addition of two CA regiments, and the provision of more artillery, both AA and field artillery for near- and longer-term delivery. The memo also mentioned the possible provision of \$1,500,000 for "defensive installations." In mid-January, the WPD sent General Grunert a radiogram asking him to report "by radio, construction items necessary to the defense of the Philippines, arranged in order of priority." The Philippine Department's response listed construction priorities totaling about \$7,104,000. They included numerous infrastructure projects on Bataan, including an airfield (\$150,000); the improvement of Kindley Field, Corregidor (\$139,000); extension and improvement of Clark and Nichols Fields (\$500,000 each); an all-weather airfield in the vicinity of Camp O'Donnell (\$500,000), located north of Clark Field; and \$2,183,552 for equipment. General Grunert's input was the first formal mention of Army airfields on Bataan and at Camp O'Donnell. The planners also said the construction of a landing field on Bataan, which then had only the naval seaplane base at Mariveles, "appear[ed] essential." They also supported the expansion and improvement of Nichols Field as "essential to the requirements of a reasonably efficient air defense" and of Clark Field as "essential for any extensive air operations." The WPD mentioned that \$140,000 had already been included in the FY 1941 tentative estimates for the improvement of Kindley Field.<sup>8</sup>

The airfield expansion and construction were critical elements on General Grunert's list of priority projects. Providing context for General Marshall's position against the Navy's suggested increase in aviation assets in the Philippines, the Air Corps staff had noted previously in February 1940, that:

- Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses, Douglas B-18 Bolo medium bombers, Douglas C-29 cargo aircraft; and single-engine pursuit planes (i.e., P-35's and P-40 Warhawks) could not be operated from Luzon without the extension of runways and additional facilities;
- Only the Martin B-10 medium bomber, the first all-metal monoplane regularly used by the Army Air Corps, and the

Boeing P-26 Peashooter pursuit aircraft could operate from the existing fields. Both planes were obsolete at the time of the Air Corps estimate.<sup>9</sup>

The War Department's follow-up on General Grunert's request showed growing confidence in its ability to obtain congressional funding for preparedness. On 5 February 1941, the WPD documented the tentative inclusion of \$1,946,000 in the supplemental estimate for FY 1941, which then ran from 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941, and requested War Department authorization. That amount included \$500,000 for Air Corps construction. Among the items that the WPD identified for future funding contingent on the submission of detailed plans and estimates by the Philippine Department were:

- Bataan infrastructure: roads, docks, bombproof storage;
- Bataan airfield;
- Extension and Improvement of Clark and Nichols Fields;
- The new airfield at Camp O'Donnell.<sup>10</sup>

The WPD's justification for its budget recommendation emphasized the defensive nature of the installations proposed for the Philippines:

The War Plans Division is of the opinion that funds and material should be provided as soon as possible for the completion of the projects covering de-  
fensive installations [emphasis original] . . . Military installations in the Philippine Department have declined steadily in defensive strength in recent years because of the agreement set forth in the Limitations of Armaments Agreement conference of 1922 and because of the lack of funds allotted for upkeep and replacement. In the face of existing world conditions it is imperative to reduce the present vulnerability of these outmoded defenses to modernized methods of air and sea attack if defense is to be attempted. The proposed program will obtain the maximum defensive value of present installations as early a date as possible and increase the possibility of maintaining a reasonably effective defense during the remaining years of American occupancy. The diversion of needed funds and materiel can be accomplished without jeopardizing the defense of the United States.

General Gerow's reference to the "remaining years of American occupancy" referred to the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, which granted the Philippines independence by 1944, was interesting. That legislation provided for the transfer of US Army installations to Philippine ownership when the US colony gained independence (commonwealth status), another issue that made the War Department hesitant to allocate additional funds for the defense of the island.<sup>11</sup>



War Department actions immediately after that met neither the level that General Grunert had proposed nor those requirements that the WPD had outlined to him earlier. This result came despite General Marshall's comment to the Philippine Department commander that they were meant "to impress Japan with the fact that we mean business." Action on obtaining additional combat aircraft for the Philippines was minimal; they simply were not yet available in the quantities needed to meet competing requirements across all operational theaters. Thus, the Army CoS recommended, and the president approved, only increases in personnel for ground forces: the PS, the 31st Infantry Regiment US, and the 60th CA Regiment US. While the augmentation of the PS did not present a significant challenge, men were not yet available for either of the two US regiments. As the WPD admitted, the men were still "being recruited for early dispatch" to the Philippines.<sup>12</sup>

General Grunert proved relentless. In March 1941, he asked for Douglas B-23 Dragon medium bombers, a modified version of the B-18, to replace his obsolete B-10. Again, providing less than requested, the War Department ordered the Hawaiian Department to ship 18 twin-engine B-18 to the Philippines. By the time those bomber aircraft had arrived at Clark Field, even GHQ Air Force had already judged the aircraft to be "very slow, obsolete." Other steps were equally minor. By the end of March, 52 of 57 P-35A from the Swedish contract were in Manila, and the War Department had transferred 31 Curtiss P-40B Warhawk pursuit planes to the Philippines. In April 1941, 31 more P-40Bs arrived. General Grunert proceeded with a reorganization that included the establishment of the Philippine Department Air Force. Brig Gen Henry Claggett, the first Air Corps general officer assigned to the Philippine Department, assumed command of the new component in May 1941.<sup>13</sup>

General Marshall continued to turn aside Grunert's other requests. In late March, he told the Philippine Department commander that "we are at present unable to stretch our available resources far enough to meet the tremendous pressure we are subjected to from all directions. This is particularly true in the matter of planes. However, the staff is exploring every possible way to get modern equipment for your bombardment squadron as well as meet deficiencies in your defensive reserve." Later, when General Grunert renewed his request for ammunition, antiaircraft equipment, and aircraft, General Marshall replied in early May: "There is nothing new in the offing. We are

doing everything we can for you, and I am sure you understand our limitations.”<sup>14</sup>

The CoS's responses to the Philippine Department's requests for combat aircraft were not a dodge; however, they reflected the situation with which the War Department had to contend. As early as the fall of 1938, the chief of the Army Air Corps had asked US aircraft manufacturers to prepare for increased production despite the absence of firm orders from the War Department. In January 1939, Roosevelt urged Congress to expand the Air Corps, including provision for 5,500 planes. The War Department concluded contracts quickly, but two years later, aircraft production was still not sufficient to meet the escalating requirements of the United States and its potential allies.<sup>15</sup>

## Funding

Although the required weaponry was not available, funds for the improvement of the Philippine Department's military facilities were still being approved. On 6 March, Secretary of War Henry Stimson directed that General Grunert be informed by letter of approval for the funding (\$7.5 million), slightly more than what he had requested in January for construction and materials, subject to the provision of detailed plans and estimates. Included were the new projects Maj Gen Grunert had previously listed for Clark, Nichols, Bataan, and O'Donnell Fields. In the comments on the budget approvals, Maj Gen Arnold presciently recommended that the estimate for Bataan Field be increased from \$150,000 to \$500,000 to allow for hard-surfaced runways for the “operation of loaded bombardment airplanes.” He concurred on the extension and improvement of Nichols and Clark Fields and a new airfield at Camp O'Donnell.

Nevertheless, the Air Corps chief said that the addition of the two pursuit squadrons (i.e., the 17th and the 20th) necessitated concrete aprons near hangars at Clark for aircraft warm-ups. In the same memo, Arnold rightly questioned the need for additional funds for Kindley Field because of its vulnerability and unsuitability for use by pursuit and bomber aircraft. In addition, Arnold recommended the construction of an airdrome in the Cagayan River valley in central Luzon, an addition to Grunert's original list.<sup>16</sup>

The Philippine Department and its short-staffed office of the department engineer (ODE) finally responded to the request for detailed plans, estimates, and maps via letter on 3 July 1941. The letter also documented supplementary estimates to cover increased costs. As an example, cost projections for Bataan Field were increased significantly from \$150,000 to \$1,128,100 and for Nichols Field from \$575,000 to \$1,021,350. The cost projections for proposed work at Clark and Kindley Field, for some reason undocumented, showed large decreases. The department did not note any change in cost projections for O'Donnell Field (\$500,000). The letter mentioned a request for about \$1.7 million for 23 other airfields in the Philippine Department and almost \$3.3 million for nine fields to be used jointly by the Army and Navy.<sup>17</sup>

A War Department summary of allotments for the Air Corps in the FY 1941 budget—which would have taken effect 1 July 1940 (the start of the new FY 1941), contained only a nominal amount for small lighting projects at Nichols and Clark. Importantly, the summary showed that the WPD's confidence in gaining additional funds for the Philippine Department was well placed. Significant funding for the expansion and improvement of Clark and Nichols Fields and the development of Bataan Field came through a congressional resolution and the second and fourth supplements (known as “supplementals”) to the FY 1941 budget, which the Philippine Department consolidated into one project. The amounts stated for various projects varied slightly from memo to memo, however, and caused some confusion in the ODE.<sup>18</sup>

On 16 April, the OCE advised Col Harry Stickney, the ODE, that the fourth supplemental appropriation to the FY 1941 budget contained \$500,000 for runway construction in the Philippines. The OCE directed that immediate steps be taken “to initiate construction of an airfield on Bataan Peninsula and [expand] facilities at Kindley, Nichols, and Clark Fields.” The OCE further advised that the construction of permanent buildings at those airfields, however, would require “separate authority.” Because of rising prices in the Philippines, the OCE had to secure additional funds for the construction of the East-West (E-W) runway at Nichols Field before sending a 22 April radiogram to the ODE with approval to begin the project.<sup>19</sup>

## Construction Challenges

With funding authorizations in hand, Col Harry Stickney wanted to start construction as soon as possible. Airfield expansion and development, however, required more than additional funds, as Karl Dod documented in *The War against Japan*. Political issues adversely affected dealings—especially regarding large capital improvement projects—with the Philippine Government, supposedly on its way to independence. The relative isolation of the Philippines from Washington, DC, was also an impediment to communications. The process of acquiring land for airbases proved cumbersome for the Philippine Commonwealth, posing a challenge to the development of O'Donnell and, later, Del Carmen Fields. Since the Clark and Nichols Fields were on government-owned land, there was not an issue with acquisition for construction projects.<sup>20</sup>

Also, Stickney and the ODE lacked skilled labor, materials, and equipment, particularly heavy construction machinery. Of the major construction companies operating in the Philippines, none had the requisite skills or equipment to build airstrips. Two mining companies, Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and Marsman and Company, had experience in tunneling and explosives. Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Company (AG&P) specialized in steel buildings and docks. Still, all three volunteered to support and perform the work for the ODE's projects. The 14th EB PS was the only military engineer unit in the Philippines. Still, it was mainly a combat engineer unit and committed to working on trails and roads in Bataan at that time. For workforce and machinery, Colonel Stickney used Filipino contractors for smaller jobs. They, too, lacked heavy construction equipment and experienced supervisory staff. He was, however, able to hire unskilled laborers locally.<sup>21</sup>

Those obstacles notwithstanding, during April to May of 1941, the ODE began work on 16 construction projects, including runway improvements at Nichols Field and Kindley Field. The ODE also started construction, very preliminarily, on O'Donnell Field in the northern sector of the Ft. Stotsenburg military reservation, as well as at Del Monte and Malabang on Mindanao. Colonel Stickney also cajoled the Philippine Bureau of Public Works (BPW) into lending a few trucks and some well-used earthmoving equipment. This was used mainly for runway construction and improvement at Nichols and Clark Fields, until the end of the monsoon season (about 1 November).

Considering equipment shortages, the COE approved only the ODE's negotiating purchases of new and used equipment locally rather than allowing him to order machinery from the United States. Colonel Stickney quickly capitalized on his new authority within the limits of the local market. Also, the OCE promised to send equipment along with the first shipment of engineers to be assigned to the Philippines.<sup>22</sup>

The weather was also a factor. The work progressed slowly because the annual monsoonal rains that plagued the Philippines from June through October compounded problems posed by other deficiencies. The monsoons and consequent flooding caused the suspension of operations at Nichols Field during the initial phase of construction.<sup>23</sup>

The need for skilled workers and heavy construction equipment led to the activation of the 809th EC in Hawaii in May 1941 and its assignment to the Philippines a month later. The arrival in Manila of the 809th in early July 1941 brought much needed but still not sufficient modern equipment and skilled labor and management for the major improvements at Nichols Fields.

#### Notes

1. Gerow to CoS, memo, 14 August 1941, Subject: Reinforcement of the Philippines, NARA RG165 [WPD], Box 16.

2. Brig Gen [Stanley Dunbar] Embrick for CG, Philippine Department, memo, 19 April 1933, Subject: Military Policy of U.S., cited in Mark Skinner Watson, *US Army in World War II, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, US Army, 1950), 415 (hereafter cited as "*Prewar Plans and Preparations*"); Brig Gen George V. Strong to CoS, memos, 21 August 1939, Subject: Military Policy as to the Philippines and 2 March, 1940, Subject: Practicability of Increasing Army Aviation Strength in the Philippines, both in NARA RG165, Box 191, Files 4192 and 4192-3. General Marshall's only comment, handwritten, on Strong's 31 August 1939, memo was "noted."

3. Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 412–18, quoting a letter from Grunert to Marshall, 1 September 1941; Arnold to Strong, memo, 8 August 1940, and Marshall to Grunert, letter, 1 September 1941, cited in William Bartsch, *December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2003), 25–26 (hereafter cited as *December 8, 1941*); William Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start: American Pursuit Pilots in the Philippines, 1941-1942* (College Station, Texas A&M Press, 1995), 2 (hereafter cited as *Doomed at the Start*). See Douglas B-19 Bolo: Stinson L-1 Vigilant, <https://en.wikipedia.org/>.

4. Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor: The Coming of the War between the United States and Japan* (New York: Atheneum, 1966), 88–89, 150–51 (hereafter cited as *The Road to Pearl Harbor*), used the term "our first firm counteractions." See James C. Thomson, Jr., Peter W. Stanley, and John Curtis Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 190–94.

5. Arnold to CoS, memo, 17 October 1940, Subject: Additional Pursuit Units for the Philippine Department, NARA RG165, File 3633-12, Box 136, with attached

movement plan and handwritten annotations, Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 35–36, said 60 pursuit aircraft were involved; E. Kathleen Williams, “Deployment of the AAF [Army Air Forces] on the Eve of Hostilities,” in Craven and Cate, eds., *Plans and Early Operations*, 176, placed the number at 48; Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, 88–107; Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 418–23.

6. Arnold to CoS, memo, 17 October 1940, NARA RG165, Box 136; William H. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 1, 7; Allison Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat* (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1944), 16.

7. Maj Gen George H. Brett to AGO, memo, 29 November 1940, Subject: Additional Engineer (Aviation) Personnel for the Air Corps.

8. Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 423–25; Gerow to CoS, memo, 5 February 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, which also cited the 26 December 1941, WPD memo and the 12 January 1941 radiogram to Grunert. It also included a summary of Grunert’s response. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 56, took the position that Grunert’s repeated petitions rather than changes in the international situation “led the War Department to make a beginning toward bolstering the islands’ defenses.”

9. Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 416; WPD to CoS, memo, 2 March 1940, Subject: Practicability of Increasing Army Aviation Strength in the Philippines; Arnold to ACoS, WPD, memo, 26 February 1940.

10. Gerow to CoS, memo, 5 February 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department.

11. Gerow to CoS, memo, 5 February 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department. Cf. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 56; John F. Cady, *Southeast Asia: Its Historic Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 482–83.

12. Gerow to CoS, memo, 5 February 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department; Letter, Marshall to Grunert, 8 April 1942, cited in Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 424.

13. Cate, Williams, and Asher, “Deployment of the AAF on the Eve of Hostilities,” in Craven and Cate *Early Plans and Operations*, 177; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 79–80; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 2, 9; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 8–13.

14. Marshall to Grunert, letters, 27 March 1941, and 2 May 1941.

15. Cate and Williams, “The Air Corps Prepares for War,” 103–04; Williams and Asher, “Deployment of the AAF on the Eve of Hostilities,” both in Craven and Cate, eds., *Early Plans and Operations*, 103–04 and 177, respectively; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 79–80.

16. Gerow to AGO, memo, 6 March 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, FY 1942, NARA RG165, Entry 281, Box 108, provided the substance for the letter, sent 7 March 1941, to the Philippine Department.

17. Office of the Department Commander, Philippine Department, to AGO, letter, 3 July 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department FY 1942, NARA RG165, Entry 281, Box 108; Col Frank M. Kennedy, chief, buildings and grounds division, [Army Air Corps], to Brig Gen Henry W. Claggett, memo, 1 April 1941, no subject [summary of available and proposed funds for the Philippine Department], NARA RG18, Box 1112.

18. Col Frank M. Kennedy to office of the chief of the Air Corps, memo, 15 April 1941, Subject: Construction in the Philippines, NARA RG18, Project Files, Box 1117; Col H[arry] H. Stickney, ODE, to CoE, 1st Ind., 6 May 1941. Stickney was responding to a letter from OCE, 19 April 1941, Subject: Airfield Construction. Both items in NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Dec. 600.1, Box 709.

19. OCE to ODE, draft radiogram, 16 April 1941, no subject [authorization for runway construction in the Philippines], NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Decimal 600.1, Box 709; OCE to ODE, draft radiogram, 22 April 1941, no subject [authorization of Nichols Field runway project], NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Decimal 600.1, Box 709.

20. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 60–63.

21. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 60–63.

22. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 60–62; 1st Lt F. Bishop, headquarters, Philippine Department, to CG, USAFFE, memo, 24 October 1941, Subject: Construction Equipment Borrowed from the Bureau of Public Works, Casey Files, Folder 6; statement, Brig Gen Hugh J. Casey, 5 June 1944, Subject: Airdrome Construction in the Philippines, n.d. [ca. June, 1944], Casey Files, Folder 1 (hereafter cited as “Casey, Airdrome Construction in the Philippines”); e-mail, Capt Theodore L. Pflueger to author, 8 March 2001.

23. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 60–62.

## Chapter 3

# **809th Engineer Aviation Company/ Company C at Nichols Field**

## **Expansion of Nichols Field**

The Army moved a small air detachment to Camp Nichols, a PS base founded just south of Manila, in 1913. In 1921, the construction of hangars and operations buildings began, and barracks followed by mid-1923. By June 1929, the base was renamed Nichols Field and became the larger of the two permanent airdromes in the Philippine Department. The 4th Composite Group, which included all the Philippine Department Air Force's squadrons, except the 3rd Pursuit Squadron, was headquartered there. Brig Gen William "Billy" Mitchell contended that Nichols was the "poorest place" for peacetime flight operations that he had ever seen. Nevertheless, with uncertainty about the future of Ft. Stotsenburg-Clark Field, Nichols Field had grown to an area of about 80 acres.<sup>1</sup>

The major challenge for Nichols Field was flooding during the annual monsoon season (June through October). The smelly Parañaque River, which looped east-west along the north end of Nichols Field and north-south (N-S) along the western border of the post, provided the only drainage for the swampy area. The Manila Railroad's (MRR) Manila-Cavite line ran N-S along the east border. A 92-acre rice paddy east of the rail line rose about 10 feet above the level of the landing. Thus, Nichols Field was a natural basin for excess water from the rice paddies and earned numerous derogatory nicknames over the years: "veritable lagoon," "Lake Nichols," and the "Parañaque Sinkhole." On 15 October 1935, Maj Thomas H. Hastey, commander of the 4th Composite Group (1 August 1935–1 August 1936), obtained funds and attempted to solve the flooding problem by building a large drainage ditch between the rail line and the rice area. It was 3,600 feet long and 25 feet wide with an average depth of five feet. The rainy season brought a temporary halt to work on 27 May 1936, but the ditch was completed. Officers at Nichols thought it would "provide adequate drainage for the rainy season." In addition to the ditch, the excavation provided enough fill dirt to build a northeast-southwest (NE-SW) runway, dubbed a "monsoon runway," and to extend the



east-west (E-W) runway by 700 feet.<sup>2</sup> Further, the carabao commonly used to cultivate the near-by rice paddies occasionally wandered on to the runways and presented problems for air operations.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the many improvements that Major Hastey brought to Nichols, the landing field and hangar facilities were deemed “inadequate for the training requirements of the 28th Bomb Squadron.” In mid-June 1938, it moved to Clark, and the 3rd Pursuit Squadron moved to Nichols with its P-26 Peashooters. Shortly after that, the Army began grading for the construction of a north-south (N-S) asphalt runway at Nichols Field and planned to extend the length of the flying field to approximately 60 feet wide and 1,500 feet long. Although Air Corps officials thought that the construction would have to be deferred during the rainy season, the expected completion date was 1 December 1938. By mid-October, despite the rain, the project was nearing completion. It was assumed, incorrectly, that “the newly constructed runway [would] permit the take-off of airplanes regardless of the condition of the rest of the flying field.”<sup>4</sup>

By the time the 17th and 20th Pursuit Squadrons arrived in the Philippines, Nichols and Clark Fields were the only two airfields in the Philippines capable of handling combat aircraft in the Philippine Department inventory. The N-S runway at Nichols was the only paved airstrip in the commonwealth. However, at 2,410 feet long and 100 feet wide, neither the macadam strip nor the unpaved E-W runway (4,980 feet long and 100 feet wide), begun sometime before October 1940, at Nichols was adequate for the newer aircraft planned for the Philippines. The improvement of Nichols Field, including a proper drainage system, became a Philippine Department priority. Despite Major Hastey’s best efforts, the drainage system in the field remained inadequate. During rainy seasons, the N-S runway still flooded to the point where it was unusable. In 1937, just after the Hastey departed Nichols, torrential rains soaked the field and caused the curtailment of flight operations. The 28th Bomb Squadron had to engage in nonflight training to meet its annual training requirement.<sup>5</sup>

Work on Nichols Field continued until the war started. In mid-January, Maj Gen George Grunert listed and set priorities for “construction items necessary for the defense of the Philippine Islands.” Among projects at Nichols Field that he prioritized, and the War Department included in a supplemental budget estimate for FY 1941 was the expansion of the landing area and improvement of runways. The War Department justified the budget request by stating, “the im-

provement and expansion of Nichols Field appear[ed] to be essential to the requirements of a reasonably efficient air defense” and recommended the approval of \$575,000 for the requested construction projects at the field. Continuing his vocal battle for the augmentation of Philippine defenses, Grunert made the case in a 13 March 1941 radiogram to the War Department for remedying the perennial flooding problem at Nichols Field by draining and adding paved airstrips. He recommended that funds be allotted and that he be given the authority “to commence work at once.”<sup>6</sup>

Subsequently, during February to March 1941, the War Department began to channel funds to the Philippine Department and increased budget requests for improvements at Nichols. The first installment of funds came in early February 1941, with the allotment of \$25,000 to widen the parking strip and surface the new E-W runway. Next was an allotment for small aviation gasoline storage facilities. In late February, the War Department allotted \$470,000 for temporary warehouses and a storage hangar. By mid-March, the WPD had prepared an estimate of \$620,000 for a supplemental appropriation. It included \$120,000 “for completing work already begun for the accommodation of two additional pursuit squadrons.” The last installment, dated 22 March, allocated \$471,000 for “expansion and storage



Source: NARA RG18, AA-220-13A\_331-138

Nichols Field (N-S), October 1940



Source: NARA RG18, AA-220-13A\_331-139

Nichols Field (S-N), October 1940



Source: NARA RG18, AA-220-13A\_331-140

Nichols Field (W-E), October 1940

(Eng 785).” The budget activity coincided with the arrival of the 57 Seversky P-35A aircraft at Nichols Field in late March for assignment to the 17th and 20th Pursuit Squadrons. By mid-April, the War Department had requested an additional \$111,000 to expand the landing area and improve the runways. On 16 April, the OCE advised the ODE via radiogram that the fourth supplemental budget appropriation contained \$500,000 to start the construction of Bataan Field and expansion of facilities at Nichols, Kindley, and Clark Fields (Eng 888). Colonel Stickney was overwhelmed “by the many large allotments for [airfield construction] [*sic*] which have been lately received.” For example, he noted the \$811,000 for expansion and storage at Nichols Field (Eng 785) and requested clarification of the numerous funding allotments from the OCE. By 10 May, Maj Gen Henry Arnold advised WPD that in addition to the lump sum of \$500,000 requested in the supplemental, the following funds were available from regular appropriations for FY 1942: Nichols Field (\$575,000), Clark Field (\$315,000), and O’Donnell Field (\$500,000).<sup>7</sup>

Using funds from the supplemental budget appropriations, the ODE was directed to take “immediate steps . . . to initiate construction” on the designated airfields. The OCE followed up by authorizing the ODE to pave the E-W and new NE-SW runways to a width of 150 feet with the necessary grading and drainage. He also approved lengthening and widening the existing N-S runway to 150 feet and paving the apron and two additional taxiways (Eng 723 and Eng 888). Capt Allison Ind, a Philippine Department Air Force intelligence officer, said that as of May 1941, Nichols’s one macadam runway (N-S) was “narrow and showed the general characteristics of a washboard.” He doubted that P-40 pursuit aircraft would be able to take off and land at Nichols, given the condition of the runway.<sup>8</sup>

During April and May 1941, Colonel Stickney used the funds to begin four construction projects before the start of the rainy season. However, the scarcity of a skilled workforce, heavy construction equipment, and materials necessary for the construction of military airfields, generally, and for projects of the magnitude planned for Nichols Field, specifically, slowed Stickney’s plans even before he had to contend with monsoons. Still, on 10 May 1941, General Grunert formally advised the War Department that the work on airstrips at Nichols Field was underway. When completed, he said the field would be able to accommodate a five-squadron pursuit group. In earlier correspondence with the OCE, he had provided estimates for



four runway projects at Nichols: extension of the N-S and E-W runways, initiation of the construction of a NE-SW runway, and construction of a SE-NW runway. Work on improving the E-W runway began on 15 April. The ODE initially estimated the completion date for these projects 1 January 1942. The concept for Nichols called for its use as a base for bombers. However, the Air Corps later changed its plans when it became clear that the runways could not be completed before October 1, about the time as the second tranche of B-17s was to arrive in the Philippines. The correspondence between the ODE and the OCE provided additional details on the projects. They included the construction of a parking strip for the E-W runway, paving and widening the E-W and NE-SW runways to 150 feet, and lengthening the N-S runway. The NE-SW runway required additional grading, and the N-S runway needed fill material to raise the level of its lower areas. Improvement of the drainage system outside the field was necessary to divert run-off from higher ground to the airstrips. Significantly, the field lacked an air defense capability; it had neither machine guns nor AA artillery, as of early June 1941. A shipment of 20 3-inch guns was not scheduled to arrive until April 1942.<sup>9</sup>

Shortly after that (30 May to 3 June 1941), the comments of Group Capt Charles Darvall, Royal Air Force, fueled the drive for airstrip construction in the Philippines. After he inspected facilities in the Philippines, including Clark and Nichols Fields, he urged “sufficient landing fields . . . properly protected and equipped” so that each could handle a squadron or bombers or fighters. He said that landing fields “should be carefully camouflaged, and full dispersal schemes should be ready now [original emphasis].”<sup>10</sup>

By 2 July, General Grunert’s warning about Nichols’s drainage problems had again become a reality. The flooding caused by continuing typhoon rains, as well as the ODE’s construction activities, made flight training at Nichols impossible for the inexperienced pilots in the newly assigned pursuit squadrons. Air Corps personnel had to evacuate their barracks and move into hangars. Consequently, the 3rd Pursuit Squadron, then based at Nichols, and 17th Pursuit Squadron were forced to shuttle their P-26s and P-35s to Clark for training, while the 20th moved to Iba Field on the East China Sea for gunnery training. By July 1941, the ODE projects at Nichols included the drainage and lengthening of one airstrip and the construction of a new paved runway (i.e., NE-SW). It also included additional hangars and bomb, ammunition, and gasoline storage facilities, and bar-

racks and officers' quarters. On 2 August, the War Department obtained approval for \$2.27 million for airfield expansion and construction. The allotment for Nichols Field was \$575,000, with almost 60 percent (\$327,900) dedicated to expanding the existing runway and building new runways. The remainder was allotted for a new control tower, a splinter-proof power room, an operations center and radio room, a transmitter, gasoline storage, aprons and parking strips, lights, road, and artesian wells.<sup>11</sup>

### **Formation of the 809th Engineer Company**

To address the issue of providing a skilled workforce and construction machinery to the Philippines, movement on the transfer of an engineer aviation company in the Philippines came shortly after the decision to release the P-35As. The 22 November 1940 conference between General Arnold and Maj Gen Julian Schley, CoE, brought agreement on the need to increase the number of engineer aviation units within the Air Corps, including US-based air districts and foreign stations. Arnold and Schley argued for increasing the strength of engineer aviation units from 2,898 enlisted men, as proposed by War Department operations division, to a total of 6,318. Of that number, they recommended an as-then undesignated engineer aviation company, separate, of 160 enlisted men for service at Nichols Field, Manila. It was the first mention of placing a US Army engineer company in the Philippines. The Arnold-Schley proposal also included the formation of an engineer aviation battalion less two companies for Hickam Field, Hawaii, and an engineer aviation regiment less two battalions at Westover Field, Massachusetts. Among the Arnold-Schley recommendations were that "every effort be made to expedite the designation of units concerned and the allotment of the personnel necessary to place the . . . plan in effect" and "that units be moved to the [listed] stations as soon as the availability of housing and personnel permit." The shortage of engineers was the most significant restraint for the plan. Inadequate facilities, including housing, remained an issue both for the 809th and the 803rd.<sup>12</sup>

From the COE's struggle to plan for new units to meet expanding workforce requirements emerged an allotment plan on 4 March 1941 to provide aviation engineers to the Air Corps. That plan first documented the future assignment of the 809th Engineer AVN Company,

specifically, with a complement of 160 men to the Philippine Department. The OCE projected that the 809th would eventually be redesignated a battalion less one company. The same augmentation plan covered the 804th Engineer AVN Company (160 enlisted men) for the Hawaiian Department, the same US Army command from which engineers for the 809th were to be taken.<sup>13</sup>

The various proposals highlighted the narrow range of options for the staffing of the 809th EC. Finally, the 3rd Engineer Combat Regiment, which was assigned to the Hawaiian Department, was selected to furnish all officer and enlisted personnel for the 809th. The context of that decision provided an example of the COE's capacity for the shuffling of personnel and activating units to meet increasing and competing demands with a shortage of engineers. Since at least August 1940, Lt Gen Charles D. Herron, CG, Hawaiian Department, had pushed for the assignment of an engineer aviation regiment to Hawaii and the augmentation of the 3rd Engineer Combat Regiment. By February 1941, he "firmly believed" that the War Department should supply Hawaii with the heavy equipment needed to repair airfield damage. His last attempt came on 19 February, immediately before his replacement by Lt Gen Walter Short. Herron argued for the assignment of both an engineer aviation regiment and a general service engineer regiment to Hawaii. He wanted to assign those engineers as units under the 18th Pursuit Wing, based at Wheeler Field. His defense plan was to have aviation engineers "for the prompt repair of any possible damage" from "possibly surprise attacks" on Hawaii's airdromes. The COE demurred on Herron's request, saying that "plans have been made for the activation of an engineer company (aviation) (separate) [i.e., 804th] for eventual station in Hawaii" at an undetermined date. The limited availability of construction equipment in Hawaii and the problem of assembling it on short notice to repair airfields was also a challenge. It prompted the Hawaiian Department commander to request large quantities of heavy trucks and construction machinery. He wanted the equipment on hand, even without the additional engineer troops he had requested. Lieutenant General Short followed up on his predecessor's request on 19 February, reaffirming the need for an engineer aviation regiment. He said that Hawaii had sufficient airfield work for new units on the outlying islands, as well as on roads and trails throughout the department. The COE concurred with Herron's earlier request and agreed to ship the construction equipment to Hawaii by about 15 March 1941 for use by

the 804th Engineer AVN Company SEP that was to be activated and assigned to Hawaii. The 804th arrived in Hawaii on 26 April 1941 with equipment taken from the 21st ER. As initially planned, when additional engineer personnel were available, the 804th was to be augmented and redesignated as an ER. In line with the COE's policy approved in April 1941, the 804th was activated as a battalion rather than a regiment on 18 June 1941. The presence of the 804th in Hawaii allowed the flexibility to proceed with the activation of the 809th with personnel from the 3rd ER. At the time, the 3rd Engineers were told: "replacements may be expected in July." Further highlighting the Army's engineer shortage, however, additional senior NCOs were transferred from the 3rd Engineers to the newly formed 804th EB and the Hawaiian Department engineer section.<sup>14</sup>

Against this backdrop, the 809th Engineer AVN Company SEP was constituted on 15 May 1941 with an authorized strength of five officers and 160 enlisted men and activated on 1 June at Schofield Barracks. The War Department AGO was directed to issue orders for the transfer of the company to the Philippine Department on or about 1 July 1941. The 809th was to have all the equipment specified for an engineer company, as well as construction equipment, quartermaster motor vehicles, and ordnance tractors. About three months before the scheduled deployment, the supply section of the 3rd ER began ordering equipment for a yet-to-be-formed 809th Engineer Aviation Company for direct shipment to Manila.<sup>15</sup>

The 3rd Engineer Combat Regiment supplied all the personnel, officer and enlisted, for the 809th. Enlisted personnel were told that they were going to the Philippines to build airfields and that the company would be expanded into a battalion, even though, as of late April 1941, the War Department did not have plans to do so. Most enlisted personnel greeted the assignment with enthusiasm. They felt that Hawaii was both confining— "like living on a rock"—and expensive, according to then Pvt Clarence Kinser. Eighty men were drawn from two companies of the regiment. Enlisted personnel and NCOs were seasoned troops who were at least on their second enlistments. Sergeants had eight to 12 years of experience, and corporals had three years of Army service. They had combat engineer specialties and, thus, training as infantrymen, unlike the aviation engineers then in basic training, but they did not have prior exposure to airfield construction. However, some had experience as water plant managers, bridge specialists, machinists, welders, surveyors, camouflagers, and



painters. Consequently, a few of the troops received about three weeks of training on heavy equipment before leaving.<sup>16</sup>

The assignment of enlisted personnel was still in flux a week after the activation. As of 23 May 1941, the CoE approved the inclusion of SSgt Ralph Gibbs to replace an unnamed technical sergeant and the addition of MSgt Turner (probably MSgt Glenn C. Turner), and SSgt Albert Burkert to the company's NCO cadre.<sup>17</sup>

The officers selected by the Hawaii Department to lead the 809th were degreed engineers:

- 1st Lt Robert J. Chandler, company commander;
- 2nd Lt Thomas H. Delamore, adjutant and supply officer;
- 2nd Lt James R. Caldwell, platoon leader;
- Reserve 2nd Lt Theodore L. Pflueger, motor pool and finance officer; and
- Reserve 2nd Lt Hugh K. Fraser, platoon leader.<sup>18</sup>

Limited biographic data was available on the officers. All the platoon leaders had come to the 3rd Engineers from the 18th Engineer Combat Regiment together. 2nd Lt Theodore "Ted" Pflueger had a degree in electrical engineering from the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, and experience with the COE in Ft. Crook, Nebraska, as a summer employee. 2nd Lt Thomas Delamore graduated from the Culver Military Academy in Indiana. In 1938, he earned a degree in agricultural engineering from Iowa State University, received a reserve commission, and was called to active duty. Delamore then served with the CCC, an important proving ground for junior officers. He served as a company commander and supply officer in the 18th ER, company commander, 3rd ER, and as a member of the Hawaiian Department staff. Delamore was promoted to first lieutenant (permanent) on 26 June 1941, as the 809th was en route to Manila.<sup>19</sup>

## Engineers at Nichols Field

Hastily trained, the newly formed company deployed to the Philippines to work on the improvement of Nichols Field, the first airfield project in the Philippines assigned to the COE instead of the Quartermaster Corps. The SS *President Taft* departed San Francisco on 21 June 1941, stopped in Honolulu, and picked up the 166 men of the

809th EC. The War Department had requisitioned the *Taft* from American President lines and renamed it the US Army Transport (USAT) *Willard A. Holbrooke*. The 809th took only clothing and mess supplies from Hawaii. Equipment, weapons, and ammunition for the 809th, ordered during March, were in Manila when the 809th arrived on 10 July as the only US Army engineer unit in the Philippines. The machinery included standard items for aviation engineer separate companies: D-6 Caterpillar tractors and trailers, four-ton dump trucks, tractor-trailers for hauling heavy equipment, rock crushers, power shovels, Caterpillar graders, mobile air compressors and air hammers, and water purification equipment. Also available were trucks outfitted for on-field lubrication and oiling. Among the “controlled items” available to the 809th were 825 pounds of block explosives and M-1 Garand rifles. On arrival at Nichols, the 809th temporarily discontinued military training, such as combat exercises in ground defense and installation security, to be able to focus on construction activities.<sup>20</sup>

After docking at Manila’s Pier 7, at the time the world’s longest passenger ship pier, and moving to Nichols Field, enlisted personnel occupied partially finished two-story, U-shaped barracks, which had northward facing verandas. The company’s activation was so sudden that the Philippine Department had to request funds for the construction of barracks for the 809th via radiogram on 3 June. The War Department AGO approved \$91,000 for the construction of housing to accommodate the “809th Engineer AVN Battalion” (i.e., as opposed to a “company”), albeit at Clark Field rather than Nichols, on 30 June. In the absence of air conditioners, screened porches made the tropical environment somewhat bearable. However, mosquito netting was still necessary inside the barracks. Following a long tradition among enlisted personnel in the Philippines, some of the men eventually secured housing off-base with local Filipinas. At that time, contractors also began moving massive amounts of earth to prepare for the construction of additional hangars and a concrete apron in front of the hangar area.<sup>21</sup>

The primary mission of the 809th was to improve the E-W runway and secondarily to develop two more runways (NE-SW and SE-NW) in a triangular configuration. Rumors that the company would become a transient unit for building airfields in other parts of the Philippines circulated within the 809th, as they later did within the 803rd EB. As late as 29 September 1941, US Army Forces in the Far East


(USAFFE) Air Force headquarters noted that “the 809th will not remain, as a unit, at one station.” The numerous other construction projects at Nichols, primarily new building projects, were not within the 809th’s scope of work. Both technical and weather problems challenged the 809th. Pvt Blair Robinette later characterized the situation as “all screwed up” because the civilian contractors had used the wrong materials and they were working against a schedule that was too long. The company had to undertake a three-week study before proceeding with construction activities. The results showed that the original ODE plans did not consider the prevailing winds and, surprisingly, the field’s high-water table. For wind studies, the 809th personnel constructed a wind rose, a graphic tool for gaining an accurate view of the general distribution of wind speed and direction at a specific location. The results showed that as originally plotted, the runways were aligned with local wind patterns only 80 percent of the time. The engineers also determined that the water table for the runways was less than three feet below grade.<sup>22</sup>

Probably not until early August 1941 did the 809th along with a Filipino workforce start work in earnest. Construction activity was delayed until field crews re-surveyed the field, changed the direction of the E-W runway slightly, and placed ground stakes to ensure flat, level construction of the runway. Despite the heat and continuing seasonal rain, they worked on a 24-hour-per-day schedule. Lt Thomas Delamore was the 809th’s chief of construction.

The company’s organizational structure was standard: sergeants led 12-man squads, the first sergeant and two technical sergeants supervised the squads, and second lieutenants led the platoons. All specialists had both specifically assigned jobs and took on supervisory responsibilities. Depending on the task, a squad, platoon, or company took orders from specialists regardless of rank. With the engineering specialties required, the company had more personnel ranked as “specialists” than its regular engineer counterparts.

In addition to its own equipment, the 809th used machinery owned by Filipino contractors. Captain Chandler estimated that approximately 700 Filipino laborers were regularly employed at Nichols Field before the start of the war. Filipinos working with the 809th were not solely laborers; some operated the heavy equipment, such as bulldozers and towed scrapers or “carryalls.” In other companies of the 803rd EB, US enlisted personnel operated heavy machinery and

supervised Filipino laborers. At Nichols Field, independent Filipino truck drivers also hauled crushed rock for the runway on a pay-per-load basis.<sup>23</sup>



**Figure 3.1. Nichols field: schematic roads and runways, 1941.** (Adapted from NARA RG 77, Entry 1111, Decimal 600.1.)

One of MacArthur's earliest orders (No. 4, 4 August 1941) prioritized the construction of new airfields. The 15 August 1941 analysis prepared by Brig Gen Carl "Tooe" Spaatz, chief of the air staff, said that at that time, only Clark Field was suitable for heavy bombers. Nichols, with the assignment of the 809th, he said, was still being modified and expanded.<sup>24</sup>

The ODE commented in late November that the 809th was working on the E-W runway with only 25 percent efficiency. The rain and the mud, in general, slowed the work as trucks and other machinery

bogged down in the muck. The complexity of the work compounded the problem. The biggest challenge was the installation of 24-inch concrete pipes on either side of the new runway to try, once again, to drain the area. Draglines, hydraulic rooters, and bulldozers were required to dig trenches in the swampy land. The engineers had access to two Isaacson hydraulic rooters on loan from the Philippine BPW for that aspect of the runway project. Depending on the model, these three- to four-ton machines could dig trenches to a depth of 26 or 30 inches. For the work at Nichols, BPW also loaned the ODE an Allis-Chalmers bulldozer. By late October, BPW had demanded the return of all the machines, a move contested by Col Hugh Casey, the newly appointed USAFFE chief engineer.<sup>25</sup>

The regular construction progress reports documented the slow pace of construction on the E-W runway. The 1 September 1941 weekly showed the completion rates on project segments:

- Grading—80 percent;
- Paving, subbase—60–65 percent;
- Surface—10 percent;
- Drainage—30–35 percent.

In mid-September, pilots of the 17th Pursuit Squadron, not yet returned from Clark Field, described the two runways as being “just like real spongy swamps.” Engineers were to have torn up both and built new, more substantial foundations. From the ODE, Colonel Stickney agreed. He reported to Col Harold George, the USAFFE Air Force executive officer, on 15 October that appearances to the contrary, the ground north of the E-W runway pavement was “so soft and muddy that it [would] not support the weight of an airplane.” When weather conditions permitted, he said the area would be compacted and covered with sod to allow for its use. The engineers were to work at night or when the field was not in use to accomplish that task.<sup>26</sup>

Colonel George pushed to have all E-W runway construction work that affected the N-S runway completed by 15 October. In response, Colonel Stickney said the requested action was complete, his comments on the ground near the E-W runway notwithstanding on 13 October, and that the “N-S runway [was], therefore, free and clear.” However, not until 28 October 1941 did USAFFE report the reopening of Nichols Field for air operations, even though the E-W runway was still under construction. Of the flying units, the 17th Pursuit

Squadron, again flying P-35As, and the 2nd Observation Squadron began operating from the field. The 17th returned from Iba Field to Nichols and the 2nd Observation Squadron returned from Clark in mid-October. The USAFFE reported that the runway construction and the end of the rainy season would significantly increase the time available for field maintenance and work on the unpaved sections of the airstrips. Col Lawrence S. Churchill, post commander of Nichols Field, requested and received approval for \$8,000 for the maintenance (i.e., over and above construction funds) of Air Corps technical buildings and the airstrips for the remainder of FY 1942, which ended 30 June 1942. The War Department continued to evaluate the request for maintenance funds for Nichols Field, Clark Fields, other airdromes in the Philippine Department, and the Philippine Air Depot until mid-December 1941 when the war brought an end to the discussions.<sup>27</sup>

The swampy ground and errant wind patterns continued to present problems for the engineers, as well as the pilots. While building the runway, the 809th had to deal with one seemingly bottomless hole in the middle of the construction area. They dumped in large quantities of gravel before finally covering the hole with concrete. The workaround was simplistic. Pilots were told to avoid the depression during take-offs and landings. Airstrip misalignment and the wind, despite the 809th's resurveys, still made some landings difficult for the 17th Pursuit Squadron, which had received 25 P-40s in mid-October. The 17th had a high accident rate, which Walter Edmonds attributed to the poor condition of the runways.<sup>28</sup>

The 19 November 1941 weekly construction progress report showed the completion rates on runway project segments, as of November 18:


- Excavation—90 percent
- Paving—adobe subbase—90 percent
- Surfacing—63 percent
- Drainage system—92 percent

A week later, the ODE said the project was 80 percent complete with modest progress on the drainage system.<sup>29</sup>

By the time the war began, the ODE had documented the E-W runway as 82 percent complete. The macadam strip was 5,000 feet long and 150 feet wide. The drainage system for the runway was 96 percent finished. However, 1st Lt Ted Pflueger believed the engineers

never truly overcame the drainage problem and did not develop an adequate base for a runway capable of handling light bombers, even though the original and key objective was to mitigate the threat of flooding. The extension of the original N-S runway was surveyed and staked, but construction had not started. The third runway, which was to connect with the first, had not been started.<sup>30</sup>

The augmentation of the pursuit squadrons at Nichols Field was completed on 4 December. The 20th Pursuit Squadron took possession of the newly assembled P-40E aircraft and turned over its P-35s to the 34th Pursuit Squadron, which was in the process of moving to Del Carmen Field, then also a work in progress. The 34th was waiting for the next shipment of P-40s, which was due to arrive in Manila on 4 January.<sup>31</sup>



Source: NARA RG111, SC242023

Nichols Field, 1946

## Organizational Changes

By mid-November, the War Department decided to move forward with the integration of the 809th EC into the 803rd Engineer AVN Battalion as Company C, the battalion's third lettered company. One possible reason was the unity of command. However, the impression among some of the officers was that personnel issues hastened the organizational move. The allegation was that Chandler, the company



commander and still a first lieutenant at the time, had stalled the promotions of First Lieutenants Pflueger and Delamore for promotion to captain before he received his captaincy. The two had been promoted to first lieutenant before Chandler and thus had date of rank on him. As a result, Capt Harry O. Fischer might have been assigned to the 803rd EB and placed in temporary command of the newly designated Company C. Formal orders showing Fischer's transfer to Company C did not exist, but he was reassigned from the North Luzon Force (NLF) to the 803rd at some point before 14 January 1942. As a senior officer, he might have also been assigned to the company to facilitate the merger with the 803rd. At some point, Sgt Grubbs Anderson from Company A and Pvt Lawrence R. Beard of Headquarters Company were reassigned to Company C, and TSgt Albert Burkert, a late addition to the 809th, was moved to Headquarters Company, for reasons undocumented.<sup>32</sup>

#### Notes

1. Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Corps in the Philippines, 1919–1942*, 24, 28, 33–35, 26, 88–89 (with quotations cited on p. 26) (hereafter cited as *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps*); ACNL, 21 no. 20 (15 October 1938): 10, Lt Wycliffe E. Steele, "Nichols Field Scoops Itself Dry," ACNL 19, no. 15 (1 August 1936): 3. Dr. Meixsel's work is an indispensable resource on the pre-World War II history of the Air Corps in the Philippines. His research involved extensive use of the *Air Corps News Letters*. Normally, a single type of aircraft comprised Air Corps or Army Air Force groups.
2. Meixsel, *Clark Field and U.S. Army Air Corps in the Philippines*, 89; Wycliffe, "Nichols Field Scoops Itself Dry," 3; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 13.
3. "Airplane Proves Too Tough for Carabao," ACNL 21, no. 19 (October 1938): 10.
4. Meixsel, *Clark Field and U.S. Army Air Corps in the Philippines*, 90; "Squadrons in Philippines Swap Station," ACNL 21, no. 14 (15 July 1938): 11, and "New Runway Constructed at Nichols Field," 21, no. 15, (1 August 1938): 18.
5. Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 14–15; Meidling, ed., *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol. VI: Airfield and Base Development*, 347, (hereafter cited as *Airfield and Base Development*); Nichols Field Correspondent, "News from the Philippines," ACNL 20, no. 20 (15 October 1937): 18; Gerow to CoS, memo, 5 February 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department; Gerow to AGO, memo, 6 March 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, FY 1942, both in NARA RG165, Entry 281, File 3251-42, Box 108.
6. Gerow to CoS, memo, 5 February 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department; Gerow to AGO, memo, 6 March 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, FY 1942, both in NARA RG165, Entry 281, File 3251-42, Box 108; Nichols Field Correspondent, "News from the Philippines," ACNL 20, no. 20 (15 October 1937): 18; Kennedy to Claggett, memo, 1 April 1941. The 5 February memo cited a 13 January 1941 secret radiogram from Grunert (Radiogram 954, CG, Philippine Department, to War De-



partment, 10 May 1941), excerpt in NARA RG165, Entry 280, Series M1080, Microfilm Roll 14, also NARA RG165, Entry 281, File 3251-42.

7. Kennedy to Claggett, memo, 1 April 1941, no subject [summary of recent allotments to the Philippine Islands]; Kennedy to AGO, memo, 15 April 1941, Subject: Construction in the Philippine Islands, NARA RG18, Box 117. Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 26–27; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 13–15; OCE to ODE, draft radiogram, 16 April 1941, no subject [funds for runway construction], NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709; Maj John R. Hardin to ODE, letter, 19 April 1941, Subject: Airfield Construction, Philippine Department, and Stickney to OCE, 1st Ind., 6 May 1941, Same Subject, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709; chief of the Air Corps to WPD, memo, 10 May 1941, excerpt in NARA RG165, Entry 280, Series M1080, Microfilm Roll 14, also NARA RG165, Entry 281, File 3633.15; Col J.W. Anderson to CoS, memo, 18 March 1941, Subject: Immediate Expansion of Airfields, Philippine Islands, NARA RG 165, Box 89.

8. OCE to ODE, draft radiogram, 16 April 1941; OCE to AGO, 3rd Ind., 17 April 1941, Subject: Revised Estimate of Proposed East-West Runway at Nichols Field; OCE to ODE, draft radiogram, 22 April 1941, no subject [authorization for construction at Nichols Field], all in NARA RG 77, Entry 1011, Box 709; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 17.

9. Philippine Department, Annual Report of Construction and Repair for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1941, RG77, Entry 393, Box 168; Stickney to OCE, letter, 22 July 1941, Subject: Fiscal Year 1942 Funds for Air Corps Construction; Maj John H. Hardin, OCE, to AGO, 3rd Ind., 17 April 1941, Subject: Revised Estimate of Proposed East-West Runway at Nichols Field; Stickney to OCE, 1st Ind., 6 May 1941, Subject: Airfield Construction, Philippine Department; OCE Exhibits, 20 June 1941, Subject: Extension and Improvement of Nichols Field, all three documents in NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Dec. 600.1, Box 709; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 3 October 1941–8 May 1945, 21 (hereafter cited as *The Brereton Diaries*); Brig Gen Carl Spaatz to Col. [fnu] Crawford, WPD, memo, 15 August 1941, Subject: Air Activities in the Philippines, NARA RG165, File 3633-17, Box 136; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 83–84; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 61–66. CG, Philippine Department, to War Department, radiogram 954, 10 May 1941, excerpt in NARA RG165, Entry 280, Series M1080, Microfilm Roll 14, also NARA RG165, Entry 281, File 3251-42.

10. Notes of the Defense Problem of Luzon by Group Captain Darvall, Royal Air Force, between 30-5-41 and 3-6-41, attached to Gerow to AGO, memo, 14 October 1941, Subject: Defense Problem of Luzon, NARA RG165, File 4192-4, Box 191; “British General Visits Nichols Field,” ACNL 24, no. 10 (15 May 1941): 18. Darvall’s notes came via the office of the US Naval observer, Singapore, to chief of naval operations (war plans), 5 August 1941, to WPD by 9 October 1941. See also Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 83–84.

11. Kennedy to Claggett, memo, 1 April 1941, no subject [summary of recent allotments to the Philippine Islands]; headquarters, Army Air Forces, G-4 to Brig Gen Carl Spaatz, routing and record sheet, 26 August 1941, Subject: Airports in the Philippines, NARA RG18, Box 1117; Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 26-27; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 13-15; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 106–109; Philippine Department G-4, to CG, USAFFE, memo, 20 August 1941, Subject: Construction Program for the Philippine Department, NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 36.

12. Brett to AGO, memo, 29 November 1940, Subject: Additional Engineer (Aviation) Personnel for the Air Corps; Arnold to CoS, memo, 17 October 1940, Subject: Additional Pursuit Units for the Philippines, NARA RG165, Box 136; Bartsch,

*Doomed at the Start*, 7, 9; Bartsch, December 8, 1941, 45. See Watson, *Pre-War Plans and Preparations*, 416-17.

13. Col S[tuart] C. Godfrey to chief, Air Corps, 1st Ind. With enclosure, 4 March 1941, Subject: Revised Basis of Allotment, Engineer Troops with the Air Corps, NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2; AGO to CG, [GHQ] Air Force, memo, 4 February 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units and 5th Ind., 12 April 1941, same subject; [OCE table], n.d. [ca. early March, 1941], Augmentation of Aviation Engineer Units beyond 1941 Protective Mobilization Plan, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 221, also projected the 809th for assignment to the Philippine Department.

14. Lt Gen C[harles] D. Herron, to AGO, memo, 23 August 1940, Subject: Construction Equipment for the Maintenance of Airdromes, cited in Herron to AGO, memo, 4 February 1941, same subject; and Brig Gen John Kingman, assistant to the CoE, to chief of the Air Corps, 2nd Ind., 3 March 1941, same subject, both documents in NARA RG77, Box 66; Herron to AGO, memo, 1 November 1940, Subject: Increase in Strength of the Third Engineers, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 460, AGO to CG, Fourth Army, Hawaiian Department *et al.*, memo, 18 June 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units and Personnel for Engineer Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Air Force, NARA RG77, Entry 390, Box 353; Lt Gen Walter C. Short to AGO, memo, 19 February 1940, Subject: Additional Engineer Troops, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 460; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 38-41; OCE to Third Corps Engineer, 5th Ind., 12 April 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units; all in NARA RG 18, Decimal 320.2, Box 221; Brig Gen Henry L. Twaddle to AGO, memo 15 May 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of the 809th Engineer Company; OCE to AGO [for CG, Hawaii Department], 26 June 1941, radiogram draft, Subject: Cadre for 804th Engineer Battalion and Engineer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Air Force, NARA RG77, Entry 390, Box 353.

15. Twaddle, ACoS, to AGO, memo, 15 May 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of the 809th Engineer Company, Aviation (Separate); and Twaddle to AGO, memo, 24 May 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of the 809th Engineer Company, Aviation (Separate), both in NARA RG77, Entry 390, Box 353; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 27; Cpt Theodore L. Pflueger to author, emails, 8 and 29 March 2001; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 127; Chief Master Sergeant Clarence Kinser, interview with author, 4 April 1999; Blair Robinette to William Bartsch, letter, 24 February 1983, MacArthur Memorial Archives (MMA), Record Group (RG) 127, Box 11. Although OCE files contain several memos requesting additional heavy construction equipment for an engineer aviation regiment and for the 3rd Engineers, no documentation concerning equipment requisitions for the 809th was found. Captain Pflueger was involved in the equipment requisitions specifically for the 809th and "several other battalions of engineers to be formed in Hawaii."

16. Kinser, interview, 4 April 4 1999; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal *Troops and Equipment*, 127; Pflueger to author, emails, 17 May and 14 June 2001; Robinette-Bartsch, interview, 21 March 1983, MMA, RG127, Box 11, Folder 3; AGO to ACoS, memo, 23 April 1941, Subject: Augmentation of Engineer (Aviation) Personnel, NARA RG 165, Entry 281, Box 77. ODE construction progress reports as late as 15 December 1941, documented the building of barracks at Clark Field for the 809th EB.

17. 1st Lt L.W. Smith, Corps of Engineers, personnel section, to AGO, memo, 23 May 1941, Subject: Cadre for the 809th Engineer Company [request for radiogram to CG, Hawaii Department], NARA RG77, Entry 390, Box 353. The 23 May memo referred to MSgt Turner rather than "Turner," ASN 6752763, and SSgt Burkert, ASN

6837676, as Burkart. See Alphabetical Listing of Enlisted Personnel in the Philippine Islands Area as Reported to the Machine Records Branch through 30 October 1941, NARA RG407 Entry 1052, Box 5 (hereafter cited as “Alphabetical Listing of Enlisted Personnel”). Listings for MSgt Turner or Turner were not found in the Leggett, Kloecker, or Ingersoll Rosters. The Mansell Roster documented Warrant Officer Glenn C. Turner, W2101280, from Texas, who was murdered in the Palawan Massacre on 14 December 1944. At least one attempt was made to promote a senior NCO from the 803rd, MSgt Clifton O. Snodgrass, 1st sergeant of Company B, to the rank of warrant officer, but the action was not successful. See Roster, Office of the Engineer, US Forces in the Philippines, April 12, 1942, NARA RG407, Entry 1050, Box 2, which listed only one engineer warrant officer, Joseph Knopping, USAFFE and US-FIP Engineer Office.

18. CG, Hawaii Department to CoE, radiogram 3058, 19 June 1941, NARA RG77, Entry 390, Box 353; Casey to CoS, memo, 25 February 1942, no subject [promotion recommendation for 1st Lt Delamore]; Eastern Iowa News: Edgewood,” *The (Cedar Rapids, IA) Gazette*, 6 August 1940, and Untitled Article [Hugh K. Fraser assignment to the 3rd Engineer Regiment], Honolulu Star Bulletin, 8 March 1941; Casey Files, Folder 8.

19. Pflueger to author, emails, 10 and 17 May 2001 and 14 June 2001; Casey to CoS, memo, 25 February 1942, no subject [promotion recommendation for 1st Lt Delamore]; “Eastern Iowa News: Edgewood,” *The (Cedar Rapids, IA) Gazette*, 6 August 1940, and Untitled Article [Hugh K. Fraser’s assignment to the 3rd Engineer Regiment], Honolulu Star Bulletin, 8 March 1941. The Army assigned junior officers command of CCC companies and encampments to give them both leadership and engineering experience. See Dickson, *The Rise of the G.I. Army, 1940–41*, 23–30, 36–43.

20. Williford, *Racing the Sunrise: Reinforcing America’s Pacific Outposts, 1941–42*, 10 (thereafter cited as *Racing the Sunrise*); Pflueger to author, emails, 8 and 29 March, 4 May, and 14 June 2001; Dod, *The War Against Japan*, 63, 127; AGO to OCE, memo, 10 September 1941, Subject: Report on Status of Controlled Items of Equipment, Philippine Department, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709; [Philippine Department Quartermaster], Transports that Went to the Philippines in 1941, n.d., NARA RG407, Entry 1053, Box 10.

21. “Construction at Nichols Field, P. I.,” ACNL 24, no. 11 (1 July 1941): 25; Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; Philippine Department Radiogram 1038, 3 June 1941, paraphrased in AGO to chief of the Air Corps, 1st Ind., 12 June 1941, Subject: Housing Construction in the Philippines; Copy, Radiogram, AGO to CG, Philippine Department, 24 June 1941, no subject [approval of housing funds]; AGO to CoE, 3rd Ind., 25 June 1941, Subject: Housing Construction in the Philippines, all in NARA RG77, Entry 1011, File 600.1, Box 709; ACoS, G-4, Philippine Department to CG, USAFFE, routing and record sheet, 20 August 1941, Subject: Construction Program for the Philippine Department, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 36; Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps*, 75. ODE construction progress reports as late as 15 December 1941 documented the building of barracks at Clark Field for the 809th EB.

22. Pflueger to author, emails, 29 March, 10 and 17 May 2001, and 4 January 2002; headquarters, Air Force, USAFFE, to CG, USAFFE, 2nd Ind., 29 September 1941, Subject: Estimate of Funds for Additional Housing Facilities at Clark Field, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 2; Kinser, interviews, 26 March and 4 May 1999; Robinette-Bartsch interview; ODE, Location Plan of Roads, Runways, Nichols Field, n.d. [probably June, 1941], NARA RG77, Entry 1011, File 600.1, Box 709.

23. Dod, *The War Against Japan*, 63, 127; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 25 February 1942, no subject [promotion recommendation for 1st Lt Delamore], Casey

Files, Folder 8; Pflueger to author, e-mails, 10 and 17 May and 6 June 2001; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999; Maj Robert J. Chandler, affidavit, 27 April 1947, no subject [use of local laborers on Bataan airfields], NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11.

24. Williford, *Racing the Sun*, 10.

25. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 62; ODE Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 30 November 1941, NARA, RG338, File 319.1, Box 4383; Kinser, interviews, 26 March and 4 May 1999; 1st Lt H.F. Bishop, assistant adjutant general, Philippine Department, to CG, USAFFE, memo, 24 October 1941, Subject: Construction Equipment Borrowed from the [Philippine] Bureau of Public Works. The site <https://www.heavyequipmentforums.com/> indicated the rooter came in two models, the HSR-60 with a digging depth of 24 inches and the HSR-80 with a digging depth of 30 inches.

26. ODE to [Philippine Department], G-4, memo, 1 September 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineers Construction, NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 36; pilots quoted in Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 137; Stickney to Col Harold George, 1st Ind., 30 September 1941, no subject [construction at Nichols Field], Casey Files, Folder 6.

27. Col Harold George to ODE, memo, 30 September 1941, Subject: Construction—Nichols Field, Casey Files, Folder 6; Col Lawrence S. Churchill to CG, Air Force, USAFFE, 1st Ind., 27 October 1941, no subject [request for maintenance funds], and headquarters, Air Force, USAFFE, to CG, Philippine Department, 2nd Ind., 28 October 1941, no subject [approval of maintenance funds; status of Nichols Field]; headquarters, Philippine Department, to AGO, 3rd Ind., 19 November 1941, no subject [request for maintenance funds]; Cpt J[ohn] R. Mamerow, Air Force AGO, to CG, USAFFE, memo, 11 October 1941, Subject: Movement of Troops, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 3; Robinette-Bartsch interview; AGO to chief of the Air Corps, 4th Ind., 9 December 1941, no subject [request for maintenance funds]; office of the chief of the Air Corps to AGO, 5th Ind., 12 December 1941, Subject: Request for Funds—Nichols Field, Rizal, P.I.; all in NARA RG18, Box 1112.

28. Andrew Hill, 19th Air Base Squadron, interviews with author, 6–9 April 2005; Pflueger, e-mail to author, 4 January 2002; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 23; Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 35.

29. ODE to [Philippine Department], G-4, memo, 19 November 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineer Construction, and ODE to [Philippine Department], G-4, memo, 26 November 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineer Construction; both in NARA RG496 (USAFFE), Entry 540, Box 36.

30. Pflueger to author, emails, 29 March 2001 and 4 January 2002; Stickney to CG, FEAF, memo, 3 December 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineer Construction, NARA RG496 (USAFFE), Entry 540, Box 36; ODE Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 15 December 1941, NARA, RG338, File 319.1, Box 4383; Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; headquarters, Army Air Forces A-4 (Logistics) to Spaatz, routing and record sheet, 26 August 1941, Subject: Airports in the Philippines, NARA RG 18, Project Files, Box 1117.

31. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 36.

32. Brig Gen Harry L. Twaddle, ACoS, to ACoS, WPD, memo, 21 November 1941, Subject: Troop Basis, Status Report—Defense Reserves, Philippines, 3-4, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), 02052930, Reel 28129, 477-80; Pflueger to author, e-mail, 2 June 2001; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 17 February 1942, Subject: Transfer of Officers, Casey Files, Folder 6; Engineer USAFFE, to ACoS, G-4, memo, 14 January 1942, Subject: Commission, Promotion, and Transfer of Engineer Personnel. Pflueger said that Hugh K. Fraser was also included in the group of first

lieutenants whom Chandler attempted to deny promotion. However, in his memo of 14 January 1942, Casey recommended 2nd Lt Hugh K. Fraser for promotion to first lieutenant (temporary). Headquarters, USAFFE, Ft. Mills, Special Orders No. 50 Extract. The 809th Engineer (AVN) Battalion (SEP) was activated at Westover Field on 15 November 1941. It then served in the European Theater of Operations. Cpt Pflueger commented about the company's personnel problems.

## Chapter 4

# From Defense to Deterrence in the Philippines

## Recognition of the Japanese Threat

Even as General Marshall was demurring on Maj Gen George Grunert's requests for reinforcements, he, Stimson, and Roosevelt in tightly held meetings were discussing—but were not yet ready to impose—more substantial military options against Japan. In a late March meeting with Marshall and Roosevelt, Stimson suggested that the existing airfield at Zamboanga, Mindanao, be expanded to meet the needs of bomber aircraft and that plans for that work should be expedited to allow for its inclusion in funding estimates at the earliest opportunity. Stimson maintained that work on airfields in the southern Philippines “might be more impressive” than measures designed merely to show the protection of Manila. His position foreshadowed the late 1941 decision to implement War Plan Rainbow 5 (R-5), which provided for the defense of the entire archipelago. After the meeting, the president suggested indirectly (a style he commonly used), “the possible desirability of going ahead with the airfield phase of the program.”<sup>1</sup>

Soon after, the American-Dutch-British (ADB) meetings were conducted in Singapore from 21 to 27 April 1941 and were based on the assumptions that the common objective was:

- (1) To defeat Germany and its allies; and
- (2) To maintain a defensive position in East Asia that would sustain long-term economic pressure against Japan until the ADB powers were in a position to take the offensive.

The ADB members stated that the most critical issues in East Asia—then referred to as the Far East—were:

- (1) Security of sea communications; and
- (2) The protection of Singapore, a key British concern.

The final report stated:

An important subsidiary interest is the security of Luzon in the Philippine Islands since, so long as submarine and air forces can be operated from Luzon,

[Japanese] expeditions to threaten Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies from the East are out-flanked.

To ensure that we are not diverted from the major object of the defeat of Germany and Italy, our main strategy in the Far East at present time must be defensive. There are, however, certain measures open to us[,] which will assist greatly in the defense of our interests in the Far East, but which are themselves offensive.

It is important to organize air operations against Japanese-occupied territory and against Japan herself. It is probable that her collapse will occur as a result of economic blockade, naval pressure and air bombardment. This latter form of pressure is the most direct and one which Japan particularly fears.

In addition to the defensive value of operation[al] submarine and air forces from Luzon, referred to. . . . above there is even greater value from the offensive point of view in holding this island. It is therefore recommended that the defenses of Luzon should be strengthened and that every effort should be made to maintain a bombing force in the island in addition to building up a similar force in China.

It will be noted that the conference emphasized the importance of the Philippines, particularly Luzon, as a strategic area for naval and air bases from which offensive operations could be conducted against Japanese territory and sea communications, and as of advantage to the Japanese in the event they were captured; hence the recommendation to strengthen defenses and augment the air force. Our present mission and restrictions as to means are not in accord therewith.<sup>2</sup>

In early July, Adm Harold R. “Betty” Stark, chief of naval operations (CNO), and General Marshall formally stated their disapproval of the ADB report because it was at variance with previous US-British planning (ABC-1) and was not a “practical operating plan for the Far East Area,” despite earlier remarks at the Roosevelt-Stimson-Marshall meetings. Generally not as aggressive as their colleagues in the Department of State, the two military leaders announced that the United States was not planning to reinforce the Philippines as recommended in the report, but they used significantly more cautious terms. Because of the requirements of other strategic areas, the United States was not able to provide considerable additional reinforcement to the Philippines. Marshall and Stark said that under then-existing world conditions, it was not possible to launch a vigorous offensive from the Philippines.<sup>3</sup>

However, even before that statement—and apparently without the knowledge of his staff—General Marshall had begun discussing the deteriorating situation in East Asia with MacArthur. Options included the potential for MacArthur’s returning to active duty in a capacity more significant than as a military advisor to the Philippine

Army (PA). In a personal letter on 20 June, Marshall turned aside MacArthur's recommendation that the US Army absorb the Philippine Army upon the closure of MacArthur's military mission in the Commonwealth. "At the present time," Marshall wrote, "the War Department plans are not so far-reaching." However, he continued, "Both the secretary of war and I are much concerned about the situation in the Far East." Referring to his discussion with Stimson "about three months ago," General Marshall said that MacArthur's qualifications and experience in the Philippines would make him "the logical selection" as the US commander in the Far East "should the situation approach a crisis." According to Marshall, Stimson had delayed recommending the appointment to the president because he "[did] not feel the time has arrived for such action." Marshall asked, "please keep [the] contents [of the letter] confidential [hand underlining by the War Department] for the present."<sup>4</sup>

The "time . . . for such action" in East Asia came about sooner than the War Department expected. In retrospect, historians have characterized the new approach to the defense of the Philippines as a late appreciation of the threat from Japan that "constituted less a change in policy than an acknowledgment of [then] current conditions."

The causal factors were several and interlocked. After a prolonged series of US proposals and Japanese counterproposals, in 1941 Japan pushed forward into Southeast Asia, despite diplomatic and economic pressure from the United States. With support from Germany, Japan pressured Vichy France to allow the Japanese army and navy to occupy eight airbases and two major ports in French Indochina (22 July), a movement that put the Philippine garrison on alert. In the negotiations with Vichy France about military bases in Indochina, Japan had raised the issue of mediating a dispute between France and Thailand, as Siam had been known since 1939, over the long-disputed Cambodian and Laotian provinces formerly under Thai control.

By accepting the offer in early 1941, the Thai government also allowed the Japanese to begin installing its military forces in Thailand, thus making Japan a threat to the nearby British colonies of Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, as well as the Netherlands East Indies. Siam had a long tradition of bending its allegiance to the dominant foreign power in the region. The actions represented opening moves designed to consolidate Japan's position in Southeast Asia and secure much needed raw materials. Indochina, British Malaya, and Burma



were sources of rice, rubber, and tin; the Netherlands East Indies had abundant crude oil reserves.

Although forewarned of the overt Japanese actions—the US military had the capability to decrypt Japanese communications using a cryptology program called MAGIC—the United States was unprepared to stop Japan militarily. Thus, the US objective remained to avoid or delay war with Japan primarily to gain time for the buildup of Atlantic defenses. This effort encompassed the development of a two-ocean navy. With the German invasion of the USSR in June, the United States began to assist in the Soviet war effort. The maintenance of shipping lanes to Vladivostok for the movement of Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR was also an important goal. Those considerations enhanced the strategic position of the Philippines and added to the complexity of the situation. Roosevelt told his military advisors in early August that he would “turn a deaf ear” if the Japanese occupied Thailand but not if they went into the Netherlands East Indies.<sup>5</sup>

Coincidentally, from within US national security circles arose an awareness of—in hindsight probably and over-optimistic faith in—the strategic value of the newly developed B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bomber. The success of that aircraft in UK bombing operations against Germany showed that it provided a weapon that, Stimson said, could “transform a heretofore defensive force into a credible deterrent capable of convincing Japan to halt its expansion into the Southwest Pacific.” With seemingly boundless enthusiasm for B-17s, he wrote to Roosevelt in late October 1941 about the strategic potential of the heavy bomber:

These new four-engine bombers now coming off the assembly line constitute a great pool of American power applicable with speed and mobility to the respective spots where in the interests of our national strategy of defense it is important that such power should be applied. . . . A strategic opportunity of the utmost importance has suddenly arisen in the southwestern Pacific. . . . We are rushing planes and other preparations to the Philippines. . . . Yet even this imperfect threat, if not promptly called by the Japanese, bids fair to stop Japan's march to the south and secure the safety of Singapore. . . . I have dwelt thus far on the Pacific front of our national peril because it is the one in which the threatened danger from Japan and the counter opportunity for us to take the initiative has first ripened. Our northeastern front in the northern Atlantic is, however, the main threat of the present war.<sup>6</sup>

A strong bombardment capability in the Philippines was a way of threatening the left flank of Japan's drive south and, hence, a powerful deterrent. In his memoirs, Stimson added one more factor affecting

the change in policy on the defense of the Philippines: “the contagious optimism of General Douglas. . . . [However,] both the optimism of MacArthur and the establishment of an effective force of B-17s were conditional on time.” General MacArthur believed that the newly organized USAFFE and the Philippine Army would have until April 1942 to prepare for war against Japan, according to Lt Gen (then Maj Gen) Jonathan M. Wainwright, who thought that General MacArthur’s projection “was a fair one.” It seemed that neither General MacArthur nor Washington-based planners considered the weather factor in their estimates. The monsoon season in the Philippines usually begins in late May.<sup>7</sup>

Consequently, the president opted for a multifaceted approach to confront and deter Japanese expansion in the Southwest Pacific: more drastic economic sanctions and the expansion of military forces in the Southwest Pacific. On 26 July, over the objections of General Marshall and Admiral Stark—who remained committed to keeping Japan in the status of a nonbelligerent or at least delaying its entry into the war against the Allied Powers—Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing Japanese credits in the United States. The two military chiefs thought—correctly over the longer term, it turned out—that restricting oil exports from the Netherlands East Indies, which was critical for the Japanese navy, would result in war with Japan. The action, in effect, halted trade between the US and Japan. The UK and the Netherlands followed the US lead by cutting off credit to Japan.

Exports of oil products, rubber, and tin to Japan ceased immediately. At the same time, Roosevelt ordered the activation of the USAFFE and incorporation of the Philippine Army into it, the recall of Douglas MacArthur to active duty as a major general and USAFFE commander, and the activation of a military mission in China. Immediately before the imposition of sanctions, Marshall had learned that Japan had ordered all Japanese ships in the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific via the Panama Canal. He ordered, and the War Department quietly implemented the search and delay of Japanese ships transiting the canal, as of 10 July 1941.<sup>8</sup>

### **Change in War Plans**

Continuing his push for the reinforcement of the islands, General Grunert radioed the War Department on 25 July that airfields were

the most vital element in defense of the islands. Unaware of pending high-level decisions regarding the Philippines, the WPD sent General MacArthur a radiogram on 28 July 1941, stating that the USAFFE plan of operations “should conform” to the mission, as stated in the Philippine Defense Project of 1940. The message pointed to the 19 July increase in “authorized defense reserves.” It said that the WPD’s Brig Gen Leonard Gerow would provide details on the additional equipment and materiel, “which may be expected under that increase.” The War Department added that “no additional forces, except 400 reserve officers to assist in training the Philippine Army, or additional equipment over and above that now authorized will be available for your command in the near future.”<sup>9</sup>

Illustrating the fluidity of the situation, at a meeting three days later (31 July 1941), General Marshall informed his immediate staff—Maj Gen William Bryden, vice chief of staff; Brig Gen Wade Haislip, G-1 (personnel); Brig Gen Henry L. Twaddle, G-3 (operations); and Brig Gen Leonard Gerow, WPD—that “it was the policy of the United States to defend the Philippines.” Significantly, he added the effort was “not [to] be permitted to jeopardize the success of the major efforts made in the theater of the Atlantic.”<sup>10</sup>

The decision sparked an immediate radiogram, released at 1153 hours, 31 July, to General MacArthur that referenced and reversed WPD’s July 28 message:

Plans are maturing to send you the following reinforcements: one squadron of nine most modern B-17 Flying Fortresses from Hawaii as soon as availability of staging fields [on] Wake Island and New Britain [were] assured, . . . 25 75-millimeter guns mounted on half-track vehicles on September 18th transport and [an] additional 25 on October transport; one company of light tanks on first available transport; one regiment of anti-aircraft artillery as soon as legislative authority [is] obtained for their retention in service. Twenty-four thousand rounds [of] 37-mm anti-tank ammunition [has been] released for shipment . . .

On 12 August, the War Department radioed the USAFFE that it would ship 50 Curtiss P-40E Warhawk pursuit aircraft to the Philippines in September.<sup>11</sup>

By transferring that first tranche of B-17s from Hawaii rather than diverting them from other sources, General Marshall was still adhering to the position that the Atlantic theater remained the focus of US policy, but one whose goal was considerably more expansive. The 31 July expansion of US policy also ended the long debate on the extent

of the defense perimeter in the Pacific. The United States formally expanded the line of defense from Alaska-Hawaii-Canal Zone to Alaska-Hawaii-Philippines-Canal Zone, albeit primarily at the expense of the Hawaiian Department. The chief of staff had believed that “with the reinforcement of Hawaii with B-17s from the mainland, a major attack against Oahu [was] considered impracticable.” The September transfer of 26 B-17s, along with the 19th Bombardment Group to the Philippines, however, did involve US deferment of aircraft shipments to the UK.<sup>12</sup>

On 1 August, in response to a request from General Grunert, the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) air staff recommended to General Marshall and the secretary of war that the Philippine Department Air Force be reorganized into the 24th Pursuit Group with a headquarters and the 3rd, 17th, and 20th Pursuit Squadrons, and the 4th Composite Group with a headquarters, 28th Bomb Squadron (medium), 2nd Observation Squadron, and a tow target detachment. The new organization, which Stimson approved on 14 August, was redesignated as the “Air Force, USAFFE” under the overall command of Brig Gen Henry Claggett. It was designed to accommodate additional aircraft planned under the second aviation objective—the War Department’s plan to develop 84 air groups that superseded the 54-group plan discussed earlier. That plan was generally based on US industrial production capabilities rather than tactical needs.<sup>13</sup>

By the summer of 1941, none of the USAAF groups were fully equipped with the newest B-17 model. According to General Arnold, as of August 1941, the United States had only 109 B-17s of all models in its inventory. Nevertheless, B-17 production was sufficient to justify planning for their deployment and operations. By deferring other priority requirements for the B-17s (e.g., patrolling of the approaches to Hawaii, the Panama Canal, Alaska, and the continental United States), as well as plans for the transatlantic bombing, a strong bomber force could probably have been in the Philippines by early 1942. According to plan, it would take the place of naval forces that the United States, UK, the Netherlands, and Australia—the group that became the ABDA Command in January 1942—was unwilling to commit to the defense of the Philippines. The logic was that a strategic bombardment force could threaten the movement of the Japanese Navy and Japanese troop and cargo shipping south from Formosa. With the threat of those heavy bombers, the logic continued, the United States might be able to force the Japanese to accept a state of armed

neutrality in the Southwest Pacific. It would free American and British forces for operations against Germany, or at least delay hostilities until after American forces became heavily engaged across the Atlantic. In either case, noted Louis Morton, the US Army was trying to insure against the risk of being called upon to send considerable forces across both oceans in the early stages of hostilities.<sup>14</sup>

The sudden turnabout completely surprised Army and Army Air Force planners in Washington, as well as General MacArthur. To address the change in policy, the Washington-based WPD and the newly formed USAAF air war plans division (AWPD)—which consisted of four officers—and the Manila-based Col Harold George of the USAFFE Air Force intensified the pace of their planning activities. Colonel George was an advocate for “the aggressive air defense of the Philippines,” according to Capt Allison Ind, his intelligence officer. Maj Hoyt Vandenberg, a firm believer in strategic, offensive airpower, was Colonel George’s counterpart in the War Department planning process. Both of their plans were long-term and based on numbers of bombardment and pursuit aircraft not yet available.<sup>15</sup>

Almost immediately after that (3 August), General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and Major General Arnold, elevated to command of the USAAF in June, left Washington to accompany President Roosevelt to Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, for consultations with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and his military staff. Before meeting with the British, Roosevelt confirmed that the United States would immediately start building up the air forces in the Philippines to ensure a complete group of Curtiss P-40s and a group (instead of the squadron just committed) of B-17s as the first step in giving General MacArthur a strategic, offensive air capability. It would also augment the Philippine Department’s defensive force with tanks and AA artillery. The decision came as the USSR requested that the United States provide 70 pursuit aircraft and five twin-engine North American B-25 Mitchell medium bombers per month from September to November 1941. This also included British pressure in Argentia for 4,000 heavy bombers. At the time, the US production of heavy bombers had not yet reached its goal of 500 per month.<sup>16</sup>

By the time Generals Marshall and Arnold had returned from the Argentia conference, the WPD had developed more detailed options for the reinforcement of the Philippines. One of the critical assumptions on which the WPD based its recommendations was that “the present attitude of Japan indicates she may consider the reduction of

the Philippine Islands a prior requirement to consummation of other plans for expansion.” Stating the obvious, the WPD doubted the ability of the Philippines “to withstand a determined attack.” For added urgency, it concluded that reinforcement of the Philippines was “essential . . . [for] ‘a reasonable assurance’” of holding Luzon and Manila Bay. Echoing the recommendations of February 1940, the WPD stated that “to offer a reasonable chance of successful defense of the Philippines, studies indicate [the] necessary minimum reinforcement” of a composite air wing, infantry division, AA regiment, and additional harbor defense troops. That being said, the WPD’s specific recommendations provided more for the augmentation of conventional defensive forces drawn principally from the ranks of the National Guard than for a move toward a strategic offensive air capability. It initially recommended the assignment of the 200th CA Regiment (New Mexico National Guard), the 41st Infantry Division (National Guard), and, in less specific terms, “modern combat airplanes to replace obsolescent types now on hand.” The office of the chief of staff amended the recommendations to eliminate the 41st and add the 194th Tank Battalion (National Guard) less one company but including the battalion’s 54 M-4 Sherman tanks.<sup>17</sup>

The AWPD took a long-term perspective in its planning effort. Its officers assumed that if a war against Japan did not coincide with the war in Europe, the primary task of the US Navy initially would be to contain the Japanese fleet and keep sea lanes open to the Philippines. If a two-front war were to break out simultaneously, the mission of the US Pacific Fleet, including the defeat of the Japanese fleet, would then expand. The pre-Pearl Harbor grand strategy did not provide for a strategic offensive against Japan until victory in Europe was assured. Thus, the AWPD divided the strategic objectives into five categories:

- To conduct air operations in defense of the Western Hemisphere;
- To prosecute as soon as possible after the commencement of the war, an “unremitting and sustained air offensive against Germany”;
- To support a strategic defense in the Pacific Theater, encompassing the use of air operations in Pacific defense and the determination of the nature of US operations and the size of US forces needed, in conjunction with the Army and Navy, for the defense of Hawaii, Philippines, Alaska, and “other areas”;

- To provide air support for the invasion of the European Continent, if that should be necessary, and to continue to conduct strategic air operations after that against the foundations of German military power and the German state until its collapse; and
- After a victory over Germany, to concentrate maximum airpower for a strategic air offensive against the home islands of Japan.

The AWPDP briefed its plan to General Marshall on 5 September and to Secretary of War Stimson on 11 September. The Pearl Harbor attack intervened to preclude its presentation to President Roosevelt as part of the War Department's "Victory Program."<sup>18</sup>

Major General Arnold wanted to act faster. Given the president's pronouncement in Argentina to immediately build complete groups of B-17s and P-40s in the Philippines, he returned to Washington more focused on immediate needs and short-term plans to build up the USAFFE Air Force for offensive and defensive operations instead of the longer-term AWPDP plan number 1 (AWPDP-1) his staff was developing. On 19 August, he asked the APWD to develop a plan as quickly as possible for sending a group of B-17s and of P-40s to the Philippines. Based on plans that Brigadier General Spaatz, chief of the air staff, had in process, the AWPDP recommended the assignment of the 19th Bomb Group (Heavy) less one squadron as a way to meet the requirement for one group of heavy bombers. The 19th, then based in Albuquerque, New Mexico, had 14 B-17s. The AWPDP stated that 12 more could be made available from other sources. With a total of 36, the allotment of B-17s to the Philippines surpassed allowed levels for any other US command. Also, it exceeded the number (20) provided to the UK during the summer of 1941. With three squadrons of pursuit aircraft already in the Philippines (17th, 20th, and 21st), the AWPDP posited that further tactical units were not necessary.

Nevertheless, in late November 1941, the 34th Pursuit Squadron was transferred to the Philippines to round out the 24th Pursuit Group. Action in the area followed quickly. Spaatz concurred on the AWPDP's recommendations on 30 August and forwarded it on 5 September to Major General Arnold, who, in turn, sent it to General Marshall.<sup>19</sup>

The chief of staff immediately approved the AWPDP's recommendations and gave "oral instructions" that a new bombardment group, reinforced by service units, be sent to the Philippines. According to

the plan developed by the air staff, the designated units were to be transferred “at the earliest practicable time.” Those units included:

- The 19th Bombardment Group (group headquarters and headquarters, 30th and 93rd bombardment squadrons with 36 B-17s)
- One reconnaissance squadron
- One headquarters and headquarters squadron interceptor command
- One Air Corps squadron—interceptor command

Other units were four ordnance companies (airbase, heavy bombardment, pursuit), air warning service units (headquarters and headquarters squadron), a materiel squadron, a truck company (Quartermaster Corps), two decontamination units, and Medical Corps personnel and hospital facilities. The office of the chief of staff coordinated on the memo on 20 September, and the secretary of war approved it formally on 24 September 1941.<sup>20</sup>

Amid the War Department’s planning, General Marshall told General MacArthur on 9 September that further air reinforcements would be forthcoming when USAFFE’s airfields were “sufficiently advanced to accommodate additional planes.” He advised that increases of heavy bombers be added to a group of five squadrons and that pursuit planes be added to a group of five combat squadrons. Further, Marshall wrote, a light bomber group of three squadrons along with required airbase units and other services was also under consideration. The War Department’s proposed plan by mid-October was to dispatch two B-17 squadrons in October with the remainder of the air reinforcements (130) arriving from December 1941 to February 1942. As he had done with General Grunert, the chief of staff reminded General MacArthur that “full requirements [could] not be met immediately due to shortages and compelling demands on production.”<sup>21</sup>

By December 1941, General Marshall estimated, the total number of combat aircraft available to USAFFE would be 208 with the addition of 26 heavy bombers to the nine B-17s that arrived in September; 49 P-40 pursuit aircraft to augment the 80 already in the Philippines; and 52 Douglas A-24 Banshee light bombers. The War Department projected the total production of heavy bombers would be 225 by the end of February 1942. In a major policy change, USAFFE was to receive first priority on delivery of those bombers. Ship-



ments were to start in January 1942, and the War Department's goal was to have 170 heavy bombers, 86 light bombers, and 195 pursuit aircraft in the Philippines by October 1942. For an expansion of that magnitude, the War Department wanted to budget for the assignment of three more engineer aviation battalions (2,133 men) to the Philippines. General Grunert still believed that additional airfields were essential for a credible defense.<sup>22</sup>

## Engineers and Airfields

While the modification of policy to allow for the provision of an offensive air capability in the Philippine garrison moved forward, the War Department and USAFFE had to confront the concurrent problem of developing a sufficient number of airfields to handle the massive number of combat aircraft involved, as General Grunert had repeatedly stated. Although the issue of funding was resolved, USAFFE still had to deal with a lack of skilled construction workers and heavy construction equipment.

Before the first deliveries of B-17s in September, the War Department, prompted in part by comments made by Royal Air Force Group Capt Charles Davall after his 30 May to 3 June 1941 visit to Manila, realized *inter alia* that airfields in the Philippines were insufficient to handle projected deliveries of heavy bombers and the pursuit aircraft to protect them. Brig Gen Henry Claggett, the acerbic commander of the Philippine Department Air Force, had raised the same complaints—the lack of landing fields and the funds to develop them—in early July 1941, albeit without success. General Claggett was concerned about the lack of dispersion, another lesson that Arnold claimed the Air Corps had learned from the Germans, and dummy fields and had voiced his dismay in early July. He pointed out to Maj Gen George Brett: “Suitable landing fields practically do not exist. We need at least eighteen for dispersion purposes. This means that eighteen small fields will have to be made larger . . . there is no defense over here except dispersion.” After a complaint from Air Chief Marshal Sir Henry Robert Moore Brooke-Popham, Royal Air Force commander for the Far East, surfaced in mid-August, General Spaatz commented to General Arnold on 26 August that “Philippine funds and airports have not been ample.” He had previously noted that on 2 August Congress had made available \$2.273 million for expansion or

construction of additional airfields, including Clark, Nichols, O'Donnell, Bataan, and 25 other fields.<sup>23</sup>

To gain more specific data, the War Department cabled USAFFE on 12 August to ask, "how many additional pursuit, heavy and medium bomber squadrons [could] be operated from existing airfields?" The query came as Colonel George in Manila was preparing an ambitious long-term plan for the USAFFE Air Force, initially opposed by General Claggett, in which he estimated that 56 additional airfields capable of handling heavy bombers he projected would be necessary as part of a "comprehensive defense plan" for the Philippines. That plan, dubbed operations plan R-5, was submitted to the War Department on 1 October 1941. It was a proposal for the defense of the entire Philippine archipelago, rather than just Luzon and Manila Bay. The plan also projected that one company of aviation engineers would be necessary at each airfield. USAFFE responded a week later that with existing airfields it could accommodate 10 pursuit, seven medium bomber, and three heavy bomber squadrons "immediately." It could add three more heavy bomber squadrons within three months, and three pursuit, two medium bomber, and four heavy bomber squadrons "total," and after that, 13 pursuit, nine medium bomber, and 10 heavy bomber squadrons at the end of six months. "For your planning purposes," USAFFE advised the War Department that it could complete four additional fields within six months to accommodate two pursuit and seven bomber squadrons "provided requisite funds and engineer equipment are made immediately repeat immediately available."

To accomplish the ambitious goals of the comprehensive defense plan for airfields, USAFFE noted that it would need \$6.0 million, 18 engineer officers qualified in construction work, and heavy construction equipment. Still, it did not mention of the need for additional, skilled engineer personnel. The radiogram contained an extensive, detailed list of the earthmoving equipment required to develop the other airfields that far exceeded the machinery available for shipment to the Philippines in the short time before the outbreak of war, even with the upcoming arrival of the 803rd EB to the Philippine garrison. General Marshall remained skeptical about USAFFE's capability to complete the required airfields. He told General MacArthur on 9 September that he was prepared to allocate an additional \$2.273 million—presumably above and beyond the \$2.2 million approved on 2 August—from his emergency fund immediately to complete the im-

provement of USAFFE airfields “provided local conditions [were] such that additional construction [could] be undertaken.”<sup>24</sup>

**Table 4.1. USAFFE construction equipment request, 19 August 1941**

Quantity	Item	Quantity	Item
7	Caterpillar Tractors – D-7 with angle dozer blades	6	Athey Mobiloaders (gravel loader attachment) – Caterpillar D-4 tractors)
6	Caterpillar Tractors – D-6	3	Caterpillar Motor Graders, Model 12 – diesel
12	Caterpillar Tractors – D-6 with bulldozer blades	3	Caterpillar Motor Graders, Model 212 – diesel
7	LeTourneau Carryalls – 12 cubic yard capacity	30	Dump Trucks – 2 cubic yard capacity
12	LeTourneau Carryalls – 7.5 cubic yard capacity	6	Station wagon vehicles
6	LeTourneau Rooters, Model S	6	Pickup Trucks
6	LeTourneau Rollers, Model W – sheepsfoot	6	Cargo Trucks – 2.5 ton capacity
6	LeTourneau Cranes, Model AD4	0	

Source: USAFFE AGO to War Department, radiogram, 19 August 1941.

While General Marshall digested the WPD’s 14 August recommendations for the reinforcement of the Philippines, General Spaatz was also repeating the gist of the Air Corps position of February 1940. “It is considered that the facilities in the Philippines at the present time, will not support a total of more than one group of heavy bombardment [aircraft] and three groups of pursuit [aircraft].” Supporting that conclusion, General Spaatz repeated that only Clark Field was capable of handling heavy bombers. He cited the work, albeit not the name, of the 809th EC at Nichols, noting that runways suitable for use by heavy bombers would not be completed until 1 October 1941. General Spaatz also pointed to six unnamed fields that would be ideal for use by pursuit aircraft within 80 miles of Manila; however, he noted that they lacked fuel, oil, and service facilities. Seven other fields “located over the entire length of the archipelago” could be used for dispersion. Still, because of their distance from Manila, General Spaatz said he did not contemplate their use for pursuit aircraft. In a September 12 memo, Spaatz stated that General Grunert

assured him that “existing airfields are available to accommodate additional squadrons and that all personnel can be housed.”<sup>25</sup>

The USAFFE response to the chief of staff’s 9 September radiogram was a bit contradictory. On the one hand, it said that all airfields were available to handle the proposed reinforcements as fast as they could be sent to the Philippines. This was somewhat more optimistic than its 19 August forecast that covered a period six months in the future. On the other hand, USAFFE maintained that development and new construction could begin immediately if the promised \$2.2 million in supplemental appropriations became available, a response to General Marshall’s question about local conditions. At the same time, Colonel George was preparing a budget for housing almost 10,000 USAAF officers and enlisted personnel at new and planned airfields in the Philippines. In addition to the ongoing work at Clark and Nichols Fields, he added several new projects: Cabanatuan (two squadrons of heavy bombers), Del Carmen (three squadrons of light bombers and support units), Rosales (three pursuit squadrons), and Lipa (two pursuit squadrons).<sup>26</sup>

In the Philippines, work slowly continued on improvement of Clark and Nichols Fields but, for all practical purposes, it was stalled at O’Donnell Field. In addition to shortages of materiel, heavy construction equipment, and skilled workforce, the ODE had to contend with the challenges presented by the rainy season in the Philippines. A USAFFE radiogram to the War Department on 23 October, the day the 803rd arrived in Manila, reflected the urgency of the time. It noted that the early arrival of USAFFE personnel required immediate action on construction at new airfields but that funds for the work were not available. USAFFE requested \$5 million in additional funds for airfield surveys, construction equipment, and the completion of the runway for authorized and planned airfields. It estimated that the allotment of \$4.2 million would be sufficient for the fulfillment of priority requirements other than shelter at Clark, Bataan, O’Donnell, Malabang, and Zamboanga Fields by funding transfers and reallocation of funds. However, priority fields—Del Carmen, Lipa, and Rosales—were to be undertaken with the \$2.2 million that General Marshall had previously promised. An additional \$740,000 was necessary for construction other than housing at those locations. After adding a request for a small sum to be used for surveys and additional fields planned under General MacArthur’s comprehensive defense program, USAFFE asked for \$250,000 for construction equipment,

emphasizing that the machinery was not available locally and that shipment from the United States would take three months.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, a significant—and easily overlooked—section of General Spaatz’s 12 September 1941 memo to General Marshall recommended the assignment of “1 Bn. Eng. (AVN) (Less one Co.)” as part of the effort “to provide the necessary service organizations for the augmented Air Forces” in the Philippines. The options for aviation engineer units ready and available for assignments were still few. Of the other aviation battalions and companies formed at about the same time as the 803rd—the 802nd Engineer AVN Battalion and the 807th Engineer AVN Company in Alaska or the 805th Engineer AVN Battalion in Panama—were already assigned to and part of the Pacific defense perimeter. The 804th Engineer AVN Company arrived in Hawaii in April 1941—it was redesignated as a battalion in July—and was just receiving personnel to bring it up to full strength by the fall. It was fully engaged in work on Hickam and Wheeler Fields. The 810th—an African-American battalion that later distinguished itself in New Caledonia—had been activated on 26 June 1941 and gained experience with airfield development. However, it was still considered a labor or general service battalion. The caveat “less one Co.” appears to point only to the 803rd, from which a detachment to Newfoundland had just left. The 12 September memo also recommended that “the units listed . . . be transferred at the earliest practicable time.”<sup>28</sup>

### Notes

1. WPD to AGO, draft radiogram, 27 March 1941, Subject: Immediate Expansion of Airfields, Philippine Islands, with the notation that the radiogram was sent on 27 March, 1941; [presumably Marshall], MFR, n.d, no subject [meeting with the president and secretary of war on Philippine defenses]. Both documents were in NARA RG165, Box 89.
2. Final Report of the ADB meeting, 21–27 April 1941, quoted in Morton, *Strategy and Command—The First Two Years*, 65–66.
3. Morton, *Strategy and Command—The First Two Years*, 65–66, 87.
4. Marshall to MacArthur, letter, 20 June 1941, NARA RG165, File 3251-50, Box 11; Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 435.
5. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor*, 24; 24; Gerow to Stimson, memo, 8 October 1941, Subject: Strategic Concept of the Philippine Islands, NARA RG165, Box 109, File 3251-60; Marshall and Stark to the president, memo, 27 November 1941, Subject: Far Eastern Situation, NARA RG165, File 18136-125; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 56-57; Cate and Williams, “The Air Corps Prepares for War,” in Craven and Cate, eds., *Early Plans and Operations*, 124–125; Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, 150–52, 209–17, 229–49; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 94; Arnold, *Global Mission*, 250. Hammer, *The Struggle for Indochina*, for example, thought

that the Japanese occupation of French Indochina was the key catalyst for the change in US policy. Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 439–440, commented: “Manifestly, it was a growing recognition of Japanese intentions that provided much of the special stimulus to action in mid-1941, but it is doubtful that to any specific act on Japan’s part can the rapidity of the movement be attributed”

6. Stinson and Bundy, “*On Active Service in Peace and War*,” 388, cited in Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, 263; Stimson to Roosevelt, letter, 21 October 1941, no subject [distribution of four-engine bombers], Arnold Papers, Library of Congress.

7. Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 438–39; Morton, *Strategy and Command—The First Two Years*, 69. See also Cate and Williams, “The Air Force Prepares for War, 1939–41,” 124–25; Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 240, for additional commentary on Stimson and B-17s. Wainwright, General Wainwright’s Story,

8. Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, 150–52, 209–17, 229–49; Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow, WPD, diary entries, 3, 9, and 10 July 1941, NARA RG165, Entry 422, Box 49 (hereafter cited as “Gerow Diary”).

9. Grunert to War Department, radiogram, 25 July 1941, cited in Dod, *The War against Japan*, 58; Gerow to AGO, memo, [draft radiogram 176 to mission, USAFFE], 28 July 1941, no subject [status of reinforcements for USAFFE], NARA RG165, Box 225, File 065/18136-39 (General Correspondence); Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 437–38.

10. Gerow Diary, 31 July 1941; Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 438–39.

11. War Department to CG, USAFFE, radiogram 1197, 31 July 1941, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 1; Gerow to AGO, memo, 31 July 1941, Subject: Reinforcements for U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, NARA RG165, Box 225, Files 4517-4560; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 118.

12. See Layton, Pineau, and Costello, . . . *And I Was There*, 121–22. Stimson to Roosevelt, letter, 21 October 1941; Marshall *Aide-memoir* (n.d.) cited in Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 123.

13. Spaatz to CoS, memo, 1 August 1941, Subject: Reorganization of Air Force Units in the Philippine Department, NARA RG165, Entry 12, Box 11. See Holly, *The US Army in World War II, Special Studies, Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces*, 236.

14. Morton, *Strategy and Command—The First Two Years*, 69–70; Prange, *At Dawn We Slept*, 188.

15. Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 439. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 118–125, provides an excellent account of the two planning activities. Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 50–56, provided a personal account of planning activities in the Philippines.

16. Arnold, *Global Mission*, 246–49, 253; O.W. [not further identified] to CoS, memo, 1 August 1941, no subject [discussion of sending materiel only to the Philippines], NARA RG165, Entry 12, Box 11.

17. Gerow to CoS, memo, 14 August 1941, Subject: Reinforcement of the Philippines, NARA RG165, Box 12, File 18812; Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 440–42. Watson pointed out that the memo bears the revisions ordered by the office of the chief of staff, initialed “SRM,” probably Lt Col Stanley R. Mickelson.

18. AWPDP-1: *The Process, Historical Analysis*; Cate and Williams, “The Air Corps Prepares for War,” 1939–41, 105, 146–47; Williams and Asher, “Deployment of the AAF on the Eve of Hostilities,” in Craven and Cate, eds., *Early Plans and Operations*, 177–78.

19. Gaston, *Planning the American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941*, for a personal perspective on the AWPDP’s development of AWPDP-1; Cate and Williams, “The Air Force Prepares for War, 1939–41,” and Williams and Asher, “Deployment of

the AAF on the Eve of Hostilities,” in Craven and Cate, eds., *Early Plans and Operations*, 147–48; 179, respectively.

20. Spaatz to CoS, memo, 12 September 1941, Subject: Plan for Reinforcing the Philippine Department Air Forces, NARA RG165, Entry 12, Box 4, filed 14528-16; Gerow to Stimson, memo, 2 October 1941, Subject: Personnel and Supplies for Philippines; Marshall to Stark, memo, 12 September 1941, no subject [outline of reinforcements for the Philippines], NARA RG165, Box 11, File 18136-52.

21. Marshall to CG, USAFFE, radiogram 137, 9 September 1941, MMA RG2, Box 1, Folder 1; paraphrase of Radiogram 366, 21 October 1941, for CG, USAFFE [projected dispatch of heavy bombers to the Philippines], MMA RG2, Box 1, Folder 3.

22. Cate and Williams, “The Air Force Prepares for War, 1939-41,” 134; Gerow to Stimson, memo, 8 October 1941, Subject: Strategic Concept for the Philippines; Maj Gen R.G. Moore to budget officer, War Department, memo, 14 October 1941, Subject: Second Supplemental Estimates, Fiscal Year 1942, NARA RG165, File 18136-76; Williams and Asher, “Deployment on the Eve of Hostilities,” 179, put the number of light bombers at 54; Adams [not further identified] to CG, USAFFE, memo, n.d., no subject [paraphrase of War Department radiogram concerning air reinforcements planned for the Philippines during April–October, 1942], MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 2.

23. Arnold to Spaatz, routing and record sheet, 19 August 1941, Subject: Airports in the Philippines, NARA, RG18, Box 1117 – Project Files; Spaatz to Arnold, routing and record sheet (response), 26 August 1941, Subject: Airports in the Philippines; Arnold, *Global Mission*, 174; H[arry] B. Claggett to Maj Gen George H. Brett, letter, 9 July 1941, NARA, RG18, Box 1114; Gerow to AGO, memo, 14 October 1941, Subject: Defense Problem of Luzon with attachment “Notes of Defense Problem of Luzon” by Group Captain [Charles] Darvall, NARA RG165, Box 191, File 4192-4.

24. AGMC [not further identified], War Department to CG, Philippine Department, radiogram 43, 12 August 1941, MMA RG2, Box 1, Folder 1; USAFFE AGO to War Department, radiogram, 19 August 1941, MMA RG2, Box 1, Folder 1. Claggett to CG, USAFFE, memo, 11 September 1941, Subject: Study of Air Force for United States Army Forces in the Far East, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 1; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 119; Marshall to CG, USAFFE, radiogram 137, 9 September 1941. Ind, *Bataan: The Judgement Sea*, 53-56, details the debate between Brig Gen Claggett and Col George on the scope of the long-range plan for the Philippine Department Air Force and of MacArthur’s reaction to it. See CG, USAFFE to AGO, War Department, memo, 1 October 1941, MMQ, RG2, Box 1, Folder 2.

25. Spaatz to Col [fnu] Crawford, WPD, memo, 15 August 1941, Subject: Air Facilities in the Philippines, NARA RG165, Box 136, File 3633-17; Spaatz to CoS, memo, 12 September 1941, Subject: Plan for Reinforcing the Philippine Department Air Forces; Letter, Claggett to Brett, office of the chief of the Air Corps, 9 July 1941.

26. MacArthur to Marshall, radiogram, 16 September 1941, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 2; George to CG, USAFFE, memo, 18 September 1941, Subject: Estimate of Funds for Additional Housing Facilities at Clark Field, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 2.

27. MacArthur to AGO, War Department, radiogram, 23 October 1941, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 3.

28. Spaatz to Marshall, memo, 12 September 1941, Subject: Plan for Reinforcing the Philippine Department; Stanton, *Order of Battle*, 582; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life: Autobiography*, 32 (hereafter cited as *Appetite for Life*); Dod, *The War Against Japan*, 29, 36, 38–42, 50, 63, and 167–71. See also Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, 594. Like the 803rd, the 810th was built around a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs. Its companies “were activated separately and therefore trained and worked at different levels.”

## Chapter 5

# Formation of the 803rd Engineer Battalion

## Constitution and Activation

Although the preparedness movement was still moving slowly, the War Department proceeded to constitute or authorize the 803rd Engineer AVN Company SEP on 4 February 1941. With the same memorandum, the War Department directed the issuance of orders to activate and organize the company with an authorized strength of 160 at Westover Field, Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts. Other engineer aviation companies constituted with the same directive were the 808th at March Field, California, and the 810th Colored at MacDill Field, Florida. The new units were to be “brought to authorized strength by selectees” (i.e., those drafted under the Selective Training and Service Act of September 1940). Selectees were required to be on active duty for one year and then serve 10 years in a reserve capacity. As initially planned, the 21st Engineer AVN Regiment was to furnish a cadre for the 803rd (11) and the 808th (116). The 810th was to receive a force of 20 men from the 41st Engineer General Service Regiment. These units were to be outfitted with the same equipment authorized on the TO&E as combat engineer companies plus “special heavy construction equipment and increased motor transportation.” The question was which organization would supply the equipment. The 3rd Corps engineer of Baltimore prepared the initial requisitions for both the 803rd and the 808th on 29 March 1941. However, the OCE canceled both requests because neither unit was in the 3rd Corps area. The OCE noted that the equipment requisition for the 808th should have been redesignated for the 21st Engineers to replace machinery designated for the 804th Engineer AVN Company SEP, which was to be assigned to Hawaii. In canceling the requisition for the 803rd, the OCE endorsement did not comment on the possible source of supply for its equipment.<sup>1</sup>

The 803rd EC was not activated at Westover Field (i.e., as opposed to “constituted”) until 7 June 1941. Other than personnel shortages, one reason for the delay between its constitution and activation was that the maintenance buildings at Westover were still unheated. Thus, military units could not be transferred there until at least May 1941.




The 803rd was one of six engineer aviation companies activated at about the same time. Others were the 804th, circa March–April 1941—Hawaii; 805th, circa February–March, 1941—Panama Canal Zone; 807th, Alaska; and 809th, constituted in Hawaii in May and activated in June 1941, for assignment to Nichols Field, Philippines. The 809th was later integrated into the 803rd in the Philippines. Per Air Corps and COE planning, the 803rd was subordinate to First Air Force, Mitchel Field, Long Island, New York.<sup>2</sup>

Named for Maj Gen Oscar Westover, the fourth chief of the Air Corps (1935–38), Westover Field was designed as an airplane overhaul facility. Many organizations during activation and deactivation passed through the base during World War II. Site development in fields formerly reserved for tobacco for cigars had begun in early 1940 under the Quartermaster Corps, which shortly became overwhelmed by the massive construction requirements of the military buildup. The Army started to shift responsibility for airfield construction to the COE in August 1941. The 803rd Engineers were one of the first units to arrive at Westover, still partially completed at the time. Only a small complement of B-17 heavy bombers was then stationed at the field. As was to be the case with the 803rd, the mission of Westover changed after the war began. Five more engineer aviation battalions, the first of which was the 809th, and one engineer aviation regiment were activated or trained on site by early 1943. In April 1943, the field became home to an airborne engineer aviation unit training center (EAUTC) under the First Air Force.<sup>3</sup>

In late March 1941, the COE ordered regular Army (RA), Capt Frank E. Fries, to Westover Field as commander of the 803rd with an arrival date of 15 May 1941. In late May, 1st Lt James D. Richardson, RA, was assigned from the 1st Engineer Combat Battalion of Ft. Devens, Massachusetts, as battalion adjutant, the first of several officers drawn from that unit. Capt Clarence Bidgood, RA, then assigned to Ft. Belvoir, was ordered to serve as the 803rd's executive officer on 25 June 1941, after the OCE canceled his assignment to the Army's Hawaiian Department, then also in critical need of engineers. On the day of the company's activation, the OCE advised Captain Fries informally that the company would be redesignated as an aviation engineer battalion with a projected complement of 625 men, 21 officers, and 10 attached Medical Corps personnel. On 7 June, the War Department AGO formally advised the WPD that both the 803rd and 808th were to be activated as battalions "at an early date." The change

of status was based on Army Chief of Staff Gen George Marshall's 25 April 1941 approval of a major increase in engineer aviation troops. The change also reflected an assignment decision by the AFCC, in whose chain of command the 803rd originally belonged. Orders for the deactivation of the 803rd EC and the constitution and activation of the 803rd Engineer AVN Battalion SEP were dated 20 June 1941. The formal activation of the battalion at Westover Field occurred on 8 July. Captain Fries assumed command of the battalion on the same day. Organizationally, the 803rd was attached to the headquarters, 4th Bombardment Wing of the First Air Force at Mitchel Field, New York. Thus, as of 6 June, Captain Fries was officially assigned to First Air Force. On activation, the battalion strength was six officers (three RA and three reservists), 40 enlisted men, and 105 selectees. The contingent proliferated; by 15 July, the 803rd had 10 officers and 194 men. The COE determined that "the separate company was not a suitable organization for use in a theater of operations," and that "a unit the size of a battalion was needed." The new aviation engineer separate battalions were to be outfitted with more and heavier equipment than any other engineer battalion. They were also scheduled to work in two to three shifts per day to facilitate 24-hour operations. Other engineer aviation companies also reactivated as battalions at the time included the 804th (Hawaii), 805th (Panama Canal Zone), and 807th (Alaska), and 808th (March Field, California).<sup>4</sup>

Following the pattern set by Lieutenant Richardson, the officer cadre came primarily from the nearby 1st Engineer Combat Battalion at Ft. Devens, rather than the 21st Engineer AVN Regiment, as proposed in February 1941. As of mid-1940, the COE had only 14 officers assigned to its construction division. Consequently, it combed the ranks of Army Reserve officers to find qualified candidates for its new construction activities. The five reserve officers selected from the 1st EB arrived at Westover Field in mid-June 1941. In addition to Captains Fries and Bidgood and Lieutenant Richardson, the first of a total complement of 17 engineer officers present for the 8 July activation were four reserve officers. They were on extended active duty (EAD) of one year: Capt Herbert V. Ingersoll, commanding officer, Headquarters Company; 2nd Lt David B. Bartlett, motor pool officer, Headquarters Company; and 2nd Lt Samuel A. Goldblith, mess officer, Headquarters Company; as well as 2nd Lt Elgin G. Radcliff, RA, Headquarters Company and battalion supply officer. First Lt Edmund P. Zbikowski and 2nd Lt Robert D. Montgomery reported shortly after




**Figure 5.1. US-based aviation engineer units, July 1941.** (Adapted from Col H. H. Pfeil, 2 August 1941, NARA RG18, Box 30, Dec. 312.1.

that and were assigned to Company A. Ingersoll, Zbikowski, Bartlett, Goldblith, and Montgomery were reassigned en masse from the 1st ER, Ft. Devens, in mid-June. The following junior officers arrived in succession:

- 12 July—2nd Lt Francis W. Donovan, Jr., Company A, and battalion recreation officer;
- July 22—2nd Lt James L. Leggett, Headquarters Company, from the Engineer School, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia;
- July 25—1st Lt James R. Oppenheim, Headquarters Company, from Ft. Belvoir;
- July 28—1st Lt Henry F. Boyer, Headquarters Company and battalion engineer officer.<sup>5</sup>

Formative activities followed rather rapidly in the pattern that the COE prescribed: the development of an organizational structure of regular and reserve officers and experienced NCOs into which enlisted men, preferably experienced in building and construction,

could be integrated. After the passage of the Selected Training and Service Act, the OCE's operations and training branch advised all existing engineer units that they would provide personnel to new organizations. At the same time, the corps began identifying qualified selectees to fill this requirement. Between 16 September 1940 and 7 December 1941, it took in 57,000 selectees. The reactivation order for the 803rd specified that the following units were to provide the NCO cadre for the new battalion: 9th Engineer Squadron, Ft. Riley, Kansas—23, including three first sergeants; 12th EB, Ft. Jackson, South Carolina—22; and First Corps Area—10 enlisted Medical Corps personnel. Other engineer troops, mostly selectees as opposed to enlistees, were to come from Engineer Replacement Training Centers (ERTC) at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, and Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri. Selectees had previously been destined for the 21st Engineer AVN Regiment.<sup>6</sup>



**Figure 5.2. 803rd Engineer Battalion: organization, September 1941.** (Adapted from Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Initial Special Roster, 8 July 1941; Montgomery, *Brief History*, 3; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 31–32.)

Until the arrival of enlisted and selectee personnel, the battalion operated at a significantly reduced strength. The initial NCO cadre arrived during 3 to 5 July. With the officers in place, Fries quickly formed Headquarters Company and Company A during 5 to 7 July. Captain Ingersoll became commander of Headquarters Company with SSgt Clifton O. Snodgrass as the first sergeant. First Lieutenant Zbikowski became commander of Company A with Clarence A. Rutz as the first sergeant. Documentation of the first commander of Company B could not be verified, but 1st Lt James R. Oppenheim, a later arrival, was probably its original commander. The first sergeant of Company B was Theodore B. House. At the same time, 2nd Lieutenant Bartlett and 2nd Lieutenant Goldblith were assigned to Headquarters Company, and 2nd Lieutenant Montgomery was assigned to Company A.<sup>7</sup>

The rationale for the battalion's organization (i.e., only two lettered companies) was not documented. Still, engineer aviation battalions of fewer than the usual three-lettered companies were not unusual. Engineer aviation battalions planned for Albrook Field, Canal Zone, and Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico, were to be "less two companies." The postwar history *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific*, claimed incorrectly that Company C was "ordered to Greenland." As noted below, documents reviewed for this study did not support that statement. Orders for the constitution and activation of the battalion did not mention the organizational structure. Instead, they provided for "an authorized strength of 21 officers," sufficient for three but not four companies.<sup>8</sup>

The challenge of staffing new engineer units adequately was not merely a bureaucratic exercise at the War Department, OCE, or GHQ Air Force levels. The personnel process went forth on an *ad hoc* basis that bordered on dysfunction. Thus, it had a direct impact on individual units, as shown in correspondence from Maj Harry E. Fisher, the engineer officer at 1st Air Force and technical advisor to the 803rd, and Captain Fries. In a 29 July 1941 letter to Fries, Fisher complained:

we have had all kinds of difficulties striving to obtain draftee personnel. Our strongest efforts started last March [1941] with a letter to the Corps [of Engineers] Area Headquarters, who retained our request for nearly two months without taking action, and after considerable pressure returned the letter to [office of the engineer, First Air Force] stating that they had no part in obtaining selectee personnel for us. Later a letter went into GHQ Air Force and nothing happened.

Fisher continued that “initially, you [Captain Fries] received your personnel automatically, without request.” With the letter, he proceeded to provide a directive on personnel procurement. He noted that Fries should start submitting “request[s] and recommendations to airbase headquarters at Westover Field for handling.” Major Fisher thought the new directive would “indicate the procedure and time for your procuring all of the remaining personnel you need to bring [the 803rd] up to full strength authorized.” Earlier Fisher had queried Fries about the possibility of exchanging experienced engineer enlisted personnel assigned to First Air Force for six typists, stenographers, file clerks with typing ability, and qualified drafting technicians from the 803rd. The exchange between Fisher and Fries resulted in the transfer of three NCOs from the 6th EB, Ft. Leonard Wood, to the 803rd. They were Sgt Eugene G. McCubbin, who was then assigned to Company B, 803rd; Sgt Toney Oliva, a 20-year veteran; and Cpl Lawrence J. Bell, who had served four and a half years with the COE. Of the three, only McCubbin deployed to the Philippines with the battalion. Without further detail, the question arises as to whether Captain Fries tried to deal with the fluidity of the personnel situation by detailing Pfc Russell Ewing on special duty to the Westover Field personnel section.<sup>9</sup> The constant shuffling of personnel throughout the existence of the 803rd plagued Capt Frank Fries and the battalion from formation through deployment and from Bataan to Corregidor.

On or about 8 July, the first contingent of 150 selectees arrived from the Ft. Belvoir ERTC via the Pullman train—the first train to ever stop at Westover Field. Further arrivals were: 18 July—157 selectees from Ft. Belvoir; July 25—15 selectees from Ft. Leonard Wood; 28 July—one enlisted man from the 18th Bombardment Group (Heavy); July 29—11 selectees from Ft. Belvoir; 15–19 August—enlisted men, all privates rather than NCO’s, from MacDill Field; 16–20 August—60 selectees from Ft. Leonard Wood; and 22 August—67 selectees from Ft. Leonard Wood. Captain Fries appointed senior enlisted personnel to be instructors for the newly arrived enlisted and selectee personnel. For example, upon reporting to the battalion operations chief, SSgt Lewis N. Simmons was the designated instructor for the 15 selectees who arrived from Ft. Leonard Wood on 25 July, and Sgt Delbert Moore served in the same capacity for the 19 arrivals from MacDill Field. Six additional reserve officers reported for duty from the instructor course at Ft. Belvoir on or about 16 July 1941.

First Lt John E. Mowick was transferred from Ft. Belvoir in early September and assigned initially to Company A.<sup>10</sup>

The assignment orders indicated that Captain Fries staffed the companies sequentially as enlisted and selectee personnel arrived at Westover Field. He initially focused on Headquarters Company and then started to fill in Companies A and B. The 19 enlisted personnel from MacDill Field, who arrived on 15 August, were divided almost equally among Headquarters Company (7), Company A (6), and the Company B (6). With the group of 60 selectees from Ft. Leonard Wood, Captain Fries continued fleshing out Company A (50) and Company B (10). On 22 August, Company B received 67 enlisted and selectee personnel, including two NCOs, from Ft. Leonard Wood. A day later, Company B gained three more NCOs, including Sgt Eugene G. McCubbin.<sup>11</sup>

### Qualifications—Officers

An essential aspect of the rapid conversion from a professional Army, which had been adequate for the interwar period, to a vastly expanded corps dominated by new civilian assignees (i.e., as opposed to RA personnel) was a systematic process to identify qualified and skilled staff. To achieve its goals, the COE developed and implemented an aptitude test and searched for officer and enlisted or conscripted personnel with prior academic training or experience in the construction trades for more efficient integration into operating units. In the officer ranks, however, the COE had more mechanical engineers than civil engineers. The ratio carried over into the 803rd. First Lt Herbert W. Coone, a doctor assigned to the medical section of the 803rd, observed incorrectly that the battalion was led by officers who were graduates of engineering programs and highly trained in the construction of airfields, roads, and bridges. All officers had bachelor's degrees in technical fields, and a few had master's degrees. Not all degrees, however, were in engineering, much less civil engineering, and they did not have previous experience in building airfields before reporting to the 803rd. The extent of military service, as might be expected, also varied widely.

Captain Fries, Captain Bidgood, and 1st Lieutenant Richardson were all West Point educated civil engineers. After commissioning with the class of 1929, Fries completed post-graduate work in engi-

neering at the University of California in 1933. His previous engineer assignments were in the CCC, a Depression-era public works program, at the Port of New Orleans, and the Panama Canal Zone. His last duty post before Westover Field was in the reserve officer training course (ROTC) at Pennsylvania State College. Captain Bidgood graduated with the West Point class of 1935 and earned a master's degree in engineering from Cornell University in 1939. Lieutenant Richardson graduated with the West Point class of 1939. Second Lt Elgin G. Ratcliff was the fourth RA officer in the battalion. He graduated with a bachelor's degree in electrochemical engineering from Pennsylvania State College, earned a reserve commission through ROTC, and received a permanent RA commission via the Thomason Act in 1940. He served with the 5th ER, Ft. Belvoir for about a year before his assignment to the 803rd.<sup>12</sup>

All reserve officers had earned commissions through college ROTC programs. Among the civil or construction engineers from the reserve cadres were: Second Lt James L. Leggett, a graduate from the University of Kentucky; 2nd Lt David B. Bartlett (Massachusetts Institute of Technology–1937); 1st Lt James R. Oppenheim, a 1935 graduate of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas (now Texas A&M); 2nd Lt Everett J. Carney (Wentworth Institute of Technology, Boston), and 2nd Lt William B. Thomas (Auburn University). A structural engineer, Leggett had worked for the American Bridge Company, Pittsburgh, before being called to active duty in June 1941. He then attended an engineer officer course at Ft. Belvoir. One of 89 former Texas A&M cadets who participated in defense of the Philippines, Oppenheim worked on soil conservation projects at the Bogota, Texas, CCC camp about a year before being called to active duty. Carney served as an officer in a CCC camp in North Westminster, Vermont, and worked as a construction engineer with R.J. Pierce of Brattleboro, Vermont, before being called up in July 1941. For some reason, the battalion rumor mill had Thomas employed as a battery salesman at Sears, Roebuck, and Company before the war. Actually, Thomas had graduated with honors in civil engineering from Auburn University. At least two reserve officers were electrical engineers. Captain Ingersoll, the oldest of the reserve officers, earned a bachelor's in electrical engineering from the California Institute of Technology in 1927 and joined the Army Reserve shortly after graduation. Second Lt John H. Winschuh graduated from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and was working as an electrical engineer with the



Public Service Electric and Gas Corporation of Newark, New Jersey when called to active duty in January 1941. He served briefly as an instructor at the Engineer School, Ft. Belvoir, before joining the 803rd. First Lt Peter W. Reynolds earned an engineering degree and a commission in the Army Reserve from Johns Hopkins University, where he starred in football. He was with the Baltimore Fire Department and also served as a high school football coach before entering on active duty in January 1941. Second Lt Robert J. Russell graduated from Carnegie Technical Institute (now Carnegie-Mellon University) and worked as an architect. First Lt Edmund Zbikowski graduated from New York University with a degree in aeronautical engineering and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Reserve in 1932. He entered on active duty on November 1940. With an absence of job opportunities in his field during the Great Depression, Zbikowski taught school before being mobilized. Three second lieutenants were graduates of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT): Walter H. Farrell (1940), electrical engineering; Samuel A. Goldblith, biology and public health (1940); and David Bartlett, civil engineering (1937). Goldblith was engaged in literature research on food and pharmaceuticals before being ordered to active duty in April 1941.<sup>13</sup>

### Qualifications—Enlisted/Selectee Personnel

Col Elgin Ratcliff commented after the war that existing units did not always send their best NCOs to the newly formed 803rd, which was a common bureaucratic practice with the formation of new organizations. The cadre included “a number of personnel problems,” and he added, “but the selectees more than made up for this [deficiency], and [they] contained a great talent in construction skills.” Lieutenant Goldblith had a different perspective, noting the need for the “training [of] enlisted men, many of whom were raw recruits and draftees, and some of whom could barely read or write.” Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal noted in *The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment* that the issue of relevant experience among selectees became more of a challenge for the COE than it had been earlier in the 1930s when “jack of all trades” enlisted personnel were a more common occurrence. Those historians observed that newer recruits or selectees tended to have a more formal education but less practical experience

because of massive unemployment during the Great Depression. The original groups of selectees sent to the 803rd, at Westover, as well as with the selectees from Ft. Belvoir later integrated into the battalion, brought a considerable body of relevant experience. They were miners, including some with explosives experience; construction workers; carpenters, heavy equipment operators; mechanics and machinists, electricians; steel riggers; truck drivers; railroad workers; surveyors; electricians; draftsmen; and farmers. For example, Pvt William Van Orden, a truck driver before being drafted, was a driving instructor specializing in heavy trucks equipped with air brakes. Pvt Albert Senna graduated from Perth Amboy Junior College with an associate degree in mapping and surveying and worked at Bakelite Corporation, a chemical company, as a surveyor. Pvt Charles Agostinelli worked for the Pennsylvania Highway Department before being drafted. Also, in this group, it must be noted, Pvt William Wuttke and Pvt Paul A. Kloecker were commercial artists; Pvt Joseph A. Vater was a painter and self-taught draftsman; Pvt Rowland Douglas, was possibly an actor. Also, the battalion contained at least two college graduates with engineering degrees in its ranks: Cpl R. Thomas Gagne, Southwest Louisiana State, and Pvt S. Santo Trifilo, a Cornell University-educated mechanical engineer who graduated in 1940. As was common in that era, many selectees had an eighth-grade level education or less, some had only a few years of high school, and a few were high school graduates.<sup>14</sup>

Assigned to Headquarters Company, MSgt Clyde Albert Huffsteckler, at age 45, was probably the only combat veteran in the battalion. He joined the Army in 1914 and took part in both the Mexican campaign of 1916–17 and the St. Mihiel and Argonne offensives during World War I.<sup>15</sup>

One possible negative aspect of the skills and experience that draftees brought to the COE was that they were older—many in their mid-20s—than later recruits and selectees inducted into the Army. They tended to be “civilians in uniform,” as Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal highlighted, and thus more worldly or independent than the younger engineer personnel who followed them. They were not as formal or respectful in their relations with officers and NCOs as was normally required in the armed forces. The remembrance of Pvt John Zubay captured the attitude of many selectees: “I was independent, so I didn’t like the military. I didn’t like anyone telling me what to do.”<sup>16</sup>



(Corps of Engineers, Military Images, Box 9, Folder 5)

**Ft. Belvoir, basic training, 1941**

The accelerated preparedness program, of which the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was a part, drove changes in the COE training doctrine. Even by war-time standards, the 803rd's earlier-than-anticipated deployment hurt military indoctrination of the newly inducted engineer personnel. In March 1941, the COE began an effort to rapidly transform a small nucleus of professional engineer soldiers into the vastly larger corps that included more personnel inducted into the service for the war effort rather than as professional soldiers. It began in March 1941, by standardizing primary military and engineer training by developing a 12-week program at the newly designated ETRC's, first at Ft. Belvoir and shortly after that at Ft. Leonard Wood. Before that time, freshly inducted engineer personnel went directly to their units for the first year. The objective of the new doctrine, which survived until early 1942, was to achieve a higher degree of preparation in less time and to relieve the gaining unit of

basic training functions. The focus of the ETRC was on the primary duties of engineer soldiers. Training, which was scheduled to last 13 weeks, involved two weeks on necessary military skills, such as wear and care of equipment, drill, and limited weapons familiarization, and eight weeks devoted to engineering tasks, including bridge, road, and culvert construction, and use of pontoons. The remainder of the training was supposed to focus on teambuilding through work with combined forces (e.g., maneuvers). On forced marches of up to 20 miles, some older selectees were at the point of exhaustion, but most showed the determination to finish. Pvt Walter Middleton said the organized training was “the hardest work I had ever done in my life,” while others made light of efforts to turn them into soldiers and engineers. Pvt. Paul A. Kloecker spent some of his time as a draftsman for the training unit, work that earned him a promotion to corporal. On finishing the 12-week course, inductees were to proceed to their assigned units for specialized group training. However, at that time, a lack of facilities, equipment, and reduced training standards compounded to affect the level of training received by newly inducted engineers.<sup>17</sup>

### Early Activities & Training

While organizing the new company, Captain Fries worked simultaneously to equip the unit and to train his personnel on the job (OJT). He proceeded through the process on an *ad hoc* basis. He relied—it seemed—more upon local initiative than on formal guidance or direction from the COE. Fries immediately began to request equipment authorized in the battalion’s TO&E. On 7 June 1941, new and used heavy construction equipment began to arrive at Westover Field. It came both from existing engineer units and direct shipments from factories. He wrote on 6 August that “equipment is arriving from time to time. Today concrete mixers, four carry-all scrapers arrived.” Captain Fries kept Maj Harry E. Fisher, his contact at First Air Force up to date, advising that he hoped to have the process completed shortly. Once sufficient equipment was on hand, his objective was not only to familiarize all personnel with airfield and road construction but also to prepare them for a deployment to an unnamed location rumored to be near the Arctic Circle. These deliveries, however, did not provide the full complement of equipment required by

the Army's TO&E for an aviation engineer battalion. The 803rd picked up additional items when it passed through San Francisco in September–October and continued to receive machinery in the Philippines until the war began. Motor vehicles taken from other units were not the best available, as might have been expected, and, thus, maintenance demands were burdensome. The initial complement at Westover Field—officers and men—assembled the equipment and learned how to operate and maintain the heavy machinery. This included cranes, bulldozers, and road graders. One severe deficiency was the lack of experience with heavy trucks needed to pull large flat-bed trailers for the heavy equipment. Some of that inexperience showed. In at least one exercise, Lieutenant Goldblith almost lost an ear when a crane hit him. Periodically, Fries furnished the First Air Force engineer office with his training directives, an upward transfer of knowledge instead of the usual “top-down” approach.<sup>18</sup>

Following the COE doctrine, the training steadily became more applied, but it retained an improvisational character as the battalion commander made do with the resources at hand. The belief was that engineer battalions would benefit from construction work on or around Army posts comparable to assignments in a theater of operations. Work on the construction of runways or auxiliary fields, especially during the summer months, was beneficial. Training recommendations came from the 803rd itself, the OCE, and AFCC. To use improvements on Westover Field as OJT opportunities, Captain Fries sought funds for construction material from First Air Force at least three times, apparently without success. He requested about \$4,000 for supplies to hard surface two stretches of road, one with soil-cement, and one with emulsified asphalt. However, First Air Force responded that it did not have an objection to the proposed projects “if and when surplus funds become locally available.” The real issue was that the 803rd and the 21st ER, had been activated after the start of FY 1941 and they were not included in the annual budget. In its budget request for FY42, the Army requested \$660,000 for runways, grading, and drainage for Westover Field. Given the budget approval process it would not have arrived in time to benefit the 803rd's training regimen.

Nevertheless, in July, Headquarters Company began work on a rifle range and feeder road. Company A constructed a bypass road beyond the airfield, and in early September, began building a railroad loading ramp on Westover Field. When the battalion commander

had to contend with the air staff's 15 July 1941 refusal to authorize funds for OJT at Westover Field, he sought out opportunities with local airport construction projects. In response to a request from the CG, AFCC, on 9 July, the OCE ordered the 803rd to detail two officers for temporary duty of approximately three months on airport construction projects, "preferably at an Air Corps Station" for practical experience in airport construction. Captain Fries demurred on the request initially because of the shortage of officers. By 2 August, he recommended that 2nd Lieutenant Leggett be placed on detached service for an airport construction project under the district engineer at Westover Field and that 2nd Lieutenant Bartlett be placed on detached service under the district engineer at Windsor Locks Field (now Bradley International Airport), Connecticut. In the absence of funds, First Air Force suggested that for visits to these locations, Fries "use [his] organizational official car outside of [sic] a mileage status." However, it would consider funding travel if Fries could submit an official request, "citing the needs and merits of the proposal." The two officers began temporary duty assignments on 15 August.<sup>19</sup>

Selectees also participated in advanced training programs. Privates First Class John Matulewitz and James Helfrich, a duo noted for practical jokes and hassling officers, particularly Lieutenant Goldblith, went to Canton, Ohio, on detached service for training on tire repairs for trucks and heavy equipment. Some enlisted personnel, including Pvt John Zubay, returned to Ft. Belvoir for six weeks of advanced training on heavy equipment. His training was cut short when the 803rd received deployment orders, but Zubay earned a promotion to private first class.<sup>20</sup>

In the absence of the specialized training programs that came later in World War II, Captain Fries even took advantage of private companies to support his training programs. First Lt David P. Tollis, an executive officer of a newly reactivated 803rd EB, wrote in 1946 that Fries' efforts foreshadowed "the training liaison between industry and the Army Air Forces." At the Windsor Locks Airport project, where Lieutenants Leggett and Bartlett were on detached service, several Seaman-Pulvi mixers were being used for the construction of soil-cement aprons. This project was completed as of October 1941. Seaman-Pulvi manufactured and sold to the US military self-propelled machines capable of mixing existing soil to 12-inch depths with lime, cement, and fly ash for on-site mixing of subbase materials for soil stabilization. On 6 August 1941, an official of the Portland



Cement Association arrived at Westover Field to conduct training on soil-cement construction. A day earlier, a representative of the American Bitmuls and Asphalt Company conducted training on asphalt construction. To supplement OJT, Fries and his officers found and exploited “mailing lists for all types of technical publications. . . .” During August–September, the engineer section of the 1st Air Force began to provide a steady stream of relevant technical manuals to the 803rd.<sup>21</sup>

Captain Fries integrated some limited military activities into the training regime. On 7 August, Headquarters and A Company undertook a two-and-a-half-hour hike and set up an overnight bivouac, including a field kitchen. During 28–30 August, a battalion training motor convoy went to Niantic, Connecticut.<sup>22</sup>

After his inspection of Westover Field in August 1941, the First Air Force inspector general (IG) singled out Captain Fries as “deserving of special commendation” for his success “in training his battalion and providing thereby essential facilities of a military necessity to the base.” When the First Air Force AGO disagreed, the IG disputed the decision and won the support of the CG of the First Air Force.<sup>23</sup>

## Westover Regime

The schedule at Westover consisted of five-and-a-half-day work-weeks. Commenting on road construction projects, Pvt Joseph Minder, Company A, said he “had it very easy.” Cpl John Moyer, battalion supply section, recalled the time as “good duty” with not much work.

The local population welcomed the engineers because the expansion of Westover Field and the nearby Springfield Arsenal benefited the local economy. Troops had access to the local granite quarry for swimming during the hot summer days. Some officers’ wives, including Rebecca Fries, Althea Richardson, Diane Goldblith, Elizabeth Leggett, and Gertrude Oppenheim, accompanied their husbands during their brief time at Westover Field. Officers and men from Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania often used the short weekends to travel home for family visits or to have family members visit them. One group from New York was noted for appropriating and using cars without permission from their owners for their travel home. As was customary and allowable in that period, officers asked engineer troops to do personal tasks and paid them. At

that time privates earned about \$20 per month. Lieutenant Goldblith asked the men to walk his dog, for example. When the battalion received its movement orders, Lieutenant Winschuh had Pvt Smith Merrill scurry to find boxes to help his wife pack for her return home.<sup>24</sup>

The arrival of officers at the permanent 803rd continued into September. Second Lt Walter H. Farrell reported for duty on 8 September and was assigned to Company A. Following Farrell were First Lieutenants John H. Winschuh and William B. Thomas on or about 13 September. Lieutenant Thomas became the engineer officer on the battalion staff. First Lieutenants Robert W. Rogers and Henry F. Boyer, both from Ft. Belvoir, were assigned initially to Company A, and apparently arrived on 28 July. However, on the orders of Captain Fries, they remained at Westover Field when the 803rd deployed.<sup>25</sup>

## The Crystal Force Expedition

Not all personnel on “detached service” were in a training status. Instead, a small detachment that was sent north to Canada became the first engineer aviation element deployed to a foreign country (as opposed to a “foreign station”). At the War Department’s direction, Capt Elliott Roosevelt, a USAAF officer and son of the president, had undertaken a unique aerial survey of northeastern Canada and the east coast of Greenland to look for a potential weather station and airdrome sites for the “Crimson Routes,” a series of joint US-Canadian far northern ferry routes. These routes were planned flight paths for the ferrying of aircraft and equipment to the UK via Montreal and Newfoundland, Canada, to Ayr, Scotland, to England. The Bluie and Crystal weather stations were deemed necessary to observe and provide timely data on the movement of polar air masses from northern Canada and Greenland.

Roosevelt identified four sites in Labrador, on Baffin Island, and in Greenland: Crystal 1 (“Bookie”)—12 kilometers south of Ft. Chimo on the Koksoak River, Quebec Province; Crystal 2 (“Chaplet”)—near the head of Frobisher Bay, an inlet on the southeastern corner of Baffin Island; Crystal 3 (“Delight”)—Padloping Island, located on the north side of the Cumberland Peninsula, Baffin Island; and Bluie East 2—Angmagssalik, eastern Greenland. “Crystal” was the code word for Canada and “Bluie” for Greenland. Agreement for the establishment



of the Crystal bases came from the government of Canada on 20 August 1941.

By that time, it was too late in the season to begin work on air-dromes since ice and snow would seal off the area before any significant construction could be completed. Roosevelt had noted that it would be necessary to withdraw shipping from the area by 1 November. Thus, they decided hastily—a common feature of military decisions at the time—in late August to establish communications and weather stations at the selected sites and proceed later with airstrip construction. Within two days, the USAAF authorized meteorological equipment for the weather stations and its shipment to the stations. Formal orders for preparations for the expeditions were issued to various Army components on 3 September 1941. The Crystal Force expedition marked the first of several frustrating and futile efforts the 803rd was to encounter.<sup>26</sup>

Seven weather stations were quickly planned for Greenland, Iceland, northern Quebec Province, and Baffin Island. The three Crystal stations were scheduled for locations in Labrador and on Baffin Island to support flight operations for the projected Crimson Route from Western Canada across Hudson Bay to Greenland. A US Marine Corps task force assumed protective custody of Greenland and established the first weather station at Narsarssuak (Bluie West 1) on 6 July 1941. The Germans occupied Denmark in April 1940 and after that established a weather and communications station in Greenland, at the time a Danish colony. In October, a weather detachment arrived at Bluie West 8, on Greenland's west coast just above the Arctic Circle. Before the end of 1941, the third installation, Bluie East 2, near Angmagssalik, on the east side of Greenland was established. On 1 September 1941, an air weather detachment started operations at Reykjavik.<sup>27</sup>

The sudden flurry of activity directly affected the 803rd EB. In early September 1941, 20 engineers, enlisted and selectee, from each of the three established companies, volunteered for temporary duty (TDY) on an unspecified mission and were transported to the Brooklyn Army Terminal by truck. Pvt Albert Soricelli volunteered because he was tired of the routine work at Westover. On 8 September, 1st Lt Francis W. Donovan, Jr., of Company A was placed on detached service to lead the detail.<sup>28</sup>

To allow for the discharge of personnel and equipment at the three Crystal and the Bluie East 2 sites during October, the tentative sailing

date from New York was 16 September 1941 but no later than 20 September. The intervening period between the issuance of orders and sailing allowed 17 days for the acquisition of personnel, equipment, and materials, concentration at the port, and loading. For the engineers, the materials included prefabricated housing like that used by the CCC, augmented with insulating materials.

The USAT *Sicilien* was selected as the mothership for the Crystal expedition, and the MS *Lake Ormoc*, a Merchant Marine ship, was chosen for Blue East 2. Smaller trawlers to accompany the two boats were drawn from the trawler fleet in Boston, Massachusetts. It was not possible to send the trawlers into the port of New York, so plans were made to rendezvous with the *Sicilien* in Labrador. The *Lake Ormoc* was to proceed to Iceland and join with the US Coast Guard Cutter (USCGC) *North Star*, an ice patrol vessel. The *Sicilien* sailed from New York on 20 September under the overall command of Lt Col Robert W. C. Wimsatt, USAAF. Aboard the *Sicilien*, Lieutenant Donovan divided the men in squads apparently of five each. In a change of plans, the *Sicilien* joined its eight lighters in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and on 28 September, went on to Hebron, Labrador, for fuel oil and water. After a two day stop in Curling, Newfoundland, the little fleet arrived at Port Burwell at the mouth of the Hudson Strait, encountering snow squalls along the way. Cargo was loaded onto three lighters, *Fabia*, *Cambridge*, and *Flow*, during 8 to 9 October. They proceeded through the calm waters of Ungava Bay and arrived at Crystal 1 on 10 October. Under the command of LCDR Isaac "Ike" Schlossbach, US Navy Reserve (USNR), the 12-man Crystal 1 detachment unloaded cargo and began work.<sup>29</sup>

The *Sicilien* then traveled to the entrance of Frobisher Bay toward Crystal 2. When its two assigned trawlers, the *Polarbjorn* and *Selis*, proved incapable of handling the load for that site, the *Lark* was added to the group. The commander of the Crystal 2 force of 13 men, including five engineers, was Capt John T Crowell, USAAF. Frobisher Bay's tidal range, the horrible weather, and primitive lightering equipment extended the unloading for several days. One problem was the maneuvering of the heavy prefabricated building components. When personality clashes threatened the success of the Crystal 2 mission, Crowell removed three of his crew and asked for volunteer replacements from the engineers. Pvt John B. Pope of the 803rd stepped forward and was selected to remain. By late October, Crowell and his crew had three buildings ready for occupancy.<sup>30</sup>

The addition of the *Lark* to the vessels serving Crystal 2 imperiled the logistical arrangements for Crystal 3. Only two smaller ships, *Cormorant* and *Quest*, were available, and the *Sicilien* did not have orders to proceed farther north into Frobisher Bay. After determining that the ice did not pose a danger to the larger ship, Lt Colonel Wimsatt and Lieutenant Commander Hubbard sought and received permission from Washington on 15 October for the *Sicilien*, along with the trawler *Cormorant*, to proceed north toward Crystal 3. The two ships arrived at Padloping Island on 16 October. Despite a “blowing gale,” cargo was successfully unloaded by 25 October. Crystal 3, a detachment of 10 weather and communications specialists, was under the command of Capt James Glenn Dyer.<sup>31</sup>

The Crystal 3 group immediately started work on the buildings, with the engineer squad doing most of the construction work while the remainder of the crew unloaded the ships. For the first building, the engineers set foundations by breaking through the frozen crust and setting posts down to the permafrost level. The posts froze at the surface, but Hubbard believed they would remain stable until the spring thaw. The placement of stringer joists and floor panels followed. They were filled with six inches of rock wool insulation. Walls and roofs followed quickly, and temporary heating was installed. The cold weather made the tar paper roofing rigid and more difficult to install. However, the results were deemed adequate. After completing the first building, the five engineers set foundations for the second and installed the floor. They postponed further work on it to take advantage of favorable weather and set the foundations for the third building. Crystal 3 commenced weather reporting on 30 October.

Nevertheless, Wimsett and presumably the engineer squad remained with the *Quest* until 4 November. This allowed the engineers to lay the foundations for a third building, likely the generator and radio building. By that time, the permanent crew had comfortable housing ashore and messing facilities. Hubbard commended the work of “four of the Corps of Engineers’ enlisted men during the construction of this site.” They were Privates James J. Ledwith, Daniel C. Seivert, Elmer L. Richardson, and Samuel G. Mezzacappa.<sup>32</sup>

The MS *Lake Ormoc* would rendezvous with USCGC *North Star* and move on to its site in eastern Greenland. It arrived in Reykjavik, Iceland, on 20 September 1941, but Coast Guard records show that the *Lake Ormoc* did not depart Iceland until 30 October. It arrived at Bluie East 2 on 2 November with the Army weather station and left

on 15 November. LTJG Frederick Crockett, USNR, commanded the 11-man Blueie East 2 detachment.<sup>33</sup>

The *Sicilien* departed Crystal 3 for Newfoundland and New York on 25 October. The *Cormorant* left the site on 30 October and arrived in Boston on 13 November.<sup>34</sup>

Returning to Westover Field after the 803rd had deployed to the Philippines, most of the detachment personnel were incorporated into the newly formed 809th Engineer AVN Battalion SEP. However, many of its members were still listed on the 803rd roster as present in the Philippines as of 7 December 1941. The battalion's hurried departure did not allow for an amendment of the roster.<sup>35</sup>

**Table 5.1. Arctic detail**

Name	Rank	Company
Bauer, Carl E.	SGT	B
Crum, Charles A.	CPL	HQS
Dick, James O.	PVT	B
Donovan, Francis W., Jr.	CPT	A
Kennedy, Wilmar, L.	PFC	B
Knox, Charles A.	PVT	HQS
Ledwith, James J.	PVT	A
Liggett, Ephrain T.	PFC	A
Mezzacappa, Samuel G.	PVT	HQS
Nelson, Ed L.	PFC	B
Pope, John B.	PVT	A
Radcliff, Fred	PVT	HQS
Richardson, Elmer L.	PVT	A
Rogers, Marcus A.	PVT	A
Savant, Ocie, R.	PFC	B
Seivert, Daniel C.	PVT	HQS
Sgroe, Salvatore	CPL	HQS
Smith, Walter E.	PVT	HQS
Sofaralli, Patrick J.	CPL	A
Soricelli, Albert J.	PVT	HQS
Thompson, William N.	SGT	HQS

Source: Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, to CG, First Air Force, Mitchel Field, memo, 1 October 1941, Subject: Re-assignment of Enlisted Men, DDE, Box 669.

## Deployment

Other than the mention of a possible deployment to an Arctic location, the 803rd's formative and training activities at Westover were seemingly insulated from the full scope of world events. The main interest was in the European Theater of Operations. Pvt John Mackowski and Lieutenant Montgomery mentioned that news of Japanese advances into French Indochina during July to August 1941, resulted in the 803rd's being placed on alert during 28 to 30 August. Mackowski said that as a combat outfit, the 803rd was one of the units confined to post to provide additional security for the Labor Day weekend.<sup>36</sup>

In a particularly prescient statement of lessons learned in the September 1941 maneuvers, the 3rd Air Task Force engineer advised Captain Fries in a letter dated 11 September 1941, a week before the 803rd received its movement orders for the Philippines:

The movement [of engineer troops to the Louisiana maneuvers of September, 1941] . . . was made on extremely short advanced notice [,] and the initial date scheduled for departure was advanced one week just one day prior to the actual departure. [Thus,] training should include detailed plans for emergency movements on short notice and practice in such movements should be included in the training program. After the procedure has been efficiently developed it is believed advisable to schedule one alert and practice movement monthly.<sup>37</sup>

The specific chronology for the 803rd's deployment activities at Westover Field was uncertain. Captain Fries might have learned of the decision to deploy the 803rd to the Philippines as early as 12 September, a week after Gen Marshall gave verbal approval for the assignment of the 19th Bomb Group to the Philippines. On that date, Captains Fries and Bidgood left the base, possibly for First Air Force, Mitchel Field, New York, and returned the same evening. Captain Fries and his wife entertained officers and their wives that night, a party that broke up at midnight. Mrs. Leggett remembered that the usually talkative and outgoing Fries was "awfully quiet that night" but did not mention any changes. The next day he called a 0900 meeting of his officers with the surprise announcement that the 803rd was to ship out under sealed orders in seven to 10 days. The officers inferred that he was still under verbal orders, and the destination was secret. However, Cpl John Moyer in the battalion supply section saw correspondence that the 803rd was to pick up munitions in Manila.<sup>38</sup>

The formal chronology is more definite. Assignment orders, dated 19 September 1941, were based on the 16 September "telephonic instruc-

tions” from the commander, First Air Force. The Westover contingent of the 803rd was to proceed by rail on or about 20 September to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation (SFPE). The orders from the War Department AGO to the CGs of the AFCC and the SFPE were also dated 16 September 1941 and specified movement to the Philippine Department. Under standard military security procedures, the 803rd’s special orders and the movement directives were all classified “Secret.” The 803rd was not on the distribution lists for the two movement directives.<sup>39</sup>

At the post, Cpl John Moyer, in the supply section, noticed that “things started to hum.” Second Lieutenants Leggett and Montgomery were recalled to the battalion from detached service on 15 September, only a month into their projected three-month OJT program. Enlisted men were recalled to the 803rd from training held at Ft. Belvoir.<sup>40</sup>

As deployment commenced, the battalion had much of the heavy equipment prescribed in the TO&E but only about 70 percent of the required trucks and vehicles. The 803rd left some of its machinery behind with the understanding that additional and replacement items would be picked up in San Francisco. The scarcity of construction equipment continued to plague all engineer units but particularly aviation engineers, with their extensive requirements. The COE did not establish a more efficient means of procurement until the end of 1942. The available heavy construction equipment and vehicles were loaded onto railroad flat cars. Shipments began on 18 September and might have continued until 20 September. On 21 September, battalion personnel left Westover Field on 16 Pullman cars. They were only told that the destination was California, but continuing speculation on the destination included Australia and the Philippines. They were carrying full winter clothing and gear designed for the battalion’s Arctic mission and the summer uniforms they had been using at Westover. Train commanders were Captain Bidgood and 1st Lieutenant Zbikowski.<sup>41</sup>

Including the Labrador Operation Crystal detachment, at least 45 members of the initial cadre at Westover missed the deployment to the Philippines. Six privates, including one enlisted man, were absent without leave (AWOL) and left behind. Captain Fries later termed their absence “desertion” and noted the only punishment was five days in the Westover Field guardhouse. Other enlisted personnel who remained at Westover were five men who had less than six months of service remaining and had decided against reenlistment.

Three men were awaiting transfers to other units, and 13 were in hospitals at Westover (9), Ft. Devens (1), the Brooklyn Army Base (1), and MacDill Field, Florida (2). One private first class was in jail in nearby Springfield, Massachusetts, and one private was in the stockade at Westover Field. The latter two men were enlistees. Two junior officers, Lieutenants Rogers and Boyer, were left at Westover Field by order of Captain Fries.

All the enlisted and selectee personnel who did not move to the Philippines were to be transferred to a new aviation engineer battalion when it was activated at Westover Field. The new unit to which the former members of the 803rd were assigned was the 809th Engineer AVN Battalion SEP, constituted on 15 November and activated on 5 December 1941. The action came in the wake of the deactivation of the 809th Engineer AVN Company SEP at Nichols Field, Manila, and its incorporation into the 803rd EB. The new 809th EB was subsequently assigned to the European Theater of Operations in July 1942.<sup>42</sup>

Despite the alert status and cancellation of passes, some officers, including Lieutenant Radcliff and men among the 803rd, tried to get home for farewell visits. Cpl Gilbert B. Soifer, the company clerk, did not record any of the tardy returnees as AWOL. At the request of Lieutenant Oppenheim, Pvt Smith Merrill located moving boxes and helped Gertrude Oppenheim pack for return to her hometown. When Merrill could not tell her where the battalion was assigned, she responded: “wherever it is, take care of him for me.”<sup>43</sup>

### **Ft. Belvoir Selectees**

Per COE doctrine and planning for the development of engineer aviation battalions, the “telephonic instructions” for the deployment of the 803rd Engineers at Westover Field had an impact on Ft. Belvoir. The 16 September 1941 AGO orders for the Air Combat Command and the Quartermaster General provided for the transfer of “149 enlisted men from the Engineer Replacement Center, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia, to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation (SFPE) to sail with the 803rd Engineer Battalion.” The designated engineer trainees, all selectees in training Companies A and B, gained the annotation “TDY 47—Destination Unknown” next to their names on the training roster. Designated by the adjutant general as “filler replacements,” they began preparations to move by train to San Fran-

cisco. As was the case at Westover Field, some of the men went AWOL briefly for farewells to family and friends before departure. Some received visits from families.<sup>44</sup>

On 23 September 1941, the Ft. Belvoir trainees boarded the train for San Francisco. Each passenger car had a security guard at its front and rear doors. In one car, the guards were Cpl Paul A. Kloecker and Pvt Walter Lamm. They were responsible for ensuring that the engineer troops did not talk with civilians during the periodic stops.<sup>45</sup>

### Notes

1. AGO to CG, GHQ, Air Force, memo with enclosure, 4 February 1941, Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units; CoE to Corps area engineer, Third Corps Area, Baltimore, 1st Ind., 24 March 1941; 4th Ind., Third Corps engineer to CoE, 4th Ind., 1 April 1941; OCE to Third Corps engineer, 5th Ind., 12 April 1941; all in NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2, Box 221.

2. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 29, 36, 38; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 127, 316, 319, 324–34; Stanton, *Order of Battle*, 582; Futrell, “The Development Of Base Facilities,” in Craven and Cate, eds., *Men and Planes*, 129.

3. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 36, 38; Coll Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 316, 319, 324–34; Stanton, *Order of Battle*, 582; Air Force Reserve Command “Units,” <https://www.afcec.af.mil/>; John Moyer, interview with author, 7 February 1999.

4. Capt Robert D. Montgomery, “Brief History,” Company A, 803rd Engineer Battalion, 21 June 1946, Microfilm Roll 00245, US Air Force Historical Office, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 3 (hereafter cited as “Brief History”); “Service Orders: Engineers,” *The Evening Star* [Washington, DC], 28 March, 12 June, and 28 June 1941; “Service Orders: Engineers,” Wilmington [Delaware], *Morning Star*, 29 March 1941; “Army Orders: First Lieutenants,” *Wilmington Morning Star*, 31 May 1941; AGO to ACoS, WPD, memo, 7 June 1941, Subject: Activation of Engineer Regiments, Aviation, NARA RG165, Entry 281, Box 77; OCE to AGO, memo, 25 June 1941, Subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaii Department; AGO to CG, First and Second Armies, GHQ Air Force *et al.*, memo, 20 June 1941, Subject: Disbandment of the 803rd Engineer Company, NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2, Box 30; Headquarters, Westover Field, Massachusetts, General Orders No. 14, 8 July 1941, DDE Box 669; Brig Gen Harry L. Waddle, ACoS, to chief of the Air Corps, memo, April 26, 1941, Subject: Additional Engineer (Aviation) Personnel for the Air Corps, NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2, Box 30; MLG [not further identified], GHQ, Air Force Combat Command, memo of telephone conversation with Maj Griffis, office of the chief of the Air Corps [not further identified], 25 April 1941 with handwritten annotations by CWR [not further identified, Air Force Combat Command], NARA RG18, Entry 241A, Box 3; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Westover Field, General Orders No. 1, 8 July 1941; CO, Westover Field to CG, First Air Force, radiogram, 12 July 1941; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion to Maj Harry E. Fisher, engineer, First Air Force, letter, 15 July 1941, all in DDE Box 669. Newspapers, notably the Washington, DC-based *Evening Star* and the Wilmington *Morning Star* regularly published lists of Army and Navy officer assignments with the location of the losing and gaining posts but omitting the unit of assignment.



5. Montgomery, "Brief History," 3; "Service Orders: Engineers," *The Evening Star*, 14 June and 20 July 1941; Lorence, "Logistics in World War II: Engineer Phase," 10; Edward Fries to author, e-mail, 22 October 2002, Subject: Biographic Information on Frank Fries (courtesy of Ed Fries); Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 27; Stanton, *Order of Battle*, 582; Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 489; Pearson, "Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II," 20; Headquarters Company, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Roster of Officers and Troops, 8 July 1941, DDE Box 669; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Special Orders No. 7, 22 July 1941; Special Orders No. 8, 26 July 1941; Special Orders No. 9, 29 July 1941, all in DDE Box 669.

6. AGO to CG, First and Second Armies, GHQ, Air Force et al., memo, 20 June 1941, Subject: Disbandment of the 803rd Engineer Company; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 112, 116; Montgomery, "Brief History," 3; Lorence, "Logistics in World War II: Engineer Phase," 3.

7. Frank E. Fries to Rebecca Fries, letter, 30 November 1941, excerpts used with the permission of Edward Fries (hereafter cited as "Fries Letters"); E.A. Brown, Corps of Engineers, to district engineer, U.S Engineer Office, memo, 9 July 1941, Subject: Assignment of officers on temporary duty in connection with the construction program and Capt Frank E. Fries, CO, 803rd Engineers, to CoE, 1st Ind., 12 July 1941 (NARA RG77, Box 8); Elizabeth Leggett to the author, letter, 15 February 2000 (cited with permission). Ranks confirmed via Headquarters Company, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Initial-Special-Final Roster, 8 July 1941.

8. See Lt Col Wendell W. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, Part I (manuscript - MS), 14-15, Fertig Papers, Folder 2, Humphreys Engineer Center. Fertig documented this detail incorrectly as Company C, 803rd Engineer Battalion, as did Lt Col George Meidling, ed., *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, 1941-45, Volume I: Engineers in Theater Operations* (Tokyo, Japan: General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, 1947), 7. (hereafter cited as "*Engineers in Theater Operations*") and Dod, *The War against Japan*, 63, possibly based on comments in Col Harry J. Hoeffe to air engineer, headquarters, Far East Air Forces, letter, 4 January 1946, Subject: History of the 803rd Eng AVN Bn, DDE, Box 669. Godfrey to chief of the Air Corps, 1st Ind., 4 March 1941, Subject: Revised Basis of Allotment, Engineer Troops with the Air Corps; Brett to AGO, memo, 29 November 1940, Subject: Additional Engineer (Aviation) Personnel for the Air Corps.

9. Fisher to Fries, letters, 16 and 29 July 1941; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Special Orders 21, 23 August 1941; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, to CG, First Air Force, Mitchel Field, memo, 1 October 1941, Subject: Re-assignment of Enlisted Men; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Special Orders No.17, 15 August 1941, all in DDE, Box 669. At the time of deployment, Oliva was in the Westover field Hospital, and Bell had opted not to reenlist. Further information was not available on Ewing.

10. Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion Separate, Special Orders 6, 8, 10, 17, 18, and 20, 18, 26, and 30 July and 15, 16, and 22 August 1941, respectively, all in DDE, Box 669; Montgomery, "Brief History," 3; Elizabeth Leggett to the author, letter, 15 February 2000; Joseph Minder, Joseph G. Minder's Diary (n.d.), 2, (cited with permission from Joseph Minder and hereafter referred to as "Minder diary"), placed the 17 August 1941, as the arrival date for the selectees from Ft. Leonard Wood; Moyer, interview, 7 February 1999; James L. Leggett, Interview, Part I, University of Kentucky (UKY) Oral History Project, 24 March 1981 (cited with the approval of the University of Kentucky and hereafter referred to as Leggett UKY Interview, Part I); "Service Orders: Engineers," *Evening Star*, 15 September 1941. Montgomery, "Brief

History,” reconstructed in POW camps and written after the war, showed slight discrepancies with arrival dates.

11. Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion Separate Special Orders No. 6, 18 July 1941; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion Separate Special Orders No. 8, 26 July 1941; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion Separate Special Orders No. 17, 15 August 1941; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion Separate Special Orders No. 18, 16 August 1941; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion Separate Special Orders No. 20, 22 August 1941; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion Separate Special Orders No. 21, 23 August 1941. The two NCO’s assigned to Company B on 22 August were Sgt George W. Young, who was eventually was interned in Japan, and Cpl Edward Jacobs, who was KIA with the sinking of the *Shinyo Maru* on 7 September 1944, in route from Mindanao to Manila. The two NCO’s assigned to Company B with Sgt McCubbin were Sgt Tony Oliva and Cpl Lawrence J. Bell. Neither went to the Philippines. Headquarters, 1st Corps Area, Special Orders No. 210, 8 September 1941, which transferred Pfc Bennie L. Bianco, (RA designation) from headquarters detachment, First Corps Area, Boston, Massachusetts, to the 803rd. Pfc Bianco did not accompany the 803rd to the Philippines for reasons undocumented.

12. Coll et al., *Troops and Equipment*, 107–110, 114; Col Herbert W. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, xv; Association of [US Military Academy] Graduates, *The 2005 Register of Graduates and Former Cadets* (West Point, NY: US Military Academy, 2005), 11, 46, 112; Fries to author, email, 22 October 2002; Brig Gen H[ugh] J. C[asey] to CG, USAFFE, memo, 11 February 1941, Subject: Promotion of Maj Fries, Casey Files, Folder 5; “Reunion on Bataan” [Clarence Bidgood], *Ironwood* (Michigan) *Daily Globe*; Elizabeth Leggett to the author, letter, 15 February 2000; Col Elgin Radcliff, *Salute to Veterans*—speech outline, n.d., cited with the permission of Martha Radcliff; Obituary for Col Elgin Radcliff—“Elgin Radcliff,” *New York Daily Record*, 21 March 2003, <https://legacy.co/2CUvSUc>; Col Elgin G. Radcliff; Smith Merrill to author, email, 15 November 1999; Be Thou at Peace, “Clarence Bidgood 1935.” West Point Association for Graduates, <https://www.westpointaog.org/>. The Thomason Act, sponsored by Representative R. Ewing Thomason, allowed the Army to select the 1,000 best ROTC graduates who wished to apply for a year’s service with the RA. At the end of a year’s service, the Army was to offer regular commissions to the top 10 percent.

13. Leggett, UKY Interview, Part I; Alumni Association of the California Institute of Technology. *Alumni Review*, June 1941, 23, and n.d., 20; *Swickley* (Pennsylvania) *Herald*, 26 August 1946, courtesy of Elizabeth Leggett; *Military Record and Report of Separation*—James L. Leggett, Jr., 31 December 1946, cited with the approval of Elizabeth Leggett; John A. Adams, Jr., *The Fightin’ Texas Aggie Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M Press, 2016), xxvii–xxviii, 19; *Prisoner of War 1st Lt Everett J. Carney Reported Deceased*, undated obituary in *Post 37: Post 37: Bellows Falls, Vermont*. “Pierce Lawton Post #37 Commander William Charles Carney.” *American Legion*. <https://centennial.legion.org/>; John J. Denehy, Jr., “Captain Edmund Peter Zbikowski, American Defender of the Philippines,” *National Military Museum Newsletter*, January 1981, 2–5; Worcester County Veterans Memorial ([www.opvets.org](http://www.opvets.org)); Joseph A. Vater, interviews with author, 24 October 1999 and 8 May 2008; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 8–24; Harry C. Dethkoff, *Texas Aggies Go to War* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M Press, 2006), 90; School of Engineering, Bachelor of Science, Civil Engineering,” [Graduation ceremony at MIT] *The Boston Globe*, 8 June 1937; “Lt. Carney Dies in Japan,” *The Bennington* (Vermont) *Evening Banner*, 24 Jun 1943; “Lt. Oppenheim declared Dead,” *Big Spring* (Texas) *Weekly Herald*, 14 July 1944; “Elections at M.I.T. for Next College Term,”

[Walter Farrell] The Boston Globe, 18 May 1938; “Herbert V. Ingersoll of Cambridge to Wed,” The Boston Globe, 16 February 1931; “Matawan Man [Lt John H. Winschuh] is Jap [sic] War Captive,” The Daily Record (Long Branch, New Jersey), 7 January 1943; “William Thomas Listed as Missing,” The Huntsville (Alabama) Times, 24 May 1942; “North Side Man Prisoner of Japs [sic]” [Lt. Robert J. Russell], Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph, 18 March 1943; “Peter Reynolds is Prisoner,” and “Police, Firemen in Uniform,” The (Baltimore, Maryland) Evening Sun, 23 January 1942 and 12 August 1943, respectively.

14. Col Elgin Radcliff, “Salute to Veterans,” Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 107–110, 125; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 37; John M. Zubay, “We Ate the Rice, Bugs and All,” in Richard David Wissolik et al., editors, *They Say there was a War* (Latrobe, Pennsylvania: St. Vincent College Press, 2005), 507–15; George A. Schatz, Sr., and Ed Kemp, “My Three and a Half Years in Hell” (MS), n.d., 1; “Albert J. Senna,” Courier News & Home News Tribune, 17 March 2011, <https://www.legacy.com/>; Samuel Trifilo, Interview by Dr. James Dunn, Humphreys Engineer Center, Alexandria, Virginia, 13 February 1996, 1–3 (hereafter cited as Trifilo interview; “Obituaries,” *Cornell Alumni Magazine* 111 no. 2 (September–October): 106—Samuel Trifilo obituary; George Wonneman, interview with author, 19 September 1998; Moyer, interview, 7 February 1999; Vater, interviews, 25 October 1998, and 12–13 October 2003; William Van Orden, interview with author, 14 March 1999; Joe B. Hill, Interview with author, 10 March 1998; Koch, “Combat Engineers of World War II: Lessons On Training And Mobilization” (Ft. Leavenworth, Army Command and General Staff College, 2003), <https://apps.dtic.mil/>, 1; R. Thomas Gagne, interview with author, 6 February 1999; Lillian Wuttke and Peter Wuttke, *Just One More Day: My Life as Prisoner of War #1475* (Self-published: 2010), 10 (hereafter cited as *Just One More Day*); Sgt Paul A. Kloecker, MFR, n.d. [probably September, 1945], Subject: Deceased[,] Co[mpany] B – 803rd Eng[inee]r B[attalio]n AVN, signed by Maj William B. Thomas, 26 September 1945, from Elizabeth Leggett, which included Rowland Douglas with an address of “N.Y.C. N.Y c/o Actors Equity,” Fisher to Fries, letter, 16 July 1941; “Prisoners form Club,” *Cornell Alumni News*, 46 no. 13 (1 January 1944): 238. See Prisoner’s Identification Cards, The Concentration Camp at Cabanatuan, NARA RG407 (Philippine Archives Collection), Entry 1072, Box 180 (Death Reports, Cabanatuan POW Camp) for a small sample of biographic information, including education, of enlisted personnel in the 803rd.

15. See “Funeral Rites Held Wednesday for War Hero,” Kings Mountain (NC) Herald, 26 September 1947 in <http://newspapers.digitalnc.org/>.

16. Moyer, interview, 20–21 October 2002; Zubay, “We Ate Rice, Bugs and All,” 508. See also John W. Wallace, *POW 83: Shinyo Maru Survivor* (Chatham, NY: Grey Rider Publishing Company, 1999), 51–64 (hereafter cited as *POW 83*); Joseph A. Poster, interview with author, 24 October 1999; Vater, interview, 29 September 1998; Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 125. Dickson, *The Rise of the G.I. Army*, 185.

17. Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 107, 124–25, 161–62; T. Walter Middleton, *Flashbacks: Prisoner of War in the Philippines* (Alexander, North Carolina: Alexander Books, 2000), 17 (hereafter cited as *Flashbacks*); Wallace, *POW 83*, 51–64; Poster, interview, 24 October 1999; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Maj Richard Koch IV, “Combat Engineers of World War II,” 18; Pvt Paul A. Kloecker to Adelaide C. Kloecker, letter, 16 March 1941, courtesy of Elizabeth Kloecker. See William C. Johnson, *Follow the Wavy Arrow* [a history of the 20th Engineer Battalion] (Privately published, 1977), 1. The Corps of Engineers selected personnel on a

limited scale when activating the 20th Engineers (Forestry) in early 1917 for construction work in France.

18. Montgomery, "Brief History," 1; Fries to unknown [possibly Maxon Corporation], letter excerpt, 6 August 1941, in 1st Lt David P. Tollis, executive officer, 803rd Engineer Battalion, "803rd Unit History, 803rd Engineer Aviation Battalion," 28 August 1948, citing sources from Westover Field and the Philippines (hereafter cited as "803rd Unit History, 1946"); Leggett, UKY Interview, Part I; Moyer, interview, 7 February 1999; Radcliff, "Salute to Veterans"; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 32; Fries to Maj Harry E. Fisher, letter, 15 July 1941, DDE, Box 669.

19. Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 126–27; Fries to engineer, First Air Force, 1st Ind., 9 September 1941, no subject [request for training and maintenance funds], DDE, Box 669; Albert Soricelli, interview with author, 6 September 1999; Brig Gen C.W. Russell, CoS, headquarters, Air Force Combat Command, to chief of the Army Air Forces, memo 15 July 1941, Subject: Funds for Training of Engineer Units (Aviation), NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2, Box 30; chief, Air Staff, routing sheet, 31 July 1941, Subject: Funds for Training Engineer Units (Aviation), NARA RG18, Decimal 320.2, Box 30; E.A. Brown, Corps of Engineers, to district engineer, US Engineer Office, memo, 9 July 1941, Subject: Assignment of officers on temporary duty in connection with the construction program with 12, 15, 31 and 31 July and 2 August 1941 indorsements, NARA RG77, Box 8; Montgomery, "Brief History," 3; Orders, AGO to 2nd Lt James L. Leggett, Jr., 8 August 1941, NARA RG77, Box 8; Wallace, *POW* 83, 65; Fisher to Fries, memo, 18 July 1941, no subject [travel funding], DDE, Box 669; "\$500,000 Sought for Military Posts in Capital Area," *Evening Star* [Washington, DC], June 5, 1941.

20. John M. Zubay, Synopsis for Veterans' Administration claim, n.d. (ca. 1999), and "We Ate Rice, Bugs and All," 508; Moyer, interviews, 20–21 October 2002 and 12–13 October 2003.

21. Fries to [unknown]; Tollis, Letter excerpt in "803rd Unit History, 1946"; See Maxon Industries Inc. "Soil Stabilization." <https://maxon.com/applications/>; See Corps of Engineers, Office of History, Military Images, Box 9, Folder 9, for a photograph of the finished soil-cement apron.

22. "Engineers from Westover Field on Hike," *The Springfield* (Massachusetts) *Daily Republican* 7 August 1941 (courtesy of Elizabeth Leggett); Montgomery, "Brief History," 3.

23. Col R. Beam, IG, First Air Force, to IG, US Army et al., memo 23 August 1941, Subject: Annual Inspection of Westover Field, Mass, FY1942, and Capt H. Weinberg, assistant engineer, First Air Force, to Maj Harry E. Fisher, engineer, 3rd Air Task Force, letter, 12 September 1941, both in DDE, Box 669.

24. Minder diary, 3; Moyer, interviews, 7 February 1999; 20–21 October 2002, and 12–13 October 2003; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 32; Elizabeth Leggett to the author, letters, 15 February 2000, and 21 October 2005; Wallace, *POW* 83, 68; Merrill to author, email, 31 March 1999.

25. Montgomery, "Brief History," 3–4; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Special Orders 8 and 9 (Boyer), 26 and 29 July 1941, respectively, both in DDE, Box 669; "Service Orders: Engineers," *Evening Star*, 20 July and 15 September 1941. Further identifying information was not available on Rogers or nor on the reason for the two lieutenants' remaining at Westover in documents specially related to the 803rd. However, the "Alphabetical Casualty Listing of Officers Who Were in the Philippine Islands Area as of 7 December 1941, May 1, 1946," listed 1st Lt Robert W. Rogers, Corps of Engineers, O-225406, in correctly as "evaluated to the US, and 1st Lt Henry F. Boyer, Corps of Engineers, O-320891, as "alive and well."

26. Lieutenant Commander C[harles] J. Hubbard, USN, 11 November 1941, Report of Crystal Force Expedition, 1–2, AFHRA, 1 (Reel 28130, 368); John D. Carter, “The Early Development of Air Transport and Ferrying,” in Craven and Cate, eds., *Plans and Early Operations*, 318; Robert V. Eno, “Crystal 2: The Origin of Iqaluit,” *Arctic* 56 no. 1 (March 2003): 65; Col D.Z.Z. (not further identified), USAAF, directorate of weather, memo, 6 July 1942, Subject: Operation of Bookie, Chaplet and Delight, AFHRA, Reel 28130, 132; Jonas A. Jonasson, “The AAF Weather Service,” in Craven and Cate, eds., *Services around the World*, 321–22. For synopses of Army Air Forces cables concerning establishment, equipment, shipment and movements of communications and weather detachments were available in AFHRA Reel 28130, 409–13. The project was not fully developed and ended in 1943 after a great circle route from southern California’s aircraft manufacturers proved shorter and more cost effective.

27. Jonasson, “The AAF Weather Service,” 321–22, in Craven and Cate, eds., *Services around the World*, 321–22.

28. Soricelli, interview, 6 January 1999; Salvatore Sgroe, interview with author, 6 January 1999; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 3; E. Kathleen Williams and Louis E. Asher Fellow, “Deployment of the A[rmy] A[ir] F[orce] on the Eve Hostilities,” in Craven and Cate, eds., *Early Plans and Operations*, 155; Hoeffe to air engineer, headquarters, Far East Air Forces, memo, 4 January 1946, Subject: History of the 803rd Eng AVN Bn, placed the detachment’s work site as only as Ellsemere Island, which is in the same territory as Padloping Island, the site documented in Hubbard’s MFR. Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larsoll, *History of the US Army in World War II: Technical Services—The Transportation Corps: Overseas Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 11, documented Boston, Massachusetts, as opposed to Brooklyn, New York, as the departure point for the Crystal Force Expeditions; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Ft. McDowell, California, to CG, First Air Force, Mitchel Field, memo, 1 October 1941, Subject: Re-assignment of Enlisted Men; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Special Orders No. 4, 12 July 1941. Lieutenant Donovan may have been known as “William,” according to Montgomery’s “Brief History.” Engineers in the cadre sent to Newfoundland were not allowed to notify family of their deployment.

29. Hubbard, Report of Crystal Force Expedition, 2–7; Eno, “Crystal 2,” 66. In his report, Hubbard did not document the port of departure for the *Lake Ormoc*. H.L.G., chief, AWPD, to USAAF G-4, memo, 17 January 1942, Subject: Arctic Clothing and Equipment, AFHRA Reel 28130, 307; Eno, “Crystal 2,” 66. John F. Fuller, *Thor’s Legions: Weather Support to the U.S. Air Force and Army, 1937–1987* (Boston: American Meteorological Society, 1990), 60, detailed the Blueie East 2 detachment of 11 enlisted men commanded by Lieutenant junior grade Frederick Crockett, USNR. It did not include engineers. See also Hubbard, Report of Crystal Force Expedition, 4; Wikipedia, Blueie East; Crystal One, <http://www.northamericanforts.com/>.

30. Hubbard, Report of Crystal Force Expedition, 4–5, 7–8; Eno, “Crystal 2,” 67. After five days of searching under weather conditions termed “abysmal,” Crowell and William Carlson, a civilian technical advisor, were unable to locate the site that the Roosevelt survey had identified as a possible airfield site. They decided to set up an advance base for the winter at a small island (now Crowell Island), off the northwestern end of Pugh Island.

31. Hubbard, Report of Crystal Force Expedition, 8–9; See Crystal 2, <http://www.northamericanforts.com/>.

32. Hubbard, Report of Crystal Force Expedition, 8–9, Annex 2 – Conditions at Crystal 3, 1–2, 4

33. Hubbard, Report of Crystal Force Expedition, 4; Wikipedia, Blue East Two.
34. Hubbard, Report of Crystal Force Expedition, 9. Details were not available regarding the ships that returned the engineers to the United States.
35. Soricelli, interview, 6 January 1999; Sgroe, interview, 6 January 1999; PFC Wilmar L. Kennedy, Cpl Patrick J. Sofaralli, and Sgt William N. Thompson were the only three engineers in the Crystal detachment not included on the roster of personnel present in the Philippines as of 7 December 1941; however, all the men in the detail were included in a list of enlisted casualties, as of 27 July 1944, in various categories: alive and well, evacuated, and missing in action (MIA). When Bataan fell, Sgroe's parents received a letter advising that he was MIA. As of 1999, both Sgroe and Soricelli declined to provide details on their work because it was classified "secret" in 1941. The 1 October 1941, 803rd memo on the reassignment of enlisted men, documented 20 enlisted or selectee personnel on the detail to St. John's, Newfoundland; it also listed a Sgt James A. Deaton as "sick in hospital" at the Brooklyn Army Base Hospital, New York. See United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), "Alphabetical Listing of Enlisted Personnel in the Philippine Island Area as Reported to Military Records Branch," 7 December 1941, 1 May 1946, in which both Soricelli and Sgroe were listed incorrectly as present in the Philippines. Similarly, the "Alphabetical Casualty Listing of Officers Who Were in the Philippine Islands Area as of 7 December 1941, 1 May 1946," listed 1st Lt Francis W. Donovan, Jr., as alive. Both lists were in NARA RG 407, Entry 1052, Box 6. See also Cate and Williams, "The Air Force Prepares for War, 1939-41," in Craven and Cate, eds., *Early Plans and Operations*, 315, provide a map showing the three Crystal sites. The Hoeffler memo contains numerous factual errors.
36. Wilson, *POW* 83, 68; Montgomery, "Brief History," 3. Leggett, UKY Interview, Part I.
37. Headquarters, Third Air Task Force, office of the engineer, Lake Charles, Louisiana, to CO, 803rd Engineer Battalion, memo 11 September 1941, Subject: Overland Movement of Troops, DDE, Box 669.
38. Montgomery, "Brief History," 3. Leggett, UKY Interview, Part I; Elizabeth Leggett to author, letter, 18 January, 2000; Moyer, interviews, 20–21 October 2004. See Spaatz to CoS, memo, 12 September 1941, Subject: Plan for Reinforcing the Philippine Department Air Forces, NARA RG165, Entry 12, Box 4, File 14528-16.
39. Special Orders No. 217, Headquarters, Westover Field, 19 September 1941, NARA RG407; AGO to CG, Air Force Combat Command, memo, 16 September 1941, Subject: Movement of the 803d Engineer Battalion AVN to the Philippine Department, NARA RG165; AGO to CG, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, memo, 16 September 1941, Subject: Movement of the 803d Engineer Battalion AVN to the Philippine Department, NARA RG165.
40. Montgomery, "Brief History," 3; Zubay, Synopsis for VA Claim and interviews, 20-21 October 2004; Moyer, interview, 3 October 2005.
41. Moyer, interviews, 7 February 7, 1999; 12–13 October 2003; and 7, 20, and 21 October 2004; Trifilo Interview, 1–3; Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 316-317; Glen Williford, *Racing the Sunrise*, 49–50; *Special Orders*, 207; Minder Diary, 3; Leggett, Interview, Part I; Lt James Leggett to Elizabeth, letter, 8 October 1941, courtesy of and cited with the permission of Elizabeth Leggett (hereafter cited as "Leggett Letters").
42. Fries Letters, 11 November 1941; Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Moyer, interviews, October 12–13, 2003; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, to CG, First Air Force, Mitchel Field, memo, 1 October 1941, Subject: Re-assignment of Enlisted Men; Headquarters, First Air Force to CG, Air Force Combat Command, 1st Ind., 9

October 1941, and headquarters, Air Force Combat Command, to CG, First Air Force, 2nd Ind., 18 October 1941, and headquarters, First Air Force, to CO, Westover Field, 3rd Ind., n.d., all in DDE, Box 669; See Unit Pages. "809th Engineer Battalion," Military.com, <https://web.archive.org/>.

43. Moyer, interviews, 20-21 October 2004; Wilson, *POW* 83, 68-69; Merrill to author, email, 31 March 1999.

44. AGO to CG, Air Force Combat Command, memo, 16 September 1941, Subject: Movement of the 803d Engineer Battalion AVN to the Philippine Department, NARA RG165; AGO to Quartermaster General, memo, 16 September 1941, Subject: Movement of the 803d Engineer Battalion AVN to the Philippine Department, NARA RG165, Box 109; AGO to CG, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, memo, 16 September 1941, Subject: Movement of the 803d Engineer Battalion AVN to the Philippine Department, NARA RG165, Box 109; Gagne, interview, 6 February 1999; Elizabeth J. Kloecker, interview with author, 2 February 2010.

45. Walter Lamm, interview, 18 August 1998; diary of Raymond C. Geier and George Wonneman diary, both courtesy of and cited with the permission of Irene Wonneman; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 33.



## Chapter 6

### The Movement to the Philippines

The Westover element of the 803rd took a northern route from Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts, traveling west to Albany via the Boston and Maine Railroad and then to Buffalo on the New York Central Railroad. It then headed southwest through St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri; Dodge City, Kansas; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Barstow, California, almost nonstop before arriving in Oakland, California. The 803rd used the rails of the Missouri Pacific, Santa Fe, and Southern Pacific Railroads, respectively. The medical staff noted that “men lapsed into depression” as the journey continued as they were staring blankly through the windows by the time they reached Albuquerque. Rumors on the destination “were a dime a dozen.”<sup>1</sup>

The kitchen for the troop train was a converted baggage car under the direction of Pfc Max Hurwitz, a chef in New York’s Catskill Mountains before being drafted. The men who worked in the kitchen—kitchen police (KP)—considered the time as “dirty duty.” Officers used the dining cars.<sup>2</sup>

The most extended stop for rest and recreation for about four hours occurred in Kansas City. For some officers and NCOs that stop translated into steak dinners, while another segment sought out other activities. Officers, including Lt Herbert W. Coone, a medical officer, and Lieutenant Leggett were stunned when 125 of the troops re-boarded and immediately queued at the prophylactic station. Captain Bidgood had ordered adding the station over the initial objections of Capt Sidney Vernon, the battalion surgeon.<sup>3</sup>

Problems with the hotboxes used to lubricate the wheels might have caused a later stop in a switchyard, possibly Albuquerque or Las Vegas. Cpl John Moyer and Cpl Edward F. Heard took advantage of the time to venture to a local high school where they convinced the athletic director to allow them access to the swimming pool and showers.<sup>4</sup>

Observations by the Ft. Belvoir inductees on the journey to San Francisco are few. They went directly from a rail siding in Ft. Belvoir on the *Crescent Line* through New Orleans to Flagstaff, Arizona, and then on to San Francisco. A stop in Flagstaff allowed for calisthenics. Food for enlisted and selectee personnel was prepared in the baggage



car, and troops ate from mess kits in their seats. On arrival in Oakland, some realized that the final destination would be in the Pacific.<sup>5</sup>

The Westover contingent arrived in Oakland on 26 September. The Ft. Belvoir contingent might have arrived as late as 30 September. They went via bus and ferry from the rail station to Ft. McDowell on Angel Island. Located next to Alcatraz Island, Angel Island was a historical home to military facilities and also the site of the West Coast immigration station. Immediately before the war, it became the staging area in the SFPE for troops being deployed to the Pacific.<sup>6</sup>

### Processing at Ft. McDowell

The short time at Ft. McDowell included some preparation but not any notable work on the integration of the two contingents. Nevertheless, some of the Ft. Belvoir element received assignments to specific companies. The emphasis was on ensuring that the battalion had most of its equipment and that personnel had all their personal effects. Lieutenant Coone noted that within a week, he did not receive an orientation but instead had physical examinations and immunizations. Engineer troops were issued tropical uniforms. Officers were neither issued new uniforms nor given time to purchase them. Personnel from Headquarters Company, including Pvt William Van Orden, spent several days loading the heavy equipment on the US Army Transport (USAT) *Tasker H. Bliss* (AP-42) when the Navy encountered some difficulties with the process. The USAT *Willard A. Holbrook*, which had been involved in transporting the 809th Engineers to the Philippines, was also part of the convoy. The 803rd learned its destination was to be the Philippines, even though some still spoke of an assignment to Alaska. Most had heard of the Philippine Islands, but many were not sure of their location. Issuance of baggage stickers for Manila finally confirmed the information on the final destination.<sup>7</sup>

Some tension, internal and external, surfaced during the battalion's stay at Ft. McDowell because of the cultural divide in the battalion. Personnel were primarily from the North or Midwest and heavily influenced by the Roman Catholic faith. They were known to harass their southern Protestant counterparts.<sup>8</sup> The large mess hall was noted for the mass quantity and quality of its food, as well as for the length and severity of its KP duty. Some members of the 803rd had KP duty and got into a fight over broken dishes. They were

ordered from the mess hall for the remainder of their brief stay at Ft. McDowell.<sup>9</sup>



Source: Paul W. Ropp, October 2002.

**Ft. McDowell, post supply, 2002**



Source: Paul W. Ropp, October 2002.

**Ft. McDowell, troop departure ramp, 2002**

## Pacific Crossing

On 4 October 1941, the 464 men, including Medical Corps personnel, of the 803rd departed Ft. McDowell via ferry for Ft. Mason, another SFPE element, at the foot of the Golden Gate Bridge. They boarded the *Tasker H. Bliss*. Formerly the SS *President Cleveland*, it

was a passenger ship built in 1921 and named for a former Army chief of staff. It set sail for the Philippines at 1720 Pacific Standard Time. It was accompanied by the USAT *Willard A. Holbrooke* and the SS *Liberty*, a transport vessel that carried inter alia some of the battalion's heavy equipment. The USS *Chester*, a Northampton class heavy cruiser, served as the convoy's armed escort. Also, on board the *Bliss*, were aviation ordnance, chemical, and medical companies assigned to the Philippines as part of the reinforcement effort. Some of the 803rd's equipment, including crawler tractors, steam rollers, graders, as well as arms and ammunition, was stowed in the hold. The troops sang the customary songs to deserted docks as they moved under the bridge and into the Pacific.<sup>10</sup>

As was usually the case in military environments, conditions on board varied widely between officers and enlisted men. Lieutenant Leggett termed it a "caste system." Lodging assignments for the 127 officers allowed for one stateroom for every three junior officers. They were grouped randomly and not by unit. Lieutenant Leggett, for example, shared a room with a medical and field artillery officer. Officers still collected their basic allowances for quarters and subsistence but were expected to tip ship attendants, largely Filipino, at the end of the voyage (about \$8.00). Food in the officers' mess was excellent and plentiful with a strictly regimented serving schedule necessary to accommodate the overcrowded ship.<sup>11</sup>

By contrast, the 1,500 enlisted and inductee personnel were crammed into converted bunks or "racks" in the hold. Seasickness was common. The first meal for the troops was hot dogs and sauerkraut. Many remembered both that food and the aroma for years afterward. Rough seas during the first few hours exacerbated stomach problems. Pfc Charles Agostinelli avoided meals to stay well but gave the food to Pvt Joseph Vater, a fellow Pennsylvanian. Toilets overflowed. Lieutenant Goldblith was among the officers who helped bring the men on deck for fresh air. Many of the engineers took several days to adapt to life at sea. To cope with seasickness, the men lived on their K rations until the food improved or they got their sea legs.<sup>12</sup>

The route to Manila was via Hawaii and Guam Island. The limited stops allowed the convoy to make the voyage in 17 days as opposed to the usual 22 to 23 days. Blackout drills began just before the ships reached Hawaii.

A brass band greeted the arrival of the *Tasker H. Bliss* in Honolulu on the evening of 9 October. Second Lieutenants Bartlett and Carney

were the officer of the day and officer of the guard, respectively. Lieutenant Leggett was the casual officer. Although enlisted men had prepared for time ashore, their passes were revoked. Only officers could disembark, a policy that adversely affected the men's morale, as Pfc John Zubay and Lieutenant Leggett both noted. However, Pvt Joseph H. Gozzo managed to get off the ship. He ended up missing the departure and was sent to the Philippines on the next transport, the USAT *President Coolidge*. Officers, including nurses, went to the bars, beaches, and high-end hotels like the Royal Hawaiian but had to be back aboard by midnight. When the ship departed at 0530 on 10 October, "those who celebrated too strenuously" needed a "day of recovery," Lieutenant Leggett observed.<sup>13</sup> On 10 October 1941, just after the stop in Honolulu, Frank Fries was promoted to major.<sup>14</sup>

With the departure from Honolulu, the convoy went to a war footing status, defined as the condition of being prepared to undertake or maintain war. That change brought added operational security measures: a total blackout was imposed; portholes were closed; and cigarette smoking was forbidden on deck. The no-smoking rule was strictly enforced. Pfc Walter A. Yosko was sent to the brig for lighting a cigarette. Ship's authorities confiscated cameras, only to return them after the *Bliss* left Guam. The men were prohibited from throwing anything overboard, a security measure to avoid tracking. The convoy crossed the International Date Line on the evening of 10 October.<sup>15</sup>

Medical problems arose during the Honolulu-to-Guam segment. The Navy cooks served tainted ham, and 16 of the 803rd were affected by the food poisoning. Hospital space filled up quickly, but the men recovered rapidly. Despite blackout conditions, the ship's lights were turned on to support medical care.<sup>16</sup>

After arrival in Guam at 0500 on 19 October, only officers and the first three grades of NCOs were allowed ashore. The beaches attracted swimmers, but most headed for the bars. Despite the Sunday closings, they managed "to get tanked up," according to Lieutenant Leggett, and bought liquor for shipboard use, a violation of regulations. Misbehavior occurred at the local officers' club. Some of the 803rd officers "tried to drink up all the available liquor." On return to the ship, one intoxicated officer, who went unnamed, fell off the gangplank. Lieutenant Leggett commented that the incident "would [have been] funny if the enlisted men had not been hanging over the ship's rail taking in the whole performance." The behavior caused Col Clyde

Selleck, the senior officer and overall commander of Army personnel aboard, to dress down all the officers after departure from Guam.<sup>17</sup>

For unclear reasons, few formational activities took place during the voyage to the Philippines. Actions to integrate Ft. Belvoir personnel into the three companies were as limited aboard the *Bliss* as they had been at Ft. McDowell. Even socially, enlisted and selectee personnel from the Westover Field and Ft. Belvoir contingents did not mix during the voyage. Nor were they involved in any organizational meetings about the battalion. One contributing factor might have been a surgical procedure Major Fries had. He mentioned the operation briefly in a letter to his wife, stating that it required subcutaneous healing and continuing care after he arrived in the Philippines. However, Major Fries also said, perhaps to assure his wife: "It has not incapacitated me at all nor inconvenienced me very much." In the absence of other activities, engineer officers involved themselves with duties generally associated with the crew. Lieutenant Leggett said that the ship's administration came "out of bedlam" and that "the 803rd Engineers [were] practically running the ship," while "other officers think they are on a joy ride." Leggett, for example, became the assistant casual officer was involved in handling records for all military personnel aboard. He also participated in inspections of the troops.<sup>18</sup>

The specific assignments for which the 803rd was ordered to the Philippines remained uncertain. A day before arrival (22 October), Lieutenant Leggett wrote, "where we are to do our airport work still remains to be seen."<sup>19</sup>

Some ship-wide administrative actions proceeded in an orderly manner. Daily sick call functioned regularly using the medical staff on board. Immunizations that began at Ft. McDowell continued on-board less than a week into the voyage. By the time the ship arrived in Manila, health records were up to date and passed inspection by health officials at the Port of Manila. The troops did not contract contagious diseases. Thus, personnel on the *Bliss* avoided a 40-day quarantine period upon arrival in Manila. On the third day of the voyage and ending on 22 October, Colonel Selleck instituted daily briefings for officers on the future duties in the Philippines. Major Fries, who was described as a "very entertaining speaker," was scheduled to give the first briefing. At first, Leggett said the sessions would probably be useful, particularly for junior officers. Later in the trip, he complained about "wishy-washy" meetings with dry presentations by colonels and lieutenant colonels who could not "bring themselves to point

where they [got] away from statistics.” The ship also held at least one preannounced fire and lifeboat drill.<sup>20</sup>

The 17 doctors on board formed a medical society to familiarize themselves with tropical medicine. Lieutenant Coone, a specialist in internal medicine, commented that some of the doctors knew the area and “crammed information into the void that existed in our education.” He also noted that “resentment ran high. The bureaucracy had placed expediency above the possible benefits of proficiency—as usual. We knew ourselves to be ill-prepared not only for the tropics, but for war.”<sup>21</sup>

Routine administrative functions within the 803rd started forming early in the voyage. The personnel section began operating on the second day. Leggett tried to have personnel and patrol records in order upon arrival in Manila. Still, he worked “on things that should have been done in Westover.” When asked about developing work schedules for the Philippines, Major Fries responded that it would depend on how much time the battalion was allotted to complete a job. He indicated a personal preference for the typical work schedule in the tropics: start very early in the morning and quit at noon.<sup>22</sup>

Both officers and enlisted men generally agreed that the voyage was dull and boring. Exercise and calisthenics were a matter of individual initiative. Officers played volleyball, despite lack of netting to keep balls from going overboard, tossed medicine balls, skipped rope, and walked on deck.

Reading filled the interim periods. As the ship approached the International Date Line, officers socialized on the sundeck in the evening. During the first days of the trip, the troops were able to listen to the World Series between the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York Yankees. The Yankees won in five games.

Two of the engineers mentioned the playing of records over the loudspeaker system. Enlisted men paced the decks and shot craps on the sundeck. The “humdrum existence” was punctuated periodically with inspections of the troops. A ship’s newsletter carried articles so brief that they had little news value. The men felt practically cut off from the world. A rumor that, in the event of a problem, all US ships were to put into a neutral port had the troops wondering what the world situation was. Still, Lieutenant Leggett wrote to his wife that “perhaps when this emergency becomes a little less serious, we officers will be [able] to send for our wives and have you-all join us.”<sup>23</sup>

As the *Tasker H. Bliss* moved into the tropics, weather began to take its toll. Troops crammed in the hold had little ventilation. Officers, as well, felt the effects of the heat. Blackout-covered windows stifled ventilation in officers' staterooms, and their woolen uniforms were out of place. White suits began to appear soon after the voyage started.<sup>24</sup>


## Arrival in Manila

The convoy sailed through the San Bernardino Straits and north toward Manila, entering Manila Bay and sailing past Bataan, Corregidor, and a fleet of rusty freighters and interisland ferries. The USAFFE Air Force did a flyover. Arrival at Pier 7 on 23 October was a brief but frenetic exercise. A brass band and a hoard of local porters, who carried luggage for tips, greeted the troops, calling them all "Joe." The heat and humidity of the tropics, which became more notable without ocean breezes, confronted the new arrivals. A boarding party arrived at 1900 for inspections and document checks, a process that lasted for about two hours.<sup>25</sup>

At that point, officers of the 803rd learned their destination was Clark Field of Ft. Stotsenburg, despite earlier, somewhat puzzling USAFFE plans for temporary shelter of newly arrived Air Corps units. As of 11 October, USAFFE had advised the Philippine Department that "units listed for station at Fort William McKinley"—the 803rd was one of three units with that designation—" [were to be] sheltered there temporarily, pending completion of permanent housing at Nichols Field," as the USAFFE Air Force had recommended on 9 October. It was not until 20 October, while the 803rd was still en route, that the USAFFE Air Force changed the battalion's basing assignment to Clark Field.<sup>26</sup>

Despite the temporary loss of some personal baggage, the engineer troops disembarked from the ship and boarded the Pampanga Open Air Bus Line vehicles and two-and-half-ton trucks ("deuce and a half") and headed for Clark Field. The locals tried to sell them food, including the local delicacy of fertilized duck eggs (*balut*), which were eaten from the shell, and beer, at every stop between Manila and Angeles City. Luggage followed via bus. They arrived about midnight, and "everyone was worn out," according to Leggett.<sup>27</sup>





Source: NARA RG18, 18-AA-84-337938.

### Manila's Pier 7, May 1939 (S-N)

#### Notes

1. Montgomery, "Brief History," 3; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 2; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 33.

2. Wilson, *POW* 83, 69–70; Moyer, interview, 7 February 1999; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 33.

3. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 2; Elizabeth Leggett to author, letter, 15 February 2000; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 33.

4. Moyer, interview, 7 February 1999. Moyer noted the location was in a desert area and surmised that it was Las Vegas. Neither books nor other interviews mentioned a stop in Las Vegas.

5. Vater, interview, 15 October 1998; 12–13 October 2003; T. Walter Middleton, interview, 1 March 2010.

6. Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 34; Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; John Soennichsen, *Miwoks to Missiles: A History of Angel Island* (Tiburon, CA: Angle Island Association, 2001), 135, 158.

7. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 2; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 19–20; Soennichsen, *Miwoks to Missiles*, 154; Joseph A. Vater, Sr., *Not Your Average Joe* (Self-published, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 2011), 10; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Zubay, "We Ate Rice, Bugs and All," in Wissolik et al., eds., *They Say There Was a War*, 508; Zubay, synopsis for Veterans' Administration claim, 1999; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 34. The letters of 2nd Lt Leggett noted the discomfort during the voyage to Manila because of the absence of tropical uniforms.

8. Religious persecution typically ran the other way during this period, from nativist persecution of immigrants, to Klan murders of Catholic priests, to bigoted opposition to Al Smith's presidential campaign in 1928.

9. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 2; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 19–20; Soennichsen, *Miwoks to Missiles*, 154; Leggett, UKY interview, 24 March 1981; Zubay, "We Ate Rice, Bugs and All," 508; Minder diary, 3.

10. Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 21–23; Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; superintendent, Army Transport Service, Ft. Mason, California, 9 October 1941, no subject [manifest, USAT *Tasker H. Bliss*], NARA RG 407. The manifest appeared to



be a draft for a radiogram notifying the Manila port superintendent of the departure of the *Bliss* with *inter alia* the 803rd EB on board. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 3; Williford, *Racing the Sun*, 50–51. As a brigadier general, Tasker H. Bliss was the second military governor of “Moroland Province” (Mindanao) during 1906–08 and then briefly served as commander of the Philippine Division. He became Army chief of staff in May 1917. See James R. Arnold, *The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913* (New York, Bloomsburg Press, 2011). In December 1941, the USAT *Willard A. Holbrook* was also part of the “Pensacola Convoy” that was part of the ill-fated attempts to reinforce the Philippine garrison.

11. Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Leggett Letters, 5, 15, 20, and 22 October 1941.

12. Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 35–36; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 3; Wallace, *POW 83*, 70–71; Zubay, 1999 synopsis—correspondence with author, 1998–2011; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 22–23; Minder diary, 3; Vater, interview, 22 August 2006.

13. Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 37; Zubay, 1999 synopsis; Leggett Letters, 8, 9, and 20 October 1941; Leggett, UKY interview; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 3; Wilson, *POW 83*, 71–72.

14. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 11 February 1941, Subj: Promotion of Maj Fries.

15. Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 36; Leggett Letters, 15 and 20 October 1941; Zubay, 1999 synopsis; Schatz and Kemp, “My Three and a Half Years in Hell,” 2.

16. Leggett Letters, 20 October 1941; Zubay, “We Ate Rice, Bugs and All,” 508; Zubay, 1999 synopsis.

17. Leggett Letters, 22 October 1941; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Wilson, *POW 83*, 72.

18. Fries Letters, 15 November 1941; Leggett Letters, 5, 6, and 16 October 1941; Gagne, interviews, 6 February and 6 March 1999; Tallmadge Walter Middleton, interview, WWII Mountain Memories: Home Front to the Front Line, 27 March 2003. D.H. Ramsey Library Special Collections, University of North Carolina at Asheville and the Center for Diversity Education (DVD) (cited with permission).

19. Leggett Letters, 22 and 26 October 1941.

20. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 3, 5; Leggett Letters, 7, 8, 17, and 22 October 1941.

21. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 3–4.

22. Leggett Letters, 15 and 22 October 1941.

23. Leggett Letters, 8, 12, 15, 16, and 20 October 1941; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Wilson, *POW 83*, 71; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 26–27.

24. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 4; Leggett Letters, 6, 7, and 12 October 1941.

25. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 5; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 36.

26. CG, USAFFE, to CG, Philippine Department, memo, 11 October 1941, Subject: Temporary Shelter of Air Corps Units, NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 35; Maj Harry B. Quinn, AGO, Philippine Department, to CG, Air Force, USAFFE (FEAF), memo, 1 October 1941, Subject: Assignment of Stations, and Capt J. R. Mamerow, adjutant, headquarters, Air Force, USAFFE, to CG, USAFFE, 1st Ind., 9 October, no subject, NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 35; Philippine Department Air Force AGO to CG, USAFFE, memo, 20 October 1941, no subject [changes in basing assignments for arriving units], MMA, RG2, Box 1, File 3.

27. Leggett Letters, 22 and 26 October 1941; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Poster, interview, 25 October 1998.

## Chapter 7

# Organization and Tasking

## US Army Engineers in the Philippines

Military engineer resources in the Philippines were limited during the prewar period and as noted previously, they were expanded only minimally with the decision to reinforce the islands. The 809th Engineer AVN Company SEP arrived in July 1941 to expand Nichols Field (the subject of a separate chapter). When the 803rd arrived in Manila, it became the second aviation engineer unit in the Philippine Department, a US Army element commanded by a general officer. The first, of course, was the 809 EC. The third unit was the 14th EB PS, which was part of the Philippine Division. However, as a combat engineer battalion, the 14th customarily worked on surveys, trail development, and road and bridge construction, primarily on Bataan. The Philippine Department included the ODE, which had only a small, specialized staff. Commanded by Col Harry A. Stickney, the ODE was responsible for the technical supervision of all US Army engineers working in the Philippines. Before the reinforcement of the Philippines began, US Army engineer elements had focused on infrastructure, waterworks, and coastal defenses in the continental United States and, to some extent, in the Philippines, in addition to combat engineering. Until the arrival of the 809th Engineer AVN Company SEP, the COE did not have troops assigned to the Philippine Department for its two field organizations: Bataan Field Area and Corregidor and outlying fortified islands. As a result, Marsman Construction Company and Filipino contractors performed most US Army-related construction in the islands under the supervision of the ODE. The US Navy used contractors from Pacific Naval Air Bases (CPNAB), a consortium of five US construction companies, as its construction force in the Pacific, including the Philippines, before and in the early days of the war. Until August 1941, the Quartermaster Corps was responsible for building camps and other military facilities.<sup>1</sup>

On 9 October, with the reinforcement of the Philippines underway, Lt Col Hugh J. "Pat" Casey arrived as chief engineer in command of the USAFFE engineer section. He was fresh from an assignment on the Pentagon construction project. Under the new command struc-

ture, Casey was responsible for the technical supervision of all US Army and PA engineer operations in the Philippines. With a staff of two officers and one civilian, Casey's team was to develop policies and procedures for those operations. It was also operationally responsible for the ODE with its 41 officers and a sizable force of enlisted and civilian personnel. Although a lower-ranking officer, Lt Colonel Casey, said he and Colonel Stickney had an "excellent mutual understanding and relationship." The ODE continued with its activities as a service engineer organization. Lt Col Wendell Fertig headed the construction division and reported to Stickney. That division supervised the construction of airfields, roads, coastal defenses, and air warning stations. Since the 14th Engineers could not handle all the ODE construction projects, Stickney relied on Filipino contractors. The 803rd was assigned to the Philippines to help remedy the situation. It was attached to the USAFFE Air Force, which was redesignated the Far East Air Force (FEAF) on 16 November 1941. Organizationally the 803rd was subordinated to FEAF but under the direct supervision of Fertig. Nevertheless, Lt Colonel Casey made himself the de facto officer in charge.<sup>2</sup>

The USAFFE engineer section was established on 26 July 1941, as part of the formation of USAFFE, and activated with Casey's arrival. General MacArthur requested Casey's assignment to USAFFE. Upon Casey's arrival in Manila in October 1941, MacArthur stressed the urgent need for airdrome construction for the air reinforcements planned for the Philippines. Added to the existing inventory of aircraft, projected aircraft shipments through 1942 would provide for 165 heavy bombers, 52 dive bombers, and 240 pursuit planes, more than double the number of aircraft in the Philippines as of mid-October 1941. Later MacArthur wrote of his vision for a string of air bases from lower Mindanao to upper Luzon. Still, Casey said that in their first meeting that MacArthur provided him with "no specific directions." Since B-17 heavy bombers required runways of about 6,000 feet, Casey wanted them to be at least that long to be able to accommodate both bombardment and pursuit aircraft. Col Harold George, the USAFFE Air Force executive officer and later FEAF's chief of logistics, was specific in providing air force requirements to Casey. He wrote on 17 October 1941, that his emphasis on facilities, which had evolved over time, was to allow for the dispersal of aircraft and that his priorities were the construction of housing and messing for one air group each at Del Carmen, the first priority on the list,

followed by Lipa, O'Donnell, and Rosales Fields. Each group was to consist of a headquarters squadron and four combat squadrons.<sup>3</sup>

### The 803rd at Clark Field

Against this backdrop, the 803rd Engineers arrived at Clark Field, Fort Stotsenburg, before dawn on 24 October 1941. They were quickly assigned temporary sleeping space in tent cities. One location was next to Clark Field for officers and one for enlisted men at Ft. Stotsenburg. Tents and emergency cots were World War I-vintage items, as was the case with most of the military stores in the Philippines at the time. Enlisted personnel had to deal with missing and broken parts to assemble cots before sleeping on the first night at Clark Field. Junior officers were quartered two per tent.<sup>4</sup>




Source: Paul W. Ropp, April 2002

#### Ft. Stotsenburg gate posts, 1902

On the first morning, a routine became established. Following reveille, which came quickly after the men had settled in, the engineers were subjected to orientation briefings on the fort and the area. Then, the battalion organized a new camp complete with kitchens. From 24 to 25 October, its convoys trucked back and forth between Clark Field and Manila to bring in heavy construction equipment, officers' baggage, and, more importantly, the battalion payroll records. The 809th EC also supplied heavy tractors along with trailers to haul them. Supplies for the battalion continued to come in through the Quartermaster Corps. Sidearms arrived on 30 October and a partial

shipment of helmets came on 31 October. Lieutenant Leggett quipped that the remainder of the helmets would be issued “shortly.”<sup>5</sup>



Source: NARA RG 111, Box 26, SCA125587 and 125588

### 1.5-ton and 2.5-ton cargo trucks - personnel and materiel, 1941

Shipments of construction equipment and trucks trickled in through mid-December. Lt Elgin Radcliff, the battalion supply officer, and his four-person staff were responsible for the management and accountability of all the equipment received. The SS *Perida*, which left San Francisco on 25 September and arrived in Manila

ahead of the battalion on 19 October, brought 15 one-and-a-half-ton dump trucks, and seven six-ton, 6x6, Corbitt prime mover trucks with winches. A month later (18 November 1941), the *American Packer*, a freighter operated by American Pioneer Line, arrived with small and medium dump trucks and construction machinery, including a roller, graders, a trencher, carryall, crawler tractors, a crane, and parts. The USAT *President Coolidge* brought four additional heavy trailers on 20 November. The remainder of the equipment arrived in mid-December.<sup>6</sup>

**Table 7.1. Equipment deliveries**

Ship	Quantity	Item	Description
<i>SS Perida</i>			
	15	1 ½ Ton Dump Trucks	Chevrolet w/canvas top
	7	6-Ton Prime Movers	Corbitt 6x6 w/winches
<i>American Packer</i>			
	18	Trucks	Chevrolet; various
	1	Motorcycle	No detail
	1	10-Ton Roller	Tandem
	1	Trencher (ditch digger)	No detail
	5	Trucks	Diamond "T" cargo body
	2	Trucks	Diamond "T," 4-ton with cargo body
	3	Carryall	12-Yard (1) and 3 ½ Yard (1)
	1	2 ½ Ton Truck	General Motors Company (GMC) w/ cargo body
	2	Motor Grader	No detail
	3	Tractor	Caterpillar D-8; one w/ blade
	1	Tractor	Caterpillar D-4
	1	Asphalt Distributor	No detail
	1	1 ½ Ton Truck	Chevrolet w/cargo body
	4	1 ½ Ton Truck	Chevrolet w/dump body
	1	1 ½ Ton Truck	Dump body
	2	Trucks	GMC
	2	Tractors	Medium
	1	Trailer	Hanson w/skids (heavy-duty, dump)

Ship	Quantity	Item	Description
	1	Crane	Two-wheel towed; knock-down frame with four wheels, tires, cables, and weight hooks
	1	Shovel	Gasoline w/parts
	2	Harrow	Leaning disc
	1	Well drill	Gasoline-powered
	1	Grader	Leaning wheel
	2	Trucks	GMC; no detail
<i>President Coolidge</i>			
	2	Trailers	No details
	2	Trailers	Rogers (probably low boys)

*Source:* Superintendent, Army Transport Service (ATS), to ACoS, G-4 [USAFFE], memo, 16 October 1941, Subject: Important Items on the *S/S Perida*; superintendent, ATS, to ACoS, G-4 [USAFFE], memo, 5 November 1941, Subject: Important Items Arriving on *American Packer*, and superintendent, ATS, to ACoS, G-4 [USAFFE], memo, 12 November 1941, Subject: Important Items Arriving on *President Coolidge*, all in NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 4747.

Quarters for the arriving engineers reflected the delay that characterized much of the build-up in the Philippines. At first, both officers and enlisted had to occupy quarters in a tent city. Permanent quarters for the added forces were still under construction. Officer tents, located along the main road from Clark Field to Ft. Stotsenburg, were equipped with electric lights. The 192nd Tank Battalion, one of several National Guard units mobilized and sent to the Philippines, was across the road. Engineer officers grumbled because low ranking USAAF officers were already living in upscale quarters, while senior personnel like Major Fries were in tents with bathing facilities a mile away. Rumors about permanent quarters abounded. However, officers did not move to new bachelor officers' quarters made of woven bamboo (*sawali*) near the battalion headquarters until 17 November. Fries termed them "shacks." Junior officers were upset—one called it a "bum deal"—because their quarters were far from the runways where B-17s and dummy aircraft were located. The site was also farther away from the officers' club than the tent city. The *sawali* barracks required netting over the bunks to protect against mosquitoes, snakes, and tarantulas. Senior officers such as Major Fries moved into permanent housing which was located on "Officers' Row" near the runways on 21 November. This housing is not to be confused with the permanent quarters on Officers' Row along the Ft. Stotsenburg parade



grounds. The units were made of tied bamboo canes with thatched roofs of nipa palm, commonly referred to as nipa houses. They were equipped with bath facilities and permanent screening. Fries shared the house with Captain Bidgood and Capt Peter W. Reynolds, commander of the Headquarters Company. Major Fries commented on the unfairness of his receiving a quarters allowance while living in a house when the junior officers had lesser quarters but did not receive subsidies.<sup>7</sup>

On 27 October, Major Fries received approval to move the troops from the tent city into barracks. However, the Quartermaster Corps voided the move. It meant extra work, but Fries thought that “the men got a big laugh out of it.” On 21 November, the Headquarters Company finally occupied permanent U-shaped wood barracks, the construction of which had begun in early October. Unlike the junior officers’ quarters, the barracks were screened entirely. In a turnabout, the Headquarters Company’s new barracks stirred resentment among other troops, apparently unaware that the COE had paid the construction. For alternate arrangements, some enlisted engineer personnel arranged for off-base housing with local Filipinas. Yet, as of 1 December, construction of shops and additional barracks for the 803rd at Clark was still behind schedule. The ODE stated that work would have to be expedited to meet the scheduled completion date of 15 December 1941.<sup>8</sup>

While the entire battalion was still billeted at Clark, the post-breakfast routine involved the three companies lining up for daily assignments, usually in individual squads or one-person details. Nevertheless, for this brief period, many enlisted men of the lettered companies did not have regular work assignments while they prepared to move to formal assignments. The battalion staff did not have to stand for formation. However, other officers still grumbled because they had to endure the morning formation.<sup>9</sup>

## Personnel Changes

With limited organizational efforts during the voyage from San Francisco, Major Fries’s first task was to formally organize the individual companies and manage the integration of the Selective Service personnel from Ft. Belvoir with the skeletal structure formed at




Westover. The realignment of officers began on 1 November, and it produced the following assignments and responsibilities:

- Battalion staff—Major Fries continued with RA officers Capt Bidgood as executive officer and 1st Lt James D. Richardson as adjutant. The remaining officers were 2nd Lt Elgin G. Radcliff, supply officer; 1st Lt William B. Thomas, battalion engineer officer replacing Lt Henry Boyer, who had remained at Westover Field; and 2nd Lt James Leggett, assistant adjutant for personnel. On the deployment of Companies A and B to O'Donnell Field and Del Carmen Field, respectively, Thomas was assigned to Company B. An Alabamian, Thomas was respected for his leadership; however, he struggled to make his southern drawl intelligible to the Filipino laborers. Within the battalion staff, Richardson and Leggett used the time to search for a new staff sergeant to improve workflow on personnel issues. Leggett was confronted not only with personnel issues affecting the battalion but also with continuing requests from the Philippine Department for rosters. Radcliff headed the four-person supply section.
- Headquarters Company—First Lt Peter W. “Pistol Pete” Reynolds was promoted to captain on 8 November and assigned as commander. First Lt John E. Mowick was reassigned from Company A to Headquarters Company, as was 1st Sgt Theodore House, who moved from Company B. First Lt James “Oppie” Oppenheim lost his position as commander of Company B to become a platoon leader along with 1st Lt Everett Carney (motor pool) and 2nd Lt Samuel A. Goldblith (mess officer). Fries wrote that he had replaced Oppenheim because the young lieutenant needed more experience and perhaps healthier work habits.
- Company A—First Lt Edmund P. Zbikowski remained as company commander. For platoon leaders, 2nd Lt David D. Bartlett moved from Headquarters Company to Company A to augment the original complement of 2nd Lt Robert D. Montgomery and 2nd Lt. Walter H Farrell.
- Company B—The older and more senior Capt Herbert V. Ingersoll was relieved as commander of Headquarters Company and reassigned to Company B, replacing Oppenheim. Clifton O. Snodgrass moved from Company A with Ingersoll as the first

sergeant. First Lt John Winschuh and 2nd Lt Robert J. Russell were platoon leaders.

- Medical Staff—The medical staff included Capt Sidney Vernon, battalion surgeon; 1st Lt Herbert W. Coone, assigned to Company A; and 1st Lt Alex Mohnac, battalion dentist. Ten enlisted men assigned to the medical staff worked in the three companies: Headquarters Company (2), Company A (4), and Company B (4). Capt Vernon had orders to coordinate medical activities with the 192nd Tank Battalion. Ft. Stotsenburg had a full-service hospital. This might have accounted for the fewer number of Medical Corps enlisted men at Headquarters Company. The Headquarters Company medics were Pfc Joseph Yuranka and Pvt Teddy Zieja.<sup>10</sup>



**Figure 7.1. 803rd Engineer Battalion: organization, 8 December 1941.** (Adapted from Montgomery, “Brief History,” 1; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Initial Roster, 8 July 1941; Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Special Orders No. 4, No. 8, and 217, 17 July and 26 July and 19 September 1941, respectively; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 31-32.)

Enlisted men, primarily those from the Ft. Belvoir contingent, were affected by these organizational decisions. The moves broke up some friendships made in basic training and they were spread among the companies. Privates George Wonneman, Joseph Poster, Albert Senna,

and Harry Menozzi, for example, were in Training Company A at Ft. Belvoir and then assigned to Company B in the Philippines. Pvt Frank Donai moved from Training Company B to the 803rd's Company A before being placed in the Headquarters Company, where he became the bugler and driver for Capt Reynolds. Pvt Marco Caputo was subject to the same readjustments before being sent on detached service to Mindanao on 1 December. Cpl John Moyer of the Westover contingent was reassigned from Company A to Headquarters Company. Personnel adjustments continued for some time. Pvt Frank Dice was reassigned from Headquarters Company to Company A because of the need for diesel mechanics at O'Donnell Field. John Knutson, a civilian in the Philippines before the war, was assigned to the Headquarters Company as a mechanic, then reassigned to Company B, and later returned to Headquarters Company.<sup>11</sup>

With the organization of the 803rd's primary elements completed, Major Fries faced the issue of incorporating the 809th Engineer AVN Company SEP, working on Nichols Field, Manila, into the 803rd. Fries was notified of the addition of the 809th on or about 21 November, and the 809th was "absorbed" into the 803rd as Company C, the battalion's third lettered company, almost immediately. The merger of the 809th into the 803rd brought minor personnel edits. As part of the incorporation, TSgt Albert Burkert was detailed from Company C to Headquarters Company, 803rd.<sup>12</sup>

After the personnel modifications, Major Fries wrote that the change of officers was "decidedly advantageous" and that "everything [was] running more smoothly now." His comment on 11 November indicated that at that time, he had a fair degree of operational leeway. "I have the battalion set up the way I want for this construction work. If some higher up doesn't come along and change it, everything will be fine."<sup>13</sup>

Major Fries was a leader and manager capable of selecting or changing officers based on competence. Once tasks were assigned he also gave them a high degree of independence. On a personal level, Lieutenant Leggett commented, "He was a great one. He didn't ask you how you were going to do it; he didn't ask any questions when you got home how you did it, just as long as you went out and did what he told you to do and came home. What you did in between, that was your business. He'd look at you and grin, but he knew you had been into something that you didn't [have the approval to do]." However, John Moyer recalled that Capt Bidgood "ran the show," as

usually expected of an executive officer, and that Fries was rarely seen. The “tough, well-seasoned” Bidgood was “very military, quiet, and stern.” In line with the expectations of the battalion commander, he expected his orders to be followed.<sup>14</sup>

Oversight visits to the outlying fields showed that Maj Fries applied the same approach to the battalion’s outlying construction activities. Fries and Leggett visited one of the battalion’s construction projects, probably Del Carmen, on 4 November for inspection. 1st Lieutenant Richardson visited both O’Donnell and Del Carmen at least twice before the war. On an 11 November trip, Leggett accompanied him. Leggett and Lieutenant Coone traveled to Del Carmen on 21 to 22 November at the invitation of Lieutenant Thomas. Still, the trip was more personal and recreational—an opportunity to use facilities that Spreckles and Smith Sugar Company opened to Company B—than official. Leggett went to Nichols Field once, on 26 November, just before integration of the 809th EC into the 803rd, but he did not mention the reason for the visit.<sup>15</sup>

Changes in assignments and responsibilities were not limited to the more junior officers and the enlisted personnel of the 803rd. Major Fries gained additional, unanticipated, and temporary responsibilities shortly after the arrival of the 803rd at Clark Field. He briefly replaced Lt Col Wendell Fertig as chief engineer for the newly formed NLF. He held that position until the permanent assignment of Col Harry Skerry on 5 December. The additional responsibilities were probably originally designed to be temporary, like the role of Brig Gen Edward P. “Ned” King as NLF commander during 3 to 28 November 1941. Fries’ appointment was logical. Fertig’s responsibilities expanded as his construction section became a division, and he had to deal with the increased scope of construction work. At the end of November 1941, Fertig’s construction division was ordered to take charge of the construction of all airfields west of the Howland Reef—halfway between Hawaii and Australia. The fields in this area, originally under the Hawaii Department, were part of the effort to secure bases of operation and support that were less vulnerable to Japanese attack than the locations in the Philippines. Some construction had already begun in Rabaul and Lae, Papua New Guinea, and at Port Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia. During mid- to late November, Col Harold George, the newly named FEAF chief of logistics, and Capt Harold “Lefty” Eads, the FEAF engineer officer, surveyed airfields and potential sites in the area. In early December, the ODE was

given responsibility for the development and construction of these airfields. According to Fertig, Major Fries was relieved, temporarily, at least, as commander of the 803rd and designated as Fertig's assistant in charge of airfield construction on these outlying islands. Preliminary discussions on the expanded construction project had just begun when the war started.<sup>16</sup>

## Formal Tasking

Lieutenant Leggett commented soon after arrival that “from all indications the 803rd will have plenty of work to do for the next few months. . . in the construction of airports.” A few days later “grapevine rumor,” always present during uncertain times, “has it that we are due for another move soon. . . . Naturally, there is nothing official on the matter. We never hear anything definite until we are ready to move.” However, as November approached and the rainy season ended, the 803rd's assignments became official. The battalion assumed responsibility for airfield projects previously handled directly by Fertig's construction division. In a change from the original concept for aviation engineers—and following the example of the 809th—individual companies were each assigned to develop (Companies A and B) or improve (Headquarters Company) one airfield rather than being designated a specific phase of an airfield construction project. The change was probably in response to changing priorities, an inadequate workforce, and lack of equipment.<sup>17</sup>

On 26 October, Company A was designated to repair Clark Field. However, the assignment was changed almost immediately, and the development of O'Donnell Field became its responsibility. Located 11 miles north of Clark Field near the village of Capas, Tarlac Province, O'Donnell Field was to be a bomber base—or “airdrome” in the parlance of the time—that included airstrips, barracks, warehouses, and associated facilities. As early as 29 September 1941, Col Harold George, then executive officer, USAFFE Air Force, had listed O'Donnell, Clark, and Del Carmen Fields as number one, two, and four, respectively, on his priority list. Later modified slightly, for “construction and planning,” Malabang, Lipa, Rosales, and Zamboanga Fields were his number three, five, six, and seven priorities, respectively. Captain Bidgood and 2nd Lieutenant Montgomery departed immediately for Camp O'Donnell to reconnoiter the area. Company

A followed on 1 November. Lieutenant Mohnac accompanied 1st Lieutenant Coone, Company A's surgeon, to set up a dispensary and dental clinic at O'Donnell.<sup>18</sup>

Company B was given responsibility for the construction of an air-drome at Del Carmen, about 14 miles south of Clark Field, near the village of Floridablanca, Pampanga Province. It also left Clark Field on 1 November. Plans for Del Carmen Field, also designated initially as a bomber base, called for three runways, a dispersal area, campsite, and barracks units.<sup>19</sup>

Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company remained at Clark Field. The company assumed responsibility for the extension and maintenance of airstrips, as well as training of enlisted men. Given the battalion-wide responsibilities (e.g., supply) of Headquarters Company, it had fewer personnel and less equipment to devote to construction activities.<sup>20</sup>

The 809th Engineer AVN Company continued its work on Nichols Field after it became Company C on 1 December.<sup>21</sup>

Rumors about additional tasking continued. In the two to three weeks before the war started, "higher headquarters" mentioned the need for airfields throughout the Philippines' southern islands for B-17s and smaller aircraft. The gossip was that the battalion would be further split up. At least one officer from each company, including Bidgood and Leggett, was to deploy to different locations to construct airfields with materials on hand and native labor. The rumored arrangement would have left each company with one to three officers along with the battalion staff of a commanding officer, executive officer, adjutant, and assistant adjutant. The planning, if any, ceased when the war started.<sup>22</sup>

### **Differing Views on Progress**

Neither Col Francis Brady, FEAF chief of staff, nor FEAF Commander Maj Gen Lewis Brereton, who arrived in the Philippines on 4 November, was satisfied with the progress of airfield construction. Upon arrival in the Philippines, Brady had requested additional funds and more engineer troops for airfield development to change a "discouraging" situation. He wanted the additional engineer troops to work on what he saw as overall lagging airfield construction in the Philippines. During a 16 November visit to Del Carmen—about two

weekdays after Company B's arrival and possibly six days after actual construction began—Major General Brereton wrote Brig Gen Carl Spaatz, USAAF chief of staff, that the established landing strip was only 300 feet wide and 3,600 feet long with the remaining 2,000 feet still a cane field. On 4 December, Lt Col Lloyd Mielenz, the ODE executive officer, wrote, “the Del Carmen Field [was] one of highest priority. Every effort should be made to provide usable runways as quickly as practicable.” He advocated the hiring of additional labor to advance the project. After a tour of air installations in the Philippines in early November, Brereton commented that the “idea of imminent war seemed removed from the minds of most. Work hours, training schedules, and operating procedures were still based on the good old days of peace conditions in the tropics.” Some of the troops believed, early on at least, that the chances of war with Japan were minimal.<sup>23</sup>

As of December 1941, work was underway on 40 airstrips on Luzon, the Visayas Group, and Mindanao. Mindanao was particularly critical because Brereton wanted to use the island for dispersal sites for FEAF's aircraft, mainly B-17s from Clark Field, and to accommodate the anticipated arrival of air reinforcements. Construction on three Mindanao bases—Del Monte, Malabang, and Zamboanga—had begun in about September, and despite the rain, progress had been made by 15 November. Other than Clark, Del Monte Field became the only airfield capable of handling B-17s. As a critical site, it had an existing commercial runway to accommodate the pineapple plantation Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Corporation). Its long golf course fairway allowed the extension of the runway. In late October, Colonel George pressed to have it upgraded from an emergency landing field to an active base with expanded housing. Construction was to start on 1 January 1942. Still, before the outbreak of the war, Del Monte Field had machine-gun pits located at each corner of the airstrip built by the 440th Ordnance Aviation Bombardment Squadron, which had moved there in early November. Also available were four reinforced shelters, a large tunnel, and barracks, located about two miles away. Still, Brereton assessed the airfield only as “adequate” and the overall progress on Del Monte “disappointing” because of the lack of facilities. On 28 November, USAFFE ordered the 803rd to send 18 enlisted men, along with 14 officers and 257 other enlisted personnel from other units on detached service to the 5th Air Base Group, Del Monte Field. The engineers' mission was





**Figure 7.2. Philippine airfields: existing and planned, September 1941.**  
(Adapted from NARA RG407, Box 109, File 3251.)



the construction of a water purification plant. The detachment from the 803rd included:

- Company A—Cpl Raymond C. Barber and Pvt John O. Choate;
- Headquarters Company—Corporals Michael J. Perfett and Rudolph G. Pfeifer; Pfc. John Matulewitz; and Privates Herman L. Ballard, Frank M. D’Agostino, Marco A. Caputo, and Michael Traino.

They departed Clark Field on 1 December.<sup>24</sup>

In a personal letter, he wrote that, as of 28 November, “our construction work is coming right along . . . Planes can land on either [O’Donnell or Del Carmen Fields]. He noted that “an airplane [had] landed on one of “our airfields.” The facility was probably Del Carmen, where the 34th Pursuit Squadron arrived on Thanksgiving. However, O’Donnell Field had also recorded a landing on 20 November of a Philippine Scout plane. In an undated letter, he commented that “we will start building barracks next week [,] as well as runways” (airfield unspecified but probably Del Carmen Field) and that “the work is progressing nicely.”<sup>25</sup>

Competing demands for time might have also affected Major Fries’ delegation of construction and construction oversight. His organization of the 803rd on-site, assumption of responsibility for major construction projects, and struggles with the FEAF, presumably in his role as temporary NLF engineer, consumed considerable effort. FEAF pressured the 803rd to build an underground headquarters at Clark Field. Richardson termed FEAF insistence on a bunkered headquarters an “obsession” and a significant job beyond the capabilities of the 803rd. In an experiment on the hardening of facilities, Captain Bidgood, whom Richardson described as a “great innovator,” filled 55-gallon drums with concrete, piled them on top of each other near the runway area, and covered them with dirt, a concept that Headquarters Company then attempted to implement. However, the men did not want to use the shelter. After the Japanese attack—and destruction of over half its combat aircraft—FEAF wanted a place for pilots to rest securely after missions. Possibly related to that requirement, on 20 December 1941, Casey requested that the ODE build a bomb-proof shelter in the hills adjacent to Clark Field with Headquarters Company providing technical supervision and with the FEAF providing civilian personnel for labor. On 21 November, Fries wrote that the FEAF wanted to put the barracks at one of the fields [unidentified] near the landing areas “so they won’t be inconve-

nienced [,] and [that] it absolutely violate[ed] every tactical and engineering principal known.” Fries went to Manila on 24 November to argue and won his point. He wrote: “They took my recommendation on the housing area.” However, he lost a battle with the FEAF on the dispersal of aircraft at Clark Field. Leggett said Fries “argued until he was blue in the face” to build a satellite dispersal site for each bomber and pursuit plane. The FEAF thought dispersal sites would not be convenient.<sup>26</sup>

In a last act before the war, Major Fries loaned Col Harry A. Skerry, the newly appointed NLF engineer, three enlisted men, a command car, and minimum supplies on 7 December 1941, to start the organization of his command post (CP).<sup>27</sup>

#### Notes

1. Casey to ACoS, G1, USAFFE, memo, 4 January 1942, no subject [attachment of 803rd Engineer Battalion], Casey Files, Folder 15. See Casey to ODE, memo, 20 December 1941, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 2, in which Casey said he was acting “under authority delegated by commanding general, Far East Air Force, in assuring proper allocation of equipment resources to build emergency air fields.” Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 2, 4, 7; Casey, *Airdrome Construction in the Philippines*.

2. US Army Corps of Engineers, *Engineer Memoirs: Major General High J. Casey* [interview by Dr. John T. Greenwood, Engineer History Office] (Washington, DC: Corps of Engineers, 1993), 147-48, 152 [hereafter cited as “Casey, *Memoirs*”]; Morton, *The US Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1953), 9 (hereafter cited as *The Fall of the Philippines*); Lt Col George Meidling, ed., *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol II., Organizations, Troops, and Training* (Tokyo, Japan: General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, 1951), 2-4 (hereafter cited as *Organizations, Troops, and Training*).

3. Casey, *Memoirs*, 143; Spaatz to CoS, memo, 27 November 1941, Subject: Reserves of Aviation, Fuel, Bombs, and Ammunition in the Philippine Islands, NARA RG165, Box 11; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 164, citing George to Casey, memo, 17 October 1941; General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 109-110; Casey, *Airdrome Construction in the Philippines*, 2. As is generally the case with memoirs, MacArthur’s *Reminiscences* must be read with care.

4. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 2, 5; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 36-37.

5. Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 29-30; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Wallace, POW83, 77; Leggett Letters, 26, 30, and 31 October, 1941; Pflueger, e-mails to author, 8, 9, and 29 March 2001.

6. Williford, *Racing the Sun*, 52-53, 58, 79-80; Radcliff, “Salute to Veterans”; superintendent, Army Transport Service (ATS), to ACoS, G-4 [USAFFE], memo, 16 October 1941, Subject: Important Items on the S/S *Perida*; superintendent, ATS, to ACoS, G-4 [USAFFE], memo, 5 November 1941, Subject: Important Items Arriving on *American Packer*; and superintendent, ATS, to ACoS, G-4 [USAFFE], memo, 12 November 1941, Subject: Important Items Arriving on *President Coolidge*, all in NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 47. The now defunct Corbitt Company, located in Henderson, North

Carolina, began production of heavy vehicles for the US Army in 1941. See “Military Information HQ,” at OLIVE-DRAB, <https://www.olive-drab.com> and Hanson Trailers, <http://www.hansontrailers.com/>

7. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 6; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 36–37; Leggett Letters, 26 October, 12 and 17 November 1941; Samuel A. Goldblith to John Bartsch, letter, 9 December 1982, MMA, Folder 2; Fries Letters, 21 and 28 November 1941; Dr. Alex Mohnac, interview with author, 11 July 1999; ODE, Construction Progress Report[s] for Semi Monthly Period[s] ending 15 and 30 November and 15 December 1941, NARA RG338 [USAFFE], Box 4383, documented the barracks project for 200 men of the 809th Engineers. See Gene Boyt, *Bataan: A Survivor’s Story* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 38. As an engineer second lieutenant who apparently arrived at Clark Field in September, 1941, Boyt took over the bungalow adjacent to the runway on Officers Row that Lt Col Fertig had occupied. It had four-bedrooms, a bathroom, kitchen, and screened porch.

8. Leggett Letters, 17 November 1941; Fries Letters, 17 October and 21 November 1941; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 39; Moyer, interview, 20–21 October 2002; H[arry] H. S[Stickney] to [Headquarters, Air Force, USAFFE] G-4, memo, 14 October 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineer Construction, Casey Files, Folder 6; ODE to Engineer USAFFE, memo, 3 December 1941, Subject: Letter from Eng[inee] r H[e]adquarters], P[hilippine] D[e]partment ] construction progress reports], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 36. Companies A and B had already deployed to Camp O’Donnell and Del Carmen, respectively, by early November. The enlisted barracks were initially designated for the 809th EB and continued to be documented with that designation.

9. Wilson, *POW* 83, 77; Minder dairy; Leggett Letters, 30 October 1941

10. Bartsch-Richardson interview, 4 September 1982, MMA, RG127, Box 11, Folder 3; Fries Letters, 30 November 1941; Leggett Letters, 28 October and 11 November 1941; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 6–7; Headquarters, Westover Field, Special Orders 217, 19 September 1941; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Col Elgin Radcliff, Notes for Presentation, n.d.; [Medical Corps] Roster, 803rd Engineer Battalion Aviation Separate, 26 March 1942, RG407, Box 1663, microfilm box 67; Elizabeth Leggett to author, letter, 11 February 2003; Zubay to author, letter, n.d., [ca. October, 2004]. According to the Leggett roster, the medical complement remained intact until the surrender. Personnel of the 803rd compiled three rosters during the war: one by Lt James Leggett, as battalion personnel officer and adjutant, with a partial update by Sgt Paul A. Kloecker after the war (hereafter cited as “Leggett Roster”); a second held by Capt Herbert V. Ingersoll, as battalion executive officer and turned over to the War Department by Sgt Edward C. Witmer after Ingersoll’s death on a hell ship (hereafter cited as “Ingersoll Roster”); and the third compiled by Sgt Paul A. Kloecker, as first sergeant of Company B. It included data up to early October 1944, when Kloecker was shipped to Japan on the hell ship *Hokusen Maru* (hereafter cited as “Kloecker Roster,” courtesy of and cited with the approval of Patricia V. Kloecker). Copies of the microfilmed Leggett and Ingersoll Rosters are in NARA RG407.

11. Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; Gagne, interview, 6 February 1999; Middleton, interview, 1 March 2010; John C. Knutson, interview with author, 20 February, 1999; Senna, interview, 6 February 1999; Frank Donai, interview with author, 7 March 1999; Frank Dice, interview with author, 25 November 1999; Fries to Engineer, headquarters, Luzon Force in the Field, memo, 23 March 1942, Subject: Roster of American Civilians, RG407, Box 1662, roll 67; Leggett Roster.

12. Fries Letters, 21 November 1941; Brig Gen Harry L. Twaddle, ACoS, to ACoS, WPD, memo, 21 November 1941, Subject: Troop Basis, Status Report—Defense

Reserves, Philippines, 3-4, AFHRA, 02052930, Reel 28129, 477-80. A new 809th Engineer AVN Battalion SEP was activated at Westover Field on 5 December 1941, moved to Ft. Dix, New Jersey, on 20 May 1942, and departed for the UK on 15 July 1942 for construction work, and then served in Algeria, Sicily, and the Italian mainland before going to Southern France with the Seventh Army assault on 16 August 1944. Charles Hendricks, Humphreys Engineer Center to Daniel Halpin, letter, 24 March 1987.

13. Fries Letters, n.d., and 11 November 1941.

14. Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Moyer, interviews, 7 February 1999 and 20-21 October 2002.

15. Leggett Letters, 5 and 11 November 1941, Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Richardson-Bartsch interview. Probably for security reasons, Leggett did not name of the field or fields visited on 4 and 11 November 1941, but it was probably Del Carmen. His letters cited the heavy dust on the roads, a problem for the area from Clark Field to the south, particularly at Del Carmen.

16. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 13-14, 25. Fertig was the sole source for the comment on Fries' being relieved of command of the 803rd and given the new assignment. War Department AGO to MacArthur, radiogram 350, 17 October 1941, no subject [division of responsibilities for ferry route construction], MMA, RG2, Box 1, File 3; Meidling, ed., *Organizations, Troops, and Training*, 6, 8, outlined the plans for additional airfields in the Southwest Pacific without mention of Maj Fries' role. Similarly, Fries mentioned nothing of these possible assignments in his letters. See Boyt, *Bataan: A Survivor's Story*, 42-43. Boyt was a second lieutenant and a construction project manager at Clark Field in late summer, 1941. Maj Harry O. Fisher, his supervisor, later became the area engineer for northern Luzon. MacArthur established the three major forces—NLF, South Luzon (SLF), and Visaya-Mindanao—in September and formalized the arrangement on 3 November 1941. Brig Gen King was the temporary commander until Maj Gen Jonathan M. Wainwright took command of the NLF on or about December 3. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 67-69. See Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 68-77, for details on the Col George's mission in the Southwest Pacific.

17. Leggett Letters, 26 and 30 October 1941; Fertig, *Guerrillo*, 13-14; Godfrey, "Engineers with the Army Air Forces," 490.

18. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 12; Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; George to ODE, memo, 29 September, Subject: Construction Plans for Proposed and Existing Airfields, Casey Files, Folder 10.

19. Montgomery, "Brief History," 4

20. Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 37.

21. Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 14. Fertig noted incorrectly that Company C of the original 803rd's original complement was sent to Greenland shortly before the 803rd was sent to the Philippines. Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 7, repeated that statement. Montgomery, "Brief History," 1, documented the 17 June 1941, assignments of company commanders for "proposed" Headquarters Company and Company A. Company B was first mentioned in Special Orders Number 217, 19 September 1941, ordering the 803rd to the Philippines.

22. Leggett, UKY interview, Part I.

23. Col Francis B. Brady to Spaatz, letter, 17 November 1941, NARA, RG18, Box 117 (Project Files); Letter, Brady to Spaatz, 13 November 1941, NARA, RG18, Box 112; Marshall to MacArthur, radiogram, 5 November 1941, NARA RG165; Gerow to ACoS-Operations, memo, 12 November 1941, Subject: Engineers, Aviation Facili-

ties, NARA RG165, Box 255; Lt Col Lloyd Mielenz, USAFFE engineer journal Entry, File No. 600.12, Subject: Letter from Engineer-Headquarters, Philippine Department, dated 12-2-41, Ref: Construction Project Reports, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 24; Lewis Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1956), 21 (hereafter cited as “*The Brereton Diaries.*” See Coll, Keith, and Rosenthal, *Troops and Equipment*, 118–119.

24. Casey, *Memoirs*, 149-50; Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 4; Lt Col George Meidling, ed., *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol. VI, Airfield and Base Development* (Tokyo, Japan: General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, 1949), 488-89 (hereafter cited as “*Airfield and Base Development*”); See also Fertig, *Guerillero*, 12–15; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 164; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 65, said progress was “notable.” Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 21; Joseph Alexander [440th Ordnance Aviation Bombardment Squadron], interview with author, 14 February 2013; Special Orders No. 82, Headquarters USAFFE, 28 November 1941, MMA RG2, Box 2, File 1; Moyer, interview, 20–21 October 2002; Cpl Herman Levi Ballard, affidavit, 1945, NARA RG153; Leggett Roster. Fertig commented that “no time remained for the development of this area (i.e., Mindanao).” See Col J.W. Anderson, WPD, to CoS, memo, 18 March 1941, NARA RG 165, Box 89: “Reference Secretary Stimson’s suggestion that work be started on the construction of fields near Davao, it is the opinion of the W[ar] P[lans] D[ivision] that fields off the Island of Luzon (in the absence of sufficient ground forces to protect such fields) would be a liability rather than an asset.”

25. Fries Letters, n.d. [probably early to mid-November]. See Construction Progress Reports, 10 November 30 and 15 December 1941. Airstrip and barracks construction at Del Carmen were scheduled to begin on 10 and 20 November 10, respectively. Airstrip and barracks construction at O’Donnell Field were scheduled to begin on 3 November and 1 December 1941, respectively. Brady to Spaatz, letter, 17 November 1941.

26. Lt Col James D. Richardson, interview with William Bartsch, 4 September 1982; Fries Letters, 23 and 26 November 1941; Casey to ODE, memo, 20 December 1941, Subject: Airfield Construction Program, Casey Files, Folder 1; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I.

27. Col Harry A. Skerry, Report of Organization and Operations of North Luzon Force Engineers during December 8-January – Excerpts from the War Dairy of Col Harry A. Skerry, CE, 1, Humphreys Engineer Center, Ft. Belvoir.

## Chapter 8


# Headquarters Company at Clark Field

## Plans and Funding

In late February 1941, General Marshall asked for “immediate” action on expanding airfields in the Philippines. In response to its requests for the FY 1941 supplemental appropriations, the War Department received \$500,000 for building at Bataan Field and expanding Clark, Nichols, and Kindley Fields. That sum included \$15,000 to cover the “repair and maintenance of [the] flying field, construction of operations and engineer offices, stock rooms, armament, radio shop and operators’ room” at Clark Field. The OCE told the Philippine Department ODE that it “desired immediate steps be taken . . . to initiate . . . [the] expansion of facilities at Clark Field.” The work could be started as soon as funds were available, a date the War Department estimated to be mid-April 1941. Although the initial funds provided primarily for “temporary construction,” which the War Department had not yet defined, to accommodate two pursuit squadrons at Clark, a fourth supplemental budget request yielded \$500,000 for runway construction. At the time, only the 20th Pursuit Squadron was permanently based at Clark Field. The authorization did not include a project-by-project breakdown. Subsequently, Col Harry H. Stickney, the ODE, started 16 major construction projects, including three new airfields: O’Donnell on Luzon and Del Monte and Malabang on Mindanao. In late June, the War Department released over \$966,000 for airfield development in the Philippines, with about 70 percent of the funds allocated for improvements at Clark and Nichols Fields.<sup>1</sup>

The US Army Air Service had first graded the turf airstrip when Clark Field was established in 1919 as an adjunct of Camp Stotsenburg. The runway was completed by 1921. Plans for additional runways to allow for four-way landings were canceled in the mid-1920s for lack of funds. The single runway was regraded in July 1927, as part of a program of improvements that included warm aircraft upstands and concrete floors in the hangars. Maintenance in 1932 included a regrading of the single runway and the addition of a concrete apron in front of the hangars. The Quartermaster Corps construction division in Manila revised the 1919 schematic of Clark Field in 1936 to keep

or include three runways north of the hangars and add a “proposed runway” south of the hangar and service area. The layout provided for the runways to be 5,750 to 6,000 feet long and 500 feet wide. Action was not taken on the plans. After the 28th Bomb Squadron arrived at Clark Field in mid-1939, according to the ACNL, a company of engineers from Ft. McKinley (not further identified) began “work on enlarging the flying field.” The ACNL did not provide any further details other than that “several of the boys from the 28th Bombardment Squadron [were] piling up the hours, since the organization has to furnish so many tractor drivers” and that the work would be completed “in a couple of months.”



**Figure 8.1. Clark Field: planned runway schematic, April 1936.** (Adapted from General Layout, Military Post, Camp Stotsenburg, 1 April 1936, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709)

On arrival at Clark Field in June 1941, an enlisted member of the 28th Bombardment Group called the base still “shockingly crude.” An officer referred to the field as “just a little old cow pasture.” The airfield was suffering from decades of underfunding and neglect, understandable considering US national security requirements, the Great Depression in the United States, and, later, the planned independence



of the Philippine Commonwealth. Clark Field consisted of one unpaved runway running roughly E-W just to the north of the hangar area. Historian Richard Meixsel pointed out that a 1920 photograph of Clark Field labeled the entire area north of the hangars as “landing field,” and a 1936 schematic prepared by the Quartermaster Corps carried the same designation for the area. In a June 1939 photograph taken from east of the field, the runways were still virtually indistinguishable from the surrounding central Luzon plain.<sup>2</sup>



*Source: Corps of Engineers, image 1657448*

**Clark Field, June 1939 (SSE-NNW)**

## **Airfield Expansion**

In late July, a change in policy from the defense of the Philippines to the deterrence of Japanese expansionism in the Pacific led to specific US actions, economic and military. One of the most significant initial acts was the decision to send a squadron of B-17s to the Philippines. With the anticipated arrival of that squadron, “construction work at Clark Field became a first priority,” according to Lt Col Wendell Fertig. He transferred to Clark on 10 August 1941, as chief of the ODE construction section and as an engineer for the North Luzon Area.




On 2 August 1941, the War Department received the authority to expend an additional \$2,273,000 for airfield construction. Of that amount, Clark Field's share was \$315,000 for the "expansion of the airfield" (runways and facilities), a figure that included \$12,000 for an "additional runway," which the ODE had proposed as a northwest-southeast (NW-SE) strip without additional detail as to exact location on the field.<sup>3</sup>

## Runways

The absence of formal plans for the runway improvement projects of 1941—not found for this study—and directional designations for the new runway scheme made a re-creation of the prewar construction activities at Clark Field difficult. However, fundamental imagery analysis appeared to show that the 28th Bomb Squadron did not follow the schematic that the Quartermaster Corps provided in 1936. That approach continued with the runway development projects of 1941. Use patterns and the position of aircraft in aerial photographs appeared to show the following three or possibly four turf runways: roughly SSW-NNE, west of the hangar area; S-N, directly from the westernmost hangar; S-N, straight from the easternmost hangar; and a separate runway roughly E-W in front of the hangar area in a configuration designed to cross the S-N runway on the east edge of the hangar area.

By early August, the Quartermaster Corps had already started the extension or construction of four runways, numbered 1–4. For FY 1942, the Philippine Department also proposed and later received funding authorization (\$15,000) for the construction of an additional runway (No. 5). Fertig's arrival marked another shift in the gradual transfer of Air Force-related construction from the Quartermaster Corps to the COE, according to the arrangement decreed by the secretary of war between the two Army components in December 1940. It was unclear what plans the Quartermaster Corps used for the expansion of runways at Clark. With the funds in hand, the Quartermaster Corps contracted with Filipino construction companies, which employed only Filipino laborers to do the work. The extent of the work completed by the Quartermaster Corps was similarly unclear. Still, work on Runway No. 5 did not advance beyond completion of the plans and specifications because, as the ODE documented, there



**Figure 8.2. Clark Field: possible runway schematic, 1941.** (Adapted from *Clark Field: Corps of Engineers, Image 1657448.*)

had been “no decision yet as to direction and length.” In his memoirs, Fertig commented that Maj William Lawrence, the Quartermaster Corps project officer for the airfield extensions, “had the work well in hand and was driving ahead with full speed [despite the weather, which hampered the ODE’s construction projects in the Philippines]. . . . Everything was progressing so smoothly that [Fertig] asked him to carry on . . .” while [Fertig] reconnoitered additional airfield sites in north-central Luzon. Lawrence agreed, “but not too willingly,” Fertig remembered because he was also managing the construction of a water system and barracks on Clark Field.<sup>4</sup>

Fertig assured Colonel Stickney that “Clark Field was capable of handling any plane that flew and landings could be made in any kind of weather.” The soil, composed of marine and volcanic deposits, was porous and thus had excellent “vertical drainage” (Fertig’s characterization) that simplified construction. As a result, the runways did not require surfacing or pavement to handle the heavy bombers. However, the 1936 drawing showed that the field had a drainage system to

handle the monsoon season and the ODE allotted funds for those drainage projects. The 20th Pursuit Squadron was based permanently at Clark. The 3rd and 21st Pursuit Squadrons were temporarily based there during the summer of 1941 while Nichols Field was flooded and being improved. As the pilots made repeated takeoffs and landings, the pursuit aircraft churned the turf and gravel runways into dust, a problem for which Fertig never found a satisfactory solution. At the time, the COE was still developing but had not yet deployed portable steel landing mats, a project it had begun in 1939.<sup>5</sup> These mats were for “unprepared fields” in theaters of operations for use with medium, heavy bombardment, and reconnaissance aircraft. The COE had just received a directive to work on lighter mats for pursuit and light aircraft, as well.<sup>6</sup>

Despite Fertig’s assurances to Stickney, by mid-August, Brig Gen Carl Spaatz wrote to the WPD “the facilities in the Philippines at the present time, will not support a total of more than one group of Heavy Bombardment and three groups of pursuit.”<sup>7</sup>

The ODE took over responsibility for runway and revetment construction on 31 August 1941, about the time Fertig had returned from his site reconnaissance in central Luzon. For airfield projects in Alaska and at Nichols Field, the COE provided supervision, most of the labor, and most of the construction equipment for the Air Corps-related projects. In contrast, the ODE’s engineers at Clark Field limited their involvement to project management, given the lack of heavy equipment and shortage of skilled workers that challenged the ODE’s construction projects. Capt Harry O. Fisher, the area engineer at Clark, managed to obtain some Caterpillar tractors from the Philippine BPW. However, they were in poor mechanical condition. Later, Stickney had to borrow three new tractors and five carryalls (scrapers) from BPW for Clark Field projects. By mid-October, when pressure for airfield development was increasing, BPW denied a request from Stickney to retain the machinery because it was needed for flood control projects. As the ODE construction project reports documented, Filipino construction companies and their workers continued to perform the runway work, much of it manually, until the war began. At some point in the process, probably about 1 September, 2nd Lt Gene Boyt, a newly commissioned engineer officer, took over as project manager. He worked under the supervision of Fischer, a veteran engineer officer and by then a newly promoted major. Boyt was quickly promoted as a first lieutenant. Despite the work of the 28th Bomb

Squadron in 1939, Boyt claimed that since Clark had only one runway as of August 1941, his objective was to build a new runway. This was to “mirror” the existing runway and be completed the first squadron of B-17s that would be arriving. The goal was also to expand the existing runway to 5,000 feet. Runways, Boyt recalled, were “graded dirt” and “incredibly simple” by current standards. They required “grading and leveling long stretches of land” and were not difficult to construct.<sup>8</sup>

Lieutenant Boyt and the contractors hurried to finish two runways in time for the landing of the first flight of B-17s, but they did not meet their goal. When the first squadron of heavy bombers arrived at Clark Field on 12 September, the last leg of their historic Hawaii to Philippines flight, Runway Nos. 1 and 2, were operational. However, work on their extensions was still in progress. Runway No. 3 was about 3,000 feet long and was scheduled to extend to 5,000 feet. Fertig explained the delay with this comment; “the dimensions of the landing strips [for the B-17s] were lengthened after each radio[gram] from the States.”<sup>9</sup>

The arrival of the first nine B-17s from the 19th Bomb Group was dramatic. The planes came through low hanging clouds, rain squalls, and “strips of fog that obscured the runway.” Low on fuel, the aircraft landed in two different directions, “almost on top of each other,” observed Lieutenant Boyt. He was probably referring to Runway Nos. 1 and 2. The first aircraft, flown by Maj Emmett “Rosie” O’Donnell, had to circle the field once before landing on Runway No. 1. He commented later that the “runway was very hard to pick up because there was no clear line of demarcation between sod and surface.” O’Donnell then rolled his aircraft to the hangar line. The second, piloted by Capt Bill Fisher, probably came down on Runway No. 2. Fertig estimated that it was about 3,500 feet long (less than half its planned length at the time). With half the length of the runway between the aircraft and the hangar line, Fisher crashed into the vertical stabilizer of Brig Gen Henry B. Claggett’s B-18 before swinging into an arc and rolling to a stop beside the first aircraft. While the third, fourth, and ninth B-17’s landed safely, the sixth “hedged-hopped” a landing beacon after its initial touch down. Three B-17s came down into a construction area, which Fertig did not further identify. He noted, “only the admirable qualities of the field saved [the fifth B-17] from wrecking.” During the landing process, Fertig had all the construction equipment moved into a wooded area “in the intersection of the various runways.”<sup>10</sup>

With the 3rd, 20th, and 21st Pursuit Squadrons already at Clark Field, the newly arrived B-17s added to the congestion. The arrival of the second tranche of heavy bombers—24 of 26 B-17Cs and B-17-Ds from 31 October to 3 November 1941—further compounded the traffic problem. On arrival, one pilot in the second group saw a small, sandy field crowded with aircraft, according to William Bartsch, and remarked, “it looked like a mess.”<sup>11</sup>

A 27 October inspection of Clark Field by Lt Col Hugh J. Casey, and Col Arnold J. Funk, a USAFFE staff member, revealed that the extension of Runway No. 1 was only 75 percent complete, and Runway No. 2 was completed only to its intersection with Runway No. 1. The extensions of Runways No. 3 and 4 had progressed only to the point of their intersection. The estimated completion date for extensions on Runway Nos. 1 and 2 was 1 December 1941. The runway expansion project was delayed because of the shifting of resources to the development of revetments or plane pens. A short while later, the diversion of heavy construction equipment to the O'Donnell and Del Carmen airfield projects extended the delays on both the runway and revetment projects. In its periodic construction project reports, the ODE commented that the “equipment [was] being used elsewhere.” The reports also noted the estimated completion dates for Runway Nos. 3-5 were “unknown” because of still-changing requirements for the length of the runway, echoing Fertig's earlier comments. By mid-November, the ODE had documented progress on the extension of Runway No. 1 at 96 percent complete, of Runway No. 2 at 80 percent, No. 3 at 45 percent, and Runway No. 4 at 12 percent. It was unclear if runway work at Clark had progressed significantly between Casey's 27 October inspection and mid-November or if USAFFE and the ODE had differing views on the progress of the extensions.<sup>12</sup>

Finally, the optimal runway length for heavy bombers was set at 2,000 meters or about 6,550 feet, “where the terrain permitted.” By mid-November, the ODE said the length for Runway No. 3 was increased from 8,000 to 8,600 feet and Runway No. 4 from 6,100 feet to 6,800 feet. In the absence of a decision on length and direction—the ODE stated interest in an NW-SE runway notwithstanding—work on Runway No. 5 never began. All work on the extensions ceased on Friday, 5 December, the weekend before the war started. Work was delayed further, one must assume, because the Japanese decimated the FEAF bomber and pursuit forces on 8 December.<sup>13</sup>

## Revetments

The ODE semi-monthly construction project reports documented that “hired” labor was responsible for the construction of 12 “dispersal and protective facilities for planes” even after the arrival of the 803rd. Despite the priority attached to airfield expansion, work on runway improvements and development was suspended as of late October, pending construction of revetments for the incoming bombers. That project was to have begun on 15 November using civilian contractors. By that time, only one of three revetments (No. 2) was under construction. It was 50 percent complete. As of early December, the Revetment No. 2 was 80 percent complete, but the ODE reported the overall project as only 20 percent complete for the period 15 November to 5 December 1941. However, according to ODE, construction equipment designated for the revetment project had also moved to Del Carmen and O’Donnell Fields, as it had been needed for the runway extensions, “by command of Air Corps Headquarters.” Casey had singled out the Del Carmen project as “one of the highest priorities.” The diversion of construction equipment to other projects was both understandable with the priorities and constraints at the time, yet also confusing. Comments on the ODE progress report dated 2 December 1941 noted that it was “essential that bunkers or plane pens be provided for the principal fields and particularly at Clark Field.”<sup>14</sup>

As could be seen with the situation at Clark Field, the arrival of the 809th EC and the 803rd EB addressed but did not solve the issue of inadequate workforce resources and limited inventories of heavy construction equipment. The planned increase in combat aircraft for the Philippine garrison exacerbated the problem. Shortly before the start of the war (29 November), MacArthur wrote to Marshall that airfield projects were “mere preparation to permit immediate use in the dry season” and “allow for maximum dispersion at the earliest date.” He said that “continuous development [would] be required to provide hard surfaces for [the] operation of heavy airplanes during the wet season.” This comment was contrary to Fertig’s evaluation of drainage at Clark and emphasized that the lack of earth moving equipment had slowed the process.<sup>15</sup>

By that time, the Army had already submitted to the War Department an estimate of the funds needed to supplement its FY 1941 budget for covering additional combat and service units (14 October). First

on the list was a request for three aviation engineer battalions (2,133 officers and men). On 22 October, USAFFE requested two sets of equipment for those units. Coincidentally or not, on the same day, the USAAF, with the informal concurrence of the CoE and the chief signal officer, listed for General Marshall the measures “required to be taken at [that] time to operate efficiently in the Far Eastern areas.” It recommended that the following “be designated and transferred to [the Philippines] for duty with the Army Air Forces on the first available transport”: an aviation engineering battalion; two signal companies and one signal platoon; an ordnance company; and additional personnel and equipment to bring FEAF up to strength. An attached tab recommended the “transfer of the 810th (Battalion) Bn AVN Eng Colored and necessary organizational equipment from MacDill Field, Fla., to [the Philippines].” By the time Marshall’s office received the memo (30 October), the Army had already projected shipments of men and materiel to the Philippines through 20 December. Engineers were not included on the list since no service engineer units were then available for assignment.<sup>16</sup>

Shortly after that, at the suggestion of Maj Gen Arnold, Marshall asked MacArthur about:

The desirability of organizing two regiments of colored aircraft engineers to assist in airdrome construction in the Philippines. One battalion of colored aircraft engineers is completing its organization [i.e., the 810th] and other units could be organized promptly. Since aircraft engineer units are primarily for the purpose of providing a labor pool for airdrome construction the idea appeals to me, but I would like to have your recommendation.<sup>17</sup>

Despite his request for additional aviation units, MacArthur quickly rejected Marshall’s proposal. Reflecting the views of the time, which Marshall also shared, the USAFFE commander said he believed the presence of what he called “colored” troops “would further complicate an already difficult racial problem,” and that past experiences with troops in the Philippines “[had] been most unfortunate.” Absent other options, MacArthur preferred to organize Philippine units with US Army officers and US-supplied equipment. By that time, USAFFE had already requested equipment for several types of military units, including one regiment of aviation engineers, formed principally with the PA. Given the time factor, that goal was not met. Colonel Brady lamented the USAFFE commander’s decision regarding the US engineers.<sup>18</sup>

The WPD quickly provided an alternative solution. With the concurrence of Brig Gen John J. Kingman, assistant CoE, and Brig Gen Spaatz, the WPD suggested the assignment of the 47th ER General Service, then at Ft. Ord, California, “be equipped to perform work normally performed by aviation engineers and dispatched to the Philippines at the earliest practicable date.” In just a few days, the 47th was being readied for deployment to the Philippines. The OCE quickly cabled USAFFE on 18 November that “two sets of aviation battalion equipment [was then] enroute [*sic*] for use by [the] 47th Engineers.” In his 29 November letter to Marshall, General MacArthur said that “the engineer units being provided from the United States, which are coming with complete equipment, will markedly accelerate the development [of airfields].” Neither the equipment nor the 47th Engineers reached the Philippines by 8 December.<sup>19</sup>

Amid its interchange with the War Department, USAFFE was dealing with internal obstacles related to construction delays and lack of materials. The USAFFE AGO pressed FEAF for an estimate of the engineer supplies necessary “for the construction of defensive works for airdromes and landing fields.” If FEAF lacked the technical personnel to prepare a detailed materials list, the USAFFE AGO asked for plans with sufficient details to allow for others to prepare the list. The objective was to take the steps necessary to request the items from the CoE.<sup>20</sup>

### 803rd Activities

In the assignment of missions for the companies of the 803rd EB, Headquarters Company had responsibility for training enlisted personnel, runway repair and upkeep, construction of revetments and trenches, and, to a lesser extent, maintenance of existing runways. Its work on runway extensions and even revetments was limited. The reasons for the reduced scope of the Headquarters Company role at Clark Field runways were several. As Fertig noted, the civilian contractors under Lieutenant Boyt had the work underway and well in hand before the 803rd arrived. Boyt, the project manager for runway development, noted that “members of the 803rd were a big help. . . . Although they were not directly involved in my assignments” (i.e., airstrip construction and extension). The diversion of the battalion’s heavy construction equipment from Clark to Del Carmen and



O'Donnell Fields demonstrated the growing importance of the latter as dispersal fields for the massive numbers of bombardment and pursuit aircraft programmed for the Philippines. As Karl Dod pointed out, the ODE, Col Henry Stickney was able to keep his jobs moving "only by constant shifting of equipment from one location to another." Thus, the Headquarters Company lacked the machinery necessary for assisting the construction projects significantly at Clark. Besides, the Headquarters Company supported the work of the entire battalion with services of common concern (e.g., supply). Acting within those limited parameters and with minimal construction equipment, 2nd Lt Everett Carney oversaw the airstrip maintenance details.<sup>21</sup>

Along with civilian laborers, the Headquarters Company participated in building revetments or plane pens for B-17s and possibly P-40s, despite directives from the newly formed FEAF that private contractors perform the work. Revetments were "U"-shaped earth mounds about 18 feet tall. Those that the Headquarters Company built used the concept developed by Captain Bidgood: gasoline drums filled with sand and stacked two-high but without a top cover. First Lt Ted Pflueger, the Company C supply officer, said Company C provided some equipment and operators for B-17 revetment projects presumably to offset machinery transferred to Company A and Company B projects.<sup>22</sup>

Confusion seemed to reign about the priority assigned to revetment construction at Clark. Despite FEAF's directive to pull equipment from revetment projects, Casey pushed for alternate means to proceed with the work, despite his doubts about their value. He wrote to the ODE on 9 December:

In [the ODE's] comments on both previous construction reports [15 November and 30 October], it was indicated that [the] work [on revetments] should be undertaken [by] contract in order to expedite completion. [A] report is desired as to the action taken to have such work done by contract. As has been previously pointed out, it is essential that bunkers or protective pens be provided for the principal fields and particularly Clark Field.<sup>23</sup>

### **"V"-Shaped Trenches**

Headquarters Company's most significant accomplishment was probably its construction of "V"-shaped trenches for use as personnel shelters. Months before the war Lt Col Lester J. Maitland, a renowned

aviator and base commander of Clark Field, had ordered the construction of the trenches reinforced with bamboo. The men dubbed those structures as “Maitland’s Folly,” and contract laborers did not begin digging them until several weeks before the Japanese attack. Boyt, who also managed that construction, noted that “until 8 December, the diggers had shown little enthusiasm. Frequently seen resting on their shovels, they talked much and dug little.” About early December, Headquarters Company began digging the trenches near the barracks area with a mechanical ditch digger—which it had or possibly received about a week before the Japanese attack—and with backhoes. The ditch digger was probably an Isaacson hydraulic roter. Depending on the model, the Isaacson roter could dig trenches from 24 to 30 inches deep. Company C had the use of two Isaacson rooters at Nichols Field. It might have provided some of the machines and included experienced equipment operators as well in the package. Its improvement of Nichols Field, which was at sea level, required an extensive renovation of the field’s drainage system. The trenches, dug with legs approximately 20 feet long, were more than slits in the earth. Those built by the 803rd included revetments of woven bamboo. The engineers also mounted a World War I-vintage .30-caliber machine gun at each end of the trench.<sup>24</sup>

## Sanitation and Health

Arrival in the Philippines brought the need for newly arrived engineers to adapt to a tropical environment. During the first few days, they used sick call primarily for diarrhea, vomiting, and excess salivation because of the heavily chlorinated water. Rationing was enforced on the post as of 30 October and limited water usage to only drinking and bathing. Lieutenant Coone also noted that unsanitary produce from local vendors caused health problems, as did uncovered box and trench latrines and waste food dumps. He was satisfied that the mess halls had passed inspection, however. Industrial accidents added to the mix of medical challenges. In early November, two men were injured when a truck overturned. The engineers also had to become accustomed to poor roads and driving on the left side of the road.<sup>25</sup>

## Morale

While confronting these organizational and logistical challenges, Major Fries had to deal with personal and professional problems within the battalion. He wrote to his wife on 15 November that the doctors told him that “it [his unspecified medical issue] will be entirely healed in a few days now.” That problem came on top of morale issues among both officers and selectees. Officers on foreign duty were supposed to sign an agreement to serve two years. The consensus of the junior officers was that “we didn’t volunteer for anything, so we’re not signing anything.” The agreements were never signed by anyone. Fries, whom Leggett described as “a good man . . . [who] didn’t force the issue,” took the refusal in stride. At the same time, Brigadier General King called Fries to his Ft. Stotsenberg headquarters with the comment, “we’re in trouble.”

An enlisted man had reported to the press that morale was low because of the high number of 28-year-olds at Ft. Stotsenburg and Clark Field. He stated that many of them expected to be discharged because of their age. Also, of concern was the high number of men in the stockade. The issue, it seemed, had first arisen while the battalion was on Angel Island and then continued to fester on the way to Manila.

According to then-Sgt John Moyer, several men in the 803rd called a reporter in Manila to protest their overseas service. “I’ll be back in a year, my dear” and “over the hill in October,” shortened to the more popular term “OHIO,” were the famous slogans. General MacArthur sent a team to investigate. Investigators, interestingly, found the problem stemmed not from the older men but the younger personnel. They noted that morale was high, wrote Fries, “especially considering the circumstances under which we moved out here.” Fries’ only comment was that King used the term “we” and not “you” and that he would “back you to the limit.” Leggett spoke of only one court-martial during that period without providing details.<sup>26</sup>

## Recreation

Lieutenant Leggett complained that the Ft. Stotsenburg-Clark Field complex lacked diversity in entertainment. Nevertheless, the officers seemed to take advantage of all available opportunities, espe-

cially at night and during off-duty hours. Mail arrived once a week. At the officers' club, poker and ping pong were popular. In addition to baseball and football, mounts were available through the officers' club for horseback riding. The troops had access to the horses of the 26th Cavalry Regiment PS, also headquartered on Ft. Stotsenburg. The post theater, located at the head of the fort's parade ground, was always filled. Major Fries, usually accompanied by some of his officers, went to a movie almost every night. Some officers spent weekends in Manila after Fries took a group to the city during the 803rd's first weekend in the Philippines. The Hotel Clipper on the Luneta, a historic urban park, was one of the popular stops. Other off-post destinations for battalion staff and Headquarters Company personnel included Baguio's Camp John Hay in the mountains north of Clark Field and Del Carmen Field. Company B had access to the recreational facilities at the plantation owned by the Spreckles and Smith Sugar Company.<sup>27</sup>

Pfc Soine Torma of Company A, described Ft. Stotsenburg's facilities as "a store, bank, two churches, a clubhouse, bowling alleys, golf course, riding club, several theaters plus the native bars and tailor shops." Many enlisted men followed a long-held tradition at Ft. Stotsenburg and Clark Field by visiting the bars and bar girls in nearby Angeles City. It had a wide-open, wild-west environment, particularly after paydays. The locals brewed a gin, known as "A11A," and the men at Clark Field considered it "pretty potent stuff." Shortly after the arrival of the 803rd, some of the enlisted men "went on quite a spree" and required a military police escort back to the post. It was small wonder, as Lieutenant Leggett documented, that the chaplain gave a presentation to the 803rd on 25 October. The topic focus was the "question of morals and the danger of disease" and "without a tinge of the goody-goody."

On the post, a swimming area was built into a local mountain stream. It ran into the area where horses and carabao wallowed and then to a site where local Filipinas washed laundry for the troops. For milder pursuits during the second weekend of November, Captain Bidgood took a convoy of enlisted men from the Headquarters Company into Manila.<sup>28</sup>

## Urgency

The sense of urgency in the War Department did not transfer readily to the Philippines War Department planning. Based on what it said was a “careful” analysis of the military and political situation, it had concluded that a Japanese attack would probably not occur until—and thus the reinforcement effort could extend—at least April 1942. To meet that deadline, the War Department developed a tight schedule for the delivery of troops and equipment. The estimated time frame was one month removed from the rainy season (roughly June through October) in the Philippines. It was not surprising then that, for the most part, troops in the Philippines were not concerned about the probability of war with Japan. Casey noted long afterward that most of the staff did not know of the “worsening relations with Japan and instructions from the War Department” because they did not have access to top-secret communications. Instead, they “just knew a critical situation was developing.” When local radio stations were vocal in denunciations of the Nazis and Japanese, Leggett said it sounded “almost like they were trying to start something.” While en route to the Philippines, Captain Fries said the work schedule would depend on the time the battalion would have to do the job. However, he added that his preference for the timing of work was a schedule typical of the tropics: starting work early in the morning and quitting about noon. Sergeant Moyer remarked that in contrast to Maj Fries “preferences,” that the Headquarters Company worked mornings and evenings during its time at Clark Field, as opposed to Company A, which had a 24-hour work schedule at O’Donnell Field. The men were always talking of the time when they would be going back home to see their families. The general situation in the Philippines prompted Maj Gen Lewis H. Brereton, the newly appointed FEAF commander, to complain that “work hours, training schedules and operational procedures were still based on the good old days of peace conditions in the tropics.”<sup>29</sup>

The situation changed somewhat with a practice blackout on 21 November. By 26 November, Major Fries was aware of the tenuous situation, but he tried reassuring his wife by writing that it was “quite possible that we will have a war with Japan. I don’t want you to worry about it, though. We, aviation engineers, are about the safest organization possible to be in, even over here . . . we stay in the rear areas and build airfields.” On 27 November, a War Department message

warned USAFFE and other commands that “negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes . . . Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action [is] possible at any moment.” It also underscored Washington’s preference that Japan institute the first overt act of war while giving MacArthur the freedom to act as he saw necessary. A 24-hour alert began on 28 November, complete with periodic drills. Everyone in the battalion had to sign out and provide details on destinations. Only 15 percent of the troops were permitted to leave the post and they were required to be ready to return to duty stations on three hours’ notice. Battalion staff and Headquarters Company could not leave the Clark Field area. Officers were required to carry sidearms from 29 November onward. Enlisted men from Headquarters Company were issued live ammunition and told to keep gas masks with them. When not on work duty, enlisted personnel pulled guard duty on bomb dumps in the jungle. After months of delay, the 803rd became involved in digging “V”-shaped slit trenches for personnel protection. An officers’ call at Clark Field in early December alerted the base to the possibility of war.<sup>30</sup>

In a 6 December 1941, memorandum for the Philippine Division, Gen Richard Sutherland, USAFFE CoS, added somewhat to the uncertainty surrounding the alert status:

The negotiations between the United States and Japanese Governments that have been in progress in Washington, DC, have not yet provided a basis for mutual understanding. Under existing circumstances, it is not possible to predict the future actions of the Japanese. The Philippine Division and the 91st Division, Philippine Army, are placed in reserve and are to be used as a striking force in counteroffensive action against any successful hostile landing on the island of Luzon. It is desired that you take immediate action, without creating agitation or comment among the troops concerned to prepare plans for the support of the North Luzon Force or the South Luzon Force by the 91st Division and the Philippine Division.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, it was not surprising that on 7 December, Fertig, then assigned to Manila, participated in a day-long picnic at Lake Taal, south of the capital city. Pilots of the 27th Bomb Group, whose A-24 dive bombers never arrived in the Philippines, also had a day of recreation topped with a reception at the Manila Hotel, which Brereton attended. Brereton’s participation ended with telephone call warning of possible overflights, later determined to be Japanese probing of Philippine air space, of Iba Field on the western Luzon coast.<sup>32</sup>

As Lieutenant Leggett wrote home on 30 November: “Perhaps this alert business will soon be over, and we will get back to some sem-

blance of normalcy. Then we can enjoy our weekend and holidays again.” Long after the war, Leggett commented that it was a “strange feeling” and that “we hadn’t been through it before, so we weren’t particularly worried.”<sup>33</sup>

#### Notes

1. ODE to CoE, 1st Ind., 6 May 1941, no subject [airfield construction, Philippine Department], NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709, Decimal 600.1; Gerow to CoS, memo, 5 February 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department; Kennedy to AGO, memo, 15 April 1941, Subject: Construction in the Philippine Islands; draft radiogram, CoE to ODE, 16 April 1941, no subject [funding for airfield construction], NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709, Decimal 600.1, Box 709. Col J.W. Anderson, acting ACoS [WPD], to CoS, memo, 18 March 1941, Subject: Immediate Expansion of Airfields, Philippine Islands, NARA RG165, Box 89; Col Frank M. Kennedy, chief of buildings and grounds, Air Corps, to AGO [Brig] Gen Henry M. Claggett, memo, 1 April 1941, no subject [available and proposed funding for construction in the Philippines], NARA RG18, Box 1112; AGO to CoE, memo, 15 April 1941, Subject: Authorization of Air Corps Construction, Philippine Islands, Fourth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1941, NARA RG18, Box 1117; Gerow to CoS, memo, 25 June 1941, Subject: Improvement of Airfields in the Philippine Islands, NARA RG165, Box 89; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 61–62; [USAAF] A-4 to chief of the Air Staff [Spaatz], routing and record sheet, 26 August 1941, Subject: Airports in the Philippines, NARA RG18, Box 1117.

2. Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps in the Philippines*, 16–17 and 91, quoting Ralph Knox and Lt William Lee; “Clark Field, Pampanga, P.I., July 12th,” ACNL 11, no. 11 (30 August 1927): 269, and “Clark Field Activities,” ACNL 12, no. 10 (15 May 1939): 14; construction division, Quartermaster Corps, to constructing quartermaster, Manila, “General Layout, Military Post, Camp Stotsenburg, P.I., revised 1 April 1936, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709.

3. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 3–16; Spaatz to Col [unknown] Crawford, WPD, memo, 15 August 1941, Subject: Air Facilities in the Philippines; AGO to COE, memo, 2 August 1941, Subject: Air Field Construction, Philippine Department, Fiscal Year 1942, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709; Philippine Department, G-4, to CG, USAFFE, routing and record sheet, 20 August 1941, Subject: Construction Program for the Philippine Department, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 36, E.P.S. [initials only], Army Air Forces, G-4, to Spaatz, routing and record Sheet 26 August 1941, Subject: Airfields in the Philippines, NARA RG18, Box 1117, Project Files.

4. ODE to CoE, letter, 22 July 1941, Subject: Fiscal Year 1942 Funds for Air Corps Construction, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709, File 600.1; Col J.W. Anderson, acting ACoS [WPD], to CoS, memo, 18 March 1941, Subject: Immediate Expansion of Airfields, Philippine Islands; Kennedy to, memo, 1 April 1941, no subject [available and proposed funding for construction in the Philippines]; AGO to CoE, memo, 15 April 1941, Subject: Authorization of Air Corps Construction, Philippine Islands, Fourth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1941, NARA RG18, Box 1117; Gerow to CoS, memo, 25 June 1941, Subject: Improvement of Airfields in the Philippine Islands; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 61–62; A-4 to chief of the Air Staff, routing and record sheet, 26 August 1941, Subject: Airports in the Philippines, NARA RG18, Box 1117; Quartermaster Corps, Construction Division, Constructing Quartermaster, Manila, “General Layout, Military Post, Camp Stotsenburg, P.I., re-

vised 1 April 1936; ODE Construction Project Reports, 15 and 30 November, and 15 December 1941; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 3, 6. Fertig was not specific about the number of runways involved, noting only that the construction involved “several additional runways at Clark.”

5. PSP (Perforated Steel Planking) was not used operationally until the Carolina Maneuvers of 1941.

6. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 3–16; Spaatz to Crawford, WPD, routing and record sheet, 15 August 1941, Subject: Air Facilities in the Philippines; “Landing Mats: Mobile ‘Fields’ Tested,” ACNL 24, no. 14 (September 1941): 5, 16.

7. Spaatz to Crawford, routing and record sheet, 15 August 1941.

8. Boyt, *Bataan: A Survivor’s Story*, 41; ODE Construction Project Reports, 15 and 30 November and 15 December 1941; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 62; V[icente] Fragante, [Philippine] Director of Public Works (BPW) to Stickney, letter, 21 October 1941, no subject [return of construction machinery to BPW], MMA RG2, Box 1, Folder 3. The date Boyt assumed responsibility for the Clark runway project was unclear. The timeline in Boyt’s book was off by five weeks; he placed the date of arrival for the first tranche of B-17s as late October. Fertig, moved to Manila as chief of the ODE construction section in early November 1941 (*Guerrillero*, 13). Nor did Boyt clarify the runways for which he was responsible. See ODE, Construction Progress Reports, 15 and 30 November and 15 December 1941. The “method of contract/h[ired] l[abor]” was listed as “hired.”

9. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 10–11; Boyt, *Bataan: A Survivor’s Story*, 41, 48–49; Boyt referred to “both” strips; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 137, 460n, cited an August, 1941, memo by USAAF intelligence division that documented the three runways at Clark as of August, 1941, sans details on their numbering. Designations for the Clark runways in the immediate prewar period are probable. Only Richard Meixsel (Clark Field and the US Army Air Corps, 17) documented the location for the original runway as running east to west just to the north of the hangar area (probably Runway No. 1). He also mentioned a “south runway” (probably Runway No. 4) located near the rail tracks and a major road (115). Runway No. 3 appeared to be the N-S runway because Casey said it intersected with Runway No. 1. 1st Lt Gene Boyt mentioned the expansion of the one runway or “landing pad” to about 5,000 feet and said he worked on “a new runway to mirror the existing one.” (*Bataan: A Survivor’s Story*, 41). In the absence of a definition of the term “mirror,” it appeared that Runway No. 4 was located south of the hangar area.

10. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 7–11; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 136–37; Williams and Asher, “Deployment of the AAF on the Eve of Hostilities,” in Craven and Cate, eds., *Plans and Early Operations*, 178–82; Maj Emmett O’Donnell to [no designation], memo, 19 September 1941, Subject: Chronological Report of Trans-Pacific Flight, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 43; Gerow to AGO, memo, 31 July 1941, Subject: Reinforcements for U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, NARA RG165, Box 225; Marshall to Stark, memo, 12 September 1941, no subject [summary of plans for reinforcement of the Philippines], NARA RG165, Box 11, noted arrival of the nine B-17’s at Clark and the scheduled departure for the other two squadrons of 26 planes.

11. Lt Ed Jacquet quoted in Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 171–72. Two of the B-17s in the second tranche were delayed in Australia because of mechanical problems.

12. ODE, Semi-Monthly Construction Progress Reports for 15 and 30 November and 15 December 1941; 1st Lt H. F. Bishop, assistant adjutant general, Philippine Department, to CG, USAFFE, memo, 24 October 1941, Subject: Construction Equipment Borrowed from the Bureau of Public Works; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 62; Boyt, *A Survivor’s Story*, 48–49; ODE to USAFFE G-4, memo, 19 November 1941,



Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineer Construction, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 31; Casey, Airdrome Construction in the Philippines; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 27 October 1941, Subject: Report of Inspection on Construction Activities at Fort Stotsenburg, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 33; Stickney to [FEAF] G-4 [Col Harold George], memo, 14 October 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department.

13. Bishop to CG, USAFFE, memo, 24 October 1941, Subject: Construction Equipment Borrowed from the Bureau of Public Works; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 62; Boyt, *A Survivor's Story*, 48-49; ODE to USAFFE G-4, memo, 19 November 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineer Construction, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 31; Casey, statement, Airdrome Construction in the Philippines.

14. ODE, Construction Progress Reports, 15 and 30 November 1941; ODE to USAFFE G-4, memo, 19 November 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineer Construction, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 31; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 6; Stickney to USAFFE G-4, memo, 14 October 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineers Construction, Casey Files, Folder 6; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 62; Boyt, *A Survivor's Story*, 48-49. Casey, Airdrome Construction in the Philippines; Casey to ODE, 1st Ind., 9 December 1941, no subject: [comment on Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Period ending 30 November 1941, NARA RG496, Box 30. The terms "revetment" and "plane pen" were used interchangeably in official documentation and historical studies.

15. MacArthur to Marshall, letter, 29 November 1941, NARA RG165, Box 122, File 3489-21; USAFFE Radiogram 138-42, 22 October 1941, referenced in War Department radiogram 552, 18 November 1941, RG496, Entry 540, Box 37.

16. Maj Gen R.C. Moore, deputy chief of staff, to War Department budget officer, memo, 14 October 1941, Subject: Second Supplemental Estimates, Fiscal Year 1942, NARA RG165, Box 11, File 18136; Lt Col Claude E. Dunham, secretary to the air staff, to CoS, memo, 22 October 1941, Subject: Augmentation of Arms and Services to the Air Force, PLUM [code for "Philippines, Luzon, Manila"], RG165, Box 11, File 18136-95, Tab B to the 22 October 1941 memo, AFHRA, IRIS Number 02052930, microfilm roll 28129, 525-26 and Tab B, 532; [unknown] to secretary of war, memo, 29 October 1941, Subject: Reinforcement of the Philippines [initialed by Marshall], RG 165, Box 11; Radiogram 473

17. Marshall to MacArthur, radiogram, 5 November 1941, no subject, NARA RG165, Box 11, File 18136-98 and MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 3. See also Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, 432.

18. MacArthur to Marshall, radiogram, 6 November 1941, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 2; Brady to Spaatz, letter, 17 November 1941, NARA, RG18, Box 117 (Project Files); Paul Dickson, *The Rise of the G.I. Army* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2020), 185, 287-88, 306-07, and 345-46.

19. Gerow to ACoS G-3 [operations], memo, 12 November 1941, Subject: Engineers, Aviation Facilities, NARA RG165, Box 225, File 4559-7; War Department radiogram 552, 18 November 1941; MacArthur to Marshall, letter, 29 November 1941; MacArthur to AGO, War Department, memo, 20 September 1941, Subject: Confirmation of Radio requesting Complete Organizational Equipment for Army and Corps Units, MMA RG 2, Box 1, Folder 2. See Dod, *The War against Japan*, 70, 283, 369. Gerow's 12 November memo mentioned plans to activate the 813th Engineer (AVN) Battalion, which was activated on 17 November 1941, and moved to Elmendorf Field, Alaska, in May 1942, to work on satellite airfields. The 47th ER (General Service) arrived in Hawaii in early 1942 to work on roads on military posts. Two companies of the 47th and the entire 804th Engineer (AVN) Battalion, also based in Hawaii, were assigned to the Makin Island operation.

20. Lt Col J. T. Menzie, USAFFE AGO, to CG, FEAF, memo, 21 November 1941, Subject: Engineer Materials Required for Defense of Airdromes, NARA RG496, Entry, 540, Box 37.

21. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 11–14; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 37, 40; Samuel A. Goldblith, Diary (28 March 1943; transcribed verbatim 1979) (hereafter cited as Goldblith diary); Boyt, *A Survivor's Story*, 46; Fries to CG, US Forces in the Southwest Pacific, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations, NARA RG407, Box 12; ODE to USAFFE, Subject: Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 30 November 1941, NARA RG407. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 63, probably overstated the contribution of the 803rd when saying “Headquarters Company began expanding the turf runways at Clark to transform this field into a huge base for B-17s.”

22. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 27 October 1941, Subject: Report of Inspection on Construction Activities at Fort Stotsenburg; USAFFE to ODE, 1st Ind., 9 December 1941, Subject: Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 30 November 1941, Casey Files, Folder 3; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 40; Samuel A. Goldblith, “The 803d in the Philippine Defense,” in Dr. Paul Ashton, ed., *And Somebody Gives a Damn* (Santa Barbara, California: Ashton Publications, 1993), 323; Donai, interview, 5 May 1998; Richardson-Bartsch interview; Boyt, *A Survivor's Story*, 41; The Semi-Monthly Construction Progress Reports for 15 and 30 November and 15 December 1941; Pflueger to author, emails, 8 March and 9 May 2001; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 62.

23. USAFFE to ODE, 1st Ind., 9 December 1941, no subject [comment on Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 30 November 1941]; Casey to CG, USAFFE, 27 October 1941, Subject: Report of Inspection on Construction Activities at Fort Stotsenburg.

24. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 324; Goldblith to Bartsch, letters, 9 December 1982, and 3 January 1983; Memo, Zubay to Veterans' Administration, ca. 1982, no subject [personal military history], said the 803rd used its “ditch digger to dig deep ditches all over Clark Field.” The inference from the Goldblith letters is that Headquarters Company acquired the ditch digger in late November or early December. See Bishop to CG, USAFFE, 24 October 1941, Subject: Construction Equipment Borrowed from the [Philippine] Bureau of Public Works; “Victory, Joe, Author unknown (probably an officer with the 27th Bomb Group (Light), n.d., NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 10. According to Heavy Equipment Forums, <https://www.heavyequipmentforums.com/>, which did not include photographs, the rooter came in two models, the HSR-60 with a digging depth of 24 inches and the HSR-80 with a digging depth of 30 inches. See also Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 125.

25. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 6, 9; Leggett Letters, 30 October and 5 November 1941.

26. Fries Letters, 11, 15, and 28 November 1941; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Leggett Letters, 17 November 1941; Moyer, interviews, 20–21 October 2002, and 12–13 October 2003; Zubay to author, letter, n.d. (ca. 2004) ); Clifford F. Wargelin, “No Return Address: An American POW's Experience in the Philippines and Japan,” *Michigan Quarterly Review*, 43 no. 3 (Summer 2014): 1, 4, <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/>. Fries commented that with the change of command in the NLF “I am sorry to see [King] go for he has been fine to us . . . I'm afraid it will not be the same.” See Dickson, *The Rise of the G.I. Army*, 173–77, 181–87, and 271–72, for a detailed account of morale issues surround the “OHIO” problem.

27. Fries Letters, 20 October 1941 (misdated. Information in the letter indicated the date was 27 November); Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 38–39; Coone, *The Sequen-*

*tial Soldier*, 11; Leggett Letters, 28 October and 9 and 21 November 1941; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I.

28. Minder diary; Leggett Letters, 26 and 31 October and 9 November 1941; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 31; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 8, 10; Zubay, “We Ate the Rice, Bugs and All,” in Wissolik et al., eds., *They Say There was a War*, 508–509; Wargelin, “No Return Address,” 3; Meixsel, *Clark Field and U.S. Army Air Corps*, 75–85, provided a detailed account of the more colorful recreational diversions present in the Clark Field area.

29. Leggett Letters, 22 October 1941; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 21; Moyer, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, 98–99; Casey, *Memoirs*, 157. For details on what Morton called “careful” analysis,” see [WPD] for secretary of war, memo, 29 October 1941, NARA RG165, Box 11. It provided the schedule for reinforcement to the Philippines, including units “recently arrived” and in route units and units and equipment scheduled to sail during 1 November 1941 and 31 March 1942.

30. Leggett Letters, 22 and 30 November 1941; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 240–42, 247–49; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 22; Gerow to AGO, memo, 27 November 1941, Subject: Far Eastern Situation [directive that a radiogram be sent to USAFFE], NARA RG165; Fries Letters, 26 November 1941; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Zubay, synopsis; Goldblith to Bartsch, letter, 3 January 1983.

31. Sutherland to CG, Philippine Division, memo, 6 December 1941, Subject: Movement Plans, Casey Files, Folder 2.

32. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 22; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 31.

33. Leggett Letters, 30 November 1941; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I.

## Chapter 9

# Company A at O'Donnell Field

## Plans and Funding

In early March 1941, the War Department listed an all-weather airfield, at first presumably for pursuit aircraft, in the vicinity of Barrio O'Donnell, Capas, Tarlac Province. The WPD noted: "This project has not been previously submitted to the War Department. However, the need for additional airfields on Luzon is obvious." The WPD ranked the field among its priority projects and estimated its cost at \$500,000. During late March, the War Department included the O'Donnell Field project in a request for supplemental funds and then added it in its FY 1942 (FY 1942—1 July 1941–30 June 1942) budget request. In response to a War Department query, the Philippine Department submitted detailed plans and estimates to justify the FY 1942 budget action on 7 July 1941. For O'Donnell Field, the Philippine Department originally outlined a proposal for an airdrome of three 5,000-foot runways: N-S, E-W, and NE-SW. This plan also included supporting facilities: a paved macadam road from Barrio O'Donnell, roads within the field, drainage, utilities, officers' quarters and barracks, and a hospital. A warehouse was to be located at nearby Barrio Santa Juliana, and a site identified only as "plateau" was listed as providing fields and runways for the dispersion of aircraft. Justifying the funding, the Philippine Department said O'Donnell Field, as well as Bataan Field, would provide for aircraft dispersion. USAFFE Air Force executive officer Col Harold George said the field would eventually accommodate three squadrons of pursuit aircraft. The site was necessary "to provide a landing field on the artillery range . . . and also to provide additional places where the Air Corps can carry on ground gunnery adjacent to a flying field." The plans were modified several times before construction began. On 2 August, the War Department made available the requested \$500,000 for O'Donnell Field in an overall authorization of \$2,273,000 for airfield construction. Brig Gen Carl Spaatz, then chief of the air staff, said the money covered a runway 5,000 feet long and 300 feet wide, hangars, a warehouse, shops, and quarters. Over the next two months, the plans expanded. By late October, Lt Col Hugh Casey, USAFFE engineer, told Colonel

George that “the work proposed [was] extensive.” Construction was to encompass barracks for 2,750 officers and enlisted men, both combat and support units, including one company of aviation engineers; aircraft and bomb-storage warehouses; aircraft revetments, hospital, and dispensary; under and above-ground storage for 550,000 gallons of gasoline; and a supporting road network. Additional quarters were included under a new funding request for \$5.0 million. The projected completion date for O’Donnell Field was 1 June 1942, “though [the] field will be ready for use much sooner.”<sup>1</sup>

## Construction

Using an aerial survey, the Philippine Department ODE selected a site (not further identified) in early 1941 for the proposed airfield that was to be O’Donnell Field. However, further investigation indicated that the field was “so rough as to make construction unnecessarily expensive” and “so boxed in by hills that its usefulness with faster types of modern aircraft would be somewhat limited” and “certainly not . . . suitable for night operations.” The next documented activity for the O’Donnell Field project was in June 1941, a quick reconnaissance by Lt Col Wendell Fertig, newly recalled to active duty with the ODE, and Maj George Withers of Barrio O’Donnell, on the O’Donnell Military Reservation as the site for a new landing field. Fertig returned for two weeks in August to locate and organize the construction of the field. He believed that Barrio O’Donnell, named for the 19th Century Spanish general Jose Maria O’Donnell, was the area most suitable for a landing strip. As was the case at Clark and Del Carmen Fields, the porous soil at the O’Donnell site had an excellent drainage capability and could sustain the heaviest aircraft then operational. Brig Gen Edward King, commander of Ft. Stotsenburg, loaned Fertig two four-wheel-drive, one-and-a-half-ton trucks to work in the mud at O’Donnell. Fertig noted that the vehicles were essential because the area could previously only be reached by horse-drawn units and then only in the dry season.<sup>2</sup>

The ODE’s construction division assigned Arthur Winne as the project manager and Young Dale as equipment superintendent. The Philippine Commonwealth agreed to begin the lengthy condemnation proceedings that allowed construction to start. Although the acquisition process still had not started as of 15 November 1941, Winne

began work on 2 September. He hired several hundred civilian laborers to build a road linking the airfield area to the “highway” of Central Luzon. Continuous rains made road construction a “nightmare.” After encountering the problem of dragging trucks through the mud, the engineers developed a nearby gravel pit to provide aggregate for filler material and, thus, sped up road construction. John Knutson, an ODE civilian employee, later attached to Company A, 803rd Engineers, said Filipino laborers also hauled rock for the road from the stream that flowed through the area. However, metal for the road was limited, and the ODE had to share supplies with the Philippine Army for its construction of Camp O’Donnell. Col Harry Stickney, the ODE, opted to provide only a road and road extension sufficient to allow construction equipment to access the airfield. As of 29 October 1941, Casey described the road as “in none-too-good condition.” Stickney had planned to improve the road after the construction of the runway was sufficiently advanced, and when weather conditions improved enough to permit “efficient and economical road construction.”<sup>3</sup>


As in other areas, Casey moved quickly. By 25 October, after he confirmed that land for an extension of the field was being acquired, Casey obtained permission to enter the area for the airstrip and began the clearing of the field for the runways. One of his first acts was to obtain a fleet of tractors, bulldozers, large trucks, and carryalls (towed scrapers with a 12-yard capacity) from the Pampanga Flood Control Project and Caliraya Power Dam. While awaiting the arrival of Company A, 803rd Engineers, and its equipment, Casey also attempted to have some construction machinery transferred from Clark Field. He said later; his intervention was “to expedite in every way the construction of these airdromes.” The Caliraya project was, at last, complete, and the Philippine National Power Corporation was about to declare the equipment surplus. Still, the work at O’Donnell was behind schedule. By 14 October, the surveys were 80 percent complete, and the new road was only 10 percent complete. Pvt Joseph Minder remembered that the road was “still rough” when Company A arrived. Additional equipment was to be transferred to the field, probably from the 803rd’s inventory at Clark Field, on or about 10 November 1941. As of 25 October, the ODE’s plans had advanced sufficiently to cover the initial phases of the work.<sup>4</sup>





Source: NARA RG 111, Box 26, SC125569

**Diesel tractor with 9 cubic yard towed scraper (carryall), 1941**



Source: NARA RG111, Box 26, SC122581

**5-7-ton tandem roller, 1941**

The 803rd tackled its new O'Donnell project immediately upon arrival in the area, despite the absence of an agreement on land acquisition. Captain Bidgood and 2nd Lt Walter H. Farrell made a preliminary survey of the area on 29 October. A day later, Farrell returned with 2nd Lt Robert D. Montgomery to scout sites for the company bivouac area. Company A moved to the area on 1 November.

To begin work, the engineers used their heavy equipment to cut cogon grass, an invasive perennial grass that grew six to eight feet tall, in the bivouac area before work details (also called work gangs) could set up a series of six-man tents. The bivouac area was west of a stream


and about 1,000 feet from the runway site. The engineers later used the stream for bathing. The natives also used the stream to wash clothes and allowed carabao to wallow upstream. The work details set up a field kitchen, which was operational at noon on the day of arrival. Some refinements were also in the offing. A few weeks after the camp was established, Capt Edmund Zbikowski, the Company A commander, purchased white china for the officers' mess during a trip to Baguio. Company A also began to truck its laundry to Clark Field. A group of US civilians assigned to the project, including John Knutson, had a house near Barrio O'Donnell with a maid, cook, and laundry facilities.<sup>5</sup>

When Company A arrived at the construction site, its primary mission was to build two runways, N-S and E-W, both 5,000 feet long and 400 feet wide, in a modified "V" design. As drawn by the ODE in June 1941, the E-W runway was eventually laid out from NE-SW. Fertig claimed that clearing had already begun on the area designated for the N-S runway, and the ODE construction progress report for 30 November 1941 documented its starting date as 20 October. Nevertheless, Company A personnel did not see evidence of runway development when they arrived. They had to carve the strip out of fields of the cogon grass "higher than a man's head" and the jungle. According to Pvt Frank Dice, diesel mechanic attached to Company A from Headquarters Company, the cogon grass was so dense the bulldozers could not remove it. Engineers and civilian laborers, working on 12-hour shifts, used machetes to cut the vegetation and clear the way for earthmoving equipment. Grading the airstrip followed the clearing of the area. Company A also had to drain several vast rice paddies in the area. Equipment continued to arrive through 10 November. The ODE approved plans for the project the same day.<sup>6</sup>

Company A's division of labor generally followed common practice on airdrome projects in the Philippines involving the COE. US Army engineer personnel operated machines, while Filipinos provided manual labor. The chain of command was from the platoon leader to his sergeant and then to corporals or privates who supervised work details of up to 15 Filipinos. At O'Donnell Field, most of the native laborers were Igorot tribesmen. Under that organizational arrangement, Cpl Ralph B. Jones supervised a work detail for barracks construction, and SSgt Trefle Metras and Pfc Charles Agostinelli managed airstrip construction details. Army engineer troops also undertook most of the technical jobs. One survey detail included



Pvt Joseph G. Minder and Cpl Samuel A. Drake. In a punitive move, Sergeant Trefle consigned Pvt John Mackowski to a labor detail for an alleged breach of motor pool protocol. Trefle believed Mackowski had personally refused to provide transportation to a stranded motor pool colleague. Pvt Joseph Vater commented that the older, seasoned tradesman among the company's selectees tended to work independently, despite the lack of military experience, and the work progressed easily for the most part.<sup>7</sup>



**Figure 9.1. O'Donnell Field: schematic.** (Adapted from O'Donnell Field Schematic, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709.)

Postwar observations on the daily work schedule showed variations, but they indicated that 1st Lieutenant Zbikowski implemented perhaps the most rigorous work regime in the 803rd, despite the heat and humidity. Lt Herbert Coone, the company surgeon, commented that Zbikowski "expected his men to devote their efforts to the success of getting the airfield built with the same dedication and urgency that he felt." For at least the first few weeks, the company worked at least two shifts per day, seven days a week. Lieutenant Montgomery,

in his "Brief History of Company A," documented a three-shift-per-day operation. The schedule for the day crew was morning work, lunch, and afternoon work. Running Company A almost as a civilian organization, Zbikowski dispensed with many routine military procedures. He did not require roll calls or further military training in the daily schedule. Rifles were stocked and stored until the war started. After three weeks of that work schedule, Zbikowski "had a near mutiny on his hands," according to Lieutenant Coone. The men needed recreation, and the company commander arranged a weekend trip to Baguio for them. For Armistice Day—11 November—he allowed a minute of silence, and for Thanksgiving Day, he arranged appropriate meals and shortened the company's work hours.<sup>8</sup>

Although site acquisition was never completed, construction progressed on road and airstrip construction with few challenges and only one notable mistake. Commenting on the failure to complete the purchase of real estate as of 14 December, Casey told the USAFFE AGO: "no further action now." Even though the dry season had begun, Company A encountered one rainstorm that temporarily mired its heavy equipment in mud. Nevertheless, as of 30 November, the barrio road and a cutoff road to the field, started on 3 November, were 85 and 50 percent complete, respectively. Both had a completion date slated for 15 December 1941. By 5 December, the barrio road was finished, and the cutoff was 90 percent complete. Work had begun on 3 November and the NE-SW runway would have been completed by 1 February 1942. By 5 December, it had moved from 5 percent to 65 percent complete. Work on the N-S runway, with a completion date of 15 January 1942, was 30 percent complete by 30 November. Then work on the runway stalled. The construction progress report for 15 December contained the comment "no work done." With work on the N-S runway well underway, Pvt Charles Agostinelli, formerly employed at the Pennsylvania Highway Department, noted that the plans from the ODE did not provide for a transverse crown in the center to allow for water runoff. When he broached the issue, Zbikowski's initial reaction was to issue an order that the runway would be built according to the ODE plans. Two weeks later, Zbikowski reversed himself and ordered the inclusion of an 18-inch rise in the center of the runway. Engineers had to excavate dirt from the nearby hills with power shovels and buckets to get the necessary material. Once the crown problem was solved, the engineers ceased

work on the N-S runway and started developing the NE-SW runway on or about 22 November.<sup>9</sup>



Source: NARA RG111, Box 26, Sc125599

#### **Power shovel with 3/8 cubic yard bucket, 1941**

For the runway construction, Company A used a technique garnered from civilian companies at Westover Field. However, that process escaped the attention of Headquarters Company at Clark Field and Company B at Del Carmen Field. Company A engineers made “earth concrete” or “dirt concrete” by spreading cement mix over the runways and allowed the powder to mix with the volcanic soil and water so that it would naturally harden. Dust would probably not have been an issue at O’Donnell Field. The process had long been used in the United States and might have allowed O’Donnell Field to operate as an all-weather facility.<sup>10</sup>

On 1 December, with surveys, plans, and specifications completed, work on three standard, wood Army barracks began. They were built

to provide separate quarters for engineers and FEAF personnel. They would have been completed by 1 February 1942. One barracks building was almost finished before the war started, but then construction was halted. At the beginning of the war, a contractor had also finished digging one water well for the field and had begun work on a second. Although not included in the semi-monthly construction progress reports, 15 November to 15 December 1941, Montgomery commented that some plane pens had been finished, and others were under construction. Also, plans for ordnance magazines, hangars, and bivouacs were in progress.<sup>11</sup>

Minor supply issues adversely affected the work of Company A. Unless supervised closely, local laborers did not strive to meet the same work ethic as the engineers. They also pilfered lumber. Material shortages led Company A personnel to engage in similar activities to acquire supplies, such as lumber, from other sources. The company's supply personnel had access to the warehouse at Tarlac, a town north of O'Donnell Field, and used it to their advantage. The engineers were forced to modify their trucks to use appropriated aviation gas for motor fuel.<sup>12</sup>

## Medical

The development of health and sanitary facilities paralleled the establishment of an initial bivouac. Lt Herbert Coone set up a dispensary, while Lt Alex Mohnac established the dental clinic. The company also had an ambulance. The medical staff set lister bags to chlorinate water, and work details dug latrines. Throughout the time of Company A's encampment at O'Donnell, Coone conducted abbreviated training sessions for his medics on anatomy and first aid. The dispensary staff included Cpl Walter J. Wasilewski, Pvt Fred W. Zimpfer, Pvt Charles Sorochety, and Pvt George J. Seamans. Coone also engaged in a limited outreach effort by treating a local mayor for malaria. As at Clark Field, snakes were a problem, and several men encountered pythons. Two major industrial accidents, including one fatality, were documented. Pvt Daniel J. Dougherty was injured on 3 December while operating a tractor. Later, Pvt Clyde V. Austin died when a truck loaded with a carryall on which he was riding went off the road, tipped over, and crushed him.<sup>13</sup>

## Morale

In addition to the rumblings of dissatisfaction with the work schedule, Lieutenant Zbikowski dealt with many common personnel problems. Most NCOs were career Army men, but some selectees were promoted to the ranks of corporal or sergeant, including Sgt Steve Kruchowski. In addition to complaining about the work, a few older selectees resented, first, being drafted and, second, having their service extended. Along with some of their younger counterparts, they were sent to the stockade before the war even started. Others were characterized as “yard birds,” who tended to plead ignorance about the work when assigned a job. Privates Frank J. Pasquale, a Brooklyn native in the motor pool, and Donato (Daniel) DiNobile teamed up to haunt 1st Sgt Clarence A. Rutz with their antics. Despite the work schedule, most draftees just wanted to get through their year’s obligation and go home. It took the war to bring a sense of urgency to the ranks.<sup>14</sup>

## Recreation

Company A personnel, despite their remote location, enjoyed some of the same recreational activities in the same places as their counterparts at Clark. They also had some unusual pursuits. Enlisted men went south to Angeles City for movies, bars, and Filipina companionship. At least one notable and movable bar fight that proceeded through two drinking establishments brought action from the military police (MP). After the initial warning failed to calm the situation, the MP’s took the group to the stockade on Clark Field. Zbikowski welcomed that group back to O’Donnell Field at 0300 the next morning. The engineers also traveled from O’Donnell to Clark for movies. Venturing further afield, officers such as Lieutenant Coone, and draftees such as Pvt Joseph Minder and Pfc Kenneth J. Stuhl, took weekend excursions into Manila and visited the Army-Navy Club. The outings allowed for upscale dining and jai-alai matches. Coone also traveled to Del Carmen to use the recreational facilities available to Company B. Most of the officers spent weekends in Baguio. That pleasant, mountainous location provided relief from the heat of Central Luzon.

During the weekend of 15–16 November, Coone took company enlisted personnel, including his medics, to Baguio for a weekend at the suggestion of Zbikowski. The brief respite was presumably to dampen the discontent about the company's intensive work schedule. The weekend before the war began (6–7 December), Pvt Joseph W. Filko, Pvt John Mackowski, and Pvt Joe Minder, among other pursuits, spent time in Baguio.<sup>15</sup>

On and near O'Donnell were activities to break up the work schedule. Company A formed a volleyball team that a local Filipino team consistently defeated. Pvt Frank A. Windell, an electrician, caught butterflies to send to his sister. Col Harry Skerry, then commander, 14th Engineer Combat Battalion PS, in a nearby encampment invited Company A officers to a performance of native dance. As of 22 November, Company A had set up a post exchange (PX), managed by Cpl T. Rupert "Tom" Gagne of the company's supply section.<sup>16</sup>

#### Notes

1. Gerow to CoS, memo, 5 March 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department; Gerow to AGO, memo, 6 March 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, F[iscal] Y[ear] 1942; AGO, Philippine Department, letter, 7 July 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, Fiscal Year 1942, and Exhibit H [O'Donnell Field], 20 June 1942; all in NARA RG165, Entry 281, Box 108; AGO to CG, Philippine Department, letter, 7 March 1941, Subject: New Airfield at O'Donnell, cited in Exhibit H, 20 June 1941, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709; ACoS, G-4, Philippine Department, to CG, USAFFE, routing and record sheet, 20 August 1941, Subject: Construction Program for the Philippine Department, NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 36; Kennedy to Claggett, memo, 1 April 1941; A-4 to chief of the air staff, routing and record sheet, 26 August 1941, Subject: Airports in the Philippines, NARA RG18, Box 1117; Casey to deputy chief of staff (DCoS) [G-4], USAFFE, memo, 25 October 1941, no subject [status of airfield projects], Casey Files, Folder 12; Col Harold H. George to ODE, memo, 29 September 1941, Subject: Construction Plans for Proposed and Existing Airfields, Casey Files, Folder 10; George to ODE, memo, 9 October 1941, Subject: Construction and Installations Desired, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 3; Construction Progress Report, 15 November 1941; Col (unknown) Chamberlain and Col (unknown) Styer [OCE], memorandum of telephone conversation, 13 November 1941. In response to a mid-November query about funding needed for the housing program in the Philippines, MacArthur said the early arrival of troops . . . necessitated completion of housing program ahead of original schedules. He requested \$500,000 "as early as practicable," in addition to \$500,000 the War Department had just provided. Brig Gen Spaatz and Col Harold George considered the development of O'Donnell, Malabang, and Del Carmen Fields, as well as the expansion of Clark Field, their highest priorities. Spaatz' priority list included Nichols and Bataan Fields and also 33 unnamed fields scheduled for development. The additional sites

were in line with concepts for dispersal of aircraft in the Philippines, as Group Capt Charles Darvall, Royal Air Force, had recommended in his late May-early June, 1941, discussions in Manila.

2. OCE Exhibit H, 20 June 1941, Subject: Construction of a New Airfield near O'Donnell, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, File 600.1, Box 709; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 4–9; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 64.

3. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 9–10; Knutson, interview, 20 February 1999; Casey to G-3, USAFFE, memo, 29 October 1941, Subject: Additional Funds for O'Donnell Maneuvers, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 25.

4. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 9–10; Casey to DCoS, USAFFE, memo, 25 October 1941, no subject [status of airfield projects], Casey Files, Folder 12; Construction Progress Report, 15 November 1941; Minder diary, 4; Casey, *Memoirs*, 119, 144–45; Casey to DCoS, USAFFE, memo, 15 October 1941, no subject [status of Zamboanga, Malabang, and O'Donnell airstrips], Casey Files, Folder 12. During his first tour in the Philippines during September, 1937–November, 1940, Casey was involved with the development of a hydroelectric power plant on the Caliraya River, Laguna Province (southern Luzon).

5. Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Construction Progress Report, 15 November 1941; Knutson, interview, 20 February 1999; Coone, *The Sequential Solider*, 12, 15, 18; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Wallace, *POW 83*, 78–80; John C. Knutson to author, letter, ca. February, 1999. Knutson, a civilian heavy equipment repairman, was assigned to Company A and worked on the road into the airstrip with ODE. When the war started he was transferred to Company B and later, with the evacuation to Bataan, he went to Headquarters Company. Joseph A. Vater, “Dates to Remember,” placed Company A's arrival at Camp O'Donnell as 4 November 1941.

6. Philippine Department, Exhibit H, 20 June 1942; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 9; Semi-Monthly Construction Progress Report, 30 November 1941; Vater, interview, 25 October 1998; Minder diary, 4; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Dice, interview, 25 October 1999; Denehy, *Captain Edward Peter Zbikowski*, 5. The Construction Progress Report, 15 November 1941, documented the start of the N-S runway as 20 October 1941; Joseph A. Vater, Oral History interview, 14 April, 2007, by Michael Blatt and Andrea Blatt, Rutgers Oral History Archives. Online: <http://oralhistory.rutgers.edu/>. (hereafter cited as Vater Rutgers interview with permission from Rutgers University).

7. Gagne, interview, 6 March 1999; Wallace, *POW 83*, 78–80, 89–90. Mackowski worked with Pvt Andrew J. King and commented that he and King always seemed to be in trouble. Cost Sheets, Daily Labor Report, Camp O'Donnell, 1–15 December 1941, NARA RG407, Box 1663, Microfilm Roll 67; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Minder diary, 4. Cpl Drake was KIA on Corregidor on 6 May 1942. Knutson, interview, 20 February 1999, said on payday an Igorot woman came to O'Donnell field to collect pay for the tribesman.

8. Vater, interviews, 6 March 1999, and 12–13 October 2003; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 12; Denehy, *Captain Edward Peter Zbikowski*, 5. Joseph Vater also remembered a 24-hour workday.

9. Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Periods Ending, 30 November and 15 December 1941; Vater, interviews, 12–13 October 2003 and 6 February 2009; Memo, ODE to USAFFE, 3 December 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineer Construction; Gagne, interview, 6 March 1999; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Casey to USAFFE AGO, memo, 14 December 1941, Subject: Acquisition of Real Estate for Airfield at O'Donnell, Casey Files, Folder 2.

10. Vater, interview, 22 August 2006; Wallace, *POW 83*, 81. See Letter excerpt, Fries to unknown, 6 August 1941, in Tollis, 803rd Unit History, 1946.



11. Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 15 December 1941; Vater, interviews, 12–13 October 2003; 28 January 2010; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4. Company A might have sabotaged the wells prior to evacuation, an action that adversely affected US POW’s held at Camp O’Donnell during April–June, 1942. See Lee Brandenburg and Matt Isaacs, *Dawn of Darkness* (Privately published, 2009), 64.

12. Wallace, *POW* 83, 91; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Gagne, interview, 6 February 1999. Among others, John Mackowski supervised the local employees who transported lumber and cement to the runway construction areas.

13. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 13, 16, 18; Leggett Roster; Wallace, *POW* 83, 78; 1st Lt James D. Richardson to Surgeon Station Hospital, Ft. Stotsenburg, P.I., 1st Ind., 6 January 1942, no subject [injury report], NARA RG 407, Box 1663, Microfilm Roll 68.

14. Wallace, *POW* 83, 78–82; Minder Diary, 4; Vater, interviews, 20–21 October 2002, and 12–13 October 2003; Gagne, interview, 6 February 1999.

15. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 13–17; Denehy, *Captain Edward Peter Zbikowski*, 5; Vater, interviews, 12–13 October 2003 and 6–9 April 2005; Joseph W. Filko, 25 October 1999. Minder diary, 4; Wallace, *POW* 83, 94.

16. Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Vater, interview, 25 October 1998; Wallace, *POW* 83, 78; Gagne, interview, 6 February 1999.





## Chapter 10

# Company B at Del Carmen Field

## Construction at Del Carmen

On 1 November, Company B left Clark Field and arrived at the Del Carmen airdrome site, about 17 miles directly south of Clark Field and seven miles outside Floridablanca, Pampanga Province. Floridablanca is a village that was founded in the mid nineteenth-century and in the center of Luzon's sugar area.

In 1919, the Spreckles and Smith Sugar Company, based in San Francisco, California, incorporated the Calamba Sugar Estate and formed the Pampanga Sugar Mill (PASUMIL) in Barrio Del Carmen, Floridablanca, as the first "sugar central." The complex was a sugar plantation—or hacienda and a sugar mill—that served area sugar growers. It became one of the largest "sugar centrals" in the Philippines. A network of narrow-gauge rail lines transported sugar cane from the various plantations to the mills, and the MRR had a four-kilometer (km) spur to the airdrome site in Barrio San Jose. Records outlining the route of Company B's travel do not exist. Still, the engineers probably went by truck from Ft. Stotsenburg through San Fernando and Guagua to Floridablanca since the more direct road from Ft. Stotsenburg to Floridablanca was not yet finished. Throughout the 1930s, the 4th Composite Group and its subordinate squadrons, either jointly or individually, conducted their periodic field training exercises using the PASUMIL landing strip and facilities in Barrio Del Carmen, on the east bank of a stream a few miles north of Floridablanca. However, the proposed Floridablanca Landing Field, which USAFFE called Del Carmen Field, was located northwest of Floridablanca. The site was a section of a sugar plantation in Barrio San Jose owned by Alfonso de Castellvi and was then leased by the Commonwealth Government, a process that, again, was not complete by the start of the war.<sup>1</sup>

As the chief of logistics (G-4) for the USAFFE Air Force, Col Harold George was responsible for overseeing airfield construction, an area of intense interest for him. On 19 September 1941, he formally requested funds (about \$900) to start a survey of the proposed site for the airfield. Ten days later, George had placed Del Carmen as number




Source: NARA RG18, AA 223-329-027 and 21858

#### PASUMIL Del Carmen landing strip, October 1940 (S-N)

four on a list of seven potential airfields that would allow for dispersal of units from Clark Field or for basing of newly assigned units. In addition to Clark Field, the others were San Marcellino, Rosales, and O'Donnell in central Luzon, and Lipa, which was south of Manila. By mid-October, George moved Del Carmen Field to top priority on the air force construction list, followed by Cabanatuan, Lipa, O'Donnell, and Rosales. With the change in priorities, George pressed Col Hugh Casey to move quickly at Del Carmen, particularly on housing and messing facilities. His preference for Del Carmen Field reflected the change in US policy. The G-4 did not yet have the field on a list for construction projects as of 20 August 1941. The first documented mention of Del Carmen was its inclusion on a map of airfields in the Philippines dated 1 September 1941. It was initially designated as a pursuit base. The plan was to use Del Carmen and Iba Field to the north in Zambales Province to change the disposition of pursuit aircraft and thus allow for better defensive coverage of Clark Field and Manila Bay. Later plans were fluid. As of mid-September, Colonel George advised USAFFE that Del Carmen would base three squadrons

of light bombers: Douglas A-24 Banshee dive bombers of the 27th Bomb Group, Light. Later plans for Del Carmen called for it to be ready for the arrival of the B-17s of the 7th or the 19th Bombardment Group, Heavy by 1 December 1941. The Roosevelt Administration had decided in early September to transfer the additional B-17s to the Philippines.<sup>2</sup>



**Figure 10.1. Del Carmen Field: proposed site, 27 September 1941.** (Adapted from Bureau of Aeronautics, Plan Profile and Cross Section of Proposed Del Carmen Airfield Site, NARA RG 407.)

The airdrome initially was to be a sizable facility with two runways, each 6,780 feet long and 670 feet wide. Plans were later expanded to create three runways, each 6,700 feet long and 300 feet wide and laid out in an “A” pattern—NW-SE, NE-SW, and E-W. Also, on the construction list were approximately 100 buildings. Construction was to encompass:

- Barracks for 2,750 officers and enlisted men, both combat and support units, including one company of aviation engineers;
- Aircraft and bomb storage warehouses;
- Aircraft revetments;
- Hospital and dispensary;

- Under and above-ground storage for 750,000 gallons of gasoline; and
- A supporting road network.

The first runway was to be completed on 15 December with the other two programmed for completion on 15 January and 1 March 1942, respectively. Two barracks were to be ready by 15 March and 1 April 1942. Company B, with about 190 men, was responsible for all the construction. Many Filipino laborers worked on the project; however, private construction companies were not involved.<sup>3</sup>

Attached to Company B was a medical detail consisting of SSgt Robert E. Matuozzi, Privates First Class Richard W. Wilson and John Welch, and Pvt John Swierjewski. Capt Ross G. McClure, a Quartermaster Corps officer from the ODE's construction and inspection section, was also attached to Company B.<sup>4</sup>

The troops established a primitive camp quickly. They set up a semicircle of World War I-vintage tents in a coconut grove. Shortly before the war started, Filipino workers finished nipa huts for Company B. With the installation of a generator, the electricians eventually wired the tents for lights. Water was available only by truck from a source seven miles away. Water was dispensed in lister bags, and it had to be heavily laced with iodine to be safe for drinking. The hot weather and the heavy work meant that Company B also had to resort to the use of salt tablets. Flies, mosquitoes, and chiggers added to the challenge. The company had cooks, but the troops groused about the quality of the food available to them.<sup>5</sup>

The actual construction of the airstrips began about 10 November. Company B had to clear sugar fields to make way for the airstrips. The engineers relied on both their heavy bulldozers and local Filipino laborers. They began work after the second week of construction, cutting the sugarcane with bolo knives and digging out the deep, intertwining root systems. The engineers shipped the cane to PASUMIL and received the resultant raw sugar juice in return. With the cane cleared, heavy equipment operations began removing dirt from the runway areas. Battalion engineer officer, Capt William B. Thomas estimated that Company B moved 40,000 cubic yards of earth in the process. Survey teams, one of which included Pvt Albert J. Senna, checked to ensure proper grading. While little excavation was required for the proposed housing area, the engineers had to grade about a half-mile road link between the airstrips and the housing

area. Unlike the Company A work schedule, Company B personnel worked half-days six days a week, which was typical for military personnel in the Philippines in peacetime.<sup>6</sup>



Source: NARA RG 111, SCA 125570 & 125578

Caterpillar cable-operated D-7 and D-8 tractors (1941)

Orders passed from the battalion commander to the company commander and then to the project manager, who provided direction to the work details. Major Fries, the battalion commander, gave his officers considerable leeway, as long as they carried out his orders and accomplished the assigned work. He seldom visited Del Carmen—if at all. However, Lt James Richardson, the battalion executive officer, and Lt James Leggett, the battalion personnel officer, made at least one visit to Del Carmen.<sup>7</sup>

During a 16 November visit to Del Carmen—just over two week-days after Company B's arrival and about six days after construction began—Col Francis Brady, chief of staff for the just-formed FEAF, wrote to his friend “Toohey” Spaatz that one landing strip was only 300 feet wide and 3,600 feet long with the remaining 2,000 feet still a cane field.<sup>8</sup>

By 30 November, Company B had completed plans and specifications for all three runways. The engineers finished the base for the NW-SE runway and had it ready for operations. Electricians were prepared to place lights on one runway, presumably the NW-SE strip, but the war prevented wiring. Work had also begun on the barracks and shops. Company B also started digging “V”-shaped trenches as part of defensive preparations. This project was started earlier than Headquarters Company at Clark Field.<sup>9</sup>

Commenting on the ODE's 30 November construction progress report, USAFFE also shared its dissatisfaction with the pace of work at Del Carmen:

Del Carmen Field is one of highest priority. Every effort should be made to provide usable runways as quickly as practicable. Additional hired labor should be provided in addition to troops, if the project can be so advanced. Special attention should be given this high priority.<sup>10</sup>

Engineers had considered the “admirable qualities” of the soil of central Luzon in selecting sites for airfields. Volcanic ash, or *lahar*, from the various eruptions of Mt. Pinatubo and ancient maritime deposits laid down in the shallow extensions of Lingayen Gulf and Manila Bay and provided for porous soil with “vertical drainage.” As with the surface at Clark Field, the ground at Del Carmen was capable of handling heavy aircraft without the use of the pavement.

The soils also had a contrary tendency: dust. Colonel Brady doubted that the dust raised by aircraft during warm-up and take-off would dissipate rapidly enough for continuing air operations. Lt Col Wendell Fertig, the ODE's chief of construction, was responsible for



supervising airdrome construction. Absent calcium chloride, the chemical usually used for dust mitigation, he proposed the spreading of raw or blackstrap molasses, the liquid residue from the sugar refining process, on the soil to solve the dust problem. While others thought the molasses was sufficient, Cpl Paul A. Kloecker noted later that as soon as the engineers spread the liquid, ants began to devour it. The soil-cement mixes which the 803rd had experimented with at Westover Field were not used. Fertig noted that the Japanese attacks halted the experiment with molasses binder. Thus, dust problems plagued air operations and exacerbated the effects of Japanese bombing and strafing at Del Carmen until US forces evacuated it.<sup>11</sup>

## Recreation

The work schedule at Del Carmen left some free time for recreation, and some diversions were available to the troops. The engineers used a power shovel to dam and dig out the Gumain River, which bordered the airfield, to allow for swimming and bathing, as well as to provide water for laundry. The river site also had a picnic area complete with a small grass shelter. Once a week, Cpt Herbert V. Ingersoll, company commander, provided transportation to take his troops into Floridablanca with its bars, liquor stores, and tattoo parlors. As was the case with the 4th Composite Group during its annual training exercises, the general manager of Spreckles and Smith opened the sugar central facilities—a golf course, swimming pool, duck-pin bowling alley, and tennis courts—to the 803rd and the 34th Pursuit Squadron, which arrived at Del Carmen in late November. Presented with the invitation, Ingersoll said the officers would not go unless arrangements were made for the enlisted men. That decision was another reason Ingersoll was popular with his men. From 21 to 22 November, Lt William Thomas, the battalion engineer officer detailed to Company B, invited Lt Leggett, the battalion's assistant adjutant, and Company A surgeon Lt. Herbert Coone to Del Carmen for a weekend of recreation. Leggett commented favorably on the dining facility, swimming pool, and bowling alley.<sup>12</sup>

Thanksgiving dinner was a sizable meal of chicken and the usual holiday trimmings followed by beer and cigars. That same day, November 26, Colonel Brady ordered the 34th Pursuit Squadron to Del Carmen Field. William Bartsch calculated that some personnel ar-



rived on Friday, November 27, and pilots landed three days later. Shortly after the P-35As landed, the squadron's support personnel set up a tent city next to the 803rd Engineers. The airmen were in time for breakfast on that first day at Del Carmen. On November 27, Secretary of War Stimson advised General MacArthur of the deteriorating situation in East Asia and that the field was not yet capable of handling heavy bombers. Still, the construction had progressed to the point where it was "ready for rough immediate use." Thus, it could accommodate the 34th and its P-35As. The semi-monthly construction progress report for 30 November 1941 noted that the NW-SE runway was only 35 percent complete. For that reason on 5 December, USAFFE canceled plans to base the 7th Bomb Group Heavy at Del Carmen.<sup>13</sup>

#### Notes

1. Middleton, interview, 1 March 2010; Sascha Weinzheimer [daughter of the Spreckles and Smith manager prior to the war] to author, e-mail 19 April 2002; "Views From The Pampang," 7 September 2008, <http://viewsfromthepampang.blogspot.com/>; William B. Thomas to headquarters, claims service, PHILRYCOM, letter, 15 July 1947, Subject: Claim of Juan Castellvi and Claim of Juan Castellvi, Administrator, NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11 (letter recipient hereafter referred to as "PHILRYCOM" (Philippines-Ryukyu Command); [Philippine] Bureau of Aeronautics, Airways Division, Plan Profile and Cross Section of Proposed del Carmen Airfield Site, Sheet No. 2, 27 September 1941, NARA RG338 (Quartermaster Corps), Box T-4400, Decimal 601; "Field Exercises in the Philippines," ACNL 22, no. 4 (15 February 1937): 12; "Field Exercises in the Philippines," ACNL 20, no. 10 (15 May 1937): 9; Casey to AGO, USAFFE, memo, 2 December 1941, no subject (request to proceed with purchase of land for Del Carmen Field), NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 49.

2. F.F.C. [no further information] to USAFFE, G-4, memo, 19 September 1941, Subject: Re Funds for Survey of Air Field Sites, NARA496, Entry 540, Box 24; George to ODE, memo, 29 September 1941, Subject: Construction Plans for Proposed and Existing Airfields, Casey Files, Folder 10; George to Casey, memo, 17 October 1941, Subject: Housing Requirements at Priority Fields, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 3; USAFFE G-4 to CG, USAFFE, routing slip, 20 August 1941, Subject: Construction Program for the Philippine Department, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 36; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 47; MacArthur to Marshall, letter, 29 November 1941, no subject, NARA RG165, Box 122; Map C, 1 September 1941, Subject: Philippines Airfield, NARA RG496, Box 109. The men of the 27th Bomb Group, Light arrived in the Philippines, but their A-24s did not. See Adrian R. Martin and Larry W. Stephenson, *Operation Plum* (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M Press, 2008), for the story of the 27th Bomb Group. Thomas to PHILRYCOM, letter, 15 July 1947; George to CG, USAFFE, memo, 18 September 1941, Subject: Estimate of Funds for Additional Housing Facilities at Clark Field [sic]; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 22.

3. George to ODE, memo, 9 October 1941, Subject: Construction and Installations Desired, MMA, RG2, Box 1, Folder 3; Francis C. Brady to Carl Spaatz, letter, 17

November 1941, NARA RG18, Box 117 (Project Files); ODE, Philippine Department, Construction Progress Reports for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 30 November 1941, and period ending 15 December 1941, NARA RG338, Box 4383 (the Del Carmen Project was not listed on the report for 15 November 1941); Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 163–64; Wonneman diary and interviews, 29 September and 15 November 1998 (Wonneman dated Company B's arrival in Del Carmen as 27 October 1941); Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 37; Lamm, interviews, 18 August and 28 September 1998; Joe B. Hill, interview, 10 March 1998; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 33; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 62, placed the start of construction at Del Carmen as November 10.

4. Leggett roster; USAFFE engineer, US Army Officers on Duty with Engineer Headquarters and Units, 21 February 1942 and 11 March 1942, Casey Files, Folders 5 and 8. Capt. McClure died in Cabanatuan POW Camp, 11 August 1942.

5. Lamm, interviews, 18 August and 29 September 1998; Hill, interview, 10 March 1998; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 33, and interview, 10 March 2010; Wonneman diary and interview, 15 November 1998; Samuel Trifilo, *Engineer Memoirs* (interview by Dr. James Dunn, History Office, Humphreys Engineer Center, Ft. Belvoir VA, 13 February 1996, 7–8; Brady to Spaatz, letter, 17 November 1941; Smith Merrill to author, e-mail, 4 April 1999; DiGiacomo and Wuttke, *Just One More Day*, 13.

6. Lamm, interviews, 18 August and 29 September 1998; Hill, interview, 10 March 1998; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 33; Wonneman, diary and interview, 15 November 1998; Trifilo interview, 7–8; Brady to Spaatz, letter, 17 November 1941; Albert J. Senna, Oral History interview, 17 October 2005, by Shaun Illingworth and James Herrera, Rutgers Oral History Archives. Online: <http://oralhistory.rutgers.edu/military-history/31-interviewees/1302-senna-albert-j> (31 October 2013), cited with permission and hereafter as “Senna Rutgers interview”; Thomas to PHILRYCOM, letter, 15 July 1947; Lt Col Clarence Bidgood to PHILRYUCOM, 1st Ind., n.d. [ca. 15 August 1947], no subject [civilian workers at airfields constructed by the 803rd EB], NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11.

7. Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 37; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I.

8. Brady to Spaatz, letters, 13 and 17 November 1941, NARA, RG18, Box 112; Marshall to MacArthur, radiogram, 5 November 1941, NARA RG 165; Gerow to ACoS-Operations, memo, 12 November 1941, Subject: Engineers, Aviation Facilities, NARA RG165, Box 255; Lamm, interview, 18 August 1998. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 206, thought that Brady may have overestimated the length of the runway. According to intelligence reports, it was 2,640 feet long.

9. ODE, Philippine Department, Construction Progress Reports for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 30 November 1941; Gerow to ACoS-Operations, memo, 12 November 1941, Subject: Engineers, Aviation Facilities; Lamm, interview, 18 August 1998; Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; [author undocumented], Far East Air Force and Provisional Air Corps Regiment Narrative, [n.d.], NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 12 [27th Bombardment Group], 55 (hereafter cited as “27th Bomb Group Narrative”).

10. USAFFE to ODE, 1st Ind., 9 December 1941, no subject (comment on construction progress report for semi-monthly period ending 30 November 1941).

11. Brady to Spaatz, letter, 17 November 1941; Casey, *Memoirs*, 148; Paul A. Kloecker in “December 8, 1941: These 7 Remember It,” *The [Sarasota] News*, 8 December 1958; Middleton, *Flashback*, 37; Ferron Edward Cummins, *This is My Story: Events and Circumstances from 1937 to 1956 (MS)*, 1990, 2, (cited with the approval of Lora Cummins); Fertig, *Tulasaffe or Education of a Guerilla*, 110–11, MMA, 10–11, and *Guerrillero*. Different drafts of *Guerrillero* and *Tulasaffe or Education of a Guerilla* showed minor variations in text and pagination.

12. Sasha Weinzheimer to author, e-mail, 19 April, 2002; Poster, interviews, 25 October 1998, and 24 October 1999; Weldon Hamilton, *Late Summer of 1941 and My War with Japan* (Bloomington, Indiana: Xlibris Corporation, 2001), 20; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 34; deGiacomo and Wuttke, *Just One More Day*, 22; Leggett letters, 24 November 1941; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; “Field Exercises in the Philippines,” *ACNL* 20, no. 4 (15 February 1937): 12, “Field Exercises in the Philippines,” *ACNL* 20, no. 10 (15 May 1937): 9, and “Philippine Department,” *ACNL* 21, no. 4 (15 February 1938): 4. Weldon Hamilton was a ground crew member in the 34th Pursuit Squadron. During field exercises in late 1938, PASUMIL quartered and messed officers of the 2nd Observation Squadron at its club and enlisted men at one of its warehouses. It allowed the men to use its two golf courses.

13. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 213, 238; Hamilton, *Late Summer of 1941*, 20; Fries Letters, 27 November 1941; Wuttke, *Just One More Day*, 13. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 31–32; 27th Bomb Group Narrative, 55; William H. Bartsch, ed., “‘I Wonder at Times How We Keep Going Here’: The 1941–42 Philippines Diary of Lt John P. Burns, 21st Pursuit Squadron,” *Air Power History* 53 no. 4 (Winter, 2006): 34, <https://www.afhistory.org/>.

## Chapter 11

### Headquarters Company at War

Word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began to arrive in the Philippines at about 0330 on 8 December 1941. Commercial radio provided the news to Clark Field about an hour later. All units were alerted, and all ranks knew about the attack by breakfast. The 5th Interceptor Command reacted to reports of enemy flights over Luzon by ordering pursuit squadrons, including the 20th from Clark, into the air.

By 0800, B-17s took off without bomb loads and started patrolling to avoid being caught on the ground. By 1130, however, most of the Clark-based bombers and pursuit planes had returned and landed to refuel. The B-17s lined up wingtip to wingtip, as at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, hours before to allow for faster refueling and loading of bombs for Brereton's proposed afternoon attack on Formosa. The 20th's P-40s were being refueled and readied for take-off to cover Clark Field. At 1217, 54 two-engine Japanese bombers in two waves began the one-hour attack on Clark Field with precision bombing. At the same time, another group attacked Iba Field, the second target of the day. Using the standard Japanese plan of attack, the fast, agile Zeros in groups of nine followed the bombers for low-level strafing that inflicted the most considerable casualties on both men and aircraft. Only three of the 20th's P-40s got off the ground using the pock-marked runways.<sup>1</sup>

Within the 803rd immediate shock and panic led to both valiant and fruitless actions. As Richard Meixsel pointed out, most of the men at Clark were relatively new to the military and had minimal training in combat operations. A group from Company B, including Pvt Joe Poster, was at Clark on 8 December but turned down an invitation for lunch and left, fearing they would be charged for the meal. The first thought of the 803rd engineers was that the approaching planes were those of the US Navy. Then the bombs began to fall. Some officers, including Lt James Richardson, ran from lunch to seek shelter under a raised latrine that was heavily protected by sandbags. Lt Samuel Goldblith sought out a "V"-shaped trench and began to fire a .30 caliber machine gun, which kept jamming, at the attackers. Lt Everett Carney and a work detail were on an airstrip when the at-

tack began. Heavy construction noise precluded them from hearing the approaching aircraft. He and Pvt Frederick Julius got the detail off the field and into dispersal sites. Other enlisted men dove from the windows of their barracks, where they were still in their bunks after lunch, and tried to escape to the trenches. They fired bolt-action Springfield rifles and .30 caliber machine guns in vain at the Japanese planes. Lieutenant Leggett and Pvt Richard Potter aided three wounded men during the attack. These actions later earned them recommendations for the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).<sup>2</sup>

John Bartsch, an author of the most detailed studies of the air war in the Philippines, termed the situation “MacArthur’s Pearl Harbor” because of the surprise and the damage that the Japanese inflicted on the FEAF. Only 10 hours after the surprise Japanese attack in Hawaii—and with ample warning of war—Clark Field was also in a shambles, as was Iba Field, home of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron. Casualties at Clark were substantial, with 55 killed and over 100 wounded. The bombs and fire badly damaged hangars and quarters located near the airstrips. Damaged and destroyed aircraft littered the field. Runways were pitted with bomb craters. Capt William E. Dyess of the 21st Pursuit Squadron wrote that he runways were “bombed so systematically that we could use only the auxiliary landing strip.” Communications facilities were destroyed. The omnipresent cogon grass was burning.<sup>3</sup>

The target during the first days of the war was Clark Field. Ft. Stotsenburg remained relatively untouched. By the next day, the PX was operating, but the officers’ club was deserted.<sup>4</sup>

In the first day of the war, the FEAF lost about half its bombardment and a third of its pursuit aircraft (shown in table 11.1, below).

**Table 11.1. FEAF modern aircraft: 8-9 December 1941\***

Type	Number Assigned	Operational	
		8 December	9 December
<b>Total</b>	194	120	84
B-17	35	30	17
P-40	107	72	50-55
P-35	52	18	15

\* Inventory number on hand at 1200 each day. The statistics excluded 39 obsolete bomber and 16 pursuit aircraft.

Source: Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 449; assistant chief of air staff/intelligence, historical division. *Army Air Forces in the War against Japan, 1941-1942* (Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 34) (Washington, DC: June 1945 (reprint)), 31.

Surprisingly, the 803rd suffered only minor injuries among its officers and one in the enlisted ranks. However, they had significant consequences. When the Japanese attacked, Major Fries was in his quarters near the airstrip where the P-40s were parked. With him were Capt Peter Reynolds, the Headquarters Company commander, and 1st Lt Alex Mohnac, the battalion dentist. The battalion commander suffered a head wound, despite taking cover when his kitchen took a direct hit. Reynolds was “peppered all over,” and Mohnac sustained injuries to his back. They evacuated from Fries’ quarters and took shelter in a bomb crater as the Zeros came into strafe buildings on Clark. Later Mohnac took Reynolds to the Ft. Stotsenburg Hospital for treatment. As a result of the effects of Fries’ head wound, Captain Bidgood took over command of the battalion. Both Fries and Reynolds were awarded the Purple Heart because of the wounds. The memorandum recommending the citation did not mention a medal for Mohnac. Pvt Frank Dice was also wounded.<sup>5</sup>

Immediately after the attack, Headquarters Company ceased working on runway development to focus on repairs. At the same time, Company A and Company B were continuing with construction projects at O’Donnell and Del Carmen Fields. The 8 December attack resulted in the loss of several trucks used by Headquarters Company. In response to a request the next day, the USAFFE G-4 provided immediate authorization for the engineers to obtain five replacements “to use in repairs to the airfield.” Every available man in Headquarters Company worked to salvage trucks and equipment and to repair the runways. They filled the craters in the runways, some four feet deep and eight feet wide, and rolled them smooth. Civilian laborers under the direction of Lieutenant Boyt were also involved in the repairs. Boyt said repairing the earth and gravel runways was a relatively easy task. By dusk, on 8 December, the strips were again operational. Late in the afternoon, the 17th and 21st Pursuit Squadrons received orders to relocate from Nichols to Clark in anticipation of a Japanese attack on Nichols. Repairs on one auxiliary runway allowed pilots from the 21st Pursuit Group to land at Clark, while the 17th sought temporary refuge at Del Carmen Field.<sup>6</sup>

The effectiveness of the plane and personnel shelters at Clark was mixed. The revetments proved to be of little value, as Casey and Boyt had forecast, even though their construction had delayed runway projects before the war. Of the 20th Pursuit Squadron’s P-40s, 20 of the 23 were destroyed or rendered inoperable in the attack. At least

two of the aircraft caught fire in revetments because of close-in incendiary bombs and strafing. The “V”-shaped trenches, on the other hand, proved their worth during the attack. Goldblith and, later, Bartsch credited them with keeping casualties low. On 15 December, the USAFFE headquarters alerted all units that “strafing attacks on personnel at Clark Field by dive-bombers have proven that a series of V-shaped trenches offer an effective emergency protection.” Lieutenant Boyt noted the change in attitude toward the “V”-trenches as soon as the war started: “those men found their motivation and soon dug so many trenches that you could hardly take two steps in any direction without falling into one.”<sup>7</sup>

As expected, the issue of dispersal and protection of the remaining aircraft became more urgent. At 0630 on 9 December, Col Lawrence Churchill, who had become commander of the Far East Air Service Command, requested that the USAFFE provide camouflage facilities sufficient to accommodate six B-17 bombers each at Clark, Nichols, Del Carmen, and San Marcelino Fields. Casey immediately issued orders to Col Lloyd Mielenz, the ODE supply officer, to ship camouflage nets and to notify area engineers to prepare sites and erect the nets as a “first priority over other work.” On that issue, as with the construction of revetments and repair of airstrips, Col Francis Brady, Brereton’s irascible chief of staff, pressured Casey for action. Casey noted on 11 December that the “air force has priority on camouflage materials.” Still, he had to ask Brady to indicate the recommended allocation of those materials to the various fields. By 9 December, Casey had recommended “priorities in construction to USAFFE.” First on the list was “hasty camouflage of important installations.” The second item focused on airfields: repairs to operating fields; provision of runways, essential gasoline, and operating facilities; defense facilities, including revetments; “hasty shelter;” and water supply. Casey’s third recommendation involved fortifications, including the installation of guns for the seacoast defense (the subject of a separate section). As a third priority, Casey listed permanent structures at airfields. He noted that within the three groups of priorities (first, second, and third), he had not established a relative order. He continued that it was “generally understood that the construction indicated within each group [was] generally in the same order of priority, subject to variation up or down depending on the urgency of a specific situation.” Shortly after that, Casey modified his earlier guidance by stating that “high priority must be given to the preparation of camou-

flage facilities for planes on the operating fields and the construction of plane pens [i.e., revetments] at each operating field." That being said, the ODE contested a USAFFE review of the 30 November Semi-Monthly Construction Report by arguing that a "shortage of equipment [was] responsible for [the] delay" in constructing dispersal and protective facilities for planes. The ODE said that "contractors would do the work if [original emphasis] we [would lend] them equipment. In that case, we could do the work equally well." If necessary, Casey advised the ODE that he was prepared to work through the Philippine Constabulary (PC) to impress labor for airfield construction.

Casey also noted that personnel should use existing quarters whenever possible rather than engaging in new construction.<sup>8</sup> The 192nd Tank Battalion moved from a relatively exposed location and took up a position covering the south airstrip, which was still under construction.<sup>9</sup>

Like all others, the units at Clark, the battalion staff, and Headquarters Company evacuated to a more secure location before sundown on 8 December. They moved several times before finally departing the area on Christmas Day. The first location was a nearby banana grove. They camouflaged equipment with netting and set up field kitchens after obtaining rations from the Quartermaster Corps. The battalion headquarters then moved to a small village about 50 yards from the end of the runway, where Bidgood and Richardson had found an old rice mill, dubbed "The Barn," that was used as a CP. The building was so termite-infested the engineers feared it would collapse. Regardless, it was one of the few structures to survive the Japanese attacks undamaged. For the changed situation and the new locations, the 803rd engineers built a splinter-proof shelter inside "The Barn" for Major Fries, an accommodation for him that continued on Bataan. The shelters were complete with two guards. The arrangement earned him the unflattering nickname of "Fearless Frank" from the troops. The engineers themselves slept on the ground. Because of the dry season, the accommodations were "not too uncomfortable," according to Boyt, who camped with the 803rd at several locations. Lieutenant Boyt remembered having Christmas dinner on 22 December 1941, at the 803rd's headquarters in "The Barn." Christmas dinner included turkey, dressing, fruit, and candy. Boyt said the occasion was "not festive" and that the faces around me were grim." Guard posts were located at each end of the camps. Maj Maurice "Moe" Daly, who had replaced Lt Col Lester Maitland as commander of



Clark Field in mid-November, was upset about the move or perhaps that he was not notified of the movement. Consequently, the battalion returned to the banana grove.<sup>10</sup>

The repair work continued at Clark Field through eight Japanese bombing raids and one strafing attack, as well as numerous false alarms from 9 to 24 December. Lieutenant Carney supervised most of the repairs. Later, Major Fries recommended him for the Silver Star medal for his work during the attack and for being under the subsequent and constant bombardment. On Major Fries' recommendation, Casey put forth additional members of Headquarters Company for the Silver Star for their accomplishments at Clark Field during 8 to 24 December 1941: Sgt Julian B. Brown, Cpl John R. Ray, Pfc Basil Blume, Pvt Melvin F. Baidon, Pvt Lawrence R. Beard, Pvt Roger D. Derr, Pvt (later Pfc) David Ferratti, Pvt Gerhard J. Hamers, Pvt (later Cpl) Dee S. Jackson, Pvt Stephen S. Pawlik, and Pvt Raymond C. Perrell.<sup>11</sup>

The repair work itself reflected one of the many ways the 803rd adapted to the situation at hand. Work details deployed to airstrips in the early morning and received breakfast in the field. A work detail included a truck and driver, an air guard, and bulldozer and carry all operators. Pvt John Zubay, who earned a Bronze Star medal for his efforts, remembered that as an air guard, he stood in the back of a pickup truck and pounded on the cab as a warning when his acute hearing picked up the sound of approaching aircraft. Trucks then picked up men and headed into the nearby sugar cane fields for cover. They had to shout their identification to the battalion guard to avoid being shot. When the raids were over, the men returned to work immediately. With little time to take cover before an attack, some of the repair details used their equipment for protection during the raids from 8 to 24 December. While a POW, Major Fries added Sgt Fredrick Julius to the list of those recommended for the Silver Star medal for airstrip repair work at Clark Field. Lieutenant Goldblith believed that Pvt Arlen W. Day also should have been included in the list.<sup>12</sup>


In addition to repairing airstrips, Headquarters Company was also involved in guard duties at Clark, as was the case for the battalion's other companies at Del Carmen, Nichols, and O'Donnell Fields, as of mid-December. Calling the situation "unsatisfactory," Casey urged that the case be "immediately remedied." He recommended that the guards should be troops other than construction personnel and armed with heavier weapons than rifles at all airfields, both operational and those still in the planning stage. The

WPD commented, in mid-November 1941, that there were “no plans to send additional [antiaircraft or air warning] units from the United States.” On Luzon, only elements of the 200th CA Regiment were available. Immediately before Casey’s protest, the USAFFE G-4 had issued four .50-caliber machine guns to the 803rd on 13 December for “protection while repairing airfields.”<sup>13</sup>

Nerves were taut after the 8 December attack. Brig General King imposed a strict blackout on Ft. Stotsenburg and Clark Field. Fearing a follow-on Japanese parachute attack, a subject of numerous rumors, King also ordered the 192nd Tank Battalion to surround the airfield. Everyone remained on alert. A sentry shot one soldier who had wandered from the camp perimeter. The tension infected the 803rd, as well. Among a group sleeping under a banyan tree, Pvt Morris A. Levine, a truck driver from New York, suffered from a nightmare, awoke screaming about paratroopers, and started shooting. One shot wounded Cpl Edwin Heard in the stomach-groin area. Sgt Richard A. Koerner, Heard’s boss in the motor pool, and Sgt John Moyer took Heard immediately to the Ft. Stotsenburg hospital, where he died on 10 December. Levine was also taken to the hospital on detached service for evaluation and did not return to the battalion.<sup>14</sup>

During 10-25 December, Headquarters Company’s four- and six-ton trucks worked continuously to move 155 mm *grande puissance filloux* (GPF) guns “all over Luzon,” Lieutenant Goldblith remembered. A heavy truck or caterpillar-type tractor was used to pull the guns. Col Ernest B. Miller, commander of the 194th Tank Battalion, estimated that the top speed for the tractors was six miles an hour. Goldblith commended Pfc Robert F. Mulvaney and Pvt Donald R. Ward for their actions on that task. The French had designed the 155-mm GPF as its standard heavy field gun in 1917, but the US army used it more effectively. It had a rifle barrel over 19 feet long with a 155 mm (about six inches) bore. The USAFFE used its artillery to significant effect in defense of the Philippines.<sup>15</sup>

During those early days of the war, Major Fries began the first segment of a long and frustrating effort to gain promotions for some of his officers. On 19 December, he recommended 1st Lt James Richardson for promotion to captain and 2nd Lt Everett Carney to the rank of first lieutenant.<sup>16</sup>



Source: NARA RG111, Box 41, SC131323

**Camouflaged 155-mm GPF and diesel tractor, Tarlac Province, 23 December 1941**

## Evacuation of Clark Field

On 23 December, a day after the Japanese landing at Lingayen Gulf, Maj Gen Jonathan Wainwright, the NLF commander, advised General MacArthur that further defense of the beach was not possible. MacArthur responded by ordering the reinstatement of War Plan Orange-3 and the staged withdrawal of the Luzon forces to Bataan. A day later, Japanese troops drove on the Agno River, secured their initial objectives, and positioned themselves for the drive to Manila. Casey noted that “it appeared that [the Japanese] might be able to break through quickly on the way to Manila and [the] decision was made to move general headquarters and the various units in Manila to Corregidor [on 24 December].”<sup>17</sup>

On or about 24 December, Captain Daly ordered Captain Bidgood and Lieutenant Richardson to evacuate Clark Field on Christmas Day. The order sparked at least two days of frenetic activity by the 803rd engineers. When USAFFE ordered the destruction of fuel and ammunition dumps in Tarlac and Nueva Ejica Provinces, just north

of Clark Field, 2nd Lieutenant Leggett and 1st Lieutenant Radcliff led details north on the night of 24 December to carry out the task. Casey was with the NLF when the order was issued to destroy military stores that could not be immediately removed. He tried unsuccessfully to have it rescinded because there was sufficient time to move the supplies to Bataan. Radcliff, along with Sergeants Raymond F Barry, John J. Moyer, and Walter A. Yosko from the company's supply section, destroyed 700 drums of high-octane aviation gasoline at Rosales Field, Luzon. Radcliff found that the gas was too close to friendly troops to allow for burning, as he had been ordered. Thus, he ordered the men to puncture each drum and drain the contents, despite the danger of explosion and fire. The fumes almost overcame the detail. They also sustained severe burns on their hands and feet during the operation. The battalion commander later recommended Radcliff and Barry for the Silver Star medal. Leggett and his six-man detail were also detailed to destroy the gasoline and ammunition dumps at O'Donnell Field. On arrival, however, Leggett encountered an ordnance unit loading the ammunition for shipment to Bataan. Allowing the ordnance personnel to continue, Leggett and his men moved on to the gasoline dump, a storage area littered with 55-gallon drums. With the same technique used by Radcliff's detail, the men took picks to punch holes in the drums and allowed them to drain. The Leggett detail returned to the ammunition dump and found that the ordnance unit had finished loading the materiel onto a six-ton Corbett prime mover and trailer, but the clutch on the Corbett had broken. Leggett took his men back to Clark Field, retrieved clutch parts—a jerry-rigged Chevrolet truck part—from a damaged Corbett, and returned to O'Donnell, where a Headquarters Company mechanic repaired the ordnance vehicle. During the night drive back to Clark Field, Lieutenant Leggett, and his driver nearly collided with a Bren gun carrier, one of several diverted from Singapore.<sup>18</sup>

When the Leggett and Radcliff details returned to Clark Field, the battalion was packing for evacuation. Major Fries allowed the men from the two details to get some sleep before the battalion began to move.<sup>19</sup>

On Christmas Day, the 803rd undertook similar destructive actions at Clark Field. Engineers under the command of 1st Lt John Mowick destroyed the bomb dump. They also used the ditch digger or rooter to cut zigzag trenches in the turf runways and destroy Clark Field's gasoline dump.<sup>20</sup>

Pvt John Zubay commented that on Christmas Day, when the US-AFFE evacuated Clark Field, the 803rd battalion staff and Headquarters Company, excluding hospitalized personnel, “went [south] down the National Highway with some work stops along the way.” They moved to Barrio San Jose, Dinalupihan District, Bataan Province, a temporary way station, to help Company A build an airstrip. Wounded men from the 803rd in the hospital at Ft. Stotsenburg were told they were to find a way to return to their units. Pvt Frank Dice of Headquarters Company, for example, wound up at Dinalupihan with Company A and stayed with that company as it moved to Bataan and then Corregidor.<sup>21</sup>

## Impact

The 8 December attacks on Clark and Iba Fields, as historians documented, doomed the defense of the Philippines before it had even started. As initially planned, the FEAF was to be a force capable of deterring Japanese in the Pacific or, in a worst-case scenario, of defending the Philippines by striking the Japanese before they could reach the islands. The heavy bombers were to have been the offensive weapon capable of striking Japanese bases and cutting lines of communication. By the end of the first day of the war, that hope was gone. In a few hours, the Japanese had gained air supremacy for their entire campaign in the Philippines. Fortunately, Brereton had dispatched two squadrons of B-17s to Del Monte before the war started. Of the 16 remaining B-17s, nine were so damaged that they were of limited use. The FEAF also lost 53 of its 105 P-40s, including 23 from the Clark Field-based 20th Pursuit squadron, as well as three P-35As from the 34th Pursuit Squadron at Del Carmen. The extensive damage to or destruction of most pursuit aircraft, which were capable of inflicting damage on the Japanese bombers and fighters, meant minimal protection of Fil-American personnel and facilities for the remainder of the campaign. By 13 December, only 22 P-40s—with six more under repair—and eight P-35s remained. The Nichols-based 17th and 21st Pursuit Squadrons were the only fully equipped pursuit squadrons capable of defending the Philippines.<sup>22</sup>

The 803rd also incurred a longer-term loss. With the aftereffect of Fries’ head wound, Captain Bidgood had to take over command of the battalion. Goldblith commented later that Major Fries was “pretty well shell shocked.”<sup>23</sup>

## Notes

1. Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 42; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 79–80, 83–84, 87; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 111–112.
2. Richardson-Bartsch interview; Goldblith to Bartsch, letter, 3 January 1983; Zubay to author, letter, n.d. (ca. 23 September 2002; Mike McKinney, “Bataan Death March,” Allentown (PA) *Sunday Review*, December 30, 2001, 1C; Zubay, “We Ate Rice Bugs and All,” in Wissolik *et al.*, eds., *They Say There Was a War*, 509; Van Orden, interview, 14 March 1999; Fries to CG, US Forces in the Southwest Pacific, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations, NARA RG407, Box 12; Casey to CoS, [USAFFE], memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Citations, Casey Files, Folder 4; Poster, interview, 24 October 1999; Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps*, 114–15; Ingersoll Roster.
3. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 73–82, conveyed the extent of the attack vividly. Lt Col William E. Dyess, Jr., *The Dyess Story* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1944), 30; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 87; Boyt, *A Survivor’s Story*, 56–58; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 102.
4. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 23; Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps*, 108–116
5. ACoS/Intelligence Historical Division, Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No 34, *Army Air Forces in the War against Japan, 1941-1942* (no location: June, 1945 (re-print)), 31; Mohnac, interview, 7 November 1999; Goldblith to Bartsch, letter, 9 December 1982; Leggett Roster; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Citations, Casey Files, Folder 4.
6. Goldblith, “*The 803d in the Defense of the Philippines*,” in Paul Ashton, ed., *And Somebody Gives a Damn* (Santa Barbara, CA: Ashton Publications, 1990), 233; Donai, interview, 5 May 1998; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 82; USAFFE G-4, journal entry, 9 December 1941, NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 30; Richardson to Pulley, PHILRYUCOM, letter, 1 May 1947; Elizabeth Leggett to family, letter, 7 May 1945, recounted a visit by Gertrude Oppenheim and Althea Richardson, with “the ex-sergeant major of the 803rd,” possibly MSgt Andrew Gorman, on Fries’ wound and its impact (cited with permission of Elizabeth Leggett). Boyt, *Bataan: A Survivor’s Story*, 60: said “Representatives of the 803rd Engineer Battalion helped with the repairs [,] as well.”
7. Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 42; Goldblith to Bartsch, letter, 9 December 1982; [2nd Lt. James W.] Fulks, 20th Pursuit Squadron, [n.d.; compiled in a POW camp], NARA RG407, Box 17; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 82; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 76–77, 111–112; USAFFE Training Memorandum, 14 December 1941, Casey Files, Folder 9; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 27 October 1941, Subject: Report of Inspection on Construction Activities at Fort Stotsenburg. Boyt, *A Survivor’s Story*, 41, 64, thought the revetments would provide protection against strafing attacks, which Morton pointed out were particularly lethal but not against bombs. By contrast, Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 98, wrote that at USAFFE headquarters, Nielsen Field, Manila, “there were no shelters. Only a few days before had there been any thought of digging slit trenches . . . The results were hardly impressive. Shallow, weakly walled, the trenches were much too close to the building . . .”
8. Casey, MFR, 10 December 1941, no subject [camouflage facilities], Casey Files, Folder 2; Casey to ACoS, USAFFE, memo, 9 December 1941, Subject: Priorities in Construction, Casey Files, Folder 2; Casey to ODE, memo, 13 December 1941, Subject: “Modification in Air Corps Requirements, Casey Files, Folder 2; author unknown, MFR, 11 December 1941, Subject: Telephone Conversation’s [sic] Colonel Casey (with had written notes on actions taken), Casey Files, Folder 2; [Lt



Col Narciso L. Manzano], USAFFE engineer journal, 12 December 1941, Casey Files, Folder; ODE to CG, USAFFE, 2nd in.d., 14 December 1941, no subject [response to USAFFE, 1st Ind, 9 December 1941, comment on 30 November 1941, semi-monthly construction progress report], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 31.

9. Report of Operations: *USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippines, 1941-42*, Annex X, Vol. IX (Provisional Tank Group), 6, NARA RG407, Box 1158 (hereafter cited as "Report of Operations—Provisional Tank Group"); Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps*, 115.

10. Richardson-Bartsch interview; McKinney, "Bataan Death March," 1C; Zubay, memo to Veterans Administration, n.d. [ca. 1982]; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 42; Boyt, *A Survivor's Story*, 61–62, 65; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 31–32; Zubay, "We Ate Rice, Bugs and All," 509; Moyer, interview, 6–9 April 2005; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 23; Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps*, 115.

11. Richardson to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 26 December 1941, Subject: Report requested by telephone on 22 December 1941, Casey Files, Folder 9; Goldblith diary; Fries to CG, US Forces in the Southwest Pacific, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations; Casey to CoS, [USAFFE], memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Citations; Ingersoll Roster. The Ingersoll Roster had all the names listed in Fries' 18 January 1943 memo. Casey used Richardson's 26 December memo to draft a recommendation for a unit citation for the 803rd. See American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor [Roster], 803rd Engineer, A.B.C. Companys [sic], 7 December 1941 to 7 December 1987; John R. Ray died in Camp O'Donnell of malaria and dysentery. Melvin F. Baildon died in Camp O'Donnell of dysentery and malaria on 30 May 1942; Basil Blume was KIA on the hell ship *Arisan Maru*, 24 October 1944; Lawrence R. Beard died at Cabanatuan POW Camp on 4 November 1942; Roger G. Derr died in Tokyo Camp 3 on 16 February 1943.

12. McKinney, "Bataan Death March," 1C; Zubay, letter to author, n.d., ca. 10 August 2004 and interview, 27 March 1999; Fries to CG, US Forces in the Southwest Pacific, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations.

13. Casey to USAFFE CoS, memo, 15 December 1941, no subject; W.W.J. [not further identified] to Gerow, draft memo, n.d. [probably mid-November, 1941], Subject: Antiaircraft Artillery, Philippines, NARA RG165, Box 255; [USAFFE] G-4, journal entry, 13 December 1941, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 44.

14. Moyer, interview, 20–21 October 2002, said he remembered the shooting incident "vividly." He and Heard were together for the rail journey from Westover Field to San Francisco. Dominic J. Caraccilo, ed. *Surviving Bataan and Beyond: Colonel Irvin Alexander's Odyssey as a Japanese Prisoner of War* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1999), 54; Leggett Roster; McKinney, "Bataan Death March," 1C; John Zubay, synopsis; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 23–24; "Report of Operations – Provisional Tank Group, 6.

15. Goldblith diary; Col. E[rnest] B. Willier, *Bataan Uncensored, 2nd Ed.* (Camp Ripley, Little Falls, Minnesota: Military Historical Society of Minnesota, 1991), 134. Only Goldblith mentioned the 803rd's role in the movement of artillery. Ward and Mulvaney died at a Cabanatuan POW Camp, in September and October, 1942, respectively. The Leggett roster listed Mulvaney as "sick in hosp[ital], believed dead Oct. '42."

16. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 17 February 1942, no subject [follow up on Maj Fries' promotion recommendations], Casey Files, Folder 5.

17. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 133–38; [Brig Gen Hugh J. Casey], Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines (Draft of dictation to [fnu] Harrison, n.d. [ca. July, 1942–January, 1943], Engineer History Office, Box 99, Folder 14.

18. Fries to CG, US Forces in the Southwest Pacific, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations; Goldblith diary, 5; USAFFE AGO to CG, NLF, memo, 24 December 1941, Subject: Destruction of Military Stores, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 36; Casey, Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I. The Fries recommendations for the Silver Star Medal did not include Moyer and Yosko. During numerous interviews Moyer never mentioned his participation in the Rosales operation. See Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps*, 119-20, for comment and evaluation of the decision to destroy essential materiel prior to the evacuation of Clark Field.

19. Leggett, UKY interview, Part I.

20. Goldblith, diary; Goldblith, "The 803d in the Defense of the Philippines," 323; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 44. Lt John Mowick died in the Osaka POW Camp (Tanagawa) in February, 1942.

21. Letter, Zubay to author, n.d. [ca. 1999]; Dice, interview, 25 October 1999.

22. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 88, 95-96; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 109; [WPD] to CoS, draft memo, n.d. date [probably early December, 1941], NARA RG165, Box 136, listed then current aircraft inventories in the Philippines and projected that 48 B-17-C, D, and E models, two B-24's, 52 A-24 dive bombers, 113 P-40D and E models, and 25 P-39D Airacobras would depart the United States for the Philippines prior to 15 December 1941. See [WPD] to secretary of war, memo, 28 November 1941, Subject: Reinforcement of the Philippines, NARA RG165, Box 11. The Navy held up the shipment of the A-24's for the 27th Bomb Group (Light) for 13 days, as of 28 November 1941. They were due in the Philippines on 25 December. The B-17s and P-40s were to arrive before 1 January 1942.

23. Richardson-Bartsch interview, 4 September 1982; Mohnac, interview, 7 November 1999; Goldblith to Bartsch, letter, 9 December 1982; Elizabeth Leggett to family, letter, 7 May 1945.





## Chapter 12

# Company C at War

## The First Days

The threat and the onset of war brought the same chaos to Nichols Field as it did to other airfields on Luzon. On 28 November, after the War Department's warning message, Brereton placed the bombardment and fighter forces, including the 17th and 21st Pursuit Squadrons, on alert. Army Air Corps troops, presumably including aviation engineer units supporting FEAF, were confined to base, although Brereton did allow 15 percent of the troops to leave duty stations on weekends. Visits to Manila were held to a minimum, and personnel had to be prepared to return to post on three hours' notice. The 17th had been scheduled to move to Mindanao, but the transfer was canceled because of deteriorating relations with Japan. On the morning of 8 December, after learning of the attack on Pearl Harbor, 17th Pursuit Squadron pilots left Nichols to cover Clark Field, while the 21st Pursuit Squadron took off to intercept Japanese bombers. After the Japanese attack on Clark and Iba Fields, Brereton ordered the 17th and 21st to abandon Nichols Field and move to Clark to mitigate the risk of further losses. Because of the extensive damage the Japanese inflicted on Clark, however, the 17th was unable to land. Instead, pilots opted to land at Del Carmen Field. The destruction of Iba Field on 8 December forced the 3rd Pursuit Squadron, "completely demoralized," to move its four operable P-40s first to an emergency landing field at Rosales Field and then to Nichols Field. Once there, 1st Lt Herbert S. Ross said the squadron "struggled for two weeks" to reorganize. The 3rd had lost nine of its 24 P-40s.<sup>1</sup>

During their time at Nichols Field, the engineers of the 809th acquired a reputation for working, playing, and drinking hard. However, when war came, they became "very serious," said Pvt James Onofrey, a mechanic with the 17th Pursuit Squadron.<sup>2</sup>

Nichols Field probably endured at least 11 Japanese air raids before the order to evacuate came on 24 December. In the absence of adequate air defense, each raid accelerated the destruction of the field, reduced the number of combat aircraft in the FEAF inventory, and provoked reshuffling of FEAF aircraft. The attacks were:

- 9 December—Seven Japanese Navy bombers struck Nichols before dawn. The field did not have any AA artillery. The closest AA battery was at Ft. McKinley. Units at Nichols Field suffered three men KIA and 15 wounded. The effect of the 27th Materiel Squadron's World War I-vintage Lewis light machine guns on the attackers was negligible. Afterward, a battery of the 60th CA Regiment moved from Corregidor on 9 December to cover the port area, Nichols Field, oil storage facilities, and the rail yard. Two more P-40s of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron moved to Nichols.
- 10 December—The second attack against Nichols Field came at 1145 as part of a massive Japanese strike that also included Nielsen Field in the Makati area of Manila, Cavite, the naval base south of Manila, and Del Carmen Field. High-level Japanese bombers using the standard attack plan hit buildings, and fighters followed to strafe aircraft and facilities. Vibrations from bombs on Nichols reverberated in Manila. Only two flights of P-40s from the 20th Pursuit Squadron challenged the attackers, but they were driven off. The 17th and the 34th were engaged over Manila Bay, and the 21st was on patrol over Bataan. More FEAF pursuit planes were destroyed when they returned to the airstrip for refueling. On 10 December, the 17th started its move to Del Carmen Field, where the 34th had just lost most of its aircraft. The losses incurred on 10 December dropped the FEAF inventory of pursuit planes to 28, and most of them needed maintenance and repair. To limit losses, FEAF restricted its aircraft to reconnaissance missions. Company C dug in with about four machine guns salvaged from pursuit aircraft, but they were not able to shoot down any of the attackers.
- 11 December—The Japanese strafed and bombed Nichols Field.
- 13 December—During the afternoon, three waves of naval bombers targeted Nichols, but their bombs landed in the neighborhood nearby. Company C shot down two of the strafing aircraft.
- 14 December—A spray of .50 caliber bullets brought down one Japanese plane, which crashed into Manila Bay. Eight other Japanese attackers were hit but not downed.
- 15 December—In the sixth attack on Nichols Field, the Japanese attempted to bomb the intersection of the two runways but missed.
- 17 December—Two waves of bombers attacked.

- 18 December—Ten low-flying dive bombers inflicted “nonessential damage,” according to a daily intelligence report.
- 20 December—Nichols suffered a small bombing raid.
- 21 December—A “terrific bombing” hit Nichols.
- 22 December—High-level bombers attacked Nichols at about 0730.<sup>3</sup>

During the strafing attack of 9 December, Privates Ellsworth C. Harker, Arthur L. Pierce, James S. Grimm, and Privates First Class Albert L. Warner and Stephen Jurczak of Company C operated machine guns near the entrance of Nichols Field and aided in the downing of two Japanese planes. On 11 December, Pvt. James H. York was one of two men who took over a truck-mounted machine gun to defend the field. In the process, the machine gun jammed three times, but York “relieved the jam and resumed fire.” After the attacks, the men returned to grading the field. As a result, Casey recommended all seven engineers for the DSC.<sup>4</sup>

Parenthetically, a chronology—prepared for USAFFE by Lt James Richardson, the 803rd’s adjutant—of air raids on fields assigned to companies of the battalion did not include information on Company C. The omission reinforced the conclusion that the organizational linkage between the battalion and Company C was not robust and that Company C operated with a higher degree of autonomy than the other companies of the 803rd.<sup>5</sup>

## Repair and Guard Duties

Company C’s heavy equipment operators tried to repair damage to the paved airstrips, a more difficult task than repairing the gravel and dirt runways at Clark and Del Carmen Fields. As was the case at Clark and Del Carmen, the engineers did not have an alarm system to warn of the approaching bombers. On 19 December, Lt Ted Pflueger took corrective action by calling the USAFFE logistics (G-4) to request signals equipment. The G-4 journal noted only: “ordered.”<sup>6</sup>

Company C was also charged with guarding the field, but for the most part, its machine-gunners were unable to fire on approaching planes because of faulty positioning of its weapons. To defend Nichols Field, Company C first dug machine gun pits for its Browning .30-caliber machine guns. Later the men used craters created by 500-pound

bombs that the Japanese dropped. They built a pillar in the center of the pit for sandbags and emplaced guns. Two men were wounded, and four Filipino laborers were killed by strafing during the 15 December raid. Other soldiers reported to take over guard duty but were withdrawn after 15 minutes. Company C also built revetments on the south side of the E-W runway. The biggest fear, as at Clark field, was an attack by Japanese paratroopers. Afterward, Lt Col Lloyd Mielenz, a senior ODE engineer, reported that “the morale of the 809th [was] low.” He requested that action be taken to correct the defensive situation at Nichols. As he had for all bases where the 803rd was assigned, Col Casey took Mielenz’s comments seriously. In a memo to USAFFE, he said that the company, again calling it the 809th, had provided half the guards at the base in addition to construction responsibilities, and asked General Sutherland for help in correcting the situation. Consequently, additional guards from the PC, basically a police force, arrived.<sup>7</sup>

For the defense of Nichols Field, Company C salvaged and appropriated, probably without proper authorization, air-cooled .50-caliber machine guns from damaged P-40s to augment its inventory of .30-caliber machine guns, which were intended for ground combat. Welders from the company’s motor pool adapted the .50-caliber guns for field use. They were acceptable against strafing aircraft but not against the higher-flying bombers.<sup>8</sup>

The reshuffling of personnel and aircraft continued unabated as the war progressed. Ground crew members of the 21st Pursuit Squadron left Nichols Field on 15 December for Lubao, Pampanga Province, where they built an airfield. They proceeded from Lubao to Bataan on 1 January 1942. Sometime during 13 to 18 December, a complement from the 3rd Pursuit Squadron flew south from Nichols to Tanauan, Batangas Province, with orders to prepare a field for the anticipated arrival of B-17s and P-40s. On 24 December, ground personnel of the 17th Pursuit Squadron were ordered to evacuate to Pilar Field, Bataan. Later, pilots of the 17th flew from Nichols with three P-35As and a few P-40s to the emergency airstrip at Lubao.<sup>9</sup>

As the 17th left Nichols, Company C was still at work. Using air drills, the engineers placed mines with pressure fuses to crater the macadam runways and set charges along the hangar line. At the same time, they destroyed thousands of gallons of gasoline by axing holes in fuel barrels. The engineers also had orders to demolish all aircraft and buildings. They set fire to the barracks and blew up the water

tower by filling it with TNT. Fire filled the air, and smoke towered high above the field. A final aircraft landed at Nichols on 25 December, close to where Company C was working with a truckload of TNT. The plane was operable but out of fuel. The pilot walked away, leaving the aircraft sitting on the airstrip. Lt Thomas Delamore, who had washed out of pilot school, wanted to fly it out but could not get permission. Japanese strafing later destroyed the aircraft, and the remaining ammunition exploded.<sup>10</sup>

## Evacuation

Orders for Company C to evacuate Nichols Field for Bataan came on Christmas Day. On 26 December, MacArthur declared Manila an “open city” in the hope of saving it from further destruction. The engineers of Company C had Christmas dinner on Dewey (now Roxas) Boulevard as they were moving out, but some of the men did not leave Manila until about 28 or 29 December. By 30 December, only a detachment commanded by Lieutenant Delamore remained behind. The engineers loaded vehicles with equipment and food and placed drums of oil and diesel fuel into carryall scrapers. They also removed additional .50-caliber machine guns and ammunition from aircraft they had been ordered to destroy. The company employed its heavy trucks to haul supplies and construction equipment, including large Caterpillar D-8 tractors, to Bataan. Lieutenants Fraser and Caldwell went to Bataan with smaller vehicles. As they left Nichols, Company C personnel burned remaining stocks of gasoline by firing a machine gun mounted on the back of a command car into the 55-gallon drums. They also blew up bunkers loaded full of bombs. While passing through Manila, Company C took time to blow up the underground gasoline tanks at service stations.<sup>11</sup>

## Demolition Actions in Manila

Before the war, the USAFFE had identified explosive stocks and engineers at various mines. On 8 December, it confiscated all dynamite held by mining companies, commercial outlets, and the commonwealth government. It also recruited and quickly commissioned mining engineers and allocated them to Philippine Department ODE, the NLF, the South Luzon Force (SLF), and the newly formed


302nd ER PA (details in a separate chapter), and to “an operation directly under the control” (not further identified) of Casey. From Christmas 1941 to New Year’s Day 1942, the USAFFE concentrated on moving supplies, including oil, from Manila to Bataan under the direction of Col Roscoe Bonham. Given their dominance in the air, the Japanese had bombed Manila, including the port area, intensively but selectively. They carefully avoided damaging the extensive petroleum storage facilities at Pandacan, an 82-acre compound on the south bank of the Pasig River in northern Manila. (As of 1941, it housed facilities of Pilipinas Shell Oil Company; SOCONY-Vacuum; and Caltex, which was a joint venture of Standard Oil Company of California and Texaco.) As US forces withdrew in response to MacArthur’s declaring Manila an open city to avoid further destruction, Casey created and implemented plans to deny the Japanese military supplies and facilities, using explosive materials that had survived enemy bombing raids. Simultaneous with the tactical destruction of bridges in the wake of the retreating USAFFE forces south and north of Manila, the USAFFE engineer also personally organized several demolition parties “for the most important special demolition activities in the Manila area.” He divided the targets into discrete groups: POL storage in the Pandacan area of north Manila, the primary target; industrial installations throughout Metro Manila; communications, highway, and rail infrastructure; and military installations.<sup>12</sup>

Casey, it seemed, selected the demolition teams specifically to leverage the expertise at hand. Lt William Ramme, a newly commissioned officer from the SOCONY-Vacuum Oil Company, was to destroy POL stocks and oil installations at Pandacan. When the situation permitted, he was also to destroy supplies of bunker fuel, the dense remains of the refining process used primarily for maritime engines, at Pier 1 south of the Pasig River.

To Lt Lawrence W. Buchanan and a group of 80 miners fell the task of demolishing inter alia industrial facilities such as Earnshaw Slipways & Engineering Company, the largest ship building and repair company in the Philippines; Ferro Manufacturing, a steel fabricator; the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) steam generation plant, highway and rail bridges, and radio communications installations, as well as government facilities at Engineer Island, including the US Coast and Geodetic Survey’s map production plant. Capt Brewster Gallup, who had assumed control of the MRR for USAFFE, and his detail were assigned to destroy the MRR’s rolling stock, engines,

machine shops, and rail bridges. (See Chapter 21 for further details on Gallup and the MRR.)<sup>13</sup>

As might have been expected, Lt Thomas Delamore and his detail from Company C, 803rd Engineers were charged with burning aviation gasoline and oil at Ft. McKinley and with wrecking Nichols, Nielson, and Zablan Fields, including depth charge hangars, and discarded planes at Zablan Field. Located on the northeast outskirts of Manila (now Quezon City) on Camp Murphy (now Camp Aguinaldo), Zablan Field housed the PA Air Corps' 6th Pursuit Squadron and its P-26 Peashooters. Nielsen Field, located in Manila's Makati district, served as FEAF headquarters. Delamore was respected as a risk-taker among the men of Company C, and he had also gained Casey's confidence with his supervision of the Nichols Field runway project. Mr. George Colley, civilian manager, Contractors Pacific Naval Air Bases (CPNAB—at the time also known as the "Colley Organization"), Manila, was also be active in trying to render military facilities useless to the Japanese. He was charged with the destruction of abandoned Navy facilities at Sunset Beach and Cavite, already heavily damaged in Japanese air attacks. (CNPAB was a consortium of eight US construction firms contracted by the US Navy in 1940 to fortify the Pacific islands and to build facilities [e.g., Subic Bay and Mariveles. See Chapter 20 for further details.])



Nielsen Field, 1946

Source: NARA RG111, Box 435, SC252276





Source: NARA RG111, Box 435, SC252276, and NARA RG18, Box 221, AA-331-189

**Camp Murphy, Zablan Field, 1939**



Source: NARA RG 18, 18-AA-184-28164

**Quartermaster Corps POL dumps and Earnshaw/Honolulu Iron Works, 1936**



**Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), Pasig River, 1940**



**Pandacan—SOCONY and Associated POL terminals, Pasig River, 1937**





Source: NARA RG18, 18-AA-184-337950


Engineer Island on the Pasig River, 1937 (N-S)

Casey's plans, at least those for Lieutenant Delamore, apparently changed with time and situation or perhaps were incorrectly documented during that hectic period. The USAFFE engineer decreed on 29 December that "Nichols Field, Nielson Airport, and Zablan Field runways shall be destroyed to the maximum degree possible." Delamore oversaw the four three-person teams from Company C charged with that mission. On 31 December, Casey issued formal orders to his demolition teams. The work was to be completed by midnight, 31 December. Orders for Lieutenant Delamore and the Company C detail came at 0710, 31 December.<sup>14</sup>

As might have been expected under the circumstances, confusion plagued the complex demolition program's planning and execution. Much of the work, particularly involving POL stores' disposition, was in progress before Casey unleashed all the teams. On 25 December, SOSONY-Vacuum reported to Mr. (later 1st Lieutenant) Ramme that it had drained its alkaloid tanks on the ground according to the Navy's instructions that same day. SOCONY-Vacuum representatives estimated that the process would take two days. They were also filling gasoline tanks for issue and transfer—an action they expected would take three days. In both cases, SOCONY-Vacuum stated they could speed up the process if necessary. The company was to begin the transfer of diesel fuel on the morning of 26 December. Ramme also noted that a Stanbasol, not further identified, was to start draining 500,000 gallons of crude oil on the evening of 25 December but still had refined petroleum products available.<sup>15</sup>

The next day, 26 December, Ramme went to Pandacan after draining bunker fuel tanks at the Port of Manila's Pier 1 into reservoirs. He reported destroying pumps and other critical parts. He then inspected the Shell and Caltex plants at Pandacan and was awaiting representatives from other oil companies. On 27 December, Casey arranged with the Director of the Philippine Bureau of Public Works (BPW) to provide a 15-person guard detail that would be under Ramme's direction for the bunker fuel tanks at Pier 1. While Ramme was occupied at Pandacan, Colonel Casey was moving forward with urgency. He directed the Philippine Acetylene Company, Superior Gas and Equipment Company, and the American Oxygen and Acetylene Company to destroy oxygen and vital components in their plants.<sup>16</sup>

On 27 December, Ramme reported that SOCONY-Vacuum had drained and destroyed its tanks, as the Navy had directed, but that the other oil companies' plants were still intact. He was still awaiting the arrival of the Caltex representative late in the evening on 28 December.<sup>17</sup>



**Figure 12.1. Manila: Demolition targets, December 1941.** (Adapted from Basic Map: Mielding, ed., *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol. VI, Airfield and Base Development.*)

On 27 December, when learning of the conflicting orders the oil companies were receiving simultaneously from the Army and Navy; Colonel Casey attempted unsuccessfully to get all the oil companies, the Army, and the Navy to cooperate and to improve planning.<sup>18</sup>

By 28 December, Ramme was making plans for using oil company trucks to release and move oil from Pandacan facilities, to release some of the oil into the Pasig River, and to demolish additional storage units. He was also planning to move oil from smaller storage private petroleum outlets (*bodegas*) with ox carts, which he felt was the safest method.<sup>19</sup>

While all those actions were in progress, Maj William Gay of Casey's staff went to a Quartermaster Corps warehouse to obtain individual equipment for the demolition teams on 28 December. He found Manila Police Department officers and soldiers looting items that he needed (shoes, uniforms, boots, and webbed accessories—belts, rifle straps and helmet straps) with the help of the civilian guards. Despite calls to Col Frank Berezina, the USAFFE quartermaster, about the problem, Gay found that the looting had become worse by 29 December.<sup>20</sup>

As of mid-day, 29 December, Ramme requested and received a group of 20 PC officers to guard Pandacan. It was then that Casey learned of a Navy request, labeled an "A1A" priority, for submarine diesel oil four days after the Navy had directed that all diesel fuel was to be destroyed. The Navy planned to use its tugs to pick up the fuel. A handwritten note in the USAFFE engineer journal commented that despite its reported destruction activities, only SOCONY-Vacuum could comply with the Navy request and added "Navy!" By 2240 on 29 December, Ramme reported from Pandacan that his team would shortly "be almost through" with their assignment and that he would release four of his six men for other details.<sup>21</sup>

On 30 December, Ramme oversaw the destruction of canned lubricants at Pandacan using picks, axes, and rifle rounds. At precisely 1700 on 31 December, Ramme's detail set the charges at Pandacan in an operation carefully controlled to limit collateral damage in the immediate vicinity. Earle Bedford, a civilian explosive expert whom Casey had recruited, and his Filipino crew returned on New Year's Day to ignite three remaining gasoline and oil tanks at Pandacan.<sup>22</sup>

Delamore's platoon or detail had about 20 engineers, including Pfc Clarence Kinser, Pfc Blair Robinette, and Pvt William Jagers. They needed transportation to reach assigned objectives, but stories vary on

the vehicles they finally used. Kinser said that at the Ford Motor Company dock, they commandeered motorcycles, possibly the famous “Indian” brand, initially bound for the British in Singapore, as well as a few trucks, for transportation, to race from objective to objective. At the same time, the USAFFE documented that had it taken possession of 400 Harley-Davidson motorcycles outfitted with sidecars on or about 14 December and advised the War Department that it “would put [them] to local military use.” The platoon used dynamite for its demolition work because Kinser said in tropical climates that dynamite was more stable than TNT. Previously trained as combat engineers, the men of Delamore’s detail had had some training in calculating formulas, determining the size of charges, and the set of packages.<sup>23</sup>

Lieutenant Delamore’s detail was outfitted with both transportation and explosives and started the work. The exact route they followed was not documented. However, they probably followed a semi-circular route from Nichols Field to Ft. McKinley in Taguig City, southeast of Metro Manila, to Nielsen Field, and then to Zablan Field and Camp Murphy. The final stop was to hit targets in the port. The detail emplaced mines, torpedoes, and bombs on Nichols and Nielsen Field’s runways and in its hangars. Targets successfully destroyed included 55-gallon drums of aviation gas at a closed fuel storage dump behind Nichols Field on Laguna Bay and structures at Nielsen Field, Camp Murphy, and parts of the port. The extent of their demolitions in the port area was uncertain because of previous Japanese bombing raids. The mission included the destruction of the remaining aviation gasoline and oil stocks left in dispersed caches throughout these fields, and military stores in the Ft. McKinley area, where a plentiful supply of aviation gasoline had also been stored. On 1 January, Bedford and his group destroyed the remaining supplies at Ft. McKinley. The engineers destroyed the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) radio and wireless facility. Casey later said, “all of [those] mission[s] they accomplished most successfully and effected major destruction on these facilities.”<sup>24</sup>

At Zablan Field, the 27th Bomb Group preempted some of Company C’s actions. Its personnel had already carried out orders received on Christmas Eve to burn the remaining 18 operable aircraft—12 trainers and six P-26s. Filipino troops and cadets destroyed technical and photographic equipment and supplies, aviation gas, all hangars (except one the Japanese damaged previously), and departed the field by 1800 on 24 December.<sup>25</sup>

With the Japanese moving on Manila unabated, all tactical military units except those of Delamore and Earle Bedford had cleared Manila by 2000, 31 December. Delamore and his detail remained “actively engaged” in the Manila area until early morning on 1 January 1942. It was a “close decision,” according to Casey, “as to whether to have Delamore’s platoon destroy its equipment (as only a few small launches remained to take its personnel to Bataan) or to risk its movement.” The engineers took the latter course in moving to Bataan and were almost cut off at San Fernando. The platoon went over the Calumpit Bridge as the 14th Engineers PS were placing the charges.<sup>26</sup>

Others in the Casey demolition details were not as fortunate. After a conversation with Colonel Bonham in Manila at 2100 on 31 December 1st Lt Lawrence W. Buchanan lost contact with USAFFE after leaving Ft. McKinley and was listed MIA on 1 January 1942. His group had removed the semi-portable generator from Ft. McKinley by truck on 26 December. The Japanese captured Earle Bedford and held him at the Santo Thomas University internment camp for the remainder of the war.<sup>27</sup>



Source: NARA RG111, Box 41, SC131154

**Pandacan: Pilipinas Shell Oil Company tanks, December 1941**





Source: NARA RG111, Box 41, SC131153.



Source: NARA RG111, Box 41, SC131154.

Pasig River: fires on the dock, December 1941



## Notes

1. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 84; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 393; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 33–34, 116–17; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 31; 1st Lt Herbert S. Ellis, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, report, n.d. [compiled in a POW camp], NARA RG407, Entry 1106, Box 1443.

2. James Onofrey (17th Pursuit Squadron), interview, 9 April 2002; Moyer, interviews, 21–22 October 2002; Andrew Miller (19th Air Base Group), interview, 6–9 April 2005.

3. Lt Col Lloyd Mielenz, 15 December 1941, Memo of telephonic conversation [with Lt. Col.] N[arcisco] L. M[anzano], Casey Files Folder 6; Richardson to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 26 December 1941, Subject: Report Requested by Telephone on 22 December 1941 [air attacks on O'Donnell, Clark, and Del Carmen Fields]. Richardson documented only air raids on fields where Headquarters Company, Company A, and Company B, 803rd, were present. Hence, the reconstruction of dates was based on the work of Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 33–34, 116–17, 129–32, 149–50, 155–57, 165, 173, 186; Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 393; Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*, 84, 92, 94, and 107; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 107, 111, 118–120; Report No. 9, USAFFE G-2 [Intelligence], 18 December 1941, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 31; Robinette-Bartsch interview; and, “Time Line: Fighters Diary of the Philippines (n.d.), <https://web.archive.org/>, and “War Notes,” handwritten, dated daily, author unknown [probably a Corregidor-based Quartermaster Corps officer], NARA RG407, Entry 54, Box 10, History of Corregidor and Bataan.

4. Melville Jacoby, “Corregidor Cable No. 79,” *The Field Artillery Journal*, 32 no. 4 (April 1942): 264–65; Engineer, USAFFE to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Citations, Casey Files, Folder 4. Jacoby seemed to recount the bravery of numerous soldiers in an effort to influence US opinion positively, as well as to inform. He combined information on two raids into one incident.

5. Richardson to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 26 December 1941, Subject: Report Requested by Telephone on 22 December 1941.

6. G-4 [USAFFE] journal [handwritten], 19 December 1941, NARA RG494, Entry 540, Box 44.

7. [Lt Col] N[arcisco] L. M[anzano], MFR, 15 December 1941, Subject: Telephonic Message from Col Mielenz with handwritten note about PC guards, Casey Files, Folder 1; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 15 December 1941, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 1; Robinette-Bartsch interview.

8. Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999; Pflueger to author, e-mail, 10 and 17 May 2001.

9. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 175–80, 189; John J. LaFianza to officer in charge, ninth service command, memo, 9 March 1945, no subject [interview of SSgt Frank A. Harangody [21st Pursuit Squadron], NARA RG407, Entry 1106, Box 1442.

10. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 189–91; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999; Robinette-Bartsch interview; [Hugh J. Casey], Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines (draft), n.d., Humphreys Engineer Center, Alexandria, Virginia, Box 99, Folder 14, 23 (hereafter cited as “Casey, Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines”); Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 209; Ellis, report, 3rd Pursuit Squadron. Ellis placed the 3rd’s move to Tanauan on 13 December, while others documented the date as 18 December.

11. Pflueger to author, emails, 5 April, 4 May, and 8 August 2001; Robinette-Bartsch interview.

12. Davis, Airdrome Construction in the Philippines: Statement of Maj. Gen. Hugh J Casey, Casey Files, Folder 1 (hereafter cited as “Casey, Airdrome Construction in the Philippines”); Casey, *Memoirs*, 170–71; Casey, Report on Conduct of

Demolitions in the Philippines, 4–5, 9, 11, 17, 21; 23; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 84; ; Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 192. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 29; Lt Col George Meidling, ed., *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific, Vol. III, Engineer Intelligence* (Tokyo, Japan: General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific, 1948), 12–15.

13. Hugh J. Casey, Summary of Directives Issued with Respect to Demolitions – 12/31/41, MFR, n.d., Casey Files, Folder 2; USAFFE Engineer, Check List [evacuation], 30 December 1941, Casey Files, Folder 10; USAFFE Engineer, Check List [evacuation], 30 December 1941; Pacific Wrecks, “Zablan Airfield (Manilla East, Murphy) NCR Philippines, <http://www.pacificwrecks.com/>; eHow, “Military Bases in the Philippines,” <https://web.archive.org/>; House, Committee on House Administration, *Asian and Pacific Islanders in Congress, 1900–2017, 107th, 1st sess., 2017*, H.R. 130, 157, <https://www.govinfo.gov/>; Casey to Lt L[awrence].W. Buchanan, [ODE], memo, 29 December 1941, no subject [supplemental direction on demolition in Manila area], Casey Files, Folder 64; Casey, notes, 31 December 1941, no subject [evacuation and demolition responsibilities], Casey Files, Folder 64; Casey, Airdrome Construction in the Philippines; Robinette-Bartsch interview; Casey, *Memoirs*, 170–71; Casey, Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines, 4–5, 11, 17, 21; 23; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 84; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 26; 1st Lt G[erald].C. W[orthington] to [unknown] Parsons, note, 25 December 1941, no subject, [demolitions directive], NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 10.

14. Casey to CoS [USAFFE], memo, 25 February 1942, no subject [promotion recommendation for 1st Lt Delamore; Casey, Summary of Directives Issued with Respect to Demolitions – 12/31/41; USAFFE Engineer, Checklist [evacuation]; Kinser, interviews, 26 March and 5 April 1999; George S. Colley, Manila, *Kuching and Beyond* (Privately published, 1951), 9.

15. Casey, Summary of Directives Issue with Respect to Demolitions—12/31/41; Casey, Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines, 4–5, 11, 17, 21, 23; Casey, Airdrome Construction in the Philippines; Casey, *Memoirs*, 170–71; Robinette-Bartsch interview; Dod, *The War Against Japan*, 84; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 26.

16. USAFFE engineer journal entries, 26 December 1941.

17. USAFFE engineer journal entries, 27–28 December 1941.

18. USAFFE engineer journal entries, 27 December 1941.

19. USAFFE engineer journal entries, 28 December 1941.

20. USAFFE engineer journal entries, 28–29 December 1941.

21. USAFFE engineer journal entries, 29 December 1941.

22. Casey, Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines, 21–24; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 84. The mayor of Manila ordered the Pandacan oil depot closed as of 31 January 2016. See Wikipedia, Pandacan Oil Depot.

23. Kinser, interviews, 26 March and 5 April 1999; Robinette to Bartsch, letter, 24 February 1983; Casey, Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines, 23. See [fnu] Adams, AGO, War Department to USAFFE, radiogram, 14 December 1941, no subject [availability of motorcycles in Manila] and E.T. Hastings, assistant AGO, USAFFE, to War Department, radiogram, no subject [USAFFE possession of motorcycles], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 46. CMSgt Kinser cited the detail's taking possessions of “Indian” brand motorcycles. However, Leggett, UKY interview, Part I, mentioned that the 803rd received Canadian-built Harley-Davidson motorcycles diverted from a shipment to British forces. He said they were superior to the 45 “Indian” motorcycles originally issued to the battalion. Leggett used the term platoon, and Samuel Goldblith, diary, used the term detail to describe Delamore's group.

24. Kinser, interviews, 26 March and 5 April 1999; Casey, Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines, 21–23; Goldblith diary; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 84.

25. Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 212–13.
26. Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; Casey, Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines, 21–23.
27. Col Roscoe Bonham, memo, 13 September 1945, Officers with Luzon Force at the Time of Surrender of Bataan, 1, NARA RG407, Box 12; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 84, citing Earle Bedford to Major General Hugh, memo, n.d.; Casey, MFR, 31 January 1941, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 5; note with handwritten update, Worthington, 25 December 1941; Wendell Fertig, “1942” (MS), Humphreys Engineer Center, Alexandria, Virginia, Box 99, Folder 7. Fertig’s notes entitled “1942” appeared to be an alternate version of “Notes of Personal Experiences.”

## Chapter 13

### **Companies A and B at War**

#### **Company A and O'Donnell Field**

On Monday morning, 8 December, Lt Edmund Zbikowski, appearing pale and nervous, approached the company in formation after breakfast. Lieutenant Farrell and several NCOs accompanied him. He announced that the United States was at war with Japan and quickly returned to his tent. Word probably reached O'Donnell Field via commercial radio earlier that morning. First Sgt Clarence Rutz began giving orders to break up the camp and move out quickly to a more secure location. Clearing the field in an hour, the men dismantled tents, including the tented dispensary and cots, and moved them to a new bivouac site in a treed area for better cover. They transferred and camouflaged all the construction equipment, dotted the runways with bundled weeds that simulated sheaves of rice to make the area look like a rice paddy, and covered supplies in the middle of the new bivouac area. The engineers were then issued vintage Springfield bolt-action rifles with dated ammunition or water-cooled Browning .30-caliber machine guns. Previously, the weapons and ammunition had been under lock and key since the company's arrival at O'Donnell. They also received gas masks and helmets.<sup>1</sup>

About noon, 54 Japanese bombers flew over O'Donnell while the engineers were at lunch. Zbikowski jumped up on the table at which officers were eating and shouted that they were probably US Navy planes. Others thought the aircraft were those to be based at O'Donnell Field. Reality set in when Company A heard the bombing of Clark Field.<sup>2</sup>

After the movement of the bivouac, Zbikowski directed the continuation of fieldwork. Men took their newly issued rifles and, with minor exceptions, returned to work details. The survey detail that included Pvt Joe Minder and Pvt Andrew J. King was disbanded. Since Company A, briefly, as the only military unit at O'Donnell Field, was responsible for both guard duties and construction, Minder was assigned to a machine gun detail. Within an hour of learning that Company A had only three machine guns for the defense of the field, Col Harry Stickney, by then the chief engineer of the NLF, arranged with the USAFFE operations (G-3) and the quartermaster (G-4) to

issue the unit six more weapons. Cpl Tom Gagne shut down the PX and was assigned to operate a Galion grader on the airstrip. After 8 December, the absences of Filipino laborers increased dramatically. In addition to carrying weapons and using camouflage, Company A's night work was under a total blackout after 8 December.<sup>3</sup>



Source: NARA RG111, Box 26, SC125571

### Galion motor grader, 1941

Otherwise, the war had bypassed O'Donnell Field and Company A. Japanese reconnaissance apparently had shown that the field was not yet operational. Though Company A worked on the airstrips; only two planes landed at O'Donnell Field before Company A evacuated it for Bataan. On 20 November, a Philippine Army scout aircraft became the first to use O'Donnell as a landing strip. In *Doomed at the Start*, William Bartsch documented the emergency landing of 2nd Lt Dana Allen, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, on 8 December. Allen had become separated from his wingman during the Japanese bombing of his base at Iba Field and elected to use O'Donnell Field as an alternate landing site. A Japanese observation plane flew overhead on 9 December, but attack aircraft did not follow. Instead, Japanese bombers flew over the airfield from 10 to 21 December en route to other targets. Still, a half-track platoon from the 192nd Tank Battalion moved from Clark to O'Donnell Field to guard against airborne landings, a significant subject of rumors after 8 December.<sup>4</sup>

Stickney continued to push for the rapid completion of O'Donnell Field. The 15 December 1941, construction progress report documented the priority given to the NE-SW runway, which was 65 percent complete versus the 5 percent completion documented in the 30 November report. Work stopped on the N-S runway. Company A completed the barrio road and 90 percent of the road cutoff to the airstrip.<sup>5</sup>

Lieutenant Coone drove to Clark Field on 9 December for food and water supplies. With the increased stress of the war, Pvt Andy King shot at what he thought were Japanese flares but they really were the cigarette lighters of another Company A work detail. 1st Sgt Rutz resolved the issue quickly and quietly by transferring Pvt King to another work detail. Minor injuries increased because the engineers were working and living under blackout conditions. Pvt Frank Dice, for example, was cut by a broken spring from a piece of heavy equipment.<sup>6</sup>

## Evacuation

On 21 December, the day before the Japanese invasion at Lingayen Gulf, and two days before MacArthur's order to withdraw to Bataan, Company A evacuated O'Donnell Field with its trucks and construction equipment and moved toward Barrio San Jose, Dinalupihan, in northeastern Bataan Province. Once there, they received orders to build a new airstrip on a priority basis.

Pvt Clyde V. Austin was crushed and died during the evacuation process when a truck and carryall tipped over, as previously noted. Dates of the accident and death vary according to the observer, but it appeared that the accident occurred during the evacuation process. Interestingly, Filipino mess workers stayed with the company as orderlies.<sup>7</sup>

## Company B and Del Carmen Field

With the receipt of the secretary of war's 27 November message, all forces in the Philippines went on alert. How serious some took the warning was open to question. Maj Gen Casey later contended most communications from the War Department—the worsening relations with Japan, for example—were top secret and not distributed to the staff. “We just sort of knew that a critical situation was developing.”

The troops, however, were aware that something had changed. All leaves were canceled. At Del Carmen, the engineers began to carry .45-caliber pistols. On 5 December, Capt Sam Marett, commander of the 34th Pursuit Squadron, put his unit on alert because of possible Japanese incursions into Philippine airspace. The Japanese had already begun probing Philippine airspace from bases in Formosa. On 6 December, MacArthur reported to the War Department that all air corps stations were on alert, airplanes dispersed and under guard, and all airdrome defense stations were crewed. Still, on the evening of 7 December—the Philippines, located west of the International Date-line, was a day ahead—some from Company B went to the bars in Floridablanca and others to Sugar Central to use the recreational facilities. Some men from the 34th went 20 miles north to the bars in Angeles City, near Clark Field, and east to Guagua. All groups returned to Del Carmen in the early morning hours. Company B personnel returning from Floridablanca early on the morning of Monday, 8 December, brought rumors of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. At 0230, the Navy intercepted a message about Pearl Harbor, and by breakfast, everyone had heard the news.<sup>8</sup>

Shortly after noon on 8 December, as the war came to the Philippines, pilots of the 34th Pursuit Squadron took off in their P-35As—stirring up heavy dust in the process—to assist with the defense of Clark Field and were attacked almost immediately. The P-35s, about nine to 12, patrolled for about an hour. All were damaged in encounters with the enemy but were able to return to Del Carmen. Early in the afternoon, one pilot from the 20th Pursuit Squadron from Clark sought refuge at Del Carmen. Later the 17th Pursuit Squadron, unable to land at Clark, also came into Del Carmen; dust again plagued the landings. The Japanese fighters that had fired on the 34th Pursuit pilots made a short strafing run over the field, but the field escaped major damage. Japanese fighters headed south after the attack on Clark but diverted to pursue P-40s and P-35s near Clark Field.<sup>9</sup>

The Japanese air attacks continued methodically. Tuesday, 9 December, brought a Japanese navy raid on Nichols Field, with the 17th Pursuit Squadron taking off through the dust of Del Carmen as part of the defense. Fog over Formosa forced the Japanese to cancel plans for a larger-scale attack. The reprieve lasted one day. On 10 December, the Japanese staged a major raid on Manila (Cavite Navy Yard and Nichols Field) and Del Carmen Field. The Japanese had learned of Del Carmen Field because of reconnaissance flights on 5 Decem-

ber and confirmed its presence during the strafing flyover on 8 December. At noon, some of the badly battered P-35s of the 34th Pursuit Squadron returned from an attack on the initial Japanese landings in Vigan on Luzon's north coast. They parked their planes in a row without the benefit of revetments, as was the case with the B-17s at Clark Field on 8 December. On Capt William Thomas' order, work had begun on revetments only after the 8 December attacks. To Thomas' amazement, Pvt Smith Merrill roughed out several quickly with a power shovel, but they were not ready in time to afford protection during subsequent Japanese bombings. Seven Japanese Zeros followed a P-35 from Clark Field and made short work of the P-35s lined up at Del Carmen, destroying a gasoline trailer in addition to the pursuit aircraft. As a result, the 34th Pursuit Squadron was finished as a flying unit. Company B did not suffer any casualties. In total, the 10 December attacks on Del Carmen and Nichols cost FEAF 33 pursuit aircraft—five P-35s and 28 P-40s—a loss almost equal to that suffered on 8 December.<sup>10</sup>

During the initial attacks, the Company B engineers and personnel from the 34th Pursuit Squadron ran into the sugarcane fields for protection. There they encountered bombs that had been stored for the bombers scheduled for deployment to Del Carmen Field. The discovery forced them to look for other locations and to dig foxholes. After the first attack, the troops attempted to camouflage their nipa huts by coating the roofs with the dark brown molasses used on the runways. The effort seemed successful until the sun and heat lowered the viscosity of the molasses. The syrup poured through the roofing material on to cots, clothing, and weapons. Much of the 34th Pursuit Squadron temporarily moved to Sugar Central and then returned. After that attack, Lt Claude Paulger said, the 34th then “just watched the planes go over.” Capt Sidney Vernon of the 803rd and doctors for the 34th used the cellar of Sugar Central as a hospital. Some Company B officers moved to the *hacienda* of Alfonso de Castellvi, owner of the Del Carmen site, during 12 to 22 December.<sup>11</sup>

With the start of the war, job descriptions began to blur, and Company B personnel redirected their efforts. For example, Pvt Walter Lamm, an electrician, began driving a truck. While work continued briefly on airstrip construction and repair, some Company B personnel went to Clark Field to help repair the airstrip. Privates Joe Poster and Clarence “Chief” Rogers traveled to Manila to pick up gasoline



from Nichols Field, encountering one of the regular Japanese attacks in the process.<sup>12</sup>

Japanese aircraft continued their systematic destruction of the American air forces in the Philippines, a strategy that included Del Carmen Field. From 10 to 20 December 1941, the Japanese bombed Del Carmen 10 times and strafed it three times. With the P-35s damaged beyond repair, the attacks hit decoy aircraft the 34th placed on the line and tank cars loaded with molasses on the runways. Company B suffered one casualty—an engineer who was wounded on 12 December—but they continued to work. The wounded man was probably Pvt Murl J. Carey.<sup>13</sup>

A week after the initial attacks, Col Henry Stickney still directed that Company B rush Del Carmen to completion, while also continuing to repair the airstrips. The Japanese attacks damaged some of the construction equipment. By 15 December, the NW-SE airstrip was 60 percent complete versus 35 percent on 20 November, and the NE-SW and E-W runways were 20 and 15 percent, respectively, versus 7 and 1 percent, respectively, on 30 November. The “items delaying work” section of the 15 December construction report noted that work on the NW-SE airstrip was “held down by the necessity of using engineer troops for airfield guard duty.” In the absence of dedicated AA artillery, the defense of the airfield involved the use of .50-caliber machine guns salvaged from P-35s and mounted on tripods. The mounts incorporated universal joints from disabled vehicles to allow for movement of the weapons. Colonel Casey noted that at Del Carmen, as at O’Donnell and Nichols Fields, only engineers acted as guards, seeming to complain that personnel from the 34th Pursuit Squadron were not assisting in defense of the field. He added that engineers were “doing everything 24 hours per day and [were] overworked with practically no rest. They attend to construction, movement of supplies, and the guard and defense of the field.” In the last reported raid on Del Carmen Field on 20 December, the Japanese also dropped propaganda leaflets.<sup>14</sup>

Despite Stickney’s directive, with the destruction of the 34th Pursuit Squadron, Del Carmen’s place on the airfield priority list dropped below that of San Marcelino, a two-runway field under construction in Zambales Province, and of Del Monte Field, Mindanao. As a result, Company B stopped work on the permanent camp at Del Carmen.<sup>15</sup>

On at least one occasion on 11 December, repairs to the airstrip took place amid a Japanese attack that involved 54 bombers. Noise

from the heavy construction equipment prevented crews from hearing the approaching Japanese bombers. A team of 17 engineers remained with their equipment and continued to work on repairs during the attack. They reasoned that planes from the 34th would need to land immediately after the Japanese departed. Capt Ingersoll credited Capt William Thomas, SSgt William Kuhn, and Sgt Edward Rorke with leading the dispersal of work crews from the airstrip and avoiding casualties. Pfc George W. Andrews, Pfc Charles H. Conklin, Pfc French Crisp, Pfc John G. Foster, Pfc William Lee, Pfc Vincent E. McCall, Pfc Fred Ross, Pfc Sylvester Smith, Pvt Arlin W. Day, Pvt Paul A. Fechner, Pvt George Gallion, Pvt Clyde Heckman, Pvt. William Mann, Pvt Smith "Bub" Merrill, Pvt Thomas E. Phillips, Pvt Fred C. Pronchick, Pvt Harold Wilson, Pfc Frank Sakowski, Pvt Elbert W. Moore, and Pvt Steven W. Voyzev, Jr., were later cited for continuing to operate heavy equipment during the 11 December attack, as well as through follow-on raids through 20 December. Captain Ingersoll recommended the men listed above for the Silver Star medal.<sup>16</sup>

During this period, Capt James Richardson, the battalion adjutant, visited the outlying airfields for which the 803rd was responsible. Major Fries, the battalion commander, was wounded in the 8 December bombing of Clark Field, and Richardson was acting in his stead.<sup>17</sup>

## Evacuation

Company B began to evacuate Del Carmen Field with the movement of an advance party to Bataan on 20 December 1941. They were the first of the 803rd's companies specifically assigned to build emergency airstrips under a program that Casey had ordered on 18 December. A rear guard left Del Carmen on 25 December, according to Lt James Leggett. In the process, Company B might have left some construction equipment at the field, and the 34th, some aviation gas, as Lt Col Nicol Galbraith, a USAFFE G-4 officer, observed and reported to the USAFFE Engineer on 4 January 1942, as he passed through the area. The advance party and probably the main body, at least, went south on National Route 7 through the nearby Layac Junction into Bataan on Highway 101 or the East Road through Hermosa to Orani. Given the short distance involved, the first Company B engineers arrived in Orani on 20 December. The battalion's rear guard probably stopped briefly near Layac Junction, the entry point for

troops retreating into Bataan. On the way through Layac, Pvt Joe Poster said Company B “liberated a healthy supply of liquor” and imbibed liberally. About Christmas time, some Company B engineers returned to Clark Field to retrieve food, including fresh pork, from the commissary. Sgt Paul Kloecker later recalled that “we packed up all the food we could haul when we retreated through a town. That year [1941] on Christmas, I ate my dinner on the run. It was the last time I tasted fresh beef for a long time.”<sup>18</sup>

### Notes

1. Wallace, *POW* 83, 97–99, Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 22–23; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Schatz, *Three and a Half Years in Hell*. Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003, recalled that a runner from Clark Field brought the news of the war to O’Donnell Field at about 1100, when the engineers were at lunch. Zbikowski then ordered the issuance of weapons. Minder, diary, 4, wrote that Company A broke down its original bivouac at about 1500 hours after Japanese bombers had flown over the field.

2. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 22–23; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003.

3. Vater, interview, 1 November 1999; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Minder diary, 4 and interview, 1 November 1999; Gagne, interview, 6 February 1999; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 26; Casey to ACoS, USAFFE, G-3, memo, 15 December, 1941, no subject [engineer guards at airfields]; Narciso Manzano, MFR, 13 December 1941, no subject [machine guns for Company A], Casey Files, Folder 2; Cost Sheets, Daily Labor Report, Camp O’Donnell, 1–15 December 1941, NARA RG407.

4. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 447; Dice, interview, 25 October 1999; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Minder diary, 4; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 23. Pvt Frank Dice mentioned the emergency landing of a “fully-loaded plane” but did not provide a date; Report of Operations – Provisional Tank Group, NARA RG407, 6.

5. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 73; Construction Progress Reports for 30 November and 15 December 1941.

6. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 447; Dice, interview, 25 October 1999; Minder diary, 4; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 23.

7. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 25; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4–5; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 79. Vater, *Dates to Remember*, n.d., documented the departure from O’Donnell Field as 24 December and arrival in Barrio San Jose, Dinalupihan, on 25 December; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003. Vater, in the interview of 20–21 October 2002, remembered the truck involved in the Austin incident was leaving O’Donnell Field. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 23–25, said the accident date was 17 December 1941, when Company A was moving to a new camp site and later documented the company’s move to Dinalupihan as 21 December. George A. Schatz, Sr., *Three and a Half Years in Hell* (MS), said the date was 17 December.

8. Casey, *Memoirs*, 157; Zubay to author, letter, 1999; Tom Gage, *Philippine Notebook*, 8 February 1990, January–February 1994, March–April 1994 (Gage was assigned to the 34th Pursuit Squadron); MacArthur to AGO [War Department], radio-gram, 6 December 1941, quoted in Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 36; Hamilton, *Late Summer of 1941*, 21; Poster, interview, 25 October 1998; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 40; Lamm, interview, 25 October 1998; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 70.

9. Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 358–61, 394, 396; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 107, 116; Lt. [Claude M.] Paulger, report, n.d., [compiled in a POW camp], Subject: 34th Pursuit Squadron, NARA RG407, Entry 1106, Box 1443.

10. Merrill to author, memo, 15 November 1999; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 121–22, 128, 142, 144, 153; Capt James D. Richardson, adjutant, 803rd Engineer Battalion, to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 26 December 1941, Subject: Report requested by Telephone on 22 December 1941, Casey Files, Folder 9; MFR, Paulger, 34th Pursuit Squadron.

11. Poster, interview, 25 October 1998; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 36; Merrill to author, email, 4 April 1999; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 163, noted that the bombs were for the 27th Bomb Group L, which was supposed to be based at Del Carmen; Gage to John Zubay, letter, 5 March 1996 (cited with the permission of Tom Gage); Gage, *Philippine Notebook*, May–June 1994; Thomas to PHILRYCOM, letter, 15 July 1947, [subject: civilian workers at Philippine airfields]; Paulger, 34th Pursuit Squadron.

12. Lamm, interviews, 18 August and 25 October 1998; Poster, interview, 25 October 1998; Knutson, interview, 20 February 1999; Smith Merrill and William J. Duggan, *Silence of a Soldier* (Oakland, Oregon: Elderberry Press, 2003), 34–35 (*Silence of a Soldier* has numerous gaps and factual errors); “Part 1: A Bitter Surrender, A Brutal Walk in the Sun and “Part 2: Hell on a Ship, Freezing in Manchuria,” both from *The Morning Call*, April 7, and 8, 2002, <https://www.mcall.com/> and <https://www.mcall.com> [Interview with Joseph T. Poster].

13. Richardson to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 26 December 1941, Subject: Report Requested by Telephone on 22 December 1941; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 18 Jan 1942, no subject (recommendation for commendation for the 803rd Engineer Battalion), 9; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Citations, recommended Carey for the Purple Heart medal. The memo listed Murl J. Carey as Murl J. Carney. The Kloecker Roster documented Pvt Carey’s date of death as 14 April 1942. See Abie Abraham, *Oh, God, Where Are You?* (New York: Vantage Press, 1997), 563. Seeming to agree with the timeframe of the Kloecker Roster, Abraham listed Murl Carey as “Murl Carry” in documenting his death for reasons unspecified on the Bataan Death March.

14. ODE Construction Progress Reports, 30 November and 15 December 1941; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 36–37; Engineer, USAFFE, to CoS [UASFFE], memo, 15 December 1941; no subject; Casey Files, Folder 9; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 163; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 95; Merrill to author, email, 28 March 1998; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 73; headquarters, 803rd Engineer Bn., AVN (Sep) Philippine Military Prison Camp No.2, Dapecol, to CG, US Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations.

15. Mielenz to CG, USAFFE, 2nd Ind., 14 December 1941, no subject [response to USAFFE comment on ODE’s construction progress report, 30 November 1941], Casey Files, Folder 3.

16. Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Bn., AVN (Sep) Philippine Military Prison Camp No.2, Dapecol, to CG, US Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations; Undated recommendation of citation for Corporal Smith Merrill; award of the Silver Star medal to Cpl Merrill substantiated in “Record and Report of Separation Honorable Discharge (WD AG Form 53-55, for Smith Merrill, 17 December 1945); copies of both documents provided by Smith Merrill. Pfc George Andrews was believed to have died as a POW on a mountain work detail, Pfc John Foster, Pvt Paul A. Fechner, Pvt Fred C. Princkick, and Pvt Elbert W. Moore died as POWs (nfi). Capt Ingersoll’s recommendation documented

Pvt Fred C. Pronchick as "Pvt. Poncheck." Names completed or verified in the Leggett and Mansell rosters.

17. Richardson-Bartsch interview, 4 September 1982, MMA.

18. Wonneman Diary; "Ex-Prisoner [Paul A. Kloecker] Recalls Death March, *The [Sarasota] Times*, ca. December, 1957; Poster, interview, 24 October 1999; PFC Laurie Jack "Gil" Gillespie [military biography and map], <https://www.usmilitariaforum.com/>; James L. Leggett, Jr., to PHILRYCOM, letter, 26 May 1947, Subject: Work on airstrips performed by the 803rd Engineer Battalion, NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11; G-4 journal, 4 January 1942, Subject: From Galbraith, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 30. Documented dates of departure from Del Carmen varied among 20, 25, and 26 December. Leggett clarified the confusion after the war in a letter to PHILRYUCOM, explaining the departure of the rear guard. See Richardson to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 26 December 1941, Subject: Report Requested by Telephone on 22 December 1941. He documented 20 December as the last Japanese air raid on Del Carmen Field. Lt Col Nicol Galbraith's reports to USAFFE G-4 were notable for their detail.

## Chapter 14

# Withdrawal to Bataan

## Impact of Pearl Harbor

At first, General MacArthur and his staff, including Colonel Casey, appear to have underestimated the impact of Pearl Harbor and the swiftness of the Japanese advance on attempts to reinforce or even resupply the Philippine garrison. In 1993, Casey said that with the losses of 7 December, USAFFE officers “felt that it was going to be difficult if not impossible to bring in any major reinforcements.” Still, they believed that the longer they held fast, the “more chance there was of possible reinforcements.” After the war, Fertig stated that for weeks after 8 December, the USAFFE did not have a complete picture of the damage in Hawaii. Yet Maj Gen Henry Arnold, chief of the USAAF had called Brereton on 11 December to alert him about the damage done at Pearl Harbor. On 13 December, MacArthur radioed the War Department emphasizing the strategic importance of the Philippines and recommending that “an immediate effort . . . be initiated through the concentrated action of all resources of the Democratic Allies on the sea, on land, and in the air, with a view to pushing reinforcements and supplies to the Philippines. I give first priority to air reinforcements. Five days later, Casey forwarded the USAFFE a list of critical engineer materials. Primarily the request was for combat engineers, needed to augment the 14th EB PS, and an appeal that it “be coordinated with other priority . . . items.” Casey also recommended that a radiograph be sent to the War Department requesting their immediate shipment. He proposed, “spreading the shipment over three boats . . . to insure against the loss of the entire shipment is shipped on a single vessel. Plan[s] should be made for the shipment of about 20% of these quantities in each month thereafter dependent on operations.” Perhaps becoming more attuned to the actual situation, the USAFFE headquarters demurred on Casey’s request, saying that it would “place this in the file of critical items to be asked or at a later date.”<sup>1</sup>

Given Arnold’s alert about the effect of the Pearl Harbor attack, Maj Gen Brereton recorded the following diary entry for 22 December 1941:

The situation was gloomy, but nobody had given up hope that we would get reinforcements and additional planes to rebuild our air strength. Our plans were based on fighting a delaying action over an extended period. Our presence in the Philippines left the enemy's flank exposed and endangered his line of communications to the south.<sup>2</sup>

As of early January 1942, lower-ranking officers and probably enlisted personnel, as well, still “knew nothing . . . of the extent of the disaster at Pearl Harbor, observed a senior officer.”<sup>3</sup>

Additionally, other than the US Navy, at first, Allied leadership in Washington and Australia also seemed unaware of the strategic implications of the damage inflicted on the US Navy at Pearl Harbor. With the War Department's 7 December message to General MacArthur, invoking Rainbow 5 went assurances of confidence and “every possible assistance and support within our power.” Not until a week after Pearl Harbor, did General Marshall began to acknowledge that it would be impossible to reinforce the Philippines in time to defeat the Japanese. However, he still urged Brig Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, newly arrived in the WPD to “do [his] best to save them.” The Philippines could possibly be resupplied if not reinforced by air and sea. At Marshall's direction, Eisenhower—first in charge of the Far Eastern desk and then as chief of the WPD— explored options and developed plans for running the blockade to, at least, resupply Bataan with bomber and pursuit aircraft. Roosevelt agreed with that position, even if some military planners in Washington—principally the Navy—did not.<sup>4</sup>

Throughout December, frenetic planning led to numerous attempts to provide the Philippine garrison with arms, ammunition, and replacement aircraft. On 10 December, the joint board reversed its position. It allowed a convoy led by the USS *Pensacola* to proceed to Brisbane with its cargo of A-24 dive bombers (sans critical parts and essential coolant) and pursuit planes destined for the Philippines, even though the Navy members on the board noted the futility of the mission. According to the plan, the aircraft were to be flown north to the Philippines, news that MacArthur received with enthusiasm. By 18 December, the War Department had formulated plans to rush 80 heavy bombers to the Philippines via Australia. Fifteen modified B-24 Liberators were to be diverted from the United Kingdom and flown to the Pacific via Cairo, while 65 B-17s were to be sent along a still developing southern route from Hawaii to Australia through Canton Island, Fiji, and New Caledonia. The proposed delivery

schedule for the B-24s was three planes per day after 5 January 1942. Orders for the delivery of the B-17s to the Philippines were dated 23 December. Fighter aircraft, ground crews, and materiel for the air force were to trickle across the Pacific by ship. On 19 December, the USS *President Polk*, with 55 crated P-40s, 55 pilots, bombs, torpedoes, and other munitions, left San Francisco for Wellington, New Zealand, and Brisbane, Australia. There the aircraft were to be assembled and transshipped to the Philippines. Two squadrons attempted to fly north through the Netherlands East Indies but encountered monsoons. In mid-December, MacArthur added to the planning mix by proposing to bring in 300 pursuit planes by carrier. The War Department directed Maj Gen George H. Brett, deputy supreme commander, American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, on 23 December that his “primary and immediate mission” was to ship vital equipment “as expeditiously as possible” to the Philippines. “Items of highest priority [were] aircraft and ammunition.” In all, some 230 pursuit planes, besides the 17 in the *Pensacola* convoy, were shipped to Australia during 7–31 December 1941. By that time, it had become evident that those efforts had little chance of success. Despite the early assurances and the efforts of the men in Australia, however, the aircraft, reinforcements, and supplies failed to get through to the Philippines.<sup>5</sup>

On 3 January 1942, Brig Gen Leonard Gerow, still head of WPD, advised General Marshall that “forces required for the relief of the Philippines cannot be placed in the Far East within the time available,” and that the allocation of adequate forces to regain control in the Philippines “would necessitate an entirely unjustifiable diversion from the principal theater—the Atlantic.” Further, the “greatest effort” that could be “sustained on strategic grounds [was] . . . to hold the Malay Barrier, Burma, and Australia.” The WPD recommended, “that operations for the relief of the Philippines not be undertaken.” By then, the War Department realized that the mission to ferry 65 B-17s to MacArthur was hopeless and designated the planes for Australia rather than the Philippines, even as Marshall searched for other options.<sup>6</sup>

Louis Morton called the WPD’s analysis a “realistic appraisal of the strategic situation and the importance of the Philippine Islands.” Nevertheless, he did not find formal approval of its conclusions, although Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall had reviewed them. Morton also claimed that MacArthur and his immediate staff



knew of the decision. The Fil-American forces, nevertheless, were not aware of their abandonment. Further efforts were limited to the provision of whatever small amount of supplies the United States and its allies could afford. They could get through the Japanese blockade via air and submarine.<sup>7</sup>

The War Department's determination to resupply the Philippines, nonetheless, continued through at least February 1942. Craven and Cate commented that "slow and untrustworthy communications" between the War Department and MacArthur "made it difficult for either to comprehend the other's position." The chances for success diminished rapidly. Planes from the USS *Pensacola* convoy did not reach the Philippines. The route from Hawaii became more perilous with the fall of Guam on 11 December, Wake Island on 23 December, and Japanese threats to, or attacks, on Midway, Canton, Palmyra, Johnston, and the Samoa Islands. Hong Kong surrendered on 25 December. From late December to early January, the Japanese raced toward Singapore, which surrendered on 15 February 1942, and the Netherlands East Indies, where the occupation began on 11 January. The Philippine defenders were isolated.

Those Japanese successes brought a sharp shift in the focus from forwarding fighter aircraft and supplies to the Philippines from Australia to a more strategic plan for developing a substantial base capable of supporting extended air operations in the Pacific Theater. MacArthur notified the War Department on 22 December of his decision to retreat to a "final defensive [position] on Bataan." That same day, the War Department informed MacArthur that "plans for reaching you quickly with pursuit plan[e]s [were] jeopardized. . . . But the War Department will press in every way for the development of a strong United States airpower in the Far East base on Australia." Of the nine air combat groups allocated to the Southwest Pacific during the last week of December, three were assigned to help hold the Malay Barrier. This area included from the Malay Peninsula through the Netherlands East Indies and might possibly allow for an assault on the southern Philippines. Marshall did not rule out the use of carriers for air raids in the Philippines but offered MacArthur little hope. By 25 January, the USAAF formally took steps to divert materiel initially consigned to the Philippines to Australia.<sup>8</sup>

## Action in the Philippines

In the Philippines, the Japanese invasion came quickly after the first bombing raids. The imperial army landed small forces at Aparri and Vigan in northern Luzon on 10 December and at Legaspi in southern Luzon on 12 December. The main invasion forces came into Lingayen Gulf in north-central Luzon on the coast of the East China Sea on 22 December and Lamon Bay in southern Luzon on 24 December. All the while, USAFFE leadership still held out hope for reinforcements from the United States. As early as 12 December, nevertheless, Gen MacArthur began making plans for a possible retreat to Bataan by instituting War Plan Orange-3 (WPO-3), even as he pursued over-optimistic plans, at least publicly, to defeat the Japanese on the beaches. A week before the decision to reinstate WPO-3, Col Hugh Casey began preparing for the worst-case scenario. He advised Capt Frederick G. Saint, the new commander 14th EB PS, that USAFFE would issue orders to the Philippine Department to build two new bridges as “a parallel bypass . . . supplementing the bridges at the Balsic and Culo Rivers near the Layac Junction on the single road entering Bataan Peninsula.” Casey charged Saint with the construction using “the minimum amount of military labor and the maximum amount of civilian labor.” With the approval of the Philippine BPW, the BPW district engineer was to furnish locally available civilian labor, materials, and equipment for the project.<sup>9</sup>

On 24 December, MacArthur formally reverted to WPO-3, based on the assumption that the United States would be fighting alone (i.e., without the allies as forecast in Rainbow 5) and ordered a withdrawal to Bataan. A day later, Japanese forces were in firm control of central Luzon. Gen Masaharu Homma, the Japanese commander, established his headquarters and prepared to march on Manila. Maj Gen Wainwright's NLF and Maj Gen George Parker's SLF conducted systematic—some say brilliant—delaying actions as they withdrew their forces through Luzon into Bataan.

With the Japanese advance and the reversion to WPO-3, remnants of the pursuit squadrons were forced to evacuate their original bases. However, few emergency airstrips were available for temporary use outside Bataan to handle the fast-changing situation. The only prewar preparation for the air force on Bataan was the preliminary work on Bataan Field. As the Philippine Department engineer, Col Henry H. Stickney had previously made the point that the “landing field on


Bataan is absolutely necessary as the last stand of the garrison of the Philippine Department is to be made on southern Bataan.” The focus, albeit limited, was on warehouse and dock construction and construction of access roads for those facilities. The seaplane ramp at Mariveles was plagued with a high-water table and was not considered usable for military operations. Consequently, Casey had recommended that it be abandoned and used only as a dummy field.<sup>10</sup>

### Emergency Airstrips

As the evacuations began, ground personnel from the depleted 3rd Pursuit Squadron moved from Iba to Tanauan, Batangas Province, south of Manila. The 17th started leaving Nichols Field on 24 December for Pilar Field, Bataan. The 21st evacuated Nichols during 15–20 December for the emergency landing strip at Lubao, Pampanga Province. The remaining personnel of the 20th left Clark Field to join the 21st on 24–25 December. The Japanese advance forced the departure of those two squadrons from Lubao in early January. Despite the Japanese destruction of most of the 34th Pursuit Squadron’s P-35s on 10 December, the demoralized squadron did not evacuate Del Carmen for Orani until 25 December. Quickly developed, but still primitive airstrips were ready by then at Lubao and Pilar but not at Orani.<sup>11</sup>

Casey realized that any reinforcements (i.e., vice materiel) would be air units and that the optimal route to Bataan would be via Mindanao. Consequently, the engineers were under pressure to build new airstrips for the few remaining pursuit aircraft. From 8 to 25 December, Fertig said, attention was first centered on “simple operational fields, consisting of runways and hideouts.” On 18 December, Casey responded to what one engineer officer termed “frantic instructions” from MacArthur by ordering the engineers to construct four airfields in two areas of Luzon.

Brig Gen Richard K. Sutherland—MacArthur’s sycophantic chief of staff—sent a memorandum to Brig Gen William Sharpe, commander of the Visayan-Mindanao Force, on 16 December. It used the same wording to order reconnaissance of additional airfield sites in Sharpe’s area of operations. Casey said that the new fields were to be developed “in anticipation of [the] early receipt of large reinforcements of airplanes” from the United States.<sup>12</sup>



**Figure 14.1. Bataan: Key locations.** (Adapted from Map No. 3: Disposition of *Bataan Defense Force*, 6-16 January 1942, *Engineers in Theater Operations*.)

Some—but not all—of Casey’s directives in response to MacArthur’s orders reflected the realities of rapidly changing situations. The USAFFE chief engineer recommended additional fields, operational as well as dummy, be developed along the Tagatay Ridge, south of Manila overlooking Lake Taal. He said, “fields [would] initially be developed for pursuit but wherever possible, be extended for bombardment.” Rendered useless by the Japanese advancement from Lamón Bay, FEAF had abandoned those fields by 24 December. The second area was along the northeast coast of Bataan. The designated fields, which were to be ready by Christmas, were to be at Hermosa, Orani, Abucay, and Pilar. The projected route for aircraft reinforcements was Australia or the Netherlands East Indies to Mindanao and, finally, to Luzon. Thus, Casey also urged “holding a portion of Mindanao as an airfield base” because it “appear[ed] vital to the successful defense of the Philippines.” A few days later, he added the airstrip at Barrio San José, Dinalupihan District, northeastern Bataan Province, to the list and, somewhat surprisingly, a field in Pinagkamaligan, located between Clark Field and Manila.

Consequently, on 20 December, an advance party of Company B, 803rd Engineers, left Del Carmen to take the lead on the Bataan projects. Company A left O’Donnell Field for Bataan a day later. By 23 December and with the order to implement WPO-3, Casey ordered Fertig to stop work on projects on the west of central Zambales Province, particularly the airfield at Maquisquis, Botolan District.<sup>13</sup>

Conditions on Bataan came into play. Much of the construction and maintenance work at the new airstrips on Bataan had to rely on manual labor—large numbers of local workers using hand tools—because more than ever equipment was in short supply and fuel shortages were soon to emerge. Casey reminded Stickney of the heavy equipment in the hands of the 803rd, specifically mentioning 30-ton tractors in Company C’s inventory, and of the need to ensure that the equipment was allocated “as required for optimum utilization.” He said the procedure was approved “under authority delegated by the commanding general, Far East Air Force . . . under the direction of [USAFFE] Headquarters.” Engineers estimated construction jobs by the amount of fuel needed from limited stocks.<sup>14</sup>

The prewar program for the construction of additional airfields and the expansion of existing facilities suffered from a lack of skilled personnel and heavy equipment. Hastily developed plans to cobble together a new set of emergency airfields and prepare defenses on

Bataan in a combat environment strained those resources even further. To meet new requirements, the USAFFE took further advantage of locally available resources. Its enlistment and commissioning of US mining engineers for demolitions and combat engineer duty provided one example. Another was the contract signed with CPNAB, the US construction engineering consortium working on Navy bases at Mariveles and Cavite before the war. When the fighting forced the stoppage of those Navy construction programs, Adm Thomas C. Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, made CPNAB and its extensive workforce and inventory of heavy equipment available to the Army. After agreement from MacArthur, the ODE signed a separate contract with the Manila-based CPNAB manager George S. Colley for an “extensive program of airfield and national defense construction.” Under that contract, CPNAB “personnel, plant, and materials no longer required [by the US Navy] [were to be] made available to the US Army.” Skilled personnel at CPNAB included US designers, 85 superintendents, forepersons, and operators—assigned and expatriate—and 4,000 Filipino mechanics and laborers. It had custody of an extensive array of heavy construction equipment used on Navy contracts, including draglines, a power shovel, D-8, and D-6 Caterpillar bulldozers, dump and flat rack trucks, mixing plants (batch and sand), and air compressors. In its inventory, CPNAB had much needed reinforcing steel (“rebar”), nails, and metal sheets. The USAFFE’s new contractor was known as the “Philippine Emergency Contractor” or, more simply, the “Colley Organization.” Among CPNAB’s assigned tasks, according to Colley, were to build:

- Three airstrips on Bataan (Bataan, Cabcaben, Mariveles);
- Roads around the base of Mt. Mariveles;
- A road from the East Highway to Manila Bay “to improve communications to Corregidor and to open a line of retreat;” and
- Tunnels near Mariveles for use as air raid shelters.<sup>15</sup>

Departing Manila on Christmas Day, Col Harold George noted that in addition to the airfields in the northern sector of Bataan, the USAFFE had to complete some further to the rear. Ironically, before the war, he had directed the limitation of work on Bataan Field but after 8 December was nonetheless disturbed by lack of airfields on Bataan. Thus, as Casey was drafting orders for new airfield construction on Bataan, airstrips at Hermosa, Orani, and Cabcaben were still

only concepts. Waiting for one of the new airstrips was the remainder of the 21st Pursuit Squadron at a hastily built runway in Lubao, just north of Bataan. It was initially destined for Hermosa to operate as a fighter unit.<sup>16</sup>

Troops, equipment, and civilians funneling through the Layac Junction into Bataan had to contend with heavy congestion, numerous damaged vehicles, and poor road discipline that slowed the process. Company C of the 803rd hauled some of the abandoned wrecks to its bivouac area at Bataan Field for use as spare parts. Traffic moved in both directions aimlessly, consuming fuel while not contributing materially to the transport of essential supplies. Bataan's roads, primitive by any measure, were unmarked. The thin surface of the East Road deteriorated rapidly. Service facilities were not available for fuel and repairs. Stocks of food, fuel, and equipment were "generally located along the principal road where they [could] be easily bombed and strafed in a straight-line aerial operation." Overruled by superior officers, military police were unable to control traffic. Maj Gen George Parker "pulled road construction gang[s] working on the West coast & Bataan roads for work on defensive positions." Casey continued to be critical of the number of vehicles and their excessive speed on Bataan's roads for some time before mandating stricter enforcement measures. Road maintenance and repair became a crucial activity on Bataan.<sup>17</sup>

Throughout the campaign, Japanese air activities hampered the airfield construction and repair activities of the 803rd. The Japanese bombed the fields during the day—the noontime attack schedule continued—and the engineers repaired the damage at night. Because the runways consisted of gravel or turf, the repair was relatively simple. Bulldozers and scrapers usually moved into action as the enemy aircraft were departing the target areas. The engineers continued and perhaps refined the observation practices developed at Clark and Del Carmen in the first days of the war. Lookouts used whistles and rifles to alert equipment operators, gave repair crews enough time to escape to foxholes near the runways, and allow for them to remove their equipment to the jungles.<sup>18</sup>

Withdrawal to Bataan changed USAFFE's major tactical organizations considerably. As of 1 January 1942, SLF was terminated, and its remaining units were assigned to the Bataan Force, which was responsible for the overall defense of the peninsula. That designation changed on 7 January, when the Bataan Defense Force was redesignated II Corps under the command of Maj Gen George M. Parker

and assigned responsibility for the defense of the eastern half of Bataan. NLF was redesignated I Corps under the command of Maj Gen Jonathan M. Wainwright and assigned responsibility for the protection of the western half of Bataan. The Philippine Department was designated Service Command Area under the command of Brig Gen Allan C. McBride. For the time being, it was assigned the defense of the beaches of southern Bataan and Corregidor.<sup>19</sup>

### Notes

1. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 37–38; Casey, *Memoirs*, 165; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 50; Arnold, *Global Mission*, 272; MacArthur to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet [Adm. Thomas C. Hart], letter, 19 December 1941, MMA, RG2, Box 2, Folder 2; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 238–242; Richard L. Watson, “Pearl Harbor and Clark Field,” and John D. Carter, “The Early Development of Air Transport and Ferrying,” both in Craven and Cate, eds., *Plans and Early Operations*, 226–33 and 330–38, respectively; USAFFE routing sheet, 18 December 1941, no subject [proposed request for engineer materiel], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 37. Maj Gen Henry H. Arnold was promoted to lieutenant general as of 15 December 1941.

2. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 60.

3. Col Glenn R. Townsend, 11th Infantry Division PA, quoted D. Clayton James, ed., *South to Bataan, North to Mukden: The Prison Diary of Brigadier General W. E. Brougher* (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1971), 18.

4. WPD radiogram, 7 December 1941, cited in Morton, *Strategy and Command*, 182; Watson, “Pearl Harbor and Clark Field,” 226–33, and Carter, “The Early Development of Air Transport and Ferrying,” 330–38; MacArthur to Hart, letter, 19 December 1941; Gen Marshall quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983) (hereafter cited as “Eisenhower”), 134. See also Robert H. Farrell, ed., *The Eisenhower Diaries* (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1981), 40–54. Eisenhower at the time was held the permanent rank of lieutenant colonel but the temporary (Army of the US—AUS) rank of brigadier general.

5. Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, 22, 80, 140, 148–52, 185; Watson, “Pearl Harbor and Clark Field,” 226–33, and Carter, “The Early Development of Air Transport and Ferrying,” 330–38; War Department to CG, USAFFE, radiogram 848, 22 December 1941 [outline of air reinforcements], MMA RG 2, Box 2, Folder 2, mentioned the B-24s but other heavy bombers were not mentioned; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *US Army in World War II, The War Department: Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1995), 150, 158 (hereafter cited as *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43*); Marshall to Brett, radiogram 856 [paraphrase], 23 December 1941, MMA RG2, Box 22; Folder 2; Col Joseph Morehead, *In My Sights: Memoirs of a P-40 Pilot* (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1988), 35–39, 42. Craven and Cates said the delivery schedule for the B-24s was 15 December 1941–1 January 1942. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 145–59, provided an excellent summary of the actions to reinforce and resupply the Philippine garrison.

6. Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, 153; Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43*, 148–67; See Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*, 240; Watson, “Pearl Harbor and Clark Field,” 226–33, and “The Defense of



Australia,” 433; Carter, “The Early Development of Air Transport and Ferrying,” 330–38; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 262; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 74–83; Gerow to CoS, memo, 3 January 1942, Subject: Relief of the Philippines.

7. Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*, 240–42, 391–92.

8. Morton, *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, 153; Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43*, 148–67; MacArthur to AGO, War Department, radiogram, 22 December 1941, and War Department to CG, USAFFE, radiogram 879, 22 December 1941, both in MMA RG2, Box 2 Folder 2; Capt Laurence J. McNamara, Air Service Command, to chief, Air Service Command, memo, 25 January 1942, Subject: Disposition of Philippine Traffic, NARA RG 18, Project File, Box 1117; Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 134–39; Watson, “Pearl Harbor and Clark Field,” 226–33, and “The Defense of Australia, 433; Carter, “The Early Development of Air Transport and Ferrying,” 330–38; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 262; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 74–83;

9. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 99–143, 162; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 16 December 1941, no subject [orders to Capt Saint], Casey Files, Folder 9; Casey, MFR, 17 December 1942, Subject: Telephone Call [from BPW]; Casey to ACoS, G-3 and G-4, USAFFE, memo, 16 December 1942, no subject [bridge construction near Layac Junction], both in Casey Files, Folder 7.

10. MacArthur to AGO War Department, radiogram, 22 December 1941; War Department to CG, USAFFE, radiogram 879, 22 December 1941, both in MMA RG2, Box 2 Folder 2; Casey, report, 7 January 1942, Inspection of Engineer Activities, 1; Stickney to CoE, letter, 22 July 1941, Subject: Fiscal Year 1942 Funds for Air Corps Construction, Philippine Department, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, File: 6001, Box 709.

11. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 187, 142–44, 194–5; Stickney to G-4, Philippine Department, memo, 14 October 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineers Construction, Casey Files; Cpl. L[eo] Arhutick, n.d., [compiled in a POW camp], 17th Pursuit Squadron, 2, NARA RG407, Box 17; Lt [Lawrence W.] Pacher, report, n.d., [compiled in a POW camp], 21st Pursuit Squadron, NARA RG407, Box 17; Lt [Stephen H.] Crosby, report, n.d., [compiled in a POW camp], 17th Pursuit Squadron, NARA RG407, Entry 1106, Box 1443. [Lt James W.] Fulks, 20th Pursuit Squadron, said the 20th was ordered to Bataan on 24 December, while Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 194–95, said the first stop for the 20th was Lubao.

12. Col Lloyd E. Mielenz to Lt Col George A. Meidling, letter, 14 April 1947, Subject: Philippine Airfields[,] 1941–1942, Humphreys Engineer Center, Box 109, Folder 9; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 27–38; Casey, *Memoirs*, 165; Casey to ODE, memos, 18 and 20 December 18 1941, Subject: Airfield Construction Program, both in Casey Files, Folder, 1; Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 60; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 20 December 1941, Subject: Necessity of Holding Mindanao as Part of Air Route for Air Reinforcement of This Command, Casey Files, Folder 3; Sutherland to CG, Visayan-Mindanao Force, memo, 16 December 1941, Subject: Additional Airfield Construction, Visayan Islands-Mindanao Area, Casey Files, Folder 9; Morton, *Strategy and Command*, 22, 80, 140, 148–52, 185; Watson, “Pearl Harbor and Clark Field,” 226–33, and Carter, “The Early Development of Air Transport and Ferrying,” 330–38.

13. [USAFFE engineer], MFR, 22 December 1941, Telephone [Conversation], Casey Files, Folder 2; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 88; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 178; See Peter J. Dekever “The Defenders of the Philippines,” [Pvt. Paul A. Fechner], SouthBendTribune.com, 24 September 2006. Meidling, ed., *Airfield and Base Development*, 489, included Abucay as one of four airstrips completed “in 1 week along the road following the northeast coast of Bataan,” but all other documentation

and interviews pointed to work on and completion only of airstrips at Hermosa, Orani, and Pilar.

14. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 37–38; Casey, *Memoirs*, 165; Casey to ODE, memo, 20 December 1941, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 2.

15. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 47; Capt. Albert L. Raithel, Jr., USN (Ret.), “Patrol Aviation in the Pacific in WW II, Part 1,” *Naval Aviation News*, No. 31 (July–August, 1992), 32; Department of the Navy, Bureau of Yards and Docks, *Building the Navy’s Bases in WWII: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1941–46* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1947), 115; MacArthur to Adm Thomas C. Hart, memo, December 18, 1941, Subject: Employment of Navy Contractor on Army Work, Casey Files, Folder 2; USAFFE, engineer, memo, n.d., [probably mid-December, 1941], Subject: Approximate Organization, Equipment & Materials of Pacific Naval Base Contractors, Casey Files, Folder 2. Casey also referred to CPNAB as the “Philippine Emergency Contractor Organization” and the “Colley Organization.” George Colley was its civilian manager. See Casey, MFR, 19 December 1942, Subject: Report 12/19 from Lt. Griffin [Lubao Airfield], Casey Files, Folder 7; Colley, *Manila, Kuching and Beyond*, 8.

16. Casey to ODE, memo, 20 December 1941, Subject: Airfield Construction Program, Casey Files, Folder 1; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 36–37; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 178–182; Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 38.

17. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 2 January 1942, Subject: Congestion in Bataan Area, Casey Files, Folder 15; Pflueger, e-mail to author, 8 August 2001. See Paul W. Ropp, “Thomas Delamore and the Defense of the Philippines: Heroism, Bureaucracy, and Fate,” *The Journal of America’s Military Past*, 27 no. 88 (Spring/Summer, 2000): 89–99, for anecdotal reporting on traffic issues on Bataan.

18. Lt Col John Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1990), 40; Kinser, interview, March 26, 1999; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 286–8; Report of Operations - USAFFE and USFIP in Philippine Islands (Luzon Force), Annex VII, Vol. V, Headquarters, USAFFE, 12 March–9 April 1942, NARA RG407, Box 1157; Dorothy Cave, *Beyond Courage: One Regiment Against Japan, 1941–1945* (Las Cruces, New Mexico: Yucca Tree Press, 1992), 97 (hereafter cited as *Beyond Courage*).


19. General Orders No. 54, HQS, USAFFE, 27 December 1941 [designation of the Bataan Force]; Meidling, ed., *Organizations, Troops and Training*, 10. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 247, noted only that McBride, MacArthur’s deputy for the Philippine Department, was assigned responsibility for the defense of the Service Command Area. Much of the official correspondence after 1 January 1942 still carried the letterhead of the Philippine Department.



## Chapter 15

### Companies A and B on Bataan

The 803rd engineers built three new fields (Dinalupihan, Hermosa, and Orani) on Bataan. They completed two others (Pilar and Bataan) of the 19 included in the USAFFE's plans for Luzon after the start of the war. It maintained or repaired two others (Cabcaban and Mariveles). However, most of the fields were abandoned in short order and came under Japanese control. As Fertig later added: "by [that] time the war of attrition had destroyed our planes."<sup>1</sup>



**Figure 15.1. Northern Bataan: new emergency airfields.** (Adapted from Map 3: *Disposition of Bataan Defense Force, 6-16 January 1942, Engineers in Theater Operations.*

### Company B

The advance party of Company B arrived at Orani on 20 December 1942. The next day, they began construction of the first emergency airstrip on Bataan, optimistically designated for bombers. The engineers

located it south of the Orani River, west of and parallel to Bataan's East Road. Revetments were originally built west of the road. In addition to the engineers, the workforce included about 800 Filipino laborers for the first few days; then, the number declined to about 500, according to Capt William B. Thomas. Local laborers were hired through a Filipino civilian assigned to Company B. The 803rd had several Filipinos responsible for hiring and paying local laborers. Colonel Fertig noted that the 803rd had its equipment plus machines from Ft. Stotsenburg available for fieldwork at both Orani and, later, Hermosa. The size of the local labor force, as estimated by Captain Thomas, indicated that the development of Orani relied more on manual labor rather than on heavy construction machinery. Ex post facto, Thomas doubted if any of the workers were ever paid for their efforts. From 21 December 1941 to 1 January 1942, Company B almost completed a 2,800-3,500-foot earthen runway. Company A then finished the work. As soon as the airstrip was deemed operational on 26 December, additional personnel from Company B arrived, as did remnants of the 34th Pursuit Squadron. The 34th set up on the north side of the Orani River and used a schoolhouse for its headquarters. Its personnel worked with Company B to camouflage the airstrip by covering it with portable stacks of rice straw. A member of the newly formed 515th CA Regiment AA remarked that the runway looked like a deserted field with stubble lying around. The CA regiment, less than four batteries, arrived on 27-28 December, established its AA gun batteries, and camouflaged them with rice straw. Other pursuit units followed quickly. Personnel of the 20th Pursuit Squadron arrived with their P-40Es from their temporary base at Lubao on 28 December, as did several additional pilots. A pilot from the 3rd Pursuit Squadron arrived shortly after that. However, by 31 December, only two P-40Es were operating from Orani. With the shortage of pilots and aircraft, missions were limited to reconnaissance with the twice daily flights, dawn and sunset, alternated among available pilots. One P-40, which was downed over Subic Bay on New Year's Day, further decreased the aircraft inventory, but additional P-40s of the 17th Pursuit Squadron arrived from Lubao on 2 January.<sup>2</sup>

While a small Company B detail probably remained at Orani until 4 January, some personnel in the company's advance party retraced earlier steps and moved north toward Hermosa on 24 or 25 December. Those engineers were possibly joined by the small rear guard that had left Del Carmen Field on 25 or 26 December. The mission at

Hermosa was to develop an airstrip to accommodate the 21st Pursuit Squadron, which was then flying from the emergency field at Lubao. Because it was yet another field developed on land that was probably part of a sugar plantation, surveyors had to lay out the field. At the same time, other engineers organized and maneuvered equipment and supplies into place. First Lt James Oppenheim was involved in supervising the project. One of his duties was to handle payments to civilian laborers, whose desertion rates were high. As a paymaster, he made a least one trip into Manila on 24 December to pick up funds to meet the payroll.<sup>3</sup>

Additional duties for Company B at that time included keeping the road open through Layac Junction—possibly from as far away as the Del Carmen area to the Bataan gateway—for retreating Fil-American forces entering Bataan. Pvt Walter Middleton noted, “for over a week traffic from Manila kept the roads loaded to capacity night and day. . . . We at Hermosa watched outfits pass us toward Bataan . . . in a very orderly way.” The engineers also helped string barbed wire for the defensive line in Hermosa, site of the first major battle for Bataan. The Hermosa assignment caused several Company B troops to miss Christmas. Still, they compensated for the deficiency during a brief return to Floridablanca to forage grease for their equipment and to steal pies made for the 34th Pursuit Squadron. Some Company B personnel moved south from Hermosa to Pilar on 27 December, while others might have stayed through 3 January 1942. At some point, Company B personnel helped haul ammunition from the Lubao railhead to Bataan Field. According to Middleton, “just as our airfield was finished at Hermosa, we got orders to move” [before it could be used]. Two weeks [i.e., ca. 6 January 1942] had passed. Two tanks came and followed us down” the East Road of Bataan.<sup>4</sup>

The withdrawal to Bataan had been completed. On 6 January, the Japanese advanced against the USAFFE lines at the Layac Junction, and by early morning of 7 January, they had attacked and occupied Hermosa. With a brief stop in Hermosa, the Japanese allowed the USAFFE some respite to reorganize.<sup>5</sup>

About 10 miles south of Orani at Pilar—or rather an area east of Pilar along the Pilar-Bagac Road, probably near kilometer post (KP) 132—was the site of two emergency airstrips. Using a local labor force, 1st Lt Karl M. Stewart, a newly commissioned engineer officer whom Casey brought in from the private sector, roughed in the “Pilar #1” airstrip, a term not used in the USAFFE documents. It was small

runway which was made of dirt and gravel over rice paddies, and it ran roughly E-W along the Pilar-Bagac Road. After orders for the work came down on 25 December, Stewart and his labor force had the airstrip and some camouflaged dispersal sites ready within 24 hours. Some P-40s from 17th Pursuit Squadron arrived at Pilar between 24 and 26 December. Trucking their equipment from the Mariveles Dock to Pilar, the squadron's ground crews arrived a day later to set up maintenance services. The same dust problems that had plagued Del Carmen also challenged operations at Pilar. The 17th used its sprinkler truck 24 hours a day for dust mitigation. Batteries B and D of the 200th CA Regiment arrived on 29-30 December to provide for air defense. On the last day of 1941, a detail from the 17th went into Manila, then in flames because of the burning oil stores, to secure a second sprinkler truck and a pump to draw water from the Talisay River, which looped west of the airstrip.<sup>6</sup>



Source: NARA RG111, Box 41, SC13131

Pile-type tank obstacles with double-apron barbed wire fencing, Bataan, 18 January 1942

According to that timeline, the 803rd worked on what the USAFFE engineer dubbed “Pilar #2,” probably an extension of the rudimentary dirt strip rather than a second runway. A Company B advance party arrived at the Pilar Field site on 27 December 1941. As of 2 January, the engineers and men of the 17th Pursuit Squadron had completed the three-sided camouflaged revetments at the west end of the runway and were ready to accept additional aircraft. The revetment walls extended to wing height on the planes. Early on the morning of 2 January, pilots of the 17th traveled to Lubao to bring some of its remaining P-40s to Pilar. One of the pursuit planes was severely damaged on landing. Of five P-35As ordered to Bataan Field, four opted to land at Pilar Field. AA crews at Bataan Field mistook them for Japanese aircraft and began firing. One of the P-35s was destroyed upon landing at Pilar, and another crashed before reaching the field.<sup>7</sup>

Company B worked with civilian laborers to improve Pilar #2, its third airfield assignment on Bataan. Capt William Thomas estimated the number of civilian workers for that project at about 50 for the first 10 days and 25 for the last eight days the company was at Pilar. A mining engineer, whom Thomas could not name, brought additional laborers, possibly as many as 35 to 40, who worked the entire 18 days. A work shift averaged about 10 hours per day. More than at Orani, Company B relied on its heavy equipment for much of the work. To improve the airstrip, the engineers used towed carryalls to strip the vegetation. They crated indigenous trees, placed them on skids, and dragged them into place along with rice sheaves for camouflage.

A total of nine P-40Es, half the remaining FEAF force, was at the field but transferred to Mindanao on 4 January. A short while later, as part of FEAF’s ongoing shuffle of aircraft, five P-40s newly arrived at Bataan Field from Orani, were transferred to Pilar on 5 January. Operations began at Pilar Field on 6 January. Their mission, as with all pursuit aircraft on Bataan, was observation and reconnaissance. Colonel George continued to conserve scarce aviation resources. Brig General Casey’s Engineer Operations Report for 7 January 1942 stated that a 7,000-foot field at “Pilar #2” would be ready by 11 January with eight camouflaged plane pens and the construction of others underway. Despite the camouflage on the airstrip, the Japanese soon discovered Pilar Field. Still, they had difficulty locating P-40s on the ground because of their concealment in wooded areas north and south of the airstrip. On one occasion, a Zero attacked Lt James M. Ross of the 17th as he was attempting to land. Lt Joseph L. McClellan,



awaiting his turn to land, shot down the enemy aircraft. Accidents had reduced the number of P-40s to three by 7 January, when part of the 17th Pursuit Squadron withdrew further south. The three planes and their pilots joined them on 8 January, after Japanese dive-bombers rendered Pilar Field temporarily inoperable.

Bataan Field then became the new center for flight operations. By 17 January, Pilar #2 was 7,500 feet long length. Company B then concentrated on grading and filling bomb craters on the airstrip. Shortly after that, Casey deemed Pilar Field to be operable again. However, Maj Albert Kircher of Casey's staff said that only a minimum amount of equipment to grade and "to keep holes filled" (presumably bomb damage) was to remain. By then, only a detachment from Company B remained for field maintenance as the rest of the company moved south to other tasks.<sup>8</sup>

Conditions at Company B's Pilar jungle bivouac were primitive. Straddle trenches and a wastewater hole passed for sanitation. Japanese dive-bomber attacks on the village and airstrip highlighted a significant failure: the lack of foxholes. When a bomb strayed into the bivouac area, the straddle trenches and wastewater hole served as foxhole substitutes for some of the men. Company B engineers worked primarily at night because of the proximity to the Japanese lines and the ever-present air attacks. Camouflage and evasion were not always sufficient. Sgt John Barrett was killed while fleeing from a strafing attack on Pilar Field on 13 January. SSgt Eugene C. McCubbin and Pvt Joe Poster could only yell a warning and watch as a truck hit Barrett. The men tried to sleep through the heat of the day. Mosquitoes abounded. The only relief was a swimming area in the nearby Pilar River. The company mess was well stocked with canned goods but lacked meat.<sup>9</sup>

Immediately before the withdrawal to the Reserve Battle Position (RBP), which was the Pilar-Bagac Road, the USAFFE engineer ordered all equipment withdrawn from Pilar. Only a detachment from Company B remained for field maintenance. The USAFFE abandoned Pilar #2 on 26 January. At the time, Company B also maintained a heavy equipment dump south of Pilar. Stored there were some pieces of equipment obtained from the Philippine BPW.<sup>10</sup>

As most of Company B was departing Pilar on 20 January 1942, the possibility of its movement to Corregidor for work on Kindley Field was discussed. However, after it participated in the Battle of the Points in late January, Company A was later given that assignment. In

addition to its work on the Pilar Field, Company B began its transition to road repair and maintenance, while at the same time adhering to Casey's dictum of providing men and heavy equipment for other engineering projects. It was briefly responsible for maintenance and repair of the East Road from Orani south to Samal from at least 7 January, probably until the Japanese penetrated the USAFFE line in that area on 10 January. Assisted by Company G, 2nd Battalion, 302nd ER PA, Company B constructed bypasses for the bridges along the East Road south from Pilar to Limay. Company G was responsible for the maintenance of that section of the East Road, a task that required spreading about four inches of sand on the roadway. Company B provided two bulldozers for the bypass work, and the 302nd provided the labor.<sup>11</sup>



Source: NARA RG111, Box 41, SC131279

**Engineer bridge builders on Bataan, 1942**

Leaving behind a maintenance detachment at Pilar, Company B moved first to Orion, the village 10 kilometers south of Pilar, on 10 January. There was still some discussion of its building another airstrip there, but then the company moved to Kilometer Post (KP) 149 of the

East Road, near Bataan Field, possibly for road and trail work. The stretch from Pilar to Orion was the only paved section of the East Road, but heavy traffic during the withdrawal to Bataan caused considerable damage.<sup>12</sup> During late January, a problem arose in the payment of civilian laborers at Pilar Field and possibly at Orani Field. Major Fries tried to solve the problem by using pay records and providing wages to “all men who present themselves.”<sup>13</sup>

As of 7 January 1942, the battalion was given the primary responsibility for road maintenance and repair in the Service Command Area on the southern tip of Bataan. About two weeks later, Major Kircher and Lt Colonel Fertig discussed the use of other Philippine Department troops on road maintenance. Kircher suggested that soldiers be responsible for road stretches in their area of assignment with the 803rd providing supervision. He wanted the remainder of the 803rd to spread gravel on the roads and reinforce bridges. By 19 January, just before the withdrawal to the RBP, all bridges from Pilar through Mariveles to Bagac had alternate crossings, either bridges or fords in place or were under construction. Strengthening of bridges involved the adding of wood “runways” or planking over the wood bridge decking common in rural or primitive areas. The runways aligned with the wheels and treads of service vehicles. Much of that section of the road had been dressed with gravel or quarry chips as the result of maintenance work performed by the 803rd and civilian laborers. The ever-critical Casey rated the work of the 803rd as “excellent.”<sup>14</sup>

Company B stayed in Orion from 10 January until about 15 January. During 15 January–4 February, a portion of Company B bivouacked at KP149, between Limay and Lamao. Their task was road maintenance and improvement of the many trails, as those dirt roads were labeled, in the area between Pilar and Limay. The Philippine Department quartermaster’s food dump was also located in this area. During the week of 17–24 January, the company took over responsibility from Company G, 302nd Engineers for all road maintenance for the East Road from Pilar to Limay. As had become the norm, most of the work was accomplished at night to lessen the threat from Japanese air attacks.<sup>15</sup>

The 803rd’s responsibility for road maintenance expanded, including the East and West Roads from Pilar through Mariveles to Bagac. As with airfield construction, the workforce included both the battalion’s engineers and civilian labor.<sup>16</sup>

Company B’s southward movement continued. By 28 or 29 January, most elements of the company had bivouacked at KP167.5, east of

Little Baguio and south of Hospital #1 on the East Road. Withdrawing from the Battle of the Points, Company A joined them at that location in late January. The remainder of Company B arrived at the new bivouac site by 4 February.<sup>17</sup>

## Company A

The main body of Company A arrived at Barrio San Jose, Dinalupihan District, Bataan Province, on or about 21 December for work on three short emergency airstrips, two of which were eventually operable. Capt Edmund Zbikowski, the company commander, wrote that “every hour of the day [was] full of action and necessary work.” On 22 December, the engineers began to carve the first airstrip of 5,000 feet in length from a sugar cane area. Lt. Robert Montgomery termed it a “poor location.” After reconnaissance efforts found a better location, the company abandoned the site of the first day’s work to begin an alternate 3,500-foot airstrip on 23 December. Montgomery commented that the project was “easy work & well done in a day.” Late in the afternoon of 24 December, Company A, along with about 50 civilian laborers, whom Lt Robert Montgomery characterized as “easily and readily employed,” started the third runway. It was to be 5,200 feet in length. They also began to build revetments. The length of the work-day was probably 10 hours, with the men working in shifts.

Just before noon of that day, Lt. Glenn Cave buzzed the field in his P-40 and made an emergency landing, the only documented operational use of the newest strip. His landing gear folded and the plane was damaged beyond repair. The engineers dragged the aircraft off the runway. Montgomery’s only comment was, “Pilot, Lt Cave, unhurt.” Cave took his gear and hitchhiked south to Bataan.

Work on the airfield continued, the Christmas holiday notwithstanding, but the company did have time for a “festive dinner,” as Lieutenant Coone termed it. The day after Christmas, Headquarters Company arrived from Clark Field just as Company A was beginning to work on revetments. At San Jose, Company A’s engineers again handled both construction and base defense.<sup>18</sup>

In the direct range of enemy artillery fire, Company A abandoned the Dinalupihan airstrips on the night of 28 or 29 December and moved to Orani. Headquarters Company left at the same time and moved to KP165.5 in southern Bataan. The battalion staff might have

arrived a few days earlier, as Lieutenant Richardson said they ate Christmas dinner along the way. Heavy traffic on the East Road slowed movement south. The battalion CP remained at KP165.5 until the surrender of Bataan.<sup>19</sup>

Four days later, on New Year's Day, 1942, General Homma ordered his Takahashi Division to advance from Angeles City through Porac to seize Dinalupihan. After facing fierce resistance, the Japanese took the Layac Junction and then turned north to capture the nearly vacant village of Dinalupihan on 6 January 1942. Arriving in Orani on 29 December, Company A continued the work on the airfield that Company B, which had moved north to Hermosa, had begun. With the Orani airstrip already operational, Company A focused on building revetments with sandbags. The company also assumed responsibility for traffic control along the East Road through Orani, presumably the same assignment that Company B had undertaken at the Layac Junction. The road was jammed with military personnel, an unexpectedly large number of civilian evacuees, vehicles, and weapons heading south into Bataan.<sup>20</sup>

The company bivouac in Orani became an obvious target. It was located at the north end of the runway adjacent to the barrio of Orani and a bridge on the East Road. While the rice straw stacks might have camouflaged the airstrip, the bivouac site had little cover. Even Lieutenant Mohnac realized the situation. He tried to find a local dentist to keep his dental equipment more secure.<sup>21</sup>

The only break in the work came on New Year's Eve. Learning of special supplies provided to the other companies, Company A asked for and received a limited quantity of beer from battalion headquarters. Lieutenant Coone and a driver volunteered to return to Ft. Stotsenburg to get medical supplies and liquor for the New Year's Eve Party. Prior looting of and scavenging at the PX limited their possibilities. Still, they were able to find scotch, rum, and bourbon in the officers' quarters after ignoring the "No Trespassing" signs posted there. During the hunt, Coone also found a neurology book and an otoscope—a hand-held instrument for ear examinations. The company's party at Orani was quiet, given the warm beer and liquor, as well as the bleak prospects for the future. Coone commented, however, that morale was good.<sup>22</sup>

Almost immediately upon arrival at Orani, Company A suffered the consequences of settling into a vulnerable work site. In the morning, probably 1 January, when the engineers left to work on the airfield,

Japanese planes strafed and bombed Orani in the first of three attacks that day. The second came mid-morning, about 1100, and the third about 1600. The bombs were all duds. However, two hit the bridge, which the Japanese had targeted in several attacks the previous week. One bomb hit a revetment, and a fourth lifted a metal building off its foundation. As a result of these attacks, Company A suffered its first combat casualties of the war. In the morning raid, Pvt Marvin Cahill, Sgt Paul D. Gellert, Pvt Clifford E. Kolthoff, SSgt Peter N. Retterath, Pfc Elmer Yochum, and several others suffered severe shrapnel wounds. Kolthoff, whose leg was nearly severed, was taken to Hospital #1, then located in Limay. Several Company A engineers received minor wounds. Two of 12 Filipinos in a shelter were killed when a bomb landed near their location. The engineers dug out and rescued the other ten. Numerous others were injured during the bombing of the bridge.

The explosion of two large gasoline trucks during the raids set fire to the village of Orani. In the last attack of the day, the bombs dropped to the rear of the Company A bivouac. The strafing was unusually heavy. However, the raid did not cause any further casualties among Company A personnel. The 34th Pursuit Squadron was using a schoolhouse as its CP. The squadron used half the building as an orderly room. It became a hospital used to treat both military and civilian personnel. The engineers managed to shoot down one of the Japanese planes. In a diary compiled as a POW, Goldblith said without explanation that during the attack, Lieutenants Zbikowski and Coone, and 1st Sgt Clarence Rutz “showed exceptional valor.”<sup>23</sup>

After the attack, the engineers exploded the remaining dud ordnance, work that continued into the early hours of 2 January. They also moved the half-circle revetments east of the East Road and rebuilt the bridge, but only after they had dug foxholes. Coincidentally, after the attack, Company A briefly took on the maintenance of local bridges.<sup>24</sup>

About 2 January, selected pilots from the 17th and the 21st, who were flying from Lubao, were ordered to Orani for evacuation to Australia. They took off in an over-loaded Beechcraft 18, a small twin-engine passenger plane. During this time, Orani witnessed a second crash landing. Lt Claude Paulger of the 34th Pursuit Squadron hit a soft spot on the runway and hit his brakes only to turn the aircraft upside-down and render it a total loss. Company A engineers stripped the damaged US aircraft of its machine guns and tried to use them for antiaircraft weapons. However, the air-cooled weapons jammed after a few rounds.<sup>25</sup> Also, on 2 January 1942, Col Harold George, who was

just named to command the newly formed V Interceptor Command, visited the Orani airstrip during his withdrawal from Manila to southern Bataan. Early in the morning on that same day, several pilots from the 17th drove from Orani to the airstrip at Lubao—which was being abandoned because it was “front line territory,”—to help P-40s fly out. The 18 P-40s remaining on Bataan were divided equally and temporarily between the 34th at Orani and the 17th at Pilar. The five surviving P-35As and one North American A-27 light attack aircraft, by then a trainer plane, were flown to Bataan Field, south of Orani. The last combat mission from Orani was a flight north of Zambales on 3 January. The last P-40 left Orani on 4 January, part of the nine-plane transfer to Bataan Field.

On 6 January, 1st Lt. Robert Wray, the 34th Pursuit Squadron's new commanding officer, received orders and moved the 34th personnel to Little Baguio at the tip of Bataan (KP169). That day 1st Lt Bill Rowe of the Pilar-based 17th Pursuit Squadron made a crash landing at Orani, damaging a rudder and wing. Mechanics from the 17th came from Pilar to make the necessary repairs and allow the plane to return to Pilar. Reporting on his 7 January 1942, inspection of engineer activities, Casey commented succinctly: “Orani—now gone.”<sup>26</sup>

Company A was ordered south on 2 January for road and bridge work on the Pilar-Bagac Road. The dirt and cobblestone route ran roughly E-W across the Bataan peninsula between Mount Natib and Mariveles Mountains. The work included expanding the roadway and building bypasses for its narrow, shaky trestle bridges. A small advance party might have departed Orani earlier. The tall trees with thick foliage provided excellent camouflage for the temporary bivouac, even as Japanese bombers passed overhead. Work details had less protection. While working on bypasses on the Pilar-Bagac Road, Company A suffered additional casualties on 31 December. Pfc George R. Eyre, Pvt Melvin Schrepel, Pvt Marvin D. Cahill, and one other engineer were wounded in action during a bombing raid which targeted a bridge. The Japanese attacks forced the men to begin working at night.<sup>27</sup>

On 9 January, Company A moved under blackout conditions to a new bivouac on the west coast of Bataan, first at KP207 and a day later to KP201.5. Its mission was to improve and maintain the primitive West Road, another single lane, unpaved route, from Bagac to Mariveles. Casey generously documented the West Road as “half paved” and the bridges as “weak.” The worst section was between



KP210 and KP189, about 20 kilometers north of Mariveles. The engineers widened the West Road and built bridge bypasses while continuing to deal with Japanese bombing and strafing of their bivouac, machinery, and work areas. The men tried to dig foxholes in the lava rock for protection. In late January, Gen Wainwright ordered that all maintenance on the Bagac-Mariveles Road be coordinated with Company A.<sup>28</sup>

In the first weeks of January 1942, Lieutenant Coone noted that “the lack of rations was getting critical.” Although Company A had some supplies of canned meat, such as bacon, it was short on the canned fruits and vegetables that Company B had stockpiled. Coone recalled an incident in which a Company A cook diverted the attention of a Quartermaster Corps sergeant to allow his men to steal canned peaches and peas. Filipino aides, however, continued to serve dinner every night on the white china plates that Zbikowski had purchased while at Camp O’Donnell.<sup>29</sup>

By 23 January, when Company A was placed on alert before the Battle of the Points, it was employed on road maintenance and the installation near Bagac of two 8-inch railway guns shipped from Manila in late December 1941–early January 1942. Initially, a detachment led by 2nd Lt Robert Montgomery and 2nd Lt Walter Farrell took on assignments usually reserved for combat engineers. They prepared bridges on the Binauangan and Quinauan Rivers and a small creek (KP205, 206, and 212) for demolition. Also, they built barbed wire entanglements, machine gun pits, and a roadblock, anti-tank position on the West Road (KP202-204). Late in the day, Montgomery and a small detachment transported and installed a portable searchlight battery at Caibobo Point (also known as Bobo Point), at the end of Trail 23. The trail branched off the West Road between KP 203 and KP204. All the projects, save the 8-inch gun installation, were completed by the night of 23 January. The 8-inch gun project and Company A’s participation in the Battle of the Points are covered in separate sections.<sup>30</sup>

As of 24 January, Company A was on alert because of the Japanese threat in the immediate area. Still, one of its platoons was grading and cleaning boulders and obstructions from the West Road between KP178-KP205. Deficiencies in the West Road from Bagac to Mariveles were known before the withdrawal to Bataan was announced. Only half its length was paved, and the bridges were inadequate. The USAFFE engineer inspections showed that the section



between KP189 (21 kilometers north of Mariveles) and KP210 was in the worst condition. A second platoon was expediting the installation of one of the 8-inch guns at Sainsain Point. The third platoon was starting to erect a 3-inch naval gun emplacement at the northwestern extremity of Quinauan Point on the East China Sea. They had also begun developing a new and more direct trail down to the point where the gun emplacement was located.<sup>31</sup>



Source:NARA RG111, Box 41, SC131288.

Double pile tank obstacles, Bataan, April 1942



Source:NARA RG111, Box 41, SC1312886.

Pile tank obstacle, Bataan, April 1942

## Notes

1. Casey to ODE, memo, 20 December 1941, Subject: Airfield Construction Program, Casey Files, Folder, 1; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 36-37; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 178-182; Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 38.
2. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 79, noted Company A built the field at Orani, while Company B was at Hermosa and then Pilar. Montgomery, "Brief History," 4-5; Vater, Interview and diagram, 13 October 2003; Wonneman diary and interview, 15 November 1998; Cave, *Beyond Courage*, 97; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 27; Middleton, interview, 1 March 2010, and *Flashbacks*, 40-43; Thomas to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 7 August 1947, Subject: Employment of Civilian Personnel Labor on Orani and Pilar Airfield's, NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11; [Lt. James W.] Fulks, "20th Pursuit Squadron Story," report, n.d. [compiled in a POW camp], NARA RG407, Box 17; Paulger, 34th Pursuit Squadron; Report of Operations - USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands. Vol. III, Annex IX: Provisional Coast Artillery, NARA RG407, Box 1158; Goldblith, "Activities of the 803rd Engineer (Aviation) Separate Battalion," in Ashton, ed., *And Somebody Gives as Damn*, 217; Gage, *Philippine Notebook*, April, 1990; March-April, 1992; and March-April, 1994; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 202, 210-12, 223; Laurie Jack "Gil" Gillespie, <https://www.usmilitariaforum.com/>, 17 September 2011, dated the departure from Del Carmen as 25 December and arrival in Orani as 26 December. In his diary, Wonneman documented his departure date from Del Carmen as 20 December, while Middleton in *Flashbacks* and Goldblith used 26 December; Richardson to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 26 December 1941, Subject: Report requested by Telephone on 22 December, 1941; Wendell Fertig, "1942" (MS), Humphreys Engineer Center, Box 99, Folder 7; Lt Col John E. Brinkmeyer to PHILRYCOM, letter, 14 August 1947, Subject: Construction of Air Fields on Bataan, P.I., NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11; Miguel Bamba [for PHILRYUCOM], statement, 14 July 1947, no subject [employment of civilian laborers on Bataan], NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11. Bamba was a paymaster attached to the 803rd and involved with civilian laborers. See Mamerow to CG, USAFFE, memo, 31 December 1941, Subject: Aircraft Status, MMA RG2, Box 2, Folder. 3.
3. Wonneman diary; Gillespie, [militariaforum.com](http://militariaforum.com); Richardson, Adjutant, 803rd Engineer Battalion, to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 26 December 1941, Subject: Report requested by Telephone on 22 December 1941; Fertig, Notes on Personal Experiences on Bataan, Corregidor, and Mindanao, 5, Humphreys Engineer Center, Fertig Papers, Folder 2; Brinkmeyer to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 14 August 1947, Subject: Construction of Air Fields on Bataan, P.I. Fertig mentioned the simultaneous work on airstrips at Orani and Hermosa, saying work was in progress on both fields as of 3 January 1942. Brinkmeyer did not mention Hermosa by name. He referred to the "temporary airfield" at Orani and "an airfield [that] was being constructed a few miles north of Orani." Dod, *The War against Japan*, 79, said Hermosa was to be a bomber base.
4. Middleton, interview, 1 March 2009, and *Flashbacks*, 41-43; Merrill, *Silence of a Soldier*, 35; Goldblith diary, 6; Hill, interview, 10 March 1998.
5. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 228-31.
6. Thomas to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 7 August 1947; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 212, 223-224, 235-237, 458; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 38; Kircher, report, 17 January 1941, Subject: Report - 16 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Cpl Leo Arhutick, 17th Pursuit Squadron, dairy, 2, NARA RG407, Box 12; Casey to CG, USAFFE, Engineer Operations 7 January 1942, NARA RG338, Box T-4383; Enclosure No. 2 to Engineer Report of 10 January 1942, n.d., Casey Files, Folder 15; Fertig, Notes on Personal Experiences, 6, and "1942," 6, said the fields were started near Pilar

when the Fil-American forces were fighting south of Guagua (i.e., about 4-5 January), according to Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 222–23; Lt Stephen H. Crosby, report, n.d. [compiled in a POW camp], Subject: 17th Pursuit Squadron, NARA RG407, Entry 1106, Box 1443. In *Doomed at the Start*, 458, Bartsch mentioned Pilar #2 without further detail; the inference was that the aircraft operated from Pilar #1 while Company B worked on Pilar #2. Pvt Joe B. Hill, interview, 10 March 1998, was the one source who said Company B found “a small strip” which “had to be improved somewhat after the company got there.” Capt Thomas’ letter was the only document found that specifically mentioned the original airstrip and the involvement of Lieutenant Stewart, who died on the hell ship *Oryoku Maru* on 14 December 1944; Leggett to OHILRYUCOM, letter, 26 May 1947. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 79, said Pilar, like Hermosa, was to be a bomber base. See Cipriano Soler, affidavit, 27 June 1947, no subject [use of civilian workers on Bataan airfields], NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11. Immediately prior to arriving at the Pilar field site (15–22 December 1941) Lt. Stewart and about 600 local workers completed the emergency landing strip known as Prado Airfield, at Barrio Prado, Lubao. Casey, report, 19 December 1941, Subject: Report 12/19 from [1st] Lt [Thomas] Griffin, assistant area engineer, Bataan], Casey Files, Folder 7, provides additional detail on the Prado or Lubao emergency airfield; Cave, *Beyond Courage*, 97. Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 239, commented that dust was a problem for pilots at Orani and Pilar and that “various expedients, including that of sprinkling the runways with a mixture of molasses and water.” Comments of Fertig and 803rd personnel indicated the use of molasses for dust abatement at Del Carmen but not at Orani or Pilar.

7. Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, “Second Battle of Bataan [map],” placed Pilar Field close to the junction of the Pilar-Bagac and East Roads, while “Bataan, P.I., Dec 8 to April 8, 1941–2 [map],” NARA RG407, Entry 1093, Box 251, hand drawn in a POW camp, placed Pilar Field between two trails slightly farther west on Pilar-Bagac Road; letter, Thomas to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 7 August 1947; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 212, 223–224, 235–237, 458; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 38; Kircher, report, 17 January 1941, Subject: Report—16 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Arhutick, dairy, 2; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations for Week Ending 7 January 7 1942, NARA RG338, Box T-4383; Enclosure No. 2 to Engineer Report of 10 January 1942, n.d., Casey Files, Folder 15.

8. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 212, 223–224, 235–237, 458; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 38; Kircher, report, 17 January 1941, Subject: Report – 16 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations for Week Ending 7 January 1942, 3; Enclosure No. 2 to Engineer Report of 10 January 1942, n.d., Casey Files, Folder 15; Kircher to Casey, memo, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 24 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6, referred to Pilar #2 with a length of 6,500 feet; Lt Thomas Delamore, report, 24 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore-23 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Pflueger to author, email, 11 April 2001; Merrill author, email, 6 April 1999; Onofrey, interview, 9 April 2002; Crosby, 17th Pursuit Squadron. Maj Albert Kircher died on 21 January 1945 in route to the Moji POW Camp, Japan, after being wounded during a US bombing attack on the “hell ship” *Enoura Maru*, in Takao, Formosa (Taiwan) harbor. See [unknown] to Brig Gen Hugh Casey, letter, 24 August 1945, Casey Files, Special Letters; Thomas to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 7 August 1947.

9. Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 44–45; Hill, interview, 10 March 1998; Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 34; Poster, Interview, A12; Leggett Roster; Kloecker Roster.

10. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, Engineer Operations for Week Ending January 17 1942, 3; Kircher to Casey, memo, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 4; Delamore, Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore-23 January 1942, report, 24 January 1942.

11. Enclosure No. 2 to Engineer Report of 10 January 1942, no date, Casey Files, Folder 16; Kircher, report, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 1; Senna, interview, 6 February 1999; Lt Col William C. Chenoweth to Lt Col George A. Meidling, letter, 27 September 1947, with attached report on engineer operations of the South Luzon Force, and Bataan Force, II Corps, Humphreys Engineer Center, Box 99, Folder 8; Thomas to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 7 August 1947.

12. Kircher, report, 17 January 1942, Subject: Report – 16 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6; Enclosure No. 2 to Engineer Report of 10 January 1942, n.d., Casey Files, Folder 15; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations for Week Ending 17 January 1942; Kircher to Casey, memo, Weekly Report on Construction, 24 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6; Casey to CO, headquarters, 803rd Engr. Bn. (AVN) (Sep), 1st Ind., 18 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 55; Wonneman, diary and interview, 15 November 1998; Pvt Raymond C. Geier, diary, cited with the approval of Irene Wonneman; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 95. The kilometer posts on the East Road marked the distance from Manila. The pre-World War II markers do not correspond to those placed on Bataan with the construction of the post war Bataan Provincial Highway.

13. Delamore, report, 24 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore—23 January 1942, 2. Details on the pay problem were not documented. As noted above, Capt Thomas doubted that civilian workers at Orani and Pilar Fields were ever paid for their service.

14. Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942, 1, NARA RG338, Box T-4383; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operation, Weekly Period ending 17 January 1942, 3, Casey Files, Folder 5; Kircher to Engineer, USAFFE, memo 18 January 1942, Subject: Report: 17 January 1942 [miscellaneous engineer issues], Casey Files, Folder 16.

15. Wonneman diary; Philippine Supply Plan No. 342, n.d., NARA, RG338, Decimal AG 400.14; Instructions [issued on 22 January 1942 to the 803rd EB], Casey Files, Folder 16; Enclosure No. 2 to Engineer Report of 10 January 1942, n.d., Casey Files, Folder 16; Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942, 1, NARA RG338, Box T-4383, documented Company B's responsibility as being from Orion (i.e., vice Orani) to Samal, probably in error for he noted Company C's responsibility for the East Road segment from Orion to Lamao. See Kircher, report, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 1.

16. Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 55; Kircher to Casey, report, n.d., Subject Inspection Trip—14–15 January 1942; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I.

17. Montgomery, "Brief History," 3; Wonneman diary; Poster, interview, 7–8 April 2002.

18. Montgomery to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 15 September 1957, Subject: Labor Claims from Airfield Projects in Bataan, NARA RG407, Entry, 154, Box 11; Vater, Dates to Remember (MS), n.d.; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Moyer to author, notes on the 803rd, 28 October 1999, and interview, 7 February 1999; Zbikowski letter quoted in Denehy, *Captain Edward Peter Zbikowski*, 7; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 26; Minder diary, 5; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 199–200; Paulger, 34th Pursuit Squadron. Gagnet, interview, 6 February 1999, said the field was built on rice paddies, while Vater and Moyer said the area was a sugar cane field. Only Montgomery, "Brief History," 5, documented work on three airfields in the Dinalupihan area.

19. USAFFE, Map Overlay of Southern Luzon, MMA, Record Group 2: USAFFE, Box 11, Folder 2; Richardson-Bartsch interview.

20. Vater, Dates to Remember, documented the departure from Orani as December 31; Denehy, *Zbikowski*, documented it as 29 December; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 27, had December 30. Wonneman diary; Gagnet, interview, 6 February 1999; Gage, *Philippine Notebook*, March–April 1992; Richardson-Bartsch interview; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 5; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 216–228; Hamilton, *Late Summer of 1941*, 33. Montgomery to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 15 September 1947, Subject: Labor Claims from Airfield Projects in Bataan, 11; Leggett to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 26 May 1947; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 79, contended that Company A and Headquarters company both worked on the Orani Field.

21. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 27.

22. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 27–29; Minder diary, 5; Brig Gen Charles G. Sage, Report of Operations – USAFFE and USFIP, Annex IX. Vol. VII, Report of Operations of the Philippine Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) in the Philippine Campaign, NARA RG407, Box 1158, 4–5 (courtesy of Robert Hudson). The Provisional 200th Coast Artillery Corps (CAC) AA was formed on 8 December 1941 at Clark Field using personnel from the 200th CA Regiment and dispatched to Manila to provide air defense. Augmented by PA personnel it became the 515th CA Regiment AA on 19 December.

23. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 31, 189; Vater, interviews, 12–13 October 2003 and 3 October 2005; Denehy, *Zbikowski*, 8; Company A Casualty History, Company “A,” 803rd Engineer Battalion (AVN) (SEP), n.d., NARA RG407, Box 1663, Roll 83; memo, Casey to CoS, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Citations; Minder diary, 5; Gage, *Philippine Notebook*, March–April 1992 and May–June 1994; Goldblith, diary, 2, 5. Montgomery, “Brief History,” 5, dated the Japanese raid on Orani as 31 December. Hamilton, *Late Summer of 1941*, 34. The date of arrival in Orani varied by participant, as did dates and times for the bomb attack. Joseph Vater, Dates to Remember, had 31 January; in his diary, Joseph Minder had 30 December; Montgomery, “Brief History,” indicated 29 January. The Company A casualty list had 30 December, and Coone dated the raid as the morning of New Year’s Day, 1942. Coone said serious casualties were taken to Limay, the location of Hospital #1. Kolthoff died in April 1942, as a result of his wounds. By that time, Hospital #1 had relocated to Little Baguio. The casualty list documented “#2 Hosp[ital]” as the destination for the wounded. It also listed four casualties, while Coone mentioned two. Sgt Gellert and Pfc Yochum were KIA on 26 January 1942, during the Battle of the Points. The Leggett roster was used for name comparisons and complete versions of names of names.

24. Vater, interviews, 12–13 October 2003 and 3 October 2005; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 5; Ashton, *Bataan Diary*, 115.

25. Vater, interview, 3 October 2005; Paulger, 34th Pursuit Squadron; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 221–22, 233, 235.

26. Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 182; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 38; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 221–22, 233, 235; Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942, 1.

27. Montgomery, “Brief History,” 5; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 32–33; Minder diary, 5; Casey, MFR, 22 December 1941, Subject: Telephone, Casey Files, Folder 2; Company A Casualty History; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Citations; Letter, Capt Robert D. Montgomery, to AGO, 24 June 1946, Subject: Battle of “Agoloma [*sic*]” Bataan, Philippine Islands, January 1942. Regarding, Company A, 803rd Engineer Battalion (AVN) (Sep),” Microfilm Roll 00245, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1–2 (hereafter cited as “Battle of



Agoloma”; Leggett to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 26 August 1947. The casualty list documented only last names (e.g., “Eyre”), while the citation memo, which had full name, rank, serial number, and unit recommended Pfc George R. Eyre, for the Purple Heart medal for wounds received on or before 4 January 1942. The Leggett and Mansell rosters were used for name comparisons and complete versions of names of names. The Mansell roster listed Pfc George Robert Eyre, listed as an engineer with the Visayan-Mindanao Force who was murdered on Palawan on 14 December 1942. Pvt Carney was probably murdered on the Bataan Death March on 14 April 1942. The fourth casualty of the 31 December attack on the Pilar-Bagac Road was listed as “?” The wounded engineer might have been Company A’s Cpl Ralph B. Jones or Pfc Chester A. Bailey.

28. Montgomery, “Brief History,” 5; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 32–33; Minder diary, 6; Casey, MFR, 22 December 1941, Subject: Telephone, Casey Files, Folder 2; Headquarters, I Corps, USAFFE, Administrative Order No. 4, 23 January 1942, NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 30.

29. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 34–35.

30. Montgomery, Battle of “Agoloma,” 2; Engineer, USAFFE, Trail Map: Bataan, 15 February 1942, NARA RG 338, Box T-4392, Decimal 400.41. Both Montgomery and the USAFFE Trail Map used the term “Bobo Point.” Other sources such as *Engineers in Theater Operations*, and Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, used “Caibobo Point.”

31. Kircher to Casey, memo, 24 January 1942, subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 1, Casey Files, Folder 6; Casey, MFR, 22 December 1941, no subject [telephone conversation], Casey Files, Folder 7; Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 2.



## Chapter 16

### Headquarters Company on Bataan

Early in the morning on Christmas Day 1941, battalion headquarters rolled out of Clark Field. Some of the men had been on patrol during the night and were awakened after little sleep to move out. A two-and-a-half-ton GMC truck pulled a mobile mess trailer, and the command car followed. The company moved along the National Road (Route 7) south to San Fernando and on to Barrio San Jose, Dinalupihan, Bataan Province, to assist Company A and speed the development of emergency airstrips. For the short period of its presence, Headquarters Company contributed a large complement of its heavy equipment—carryalls, graders, bulldozers, and tractors—to the construction effort. Lt Everett Carney oversaw the airstrip project. Company officers were quartered briefly in Filipino homes, accommodations that Lieutenant Coone considered “luxurious by our standards.”<sup>1</sup>

At least some of the battalion staff moved directly into southern Bataan and established the battalion CP on the Real River at KP165.5, just west of Cabcabén. They were in position for an afternoon Christmas dinner and shared the meal with members of the 21st Pursuit Squadron, who had abandoned Nichols Field the preceding day.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, the area gained a distinction as one of the most productive breeding grounds in the Philippines for malaria-carrying *Anopheles* mosquitoes. It was also home to Hospital #2, which began taking in patients on 31 December and two large civilian refugee camps that eventually housed 25,000 Filipinos. The rapidly flowing mountain stream provided some oxygenation of the water, but heavy water use and the human waste of thousands of troops and refugees quickly led to contamination. Skin infections, particularly impetigo, ringworm, and scabies, were widespread in the area, and amoebic dysentery was common.<sup>3</sup>

As the battalion was establishing its CP on Bataan, Casey tried to transfer Major Fries to the NLF (soon to become I Corps) engineers. The move was to counter a 28 December request by Col Harry Skerry, NLF engineer, for the assignment of Capt (later Maj) Robert A. Lothrop, an engineer officer responsible for fortification and military works construction at Ft. Mills, to the NLF. Skerry wanted to strengthen the PA engineer battalions in the I Corps by placing US



Army officers in command. As a temporary measure, he placed Lt Col Narciso Manzano—Casey’s intelligence and map officer—in direct command of the 71st Engineer Combat Battalion PA and wanted Lothrop to eventually command the 91st Engineer Combat Battalion PA. Lothrop was a favorite of Maj Gen George F. Moore, chief of harbor defense. On 29 December, Moore appealed to General Sutherland to stop the transfer on the grounds that Lothrop was the “only officer thoroughly familiar with the [CA] set up.” Sutherland approved Moore’s request, and Lothrop remained on Corregidor. That same day that Skerry requested information from the USAFFE engineer concerning Lothrop’s transfer, and Casey sought approval for Major Fries’ assignment from the 803rd and the FEAF chain of command. He received concurrence quickly on 1 January 1942. Colonel Rutherford advised on 30 December that Fries had been ordered to report to Colonel Skerry “for assignment and duty.” Manzano remained on Casey’s staff, but for reasons undocumented, Fries’ transfer was not consummated. However, within a few weeks, Maj Clarence Bidgood, executive officer of the 803rd engineers, was transferred to command the 71st Engineers, a temporary assignment that became permanent in February 1942.<sup>4</sup>

Removed from working on specific airstrips, Headquarters Company took on a variety of engineering and logistics assignments during the first days in its new Bataan CP. They delivered 8-inch guns from Dinalupihan to Bagac (as previously mentioned). The company also supplied all companies in the battalion with food, fuel, and ammunition. Its large trucks and trailers made several trips from Bataan to Manila to haul back gasoline in 55-gallon drums. The engineers cached the fuel along the road from Orani to Mariveles. As a result, Lt Col Fertig later said, and Sgt John Moyer of Headquarters Company verified, that “we [had] so much gasoline and fuel that we need[ed] not to bother [the quartermaster] for some time.” Colonel Casey noted on 2 January: “In general no service facilities exist[ed], other than drums of gasoline dumped along the road.” He wanted motorcycle patrols to police both the disposition of fuel drums and the vehicles abandoned along the East Road for lack of fuel.

Headquarters Company also set up a shop to make parts and repair the battalion’s heavy equipment. By 7 January 1942, the company was responsible for repair and maintenance of the East Road from Lamao to Mariveles, an assignment for which the company requested 50 additional laborers. In late January, Major Fries complained that

Maj Gen Guillermo Francisco, commander, 2nd Division PA, had not taken laborers off beach defense projects, as ordered, to furnish requested men for road work. Headquarters Company also delivered heavy timbers for construction activities. On 8 January, the construction service moved a sawmill from Hermosa to process logs into lumber.<sup>5</sup>

During mid-January, the company took over responsibility for road maintenance from Cabcaben to Mariveles (KP159-186). Supervised by Headquarters Company personnel primarily under the command of Lt Everett Carney and Lt Samuel Goldblith, Philippine Army troops spread gravel and sand over the entire assigned section or “stretch” and cleared obstructions manually in various sectors. Road improvement was quickly noticeable. Bridges were repaired and decking strengthened by runways or timbers aligned perpendicularly to existing bridge decking to accommodate the track or axle span of military vehicles. The work details also developed alternate bridge and ford crossings. After an inspection during 13–14 January, Major Kircher characterized the improvement on the stretch from KP159-186 as “notable.” One of the bridge repairs involved damage by a gasoline tanker near Rodriguez Park, Lamao (KP151.8). The truck slipped off the bridge runway and sheared the planking. The result was a loss of time and gasoline and a delay in ton-miles for cartage. Rodriguez Park became a supply point for ammunition after the withdrawal to the RBP in late January. The accident also brought another appeal for increased enforcement of vehicle speed on bridges and all roadways.<sup>6</sup>

In late January, Lieutenant Carney and a select group of enlisted men experienced in carpentry dismantled and moved four rice mills. They were operated by the department quartermaster and they rebuilt them along the road east of quartermaster dump 6 (KP166.3). Two of the mills were in the center of Orion and another was from Pilar. The quartermaster made arrangements with the office of the Service Command engineer (OSCE)—which had been formed on 28 December to replace the office of the Philippine Department ODE—to measure the bases of the mills onsite so that they would have foundations in place for the movement and reconstruction. Movement of the Pilar rice mill began on 24 January. Fertig estimated that the Headquarters Company detail would take 72 hours to move the two mills from Orion and 30 hours to move the one from Pilar. An older rice mill at Limay was used as long as was practical and then abandoned. Company C provided the 6-inch belting for the reconstructed

mills. Seven Czechoslovakian diplomats stranded in Manila because of the war volunteered to work on recovering and reconstructing the rice mills from Orion. As was the case with the Headquarters Company engineers, the diplomats did not have any experience constructing grain mills. Staff members of the OSCE headquarters were also involved with the reconstruction. One mill was in operation as of 17 January, with rice straw trucked from an area near the front lines for threshing. On the night of 17–18 January, 24 trucks picked up additional rice straw near Pilar. By 2 February 1942, three rice mills were in operation, and the fourth was scheduled to begin operations on 2 or 3 February. Brig Gen Alan McBride had described the rice situation as “critical,” as of 17 January. The return of the mills to operation increased rice production “considerably” by 2 February, according to the department quartermaster. The engineers were responsible for keeping the mills operational.<sup>7</sup>

Headquarters Company was probably also responsible for the mid-January 1942 movement of sawmills. The second sawmill was transported from KP146 in the I Corps sector of the Pilar-Bagac Road to KP201.5 on the West Road, 20 kilometers (km) south of Bagac near the Anyasan River. The confusion of war again interfered with the activity. Two engineers from the 803rd reported to Maj Barton A. Barrett, II Corps, on 12 January that they were under orders from Lt Colonel Fertig to deliver the mill “some where [sic] on the West Road” on the morning of 13 January. Barrett ordered them to truck the mill to the Company A location. Then, Colonel Skerry ordered Lt Col Roscoe Bonham, engineer supply officer, to be at the new mill site to inspect the timber and place the mill. The mill was dismantled and readied for movement on 13 January, a day later than planned. Two civilians were supposed to accompany the mill to assist with installation and operation. They were at the new site briefly and then returned to the II Corps area. When Maj William Chenoweth, II Corps engineer, requested their replacement or return, Casey directed on 18 January that the men return to fulfill their mission.<sup>8</sup>

## Command

Upon arrival in Bataan, the 803rd operated under a complex command structure with a fluid chain of command. It was strained by the necessities of war rather than viewed as a unit subordinate to the Air

Force, as the COE had originally planned. Further, its companies continued to operate basically as separate, self-contained entities, as was the COE intention for aviation engineer companies. However, the chain of command or communication from the USAFFE engineer Casey to the battalion and company commanders and then finally to platoon leaders to squads was unclear. The official version was that the battalion “split into a number of detachments[,] which were assigned to construction work. . . . Frequent transfers of these elements from one area to another to meet high-priority construction needs” were common. First, the numerous detachments worked on airfield construction. Later they added road construction and maintenance and *ad hoc* assignments to their portfolio. Pvt Joe Poster of Company B noted that officers “wanted everything done at once,” and other 803rd veterans said that they saw little of a day-to-day command structure. “The work got done,” added Pvt George Wonneman. Hence, in addition to engineer work, Headquarters Company performed miscellaneous tasks, including the movement of heavy artillery. Company B Privates George Wonneman and Joe Hill hauled ammunition while Wainwright took advantage of the 803rd’s trucks to meet the I Corps requirements.<sup>9</sup>

The defense of Bataan, which began tactically on 7 January 1942, involved numerous reorganizations of the USAFFE’s command structure. When the ODE became the OSCE under the command of Col Harry H. Stickney, the newly formed engineer unit had echelons on Bataan and Corregidor. Pursuant to a War Department order, it was responsible for all airfield construction on Bataan and Corregidor, the creation of all facilities required for logistical support, and the development and maintenance of roads, bridges, and trails, as directed by the USAFFE. Fertig remained in charge of the OSCE construction section. The area of responsibility for a newly formed Service Command Area, which was commanded by Brig Gen Alan C. McBride, was the tip of Bataan south of the Mariveles Mountains. The USAFFE engineer section also had a forward echelon at the advance CP at Little Baguio, General Casey was the only member of MacArthur’s staff who established his office on Bataan rather than in Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor, but kept a rear echelon on Corregidor. The OSCE and the USAFFE engineer advance echelon worked together closely. The 803rd was organizationally attached to the OSCE but was also responsible for reporting to Casey and briefly to FEAF.<sup>10</sup>

The situation became even more confusing in early January. On 5 January, at Casey's recommendation, the USAFFE issued orders formally transferring the 803rd from FEAF to Headquarters, USAFFE, and for the battalion "to serve as an Army engineer unit." Casey had noted that the 803rd had previously been placed in what was termed "detached service" to the ODE for airfield construction. By focusing more on road and trail work rather than airfield construction and maintenance, the 803rd had transitioned from an engineer aviation battalion into a general construction battalion. Hence, the battalion's value and, thus, subordination to FEAF were less relevant. Both the 803rd and the 14th EBs were assigned to headquarters, USAFFE, but the engineer and construction division of the Service Command engineer directed their activities. Casey's recommendation of 5 February 1942 added to the mix. It confirmed the 803rd's chain of command from USAFFE through the I Corps and II Corps engineers to the 803rd. Capt James D. Richardson, the original battalion adjutant, said later that in reality, Casey controlled the 803rd because it had more equipment and capability than most of the engineer units. Casey's comments seemed to confirm that assessment: "I was on Bataan all the time. . . . I was also covering the front at all times—I and my staff assistants." Maj William Gay guarded one portion of the line daily, and Lt Thomas Delamore protected another section.

Along with Col Narciso Manzano and Maj Albert Kircher, that group of officers conducted rigorous inspections of engineer work and prepared candid, often blunt, reports for Casey. On 11 February 1942, the USAFFE staff opined that the 803rd was under the Philippine Department—the staff still used the outdated nomenclature—as far as gasoline allowances were concerned. Unsurprisingly, as late as 21 February, Major Fries received USAFFE communications through the 5th Interceptor Command and he was finally forced to request clarification as to which headquarters he was responsible for. Two enlisted men, Pfc Revis C. Hyde and Pvt John F. Duff, from the 5th Interceptor Command, remained with Company C at Bataan and Cabcaban Fields throughout the siege, but their responsibilities were undocumented.<sup>11</sup>

The health and capability of the 803rd's commander continued to be an issue on Bataan. Consequently, several versions of the command situation surfaced. After he arrived in Bataan, Lt Gene Boyt, an ODE project engineer at Clark Field, said when he was not able to contact Maj Harry Fischer, his commander. He reported to Maj

Clarence Bidgood, “the commander of the 803rd, who issued my orders from then on.”

Within the battalion, the situation became more personal. Because of their tasking priorities, enlisted men complained that their first order of business was to build and protect Maj Fries’ bunker. Two guards were to provide security for the shelter, but some of the men turned down that assignment. The men rarely saw him emerge from the bunker. Meals were delivered to his shelter. The men characterized him as “Fearless Frank, the only man on Bataan without a sun-tan.” Mohnac said Capt Sidney Vernon, the battalion surgeon, was afraid that Fries’ lack of activity would lead to muscle degeneration, and he urged the commander, unsuccessfully, to leave the shelter for exercise. To several Headquarters Company officers, Fries’ leadership was ineffectual. As one historian has documented, however, the ineffective leadership and a bunker mentality were not uncommon among US Army officers on Bataan.<sup>12</sup>

Communication among the three companies was difficult. Lieutenant Leggett, who became the battalion adjutant in late March, kept in contact with the companies regardless of location, presumably as Capt James Richardson had so done previously. Much of Leggett’s work was via personal contact and involved driving the roads of Bataan at night to avoid Japanese air patrols. Couriers, including Pvt Joseph Mann of Company B, also shuttled messages among battalion headquarters and the individual companies.<sup>13</sup>

Vagaries in the chain of command affected issues large and small. On 24 January, Major Fries complained “about the habit of Corps Eng[inee]rs using units and equipment for missions without going through channels.” During an inspection trip two days later, Lieutenant Delamore “warned the Corps Eng[inee]r [Maj William Chenoweth] about borrowing the 803rd for small emergency jobs.” Subsequent communication from Casey to the two corps engineers on that issue brought positive changes for the 803rd. In early February, II Corps engineer Chenoweth requested through USAFFE the assistance of the 803rd to build a bridge as part of his trail development effort. Even the headquarters of Service Command muddied the waters by ordering the 803rd to move its motor park, another action that prompted a plea from Major Fries for support from USAFFE. When the Battle of the Points resulted in an emergency call for additional troops to counter the Japanese flanking movement, the lack of clarity in the chain of command became more evident. Company A was

committed to action on 24 January 1942, under orders sent directly from Brig Gen Clinton A. Pierce to Company A commander Lt Edmund Zbikowski rather than through Major Fries as the battalion commander. Fries quickly complained to Maj William Gay, and Casey then forwarded the specific complaint to the USAFFE Operations (G-3). Casey then made a general recommendation that “serious consideration be given to any decision committing [the 803rd] to action and that they be employed only in serious emergencies” because of their work on “important road, airfield, artillery emplacement, and other important construction projects. . . .” To place the problem in perspective, Col Ernest B. Miller, commander of the 194th Tank Battalion, repeatedly documented in *Bataan Uncensored*, miscommunication, a lack of communication, and poorly defined communication which plagued operations in Bataan throughout the campaign.<sup>14</sup>

#### Notes

1. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 27; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 42, 44; Goldblith diary.

2. USAFFE Map Overlay, 30 December 1942; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 42, 44; Goldblith, diary; Leggett, UKY Interview, Part I.

3. Col Samuel C. Grashio and Bernard Norling, *Return to Freedom* (Spokane, Washington: University Press, 1982), 15; Paul Ashton, “Genesis of General Hospitals # 1 and #2,” Ashton, ed., *And Somebody Gives a Damn*, 64, 75, 79; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 43, 79

4. Author undocumented, MFR, 28 December 1941, Subject: Telephone Conversation with Col Skerry; author undocumented, MFR, 29 December 1941, Subject: Telephone Calls, and author undocumented, MFR, 30 December 1941, Subject: Telephone Call from Col Rutherford. All of these MFR were in the USAFFE engineer journal, Casey Files, Folder 3. Mielenz to USAFFE engineer, Bataan, memo, 1 February 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 25–31 January 1942, Inclusive, Casey Files, Folder 4; USAFFE engineer journal, 1 January 1942, no subject [miscellaneous engineer issues], Casey Files, Folder 13; Kircher to Casey, letter, November, 1944, Casey Files, Folder 23.

5. Moyer, interviews, 20–21 October 2002, and 7 February 1999; Zubay, interviews, 17 March 1999, and Zubay to author, letter, ca. 1999; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 43; Fertig, Notes on Personal Experiences, 5; Donai, interview, 7 March 1999; Knutson, interview, 20 February 1999; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 2 January 1942, Subject: Congestion in Bataan Area, Casey Files, Folder 15; Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942, 1; Delamore, report, 24 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore – 23 January 1942, 2; Pflueger to author, email, 8 December 2001.

6. Kircher to Casey, report, nd., Subject: Inspection Trip – 13–14 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Kircher, report, 24 January 1942, subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 1; Goldblith diary, 2; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; USAFFE Administrative Order No. 2. 23 January 1942. Explanation of civil engineering terminology from T. Christopher Wilson, consulting engineer, 12 August 2013.



7. Christian Batol, Orion native, interview with author, 28 June 2018, Administrative Order No. 2, 23 January 1942, NARA RG496, Entry 520, Box 30; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operation, Weekly Period ending 17 January 1942, 4; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 10; Col Frank Brezina, quartermaster, to CG, USAFFE, 22 January 1942, Subject: Reconnaissance for Locations of Rice Mills, Casey Files, Folder 17; Kircher, report, 25 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 1; Delamore, report, Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore – 24 January 1942, 2; Jane Cambus to author, letter, 12 June 2006; Col Michael A. Quinn [motor transport, Luzon Force], to Irene Vincent, letter, 26 April 1973; Arnost Moravek, statement, 5 November 1947, Subject: [Czechoslovakian diplomats' participation the defense of the Philippines]; Brig Gen Charles C. Drake to Assistant CoS, G-4, USAFFE, memo, 25 January 1942, Subject: Quartermaster Plan of Supply, NARA RG 338; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1942, 3; Col Frank Brezina to quartermaster, USAFFE, Ft. Mills, memo, 2 February 1942, Subject: Supply Situation, Class I Supplies, NARA RG338; Lt Col Frank F. Carpenter to assistant G-4, USAFFE, memo, 17 January 1942, Subject: Information Obtained on Inspection Trip 17 January 1942, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 31; 1st Lt W.C. Ramme, assistant Engineer, USAFFE, report, 29 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Ramme – 28 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 93. Cambus' father was a member of the Czechoslovak group involved with the rice mills. She researched and was writing a history of the Czechoslovakian participation in the rice mill project. Letters were cited with her permission.

8. Gay, MFR, 13 January 1942, no subject [miscellaneous engineer issues]; author undocumented, MFR, 14 January 1942, Subject: Captain Chenoweth – reports; Casey, MFR, 18 January 1942, Subject: Telephone Call from Capt Chenoweth, all three documents in Casey Files, Folder 16.

9. Poster, interview, 25 October 1998; Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; Bell, interview, 3 March 1998; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 56, 59; Lamm, interview, 26 October 1998; Middleton, interview, 1 March 2010; Meidling, ed., *Organization, Troops and Training*, 12; American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor, *History of the Defenders of the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island, 1941-42*, cited in a letter from John Zubay to author (n.d.).

10. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 86-87; Meidling, ed., *Organization, Troops and Training*, 10, 12; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 247; USAFFE General Orders No. 54, 27 December 1941, no subject [designation of Bataan Defense Force], Casey Files, Folder 3. Accounts vary on the designation "Service Command." Biographic Profile: "Hugh John Casey;" Casey, *Memoirs*, ix.

11. Casey to ACoS, USAFFE, memo, 1 January 1942, no subject [recommendation for issuance of orders transferring the 803rd to USAFFE], Casey Files, Folder 15; Lt Col E.T. Halstead, assistant AGO, USAFFE, to CG, FEAF, memo, 5 January 1942, Subject: Attachment of 803rd Engineer Bn. (AVN); Richardson-Bartsch interview, 4 September 1982; Casey, report, 5 February 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip 4 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Maj William A. Gay, MFR, 22 February 1942, Subject: Telephone Calls, Casey Files, Folder 5; Ingersoll Roster. Pvt Duff died at Cabanatuan, and Pfc Hyde was in Japan at the Matsushima POW camp when the war ended.

12. Bartsch-Richardson interview; Casey, *Memoirs*, 168-69; Moyer, interviews, 20-21 October 2002, 7 February 1999; Zubay, interview, 27 March 1999, and statement, ca. 1999; Mohnac, interview, 23 March 2000; Boyt, *Bataan: A Survivor's Story*, 69, 71; Richard B. Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition: General Vicente Lim and the Philippine*



*Military Experience, 1910-1944* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2018), 202–204. During the interviews several enlisted men volunteered the nickname for their commanding officer. In early February 1942, Bidgood ordered Boyt to report to Major Fischer, when Fischer commanded the 201st EB PA. Mohnac said that as a POW, Major Fries suffered so severely from “day blindness” for lack of Vitamins A and B that he (Mohnac) tried to keep him off a hell ship bound for Japan. After a final discussion with the medical commander at Cabanatuan, Mohnac returned to the barracks to find that Fries was already gone.

13. Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Museum; “Archive Record: Joseph Mann,” <https://philippinedefenders.pastperfectonline.com/>.

14. Kircher, MFR, 25 January 1942, Subject: 24 January 1942; Gay, MFR, 25 January 1942, Subject: Telephone Call Major Fries – 2:20 AM, 25 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Casey to ACoS, [USAFFE] – G-3, memo, 25 January 1942, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 16; Delamore, report, 28 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore, Casey Files, Folder 6. See Miller, *Bataan Uncensored*, 134–35.

## Chapter 17

### Roads and Trails

Although General MacArthur initially said that retreat on Bataan was not possible, situational realities forced him to order a tactical withdrawal further into Bataan. Faced with Japanese pressure, particularly on the Abucay Line in the II Corps area, on 22 January, he ordered the USAFFE forces to withdraw to the RBP on the Orion-Bagac line, located south of the Pilar-Bagac Road. Despite Japanese ground and air attacks continuing through 24–25 January, the withdrawal was virtually complete by 26 January. Commenting to General MacArthur on the decision, newly promoted Brig Gen Hugh Casey cited the adverse impact of the move: the loss of Pilar Field; the vulnerability of Bataan and Cabcaben Fields, where Company C was working; the loss of long-range artillery; and loss of 8-inch gun positions near Bagac, on which Company A was working at the time. Nevertheless, the new location allowed for the concentration of the USAFFE defenders in a smaller area (15 square miles), reduced the amount of coastline to be defended, and shortened logistical lines. The priorities of the 803rd engineers shifted from airfields to the maintenance and repair of roads and improvement of trails, which were dirt roads at the time. Headquarters Company and Company B carried the most substantial responsibilities for the road work. Company C focused on airfield maintenance and improvement and secondarily on road work. As a result of casualties suffered in the Battle of the Points, Company A transferred to Corregidor in early February.<sup>1</sup>

As the withdrawal to the RBP approached, Service Command issued Field Order 5 on 18 January 1942, placing units within its new organizational structure into groups with “defense functions.” The breakdown for the 803rd was as follows:

- Company A: Binuanean River (KP204.5) to KP200, West Road;
- Headquarters Company: KP164 to KP165.5, East Road, near its bivouac area, along with the 19th Quartermaster Company and quartermaster detachment bakery;
- Company C: KP157 to KP155, East Road, near Bataan Field, along with quartermaster and FEAF detachments; and

- Company B: KP151 to KP148 (Alangan River to Lamao), East Road, along with two quartermaster detachments.<sup>2</sup>

On 22 January, Casey also ordered Major Fries to have Company A, already bivouacked at KP201.5, to standby for aiding the movement of 155-mm artillery to new locations from KP216 to KP201 of the West Road (I Corps). Company B was to standby from Pilar to Limay and Company C from Limay to Cabcaben for the nights of 22–24 January. Company B was also to relocate its heavy equipment motor pool from Limay and its mobile shop unit to an area adjacent to battalion headquarters at KP165.5, west of Cabcaben. Much of the equipment was already there.

By early February, the 803rd's equipment park also housed machinery from the newly formed 302nd ER PA and 14th Engineer for repair. John C. Knutson, a 21-year old civilian, helped set up the repair shop. It was outfitted to make replacement parts and rebuild damaged items. With equipment spread over a wide area, Pvt Walter Middleton, a self-described "grease monkey" in the motor pool, was among the engineers who moved among various worksites for lubrication jobs, oil changes, and fueling.<sup>3</sup>

During the retreat, on or about 25 January, Lieutenant Goldblith and a work detail, which included Cpl Augustine Turturro, drove a tractor and a heavy truck with a winch to an area near Bagac to salvage a capsized 20-ton searchlight truck. They were able to get the truck back on the road because Maj Gen Wainwright and his staff kept the road clear of retreating Filipino troops—actually halting their retreat, Goldblith claimed—while the engineers finished their work. The engineer detail returned the truck to its unit. Goldblith was awarded the Silver Star medal for his efforts.<sup>4</sup>

Effective at noon, 26 January, the defense of the Service Command Area of southern Bataan was divided into West and East sectors and assigned to the I Corps and II Corps, respectively. While the corps commanders, Wainwright and Parker, had command of combat troops in these sectors, the CG of Service Command retained control over service troops and supply installations in the Service Command area.<sup>5</sup>

During the last week of January, as Fil-American troops prepared to withdraw to the RBP, the engineers began to receive reports that the Japanese were withdrawing north toward Hermosa while continuing to shell Mt. Natib. By mid-February, faced with defeats at the Battle of the Points and the Battle of the Pockets, General Homma

withdrew his forces to a secure defensive line extending from high ground north of the Bagac and Gogo Rivers on the West and roughly back to the plains of Balanga on the East to await reinforcements. He also directed the occupation of Mindoro Island to seal approaches to Manila Bay. Although Homma disagreed with staff recommendations to starve out his opponents, the maneuvers he ordered effectively began the blockade, the siege, and the starvation of Fil-American forces on Bataan. With a lower level of activity, Fil-American troops moved as far north as the original MLR. Brig Gen Clifford Bluemel, commander of the 31st Infantry Regiment PA, talked of reestablishing the Mabatang-Mauban line. Engineers took the opportunity to strengthen positions along the RBP. Casey even began planning for all-weather roads in the II Corps and optimistically said that “plans for reconstruction of bridges to include San Fernando, Pampanga Province, [were] being made.”<sup>6</sup>

Still expecting reinforcements or at least re-supply from the United States, Casey continued to place a high priority on airstrip construction and maintenance. However, after withdrawal to the RBP, the most critical work for the engineers became road maintenance and trail improvement. Casey’s planning, and thus, the work of the engineers included the initiation of work on all-weather roads, trails, and airstrips, and the construction of B-17 revetments at Bataan and Mariveles Fields. The effort reflected hope for sustained resistance and the arrival of reinforcements rather than the actual realities of the Pacific war.

## Roads and Trails

The withdrawal to the RBP temporarily limited lateral communication between the two corps to the coastal East and West Roads that circumnavigated the shoreline of Bataan. The Japanese held the central portion of the Pilar-Bagac Road, an essential line of communication and supply during the initial defense of Bataan. Thus, Colonel Skerry already had the I Corps engineers working on trails and roads in early January, while Company B, 803rd engineers, was beginning a similar effort in the II Corps area. After withdrawal to the RBP, the work became more critical because troops in the center of the Bataan were isolated. Consequently, Casey ordered the improvement of trails, as well as the construction of new trails or links between exist-

ing trails to correct the situation. The most important of these trails was a route paralleling the Pilar-Bagac Road and, therefore, the RBP. He assigned the task to the 14th EB PS. The 803rd played a minor role in that project by contributing two heavy-duty towed graders.<sup>7</sup>


## Road Work

The 803rd EB gained responsibility for repair and maintenance of most of the remaining coastal road network, which dated from the Spanish colonial era. As of 1919, Bataan had only one “first-class” road. It extended from Dinalupihan to Limay. What became the West Road from Moron to Mariveles and the Pilar-Bagac Road was still categorized as a “trail” at that time. The East Road was a narrow, two-lane route, paved down the coast to about Pilar, but “it quickly started to go to pieces,” according to II Corps engineer Lt Col William C. Chenoweth, newly promoted. South of Pilar as far as Orion, at least, the road had a cobblestone base that was supposed to provide a foundation for paving. As of February 1941, the War Department categorized construction on Bataan, including “seven miles of a two-way road across difficult terrain . . . [and] improvement of some forty-two miles of narrow, dirt roads . . . impassable during the rainy season” as a “first priority.” Unfortunately, the paving remained incomplete once the war started. The road base was unstable, and potholes developed continually. In the absence of binding material, the engineers could only fill both potholes and bomb craters with coarse gravel and top them with fine gravel from the Mariveles quarry. The West Road was a narrow, sandy thoroughfare. The 803rd used bulldozers to widen it before spreading gravel as an improvement. Augmenting the Spanish road system, the Philippine BPW and the 14th Engineers built additional roads, bridges, and trails before the war. Those thoroughfares required constant maintenance to accommodate the heavy traffic flow and heavy military vehicles and construction equipment. The Pilar-Bagac Road, as long as USAFFE had access to it, and the East Road carried two-way traffic, although bridges were one-way only, 24-hours a day. On the East Road, movement of troops and supplies to the South had priority during the day, and movement north had preference at night. The West Road was reserved for use by the Philippine Department for the movement of supplies to the I Corps. The engineers constructed lower profile, alternate crossings at most

bridge locations, and reinforced others to allow for loads of up to 13 tons. The 803rd carried out as much of the road and bridge work as possible at night. In addition to the threat of Japanese air raids, by the end of January, the average temperature on Bataan was 96 degrees Fahrenheit during the day.<sup>8</sup>

Immediately before the withdrawal to the RBP, the 803rd was responsible for road and bridge maintenance from Pilar to Bagac. As of 31 January 1942, the assignments became more specific and were, as aligned by USAFFE, west to east from Manila Bay to the East China Sea:

- Company C—Alangan River to Juanting River, four kilometers north of Cabcaben (KP148-KP167, East Road);
- Headquarters Company—Juanting River to the Little Baguio/“Zigzag” area (KP 167-KP170, East Road);
- Company B—KP 170-185 (Bian River, north of the “Mariveles Cut Off”); and
- Company A—Preventative maintenance on the West Road (not further specified). Immediately before it participated in the battle for Quinuan Point, Company A was responsible for maintaining the West Road from Mariveles to the Anyasis River (KP 178-KP 205).<sup>9</sup>



**Figure 17.1. 803rd road maintenance and repair assignments, 31 January 1942.** (Adapted from Engineer, USAFFE, Trail Map, Bataan Peninsula, 15 February 1942, NARA RG496, Entry 1050, Box 39.)

In addition to its work on Bataan and Cabcaben Fields, Company C also had to maintain and repair the East Road Segment from Orion through Limay to Lamao. The work included the construction of an alternate bridge about 50 feet long at a river crossing near Orion. By 24 January, the tasking was modified, including the road sector from Limay, where Company B's responsibilities stopped, to Cabcaben. The company also established two water points to supply drinking water using pumps, tanks, and filters from its supplies.<sup>10</sup>


With Company A's movement to Corregidor in early February, the burden fell on the remaining three companies on Bataan. Major Fries ordered the following changes on 3 February:

- Headquarters Company—East Road, Cabcaben to Mariveles (road and bridge maintenance) with the addition of the Mariveles Cut Off and Mariveles bypass when completed. The Mariveles Cut Off was a loop road that ran from KP175 at the bottom of the Little Baguio “Zigzag” section to KP181 on the West Road, thus, circumventing the Mariveles area. Begun as part of an ODE project of mid-April 1941, it was almost completed by 23 August. Improvements to the cut off were about 40 percent complete as of 24 November. The Mariveles Cut Off would have diverted traffic from the portion of the West Road that Mariveles Field used.
- Company B—Mariveles to the Quinuan river (KP178-KP195), an addition that included road segments previously assigned to Company A and responsibility for the maintenance of Mariveles Field, when completed.
- Company C—East Road, Limay to Cabcaben, the addition of four kilometers, with a focus on the expansion and repair of Bataan Field and later the maintenance of Cabcaben Field.

Headquarters Company and Company B had to deal with the most extended segments of those roads. At the same time, Company C dealt with a smaller portion of the East Road that was in comparatively better condition than the sectors assigned to the other companies.<sup>11</sup>

Most skills and experience transferred readily in the switch from airfield construction to road maintenance. Still, the management of tasks spread over long stretches of road underscored the need for adjustment. While some Company C personnel had some experience with road construction and gun emplacements during their service

with the 3rd Engineer Combat Regiment in Hawaii, most in the Westover contingent of the 803rd had only minor exposure to road repair and maintenance. A few of the selectees from Ft. Belvoir and Ft. Leonard Wood had engaged in road work as civilians. Later management of fuel consumption also became a challenge for the engineers. The frenetic Casey and his staff conducted regular and frequent inspections to ensure the roads were improved and maintained. As part of that process, they also prepared candid, often blunt reports of their findings.<sup>12</sup>



**Figure 17.2. 803rd road maintenance and repair assignments, 3 February 1942.** (Adapted from Engineer, USAFFE, Trail Map, Bataan Peninsula, 15 February 1942, NARA RG496, Entry 1050, Box 39.)

Soon after the Fil-American forces withdrew to the RBP, the unpaved one-lane West Road received the most attention from Casey and, hence, the 803rd. Casey's 29 January inspection revealed that West Road was in poor condition from KP193.7 to KP196, from KP202.5 to KP203.5, and at 206.3. He observed a large group of workers "with relatively little work to do in spreading stone at KP 182.5" and a small, inadequate force removing boulders at KP84.5. This was a stretch of road then assigned to Company B. He commented that



trucks not used in one place (KP184.5) were needed in others (KP182.5). He wanted the engineers to balance work assignments for better production and to ensure that preventative maintenance that was “direly needed” was completed from Mariveles to KP205 to prevent breakdowns of the road. All dike fills across minor streams were settling rapidly and in urgent need of improvement. Badly worn road edges made night driving dangerous. Some action was already in progress. During Casey’s inspection, Headquarters Company was already spreading gravel and removing boulders from bad sections from KP170 (Little Baguio) to KP185, north of Mariveles.<sup>13</sup>

Less than a week later, Casey documented once more that the West Road was still in “bad shape” (original emphasis) from Mariveles to KP205. Becoming more explicit, he wrote that instruction should be issued to the OSCE for the 803rd Engineers and the I Corps Engineer “to concentrate their activity on this vital supply route, spreading their forces over the route attacking all bad spots simultaneously.” Company B had moved machinery to KP184.5, as Casey directed but had again concentrated its equipment too heavily in one location. Supplementing his earlier direction on the management of machinery, he recommended better camouflage discipline in protecting the equipment, particularly during work and mess breaks.<sup>14</sup>

The 803rd reacted more quickly to the second advisory. Work units and trucks from Headquarters Company were moved to reinforce Company B. Among the truck drivers were Company B’s Pvt Walter Lamm, assigned initially as an electrician, and Pvt Joe B. Hill. Privates John Zubay and William Van Orden from Headquarters Company were among those who drove the one-and-a-half-ton dump trucks for Headquarters Company. Headquarters Company also moved a portable rock crusher to the West Road. The use of local rock offered a way to reduce hauling distances and fuel consumption. The combined force reconnoitered the West Road, located points for repair, refreshed kilometer post signs, and placed new signage on curves and other dangerous locations. Company B’s road maintenance responsibilities were changed slightly on 8 February to encompass the stretch between Mariveles and KP200 (Anyasan River). Reinforcing Company B’s repair work on the West Road, Headquarters Company added a five-kilometer stretch (from KP200 at the Silaiim River to KP205), to its list of assigned road and bridge improvement projects. The additional area of responsibility included Trail 21. This trail was a west-east route tying the West Road to Trail 7, a major interior thor-

oughfare paralleling the West Road. Lt Samuel Goldblith commanded the work detail for the stretch from KP 200 to KP 205. The assignment also extended to de-mining bridges at the Binauangan and Pay-sawan Rivers (KP204.5 and KP206.5, respectively). Lt Everett Carney commanded the detail that graveled the Mariveles Cut Off and added treads for its bridges. After an inspection on 29 January, Casey commented that the cut off was “generally in excellent condition.”<sup>15</sup>

On 13 February, Major Fries reported a 1.5 km overlap between the responsibilities of Headquarters Company and the 71st Engineers, commanded by Cpt Clarence Bidgood, the 803rd’s former executive officer, at about KP205. Fries said the 803rd could handle the responsibility better because it was better equipped. The I Corps (71st Engineers), he said, could handle north of that marker. In a 14 February report to USAFFE, Casey noted improvement in the West Road between KP200 and KP205. General preventative maintenance was to come after those repairs. The filling of craters after air raids added another dimension to the battalion’s work.<sup>16</sup>

Maj William Gay, one of Casey’s inspectors, noted that while the 803rd was making good progress in its sector, the I Corps engineers were making little improvement. Repeating Casey’s earlier evaluation, Gay said, that as of 15 February, the stretch of the West Road north of KM184 was still in “bad shape,” even though Company B was making spot improvements on the worst sections from Mariveles to KM204. From a management perspective, Gay observed that two groups of 20 men each from the 803rd were engaged in manual labor. To speed up the work, he suggested sending additional civilian laborers so the 803rd engineers could act as supervisors. At the same time, civilian labor crews (road workers or “*camineros*”) were being organized. Casey documented that 100-110 *camineros* were working on the West Road, and 250 more were constructing side roads to coastal points off the West Road.<sup>17</sup>

By 18-19 February, a week after Fries’ recommendation, the additional effort on the West Road had become evident. Capt Thomas Delamore commented the road in was “in good shape for driving” from the Mariveles Cut Off to KP200 except for two stretches still under repair. Company B, Headquarters Company, and the engineers of the I Corps were working from KP185 to KP210.8. Delamore informed the I Corps engineer Col Harry Skerry on 18 February that the 803rd was to maintain the road to KP205 and that the I Corps would take over from that point northward. The 803rd was operating

its portable rock crusher located between KP186 and KP187, and the I Corps engineer had another between KP203 and KP204. The 803rd operated two bulldozers and a small Osgood power shovel in the sector. Three motor patrols monitored the road, while civilian laborers laid clay and crushed rock on the road.<sup>18</sup>

As of 21 February, according to Casey, the “West Road showed material improvement” with further work still required from KP186.5 to KP190. Headquarters Company work in its sections of the East and West Roads included placing new signs, patrolling roads, and performing preventative maintenance. Within the segment from KP200 to KP205, the company augmented inadequate areas, placed fill, and built road revetments. The *caminero* system was expanding and working well in Headquarters Company’s sectors. Casey said that Company B showed “satisfactory progress” with continued spot improvement in the worst places from KP183 to KP200. It also set up patrols and maintenance for the remainder of its assigned road segment.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to Filipino laborers, the 803rd had several US civilians with specialized skills in its ranks, as of 19 March 1942. In Headquarters Company were Antonio M. Giminez, an assistant engineer; John C. Knudson, a construction supervisor; Cornell L. Minguely, a mechanic supervisor; and Ray C. Tuggle, listed only as a civilian employee. Roy Allen, an engineer, was in Company A, and Raymond L. Ville, listed as a civilian employee, was in Company C.<sup>20</sup>

From late January to early March, Casey deemed the East Road from south of the Alangan River (KP148) to Cabcaban, the responsibility of Company C for most of that time, to be in “excellent shape.” On 31 January, just before a modification of assignments, Headquarters Company improved two bad turns in the East Road at the Juanting River north of Cabcaban and graveled bad stretches in that sector of the East Road. Company C continued patrols and preventative maintenance through the first week of March.<sup>21</sup>

During the early days of the siege, the shuffle of officers from the 803rd to Philippine Army engineer battalions (the subject of a separate section) affected Company C. On 14 January 1942, Casey requested the transfer of Lt James R. Caldwell to headquarters, I Corps. That request was overtaken by events when Caldwell was KIA the next day. At the same time, Casey recommended Lt Ted Pflueger’s transfer to the 71st EB PA to augment Maj Clarence Bidgood’s staff and Lt Delamore’s formal transfer to the USAFFE Engineer staff. Second Lt Ralph Gibbs, a newly commissioned officer, and former technical

sergeant replaced Caldwell as a platoon leader. Gibbs did not want the promotion and said several times that he would prefer to remain in the enlisted ranks.<sup>22</sup>

## All-Weather Roads

In mid-February, as General Homma pulled his troops back, Casey optimistically requested plans from I and II Corps engineers for the conversion of roads. He also asked for proposals for principal trails and airfield roads in sectors forward of Service Command into all-weather routes “for rainy season operations.” The I and II Corps were supposed to submit estimates of materiel and equipment requirements for the work. As the chief engineer’s comments below indicate, he was either unaware of the War Department’s decision to divert convoys to Australia and the failure of attempts to break the Japanese blockade or unwilling to acknowledge the realities of USAFFE’s situation, perhaps because of the lull in the fighting. His objective was to have the upgrades completed by 1 May, before the rainy season, which generally began at the end of May. He advised the USAFFE of his plans in his 15 February report of engineer operations. In his report to USAFFE the following week (22 February), Casey commented on the completion of preliminary planning for all-weather roads and added that “plans for reconstruction of bridges to include San Fernando, Pampanga, are being made.” After the war, Lt Col William C. Chenoweth commented, probably correctly, that the plans for rebuilding structures outside Bataan to facilitate the advance of the USAFFE troops were “for morale purposes.” Possibly ahead of USAFFE in his actions, Casey nevertheless was still determined to press forward with his plans, for he added in the same report:

A command decision should be made as to our probable situation two months hence, for preparation of necessary advance plans and present operations necessary to meet that situation. If we are to assume that we shall continue in our present position, operation[s] should be undertaken at once for the conversion to all-weather operations of our roads, principally interior supply routes [i.e., trails] and our airfields so that they will function and not be bogmires [*sic*] during the approaching wet season. . . .

The main roads and the airfields will be required irrespective of whether [the] present position is merely held or whether we advance and definite provision should be made for their all-weather improvement. Within the limitation of present fuel allowances, it is planned to continue on the conversion of

Mariveles and Bataan airfields and the principal East and West Roads to all-weather supply routes.<sup>23</sup>

Casey's order to upgrade Bataan's principal roads and trails to all-weather routes brought a significant change in responsibilities for road work by early March in the Service Command Area. The segment assigned to the 803rd decreased considerably, running from the Alangan River on the East Road only to KP173, at the bottom of the "Zig Zag" hill immediately west of Little Baguio. The 14th Engineers took over the segment between KP173 and KP205. Each had responsibility for subsidiary roads in their respective areas. Within the 803rd, Headquarters Company's responsibility still began at Cabcaben, but it ended at KP169 (Little Baguio). Its work included ditching by machine, wherever possible, and placement of concrete culverts at all entrances to units along the road. Company B took the remainder (KP169 to KP173). Its work included improvement of the KP 169 to KP173 stretch and the ditching and surfacing of the Sisiman Bay and Alasasin River Roads. The Sisiman Road, which CPNAB had built, began at about KP172.7 on the lower "Zig Zag" of the East Road, west of Little Baguio, and ended at the Sisiman dock. The Navy based its patrol torpedo (PT) boats there, and the 14th Engineers maintained the road. The Alasasin Road began at KP167, east of Little Baguio. Those roads provided additional access to Manila Bay east of Mariveles.<sup>24</sup>

Work proceeded reasonably rapidly. The CPNAB finished the preliminary cut for the Sisiman Bay Road from about KP173.7 on the East Road to Sisiman Bay during the week of 21 February. The following week they prepared to start grading and surfacing the route. During 8-14 March, Col Harry Stickney, who was designated as Luzon Force engineer in the post-MacArthur command structure, reported that Company B, 803rd, was emplacing culverts and ditching the road in preparation for all-weather operations. At the same time, Headquarters Company was engaged in similar work from Cabcaben (KP160) to the Little Baguio area (KP168). The changes did not affect Company C. It continued to perform preventative maintenance and to patrol the East Road segment from the Alangan River to Cabcaben (KP148 to KP160).<sup>25</sup>


As of 14 March, all engineer units in the II Corps were placed under the control of the corps engineer, Maj Chenoweth, for work on all-weather roads, a centralization effort designed to conserve gasoline. All the work, both for the 803rd and the 14th, included *camineros*. However, after an inspection of the II Corps, Maj William Gay said it

would “be impossible to complete [that] program by the rainy season unless gasoline [became] available.”<sup>26</sup>

By late March, Luzon Force engineers had constructed a floating dock at Sisiman Bay to allow for more direct access to quartermaster dumps in the rear area. The original wooden fixed dock was four feet wide, and 240 feet long for water barges and was built in 1921. This new construction allowed the rapid movement of supplies to the II Corps, if only for a few weeks. The Quartermaster Corps attempted to conceal the navigation head by directing all boats and barges to enter or depart Sisiman Bay under cover of darkness and to arrange for loads that could be handled during hours of the night. The Sisiman Cove dock, originally intended to serve anticipated convoys with reinforcements, became one of the backup loading areas. It was for the movement of troops, weapons, and material from Bataan to Corregidor if the “evacuation must be made in less time” than planned, according to Luzon Force, G-4, on 8 April 1942. The Alasasin Beach, for which Company B built the access road, was an option for the movement of troops, weapons, and materiel to Corregidor.<sup>27</sup>

## Trails

The road and trail program began in earnest in mid-January in both I and II Corps. The objective was to build or improve a trail network that paralleled the three road systems. This would allow for easier and more secure movement throughout I and II Corps and Service Command. In the I Corps, the 1st and 91st EBs PA initially worked with the 14th Engineers PS on most of the trail projects. In the II Corps, Chenoweth had the 14th Engineers continue building roads and focused the 302nd ER PA on maintenance. Even though progress was slow, numerous old roads and trails were improved and new roads and trails opened in II Corps. By the end of January, the 14th Engineers had taken over most of the responsibility for trail improvement. It worked on the junction of Trails 7 and 8 and constructed a supply route between the West Road and Trail 7. By mid-February, Casey ordered Chenoweth to turn Trail 8 into “the best pack trail possible,” extending it west of Trail 38, which paralleled the East Road, through the II Corps to the West Road.<sup>28</sup>



**Figure 17.3. Bataan: Trails in II Corps and Service Command areas, 5 February 1942.** (Adapted from 803rd Engineer Battalion, Map-South Subsector, 5 February 1942, NARA RG496, Entry 1050.)

For the trail work, Chenoweth exploited abandoned routes and used multiple engineer units on the same project. In the II Corps, for example, he decided to build upon the bed of an abandoned logging railroad of the Lamao River (i.e., instead of using Trail 20) to bring the road into Trail 20 below Trail 24 by the end of February. For that project, in early February, Chenoweth requested through the USAFFE to Service Command the assistance of the 803rd to build a bridge on the old railroad bed. The request included equipment from the 14th Engineers PS and the engineer depot, as well as 12 to 20 carpenters.<sup>29</sup>

The 201st and 202nd EBs PA, newly formed from the 301st ER PA and under the command of Maj Harry O. Fischer and Captain Mitchell Major, respectively, performed most of the work on Trails 18 and 20 to provide a bypass for the East Road. The estimated date of completion was the end of February. Casey directed Chenoweth to have the 803rd act as coordinator for the work with the 14th. Delamore assigned SSgt Charles J. Joskens and a work unit from 1st Platoon, Company C, to the task. By 5 February, Trail 20 from Limay (KP145) to the Alangan River, including the "Artillery Loop," and the junction with Trail 22, and Trail 22 from KP147 to the intersection with Trail 20 were, considered "completed motor trails." The stretch of Trail 20 between the Lamao (Trail 24) and the Alangan Rivers was still in process, as were Trails 4, 8, and 18 north of the Alangan.<sup>30</sup>

By 13 February, Casey issued orders for plans to convert main trails and roads into an all-weather network. This was "under the assumption" that they would have "to be completed before the wet season on or about 1 May, including amount of rock required, location of quarries and gravel pits, use of *paquiao* system [i.e., public works not subject to competitive bidding] for getting materials from distant locations, equipment and transport required, drainage improvement necessary, and man hours (troop and civilian labor) required."<sup>31</sup>

In mid-February, Casey requested that Service Command develop Trails 26 and 20 from the vicinity of KP164.5 to the junction of Trail 20 with Trail 24 into a subsidiary but still unpaved road as an interior parallel route for the East Road. Calling it a "high priority," the USAFFE chief engineer said civilian labor should "be used to the maximum." After two weeks, a combined crew from the Headquarters Company, 803rd engineers, whose bivouac was near-by; the ODE; and a considerable number of civilian laborers had completed an estimated 25 percent of their task.<sup>32</sup>



## Post-MacArthur Reorganization

The departure of General MacArthur and most of the senior USAFFE staff from the Philippines on 12 March set a significant reorganization in motion and initially brought confusion. The Luzon Force, USAFFE, was constituted effective 11 March 1942, under Wainwright's command by order of General MacArthur. Included among its subordinate elements was the 803rd EB, less Company A. Brig Gen Albert M. Jones replaced Wainwright as commander of the I Corps. Under those orders, Brig Gen Allan McBride, MacArthur's deputy for the Philippine Department, retained his post as commander of the Service Command, Luzon Force. Maj Gen Edward P. King was named to command the Luzon Force artillery section. The Luzon Force engineer section included the men from Casey's staff: Maj William A. Gay, Maj Albert J. Kirchner, Capt Thomas H. Delamore, Capt Ralph McGuire, 1st Lt William C. Ramme, and 2nd Lt Charles J. Cushing. MacArthur attempted to retain command from Australia. Thus, confusion reigned until General Marshall clarified the command structure in the Philippines on 20 March, telling Wainwright, "upon the departure of General MacArthur, you became commander of US forces in the Philippines." Wainwright, in turn, appointed Maj General King to command the Luzon Force.<sup>33</sup>

## Miscellaneous Responsibilities

### Companies B and C

Company B's work details helped emplace a 155-mm heavy artillery GPF near Cabcaben, possibly for the 86th Field Artillery (PS).<sup>34</sup>

Another of Company C's miscellaneous responsibilities was to build and maintain the engineer dock at Cabcaben, one of three docks on Bataan. The other two engineer docks were at Mariveles and Lamao. At first, all supplies from Corregidor came through those docks. All three had narrow approaches that could handle only two trucks to service the scows arriving from Corregidor. Thus, congestion at the Cabcaben dock was a problem early on. However, lumber, tractors, and diesel engines still came through it. The dock also received materiel for the diminished FEAF, such as aircraft propellers and aviation gas. In mid-January, for fuel handling, Company C

requested and received a pump with a 50-foot lift and an output of 160-175 gallons per minute. Later, barges brought crushed stone from the Mariveles quarry as a fuel conservation measure. By 2 February, the dock needed repair, and Company C was tasked with the project. The work began within five days as Company C assembled the necessary materials and then repaired the dock surface and the approaches with new timbers on the sides and the ends of the pier. The repairs were finished on 21 February.<sup>35</sup>

### Headquarters Company

During the siege of Bataan, Headquarters Company continued to take on different construction jobs unrelated to roads and airstrips. During January and February 1942, SSgt Frederick D. Julius worked with Maj Timothy J. Robinson, Service Command engineer section, to install 3-inch and 1-inch naval guns along the coast of Bataan, according to 1st Lt Samuel Goldblith. The weekly engineer operations and the inspection reports for late January and February showed the construction of 3-inch gun positions for beach defense at Saysain, Tiliim, Bobo Point [Caibobo Point], Cañas, Biaan, Quinuan, Vigia, and Solomon Points, and Agloloma Bay on the West Coast, as well as three on the East Coast, including Ayam and Mantic Points. Although Company A installed one 3-inch gun emplacement on Quinuan Point, the reports did not mention it, nor did they provide details on the engineer units responsible for other installations. In addition to the East Coast installations, Company A, 803rd, installed a portable searchlight battery on Bobo Point, located 16 km. south of Bagac. On Bataan, as had been the case at Clark Field, the battalion was involved with explosive ordnance disposal and neutralization of dud bombs. Also, heavy equipment operators from Headquarters Company were loaned to other companies of the battalion, and its truck drivers provided “heavy hauling for almost every organization” on Bataan, according to Capt Robert Montgomery.<sup>36</sup>

### Notes

1. Headquarters, USAFFE, Field Order 9 [withdrawal to RBP], 22 January 1942, NARA RG496, Entry 550, Box 30; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 290–95; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 227–228; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 89; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memos, 29 January 1942 and 7 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Ending 31 January 1942 and 7 February 1942, respectively, Casey Files, Folder 10; Kircher to Casey, Weekly Report on Construction, memo, 24 January

1942, Casey Files, Folder 6; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 22 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 297.

2. Casey, MFR, 25 January 1942, Subject: Service Command (F[ield] O[rder] No. 5, 1/18/42, Casey Files, Folder 16.

3. Casey, MFR, 24 January 1942, no subject [22 January instructions for Maj Fries]; Kircher to Casey, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: 6 February 1942 [803rd issues and ODE complaints), Casey File, Folder 4; Knutson, interview, 20 February 1999; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 52; Gay, report, 24 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Major Gay – 23 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Delamore, report, 24 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore – 23 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16, contained a complete list of engineer plans and actions related to the withdrawal. Knutson later volunteered with three others to operate behind Japanese lines and destroy airfields and aircraft. See Brig Gen R[ichard] J. Marshall, USAFFE DCoS, to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 8 January 1942, MMA RG2, Box 1, Folder 3.

4. Goldblith diary, 3; Goldblith, “The 803d Engineers in the Philippine Defense,” in Ashton, ed., *And Somebody Gives a Damn*, 323; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 47–8, 52. Cpl Augustine Turturro died on 21 August 1942, at Camp O’Donnell. For the award of the Silver Star medal, Goldblith cited General Order No. 5, Headquarters, 5th Interceptor Command.

5. USAFFE Field Order Number 10, 25 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 13.

6. Delamore, report, 24 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore—23 January 1942, 2; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 347–49; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 97; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942.

7. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 88, 90–91; Casey to CO’s, 14th Engineer Battalion; engineer, I Corps; engineer, II Corps; and 803rd Engineer Battalion, memo, 5 February 1942, Subject: Lateral Road, Casey Files, Folder 4; Chenoweth, Report on Engineer Operations of the South Luzon Force, and Bataan Force, II Corps.

8. Batol, interview, 28 June 2018; [Philippine] Bureau of Public Works, Road Map of the Philippine Islands, No. 6, 30 June 1919, NARA RG350 [Bureau of Insular Affairs], Entry 11, Folder 2. The Balanga-Limay section of the East Road was constructed during 1915–1919. Gerow to CoS, memo, 5 February 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, NARA RG165, Entry 281, Box 108; Goldblith, “The 803d Engineers in the Philippine Defense,” in Ashton, ed., *And Somebody Gives a Damn*, 323; Goldblith diary, 2; Poster, interview, 2 October 2002; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 55; Kircher to Casey, memo, n.d., Subject Inspection Trip—14–15 January 1942. Bataan Defense Force, Administration Order No. 1, 2 January 1942, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 30; ODE Map [facilities and bridges on Bataan’s east coast, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 39; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Bataan Supply Plan (Map), NARA RG338; Decimal 319.1, Box T-4383; Capt Paul [L.] Ashton, *Bataan Diary*, 113; Chenoweth, Report on Engineer Operations of the South Luzon Force, and Bataan Force, II Corps.

9. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo 31 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations, Weekly Period Ending 31 January 1942, 10; and Engineer, USAFFE, advance CP, Bataan, to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, Casey Files, Folder 16.

10. Casey, report, Inspection of Engineer Activities -7 January 1942, 1; Kircher, report, 24 January 1942, subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 1, Pflueger to author, emails, 20 June and 14 December 2001; Kinser, interview, 5 May 1999.

11. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1942; Maj Frank Fries to All [803rd] CO’s, memo, 3 February

1942, Subject: Changes in Sectors of Responsibility, Casey Files, Folder 4; Van Orden, interview, 14 March 1999; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 95; Goldblith, "The 803d Engineers in the Philippine Defense," 323; ODE to Philippine Department, G-4, memo, 1 November and 3 December 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineers Construction, both in NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 36.

12. Commander, Third Engineer (Combat) Regiment, to Maj Gen Julian L. Schley, letter, 26 September 1940, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 462; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 38.

13. Casey, report, 30 January 1942, Subject: Report of Inspection of I Corps and Bagac Guns 1/29, Casey Files, Folder 7; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1942.

14. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 February 1942; Map, ODE, 15 February 1942, Subject: Trail Map, Bataan Peninsula, NARA RG338, Box T-4392; Kircher to Casey, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: 6 February 1942 [coordination with engineer elements], Casey Files, Folder 4.

15. Lamm, interview, 25 October 1998; Hill, interview, 10 March 1998; Zubay, interview, 27 March 1999; report, 1st Lt W.C. Ramme, assistant engineer, USAFFE, report, 29 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Ramme-28 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey, report, 4 February 1942, Subject: Report of Inspection I Corps and Bagac Guns 1/29; Kircher to Casey, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: 6 February 1942; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life* (1996), 42; Goldblith diary, 3; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 95.

16. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 10; Casey, report, 5 February 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip 4 February 1942; Kircher to Casey, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: 6 February 1942 [803rd issues and ODE complaints]; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 February 1942, 2; Casey, report, 14 February 1942, Subject: Inspection-13 February 1942.

17. Gay, report, 15 February 1942, Subject: Inspection I Corps by Major Gay 2-14-42, Casey Files, Folder 5; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942.

18. Delamore, report, 18 February 1942, Subject: Inspection of Lt. Delamore-18 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5; Delamore, report, 20 February 1942, Subject: Inspection of Lt. Delamore-19 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5. The Osgood Company, based in Marion, Ohio, manufactured steam shovels, dragline excavators, and cranes from 1910 to 1954, when Marion Power Shovel Company purchased it.

19. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 1 March 1942: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 28 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8.

20. Fries to engineer, Luzon Force in the field, memo, 23 March 1942, Subject: Roster of American Civilians, NARA RG407, Box 1662, Microfilm Roll 67.

21. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1942, 3; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8.

22. Pflueger to author, e-mails, 29 May and 2 June 2001; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 17 February 1942, Subject: Transfer of Officers, Casey Files, Folder 6; Engineer, USAFFE, to acting CoS, G-4, memo, 14 January 1942, Subject: Commission, Promotion, and Transfer of Engineer Personnel.

23. Casey to I and II Corps engineers, memo, 13 February 1942, Subject: All-Weather Roads, Casey files, Folder 5; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942. See Dod, *The War against Japan*, 90, 97; and Chenoweth, Report on Engineer Operations of the South Luzon Force, and Bataan Force, II Corps.

24. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942; 1st Lt H.E. Phillippe, map, 4 January 1942, Subject: Road and Trail Map, Bataan Peninsula, NARA RG338, Box T-4392. Lt Phillippe was KIA at Ft. Mills, Corregidor, on 3 May 1942; engineer staff, ODE, map, 15 February 1942, Subject: Trail Map, Bataan Peninsula; Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 77; "Brief War History of the 14th Engineers," 6.

25. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942; Stickney to CG, memo, 15 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 17; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 48.

26. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942; Stickney to CG, memo, 25 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 24 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 17; Gay, report, 14 March 1942, Subject: Inspection II Corps – Major Gay – 3/13/42, Casey Files, Folder 8. The 7 March report was Casey's last; he left the Philippines with MacArthur on 11 March. With Casey's departure, Col Harry Stickney filed the weekly report.

27. R.G.R. [not further identified], headquarters, Luzon Force, memo, to G-4, Luzon Force, 22 March 1942, no subject [construction of the Sisiman Bay floating dock], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 40; R.C.H. [not further identified], headquarters, G-4, Luzon Force, USAFFE, to G-4, USFIP, memo, 23 March 1942, no subject [use of Sisiman Cove in darkness], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 40; C.C.D. [not further identified], office of the quartermaster, to CoS, USFIP, memo, 8 April 1942, subject: [quartermaster] plan, evacuation of Bataan, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 40; [office of the quartermaster, Luzon Force], memo, 8 April 1942, Subject: G-4 Plan for Movement of Weapons-Ammunition-Supplies-Etc., from Bataan to Ft. Mills and for Disposition of Balance, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 40; Quartermaster Corps Form 173A, December, 1921, no subject [Sisiman barge dock], NARA RG77, Entry 370, Box 158; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, p. 49.

28. Gay, MFR, 28 January 1942, Subject: Telephone Calls 1-26-42, 1-27-42, 1-28-42; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations, Weekly Period Ending 17 January 1942, 1-2; Casey to CoS, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1942; Gay to Chenoweth, memo, February 3, 1942, no subject, Casey Files folder 4.

29. Delamore, report, 28 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore, Casey Files, Folder 6; Delamore, MFR, 6 February 1942, Subject: Telephone Call Maj. Chenoweth—2:15, Casey Files, Folder 10.

30. Gay, report, 17 February 1942, Subject: Inspection II Corps—Major Gay—2-15-42, Casey Files, Folder 13; 803rd Engineer Battalion, Bataan Trail Map, South Sector, 5 February 1942; Chenoweth, Report on Engineer Operations of the South

Luzon Force, and Bataan Force, II Corps. See Mansell Roster. SSgt Charles Joskens died at Cabanatuan on 11 August 1942. Cadwallader and Gibson Lumber Company had the timber concession in Bataan Province with a major sawmill and *banca* building operation at Limay. See [Philippine] Bureau of Forestry, *Annual Report, 1915* (1916), 48. Rail lines serving timber companies were generally five to 20 km long and served as feeders to haul logs to river points.

31. Casey to I and II Corps Engineers, memo, 13 February 1942, Subject: All-Weather Roads.

32. Casey to ODE [*sic*], memo, 13 February 1942, no subject [development of Trails 20 and 24], Casey Files, Folder 5; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 1 March 1942: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 28 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942; Moyer, interview, 7 March 1999; Goldblith diary, 8; Pfc. Laurie Jack "Gil" Gillespie [military biography and map], <https://www.usmilitariaforum.com/>.

33. General Orders No. 42, 14 March 1942, [Subject: Constitution of Luzon Force], issued under the name of Maj Gen Richard K. Sutherland, RG 407, Philippine Archives Collection, Box 1662, microfilm roll 71; Marshall quoted in Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 363. Morton also provided a detailed account of Wainwright's assumption of command (360–66).

34. Poster, interview, October 24, 1999.

35. Lt. Col N[icol] F. Galbraith to G-4, USAFFE, 8 January 1942, Subject: Narration of Events, RG496, Entry, 540, Box 31; C.C.D. [not further identified] to G-4, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, no subject [Cabcaban dock congestion, quartermaster issues]. NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 31; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942; Casey, report, 20 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Major Gay and Lt. Delamore—19 January 1942, 1; Pflueger to author, e-mail, 16 April 2002.

36. Goldblith diary, 3; Goldblith, "The 803d Engineers in the Philippine Defense," 323; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1942; Kircher to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 14 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, Casey Files, Folder 16; Casey, report, 5 February 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip 4- Feb 42, Casey Files, Folder 4; Delamore, report, 8 February 1942, Subject: Inspection of Lt. Delamore—2-7-42, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942; Leggett, UKY interview, Part II; Richardson-Bartsch interview; Montgomery, "Battle of Agoloma," 10, and "Brief History," 5.



## Chapter 18


### **Company A at the Battle of the Points**

Coinciding with MacArthur's decision to withdraw to the RBP on 22 January 1942, the Japanese attempted to exploit their breakthrough at Mauban on the East China Sea north of Bagac with a flanking movement to the south in the Service Command area. On 23 January, as Fil-American forces began to pull back to the RBP, the Japanese haphazardly landed two battalions at three separate locations (N-S): Anyasan, Quinauan, and Longoskawayan Points. Historian Richard Meixsel pointed out that Japan's capability for the planning and execution of amphibious warfare had atrophied after its invasion of China in 1931. That deficiency had adversely affected ship-to-shore operations at Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay before the Japanese army attempted to scale the high cliffs of southwestern Bataan. The objective, patterned after Gen Tomoyuki Yamashita's tactics in Malaya, was to cut off access to the West Road, which served as the I Corps' supply line. In the initial efforts to organize a defense of the points, Company A, 803rd EB, became the first US Army engineer unit to be used as infantry in combat during World War II.<sup>1</sup>

Brig Gen Clyde Selleck, commander of the south subsector, west sector, the I Corps, and the 71st Division Philippine Army, was responsible for the defense of the area. However, since almost all the division's combat troops had been taken from him, Selleck commanded only the headquarters and service troops and one battalion of artillery supplemented by the 1st Regiment, PC. The group was essentially a paramilitary police force—the elements of the US Provisional Air Corps Regiment (PACR)—consisting of grounded airmen with limited infantry training and the promise of sailors from the naval battalion at Mariveles. Planning for the defense of the sector, Selleck established his CP at KP191 on the West Road, about 5,000 yards inland from Quinauan Point. In addition to barbed wire and machine-gun emplacements, he only had time to install two 3-inch naval guns. Naval gun crews operated both batteries. Company A was emplacing a third maritime gun on the northwestern shore of Quinauan Point overlooking Agloloma Bay. The cement base was incomplete when the Japanese attack began. The road to transport the weapon to the emplacement site was not completed until the week of



7 February. It was finally installed, in operation, and instrumental in “breaking up the landing of 5 enemy barges” as of 15 February, according to a later engineer inspection report.<sup>2</sup>



**Figure 18.1. Bataan: Japanese landings, 23 January–1 February 1942.** (Adapted from Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 297.)

Capt Robert D. Montgomery, Company A, later described Quinauan Point as “one mass of dense jungle growth with masses of interwoven vines, trees, [and] brush,” with “a deep ravine located about midway.” About three-quarters of a mile wide from base to the seaward point, the U-shaped area extended from the Bataan Peninsula approximately 1.2 miles into the East China Sea.<sup>3</sup>

The defenses were meager and straightforward. Lt John Bulkeley’s patrol torpedo (PT) boats patrolled the area. The 34th Pursuit Squadron had dug machine-gun pits and guarded the south side and mouth of Agloloma Bay. The 17th Pursuit Squadron was on the beach defense at the crest of Quinauan Point. I Company, 1st PC, was stationed to the west of the 17th. The Company A bivouac was east of the West Road at KP201.5. A detail from Company A was already on Quinauan Point. In conjunction with the OSCE (formerly the ODE), the detail

was preparing for the installation of the 3-inch gun on Quinauan Point, as of 24 January. Company A trucks and drivers hauled crushed rock from the Mariveles quarry to the job site. The northern branch of Trail 31, which began at KP195 of the West Road, roughly paralleled the Quinauan River to the northwest extremity of Quinauan Point and led to the 3-inch gun emplacement. The new road did not appear on Japanese maps, and Fertig credited it with allowing for the presence of the half-tracks that met the first invaders. About two-thirds of the way down that trail, Filipino laborers under the command of 1st Lt Gerald E. Worthington—the Service Command engineer officer in charge of the Mariveles quarry—began cutting a more direct path to the gun emplacement.<sup>4</sup>

The Japanese threat to the sector triggered an incremental response. Brig Gen Selleck put his newly assigned troops and Company A on alert early in the morning of 23 January, when the 34th Pursuit first reported the Japanese landing on Quinauan Point. Some engineers from Company A continued to install 8-inch guns near Bagac, while others maintained and constructed roads and bridges, worked defenses (barbed wire entanglements, machine-gun pits, and anti-tank positions), and prepared bridges between KP205 and KP212 for demolition. Engagement in the defensive tasks continued the broadening of the company's mission to those functions generally reserved for construction and combat engineer units. During the nights of 22–24 January, it was also on standby to aid in the movement of the 155-mm GPF artillery pieces to new positions between KP 201–205. This occurred in conjunction with the pullback to the RBP. While work on assigned tasks continued, Lt Edmund Zbikowski—commander of Company A—received word that a small force of Japanese using small boats had landed on Quinauan Point. He was ordered to prepare to block trails from the point. Small detachments under Lieutenants Robert Montgomery and Walter H. Farrell, accompanied by Worthington, were assigned to the mission. Farrell reconnoitered the north trail, while Montgomery and Worthington took the south trail. Both parties found that units assigned to these respective areas were well prepared (e.g., drilling of trees for charges). Consequently, they determined that the engineers would have little additional work (e.g., planting and wiring of charges) to complete the task once formal orders were received. The only addition they recommended was use of ditches and barbed wire entanglements for the defense of the area. On the night of 23 January, dissatisfied with Selleck's lack of aggres-

siveness, the USAFFE replaced him with Col Clinton Pierce, commander of the battle tested 26th Cavalry PS.<sup>5</sup>



Source: NARA RG 111, Box 41, SC131320

#### **Barbed wire barriers, Moron-Bagac Road, 16 January 1942**

Company A then shifted from working on engineer tasks to combat operations. Bulkeley's PT boats disrupted but did not stop the landings. The 34th Pursuit Squadron put up some resistance but could not dislodge the invaders. Fortunately for the defenders, Col Nariyoshi Tsunehiro, the Japanese commander, halted operations temporarily to dig in (dig foxholes). The 1st PC arrived to reinforce the 34th, and the 21st Pursuit Squadron arrived from Mariveles on 24 January. On the third day of the battle, 25 January, at about 0100, Pierce, a newly promoted brigadier general, directed Zbikowski to report to the south subsector headquarters on Quinauan Point within three hours with engineer equipment. In a rush to round up reinforcements, Pierce circumvented Major Fries, commander of the 803rd. At the same time, Zbikowski was notifying Fries (about 0200, 25 January) of Pierce's orders, his men were loading trucks with barbed wire, dynamite, tools, recently issued machine-guns, and extra ammunition. As soon as breakfast was completed, the company,

except for rear echelon personnel (cooks, mechanics, etc.), moved out using its heavy equipment and went to a new bivouac to the rear of Quinauan Point and west of the West Road. Men and equipment were in place and camouflaged by the afternoon when they were ordered to rest. Then Zbikowski and his officers reported to the Quinauan Point headquarters. Maj Harold Cogswell, the south sub-sector engineer, was the ranking engineer on Quinauan Point. "It was there," Captain Montgomery recalled later, "that we learned our mission was not to be purely an engineer mission." Zbikowski was advised that the 20 to 100 snipers in the invasion force were scattered throughout the jungle and that the Fil-American units were too widely spread out along the north-south trail to prevent the Japanese advance. Company A was then ordered to fill the line, establish contact with other units along the line, and then advance in a skirmish line down the length of the point. These actions were supposed to clear the area of snipers and push the enemy to the end of the point "for annihilation." Capt George Mannes Schmidt, an infantry officer from the 71st Division PA, was assigned to Zbikowski as a guide and advisor. Zbikowski immediately advised Major Fries by telephone of Company A's new mission. On 26 January, the USAFFE engineer attempted to secure the release of Company A from the Quinauan Point action; however, it was unsuccessful and he only received the promise of an early departure.<sup>6</sup>

As part of Company A's preparations, Zbikowski ordered 1st Lieutenant Coone to establish an aid station just off the beach or east side of the West Road. He and his four corpsmen used an ambulance as sleeping quarters and rotated guards every few hours. The FEAF aid station was a half-mile closer to the East China Sea. At the same time, SSgt Trefle Metras, acting as the company's temporary first sergeant, moved cooks and mechanics along with ration trucks and field equipment to establish the rear echelon. On 26 January, Capt James D. Richardson, the battalion executive officer, arrived on scene to direct the movement of the rear echelon unit of cooks and mechanics south to a new bivouac on Signal Hill (KP187.5) because of the Japanese threat.<sup>7</sup>


Company A's lack of infantry training and experience was apparent early in the operation. Lieutenant Farrell led the third platoon along a north-south path traversing the point with orders to establish contact with the 17th Pursuit Squadron, which was reconnoitering beaches and trails in the rear and to his right. Farrell spread the platoon along the north-south line but was only able to link up only with

the 1st PC on his left. Neither trained nor prepared for combat—basic training at Ft. Belvoir involved one day on the rifle range—the men were “scared stiff,” according to Pvt Joe Vater—and got lost in the jungles on numerous occasions. Farrell was unable to meet the 17th without losing contact with the 1st PC.

Consequently, Montgomery and the first platoon were ordered to fill the line to Farrell’s right. He covered the area from the beach to the high ground. When still unsuccessful in finding the 17th, Montgomery sent a small reconnaissance unit to the rear in an attempt to locate the airmen. The surveillance revealed that the 17th was also inspecting the area and would then meet Montgomery’s platoon. As a result, Lieutenant Bartlett and the second platoon were then sent to fill the gap between the first platoon, located to his right, and third platoon to his left. The first platoon had the beach to its right. To the left of Farrell’s third platoon were the 1st PC and the 34th Pursuit Squadron, respectively. With a total complement of 147 men, Company A provided about 90 men in the skirmish line.<sup>8</sup>

Thus established, by 0800 on 25 January, Zbikowski began leading Company A on the thin skirmish line westward against the Japanese at the end of the point. The weaponry available to Company A included antiquated .30-caliber Springfield rifles, six water-cooled machine-guns, one Lewis gun, a Browning automatic rifle, two Browning automatic pistols, and World War I-vintage hand grenades, most of which were duds. As they moved, the troops set fire to “all suspicious trees, nooks or coves,” according to Montgomery. The thick jungle growth and heavy, bulky machine-guns slowed the engineers’ progress. They spent most of the day looking for snipers. New to both combat and the jungle environment, the engineers moved noisily through the thickets. The 17th Pursuit Squadron finally joined the line about noon on the extreme right flank, an addition that allowed for better communications. Zbikowski was then given command of the line from the left flank of the 1st PC to the beach on the right, where the 17th was located. His supervision included advancement orders and liaison contacts.<sup>9</sup> Forward progress continued to be slow in the extreme heat of the day. The troops encountered small groups of Japanese, including snipers.

In the action that followed, Pvt Raymond T. Goldbach was killed, and Sgt Gilbert B. Soifer was wounded. Later, Pvt Elmer C. Yochum was killed when he stood and sprayed .30-caliber machine-gun fire into the trees until the gun jammed. His assistant gunner, Sgt Paul



**Figure 18.2. Quinauan Point: approximate line of defense, 25 January 1942.** (Adapted from Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 303; Bataan Trail Map, 15 February 1942.)

Gellert, was killed shortly after that. The 17th Pursuit Squadron also had trouble keeping up with the movement of the skirmish line because of dense undergrowth and the steep slope it had to traverse.

Consequently, troops in the main line of resistance dug in several times to allow the right flank to move ahead and keep the line in a concave shape. Ultimately, to close in on the Japanese, the 17th arrived near the location of the 3-inch gun on which Company A had worked. Montgomery concluded that “all went well and according to

plan with a few minor skirmishes and a thorough blazing of trees and any suspicious positions.” By about 1630, machine-gun fire indicated that the engineers had hit the Japanese line. John Whitman related in *Bataan: Our Last Ditch* that Company A personnel tired of the slow progress and decided to rush the Japanese. The tragic result was that five engineers were killed and 15 wounded. With the help of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Division PA, Company A later managed to remove dead and wounded troops.<sup>10</sup>

At about 1830, with night falling fast, the line passed the 3-inch gun position, and movement became even more difficult. By going beyond established trails and paths, the troops continued to deal with the jungle growth. At the ravine near the end of Quinauan Point, the beach defenders came up on higher ground and kept watch on the shoreline from the cliffs. The moon disappeared, and an inky night set in. As the line approached the southwest corner of the point, Farrell reported a loss of contact with the 1st PC on his left. The troops dug in, and scouts were dispatched in an unsuccessful attempt to find the constabulary troops. They did, however, locate the 34th Pursuit Squadron.<sup>11</sup>

Zbikowski consolidated the force’s position and moved up to the southwest corner of Quinauan Point. From that position on the cliff, the defenders technically had the Japanese on the beach surrounded. However, it was unable to make visual contact or advance further because of the loss of the PC unit. As a result, the troops dug in and quietly spent the cold night in that position. They were waiting for orders from the south subsector headquarters or reinforcements. All night long, the Japanese kept up a stream of harassing rifle and machine-gun fire with tracers passing over the heads of the Fil-American troops. Montgomery concluded that the Japanese had overestimated the strength of the defenders and did not realize how close they were to their adversaries. As a result, the enemy did not attempt to attack.<sup>12</sup>

At daybreak on 26 January, Zbikowski withdrew to the N-S line—where the defenders had begun the action. He wanted to get new orders from headquarters, food and water, and reinforcements. He told the troops to “just sit down and get some rest.” Montgomery reasoned that if the Japanese attacked the southwestern tip of Quinauan Point, “all would have been lost.” In contrast, the withdrawal allowed the defenders to continue to contain the Japanese on the tip of Quinauan Point. After the defenders formed a thin line, Zbikowski returned to



the south subsector headquarters. Cpl Tom Gagnet moved slightly behind the line to set up a machine-gun and to try to hold the line. This action earned him a recommendation for the Silver Star Medal. Montgomery took a small detachment to retrieve food and water from headquarters. The squad found both and returned with a barrel of “muddy water” and enough emergency “C” rations to give each man two cans of food.<sup>13</sup>

Platoon leaders had time to distribute the rations, but the men did not have time to eat. At 0800, the Japanese, who had followed Zbikowski's force, attacked. With intense machine-gun and rifle fire, the enemy tried but failed to break through the defenders' line at a high point on the junction of the N-S and boundary paths, a front of about 150–200 yards. The defenders held their line without serious casualties.<sup>14</sup>

At about 1100, the skirmish line was able to regroup and reform according to original plans because Zbikowski returned with the “lost” PC unit. Montgomery said the 1st PC had withdrawn for food and rest. The process gave the men time to eat for the first time in more than a day. They resumed advancing against the Japanese by hacking through the jungle with bayonets and burning all trees and suspicious areas. Skirmishes continued through the day, and about 1,500 of the defenders encountered stiff resistance from the Japanese force in trenches three feet deep, two feet wide, and six to eight feet long. Also, snipers who had tied themselves in the trees while retreating before the skirmish line became more active. The Japanese fire came not only from snipers above in the excellent camouflage of banyan trees but also from the rifles, machine-guns, knee mortars, and hand grenades of the entrenched Japanese to the rear.

During “a stiff encounter” on 26 January, Pfc Robert R. Reh, Pfc Lawrence M. Williams, Pvt John Jacobellis, Pvt James G. Kenny; Pvt J. McClure, and Pvt Robert Sullivan were KIA. At some point, Pvt Fred W. Zimpfer, a corpsman, was also killed. He was one of the several Company A personnel awarded the Silver Star Medal (posthumously) for his actions. Lieutenant Montgomery, SSgt Joseph W. Roszkowski, Sgt Delbert Moore, Sgt Gilbert Soifer, Sgt Cpl Louis Jay, and Pfc Leo T. Harrington were also among the wounded in action. Severely wounded, Pvt Felman E. Cappel and Pvt Lester Peterson were evacuated to Hospital #1, Little Baguio, where amputation of their legs was necessary.<sup>15</sup>



Zbikowski ordered his troops to “dig in” and called an officers’ conference. From the meeting came the decision to advance and “clean out the Japs.” In the afternoon, a PC battalion launched an attack spontaneously without the necessary base of fire. It cleared out enemy foxholes and trenches before being pinned down by fire from its flanks and the rear. Company A’s forward movement started at about 1700 and was met again with fierce resistance. The Fil-American force again encountered snipers using both rifles and hand grenades. They also faced machine-gun and rifle fire, hand grenades, and a 1-inch cannon from the entrenched troops. Montgomery claimed that, after bearing the brunt of the attack from the main Japanese force, Company A cleared the enemy’s trenches permanently. After about six hours of combat (i.e., about 2300), the fighting suddenly stopped. The dead and wounded were removed, while the survivors “took in more area.” Some Company A personnel were trapped among the Japanese forces and had to wait until it was dark to infiltrate back to their lines. As a result of four days of action, the hastily thrown together force of 500 men from Company A, 803rd Engineers; FEAF V Interceptor Command; 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, PACR; headquarters, 71st Division; and 1st PC had gained an estimated 100 yards and had held the line against 600 Japanese.<sup>16</sup>

The lull in the fighting brought welcome reinforcements. Two companies of the 11th Division PA arrived without officers and were detailed to Company A. Zbikowski used them to replace Company A casualties and fill in the line. Soon after, two platoons from the 12th Infantry Division PA arrived and were combined into one unit. A 75-mm gun battery from the 88th Artillery PS, just withdrawn from the Abucay line on Bataan’s east coast, was the last addition to the complement on Quinauan Point for that day. Brig Gen Richard J. Marshall, the USAFFE deputy CoS, ordered Company A to pull back into a reserve position by 0100 on 27 January. Farrell and his third platoon, Company A, turned over their responsibilities to the new PA battalion, while Zbikowski returned to headquarters for further orders. Shortly after that, Bartlett and his second platoon were relieved. At about 1430, Montgomery and the first platoon were finally relieved and moved to the rear for medical treatment and food. The battle, however, continued. On 27 January, the 1st Battalion PC tried and failed several times to destroy the Japanese force.<sup>17</sup>

The wounded were either treated in place or removed to an aid station in the rear. When notified of the situation, Lieutenant Coone

and his corpsmen grabbed first aid chests, cots, and stretchers and proceeded to the FEAF aid station. There, he encountered an estimated 50 wounded men being treated by one doctor and a few corpsmen. The severely wounded were transferred from stretchers to blankets so stretchers could be used again. The medics exhausted their supplies of saline solution, hydrogen peroxide, and splints. By the early morning of 27 January, the most severe cases were stabilized and carried 75 feet to waiting ambulances for transport to the hospital at Mariveles. Later, the remaining wounded engineers were taken by trucks the corpsmen had commandeered to Mariveles. Lieutenant Montgomery was in the last load of wounded men to leave Quinauan Point for Mariveles. He returned to the new bivouac area shortly after that.<sup>18</sup>

On the morning of 28 January, the 45 Infantry Division PS—which had moved without relief from the battle at Abucay Hacienda on Bataan’s East Coast—arrived on Quinauan Point. As of 0830, the remainder of Company A was relieved after one day of rest, when Brig Gen Marshall ordered the withdrawal of all service units. Zbikowski moved his remaining 46 engineers from Quinauan Point. The mobile remnants of the entire company moved to the new bivouac on Signal Hill, just north of Mariveles, and then on to Little Baguio (KP167.5). There, it bivouacked with elements of Company B. The movement was disrupted on 27 January when Col William Marquat, CoS of the PS CA Corps (CAC), for reasons undocumented, temporarily prevented a Company A detail from returning to its former CP to pick up equipment. On 28 January, with the intervention of the USAFFE engineer, movement of the equipment continued. From 29 January to 3 February, the company briefly resumed its maintenance work on the West Road and its bridges, which was still in need of much additional improvement.<sup>19</sup>

The Battle of the Points finally ended on 18 February with the annihilation of the Japanese invasion force by another composite group consisting primarily of elements of the 45th and 57th Infantry Divisions PS. After the action of 26 January, Coone estimated Company A casualties at 50 percent, including those either KIA or wounded in action (WIA). Major Fries reported on 27 January that Company A had “only 46 men remaining beside[s] company overhead.” Lieutenant Zbikowski provided the formal breakdown of casualties, as of 29 January:

- KIA—9

- WIA—hospitalized – 28
- WIA—in camp – 10
- Ill—in camp – 20–30

He blamed the high losses—actually 10 KIA, as opposed to the nine that were reported at the time—on faulty hand grenades and the impossibility of getting crossfire on the Japanese. Total Fil-American casualties, killed and wounded, were about 500 men. One of the 34th Pursuit pilots was given the task of securing personal items (wallets, rings, watches) of the Company A personnel KIA at Quinauan Point. Morton noted that it was a “heavy price to pay for the security of the West Road.”<sup>20</sup>

## Evaluation

Evaluation by participants and historians of the contribution or effectiveness of the initial Fil-American force on Quinauan Point varied widely. Louis Morton called the force generally “a miscellaneous and motley array of ill-assorted and ineffective troops.” Consequently, he said, “it is not surprising . . . that little progress had been made in pushing the enemy into the sea.” Allison Ind, Col Harold George’s intelligence officer who wrote one of the first histories of prewar preparations and battle for Bataan, characterized the entire force as “Coxey’s Army.” He then wrote, with partial accuracy: “Initially, only some Philippine Scouts and Air Corps Infantry of the 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons held this area. The force of the 803rd Engineers (as tough a fighting outfit as ever set foot on Bataan) and reinforcements from the 45th Infantry were rushed in to stem the Japanese advance. . . .” Col Harry A. Skerry, the I Corps engineer, said after the war: “Until the arrival of the 2nd Battalion, 45th Infantry PS, Company A, 803rd Engineers was probably far and away the most efficient troops present in this heterogeneous group.” Echoing the comments of Lieutenant Montgomery, Lt Col Irwin Alexander, an infantry officer and advisor to the 71st Division PA on Quinauan Point, said that the Japanese commander “far overestimated” the strength of the Fil-American forces opposing him and was forced to dig in. He added: “It is my belief that the active patrolling of the pursuit squadron on Quinauan Point, the loud noise of the movement of the Bren gun carriers, American voices present during the attacks, and later, the

attack of the American battalion [sic] of engineers, all helped influence the Nip commander in his estimate.<sup>21</sup>

While historians are more interested in the impact of Company A's contribution at the Battle of the Points, Casey was necessarily focused on preserving his engineers. His concerns encompassed adherence to the chain of command, even in a crisis. Upon learning of the diversion of Company A to Quinauan Point, he immediately protested to the USAFFE ACoS for operations that Major Fries was not—but should have been—advised of orders committing Company A to action “so he [could] take appropriate measures as dictated by the change.” He also urged that “serious consideration be given to any decision committing this unit to action and that they be so employed only in serious emergencies.” This request was because of the engineer's work on road, airstrip, artillery emplacement, and other construction projects. This plea mirrored almost precisely the wording of Major Fries' initial complaint to the USAFFE engineer at 1420 hours on 25 January. In this environment, Major Fries was continually challenged by the chain of command and various communications issues. Two hours earlier, the headquarters of the Philippine Division (HPD) had called him to request that he put several officers and men on standby for reasons unspecified. Fries did not have the men available at that time and so he stalled by telling HPD to call back later.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to his protest, Casey again demonstrated his talent as a bureaucratic politician. He took further active steps to seek a reprieve and protect Company A. On 26 January, the day after his protest to USAFFE, he recommended “a company of the 803rd Eng[inee]r B[attalio]n” for construction work on Corregidor, even as he acknowledged that “sufficient forces . . . [were] locally available.” On 3 February, he followed up with a request and then received orders for the movement of Company A for temporary duty at Ft. Mills, Corregidor. Casey also proposed a plan for the company's movement. Its mission, formulated during the last week of January, was to develop Kindley Field, including the resumption of work on aircraft revetments, and handle miscellaneous construction projects. The movement orders, under the direction of Capt Brewster G. Gallup, the USAFFE engineer responsible for 8-inch gun installations, provided for an advance party of 29 men to arrive at engineer dock, located on Corregidor's north shore, on 3 February. Ninety-five more engineers arrived on 4 February. Gallup made plans for a temporary bivouac area at Ft. Mills. Of the company's equipment inventory, only one

bulldozer less its blade and one carryall with a tractor were scheduled for shipment along with the first complement of engineers to Corregidor. The remainder of the equipment was to remain under guard at the Company B bivouac area for shipment “when required.” Once on Corregidor, Company A was under the general direction of Maj Robert B. Lothrop, assistant defense engineer from Ft. Mills.<sup>23</sup>

Casey’s protest also produced a formal policy statement on the use of engineers in defense of the Philippines. On 9 February 1942, Maj Gen Sutherland issued the following to corps and division commanders:

Recent inspection and reports disclose the faulty use of engineer units. Among other examples are the employment of engineer units as guards for Division CP’s, guard for an infantry CP, carrying parties for rations for other units, employment in attack in place of available infantry units, . . . during periods while other urgent engineer missions had to be neglected.

It is important that the supply routes to Corps and Division units be improved by proper utilization of engineer units assigned, if the supply system of the effected unit is to function properly. . . .

Engineers can and should be used as Infantry when the emergency dictates. Such emergency use [,] however [,] does not embrace, as has been done, sending engineer units into an attack to advance our lines when other Infantry units are available. Engineer units have not had the special training and [,] in particular [,] are not equipped with suitable weapons for such tasks. Engineer units should be considered as a combat reserve to be withdrawn from their prior and normal engineer missions only when emergency dictates and when Infantry units are not available.<sup>24</sup>

The absence of training for combat conditions continued to plague engineers in other theaters. In the process of developing an airfield near Myitkyina, northern Burma, the 879th Engineer Aviation Battalion Airborne was thrown together with “Merrill’s Marauder’s” to defend the area during the summer of 1944. Karl Dod commented: “The baptism of fire proved costly because of their unfamiliarity with the ways of the enemy and peculiar demands of the battlefield. . . . [They] were lax in security measures and prone to panic when surprised.” Similarly, in the battle for Myitkynia, the 209th Engineer Combat Battalion, untrained and unused to combat or working as an integrated combat team occasionally broke in the face of enemy fire. The 209th subsequently received behind-the-lines combat training from Merrill’s Marauders.<sup>25</sup>

## Notes

1. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 296–99; Maj Francis Cain III, *The 111th Engineer Group in the Bulge: The Role of Engineers as Infantry in AirLand Battle* (master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), 2–3; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 40; Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 169–70.
2. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 296–99. The defense of the southwestern tip of Bataan I Corps came under Maj Gen Wainwright when Service Command was relieved of its defensive responsibilities in mid-January 1942. See headquarters, USAFFE, Field Order Number 10, 25 January 1942. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 February 1942, and Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, February 15, 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942, both in Casey Files, Folder 10.
3. Capt Robert D. Montgomery, to AGO, letter, 24 June 1946, Subject: Battle of Agoloma, 2.
4. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 2; Kircher to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, January 24, 1942, Subject Weekly Report on Construction, Casey Files, Folder 16; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 40; Engineer, USAFFE, roster, 21 February 1942, Subject: US Army Officers on Duty with Engineer Headquarters and Units, Casey Files, Folder 6. See also Col Roscoe Bonham, Officers at Corregidor at the Time of Surrender of Bataan 4/9/42, NARA RG 407, Box 12, 3. 1st Lt Worthington died in route to Japan in December 1944, or January 1945.
5. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 2; Casey, MFR, January 24, 1942, no subject [instructions to Maj. Fries], Casey Files, Folder 16; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 270, 274; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 304–05.
6. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 2–3; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 276–79; Vater, Rutgers interview; Maj William A. Gay, MFR, 25 January 1942, Subject: Telephone Call Major Fries–2:20 AM 25 Jan 42, Casey Files, Folder 16. Maj Cogswell died in route to Japan in January 1945. See Col Roscoe Bonham, Officers with Luzon force at the Time of Surrender of Bataan, n.d.; Engineer, USAFFE, advance command post, Bataan, to Casey, memo, January 29, 1942, Subject: Report 25, 26, 27, 28, Jan 41, Casey Files, Folder 4. Montgomery documented Manneschmidt as assigned to the 1st PC; Mansell listed him as with the 71st. Whitman documented Company A's arrival on Quinuan Point as 24 January, while Montgomery had 25 January.
7. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 37; Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 6; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 3.
8. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 3–4; Wallace, *POW* 83, 106; Vater, Rutgers interview; 1st Lt. W[illiam] C. R[amme] to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 26 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt Ramme–28 Jan 42, Casey Files, Folder 4.
9. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 4; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 279–280; Wallace, *POW* 83, 106–09.
10. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 4; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 281; Wallace, *POW* 83, 111.
11. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 4.
12. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 4.
13. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 5; Vater, interview, March 6, 1999; interview, Gagnet, 6 February 1999.
14. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 5.
15. Montgomery, “Battle of Agoloma,” 5; Wallace, *POW* 83, 109–11; Minder diary, 6; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 40; Company A Casualty History; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 281, noted that five engineers died in the initial phase of the 26 January attack. See Leggett Roster. Cpl Louis Jay, Jr., died in Cabanatuan POW Camp of cere-

bral malaria on 23 July 1942; Pfc Herrington, awarded the Purple Heart medal because of the action on Quinauan Point, was KIA at Kindley Field, Corregidor, 24 March 1942.

16. Montgomery, "Battle of Agoloma," 5–6; Minder diary, 6; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 281; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 308.

17. Montgomery, "Battle of Agoloma," 5; staff conference [notes], Engineer, USAFFE, advanced C[ommand] P[ost], Bataan, 28 January 1942, 1, Casey Files, Folder 13; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 40; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 281; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 305.

18. Montgomery, "Battle of Agoloma," 5–6; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 37–38; Montgomery, "Brief History," 3.

19. Montgomery, "Battle of Agoloma," 6, and "Brief History," 3; staff conference [notes], engineer, USAFFE, advanced CP, Bataan, 28 January 1942, 1–2; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 281–93.

20. Capt Thomas Delamore, report, 29 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Lt. Delamore, Casey Files, Folder 13; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 312; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 10; Tom Gage [Philippine Notebook] to John Zubay, letter, March 5, 1996. As with many of the statistics from the battle for Bataan, individual sources had differing numbers. Casualty History, Company "A," [sic], 803rd Engineer Battalion (AVN SEP, NARA RG 407, listed nine KIA and "???35 other casualties" in the "engagement, Aglalomia [sic], 1-26-42; Ramme to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, January 29, 1942, documented a report from Maj Cogsell that Company A casualties were: 12 killed, 10-11 missing, 19 severely wounded, 25 minor wounded. Coone, *The Sequential Solider*, 193, said 10 members of Company A were killed at the Battle of the Points. An analysis of the 803rd roster, based on reporting from numerous sources, indicated that Coone's estimate was the most accurate.

21. Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 260; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 308; Col. Henry H. Skerry to Lt Col George Meidling, letter, 20 July 1949, no subject [critique of Engineers of the Southwest Pacific]; Dominic Caraccilo, ed., *Surviving Bataan and Beyond: Colonel Irvin Alexander's Odyssey as a Japanese Prisoner of War* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1999), 97–98. Ind's reference was to Jacob S. Coxe and a protest march of some 500 workers he led from Ohio to Washington, D.C., in 1894 to protest the government's failure to help American workers during an economic downturn.

22. Casey to ACoS, USAFFE, memo, 25 January 1942, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 16; Gay, MFR, January 25, 1942, Subject: Telephone Call Major Fries–2:20 AM 25 Jan 42.

23. Casey to ACoS, G-1, memo, 2 February 1942, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 13; [Col.] D[orsey] J. R[utherford], [CAC], executive engineer], MFR, 3 February 3, 1942, no subject [telephone conversation], Casey Files, Folder 13, MFR, 3 February 1942, no subject [telephone conversation], Casey Files, Folder 4; headquarters, USAFFE, Special Order 12, 3 February 1942, no subject [movement of Company A], Casey Files, Folder 4; Lt Col L[loyd] E. Milenz, [defense engineer, Ft. Mills], to Engineer, USAFFE, Bataan, memo, 1 February 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, January 25–31, 1942, Exclusive, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 26 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Ft. Mills, Casey Files, Folder 4; Fries to All CO's [803rd EB], memo, 3 February 1942, Subject: Changes in Sectors of Responsibility, Casey Files, Folder 6. USAFFE Special Order 2 specified that Company A was assigned "for temporary construction work."

24. Sutherland to corps and division commanders, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: Use of Engineers, Casey Files, Folder 13.

25. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 455; Leslie Anders, "Engineers at Myitkyina," *The Military Engineer*, 44 no. 302 (November-December): 447; "209th Engineer Combat Battalion," CBI Order of Battle: Lineages and History, <https://web.archive.org/>, accessed 21 August 2020.





## Chapter 19

### **The Gnat**

Maritime actions at the end of the Battle of the Points, surprisingly, provided yet another example of the inventiveness of the USAFFE forces, in general, and the engineers, in particular. As another method for meeting a challenge, Maj Albert J. Kircher, the engineer officer on Casey's staff responsible for construction, proposed the armoring of motor launches to augment beach defense. As was common on Bataan, the crews were an assortment of available personnel, including troops from the 14th Engineers PS and the 803rd engineers. In separate actions, thus, personnel from the 803rd participated in both land and the sea combat operations during the Battle of the Points. The armored boats were effective in attacking Japanese forces on cliffs.<sup>1</sup>

Major Kircher first broached the concept of an armored boat to Brigadier General Casey and Lt Col Wendell Fertig during dinner and during the time of the Battle of the Points aboard the USS *Canopus*. The ship was an antiquated, submarine tender in Mariveles harbor that the Navy had disabled, disguised, and converted into a machine shop and food storage facility. He proposed converting a 40-foot motor launch into an armored barge to eliminate the small contingents of Japanese still hiding in the caves on Quinuan Point. On 27 January, the Navy agreed to furnish a 40-foot boat for this plan. With the approval of Cpt Earl L. Sackett, commander of the *Canopus*, work started the next day on three vessels; one was the *Gnat*. Officially it was the US Army Armored Boat *Gnat* and unofficially, the "Mickey Mouse Battleship." Workers sheathed the bow with 3/8-inch boilerplates to protect the helmsman and gunners. Originally, the plan was to install a 37-mm machine gun, apparently captured from the Japanese, to fire through a forward screen and two .30-caliber machine guns to fire from sides of the armored cruisers. However, the Navy boatwrights fabricated emplacements for the 37-mm Japanese gun, two .50-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns, and two .30-caliber machine guns in the three vessels ultimately selected for the project. There appeared to have been some disagreement on the weapons to be used and which organization would provide them. The final agreement with the Navy was to keep the 37-mm machine gun and to replace the .30-caliber machine guns with twin .50-caliber machine guns.<sup>2</sup>



Source: NARA RG18, 18AA-186-339771

### USS *Canopus*, Manila Bay (1938)

The *Gnat* was placed in service on 31 January under Navy personnel. For the next two days, Cdr Henry W. Goodall, executive officer of the *Canopus* did three shakedown cruises to Longoskawayan Point, one of three Japanese invasion sites, on the southwestern tip of Bataan. The first, on the date of “commissioning,” involved two sorties. Goodall used the .37-mm gun to good effect in killing several of the enemy. He also captured nine prisoners, four of whom died on the trip back to Mariveles. The weekly report of engineer operations for the week of 25–31 January said the vessel “under naval personnel demonstrated its usefulness in the capture of 9 Japs, 2 of whom were unarmed. The Navy is planning on similarly equipping 2 additional launches for their operation, turning over to the Army its first cruiser. . . .” A second mission to Longoskawayan Point under Goodall included two armored cruisers to clean out the caves on the cliffs. As of 2 February, the Army and Navy had three armed and armored launches in operation.<sup>3</sup>

On 4 February, Casey had two meetings about the armored cruiser. The first was with Brig Gen Clinton A. Pierce, the I Corps subsector south commander. It resulted in firming up arrangements for staffing the *Gnat*. They agreed on the need for men from the south subsector to operate the weapons. Pierce thought the boat was to have only two .30-caliber machine guns, but Casey said he would get both the 37-mm gun and twin .50-caliber machine guns. Casey assured Pierce that the *Gnat* was to be made available to Pierce for inshore operations. In a second meeting that day with officers of the *Canopus*, Capt Ralph S. Fralick, commander of Company C, 14th EB PS, was designated

commander of the *Gnat*. At that time, Casey learned that Fralick was already trying to assemble a crew from the 803rd and the Service Command engineer section. He instructed him to operate the boat for several days with the Navy and report to Pierce for instructions. Casey “suggested” that Fralick establish a base in the south subsector, secure gasoline and provisions, and arrange communications (signals and plans) for joint operations with Pierce. Fralick responded that he had been under the impression that he would operate on the East coast in Manila Bay. As of 21 February, Fralick was assigned to the I Corps, subsector South, coast patrol. As early as 6 February, Major Fries had advised the USAFFE engineer that he could supply two men from the 803rd for “the armored cruiser crew.” The 803rd contributed at least one more engineer to help crew the armored boats. The USAFFE Special Orders No. 56, 1 March 1942, designated Pvt Ralph C. Cooper and Pvt Dan C. Pinkston, both of Headquarters Company, for attachment to the 20th Pursuit Squadron, which was stationed at Mariveles Field, for duty on the *Gnat*.<sup>4</sup>

In the last days of the battle for Quinuan Point, the Japanese took refuge in coastal caves facing the sea. Twice they were offered surrender terms, and both times they fired on the bearers of those messages. Pierce and the Navy then sent its new task force into action. Under the overall command of Goodall, it consisted of two armored motor launches, including the *Gnat*, and two whaleboats. The second armored cruiser, commanded by Goodall, had an anti-tank gun and four machine guns, two .50 caliber and two .30-caliber. Navy personnel operated the guns. In each of the whaleboats were 10 men from the then grounded 21st Pursuit Squadron. Capt Edward Dyess, the squadron commander, went aboard one of the whaleboats to direct fire. The boats left Mariveles harbor at 0600 on 8 February. Upon arrival at Quinuan Point, they shelled the cliffs using, first, the .37-mm guns and then the machine guns for about 10 minutes. White sheets, which the US troops on shore had hung from the top of cliffs, marked their targets. Then Japanese dive bombers attacked. The boats raced for the beach with the Navy gunners continuing to fire. Faced with 100-pound bombs, the two whaleboats were grounded on the beach. They dropped the airmen on the beach and then departed. The grounded airmen worked their way across the beach and up the ravines of Quinuan Point.<sup>5</sup>

Goodall broke off the fight and began guiding the armored cruisers back to Mariveles and to the *Canopus*. Shortly after that, a second

Japanese air attack damaged the boats. Severely wounded, Goodall beached the boats and ordered the men to take care of the injured.<sup>6</sup> A salvage party from the *Canopus* was able to repair one armored cruiser; the one Goodall commanded, and the two whaleboats. The second armored cruiser was stripped of armaments and fittings for repurposing, a common practice during the battle for Bataan.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, Col Harry A. Skerry, the I Corps engineer, sent in a demolition platoon from the 71st Engineer Combat Battalion PA to attack the caves from the land side. They first lowered 50-pound boxes of dynamite with burning time fuses over the edge of the cliff. After a sergeant was wounded while lowering one of these boxes, they changed their method and hurled charges, consisting of four sticks of dynamite bound together, into the ravines. The remaining Japanese, about 50 in number, then withdrew into a single large cave.<sup>8</sup>

The armored cruisers had demonstrated their usefulness in close inshore operations. During the week of 14 February, another 40-foot armored motor launch, *Gnat II*, was turned over to Brig Gen Pierce for operation. Fertig said the vessel, commanded by a young engineer officer, continued inshore patrols “until the end was inevitable and not wanting any part of it, this group removed the armor from the Motor Sailer [*sic*], and loading with fuel and chow, took off for China.” The “young engineer officer” was Capt Ralph Fralick. Along with 2nd Lt Maurice G. Hughett and Staff Sergeants Charles P. Heald, I. A. W. White, and Gordon V. Stoddard, Fralick, left the Philippines on the night of 15 March 1942. The NCOs were from the 5th Interceptor Command. In a boat the War Department named only *Gnat*, they sailed 850 miles into Tourane Bay (current day Da Nang), French Indochina. There, Japanese troops captured them under French protest and then sent the men to a POW camp in Thailand. Ironically, Headquarters, United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), Ft. Mills, Corregidor, listed Capt Fralick as “believed to have deserted,” as of 12 April 1941.<sup>9</sup>

Upon receiving the news of the capture, Wainwright wired the War Department that “if returned to military control, they should be charged with desertion in war and cowardice in the face of the enemy.” Reviewing the matter in 1944, the War Department found insufficient evidence to charge the enlisted men and seemed disinclined to pursue charges against the officers. The reviewing officer noted several mitigating factors, including the “period of great stress and uncertainty” facing troops on Bataan during mid-March 1942, and

the failure of the USFIP to submit a “missing” other casualty report” on the incident until after the fall of Bataan.<sup>10</sup>

### Notes

1. Kenneth J. Deaon, “Combat Engineers, Quinuan Point, Bataan, 1942,” *The Quan*, September 1964, 3. *The Quan* was the regular newsletter published by the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor.

2. Deaon, “Combat Engineers, Quinuan Point,” 3; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 64–65; “Maj Ralph S. Fralick to *The Quan*, letter, 6 March 1963,” *The Quan*, March 1963; Mansell Roster; Gay, MFR, 28 January 1942, Subject: Telephone Calls 1-26-42, 1-27-42, 1-28-42, Casey Files, Folder 4; Cmdr E. L. Sackett to chief of naval operations, letter, 12 August 1942, Subject: War Diary—USS *Canopus*—(hereafter cited as the *Canopus* Diary); Engineer, USAFFE, MFR, 28 January 1942, Subject: Staff Conference 1-26-42, Casey Files, Folder 13.

3. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending January 31, 1942, 4, 7; report, Casey, report, 5 February 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip 4 Feb 42, Casey Files, Folder 4; *Canopus* diary, 19; Galbraith to USAFFE G-4, memo, 2 February 1942, no subject [G-4 report from its command post on Bataan], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 31.

4. Casey, report, 5 February 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip 4 February 1942, gave a summary of the two meetings. The term “suggested” was in Casey’s report. “Small Bits,” *The Quan*, September 1965. Only the American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Roster of the 803rd Engineers and the Mansell Roster listed Pvt. Dan C. Irwin as a member of the 803rd. because he changed his surname to Irwin from Pinkston after the war. Neither documented the company to which he was assigned. See “Life Members,” *The Quan*, December 1969; “Fralich to *The Quan*, letter, June 1963,” *The Quan*, June 1963; Kircher to Casey, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: 6 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; USAFFE Special Orders No. 56 Extract, 1 March 1942, NARA RG 407, Box 1663, Microfilm Roll 71. USAFFE Special Orders No. 56 also officially relieved Capt Fralick of assignment to the 14th EB PS on 1 March 1942. Cooper died at the O’Donnell POW Camp.

5. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 February 1942; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 291; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 44.

6. Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 291. Accounts of this action varied. Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 44, said two whaleboats and one armored cruiser were demolished at Quinuan Point. As a participant who landed on the beach, he probably did not witness Goodall’s withdrawal of the boats. Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 292, used Goodall as a primary source and said that all four boats were beached and lost in an air attack as they attempted to return to Mariveles. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 65, said the shelling by the *Gnat* lasted three days.

7. Sackett, *Canopus* diary, 21.

8. Deaon, “Combat Engineers, Quinuan Point, Bataan, 1942,” 3.

9. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 10; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 65, did not identify the engineer officer; See The Straight Dope Message Board, “Trying to Find the Name of a American WWII POW,” <https://boards.straightdope.com/>; Headquarters, USFIP, roster, 12 April 1942, NARA RG407, Entry 1050, Box 2.

10. Col George F Herbert, Casualty Branch, AGO, memo, 21 August 1944, Subject: Status of Capt Ralph S. Fralick, 2nd Lt Maurice G. Hughett, SSgt Charles F. Heald, SSgt I. A. W White, SSgt Gordon V. Stoddard, NARA RG407, Entry 1058, Box 21. W. E. B. Griffin's *Behind the Lines #7* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), whose historical context was usually fairly accurate, attempted to portray the exploits of Fralick and a crew of 40 men in sailing 1,200 miles to Hanoi.

## Chapter 20

# **Three Survivors: Bataan, Cabcaben, and Mariveles Fields**

## **MacArthur and USAFFE**

At the urging of Col Hugh Casey, General MacArthur made his only tour and inspection of the Bataan front on 10 January 1942. In a note to MacArthur dated 9 January 1942, Casey made a personal plea to the USAFFE commander about the “desirability of your making a personal reconnaissance of the Bataan dispositions, conferring with the force and division commanders and seeing and being seen by the troops” (original emphasis). He also recommended the dispatch of a message to the command “to exhort their best effort at the present main stand. . . .” Visiting Bataan, the day after Casey’s draft memo was dated, MacArthur moved north on the East Road, crossed the peninsula on the Pilar-Bagac Road, and then headed south on the West Road, visiting corps and division commanders. The general did not stop to inspect or visit with the troops. That oversight was characteristic of a personal detachment that characterized his interactions throughout much of the war. Enlisted personnel of the 803rd, at least, were not impressed by the general’s tour.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly after he visited Bataan, MacArthur chose not to tell his troops of the situation they faced and instead issued yet another of his optimistic pronouncements on 15 January 1942. The USAFFE ordered that “the following message from General MacArthur will be read and explained to all troops. Every company commander is charged with personal responsibility for the delivery of this message. Each of the headquarters will follow-up to ensure reception by every company or similar unit”:

Help is on the way from the US. Thousands of troops and hundred of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of the arrival of these reinforcements is unknown, as they will have to fight their way through the Japanese. It is imperative that our troops hold until these reinforcements arrive. No further retreat is possible. We have more troops in Bataan than the Japanese have thrown against us. Supplies are ample. A determined defense will defeat the enemy’s attack. It is now a question of courage and determination. Men who run will merely be destroyed, but men who fight will save themselves and their country.



I call on every soldier in Bataan to fight in his assigned position, resisting every attack. This is the only road to salvation.

If we fight, we will win. If we retreat, we will be destroyed.<sup>2</sup>

Debate on the purpose and honesty in that message has remained contentious. After the war, Maj Gen Casey defended MacArthur's message. He noted that since "we all to a man felt [that reinforcements] would be on the way" that "it was no false message." The adverse reaction of 803rd personnel aside, Casey maintained that the effect of the message and MacArthur's visit to Bataan, on 10 January "was noticeable throughout the command" and stimulated "the will to fight on the part of all concerned." In a later interview, he said more accurately that the objective "was more with the objective of stimulating morale." A day after his pronouncement (16 January), MacArthur had the USAFFE AGO issue a memo to commanders with the following message: "The Commanding General is very much displeased at continuous reports stating the troops are tired and need relief. He wishes such reports to cease."<sup>3</sup>


The perspective of Bataan veterans notwithstanding, MacArthur did continue to promote the cause of reinforcement of his embattled Philippine force. In late January, he concurred with Gen Archibald Wavell, the British supreme commander of the ABDA Command (ABDACOM) on the need to check the Japanese advance southward. Also, given limited naval and land forces available, MacArthur said building up for a counteroffensive from Australia was desirable. MacArthur also acknowledged that little could be done to help the defenders of the Philippines except for the provision of food and ammunition. However, he continued support by requesting two to three squadrons of dive bombers and pursuit planes to relieve pressure for the defenders and to raise morale. The response MacArthur received was that the entire ABDACOM had only 16 P-40s in operation. By February, he still contended that the carrier force might bring air reinforcements within flying distance of the Philippines. Alternatively, Douglas A-24 Banshee dive bombers, Bell P-39 Airacobra pursuit aircraft, and Douglas twin-engine A-20 Havoc light bombers could be ferried from Australia. MacArthur characterized the need as "imperative," arguing realistically that most of the FEAF's aircraft were damaged and would not last much longer. His argument for air reinforcements continued into early March. His effort softened the interpretation of

the 15 January message, which some 803rd engineers continued to view cynically.<sup>4</sup>

The same day as MacArthur's message to his troops, Maj Gen Louis Brereton, commander of the FEAF in the Philippines and then in Australia, also became commander of US ground and air forces in Australia and the ABDACOM. Two days later, under heavy pressure from the Australians and the Dutch, he terminated plans to ferry aircraft to the Philippines. With the actual and projected Japanese capture of staging bases in Java, he directed that planned flights to the Philippines be canceled. Pilots were assigned to help delay the Japanese offensive in the Netherlands East Indies.<sup>5</sup>

Brig General Casey and Colonel George continued to move forward seemingly unaware of or unwilling to acknowledge those decisions. With the construction of Cabcaben Field and work on Mariveles Field, George was still pressing and hoping for reinforcements from Australia at the time of Brereton's decision. On 18 January 1942, Casey advised the 803rd commander, Major Fries, that it was "desired that [air] fields under your jurisdiction be kept on an operating basis at all times. If only the operating fields are maintained, this fact will be noted by the enemy subjecting those fields to concentrated attack." Two days later, Casey wrote: "Our principal requirement is to hold for TIME [original emphasis] until reinforcements come. The longer we can hold the enemy on our present front, the more time we can save, including the defense of the RBP"<sup>6</sup>

By mid- to late January, the USAFFE had abandoned the emergency airstrips on the East Coast of Bataan at Hermosa, Orani, and Pilar as quickly as the 803rd had built them. The rapid Japanese advancement and the withdrawal to the RBP were the causal factors. For the remainder of the battle for Bataan, three airfields—Bataan, Cabcaben, and Mariveles—housed FEAF's limited and steadily decreasing inventory of combat aircraft. Operational until the last, they also provided potential bases for the air reinforcements for which the USAFFE continued to plead. Company C also took on the same road repair and maintenance tasks as the other companies of the 803rd and worked to improve the docks at Cabcaben.<sup>7</sup>



**Figure 20.1. Three surviving airfields.** (Adapted from ODE, Bataan Road and Trail Map, 4 January 1942, NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 10.)

## Bataan Field

A topic for discussion in the mid-1920s was whether or not the Philippine Department Air Force should concentrate its resources in one location to allow for a rapid, coordinated response to an enemy attack as opposed to using Clark, Nichols, and Kindley Fields. One option was to develop a new airfield near Cabcaben on the southeastern tip of Bataan. According to historian Richard Meixsel, the argument for Cabcaben was that aircraft could cover central Luzon, as well as landing points in northern Luzon and south of Manila, while the base was enjoying the protection of Corregidor's heavy artillery. Batteries Hearn and Geary could provide artillery support to Bataan—and AA batteries. Lack of funding ended the debate.<sup>8</sup>


Consequently, before plans to reinforce the Philippines, Bataan did not have any operational airfields capable of handling combat aircraft. A prewar seaplane base extending toward Mariveles Harbor and named Mariveles Field had a ramp and landing strip. However, it was abandoned as inadequate at the time of the withdrawal into Bataan. Supporting an early 1941 proposal for an airstrip on Bataan, Col Harry Skerry, ODE, said somewhat repetitively that it was “abso-

lutely necessary [because] the last stand of the garrison of the Philippine Department [was] to be made on Bataan . . . It [was] absolutely necessary that at least one airfield in addition to the small field on Corregidor be provided for the final defensive lines on Bataan.” However, upon thinking about the rolling hills of southern Bataan, he caveated his support by noting that there was “no area within the proposed defensive lines on Bataan which [was] particularly adapted to air-drome construction.”<sup>9</sup>

In the immediate prewar era, the only airstrip planned for the peninsula was Bataan Field. It was to be a 2,000-foot runway on a jungle site located north of the Juanting River (between KP156 and KP157) extending toward Juanting Point. The project had initially been dubbed “Richards’ Folly” for Col Harrison H. Richards, the Philippine Department’s senior air officer who supported its construction. The debate over the reinforcement of the Philippines resulted in efforts to expand Richards’ Folly. In late 1940 or early 1941, Stickney estimated that \$150,000 would be needed to construct an airfield on Bataan. Commenting on budget estimates—and looking very much to the future—in early March 1941, Maj Gen Henry Arnold, chief of the Air Corps, recommended the estimate be increased to \$500,000 “in order that hard-surfaced runways [might] be provided for the operation of loaded bombardment airplanes.” Arnold and his air war plan staff strongly advocated for the strategic use of heavy bombers, in general. They had, for some time, lobbied for their use as offensive weapons in the Philippine Department, in particular. By late July 1941, he believed that \$628,000 would be needed to construct one runway with additional funds necessary to build a complete airfield, including an additional runway northwest-southeast (NW-SE) capable of supporting “effective operations by a combat squadron.” Stickney added another \$500,000 estimate for a N-S runway, as Colonel Richards had recommended, to make the field “suitable regardless of wind direction.” The need for extensive excavation and grading across the hills and valleys of southern Bataan and for large culverts, as Stickney feared, added to that cost. Although still primitive, Bataan Field eventually became the most extensive airbase on Bataan, at least as compared to Cabcaben and Mariveles.<sup>10</sup>

In mid-March 1941, the WPD approved the construction of a new airfield on the Bataan Peninsula, in addition to the expansion of air facilities at Nichols and Clark fields on Luzon and Kindley Field on Corregidor. The WPD advised General Marshall that \$500,000 for

these projects would come from the funds in the Fiscal Year 1941 (FY 1941) supplemental budget and recommended that work be started as soon as the funds were available. A month later, the AGO wrote to the CoE: “it is desired that immediate steps be taken to initiate construction of an airfield on Bataan Peninsula and expansion [of] facilities at Kindley, Nichols, and Clark Fields.” The funds were allocated for the construction of the airstrip and supporting utilities on 22 April 1941, from the allotment from Nichols Field (Project D-37). In late June 1941, \$150,000 was released for the field, and an additional \$500,000 would be requested for FY 1942. An ODE construction progress report documented that “hired and contract” labor had begun work on Bataan Field on 24 May 1941. The project had a 1 February 1942 scheduled completion date. Col Roscoe Bonham, who eventually directed engineer supply operations for USAFFE, said that a Filipino company (possibly Linsangan) contracted for the work. Runway “A,” which became the field’s only airstrip, was laid out NW-SE with a three percent upward slope to the northwest. It was to be 4,000 feet long and 400 feet wide. Nevertheless, as of 14 October 1941, the ODE listed Runway “A,” which was not on Stickney’s original schematic, as 25 percent complete and Runway “B,” as two percent complete.<sup>11</sup>



**Figure 20.2. Proposed Bataan Field and location plan.** (Adapted from *Bataan Field Schematic*, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709.)

In late 1941, USAFFE's emphasis was on the construction of larger, permanent airfields for the planned arrival of the large bomber force. Consequently, Bataan Field lost the priority assigned in April. On 18 October 1941, Colonel George requested that the ODE "[hold] construction on Bataan Field to a minimum" since it was "considered an emergency landing field only" (i.e., vice its original mission as a dispersal location for aircraft). Surplus funds available because of the curtailment were to be "applied to other airfield projects for which funds [were] inadequate." The projects slated to continue at Bataan Field were "one runway only," gasoline storage, housing and messing facilities for 60 officers and 250 enlisted men, supporting utilities, water supply, roads, a warehouse, ammunition and bomb dumps, communications facilities, and a small parking strip.

Nevertheless, work on Runway "A," proceeded more rapidly than estimated. It supposedly was 75 percent complete by 30 November but still listed as "under construction as of 15 December." Casey then learned that as of 26 or 27 December, Bataan Field was 3,750 feet long and 40 feet wide. Consequently, the field could accommodate only small planes and pursuit aircraft. With use, its red dirt quickly turned to dust.<sup>12</sup>

While Lt Thomas Delamore's squad was beginning its demolition work in Manila, the remainder of Company C went to Bataan Field, arriving on Christmas Day. Its initial project was to extend eastward the NW-SE runway, which crossed over the East Road to the edge of the jungle. On arrival, Company C personnel described the runway as "not more than a road." CPNAB was on site as of early January 1942 working on drainage ditches for the field. Taking over from the CPNAB, Company C first faced the challenge of clearing rocks and trees with explosives. A large crew of about 300 Filipino laborers provided most of the manual labor. Bataan Field's gravel runway was 4,200 feet long and 100 to 200 feet wide by mid-March 1942.

With the priority on preparation for possible air reinforcements, Company C used sandbags, which were in short supply, for revetments. The engineers located some of the revetments in the bamboo clumps at the northwest end of the field. They were complete with netting-and-tree-limb camouflage to complement other structures from the prewar construction project. For additional sandbags, they bulldozed and compacted dirt into mounds. On 2 January, five P-35s assigned to the 17th Pursuit Squadron were scheduled to arrive from Lubao but only one landed. Two planes and one pilot were lost in the

transfer process, and two landed at Orani. On 3 January, when Delamore's demolition team arrived, Bataan Field was deemed operational.<sup>13</sup>

The Company C bivouac was in a thickly wooded area on a hill northwest of the field on the north side of the runway. The gentle slope of the area was a direct contrast to the steeper slope on the south side of the runway. With the camouflage provided by the tall narra trees, the bivouac was never strafed. FEAF personnel were encamped south of the field.<sup>14</sup>

As noted previously, six pilots and P-40s from the 3rd, 20th, and 34th Pursuit Squadrons landed at Bataan Field from Orani on 4 January 1942. Three pilots from the 17th Pursuit Squadron came in from Pilar Field with their P-40s four days later. During the intervening period, FEAF personnel, except those supporting operations (mechanics and armorers), at the Bataan Field were detached to infantry units. The Japanese bombed and strafed Bataan Field on 5 January.<sup>15</sup>

As of 7 January, Company C was maintaining the 3,700-foot runway. Its assignment for the further development of Bataan Field included expansion of the airstrip to 5,200 feet by 12 January with a platoon-sized workforce. Fertig reported on 13 January that 35 men with two graders, a bulldozer, and two carryalls were working on the airstrip, while others concentrated on revetments. Ten days later, about 10 camouflaged revetments were ready for use, and FEAF personnel were constructing additional units. About that same time, the 14th EB PS was to send an available earth auger to Company C to speed up the setting of upright poles for hanging camouflage. A repair shelter was "practically complete." Minor delays were experienced. In mid-January, when Casey learned that only one platoon from Company C was working on Bataan Field, he ordered the ODE to increase the workforce and to push the field to completion quickly. Specifically, he wanted to smooth the rough construction area paralleling the runway, where a plane had crashed on 11 January. Japanese raids also slowed both construction and repairs.

By 17 January, the runway was finished, and the extension was 85 percent complete. FEAF personnel built additional revetments under the supervision of Company C. After MacArthur's 10 January stop at Bataan Field, FEAF took over responsibility for camouflage maintenance. To speed construction efforts, Company C commander Capt Robert J. Chandler might have diverted Philippine Army laborers from road maintenance to airfield construction, as Major Fries re-

ported on 31 January. Questioned later by Kircher on the documentation, Fries promised that “future reports [would] show a better labor distribution.”<sup>16</sup>

At noon on 15 January, Japanese Mitsubishi Ki-30 “Ann” light dive bombers bombed and strafed Bataan Field. Lt James R. Caldwell, Lt Theodore Pflueger, Lt Thomas Delamore, and Pfc Clarence Kinser were on the airstrip at the time to inspect repairs. Pflueger and Delamore scurried from the strip. Caldwell was killed as he sought cover. He was later buried at the west end of the runway. Kinser was wounded. At dawn on 17 January, nine Nakajima Ki-27 “Nate” fighters strafed the field, a break in the usual attack pattern. Undeterred, two P-40s left a few hours later from their concealed revetments on a mission to intercept Japanese observation planes over the MLR. The pilots shot down two observation planes, frightened off a formation of light bombers, and strafed a convoy of trucks on the East Road between Samat-Orani. Their success raised the morale of the troops, who were elated to see the FEAF aircraft finally in action; however, the effort brought immediate retaliation from the Japanese. A late afternoon raid damaged the runway severely and brought operations to a halt until the next day.<sup>17</sup>

The 200th CA Regiment AA, less one battery, provided air defense for Bataan Field. It was situated at the northwest corner of the airstrip. Two fixed naval mounts at the northeast end of the airstrip, coupled with four self-propelled mounts, at least temporarily, provided beach defense.<sup>18</sup>

Colonel George became commander of the 5th Interceptor Command, such as it was, on 30 December 1941. On 15 January 1942, he moved his command from Little Baguio (KP169) to Bataan Field as an advance interceptor CP. The operations center, a bamboo shack and lean-to located away from the jungle to the west of the field, centralized command and achieved more immediacy in operations. George was promoted to brigadier general on 25 January.<sup>19</sup>

One FEAF officer commented that during the first two months of operations at Bataan Field, Japanese dive bombers in flights of three, nine, or 18 attacked three to four times a week. He estimated the number of bombs at 500. Of that total, 10 bombs hit near the revetments, despite “bare roads leading to the revetments . . . [that] could be easily seen from the air, and about 50 hit the runway.” The remainder “hit harmlessly into the woods on either side of the runway.” None of the aircraft were damaged. Personnel casualties were one



man who was KIA and three wounded. The “danger [was] more from their [Japanese pilots’] bad shooting than from accurate bombing.” During a 7 March attack, which included fragmentation and white phosphorous ordnance, several bombs “strayed on the runway, but the engineers . . . cleaned [it] up in no time.” The Philippine air depot suffered several small fires from the phosphorous bombs.<sup>20</sup>

Colonel George struggled to keep his composite “Bataan Field Flying Detachment” staffed, equipped, and flying. On 20 January, three pilots and P-40s came back to Bataan Field from Mindanao, and three pilots returned from detached service on beach defense. As of 22 January, the Bataan Field Flying Detachment had 14 pilots, nine P-40Es, two P-40Bs, a Beechcraft stagger wing, four trainers, and an O-49 observation plane. With limited aircraft, missions were allowed only for nuisance or annoyance attacks on the enemy. The reconnaissance and patrols were against artillery-spotting observation planes, but the group also engaged in some *ad hoc* attacks on shipping in Manila Bay and Japanese bombers. On the evening of 26 January, two of the P-40s bombed and strafed Nielsen Field in the heart of Manila. Three more P-40s attacked Nichols Field later in the evening and worked over a Japanese convoy on Bataan during the return flight. On 30 January, the detachment raided Waterous Field, Mindoro Island, which the Japanese had just captured as part of Homma’s plan to seal Manila Bay. In February, US pilots attacked the Japanese flanking movement at the Battle of the Points. Two pilots and planes were lost in the process.<sup>21</sup>

In response to the attacks on Manila, the Japanese staged three retaliatory raids against Bataan Field during 27 to 29 January. The strikes, which usually consisted of strafing runs followed by two bomb attacks, centered on a ravine on the north side of the airstrip. The first raid did not damage the revetments—which were in a bamboo grove on the west end of the field—or the aircraft. The attack at about noon on 29 January cratered the runway. Company C usually fixed the bomb damage to the dirt and gravel airstrip within 30 minutes, but the repair work slowed construction projects on the field. The airstrip was 3,600 feet long by 22 January, and the plan was to extend it to at least 5,000 feet in three weeks (15 February). While engaged in repairs, the engineers were frequently caught on the runway during raids. The noise of the machinery precluded their hearing the approaching Japanese aircraft. The engineers jumped under machinery or behind bulldozer blades until the attacks ended.<sup>22</sup>

Provisions for the active defense of Bataan Field were reasonably substantial, given the USAFFE's limited resources. For advance warning, the US Marine Corps air warning unit, which was located on the west end of the field, was linked to Corregidor via the 5th Interceptor Command. The engineers also employed their own "warning system." Reminiscent of the system at Clark Field, a sentinel fired three shots to alert repair teams of approaching enemy aircraft and then additional shots to warn personnel to leave their equipment and seek cover. Battery C, 91st CA Regiment, CAC PS, provided AA support from 29 December 1941 to 6 February 1942, before moving to Mariveles. Elements of the 200th CA Regiment also worked from gun emplacements in the field. A Company C platoon and one bulldozer were taken for off-road work during mid-February and allocated for a day's work on a road to the 200th's battery. On the perimeter of the field was a .37-mm battery, presumably operated by the 200th, and a 3-inch fixed naval battery was at the southeast end of the runway.

Engineer and FEF ground personnel fought back with whatever weapons were available. Along the runway, the engineers had fixed and mobile gun pits, each staffed with two men, for their four .50-caliber and ten .30-caliber machine guns. Colonel George's men used .50-caliber machine guns that, symbolically, had been intended for B-24s that the War Department had scheduled for the USAFFE. The engineers also had adapted their carryalls towed by Caterpillar tractors to become mobile machine gun pits. The heavy steel of the carryalls protected from the attackers. Others futilely resorted to firing antiquated Enfield rifles at the Japanese.<sup>23</sup>

Company C also engineered environmental or passive defense measures. By 24 January, air force personnel under the supervision of Company C were given responsibility for building additional revetments. The field had seven revetments, including the main structure with a capability to shelter five planes, and a maintenance revetment for non-operable aircraft in place and capable of protecting 12 pursuit planes. Company C built the sunken earthworks at the southeast end of the strip and used chicken wire netting and foliage to camouflage them. The sizable main revetment on the south side had the natural camouflage of overhanging branches and vines. Trails that allowed access to the revetments were wide enough to accommodate P-40s. On landing, tractors pulled planes off the field down the downward sloping hill to a three-foot revetment in about 30 seconds. A maintenance revetment protected damaged planes and repair me-

chanics. Company C was responsible for the maintenance of the revetments, as well.<sup>24</sup>

Brig Gen George's objective was to have revetments for 15 pursuit aircraft at Bataan Field by 15 February. Air Force construction teams continued working on revetments at Bataan Field until late February and came close to meeting that goal. During the first week of February, two additional P-40 revetments were complete, and the Air Force was continuing to work on camouflage. A B-17 revetment begun a month earlier was finished, and camouflage was being added, as of 28 February. Company C personnel believed the plan was still to prepare for reinforcements.<sup>25</sup>

The defensive measures and actions were effective. The Japanese did not damage any planes in Bataan Field's jungle revetments. At some point about 26 February 1942, Sgt Vincent C. Dempewolf was KIA, presumably in defense of either Bataan or Cabcaben Fields, and posthumously awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart medals for his action.<sup>26</sup> The threat to Bataan Field was not only from the air. On 6 March 5th Interceptor Command intelligence laid a trap and captured four Japanese sympathizers (*sakdalistas*) believed to be engaged in sabotage. Among the *sakdalista* ranks were two men from the labor parties employed on Bataan Field.<sup>27</sup> Casey estimated the runway extension was 95 percent complete, making it 4,200 feet, and the repair shelter was finished, as of 31 January.<sup>28</sup>

The USAFFE chief engineer, however, was not satisfied with progress on the airfields by mid-February and developed "graphic progress schedules" to show start and completion times. He wanted "all items pushed" with the use of additional forces and more extended work periods. Plane pens, bypass roads, warming up and taxi strips, "must be pushed and assigned higher priorities for earlier completion than now being attained. For Bataan Field, he specified:

- Bypass road—"push;" (original wording presumably meaning "rush" to completion);
- Warmup strip—60 x 100 feet—"push;"
- Burlap covering for hanger—"keep pushing;"
- Splinter proofing of observation post—"high priority;" and
- Seven revetments—to be completed by 1 March.

Also, on the list—but without annotation—were the splinter proof hangar north of strip and improvements for all-weather operations.<sup>29</sup>

To accomplish Casey's goal of a 5,300-foot runway—an effort he conceded would take “considerable effort”—the engineers brought in additional equipment. On 13 February, they added a towed grader, a machine that pushed earthen material in front of the blade, a carryall for leveling, grading, and moving equipment to different locations; and a tank truck. Although the extension was considered complete, the clearing of the ends and sides of the airstrip remained, as did work on camouflaging shelters. Filipino workers began removing boulders—“a greater task than anticipated, according to Casey—from the eastern edge of the runway. Still, Casey said there was “still much work to be done on this field” to meet his schedule.

To deal with the dust problem Capt “Lefty” Eads, the FEAF engineer officer, requested and received two more water wagons for Bataan Field on 3 February. These were used for dust suppression on the runway. Pumping equipment for saltwater spraying was also installed.<sup>30</sup>

Inspections by the USAFFE engineers continued to discover engineering problems. Casey, for example, termed the earth stacked around the hangar on the north side of Bataan Field, “an engineering monstrosity.” He saw the need to redesign and strengthen the hangar with trusses rather than stringers in the roof and interlocking braces on sidewalls to resist lateral loads of fill. Otherwise, he thought the hangar would collapse if wet, an issue for his “all-weather” capability.<sup>31</sup>

The airstrip work continued into late February, even as the engineers repaired bomb damage. The end of the runway and the warmup strip were virtually complete within a week, and the sides of the runway were being graded. The engineers were also improving the field's road network. Regular maintenance, such as watering and rolling of the airstrip, continued. To address the camouflage issue, Capt Harold T. Gewalt, a construction and inspection officer on Casey's staff, received approval to release netting for Bataan Field on 23 February.<sup>32</sup>

The effort yielded success by late February and early March. The warmup strip, repair hangar, and bunker camouflage projects were completed by 28 February. Work on the water point proceeded. At that time, Casey judged Bataan Field along with Cabcabén and Mariveles Fields to be “in relatively excellent shape for dry weather operations.” Further improvement was contingent on increased gasoline allocations. Casey had successfully argued for and received an increase in the 803rd's fuel allocation from 500 to 775 gallons per day. The entrance road and the clearing and grading of sides and ends of

the runway were considered completed by 7 March. The camp's road network and bunker camouflage, as well, were almost finished by that date. To speed operations and to conserve steadily dwindling fuel supplies, the engineers started building a pier at the Manila Bay end of the field to handle rock from the quarry for resurfacing the field. The dock was to be completed and the stockpiling of rock and begun by 10 March. Barges from the Mariveles quarry used less fuel than trucks. Almost on schedule, the engineers started using the rock shipments for surfacing operations.<sup>33</sup>

Capt Edward Dyess and the 21st Pursuit Squadron took over flying operations at Bataan and Cabcaben fields on 12 February after their return from the Battle of the Points. With both continuing losses and continuing repairs, he had four P-40Es and one P-40B, the so-called "Bamboo Fleet," in operation. Missions during the remainder of February and into March involved reconnaissance, transport of medical supplies from the southern islands, and dropping of supplies to guerillas in the mountains of Luzon, as well as a few bombing runs during 16 February–2 March. On 3 March, Brig Gen George approved a mission against Japanese shipping in Subic Bay. It included two P-40Es each from Mariveles and Bataan Fields and the one P-40B from Cabcaben Field. After numerous sorties and various mishaps, the US pilots damaged or sank two Japanese transports, one of which had landing barges. Yet the damage to FEAF outweighed the damage to the Japanese: two P-40Es and one P-40B were lost, and one P-40E was severely damaged. The Bamboo Fleet was reduced to a single P-40E, Dyess' "Kibosh." Two days later, Air Corps mechanics had fashioned a "P-40 Something," cannibalizing parts from damaged aircraft, and two "well-worn" P-35s from Mindanao.<sup>34</sup>


### Cabcaben Field

Despite tentative plans in the mid-1920's, actual planning for Cabcaben Field, located between KP160 and Barrio Cabcaben, did not take place until Fil-American forces were withdrawing to Bataan. Its development continued almost until the surrender. According to Fertig, Colonel Stickney chose the development of a new airfield as one of the first projects for CPNAB, then working under contract to the Service Command engineer. The CPNAB foreman, a former naval aviator, was given a free hand in locating the airfield and chose Cab-

caben for its location. The construction of the landing strip, located in a hilly, heavily wooded area, involved the leveling of part of Cabcaban Barrio, according to Venancio Barria, a CPNAB employee. The runway ran ESE-WNW with no slope; however, a hill was located at the northwest end. By 17 January, CPNAB had nearly completed the runway, including drainage ditches, and was proceeding to construct revetments with the assistance of Company C. The contractors turned the field completely over to Company C for maintenance and extension of the runway on 24 January. About 50 officers and men from Company C arrived at Cabcaban Field with a small complement of construction machinery. The equipment included three large bulldozers, a road scraper, and a small power shovel, in addition to its trucks, for earthmoving. One diesel road roller was moved from the West Road to Cabcaban Field to augment Company C's complement of heavy equipment. Fertig said the runway and its extension were completed and operational "before the Japanese stumbled on to what was being done." At that point, the FEAF assumed responsibility for constructing new plane pens. Three Japanese air raids in mid-January—one in the Cabcaban area on 11 January and two on the field itself on 16 January—caused minor delays in the work. At about noon on 16 January, two groups of nine Japanese light bombers each attacked Cabcaban Field. As of that time, aircraft had yet to be assigned there.<sup>35</sup>

Drawing on their experience as combat engineers, Company C personnel also contributed to area defense. On 20 January 1942, Captain Chandler requested five air-cooled and five water-cooled .30-caliber machine guns and four .50-caliber machine guns for his assigned defense sector from KP155 to KP157 on the East Road, just north of Bataan Field. The USAFFE engineer allowed for the release of seven air-cooled and three water-cooled .30-caliber machine guns, some with mounts and some without. After MacArthur's 10 January tour of Bataan, soldiers of the 31st Infantry Regiment US moved south from the Abucay Line to Bataan Field to instruct Company C in the use of the Enfield rifle, yet another of the World War I-vintage weapons on which the Bataan defenders had to rely.<sup>36</sup>

After 4–6 February, when Bataan Field endured three more bomb raids, Brig General George decided to shift four of his eight remaining P-40s to Cabcaban Field. The gravel runway of 3,600 feet long at Cabcaban Field had been operational since 22 January. Upon assuming control of construction work at Cabcaban, Company C immediately



**Figure 20.3. Cabcaben Field: location and runway schematic, January 1942.** (Adapted from 60th CA Regiment Sketches, NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11.)

started on the maintenance program and work on the extension to 4,300 feet. Company C surveyed the extension and managed the work of Filipino laborers on the extension and widening of the strip. To avoid detection, the movement of aircraft to Cabcaben Field took place on the night of 6 February. For landings, the runway was reasonably level, but high ridges bounded on both sides. Carabao on the

runway disrupted the initial landings. In one attempt at night, with runway lights turning off and on, Lt William Baker, formerly of the 34th Pursuit Squadron, flew over the field twice to avoid the animals before he eventually crashed. The carabao and accident caused the loss of one P-40, leaving the force with seven aircraft.<sup>37</sup>

Emplacements for anti-aircraft guns were built for the 200th CA Regiment, which had been in place at Cabcaben Field since mid-January. The 200th was outfitted with radar—like the Marines' radar at Bataan Field—and it was linked to the 5th Interceptor Command at Little Baguio and, in turn, to Corregidor. Two self-propelled mount (SPM) AA guns were located at the Manila Bay end of the airstrip. The 515th CA Regiment positioned its AA artillery south of Cabcaben at about KP 162. Two SPM's provided beach defense for the field until 1 March, when they were then sent north to KP142. Six light tanks lined up along the center of the landing strip each night to prevent enemy landings.<sup>38</sup>

The runway was 3,700 feet long and 150 feet wide by 31 January, still with plans to extend it to 4,300 feet. Casey documented that work was proceeding on revetments at Cabcaben Field in mid-January. As of 22 January, the field had eight revetments as the result of the FEAF construction efforts. In early February, the extension of the airstrip was complete, and Company C was performing routine maintenance on Cabcaben Field. Within two weeks, the effort had intensified. Equipment in operation included a water truck, two carryalls, a grader, and a roller. The runway was generally in good condition and its widening neared completion. Efforts over the next nine days brought the total number of revetments completed or nearly completed to 17 (six excavated and 11 surface revetments). Also, the engineers submitted forms for the warmup strip. Still, Casey pressed for additional work to meet his construction schedule. He wanted the engineers to experiment with a saltwater pump connected directly to a pipe-and-hose system, as at Bataan Field, because water trucks were not sufficient for dust mitigation. He also requested a gravity flow system to be used with a nearby stream that would supply for the sprinkling onto vehicles, but only on the central portion of the runway.

Interestingly, Casey questioned if the engineers' mixing cement and clay at a 1:10 ratio would help with the dust problem. Company A had earlier used a similar mixture at O'Donnell Field. The USAFFE chief engineer also noted that the approach to the repair hangar was too steep and needed to be flattened. Throughout that time, naturally,



runway repairs, rolling, and watering operations continued. When, for example, 15 Japanese dive bombers attacked Cabcaben Field on the morning of 17 February, Company C quickly repaired the runway, which had suffered light damage despite the large number of bombs dropped. Two waves of dive bombers, one of four aircraft and the second of five, came in at low altitude to hit the airstrip and the barrio of Cabcaben with incendiary bombs on the morning of 7 March, but once again they caused little damage.<sup>39</sup>

From mid-February forward, as the Bamboo Fleet continued to lose aircraft, Company C continued apace with its improvement of Cabcaben Field. By mid-March, when the field had not a single pursuit plane, the company had completed the widening of the runway. The engineers had also cleared the west end of the airstrip, finished both the taxiway and entrance road, and extended the field's internal road network. The repair revetment was half-finished and floored. All the while, Company C proceeded with runway repairs, watering, and rolling. SSgt Harry Simms, 693rd Ordnance Squadron, noted the company "earned the respect and admiration of everybody for their bravery in working in the tropical heat and frequent strafing by Japanese planes."<sup>40</sup>

Casey's "progress" list for Cabcaben Field, as of mid-February, included:

- Better approaches in the north side and east end of the strip—"1st priority;"
- Warmup strip 60 x 100 feet—"immediate;" and
- Sprinter proof observation post—"high priority."

Also, on the list—but without annotation—were:

- Watering—a pump for the use of saltwater;
- Improvement for all-weather operations;
- Improvement of field road network;
- A bypass road around the field;
- Hillside revetments; and
- Smoothing of the ground 50 feet on the side of each runway.<sup>41</sup>

Casey documented in detail that throughout the construction and maintenance projects, the engineers learned from experience and adapted. Revetments or plane pens provided an interesting example

of what was later termed in project management texts as the continuous process improvement.<sup>42</sup> Because revetments on Bataan were U-shaped, the aircraft was backed into them (i.e., with the tail section at the base or rear of the pen). Inspections of the revetments revealed both positive and negative aspects of construction:

- The recess for the plane was excavated below ground level for better protection;
- Sandbag revetments, as at Orani, were built above ground levels;
- Trenches were occasionally excavated for the wheels to lower the plane's profile and reduce the height of the revetment or provide better cover; and
- The height of individual revetments, both earth and sandbag, was uniform and did not take into consideration the variation in the height of an aircraft from nose to tail, requiring large numbers of sandbags.

Consequently, Casey proposed two detailed options for building and storing aircraft in the plane pens. His recommended opportunity provided for a “complete reversal in the method of storing planes” to overcome the disadvantages of the original design by parking the planes with the nose at the base of the “U”-base. “The vulnerable engine[,] propeller, and main wing[,] including the gas tank,” he said, “would receive the most protection.” He claimed that his recommendation would (1) require less excavation and (2) provide for a flatter entry ramp and improve protection for hillside pens (e.g., Bataan Field).<sup>43</sup>

By the end of January, the Mariveles quarry, formerly owned by the AG&P Company, was operating eight to 11 hours a day. It was able to meet the demands for crushed rock for construction and maintenance of both roads and airstrips.<sup>44</sup>

## Mariveles Field

The CPNAB, instead of the 803rd Engineers, relocated and redeveloped the former Navy seaplane base at Mariveles Harbor as the new Mariveles Field. Casey initially concluded, as of 7 January 1942, that the naval facility should be abandoned and used only as a dummy field. He thought that the high-water table in the area and the constant bombings had rendered the field unsuitable for air operations.

However, Harold George—first as a colonel and then as a brigadier general—argued that Mariveles was a proper place for an airfield complex. His aide Captain Allison Ind used the term “subterranean stronghold.” The central portion of the bowl in which the town was located, George contended, would be a good landing field. Located just west of Mariveles along the north bank of the Pucot River, it incorporated a section of the West Road and sloped eastward toward Mariveles Harbor. The valley extended due west from Mariveles Bay. To the south and north, high ridges with bamboo groves allowed for a series of tunnels for dispersal areas, bombproof hangars, repairs bays, quarters, and fuel and ammunition dumps. When operational, the field could serve both amphibious and land-based aircraft.<sup>45</sup>

On 10 January, quickly overruled, Casey ordered the Service Command engineer section to construct an airstrip to replace the existing one by “progressive widening and extension of the highway reach [section] adjacent to the former airfield project, working initially on the provision of a 60-foot wide roadway-runway paved section and using rock from the tunnel operations and nearby quarry.” Fertig responded immediately to Casey, noting that the CPNAB would begin construction on 11 January. The plan was for an airstrip 5,000 feet long and 600 feet wide, including an extension to Mariveles Bay to accommodate medium bombers and an apron to accommodate seaplanes. “Perverse wind currents” were acknowledged as the only major drawback to the new airstrip. Work on the tunnels for personnel shelters and bomb storage also began. The completion date could not be predicted, Casey said, because of the nature of the subsoil and the probability that stabilization would require more fill than anticipated.<sup>46</sup>

Progress on the airstrip was notable, even though Major Kircher’s various inspection reports sometimes produced conflicting assessments of the work. Reporting on his 13–14 January inspection, Kircher included the comment that the work would “be pushed to get a usable runway as soon as possible.” To speed up the work, he recommended, and Casey approved the transfer of a diesel road roller from the West Road to Mariveles. Kircher also suggested changing the axis of the field to take advantage of higher ground. After an 18 January inspection, he said the “field at Mariveles [was] enlarging rapidly—approximately 1000–1200 cu[bic] yards being placed in fill daily. The road back to the hill line where the tunnels [were] to be built [was] nearly completed. A camouflage net and suitable screening [was to have been] set up before the portal work [was] done.” Yet, two

days later, Kircher documented that work on Mariveles Field was “proceeding somewhat more slowly” because of poor traffic control and a lack of trucks. As of 24 January, approximately 2,200 feet of dirt and rock fill from the hill north of the road had been placed. Contractors had begun the ditching on the south side of the airstrip, located the tunnel site, and had completed 90 percent of the road to the tunnel complex. The area between the Navy base and the runway was dubbed “suicide flats” because it was in the line of approach for bomber attacks against shipping and installations in the Bay and Corregidor. The Marines set up an AA site in suicide flats. By 2 February, contractors were sprinkling and rolling the runway to make part of the fill into an emergency runway.<sup>47</sup>

Numerous challenges slowed the work of the CPNAB at Mariveles Field. The loamy consistency and moisture content of the tidal marsh subsoil was a problem, particularly in the 800 feet surveyed for the airstrip extension close to Mariveles Bay. A suspected Japanese presence in the area during late January halted construction operations, and air raids later harmed the project. Work on revetments and smoothing operations stalled in early February because of a labor shortage. The CPNAB claimed many laborers were quitting and moving to the Service Command engineer section, which paid higher wages. By 31 January, the CPNAB had widened the airstrip from 65 to 100 feet and was engaged in a continuous rolling of the airstrip. Shortly after that, “Lefty” Eads observed that the field was rough, despite Fertig’s promise to start smoothing it, and that only a narrow strip outside the original road area had been packed.

Brig General George was determined to press on. In early March, he advised Maj William Gay of Casey’s staff that he expected Bataan Field to become a target of concentrated bombing and wanted Mariveles as an emergency field, instead of Cabcaben. The still-hopeful George wanted to save Cabcaben “for any big ship which [might] come in” and to have Bataan and Mariveles Fields ready for the expected reinforcements. Yet by the end of March, Fertig was skeptical that the 100-foot-wide runway could even accommodate four-engine bombers.<sup>48</sup>

Mariveles Field was ready to accommodate aircraft by 7 February. The runway was extended toward the beach with the removal of nipa shacks and palm trees. The initial widening of the airstrip from 65 feet to 100 feet was almost complete, and further widening to 150 feet was about to start, the major variations in the earthen base notwithstanding. The taxiway to plane pens was operable. By the third week

of February, two revetments were complete, four were under construction, and the taxiway to the airstrip was finished. With 500 feet more of the airstrip extension expanded to 65 feet, the total operable runway length was 4,300 feet. Casey suggested to Brig General George that he detail the FEAF personnel to Mariveles Field for the maintenance of the plane pen camouflage and preparation of new plane pens, given the advanced status of the field. One squadron arrived during the week of 21 February to assist with the plane pen construction in the low-lying hills west of the airstrip and maintain camouflage on existing revetments. Bartsch said that some of the revetments were built large enough to accommodate B-17s.<sup>49</sup>


Labor continued to be a problem for construction projects at Mariveles Field. Refugees in camps managed by the civil government hesitated to work because they were paid and fed regardless of their employment situation. Many had families in the refugee camps and were not willing to work far from them. Consequently, Casey counseled his engineer commanders that “laborers furnished for engineer work be given such treatment as will ensure their retention on the projects on which engaged.” He advised, for example, the inclusion of “adequate and equally distributed rations; permission to return to families once a week, if appropriate; and allocating specific tasks to specific groups (*paquiao*).” That flexibility brought some success. By mid-February, 300 additional laborers were available. Casey was optimistic that “better results [could] be expected.”<sup>50</sup> Casey’s 12 February progress list of priorities for Mariveles Field included:

- Taxi strips to revetments—“expedite;” and
- Revetments—“higher priority than tunnels” (“a simple matter of labor”); eight needed but only two completed.

Also, on the list—but without annotation—were:

- Compaction of the runway;
- Tunnel construction;
- Improvement for all-weather operations;
- A splinter proof observation post; and
- Revetments in the hillside.<sup>51</sup>

After the Battle of the Points, George assigned the 20th Pursuit Squadron—just relieved of infantry duty at Longoskawayan Point—to Mariveles Field. On 23 February, two P-40Es left Bataan Field for



**Figure 20.4. Mariveles Field: location and runway schematic, January 1942.** (Adapted from ODE, Road and Trail Map, Bataan Peninsula, 4 January 1942, NARA RG407, Entry 1054; Hand-drawn Map of Southern Bataan, NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 10; 2nd Battalion, 60th CA Regiment, Position Sketch, Mariveles Field, NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 1.

Mariveles Field. About that time, Casey deemed Mariveles to be “in relatively excellent shape for dry weather operations.” The three airfields had two operable P-40s each. Four days after its arrival, the 20th’s first assignment was to protect two P-40s that were flying reconnaissance missions from Bataan and Cabcaben fields. They later flew missions to help Capt Edward Dyess test an air warning system. The two P-40Es also participated in the 2 March raids on Japanese shipping in Subic Bay. The two pilots destroyed a small ammunition ship, but both

P-40s were damaged beyond repair after unsuccessful landings on the windswept Mariveles Field.<sup>52</sup>



Source: NARA RG111, SC252248

#### Mariveles Field and “telescoping” runway (ESE-WNW), 1946

In early March, two Japanese planes attacked Mariveles Field while numerous heavy construction machines and about 100 men were working on the airstrip. The bombs were released late and fell about 400 yards beyond the target. AA artillery went into operation and shot down one plane.<sup>53</sup>

George and Captain Allison Ind visited Mariveles Field on 5 March. Capt Joe Moore, commander of the 20th Pursuit Squadron organized his squadron, but he did not have any planes available. The squadron was trying in vain to raise and restore a single-engine Navy aircraft, all the while still hoping for reinforcements. Construction activities continued. Widening of the airstrip progressed. By 28 February, the first two sections (4,800 to 3,500 feet and 3,500 to 900 feet) were 150 feet and 175 feet wide, respectively. The follow-on sector of the extension from 900 feet to 200 feet was 100 feet wide. A third re-vestment was completed, and three others were nearing completion. The contractors had designed a bombproof hangar. Approval was ob-



tained to transfer three Navy tunnels to the Army for sheltering shop facilities, critical parts, and personnel at Mariveles Field.<sup>54</sup>

Progress on Mariveles Field continued during March. As of mid-March, the CPNAB placed additional fill to provide a crown for the airstrip to facilitate drainage. The configuration of the runway was unusual. Instead of parallel sides for its entire length, it had a staggered layout. The first 4,000 feet was 200 feet wide, part of the extension (700 feet) was 175 feet wide, and the remainder was 100 feet wide. Work on the field, however, had not yet met Casey's 12 February priorities. Only four plane pens were ready. The remaining three were 90 percent complete. Surface tests began on quarry muck for use as a possible surfacing agent for an all-weather runway.<sup>55</sup>

By late March, a crew from Company B began working with the CPNAB contractors to surface and maintain the Mariveles runway with gravel. Daily, the troops came down to the field from their Little Baguio bivouac. The contractors required 550 gallons of diesel daily for its three shovels, nine bulldozers, one grader, and two rollers. Company B needed 100 gallons daily to fuel its grader, bulldozer, and roller, almost a 100 percent increase over the 55 gallons it was receiving at the time. Unfortunately, the Luzon Force did not have the supplies available to meet the CPNAB requirements.<sup>56</sup>

### Notes

1. Casey, *Memoirs*, 169–70; Casey to MacArthur, draft letter, Casey Files, Special Letters; *Diary of Col Edmund J. Lilly* [Commanding Officer, 57th Infantry Division (PS)], Combined Army Research Digital Library [US Army Command and General Staff College], 58; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 50–51. See also Waldo Heinrichs and Marc Gallicchio, *Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 210.

2. Col Carl H. Seals, AGO, [headquarters, USAFFE,] to all unit commanders, memo, 15 January 1942, Subject: Message from General MacArthur.

3. Casey to Col W.F. Heavey, letter, 15 October 1946, Corps of Engineers, History Office Files; Casey, Engineer Memoirs, 170; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 50.

4. Watson, "The Defense of Australia," in Craven and Cate, eds., *Plans and Early Operations*, 407, cited a radiogram from MacArthur to Roosevelt on 11 February 1942; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 304. The Craven and Cate reference may have been to MacArthur's Radiogram 1063, 22 January, 1941, NARA RG165, Entry 281, File 4266-38. See also Radiogram 205, 5 February 1942, from MacArthur to the war department, NARA RG165, Entry 281, File 3633-38.

5. Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 262; Col James A. Morehead, *In My Sights*, 47, documented the date as 20 January. Morehead was a replacement pilot in the 17th Provisional Pursuit Squadron destined for the Philippines. Brereton, *The Brereton Diaries*, 74–83, described the pressure from the Australians and Dutch to focus on the defense of their respective interests and also the



attempts to send supplies and reinforcements to the Philippines: “Everyone in the Pacific except the Americans had written off the Philippines.” He did not specifically address his decision to discontinue plans to send air reinforcements to the Philippines, although he mentioned closing FEAF headquarters at Darwin and transferring Darwin and Bachelor Fields, staging points for reinforcement to Java, to ABDACOM.

6. Casey to CO, headquarters, 803rd Engr. Bn. (AVN) (Sep), 1st Ind., 18 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Casey, report, 20 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Major Gay and Lt. Delamore – 19 January 1942, 2.

7. USAFFE, Bataan Peninsula: South of Balanga-Moron Line, map, 15 February 1942, NARA RG338, Box T-4392; Philippine Department to WPD, letter, 7 July 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Exhibit B – Bataan Field, 21 June 1941.

8. Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps*, 86–87.

9. Stickney to CoE, letter, 22 July 1941, Subject: Fiscal Year 1942 Funds for Air Corps Construction; See Pacific Wrecks, “Mariveles Airfield: Bataan Province Philippines,” <http://www.pacificwrecks.com/>.

10. Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 38; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 39; Brig Gen Harold George to CG, FEAF, Darwin, Australia, draft radiogram, 22 January 1942 [status of aircraft and air fields], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 43; Stickney to CoE, letter, 22 July 1941, Subject: Fiscal Year 1942 Funds for Air Corps Construction; Gerow to AGO, memo, 6 March 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, FY 1942, NARA RG165, Entry 281, File 3251-42, Box 108; For a summary of the Air War Plans position on the strategic use of medium and heavy bombers in the Philippines, see Bartsch, *December 8, 1941*, 16–17. Brig Gen Carl Spaatz and Capt Hoyt Vandenberg began developing that concept in 1939. Casey’s early January 1942, reports on Mariveles Field were limited and mentioned only an airstrip plagued by a high water table. See Be Thou at Peace, “Harrison H. Richards 1911,” West Point Association of Graduates, <https://www.westpointaog.org/>; Colonel Richards was later the senior air officer on MacArthur’s staff.

11. Col J.W. Anderson [WPD] to CoS, memo, 18 March 1941, Subject: Immediate Expansion of Airfields, Philippine Islands, NARA RG165, Box 89; AGO to CoE, memo, 15 April 1941, Subject: Authorization of Air Corps Construction, Philippine Islands, Fourth Supplemental National Defense Appropriations Act, 1941, NARA RG18, Project Files, Box 1117; Kennedy to AGO, memo, 15 April 1941, Subject: Construction at Philippine Islands, NARA RG18. Project Files, Box 1117; Gerow to Marshall, memo, 25 June 1941, Subject: Improvement of Airfields in the Philippine Islands, NARA RG165, Box 89; Philippine Department to WPD, letter, 7 July 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Exhibit B – Bataan Field, 21 June 1941. See also USAAF logistics (A-4) to Spaatz, routing and record sheet, 26 August 1941 and 2 August 1941, Subject: Airports in the Philippines, NARA RG18, Project Files, Box 1117. It documented \$2.273 million were made available for air fields in the Philippines, including \$500,000 for an airstrip and “other construction” on Bataan Field. Col. Harold George to ODE, memo, 29 September 1941, Subject: Construction Plans for Proposed and Existing Airfields, Casey Files, Folder 10; [Col] H[enry] H. S[tickney] to G-4, [Philippine Department], memo, 14 October 1941, Subject: Weekly Report of Department Engineers Construction, Casey Files; ODE, Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 15 November 1941; George to CG, FEAF, Darwin, Australia, draft radiogram, 22 January 1942; Col Roscoe Bonham to PHILRYUCOM, letter, 7 June 1946, no subject [use of civilian workers on Bataan’s airfields], NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 11. Bonham erred by naming Bataan Field as Cabcaben Field.

12. George to CG, FEAF, Darwin, Australia, draft radiogram, 22 January 22, 1942; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 257, 318–19; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 313; George to ODE, memo, 18 October 1941, Subject: Construction – Bataan Airfield, Casey Files, Folder 6; Casey to AGO, USAFFE, memo, 22 October 1941, Subject: Construction – Bataan Field; ODE, Construction Progress Report for Semi-Monthly Period Ending 15 November 1941; Kinser, interview, 5 May 1999; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 15 December 1941, no subject [airfield guards], Casey Files, Folder 1; Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 239; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 73; Pflueger to author, e-mail, 16 April 2002; USAFFE engineer journal, author unidentified, 26 or 27 December 1941, Subject: Telephone Conversation with Maj Field [not further identified], Casey Files, Folder 3. In *They Fought with What They Had*, Walter Edmonds described Bataan Field as a “raw slash that ran 5,000 feet down grade from the base of wooded hills to the shore of Manila Bay,” where the East Road crossed over the airstrip. He reported the width as 75 feet.

13. Kinser, interviews, 26 March and 4 May 1999; Tollis, 803rd Unit History, 1946, citing a letter from Venancio R. Barria, a CPNAB employee who worked on Bataan Field; Robinette to Bartsch, letter, 24 February 1983, MMA, RG127, Box 11, Folder 3; Robinette-Bartsch interview; Casey, statement n.d. [June, 1944], Subject: Airdrome Construction in the Philippines, [8 October 1941–6 May 1942], 5, Casey Files, Folder 1; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 73; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 222, 257; Meidling, ed., *Organizations, Troops, and Training*, 14; Maj Robert J Chandler, affidavit 29 April 1947, no subject [use of civilian contractors on Bataan airfields], was the only source connecting CPNAB to Bataan Field. Bartsch said the engineers extended the runway by almost 1,500 feet to 5,200 feet and widened it to 100 feet. He placed the number of revetments at 12. Casey said the three runways—he mistakenly referred to Cabcaben as Cabanatuan Field—were possibly lengthened to 5,000–6,000 feet after his departure.

14. Pflueger to author, e-mails, 11 April 2001 and 31 January 2003; Robinette-Bartsch interview. The narra, a deciduous tree, can grow over 100 feet tall.

15. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 240–42, 256; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999.

16. Casey, report, 7 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Engineer Activities, 1; Casey to ODE, memo, 13 January 1942, no subject [instructions to ODE], Casey Files, Folder 16. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 257, said the runway was 3,750 feet long and 40 feet wide. Maj William A. Gay, MFR, 13 January 1942, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 16; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 17 January 1942, 5; Kircher to Casey, memo, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 2; Kircher to Casey, memo, 4 February 1942, Subject: 2 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999; Gay, memo, 20 January 1942, no subject [meeting with Capt Allison L. Hartman, 14th Engineers], Casey Files, Folder 16.

17. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 253–56; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999; Pflueger to author, e-mails, 11 April and 29 May 2001. Lt Caldwell had just been designated for assignment to the 71st EB PA; Robinette to Bartsch, letter, 24 February 1983, said, incorrectly that Lt Hugh Fraser was killed at Bataan Field in February, 1942.

18. Map [hand drawn] of Lower Bataan detailing airfields and field hospitals, origin unknown NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 10 (History of Corregidor and Bataan); Report of Operations - USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands. Vol. III, Annex IX: Provisional Coast Artillery, 6.

19. Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 209–210, 228–34, 235.

20. “Victory, Joe” [notes on the Bataan campaign, author unknown, date unknown], 1, NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 10 (History of Corregidor and Bataan).

Comments in the narrative indicated that the writer may have been from the 27th Bomb Group.

21. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 257–63, 280–89; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 251-52; George to CG, FEAF, Darwin, Australia, draft radiogram, 22 January 1942.

22. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 286; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 73.

23. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 73; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 286, 318–19; Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; Order of Battle, 91st CA Regiment, Philippine Scouts (harbor defenses), Organization and Assignments, 1941-1942; Robinette-Bartsch interview; Delamore, MFR, 14 February 1942, Subject: Telephone Call Major Fries–2:00PM, Casey Files, Folder 5; George to CG, FEAF, Darwin, Australia, draft radiogram, 22 January 1942.

24. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 319; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999; Kircher to Casey, memo, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 2.

25. George to CG, FEAF, draft radiogram, 22 January 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations for Week Ending 7 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8; Kircher to Casey, memo, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942; Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999. The weekly engineer operations reports did not mention revetments after Casey's March 1 memo.

26. Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 322; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 47; HonorStates.org, "Vincent C. Dempewolf," <https://www.honorstates.org/> and Fold 3, "Vincent C. Dempewolf," <https://www.fold3.com/> cited General Order 287, 1945, as the documentation for Dempewolf's decorations—Sgt. Dempewolf was KIA on 26 February 1942 [Leggett Roster] although the Kloecker roster documented Dempewolf's death as 10 April 1942, presumably on the Death March.

27. Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 326.

28. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 31 January 1942, 4–5; Gay, MFR, 5 February 1942, Subject: Mariveles Airfield, Casey Files, Folder 4.

29. Casey to department engineer, memo, 12 February 1942, Subject: Expediting and Control of Progress on Airfields, Casey Files, Folder 5.

30. Casey, report, 14 February 1942, Subject: Inspection 13 February 1942; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending January 1942, 4-5; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 February 1942, 6.

31. Casey, report, 14 February 1942, Subject: Inspection 13 February 1942; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending January 31 1942, 4–5; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942.

32. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942; Gay, MFR, 23 February 1942, Subject: Telephone Calls, Casey Files, Folder 13. Capt Gewalt was KIA on Malinta Hill, Corregidor, on 29 April 1942, according to memo, Col Roscoe Bonham, n.d., Subject: Officers on Corregidor at the Time of Surrender of Bataan 4/9/41.

33. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 1 March 1942: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 28 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8; memo, Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942; Stickney to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 March 1942, Subject: Engineer

Operations Report for Week Ending 14 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 17. Casey had departed the Philippines on 11 March. Hence, Stickney submitted the engineer operations report for the week ending 14 March 1942.

34. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 314–21, 324–5, 328–335; Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 46–47, 51–60.

35. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 47; Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; Draft radiogram, George to CG, FEAF, Darwin, Australia, 22 January 1942, no subject [status of aircraft and air fields]; Harry T. Simms, “Death March,” in Ashton, ed., *And Somebody Gives a Damn*, 197; report, Casey, Inspection of Engineer Activities 1 January 1942, 1; Memo, Casey to CoS, USAFFE, 19 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 17 January 1942, 4; memo, Kircher, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 1; report, Kircher, 17 January 1942, Subject: Report – 16 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6; Pflueger, e-mail to author, 16 April 2002; Tollis, 803rd Unit History, 1946, citing a letter from Barria, who claimed incorrectly that Headquarters and Service Company worked on Cabcaben Field; *Canopus Diary*. The three raids on Cabcaben Field involved flights of nine light bombers each.

36. Casey, report, 20 January 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip of Major Gay and Lt. Delamore – 19 January 1942, 1, Casey Files, Folder 16; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999; Map of Lower Bataan of Lower Bataan showing airfields and field hospitals; Report of Operations - USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands. Vol. III, Annex IX: Provisional Coast Artillery, 6. On 8 April, the 515th, as infantry, occupied the same general area, high ground just south of Cabcaben Field; to its east was the 200th CA Regiment.

37. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 307–08; Casey, Airdrome Construction in the Philippines, 5; draft radiogram, George to CG, FEAF, Darwin, Australia, 22 January 1942; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 31 January 1942, 4–5; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 318; Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; Col Samuel C. Grashio and Bernard Norling, *Return to Freedom*, 29; 27th Bomb Group Narrative, 59. Casey’s weekly reports rarely linked airfield work to companies of the 803rd. Since CPNAB turned over Cabcaben Field to Company C on 22 January 1942, the assumption was that further work was by Company C and its Filipino laborers.

38. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 318; Map of Lower Bataan [hand drawn], n.d. [probably after surrender], NARA RG407, Entry 1054, Box 10 (History of Bataan and Corregidor); Report of Operations - USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands. Vol. III, Annex IX: Provisional Coast Artillery, 5–6. The rough map did not depict 200th’s installation as noted by Bartsch. Tollis, 803rd Unit History, 1946.

39. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 17 January 1942; Kircher to Casey, memo, 14 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction; memo, Casey to CoS, USAFFE, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 31 January 1942, 5; Casey, report, 14 February 1942, Subject: Inspection 13 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5; Goldblith diary, 7; George to CG, FEAF, Darwin, Australia, draft radiogram, 22 January 1942, no subject [status of aircraft and air fields]; memo, Kircher to Casey, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 2; Memo, Casey to CG, USAFFE, March 1, 1942: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 28 February 1942; Headquarters, 4th Marine Regiment, Ft. Mills, *R-2 Journal*, 17 February and 7 March 1942, in Headquarters, Fourth Marine Regiment, Ft. Mills, Philippine Islands. *R-2 Journal*, 8 December 1941–3 May 1942. <http://www.mansell.com/> (hereafter cited as 4th Marine journal).

40. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 1 March 1942: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 28 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942; Stickney to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 March 1942; Simms, “Death March,” 197.

41. Casey to department engineer, memo, 12 February 1942, Subject: Expediting and Control of Progress on Airfields.

42. According to the American Society for Quality, “Continuous improvement, sometimes called continual improvement, is the ongoing improvement of products, services or processes through incremental and breakthrough improvements. These efforts can seek “incremental” improvement over time or “breakthrough” improvement all at once.” For more information on the model, see <https://asq.org/>.

43. Casey, MFR, 16 February 1942, Subject: Plane Pens, Casey Files, Folder 5.

44. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 31 January 1942, 3.

45. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 74; Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942, 1; Ind, *Bataan: Judgment Seat*, 22–25; Fertig, Notes on Personal Experiences, 60–61, and “1942,” 10; See Pacific Wrecks, “Mariveles Airfield,” <http://www.pacificwrecks.com/>.

46. Casey to ODE [*sic*], memo, 10 January 1942, Subject: Tunnel and Airfield Project, Mariveles, Casey Files, Folder 6: Fertig to Engineer, USAFFE, Ind., January 12, 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 60–61, and “1942,” 10.

47. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 17 January 1942, 4; report, Kircher, report, n.d., Inspection Trip—13–14 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Kircher to Casey, memo, 24 January 1942, subject: Weekly Report on Construction, 2; Kircher, report, 17 January 1942, Report—16 Jan 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6; Kircher to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 19 January 1942, Subject: 18 January 1942 [inspection of Mariveles Field], Casey Files, Folder 16; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, January 29, 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1942, 5; Kircher to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 21 January 1942, Subject: 20 January 1942 [inspection of 8-inch guns and Mariveles Field].

48. Kircher, MFR, 25 January 1942, Subject: 24 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 10; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Ending 31 January 1942, 5; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 200; Kircher to Casey, memo, 4 February 1942, Subject: 2 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6; Gay, MFR, 5 February 1942, Subject: Mariveles Field, Casey Files, Folder 4; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 262; Fertig, “Notes on Personal Experiences,” 14.

49. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 22 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 21 February 1942; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 321–22.

50. Casey to department engineer, corps engineer, I Corps; corps engineer, II Corps; CO, 14th Engineers; CO, 803rd Engineers, memo, 12 February 1942, Subject: Laborers, Casey Files Folder 5; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942; Casey to CG, FEAF, memo, 14 February 1942, no subject

[FEAF personnel for Mariveles Field], Casey Files, Folder 5; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 314–15.

51. Casey to department engineer, memo, 12 February 1942, Subject: Expediting and Control of Progress on Airfields.

52. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 322-35; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 1 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 28 February 1942; *Canopus* diary.

53. Caraccilo, ed., *Surviving Bataan and Beyond*, 100.

54. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 1 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 28 February 1942; Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 325.

55. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942; Stickney to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 March 1942. Technical details on runway layouts from Col Warren Kaufman, USAF, retired.

56. Lt Col E[arl] T. Halstead, AGO, Luzon Force, to CG, USFIP, 1st Ind., 31 March 1942, no subject [increase in fuel allocation], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 46; Poster, "War Stories in Their Own Words," A12.



## Chapter 21

### **The 8-inch Guns**

The saga of eight 8-inch railway guns sent to the Philippines for the “Philippine Inland Seas Defense Project” in mid-1941 graphically illustrated the effort, inventiveness, frustration, and the eventual failure experienced in defense of the Philippines during 1941–42. In response to a request from Douglas MacArthur, then an advisor to the Philippine Army, the US War Department sent eight 8-inch railway guns as the only available substitutes for more effective but unavailable 12-inch field guns. The US also sent 24 155-mm GPFs, antiquated heavy artillery developed in World War I. The newly formed USAFFE and the Philippine Commonwealth were to begin installing the guns immediately upon arrival. Still, the effort was stalled as of 8 December 1941, when the Japanese attacked the Philippines. After three weeks and with the abandonment of Manila imminent, the USAFFE decided to ship the guns to Bataan, where the Fil-American force was to make its last stand against the Japanese. The limited, antiquated artillery pieces already available to the USFIP had proved effective against the Japanese. The 8-guns would have added considerably to the firepower of the defenders. However, during their transport to Bataan, six guns were lost or destroyed in the withdrawal from Manila and in the face of the rapid Japanese advance. Installation of the weapons in Bataan and then Corregidor resulted in misuse, minimal use, or nonuse of the remaining guns. The 803rd EB worked on the transport and installation of the firearms on Bataan and Corregidor.

### **MacArthur’s Concept**

The journey of the 8-inch railway guns began with MacArthur’s February 1941 memo. It outlined the defense of the entire Philippine archipelago as opposed to concentrating on Luzon. Then serving as a field marshal and advisor to the Philippine Army, MacArthur proposed to Gen George C. Marshall that he increase the capacity of Philippine defenses during the Commonwealth’s transition to independence. A more assertive but still reactive approach to the protection of the Philippines, the proposal reflected the growing interest in



the hardening US policy toward Japan. His concept involved both US and Philippine resources for “an adequate defense, at the beach,” against a landing force of 100,000. He requested, *among other things*, seven 12-inch guns, 24 155-mm GPFs, and searchlights for “blocking the few narrow straits into the [Philippines] inland seas.” Mines and motor torpedo boats were to augment the coastal artillery (CA). The initiative became known as the “Philippine Inland Sea Defense Project.” Luzon and the Visayan Islands, which MacArthur said constituted a “homogeneous unit,” were to be the center of resistance to an invader. Still, he said supplies for the defenders would have to come north through the Sibuyan and Visayan Seas. Marshall responded on 17 February, suggesting the substitution of 8-inch railway guns for the 12-inch guns, which could not be manufactured and made available before 1943. Marshall attached an equipment status report stating that the 8-inch railway guns with a range of 21,000 yards could be removed from railway cars and mounted on concrete emplacements as “a satisfactory substitute for the 12-inch barbette carriage guns.” After MacArthur approved the alternative proposal, Marshall responded that “in the event of approval by the president,” he would also direct shipment of 24 155-mm guns and seven 8-inch guns “by the first transportation available after the pressing requirements of the Philippine Department have been met.” Marshall sent a similar letter to Maj Gen George Grunert, commander of the Philippine Department, saying that seven 8-inch railway guns would be loaned and shipped to the Philippine government. In mid-November 1941, Lt General MacArthur proposed the expansion of the Inland Seas Defense Plan. This proposal would allow CA coverage of probable enemy landing areas in North Luzon. It was a complement to the Operations Plan R-5 that USAFFE sent to the War Department on 1 October 1941, and the R-5 war plan that he later tried to implement.<sup>1</sup>

MacArthur wanted the armaments quickly; however, Marshall did not act with the same urgency. Marshall thought—correctly as it turned out—that it would take time to prepare installations and train the Philippine Army troops. The guns, eight instead of the initial planned seven, were shipped in mid-1941 aboard the USAT *Liberty*. The arms were removed from their railcar platforms but retained the circular armor plate (carriage barbette). Twenty-four 155-mm GPF were also included in the shipment. Ammunition and fire control equipment, along with required communications devices for the 8-inch guns and 155-mm GPFs, arrived in the fall of 1941. However,



Source: NARA RG111, Box 56, SC136225


**Standard 8-inch M1888 gun mounted on M1918 drop bed rail car, 1942**

in approving the issue of that equipment on 31 October, the War Department AGO advised the chief of ordnance to “supply on the first issue the minimum number of [fire control] items as determined by the chief of coast artillery that will enable the 11 of the 155-mm batteries and the four of the 8- inch batteries to be put into action.” On arrival in the Philippines, the 8-inch guns were stored in the Manila ordnance depot. Capt Stephen M. Mellnik, who was the commander of Battery D, 91st Regiment PS, was reassigned to the headquarters of the newly formed Philippine Coast Artillery Corp (CAC), PS, Manila, on 5 November 1941. His task was to manage the 8-inch gun project, including identification of sites, installation, requisition of fire control equipment, and scheduling the induction and training of 365 Philippine Army personnel at Fort Wint, Subic Bay, to man the guns. Maj Guy Stubbs worked with Mellnik on the project, which was under the auspices of the Philippine CAC. MacArthur assured Marshall in February 1941, that “an extensive study [had] been made to determine the positions, necessary land protection, and fields of fire of the

channel batteries” and that “the Commonwealth Government [was] in a position to undertake the installation of batteries.” Thus, the War Department provided the guns but did not allocate funds to cover the installation.<sup>2</sup>

Col William F. Marquat, CAC chief of staff, told Mellnik “to convert circles on the map and cannon in the warehouse into PA firing units on the ground.” From early to mid-October, Mellnik and his group completed a map review and visited proposed sites on Mindoro, Cebu, southern Luzon, Leyte, and Samar. Mellnik, Stubbs, and their small staff first identified 12 firing locations from the northern Luzon to the southern tip of Cebu, in addition to one on Cape Santiago, Batangas Province, south of Manila on Luzon (Location 13 of the gun positions initially proposed). In its 10 November response to a War Department request for status, the USAFFE stated that batteries of the 155-mm guns would be “manned successively as [the] emplacements [were] completed” and that emplacement of the 8-inch guns was to start 1 February 1942. The USAFFE expected that all the guns would be in place and manned by 1 May. On 25 October, the Philippine Army requested funds for infrastructure (water and power) at the 13 stations, as well as transportation and emplacement of guns at Cape Santiago and infrastructure. The USAFFE approved the request on 1 November. The PA then inducted the Filipinos and sent them to Corregidor for training. Bids on the five-gun emplacements were opened on 25 November but could not be awarded until funds were allocated. At that time, the PA requested the release of the funds for all 12 remaining installations and received the USAFFE approval three days later. On 8 December, the day the war started, Mellnik and Stubbs checked the site on Cape Santiago, 75 miles south of Manila, and ordered the crew to begin pouring the concrete base.<sup>3</sup>

With the outbreak of war, Col Constant Irwin, the USAFFE operations chief, directed, and Col Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur’s chief of staff, approved the cessation of the Philippine Inland Seas Defense Project. This cancellation was in anticipation of the Japanese invasion and probability of rapid advance. The 155-mm GPFs were transferred to USAFFE artillery chief Brig Gen Edward P. King, who was delighted with the addition of the heavy guns. However, Mellnik noted that “no one wanted the unwieldy 8-inch guns that required railway mounts or specifically-designed firing positions.” Calculating that seven guns were on hand, Sutherland ordered the installation of one 8-inch gun on Bataan, the transport of one to Corregidor, and



**Figure 21.1. Inland Seas Defense Project: Proposed 8-inch gun positions, 1941.** (Adapted from NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 23.)

the destruction of the remaining five. Sometime before 18 December, Mellnik and Stubbs went to Bataan. On 20 December, Maj Albert Kircher, a USAFFE construction engineer, traveled from Manila to Orani to pick up Capt Frederick G. Saint, commander of the 14th EB PS, and four to five men to assist with the survey of the Bagac area for the gun sites. The 14th would be responsible for the installation of the 8-inch guns. "After hours of walking, we located a gun position near Bagac," Mellnik wrote. Kircher provided Saint with the instructions and blueprints before returning to Manila. Immediately after that, when WPO-3—which provided for withdrawal into Bataan was reinstated—the USAFFE advised the SLF that work on gun emplacements in the Batangas area (Cape Santiago, at least) would not be constructed and ordered him to obtain templates for the base from PA engineers for use in Bataan.<sup>4</sup>

## War and Chaos

By 27 December, nevertheless, all eight of the 8-inch guns still languished in Manila, although they had been moved to the MRR's Farola Railroad Yards from the near-by ordnance depot. Both facilities were in the Binondo District on the north bank of the Pasig River. The area was Manila's central commercial district at the time. The Quartermaster Corps had leased the Farola Compound of the Pacific Commercial Company on the industrial wharf (*Muella de la Industria*) before the war. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, the MRR fell under military control, and Maj Brewster G. Gallup of the ODE construction and division, took command. He had a close working relationship with the MRR president Jose Paez and began discussions with him on the movement of the guns from Manila to Bataan.


The result was an agreement for the AG&P, a Manila-based construction contractor, to load the weapons at Farola for shipment to Lubao, Pampanga Province. Located on the MRR's Carmen Branch about 16 kilometers southwest of San Fernando, Lubao had become the railhead for shipments to Bataan. At Lubao, the MRR allocated two cranes, a 10-ton and five-ton, to unload the guns onto 20-ton capacity trailers pulled by heavy trucks. Lt Col Wendell Fertig, chief of the ODE construction division was to have the trucks in Lubao on the afternoon of 29 December. The USAFFE engineer thought the heavy trailers would be able to negotiate the Pilar-Bagac Road. The

situation was so confusing that some consideration was given to moving the guns from Manila via barge or lighter. To that end, the engineers recruited Homer J. Martin, a civilian engineer and a (fireman, hoist engineer, and two to three riggers) from the British Club, Manila. They reported to the Farola Compound's north pier. On 28 December, when six flat cars arrived at Farola, the volunteers from the British Club were able to load two guns onto four railroad cars. Two of the cars were for the barrels and two for the gun bases. Later that evening, the two cranes left Manila for Lubao.

In yet another surprise development, Col Roscoe Bonham, who was responsible for engineer logistics, discovered that he still had six guns on location instead of the three on which he initially planned. The effort showed close collaboration between the engineers and the USAFFE quartermaster (G-4). While Bonham was trying to track the 8-inch guns, Lt Col Nicoll F. Galbraith, a G-4 officer, was lining up 15 trucks to pick up spare parts at the ordnance depot for the weapons. On 29 December, a switch engine and the four cars left Manila and went through the rail yards at Caloocan, probably with the last gun. The British also loaded that gun and it arrived in San Fernando at 2140. San Fernando is about 62 kilometers from Manila and was a small provincial capital (Pampanga Province). However, at that time it was a significant rail switching center on the MRR main line north. Since the tracks were full at Lubao, the train had to remain in San Fernando overnight and did not pull into Lubao until 0700 on 30 December.<sup>5</sup>

The logistical activity intensified on 30 December amid the chaos caused by priority movements of materiel from Manila, daily air raids, and the approaching Japanese. At 0730, Gallup received an order for six additional flat cars for Farola but he only sent five because two cars were already in place at the yards. At 0745, a second train left Manila with four guns. That afternoon, Gallup sent four more flat cars to Farola. To Gallup's surprise, the USAFFE chief engineer Col Hugh Casey had advised him in error. It turned out that the guns, probably two from the first train, were unloaded and on the ground at Lubao. At the time, Casey was also busily engaged in planning the destruction of facilities and materiel in Manila that was deemed of value to the Japanese. Gallup updated his boss, Lt Col Wendell Fertig, on the arrangements for cranes at Lubao and added that he thought the "engineer battalion," presumably the 803rd, was arranging for trucks to pick up the guns. An ODE engineer, Maj Harry O. Fisher,

found the weapons were “never unloaded” from the flat cars in Lubao because the cranes had been sent back to San Fernando.



**Figure 21.2. Manila Railroad Company: North Luzon lines.** (Adapted from Philippine Bureau of Commerce and Communications, Map Showing Duplication of Communications Systems in Part in the Island of Luzon, Sheet 1, 1 November 1931, NARA RG350, Entry 11, Folder I.)

At noon on 30 December, the Japanese bombed Lubao. Forty freight cars stood idle on the mainline, and eight were on the siding. Fisher had prepared the trailers, probably “low boy” models designed to haul heavy construction equipment, to load the guns. However, rail cars loaded with ammunition exploded and immobilized his prime movers and the trailers. Japanese strafing heavily damaged their irreplaceable tires. Kircher said work would resume at 1400 that day. Either a second convoy was sent, or Major Fisher briefly left Lubao to find a second convoy. Upon return, he learned that the two





Source: NARA RG18, AA-186-21862 or 1427AC

**Caloocan terminal and rail yard, north Manila, 1937**



Source: NARA RG18, 18-AA-189-341710

**San Fernando yard and rail station, 1938**



guns had disappeared. Fisher searched every location except the still-burning San Fernando railhead. The big guns, possibly two and perhaps four, had been shunted onto the branch rail lines designed to serve the area's sugar plantations from San Fernando to Del Carmen.<sup>6</sup>

About midnight on 31 December, the last four flat cars with the remaining two guns and accessories left Farola, traversed Manila by 0600, and came close to San Fernando by about 0730. However, an air raid and fire at San Fernando forced the train to return to Santo Tomas, the station three kilometers south of San Fernando. On January 1, 1st Lt Richard A. Keasy, an ODE inspections officer, found guns, probably the four shipped from Manila the previous day, in San Fernando. Still, with the withdrawal of Fil-American forces from the area, he abandoned them.

On 31 December, Col Lloyd Mielenz reported that the guns (number not provided) had arrived and been dumped on the ground on a siding outside Lubao. According to Mielenz, Capt Fisher had a 10-ton and 5-ton crane, as well as a jack, to lift them; however, he was still trying to obtain a more substantial crane. Bolts to fasten the guns to their bases, supposedly shipped on 23 December, had not arrived. Colonel Bonham had to reorder them.<sup>7</sup>

## The Hunt

Meanwhile, Major Kircher moved the hunt for locating the four guns to the Del Carmen sugar fields. He and elements of Company B, 803rd Engineers, began searching along the extensive rail network in the Del Carmen area. The system included 383 kilometers of private rail lines serving the Pampanga Sugar Central, a processing facility, and 13 kilometers of the MRR's Carmen line track from Lubao to Del Carmen. On 11 December 1941, the Pampanga Sugar Development Company volunteered and MacArthur accepted an offer to place the private sugar rail network, locomotives, and freight cars at the USAFFE's disposal. In colorful language, Fertig wrote that the guns had disappeared after being switched into "the maze of rail lines that gridded the cane fields to the southwest." He added that "needles have been lost in haystacks, but the hunt for the 8-inch guns lost in the cane fields of Pampanga [Province] became a classic," as "night after night huge convoys of 10-wheel trucks and trailers followed false clues." The hunt was far more difficult than even Fertig documented. The rail

tracks were hidden in fields of ripe cane 10 to 16 feet tall. The foliage provided camouflage against the Japanese bombers yet hindered the engineer search parties. To add to the confusion, the rail cars were in motion during much of the search. Kircher found that “other guns may have been switched” to Concepcion, a Carmen Branch depot about three kilometers west of Lubao on the spur line serving the Del Carmen sugar area.

On 30 December, Capt Richard W. Fellows, commander of the Nichols air depot in Manila, claimed an 18-car train that included “2 naval guns” along with other missing and essential munitions made it to Del Carmen. He and Capt Howard V. Munton, Del Carmen sub-depot commander, sent a Sugar Central train to reclaim the misrouted cars and take them back to Lubao. However, Lubao was involved in a Japanese raid that destroyed the eight ammunition cars on a siding and the eighteenth car of the train that Fellows had just sent from Del Carmen. In a scene reminiscent of western movies, at gunpoint, Fellows ordered a Filipino engineer employed by Sugar Central to move the 17 operable cars from Lubao across a burning bridge from the north line to the plantation rail system and back to the concealment of the tall sugar cane. Given the confusion of the tactical situation in the area, Fellows did not advise his counterparts that he withdrew the weapons to the Del Carmen area. He later said his attention was focused solely on locating aviation gasoline.<sup>8</sup>

On 2 January, as the Japanese broke through Fil-American lines and headed southwest to Guagua, the engineers of the 803rd finally located two of the guns still on flatcars in the cane fields of the Dinalupihan sugar estate. At daylight, Japanese planes strafed the engineers’ convoy without damaging the trucks. According to Mellnik’s plan, the engineer’s mission was to take the guns to Bagac on Bataan’s western coast. During the search and transport operation, the engineers contended with the continuous retreat of Fil-American forces, congestion on the highways caused by the transport of materiel and equipment, and a high number of civilian evacuees moving to Bataan. Enemy patrols were consistently present in the area.<sup>9</sup>

On 2 January, Kircher reported that the two 8-inch guns on railroad cars—probably the two shipped from Manila on 29 December—were moving from San Fernando and would be loaded for transport to Bataan. He requested an artillery officer and the plans for installation. Gallup advised Fertig that “only six guns ever got to Lubao out of the total of eight shipped.” He also told Casey that he was looking

for the other four guns in the Del Carmen area. Only the two 8-inch guns, which were inadvertently sent to Dinalupihan, survived the bombing attacks at San Fernando and Lubao.<sup>10</sup>

Fertig sent the Headquarters Company of the 803rd Engineers to transport the guns to Bagac. Its work detail picked the arms up in the Del Carmen area cane fields and loaded them, probably with the help of Company B, 803rd Engineers. Since each barrel weighed 33,000 pounds, the engineers presumably used heavy winches on their prime movers as a substitute for the cranes initially planned. Although several US manufacturers produced the “prime movers,” the engineers commonly referred to them as “Corbitts,” who was the original manufacturer. Lt John Mowick commanded the Headquarters Company detail. The convoy then began the slow trek to Bataan over primitive, heavily congested roads. Bataan’s major roads were single-lane, partially paved, or nonpaved thoroughfares. Thus, the engineers had to reinforce road fills, bridges, and roads to survive the heavy weight of transporting the guns. Lt Samuel A. Goldblith of Headquarters Company later said the route was “all along the coastline of Bataan from Bagac to Pilar.” He probably meant to indicate that this was south on the East Road to Pilar and then east on the cobblestone Pilar-Bagac Road. This route was the most direct; however it was even more primitive route than the route to Bagac. One complete gun and the barrel of a second finally arrived at the Saysain Point south of Bagac. The remaining component, presumably the base, showed up a day later.<sup>11</sup>

Confusion and misfortune followed the guns to Bataan. Planning for emplacement had begun on 7 January. Casey’s comment was the project “must be pushed.” He believed the guns could cover against sea approaches from Olongapo and Subic Bay and guard against landing operations on the west coast. He also thought they could be used for the defense of the Pilar-Bagac Road in front of the RBP. The guns would allow the USAFFE to “control the lateral movement of the Japanese as they advanced to Bataan.”


By March 1942, the USAFFE viewed the remaining gun as beach defense. Initially, the 14th EB PS was to install the weapons, and the work was initially estimated to take three weeks. However, Casey recommended that the project be turned over to the ODE under the command of Capt Gallup and that he use equipment from the 14th. Five trucks were readied to haul sand, rock, and cement to installation sites. The first concrete for the number two gun was scheduled to be poured on 9 January. Kircher believed that 30 to 40 laborers would be

required. However, with only that small of a labor force, the installation work stalled.



Source: NARA RG 18, 18-AA-187-340662

**Del Carmen Sugar Mill (PASUMIL) and rail yard, 1933**



Source: Corps of Engineers, military images, Box 6A, Folder 5

**6x6 prime mover with winch and 20-ton low boy trailer, 1941**

On 23 January, over Gallup's objection, Maj William A. Gay, one of Casey's inspectors, ordered Capt Edmund P. Zbikowski, commander of Company A, 803rd Engineers, to send a platoon immediately "to expedite the work" on the 8-inch gun. Lt Walter H. Farrell com-



manded the platoon. By 4 January 1942, Company A had moved from Orani Field on Bataan's east coast to KP201. Leaving at 1130, the platoon reached Saysain Point (KP216) quickly, and the men were working before 1400. Arriving at the point on 23 January, Major Gay found that they "were resting under the trees" but only because of Japanese air activity in the area. The cradle for the number two gun was in place at the edge of the hole dug for the base. Each time the Japanese aircraft departed; the engineers resumed moving the cradle into position. Enemy reconnaissance was a daily occurrence, but bombs did not fall on the Saysain battery position. When the base—consisting of 100 yards of reinforced concrete—was completed on 24 January, the engineers discovered that the ordnance corps supplied the wrong template with the gun and it was off by eight inches. Additionally, a faulty ring did not fit the embedded base ring. Consequently, the engineers had to modify the base by chiseling out several yards of concrete and bending bolts to meet the ring's specifications.

When the platoon completed its work, Raymond D. Flatland and Thomas Casad, two civilian ordnance employees, arrived to help install the gun. At the same time, Company A personnel rigged and moved the base for the number two gun, but only after waiting for blocks-and-tackle from other jobs.<sup>12</sup>

For reasons unexplained, Gallup told Gay that he did not want to use the 803rd on the number one gun. After the war, the number two-gun battery commander wrote, "a faulty template had been constructed and utilized by the responsible engineer unit assigned [to] the installation of the guns." By 10 January, the installation of the number one gun was underway. As was the case with the number two gun, a gun ring did not fit the ring on the concrete base. Again, the engineers adapted the concrete base to fit the gun base. The removal of the natural cover and the presence of dumps for construction materials made the battery area and its road network visible targets for frequent air and artillery attacks.<sup>13</sup>


From 22 to 23 January, the Japanese attempted to flank the I Corps position with landings on Longoskawayan and Quinauan Points, southwestern Bataan, to cut the West Road. They followed up with landings on Anayasan and Salaiim Points, their northernmost invasion points, from 26 January to 2 February. The attacks, called Battle of the Points, provided another glitch in the gun emplacement.





Source: NARA RG111, Box 41, SC147910 and SC147911

8-inch railway gun mounting and gun carriage barrette, both photos taken in 1942



**Figure 21.3. Saysain Point: 8-inch gun emplacement, January 1942.** (Adapted from Report of Operations, USAFFE and USFIP, in the Philippine Islands (Luzon Force), Annex VI, Vol. IV, p. 246, NARA RG 407, Box 1157; ODE, Road and Trail Map, Bataan Peninsula, 5 January 1942, NARA RG338, Box 4392.)

Without notification to Maj Frank Fries, commander of the 803rd, Company A was inserted into combat operations at Quinauan Point during 25 to 28 January 1942. Company A became the first engineer aviation company ever committed to combat operations, even though its personnel had had minimal weapons training. This action removed Company A from engineer tasks, such as the installation of the 8-inch guns. The 14th engineers took over the work of Company A on the guns, but they were not able to complete the survey to find the line of sight (“run in”) from the gun position. By 29 January, the number one gun was “almost ready” to fire except for minor problems with installation and the survey (“running in”) of the gun position. The ordnance

corps personnel lacked the transit instrument essential to the survey and were trying to locate it. Casey ordered Gallup and an NCO to fix the problem and to be ready to fire by 30 January. A detail of 142 men from the newly formed 2nd Regiment, CAC, was assigned to man the battery. Again, for reasons undocumented, Gallup prevented the battery commander on the site from digging foxholes and dugouts.<sup>14</sup>

Because of heavy Japanese pressure on the I Corps on Bataan's western coast and the penetration of the II Corps' left flank in the East, MacArthur decided on 22 January to withdraw eight miles south to the RBP. The move occurred from 23 to 26 January. Casey, a newly promoted brigadier general, urged "serious reconsideration" of the estimate that led to the decision. He pointed out the negative results of the withdrawal to the RBP, maintaining, among other things, that "[t]he 8" guns [then] being installed [would] be lost if we move back to the RBP."<sup>15</sup>

The number one gun was still not ready to fire on 30 January, as Casey had directed, but it was ready on the following day. Mechanical problems persisted. A falling tripod timber had damaged the gears and pinions of the traversing mechanism. The subsequent repairs allowed the gun to traverse correctly. By the time the makeshift repairs had been made, probably on 31 January, Japanese 75-mm guns had moved within range and laid down a heavy barrage. Elements of the 515th CA Regiment US opened fire with .37-caliber antiaircraft guns to drive off the reconnaissance plane used by an artillery spotter. The Japanese continued firing but accuracy decreased. With the weapon sandbagged, supposedly camouflaged, and seemingly wired electrically, Company A headed south for transit to Corregidor. For the first two weeks, the gun and its crew had only one opportunity to fire. A light cruiser and tanker that came out of Subic Bay were within its range. The first shot hit close to the cruiser, forcing it out to sea. After a second shot, the officer in charge stopped firing because he thought the ships were out of range. He mistakenly assumed that the range was 17,000 yards instead of its actual range of 21,000 yards. By the time the error was discovered, the ships were out of range.

As late as 12 February, I Corps engineer Col Harry Skerry told Major Gay that problems persisted. He claimed the gun still had wiring problems, and the camouflage was not complete when it was turned over to the I Corps. According to Skerry, personnel from the 2nd Regiment, CAC, did not have training on the gun, and its commander said he did not have sufficient staff to operate the weapon. To alleviate



some of the problems, Skerry offered to “take care of [the] camouflage and protection.” By 15 February, an emergency fire control system with a 15-meter range finder had been installed.<sup>16</sup>

### Installation Complete

True to form, the camouflage issue was not corrected, as Skerry had promised, until the first week of February. At the same time, the gun was also sandbagged and wired before it was turned over to CAC. The Japanese held the heights north of Bagac, about three miles from Saysain Point and by mid-February commanded the lower Saysain plateau. They subjected the entire area to almost daily direct artillery fire. About 20 February, the number one gun suffered a direct hit from a 155-mm projectile. The damage was limited to the recuperation cylinder and the spring it housed and did not affect continued operations.

Interestingly, on 19 February, Capt Thomas Delamore, an engineer and inspector on Casey’s staff, visited the site to find that the “gun has definitely been located by the Japs [,] as they have a find on it.” He documented that the gun stood out because “a large area of brush [had] been cut” around it, and the road into the position was “well used” and “in the open.” He further commented that the camouflage was still “very poor.” In fact, the battery had not changed the brush, which had withered. Nevertheless, the incident did cause the battery to undertake immediate reorganization. As of 15 March, actions included: changes to the camouflage schedule and control of visible activity; construction of tunnels for the plotting room, shelters, supplies, mess hall, and kitchen; splinter proofing of structures, the establishment of a horizontal base and observation stations; development of sunken ammunition and powder magazines, emplacement of additional searchlights, and provision for a local beach defense.<sup>17</sup>

The modifications allowed for more use of the number one gun than have generally been documented in subsequent histories:

- 15 February 1942—16 rounds fired at a range of 17,000–20,000 yards and the enemy light cruiser *Kuma*, which had arrived at Subic Bay in mid-February, and the torpedo boat *Kiji*. An additional cruiser arrived to shell from Saysain Point to Bobo (Caibobo) Point;

- 25 February—12 rounds fired at a range of 15,500–17,500 yards at a freighter convoy sailing into Subic Bay;
- 2 March—30 rounds in four scheduled firings at targets provided by the I Corps into the Tual River Pocket reserve south of the RBP, and area east of Bagac, where the “Battle of the Pockets” took place during 23 January–17 February 1942;
- 2 April—Five rounds at a range of 21,000 yards against a convoy of freighters sailing into Subic Bay; and
- 3 April—Five rounds at a range of 20,000 yards at two freighters in Subic Bay.<sup>18</sup>

The vulnerability of the number one gun battery resulted in the issuance of an emergency order. The order was probably issued in early February by Maj Gen Jonathan M. Wainwright, then the I Corps commander. He stated that the breech blocks of the 8-inch guns were to be removed and placed in half-ton bomb trucks parked near gun emplacements. If the enemy acted against the batteries, the breech blocks were to be transported to the rear. The battery, however, did not have to implement that order. The surrender of the Bataan force brought the implementation of a new order to destroy the gun. On 8 April 1942, Maj Gen Albert Jones, the latest I Corps commander, ordered the battery to destroy the weapon to prevent its falling into enemy hands. With the order in hand “on or about 10 April” at 0200, battery commander Maj Alfred J. D’Abrezzo of the CAC, and three of his officers destroyed the gun, its supporting equipment, and the tunnels. Again, the gun was subjected to extraordinary means. When TNT charges failed, the men loaded the gun with one round of ammunition and one-and-a-half the normal charges. They then filled the muzzle with rock and sand and tamped the mixture before firing the gun the last time with an extended field wire lanyard. The demolition was complete.<sup>19</sup>

The number two gun was test-fired on 31 January, although Casey had alerted Gallup to its “re-removal” two days earlier. He had scheduled the move for 30 January with the help of the 803rd’s Company A. Company A’s personnel came from a new bivouac area in southern Bataan (KP167.5) to remove and transport the gun tube south to Mariveles. Headquarters Company handled the transportation. For the move, Casey secured two trailers of 10- and 20-ton capacities, respectively, and necessary tools. He also arranged for a Caterpillar

D-8 tractor—a machine rated at 115 horsepower with a drawbar pull up to 12.75 tons—to accompany the gun. Lt Samuel Goldblith commanded the work detail of 14 men, including Pvt John Zubay and Pvt Hugh F. “Heavy” Hamrick. Lt Samuel Goldblith of Headquarters Company issued orders, “to bring back an 8-inch naval gun.” His detail used two low boy trailers to haul the gun and a base. The slippage of one trailer off a bridge forced Zubay and Hamrick back to the front lines to retrieve another D-8 Caterpillar tractor to maneuver the trailer off the bridge. Fertig commented that it was “the same weary process of dismantling, loading, and transporting the huge mass of metal.” As of mid-February, only some parts for the dismantled gun remained at the original site.<sup>20</sup>


## Corregidor

The same sad story followed the number two gun to Corregidor. Plans for its installation were completed on 1 February. The same day Fertig recommended to Major Fries that the weapon be shipped from Mariveles with its better shore and dock facilities. The gun was finally loaded on 6 February, a day later than planned. Company A had moved to Corregidor during 3–6 February to improve Kindley Field and install the 8-inch gun. It took control of the weapon during the night of 6–7 February. Major Gallup retained a vital role in the project’s management, supervising the unloading and fieldwork. A platoon from Company A provided the labor. Maj Robert B. Lothrop, the Ft. Mills post engineer, was the general supervisor for the project. By the time the gun arrived, camouflage had been placed on the installation site, dubbed RJ43 (Road Junction 43), located south of Artillery Point between Water Tower Hill and Malinta Tunnel.<sup>21</sup>

The platoon began excavation for the gun base on 14 February. At the same time, it was stocking material to pour the concrete and camouflage the site. As with most of their tasks on Corregidor, the men worked at night and stayed in foxholes during the day. On 4 March, the project was complete. The site included underground ammunition storage. The 8-inch gun was mounted on its base, giving it a 360-degree axis, and test-fired.<sup>22</sup>

Commenting specifically on the artillery, Louis Morton wrote that Corregidor’s “defenses were further strengthened by the addition of an 8-inch gun . . . brought over from Bataan.” The 12-inch mortars of

Battery Geary with their antipersonnel rounds had proven effective, even firing at maximum range, in the Battle of the Points. Battery Hearn's mortars, positioned to defend against threats from the East China Sea, had also shelled Cavite, located south of Manila on Manila Bay. Nevertheless, not until the last days of the Bataan defense did Battery Hearn direct its fire against the higher elevations of the peninsula and the last line of organized resistance along the Alangan River.



**Figure 21.4. Corregidor (RJ43): 8-inch gun emplacement.** (Adapted from Basic map from Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 554.)

Despite the unexplained delays in installing the gun as the Philippine Commonwealth and MacArthur proposed in early 1941, and the tremendous efforts to fix the guns after the war started, these large artillery pieces might have helped delay the Japanese conquest slightly longer than the Fil-American defenders did. The positions selected on Bataan allowed for coverage of the RBP and the West Coast. The site in Corregidor was in the position to fire on the Japanese assault forces during 5–6 May 1942.

Stories of the fate of the remaining 8-inch gun differ, but its lack of impact remained a constant. In a 6 October 1945 report, Gen Homer Case, commander, 14th Antiaircraft Command, stated that the 8-inch Model 1908 railroad gun, emplaced in concrete east of Malinta Tunnel, was in an exposed position and fired only a few of the 300 rounds of ammunition on hand before it was destroyed. All shells fired were found to be duds. Morton said, “no crew was available, and the [8-inch] gun never fired a shot at the enemy.” Supplementing Morton’s comments, Charles Bogart—who first wrote in detail about the Philippine Inland Seas Defense Project—said that although ready for combat, the gun never fired again because artillerymen who were supposed to operate it were never evacuated from Bataan. Thus, the effort dedicated to transport and installation only served to pull engineers from priority tasks. Lt Col Fertig’s comment summarized the situation: “again work well done was lost.”<sup>23</sup>

In an eloquent summation of the overall project, Mark Skinner Watson commented in his book, *The War Department—Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*:

Of the development of the Luzon-Visayan enterprise, not much more need be said, save that with the larger authority that came to General MacArthur [in mid-1941], he pushed the enterprise with energy. That it would lead nowhere, although unforeseeable, proved the fact, for fate allowed insufficient time and materiel, manpower, and training. What this impressive plan might have developed in another six months, had the Japanese attack been delayed so long, is a matter for diverting but fruitless speculation. General MacArthur’s high optimism over the prospect was revealed at intervals as the work advanced under his direction.<sup>24</sup>

#### Notes

1. Watson, *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 426–432; MacArthur to Marshall, letter, 17 February 1941, NARA, RG165, Box 11; MacArthur to AGO, War Department, letter, 1 October 1941, Subject: Operations Plan R-5, MMA RG2, Box 1, Folder 2; Marshall to MacArthur, letter, 29 March 1941, NARA RG165, Box 11; Marshall to Grunert, letter, 29 March 1941, NARA RG165, Box 11; MacArthur to Marshall, letter, 17 November 1941, no subject [expansion of Inland seas Defense Plan], NARA RG165, Entry 281, Box 109; Charles H. Bogart, “The Doomed Philippine Inland Seas Project,” *Periodical* 54, Corregidor Historical Society, n.d., 1. The number of guns varied in different accounts from six to eight, and the debate has continued. See Tony Fredo, “The Big One of Bataan,” *ShellWings*, 5 February 2016, <https://shellwings.wordpress.com/>. By June 1918, the first 8-inch railway mount had passed testing at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. By November 1918, 18 complete units had been turned out, and the contracting plants had developed a capacity of 15 mounts per month. See also Glen Williford, *Racing the Sunrise*, 103–04.

2. MacArthur to Marshall, letter, 1 February 1941; Williford, *Racing the Sunrise*, 103; Casey, Report on Conduct of Demolitions in the Philippines (Draft), n.d., 9; Bogart, "The Doomed Philippine Inland Sea Defense Project," 3; Carl Robinson, AGO, to chief of ordnance, 1st Ind. 31 October 1941, Subject: Seacoast Artillery Equipment, Philippine Department, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 23; Robinson to chief signal officer, memo, 31 October 1941, Subject: Seacoast Artillery Equipment, Philippine Department, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 23.

3. Brig Gen Stephen M. Mellnik, *Philippine Diary, 1939-45* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969), 11, 20–28, 36–37, 42; Maj Harry B. Quinn, assistant AGO, USAFFE, to CoS, PA, memo, 1 November 1941, Subject: Allotment of Funds for Inland Seas Defense Installation, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 24; CoS, PA, to CG, USAFFE, memo, 25 October 1942, Subject: Inland Seas Defense Project of the Philippines, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 25; USAFFE Special Orders No. 59, 1 November 1941, [assignment of Cpt Mellnik to CAC], MMA RG2, Box 1, Folder 3; CoS, PA, to CG, USAFFE, memo, 25 November 1942, Subject: Inland Seas Defense Project of the Philippines, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 25; USAFFE to War Department, radiogram, 10 November 1941, no subject [timing of gun emplacement and manning], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 37, [Source not specified], Map, Coast Artillery Sea Coast Gun Protection for Beach Defense Operations in Critical Areas of North Luzon, n.d., NARA RG496, Entry, 540. The 91st was one of the Philippine Scout regiments responsible for maintaining minefields and staffing island outposts in Manila Bay. Mellnik dated the arrival of the guns in the Philippines incorrectly as mid-1939. The Japanese torpedoed the USAT *Liberty* in January 1942, off the coast of Bali, where it was then beached.

4. Bogart, "The Doomed Philippine Inland Sea Defense Project," 3; Mellnik, *Philippine Diary*, 43. Bogart said Sutherland ordered the transfer of two 8-inch guns to harbor and port defense; [Col] D[orsey] J. R[utherford] to AGO through ACoS, G-3, 1st Ind., 24 December 1941, Subject: Demolitions, Casey Files, Folder 13; USAFFE engineer journal [entries by Captains Gay and Kircher on the 8-inch guns], 19–20 December 1941, Casey Files, Folder 7.

5. Maj Brewster Gallup to Fertig, memo, 2 January 1942, Subject: Shipment of 8" Guns by M[anila] R[ail] R[oad], with handwritten margin notes, probably by Casey, Casey Files, Folder 15; Sutherland to Jose Paez, letter, 14 December 1941, no subject [military control of MRR], NARA RG407, Entry 1053, Box 10; USAFFE engineer journal, 28–29 December, 1941, Casey Files, Folder 3; Sutherland to the secretary to the [Philippine] president, letter, 17 November 1941, MMA RG2, Box 1, Folder 4; Lt Col Nicol Galbraith, notes in Manila (handwritten), 28 December 1941, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 30; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 49–50, Fertig Files; "Company Overview of Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific, Company of Manila, Inc.," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 23 March 2013; See Jim Fergusson's Railway and Tramway Station Lists, "Philippine Railways—SL33 Passenger Stations & Stops," [http://railwaystationlists.co.uk/\(based on Guia Oficial de Filipinas, 1891-98\)](http://railwaystationlists.co.uk/(based on Guia Oficial de Filipinas, 1891-98)). Reconstructing the events later Fertig said "finally it seemed definitely established two of the guns had been lost in the destruction of the ammunition train in San Fernando on the 29th," but the comment did not jibe with dates and times provided in the status report that Gallup compiled for Fertig at the time. It is possible that two of the four guns shipped from Manila on 31 December 1941 were destroyed in an air raid the same day. The observation of Ind, *Bataan: The Judgment Seat*, 178, that on 25 December 1941, he and Col Harold George, commander, V Interceptor Command, FEAF, passed trucks carrying dismounted naval guns heading north near San Fernando does not correlate with the comments of the participants.

6. Gallup to Fertig, memo, 2 January 1942, no subject [8-inch guns]; USAFE engineer journal, 30 December 1941, Casey Files, Folder 3; Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 229. The Gallup Memo had the hand-written annotation "Fisher and convoy." The narrative in Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 14–15, relied heavily on Fertig's account.

7. Gallup to Fertig, memo, 2 January 1942; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 50; USAFFE engineer journal, 31 December 1941, Casey Files, Folder 3.

8. Gallup to Fertig, memo, 2 January 1942; Kircher to Casey, MFR, 2 January 1942, no subject [telephone call], Casey Files, Folder 6; MacArthur to Jose M. Tapia [Pampanga Sugar Development Company], letter, 16 December 1941, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 49; Brig Gen Richard W. Fellows, Comment on Bogart, "The Doomed Philippine Inland Seas Project," 3; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 49–51; Fertig, "Notes on Personal Experiences," 6; Edmonds, *They Fought with What They Had*, 229–230. The location to which the guns may have been switched was documented but almost illegible in the roughly done handwritten notes on Gallup's memo. It appeared to be "Concepcion," a stop on the Del Carmen line.

9. Gallup to Fertig, memo, 2 January 1942; Kircher to Casey, MFR, 2 January 1942; Fellows, Comment on Bogart, "The Doomed Philippine Inland Seas Project," 3; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 49–51; Fertig, "Notes on Personal Experiences," 6; Galbraith to USAFFE G-4, memo, 8 January 1941, Subject: Narrative of Events [inspection tour from Del Carmen to Dinalupihan], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 31.

10. Gallup to Fertig, memo, 2 January 1942; Kircher to Casey, MFR, 2 January 1942.

11. Gallup to Fertig, memo, 2 January 1942; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 49–51; Fertig, "Notes on Personal Experiences," 6; Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Subject Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942, 4, NARA RG338, Box T-4383; Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 14–15; Casey, *Memoirs*, 167. The Goldblith diary documented the role of Headquarters Company and 1st Lt Mowick in transporting the guns. He used the term "from Bagac to Pilar," placing the two locations in reverse order. The guns finally trucked to Bagac were not those in the first shipment from Manila on 29 December. The date of arrival in Bagac was not documented. Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 47–48, detailed the work he and Headquarters Company to retrieve a 1.55-mm GPF and a heavy searchlight but did not make any mention of his involvement with the 8-inch guns.

12. Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Subject Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942, 4; Casey, *Memoirs*, 167; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8; Maj Alfred J. D'Arezzo to Maj Gen William F. Marquat, letter, 27 September 1945, Subject: Eight (8") Inch Gun Battery, Saysain Point, Bataan, P.I., courtesy of Charles Bogart; Engineer, USAFFE, report, 14 January 1942, Subject: Inspection trip of Maj Gay – 23 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 16; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 50–51; Vater, interviews, 5 October 1998 and 12 October 2003; Minder diary, 5–6; Kircher to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, Casey Files, Folder 16; Paul Ashton, "Battle of Bataan," in Paul Ashton, ed., *And Somebody Gives a Damn*, 91; USAFFE engineer journal, 9 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 13, citing a phone call from Maj Gay to Col Rutherford; Ray[mond D.] Flatland to Casey, letter, 27 August 1945, and Casey to Flatland, letter, 22 November 1945, both in NARA RG407, Entry 1106, Box 1442, provided the names of the two civilians involved in the installation of the 8-inch guns. Fertig noted that civilians installed the guns because of a shortage of troops; however, "my officers and men" remained. In one version of his 17 January 1942 Report – 16 Jan 42, Maj Kircher mentioned that the 803rd was to "get the "B" gun parts from the Pilar-Bagac Road."



A second version was corrected to use the term “8” gun parts. It was uncertain if this pertained to the 8-inch guns, but transport of some of their parts had been delayed. Pvt Joseph Vater worked on the 8-inch gun project and identified Lt Farrell as his commanding officer. Col W[illiam] F. Maher, Annex to Accompany Field Order 14, I Corps, 8 April 1942, 8 April 1942, Humphreys Engineer Center, Box 99, Folder 9, identified the site of the number one gun as Saysain Point, which was south of Bagac.

13. D'Arezzo to Marquat, letter, 27 September 1945, Subject: Eight (8”) Inch Gun Battery.

14. Montgomery, Brief History; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 51; Vater, interviews, 5 October 1998 and 30 July 2008; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 4 February 1942, Subject: Report of Inspection of I Corps and Bagac Guns, Casey Files, Folder 7. See Letter and enclosure, Capt Robert D. Montgomery, to Adjutant General Office, 24 June 1946, Subject: The Battle of “Agoloma [*sic*],” Bataan, Philippine Islands, January 1942, Regarding Company “A,”- 803rd Engineer Battalion (AVN) (Sep). The NCO working with Maj Gallup was identified in two documents as Sgt Hunt with further detail in one identifying him as a CAC master gunner. He could have been Sgt Perry A. Hunt or TSgt. Charles F. Hunt. See Center for Research: Allied POWs Under the Japanese, <http://www.mansell.com>. See [Maj] W[illiam] A. G[ay], report, 31 January 1942, Subject: 8” Railway Guns, Casey Files, Folder 6; D'Arezzo to Marquat, letter, 27 September 1945, Subject: Eight (8”) Inch Gun Battery; Gay, report, 13 February 1942, Subject: Inspection I Corps by Major Gay 12 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5. One of Casey's inspectors, Maj Gay, was sufficiently puzzled by inconsistent versions of problems with the gun that he questioned the veracity of Capt Gallup's reports.

15. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 89; Casey to deputy chief of staff, [USAFFE], memo, 22 January 1942, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 16.

16. Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 51–52; Maj Gay, MFR, 31 January 1942, Subject: 8” Railway Guns, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey, report, 4 February 1942, Subject: Report of Inspection [of ] I Corps and Bagac Guns 1/29; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations for Week Ending 7 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Wallace, *POW* 83, 113; Engineer, USAFFE, Bataan, report, 13 February 1942, Subject: Inspection [of] I corps by Maj Gay, 12 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6; Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942, 4; Casey, *Memoirs*, 167; Engineer, USAFFE, report, 14 January 1942, Subject: Inspection trip of Maj Gay – 23 January 1942; Engineer, USAFFE, advance command post, Bataan, memo, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Construction Report, 24 January 1942; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 50–51; Vater, interviews, 5 October 1998 and 12–13 October 2003; Minder diary, 5–6; Kircher to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 24 January 1942, Subject: Weekly Report on Construction, Casey Files, Folder 16; Ashton, “Battle of Bataan,” 91. Fertig noted that civilians installed the guns because of a shortage of troops but that his officers and men remained. In one version of his 17 January 1942, Report – 16 January 1942, Maj Kircher mentioned that the 803rd was to “get the “B” gun parts from the Pilar-Bagac Road.”

17. Letter, D'Arezzo to Marquat, 27 September 1945, Subject: Eight (8”) Inch Gun Battery; report, Cpt Thomas Delamore, 20 February 1942, Subject: Inspection of Lt. Delamore – 19 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5.

18. Letter, D'Abrezzo to Marquat, 27 September 1945, Subject: Eight (8”) Inch Gun Battery; See Bob Hackett and Sander Kingsepp, “Junyokan: IJN Kuma: Tabular Record of Movement.” [http://www.combinedfleet.com/kuma\\_t.htm](http://www.combinedfleet.com/kuma_t.htm).

19. Col W[illiam] F. Maher, Annex to Accompany Field Order 14, I Corps, 8 April 1942, 8 April 1942, Humphrey Engineer Center, Box 99, Folder 9; Letter, D'Arezzo to Marquat, 27 September 1945, Subject: Eight (8”) Inch Gun Battery.



20. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations ending 31 January 1941, Casey Files, Folder 4; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 51; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Zubay to author, letter, ca. 1999; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 47–48; D'Arezzo to Marquat, letter, 27 September 1945, Subject: Eight (8") Inch Gun Battery. In his letter Zubay said his actions were “at the same time the Japs had pulled an end run around our lines and landed at Agolome [*sic*] Point [i.e., ca. 25 January].” He did not specify the location of the front lines at that time. Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 14, which was prone to overstatement, noted the guns “were to see heavy duty in the battle for Bataan.”

21. Gay, MFR, 5 February 1942, Subject: Telephone call – 2-1-42, Fries 9:50, Casey Files, Folder 4; Col Lloyd Mielenz [defense engineer, Ft. Mills] to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 9 March 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 1–7 March 1942, Inclusive, Casey Files; Casey to acting chief of staff, G-1, memo, 3 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Headquarters, USAFFE, Special Order 12, 3 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Kircher to Casey, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: Report: 6 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey to CG USAFFE, memo, 8 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations for Week Ending 7 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Mielenz to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 9 February 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 1–7 February 1942, Inclusive, Casey Files; Vater interviews, 6 March 1999, and 12–13 October 2003; USAFFE engineer journal [Casey], 24 December 1941, Casey Files, Folder 13, provided sole identification of Lothrop's position. Engineer, USAFFE, roster, 21 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6, identified him as assistant defense engineer, Ft. Mills. The gun's location was almost directly on the path of the Japanese invasion route of 5 May 1942. See Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 554.

22. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5; Vater, interview, 6 March 1999; Mielenz to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 9 March 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 1–7 March 1942, inclusive, Casey Files; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 13 February 1942, Subject: Inspection of Ft Mills, Casey Files, Folder 6; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 490.

23. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 489–90; Eyewitness Statement, Gen Homer E. Case, 6 October 1945, Subject: Report as to War Damage to the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bay, <https://www.corregidor.org/>; Bogart, “The Doomed Philippine Inland Sea Defense Project”; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 52; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 261–62; <https://www.corregidorisland.com>.

24. Watson, *Strategy and Command: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, 432.

## Chapter 22

### **Personnel and Organizational Changes**

Throughout the battle for Bataan, as battalion commander, Major Fries had more concerns than engineer requirements and tasking. After the withdrawal to Bataan, he also had to continuously shuffle personnel to fill critical gaps inside and outside the battalion. The principal causes for those challenges were the lack of experienced US Army engineer personnel—the 803rd was the only US Army engineer unit in the Philippines—and the last-minute the call up of Philippine Army engineers. Most of the Filipinos had only limited military training and specifically did not have training as military engineers. Ironically, casualties were only a minor factor. Most of the personnel detached from the 803rd, both veteran and newly commissioned officers and NCOs, went to I Corps and then many of those to the 71st Engineer Combat Battalion Philippine Army.

In the II Corps, the 301st Engineer Combat Regiment Philippine Army reorganized in mid-February into the 201st and 202nd Engineer Combat Battalions Philippine Army. They had many US engineers with mining, if not military, experience. Thus, the shuffling of personnel in a combat environment was even more essential and critical than the challenges that had plagued the COE in the immediate prewar era.

### **Personnel Deficiencies**

For its construction of airfields, both in the prewar period and after withdrawal to Bataan, the companies of the 803rd operated almost as autonomous entities with seemingly little interaction with the battalion commander, among themselves, or with the engineer battalions of the Philippine Army. On Bataan, this was most evident when work on airfields became more limited, and the emphasis changed to general construction—particularly road and trail work—and combat engineering. The 803rd became more closely linked to the Filipino engineer battalions and the 14th Engineers PS. As of early February, under Casey's direction, the I Corps engineer Col Harry A. Skerry and the II Corps engineer Maj William Chenoweth attempted to strengthen the hastily organized and poorly prepared

Philippine Army combat engineer battalions with personnel, advice, and training from the 803rd and the 14th Engineers. Before the war, the 14th was able to provide only one officer and two NCOs to each PA engineer battalion for the training of cadre.

On 23 December, in the middle of the retreat from Lingayen Gulf to Bataan, Stickney told Casey that the NLF—which later became the I Corps—suffered from “a deficiency of skilled labor” and requested “about 20 or 30 good all-around demolition and general construction men” to assist the various engineer units on construction and demolition assignments. Major Chenoweth was more fortunate in II Corps. With the 500 troops he had separated from the units in the II Corps for the 301st Engineer Combat Regiment, he added many civilian mining engineers whom the USAFFE had commissioned quickly after the start of the war. With their induction, Chenoweth wanted to propose an exchange of four or five officers of the 301st Engineers with officers of the 803rd or 14th to give the newly commissioned officers needed “military experience with regular organizations.” Still, he correctly surmised that he did “not think he [would] get to first base.” He acquired only Maj Harry O. Fischer and Capt Mitchell Major from the Service Command engineer section. When the 301st was reorganized on 13 February 1942, they were named the commanders of the 201st and 202nd Engineer Combat battalions, respectively.<sup>1</sup>

To teach PA engineers the essentials of combat engineering, Casey, Skerry, and Chenoweth began intensive training courses. Officers of the 14th and 803rd were assigned to combat battalions for instructing soldiers on the basic use of tools and equipment, placement of machine guns, and beach defense preparation. On 9 March, the II Corps commander Maj Gen George Parker and General Casey approved the assignment of 803rd officers to train their counterparts in the 202nd EB PA “for a period not in excess of 7 days” in “normal company and battalion administrative procedures.” Goldblith said Headquarters Company tried to conduct a school for the newly commissioned mining engineers in late March, but the final Japanese offensive intervened to stop the effort.<sup>2</sup>

## Promotions and Assignments

Casey drove the personnel changes by simultaneously assigning veteran commissioned officers to the I and II Corps on a temporary

basis, by pressing for the commissioning of selected enlisted personnel to replace departing officers, and by urging the promotion of officers—particularly from the 803rd. Under the circumstances, the process took longer than anticipated and required Casey's persistence to bring the changes to fruition. From the 803rd, some of the newly commissioned officers were sent to the I Corps, and others remained in the battalion, primarily Company C, to fill vacancies left by officers who had been reassigned. The first of Casey's actions cost the 803rd its executive officer. Capt Clarence Bidgood was temporarily assigned to the 71st Engineer Combat Battalion PA as of 14 January 1942. Capt James D. Richardson replaced him. Lt James D. Leggett moved up to become the battalion's assistant adjutant. About a month later, on 11 February, Bidgood was promoted to major (temporary), and on 22 February, he was assigned formally to command the 71st Engineers. Lt Theodore L. Pflueger, the supply officer in Company C, accompanied Bidgood to the 71st. Politically, the US Army assignees to the PA units did not have command authority; instead they could only train, advise, and make recommendations to commanders of PA engineer battalions, who were usually captains. Despite this, they were essentially in command. The assignments of Bidgood, Fischer, and Major as battalion commanders represented a notable, if unpublicized, change in policy to fit the requirements of the time.<sup>3</sup>

At the time of the assignments of the first officers to Philippine Army engineer battalions, Skerry pressed Casey, and Casey, in turn, pressed the USAFFE for the commissioning of senior NCOs and college-educated engineers inducted via selective service for transfer to I Corps, particularly for the 71st EB. Formed in Baguio, the 71st had worked on roads at Camp O'Donnell, but they did not have combat engineer training. Casey's objective was to "furnish urgently needed junior engineer officers" to the PA units. All the proposed candidates were from the 803rd engineers:

- Promotion to 1st lieutenant:
  - MSgt Sergeant Clyde E. Huffstickler, Headquarters Company
  - MSgt Sergeant Dumont G. Williams, Company C
- Promotion to 2nd lieutenant:
  - TSgt Ralph Gibbs, Company C
  - TSgt Ernial M. Feller, Battalion Headquarters

- 1st Sgt Clarence A. Rutz, Company A
- SSgt Howard G. Morton, Company A
- SSgt Sidney Angus, Company B
- TSgt James H. Duff, Battalion Headquarters
- Sgt Santo S. Trifilo, Company B (selectee)
- Sgt Victor Witman, Company B (selectee).<sup>4</sup>

As responses to his recommendations lagged, Casey both side-stepped and challenged the bureaucracy. On 18 January 1942, Skerry called Casey to request that engineer personnel promised his troops would “be sent as soon as possible.” Casey immediately called Major Fries and “instructed him to send the enlisted men recommended for commission[s] temporarily to Col. Skerry[,] pending final action on their commissions.” Casey then directed Col Narciso L. Manzano, his executive and personnel officer, to follow up with the USAFFE at Ft. Mills, on 21 January. When approached on the matter, Col Charles P. Stivers, G-1 (Personnel), responded that he was working on the commissions and the transfers but needed to discuss it with General Sutherland. It turned out that Sutherland was the obstacle. Disagreeing with Casey’s recommendations, the Corregidor-based Sutherland said on 5 February that there was nothing to justify the necessity for the promotion, commissioning, and transfer of enlisted men from the 803rd and noted that the proposal appeared to be a “scheme” to promote certain men. Still, Sutherland said, “if a definite and useful purpose [could] be shown, he would approve the letter.” In response, Sutherland’s interlocutor, Col Dorsey J. Rutherford, who was Casey’s executive officer, disagreed on the issue of a scheme and noted the need for the men and the promotions.<sup>5</sup>

Commissions for all the enlisted personnel on Casey’s commission finally became effective on 6 February 1941. As of 21 February, newly commissioned Second Lieutenants Feller, Rutz, Morton, Trifilo, and Witman were officially transferred and permanently assigned to the 71st. First Lieutenant Huffstickler and 2nd Lt. Duff went to the I Corps headquarters for assignments in personnel, operations, and training, respectively. They had held temporary posts in those units since 15 January.<sup>6</sup>

The augmentation of the 71st was particularly important. According to Skerry, during January 1942, the 71st functioned as the I Corps engineer element responsible for meeting the engineer requirements

for the entire I Corps area, as opposed to working within its assigned combat division. The 71st Engineers with its attached labor companies of about 100 men each became responsible for maintenance of the West Road, north of the Service Command Area. They essentially replaced Company A of the 803rd in early February 1942. Skerry judged that the labor companies attached to the 71st “were a definite help and were used largely on maintenance and repair of roads.” However, Maj William Gay commented in mid-February that the efforts to drive aggressive actions in the Philippine Army elements were exhausting officers like Major Bidgood and they were “not capable of continuing under such pressure.”<sup>7</sup>

Stickney continued to deal with personnel shortages in the I Corps. As of 15 March, he requested the activation of a I Corps engineer headquarters and additional enlisted personnel to staff it. He noted that an inadequate number of enlisted men limited the time he and his five overworked officers had to meet the obligations of their primary functions: planning, supervision, and inspection. Stickney recommended filling new positions with “surplus personnel of the 14th Eng[inee]rs (PS), as well as from the 803rd and Department Engineer.”<sup>8</sup>

Other newly commissioned officers stayed in the 803rd to backfill reassigned personnel. Second Lt Sidney Angus moved from Headquarters Company to the 803rd’s battalion staff. In Company C, 1st Lt Dumont Williams and 2nd Lt Ralph Gibbs replaced the late 2nd Lt Caldwell and 1st Lt Pflueger, respectively. In the enlisted ranks, Metras E. Treffle, Company A’s motor pool sergeant, replaced Clarence Rutz, as the first sergeant of Company A. The 22 February assignment orders also document the transfer of 1st Lt Thomas Delamore from the 803rd to Headquarters, USAFFE, and Maj Harry O. Fischer to Headquarters of the II Corps (i.e., 201st Engineers). Delamore had previously been temporarily assigned to Casey’s staff as an inspector, and Fischer had been on temporary assignment to the II Corps.<sup>9</sup>

Because of the input from Major Fries, Casey recommended in his 14 January 1942 memorandum to the USAFFE on the commissioning of enlisted personnel that the following officers be promoted to give them “rank commensurate with positions held and work performed[,] as well as [to] help to [maintain] the excellent morale of this unit:”

- Promotion to captain (temporary):
  - 1st Lt Elgin G. Radcliff as company commander [unspecified]

- 1st Lt James D. Richardson, battalion officer
- 1st Lt Edmund P. Zbikowski, commander, Company A
- To First Lieutenant (permanent):
  - 1st Lt James L. Leggett, battalion headquarters
- To First Lieutenant (temporary):
  - 2nd Lt Everett J. Carney, company officer, Headquarters Company
  - 2nd Lt Hugh K. Fraser, company officer, Company C.<sup>10</sup>

As with Casey's other requested personal actions, the USAFFE greeted the promotion recommendations with inaction. In frustration, on 17 February, Casey wrote to General MacArthur, through Col Charles P. Stivers, assistant chief of staff—personnel (G-1). In the diplomatic fashion characteristic of his written communication with the general: "Attention is invited to the fact that these recommendations are being resubmitted [original emphasis] as no action has yet been taken on previous recommendations submitted by the C[ommanding] O[fficer], 803rd Engineers." Casey requested urgent "immediate[,] favorable action . . . [because] further delay . . . [would] be detrimental to the morale of this splendid organization." In addition to re-documenting his 14 January 1942, request, Casey also repeated his recommendation for the promotion of 1st Lieutenant Richardson, the battalion adjutant, to captain and 2nd Lieutenant Carney to first lieutenant. To support his case, Casey included copies of the 16 and 17 February letters from Major Fries on the transfers and promotions. He also noted that "several of the vacancies for which promotions are herein recommended are contingent on the transfer of certain officers from the 803rd [EB], as originally recommended . . . [on] 14 January 1942."<sup>11</sup>

The resubmission was effective. Casey received approval for most of his recommendations on 24 February, and Manzano immediately notified Fries of the results. First Lieutenants Richardson and Zbikowski were promoted to captain (temporary). Second Lieutenants Carney, Fraser, and Leggett were promoted to first lieutenant (temporary). Casey must have been confident of the response, for the 21 February 1942, roster of officers with the USAFFE engineer headquarters and units had already documented the promotions and assignments. In response to his query, Colonel Stivers told Manzano

that 1st Lt Radcliff had not been promoted to captain, as recommended, because of his “low rank, short commissioned service [and] no command.” Manzano’s protestations that as battalion supply officer, Radcliff occupied a captain’s billet on the table of organization and that he was slated for assignment as a company commander [not documented further], also a captain’s billet, did not change the USAFFE’s decision.<sup>12</sup>

While these personnel actions on promotions and transfers were in motion, Major Fries undertook yet another realignment of officers in the 803rd on 7 February. In addition to assigning the newly promoted 1st Lieutenant Williams and 2nd Lieutenant Gibbs to platoon leader positions in Company C, he also reconfigured the battalion staff:

- 1st Lt James D. Richardson—relieved as battalion adjutant and assigned as executive officer, replacing Captain Bidgood, who was assigned to the I Corps on verbal orders;
- 2nd Lt James L. Leggett—relieved as assistant adjutant, detailed as battalion adjutant, and in addition to other duties, designated battalion intelligence officer;
- 2nd Lt Sidney Angus—reassigned from Headquarters Company to become adjutant adjunct for personnel, replacing Leggett;
- 1st Lt William B. Thomas, battalion engineer officer—relieved of additional duties as battalion gas officer and intelligence officer; and
- 1st Lt Elgin B. Radcliff—in addition to other duties, assigned as battalion gas officer.<sup>13</sup>

On 11 February 1942, Casey also pursued—unsuccessfully—the promotion of the 803rd’s commanding officer, Major Fries. Casey recommended that to the USAFFE that Major Fries be promoted to lieutenant colonel for his “outstanding work,” and “high qualities of leadership.” Casey cited MacArthur’s commendation, which Casey himself had drafted, on 20 January 1942, for the “fine work” of the battalion. Two weeks later, he recognized the battalion’s work on roads and bridges from Pilar through Mariveles to Bagac as “excellent.” Casey’s recommendation concluded with “In personality, ability, and leadership [Maj Fries] is an outstanding officer.” However, again, the USAFFE did not act on Casey’s recommendation.<sup>14</sup>



Further, but still not final, personnel changes came on 7 February. Major Fries recommended the temporary promotion of enlisted personnel to fill the vacancies left by the departing NCOs. Temporary promotions brought an increase in rank but not in pay. To receive the compensation accorded to each rank, the promotion had to be classed as “permanent.” The group of temporary promotions included:

- Headquarters Company
  - Master Sergeant: TSgt Frank Rose
  - Technical Sergeant: SSgt Matthew S. Whitehurst
  - Staff Sergeant: Sgt Merrill F. Miller
  - Sergeant: Cpl Raymond F. Barry
  - Corporal: Pfc Michael J. Perfett and Pfc Stanley Casanova
- Company A
  - First Sergeant: SSgt Treffle E. Metras
  - Staff Sergeant: Sgt Floyd T. Niday and Sgt Peter N. Retterath
  - Sergeant: Cpl Ralph M. Hayman, Cpl Lawrence E. Cook, and Pfc Donald Smith
  - Corporal: Pfc John B. Stoddard and Pfc Alton R. Swann
- Company B
  - Staff Sergeant: Sgt Harold J. Rabinowitz
  - Sergeant: Cpl Edward C. Witmer
  - Corporal: Pfc James A. Russell and Pfc Albert A. Vaccaro
- Company C
  - First Sergeant: Sgt Raymond F. Sternberg
  - Sergeant: Cpl Carl D. Smith and Pfc (Specialist 3rd Class) Stanislaus Malor
  - Corporal: Pfc William Jagers, Jr.<sup>15</sup>

As part of the 7 February personnel action, TSgt Albert Burkart was transferred to Headquarters Company from Company C.<sup>16</sup>

Given the pressures of the time, the fluidity of the personnel situation for the engineers continued with further transfers to and from the 803rd. These changes would be on a permanent or temporary basis to the other units. On 13 February, the following enlisted per-

sonnel, supposedly from the 803rd, were promoted and assigned to Headquarters, I Corps: SSgt James R. Smith, promoted from sergeant; Sgt Peter F. D'Onotrio [possibly D'Onofrio], promoted from private first class; Sgt Eugene F. Kowalski of Headquarters Company, promoted from private; and Melville L. Levy of B Company promoted to specialist third class. Nor were the assignments limited to the I Corps. The II Corps engineer, Major Chenoweth ordered two men from Company B to train as mechanics for the 302nd ER PA. Ten days later the USAFFE engineer approved a "mutual transfer" involving a Pfc George R. Eyre of Company A, 803rd, to the Service Command engineer section and Pvt Alvin E. Stewart of the Service Command engineer section to Company A. Eight more of the 803rd's enlisted men were to be assigned to the II Corps. As of 10 March, however, they had not reported to Maj Barton A. Barrett, the II Corps intelligence officer. Casey reported discussing "personnel problems" with Major Fries on 13 February, but he did not elaborate on which issues or any resolution in his report.<sup>17</sup>

#### Notes

1. Dod, *The War against Japan*, 88, 95–98; Skerry to Lt Col George A. Meidling, letter, 20 July 1949, no subject [Comment on Volumes II and V, *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific*]; Casey, *Memoirs*, 154, 187; Engineer, USAFFE, advance CP, [roster], 11 February and 11 March 1942, Subject: US Army Officers on Duty with Engineer Headquarters and Units, Casey Files, Folder 9; Manzano, Subject: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Major Chenoweth, MFR, 16 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5; Gay, report, 17 February 1942, Subject: Inspection II Corps—Major Gay—2-15-42; Casey, memo, 3 February 1942, Subject: Strengthening of Combat Units, Casey Files, possibly a draft recommendation for strengthening PA combat divisions; Delamore, report, 20 February 1942, Subject: Inspection of Lt. Delamore—19 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5; Casey, MFR, 23 December 1941, Subject: Telephone Conversation [with Col Stickney], Casey Files, Folder 13; Manzano to ODE, 13 February 1942, 2nd wrapper Ind., Subject: Mutual Transfer between Pvt Eyre, 803rd, and SSgt Stewart, ODE, Casey Files, Folder 5. Capt Mitchell Major died at the Cabanatuan POW Camp on 28 August 1942.

2. Casey to engineer, II Corps, 1st wrapper Ind., 9 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 50 Casey to ODE, memo, 10 January 1942, no subject [roster of engineers recommended for formal assignment to II Corps], RG 407, Box 1662, Microfilm Box 67.

3. Headquarters, USAFFE, Special Orders No. 40, 11 February 1942, and Special Orders, No. 50, 11 February 1942, both in NARA RG407, Box 1663, Microfilm Roll 71; Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I.

4. Engineer, USAFFE, to Acting CoS, G-4, memo, 14 January 1942, Subject: Commission, Promotion, and Transfer of Engineer Personnel, Casey Files, Folder 6; Brig Gen Clyde Selleck, *War Diary*, (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1985), 11.

5. [USAFFE engineer journal entry 626], Rutherford, 5 February 1941, no subject [conversations with Sutherland, Mielenz, Casey, etc.], Casey Files, Folder 4; Dorsey, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: Report Engineering Activities Week Ending 7 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey, MFR, 18 January 1942, Subject: Col Skerry called 1:15 PM 1-18-42 [re: personnel], Casey Files, Folder 16; author undocumented [possibly Col Dorsey Rutherford], MFR, 24 January 1942, no subject [miscellaneous engineer issues], Casey Files, Folder 13.

6. Roster, Engineer, USAFFE, 21 February 1942, Subject: US Army Officers on Duty with Engineer Headquarters and Units, Casey Files, Folder 5; Montgomery, "Brief History," 5; Summary of Headquarters, USAFFE Special Orders No. 26, 6 February 1942, NARA RG407, Entry 1053, Box 9.

7. Skerry to Meidling, letter, 20 July 1949, [Subject: Comment of *Volumes II and V, Engineers of the Southwest Pacific*]; Casey, *Memoirs*, 154, 187; Engineer, USAFFE, advance CP, [roster], 11 March 1942, Subject: US Army Officers on Duty with Engineer Headquarters and Units, Casey Files, Folder 9; Col Harry A. Skerry, Report of Organization and Operations of the North Luzon Force Engineers between 8 December and 6 January 1942, n.d., 2-3; Gay, report, 13 February 1942, Subject: Inspection [of] I Corps by Major Gay 12 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6. The 71st was under the command of Capt Hector Franco at the start of the war, and Lt. Hugh A. Derrick, Corp of Engineers, was assigned as the battalion advisor.

8. Stickney to Engineer, USAFFE, 1st wrapper Ind., 15 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8.

9. Engineer, USAFFE, to ACoS, G-4, memo, 14 January 1942, Subject: Commission, Promotion, and Transfer of Engineer Personnel, Casey Files, Folder 6. Rutz died at Camp O'Donnell, and Williams died at Cabanatuan POW Camp on 26 August 1942. Pflueger to author, email, 5 April and 9 May 2001; Wallace, *POW* 83, 78-80; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 17 February 1942, Subject: Transfer of Officers, Casey Files, Folder 6; Kinser, interview, 4 May 1999.

10. Engineer, USAFFE, to Acting CoS (G-4), memo, 14 January 1942, Subject: Commission, Promotion, and Transfer of Engineer Personnel.

11. DJR [Col Dorsey J. Rutherford], MFR, 21 January, 22 January, and 5 February 1942, Casey Files, Folders 13 and 7, respectively; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 17 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6.

12. Col. N[arciso L. M[anzano], MFR, 24 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6; Capt. E. Viardo, Engineer, USAFFE, Ft. Mills, memo, 14 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5; Engineer, USAFFE, 21 February 1942, Subject: US Army Officers on Duty with Engineer Headquarters and Units, Casey Files, Folder 5. The roster had Radcliff listed as a captain.

13. Headquarters, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Aviation, Separate, Special Orders Number 15, 7 February 1942, NARA RG407, Stack 270/Row 49/Compartment 23/Shelf 6/Roll 1663.

14. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 11 February 1942, Subject: Promotion of Maj Fries, Casey Files, Folder 6; Casey to [CoS, USAFFE], memo, 21 December 1941, no subject [draft commendation for 803rd Engineer Battalion, Casey Files, Folder 2; Casey to [CoS, USAFFE], memo, 18 January 1942, Subject: Commendation; CG, USAFFE, to CO, 803rd Engineer Aviation Battalion, memo, 20 January 1942, Subject: Commendation; Fries, Philippine Military Prisoner Camp No. 2 [Davao Penal Colony - DaPeCol] "to whom it may concern," memo, 18 January 1943, no subject [Recommendations for Decorations], NARA RG 507, Box 12; Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942, NARA RG338, Box T-4383, Decimal 319.1.

15. See 803rd Engineer Aviation Separate Battalion, Special Orders No. 15, 7 February 1942.

16. See 803rd Engineer Aviation Separate Battalion, Special Orders No. 15, 7 February 1942.

17. Manzano, MFR, 17 February 1942, Subject: Telephone Conversation with Col [Harry] Skerry, citing Headquarters, I Corps, Special Orders Number 20, 13 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8. The Ingersoll, Kloecker, and Leggett rosters identified Pfc Levy, who died at Cabanatuan on 5 September 1942. The USAFFE roster identified Pvt Kowalski as Headquarters Company, and the ADBC roster listed him as a private without identifying company of assignment. The record for Sgt James R. Smith was in the USAFFE roster, while the ADBC roster listed him as a private without identifying company of assignment. No 803rd or USAFFE roster had a listing from Sgt Peter F. Donotrio. The correct spelling was probably Peter F. D'Onofrio, who was KIA on the *Shinyo Maru* on 7 September 1944. Casey to Engineer, II Corps, memo, 9 March 1942, Subject: 1st Wrapper [Indorsement], Casey Files, Folder 8. The initial memorandum with the name of these personnel was not available. [Maj] W[illiam] A. G[ay], [USAFFE Engineer training and operations officer], MFR, 10 March 1942, Subject: [Conversation with] Major Barrett – II Corps, Casey Files, Folder 8. Manzano to [ODE] in the Field, 2nd wrapper [Ind.], 23 February 1942, Subject: Mutual Transfer between Pvt. Eyre, 803rd, and SSgt Stewart [Department Engineer]; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject; Citations, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey, report, 14 February 1942, Subject: Inspection 13 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5; Gay, report, 17 February 1942, Subject: Inspection II Corps – Major Gay – 2-15-42, Casey Files, Folder 13. Pfc George Robert Eyre, Corps of Engineers, was assigned to the Visaya-Mindanao Force when surrendered. He was murdered in the Palawan POW massacre.



## Chapter 23

# Life during the Siege

## Morale

Morale was high when the USAFFE troops finally reached Bataan and dug in for the fight. Among the 803rd Engineers, Lieutenant Coone commented that the Company A's New Year's Eve party at Orani was quiet and despite the warm beer, liquor, and bleak prospects for the future, that morale was good. Of the battalion, in general, Colonel Casey wrote on 8 January after an inspection tour: "Good outfit. High morale." MacArthur's 10 January tour of Bataan did little, if anything, to raise morale in the 803rd, however. Pvt Walter Middleton—who was working on the West Road when the general's motorcade passed—said later that it was "strange" that MacArthur "would pick an area that was practically deserted and not visit even makeshift hospitals where it might have made a difference." In mid-January, Casey's second attempt to obtain a unit citation commending the 803rd for its work from 8 to 24 December was successful. A verbatim repetition of a Casey memo to the USAFFE, the commendation began:

This Headquarters has noted with deep satisfaction the splendid work performed by your organization since its arrival in the Philippines, and particularly between 8 December, 1941, and 24 December, 1941.

In the face of continued bombardment and strafing of Clark, Del Carmen, and Nichols Fields your men continued day and night to carry on their important engineer construction and repair operations, and in addition to their engineering mission, assumed the task of guarding and defending these fields. They have displayed a splendid spirit, established an excellent record, and set a high standard of devotion to duty in the execution of their tasks.<sup>1</sup>

The commendation was posted on the bulletin board at battalion headquarters, and some of the men later copied it into their diaries.<sup>2</sup>

As of mid-February, Brig General Casey observed, "in general morale of American officers in front line units is not too high." As detailed in a separate chapter, he might have also included Company A, whose ranks were decimated at Quinuan Point, in the latter category. "They have kept going under difficulties of having to force much of their personnel to keep fighting and the continuous strain without relief [was] telling on them." Yet he also said, "morale of all [engineer]

units appear[ed to be] increasing.” Among other measures to boost morale, he suggested that priority be given to promotions in combat units rather than headquarters, staff, or service units. He also suggested that MacArthur and Manuel Quezon, president of the Philippines, make a joint visit “to inspire the commands and troops.” At the same time, however, Casey was still fighting with the USAFFE headquarters for promotions for both officers and men of the 803rd. A day later he commented, “if only a company or battalion of reinforcements or only a few planes could be secured soon, merely as symbols [emphasis in original] of reinforcements to come even tho [sic] in the fairly remote future, such additions would effect a great uplift in morale of the entire command.”<sup>3</sup>

But morale degraded steadily with the shortage of food, cigarettes, and medicine. Lieutenant Goldblith later commented that by February, food shortages had made the engineers “short-tempered, hungry, etc.” Hopes were severely shaken when President Roosevelt, in his 23 February 1942 “Fireside Chat,” placed the Philippines “in the big picture of the war.” Reading between the lines of the speech, his listeners on Bataan did not find any hope for relief in the president’s remarks about the nature of global warfare, the tremendous tasks facing the American people, and the steady increase in military production.<sup>4</sup>

Among themselves, the troops were more sarcastic or cynical in their outlook. Officers, in general, and MacArthur, in particular, were frequent objects of their scorn. In a diary kept on Bataan, Pvt John Zubay recorded the following poems:

#### **Dugout Doug**

Dugout Doug is shaking on the rock  
 Safe from every bombing & from all sudden shock  
 He’s eating all the best food in the land  
 While his troops are starving n Bataan  
 Dugout Doug, come out from hiding  
 Dugout Doug, come out from hiding  
 Send Franklin the glad tiding  
 That his troops go striding on  
 Dugout Doug’s not timid. He’s cautious  
 Not afraid. He’s protecting his stars that  
 Franklin made  
 Four star generals are as rare as  
 Food is on Bataan, while we go starving on . . .

### The Kurnel Bird

This bird will go some distance from its  
Nest to defecate but it can be observed  
Urinating around its nest at dusk or  
Shortly after dark. . .<sup>5</sup>

When MacArthur escaped from Corregidor on 11 March, morale “went straight downhill.” However, “front line troops fared better after MacArthur left possibly because he did not ensure that the fighting troops at the front were getting their fair quota of food and supplies,” Lieutenant Leggett commented later. Although MacArthur’s message to the troops said that the president had ordered his evacuation to Australia to organize the offensive against Japan, Private Middleton observed that “scores of the guys had some old fashioned ‘cussin’ going about it.” Journalist Frank Hewlett captured the sentiment with his famous lyrics:

We’re the Battling Bastards of Bataan,  
No mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam,  
No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces,  
No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces,  
And nobody gives a damn!<sup>6</sup>

Individual soldiers, as always, tried to make do. Probably in late March, Pvt William Wuttke of Company B wrote to his wife Lillian in a letter smuggled out via submarine: “To date, I am well and o.k. . . . My reaction to the situation is better than anyone would have anticipated, even myself. I hope that you are also being realistic about the whole thing and keep that . . . chin . . . up, looking for that silver lining after all this blackness, which we both anticipated.” Still, in late March, Pvt Albert Senna commented on declining morale and personnel problems in Company B. Headquarters Company personnel, including Pfc Frank Donai, a musician, went to nearby Hospital #2 to play and sing for the patients. In return, they earned a cup of coffee, “a real treat” for them, remembered Donai.<sup>7</sup>

In an interview after the war, Lt James Leggett reviewed the conditions:

When our men would come back, they would just look like they were completely beat out. Of course, most of them were beat out before they went up because we’d been on theoretical half rations since shortly after Christmas or, say, the first week of January. And half rations were not really half rations. And so that combination, with the fact that we were in mosquito and the malaria country . . . we could rarely get 50 to 65 percent for active duty at one time. And of course, that was gradually decreasing. . . . People were sick. They



had malaria, they had chronic diarrhea, and just a general rundown, worn-out condition.<sup>8</sup>

Still, on 1 April, as the Japanese were starting their last offensive on Bataan, Maj William Gay of the USFIP engineer section, wrote to Brig General Casey, his former boss who was in Australia, that, “in all seriousness[,] General[,] the situation is critical but not hopeless. How long we can hold what we have and how long it will be before we can recoup our losses is an open question.”<sup>9</sup>

Probably related more to performance or adverse actions than morale, the Bataan-based companies of the 803rd had at least 12 men on partial pay, a punitive measure, as of March 1942. These troops were in: Headquarters Company—three engineers and two medical corpsmen; and Company B—seven engineers. A Company B corporal was demoted to private first class because of “inefficiency.” Also, two engineers were in confinement: one each from Company B and Company C. One of the Company C troop was listed as a deserter, leaving open the question of where a deserter might have gone during the siege.<sup>10</sup>

## Food

With the withdrawal from Luzon still in progress, Col Frank M. Brezina, the Philippine Department quartermaster, advised Brig Gen Lewis Beebe, his USAFFE counterpart, that as of late December 1941, only 15 days of food (Class I supplies) were available on Bataan. With additional supplies from Ft. Stotsenburg and Ft. McKinley, he estimated there would be sufficient class I supplies for all troops for only about four weeks. Brezina urged the USAFFE to procure large stocks of rice for immediate shipment to Bataan and to buy additional canned goods and flour in Manila, where “large stocks . . . [were] available in the hands of wholesalers.” Engineer personnel and the companies of 803rd, it seems, took matters into their own hands to supplement rations. Lt Colonel Fertig noted that 1st Lt Richard A. Keasy, the ODE, used two truck convoys to take about 100 tons of food abandoned at Ft. Stotsenburg— which by then was deserted— on the nights of 29 to 30 December. The ODE, soon to become the Service Command engineer section, also kept four-truck convoys on the road between Bataan and Manila as long as possible to carry food supplies. From Headquarters Company, Lieutenant Goldblith, Sgt Ray Barry, and Sgt John Moyer managed to take supplies from the

Clark Field PX and warehouse. They acquired four to five truckloads of food, mainly canned goods, from Manila with several trips during 25–31 December. They also “picked up” food items “along the way” to Bataan. About Christmas time, a group from Company B returned to Ft. Stotsenburg to retrieve food stocks, including pork chops, from the fort’s commissary. During the evacuation of Manila, Company C personnel took food from Nichols Field and warehouses in the city, concealed it from the quartermaster, and hauled it to Bataan for transfer to the battalion. As the Luzon Force became more organized, the Quartermaster Corps tried to take charge and consolidate the storage and delivery of foodstuffs.<sup>11</sup>

Upon arrival in Bataan, troops went on half rations. Lt Gen Wainwright cut that meager food allotment in half on 15 March. As Wainwright later explained, the dietary restrictions were even worse than they appeared because the rations were those of the Filipino soldier. They were not only smaller in quantity than US rations but also based on a diet of rice and canned fish as opposed to the wheat—and meat—based US rations. Confirming the suspicions of many troops, one officer acknowledged “an inequality between front and rear” echelon troops in the distribution of rations.

Of the food items available to the Service Command quartermaster, as of 30 January 1942, the largest supply of protein was slightly over 251,000 pounds of canned salmon. The primary vegetable was tomatoes in the form of canned stewed tomatoes and tomato paste—about 29,000 and 17,000 cans, respectively. The most abundant fruit was canned peaches (3,400 cans). Among other raw food materials were about 139,000 pounds of flour, 233,000 cans of milk, and 103,000 pounds of sugar. Even when the relocated rice mills resumed operations, supplies of that grain, the mainstay of the 803rd’s menu, was diminishing.

Company C received its last full meal with bread on 25 March. In his 25 March 1942, report to Ft. Mills, Colonel Brezina commented, “the baking of bread is being slowed down, so that on 25 March we are baking three ounces for each American ration, and the same amount on 26 March. After that, the issue of bread to troops will stop. Only a small amount of bread will be baked daily to keep the yeast alive, until such time as we may receive flour from outside sources.”<sup>12</sup>

The efforts of units to acquire and hoard ample quantities of food came quickly to the attention of the Service Command, even as it was forming. After a week and a half of what Brig General Beebe, the

USAFFE G-4, termed a “befuddled period,” forces on Bataan began to stabilize. Brigadier Gen Allan McBride ordered, “all subsistence in excess of (3) days supply will be turned over immediately to the department quartermaster[,] and no further issues will be made until they have arrived at parity with other troops.” Quartermaster troops circulated among the units to confiscate the hoarded food and provide for more equitable distribution. The impact of the order on the 803rd was unclear. Goldblith said the 803rd turned over all the food to the Quartermaster Corps. With his degree in food and nutrition from MIT, Goldblith was the mess officer for Headquarters Company. He earned a reputation for monitoring food supplies closely. The battalion kept much of the food in its storage shelter that Sergeants Barry and Moyer, and Pvt Walter Yosko had built at the battalion CP. They stacked food containers in rows with aisles. Typical of the suspicion among enlisted personnel, Moyer contended that Headquarters Company ate well, but that much of the food was reserved for officers. Leggett commented that the battalion did not have any “C” rations, but “higher headquarters . . . had a pretty good stock [of rations] . . . and ate better than we did.” Occasionally men of the 803rd were granted permission to eat at the USAFFE engineer headquarters at Little Baguio (KP169).



Bakers on Bataan, 1942

NARA RG111, SC131293

Theft of food often occurred. In early March, Lieutenant Radcliff discovered Sergeant Moyer eating a can of Del Monte fruit cocktail from battalion supplies and had Moyer reduced in grade to private. Pvt William Van Orden, a truck driver, was particularly noted for his ability to pilfer food, and he did so on the USS *Canopus*, harbored in Mariveles Bay. With the 26th Cavalry PS stationed close by, Headquarters Company also had occasional access to mule and horse meat.

Supporting the complaint of front line troops that rear echelon elements received the better rations, Lieutenant Leggett admitted that “the closer you were to the rear echelon, the better you fared” but that after Wainwright came in “there was more equitable distribution of supplies.”<sup>13</sup>

The Service Command quartermaster set up two food distribution points: The East Sector advance dumps were west of Lamao for troops north of KP156 and Dump #5, KP156, for troops south of that road marker. For West Road, the supply dump was at KP209.7. The quartermaster also established a daily supply schedule for its food dump for all units—the 803rd engineers’ food pickup was 2045 daily—but few adhered to the schedule as a result of congestion and delays.<sup>14</sup>

Food supplies—or at least memories of food supplies—varied according to the company. Pvt William Van Orden remembered that Headquarters Company personnel had little to eat but did not starve. During February 1942, Lieutenant Goldblith and the Headquarters Company cook pulled together a small group of men with butcher skills to hunt carabao in the Mariveles area. They bagged one animal and took the carcass back to their bivouac area. “For two days,” Goldblith recalled, “Headquarters Company of the 803rd EB. had carabao stew [,] and we all felt sated for a few days.”

Also, at Headquarters Company, monkey stew supplemented the one ration of meat issued per week. Goldblith at first refused to tell Major Fries about the substitution because of the battalion commander’s delicate stomach. The Japanese bombed the Headquarters Company bivouac at least once. The raid was in the middle of the meal call. Running for cover, the cooks spilled a cauldron of rice.<sup>15</sup>

During the day, Company B personnel foraged for food, sometimes in the area between the opposing forces, looking for “just about anything edible.” Pvt Joe Hill said in the last days of the war that the 803rd received two meals a day and were better fed than most of the Luzon Force because the engineers had trucks to haul food. Pvt George Wonneman recalled that Company B ate “lots of pancakes”

during that time because of an abundance of flour and that they also had *lugao*—watery rice gruel. Pvt Walter Middleton said the only way Company B troops got rations was to steal them. Captain Ingersoll ordered Company B personnel not to kill carabao but to take any carcasses if they were hit by vehicular traffic and kill the animals. The meat was stored on the USS *Canopus*, which had refrigeration. Middleton said, “we had no food at all . . . and were hungrier than ever,” and Pvt Joe Poster added, “and [we were] continuing to grow weaker.”<sup>16</sup>

At Company C, Pvt Clarence Kinser claimed that by the time of surrender, Company C personnel were practically starving. Cashews were grown in the area and available as a food source. However, the men had to be careful about ingesting the shells because of their toxicity.<sup>17</sup>

During March, the average daily food ration was 10 ounces of rice with one ounce of meat added occasionally. As the final Japanese offensive was beginning, Capt William Gay assessed the situation candidly and said to Brig. Gen Casey: “Six of our [EBs] had 50% sick and one had 75%. The 14th and the 803rd were 20% ineffective.”<sup>18</sup>

## Medicine

Capt Sidney Vernon, the battalion surgeon, and Dr. Alex Mohnac, the battalion dentist, were attached to Headquarters Company on Bataan. Mohnac said they “used every expedient.” Vernon fermented rice to make Vitamin B and parceled it out one spoonful at a time. While functioning as a dentist, Mohnac had a manual drill for fillings. Patients had to work the foot treadle for the drill to operate. While functioning as a self-taught physician, Mohnac effectively used a book on tropical medicine taken from the USS *Canopus*. Mohnac had a small hospital tent of about eight bamboo beds built for Headquarters Company about 200 yards from the battalion mess tent. He and Vernon treated PS and civilians working on airfields, as well as the 803rd personnel. Mohnac enticed Pfc Sidney Harris, a Headquarters Company troop who had a master’s degree in chemistry, to become a corpsman. Harris was KIA on 28 March 1942, when the Japanese bombed the battalion mess hall, one of the few occasions that the Japanese hit battalion headquarters.<sup>19</sup>

## Fuel

Initially, at least, the USAFFE troops on Bataan did not suffer from a shortage of fuel. Still, regular consumption and an absence of supply during the siege eventually changed the situation. An informal system of depositing 55-gallon drums on roadsides during the withdrawal process gave way to a structured supply organization. By 23 January, the quartermaster had established fuel distribution points south of Limay (KP146) for the II Corps and south of Bagac (KP195) for the I Corps. By early February, fuel shortages began to emerge. As of 16 February 1942, when the USAFFE reduced the allotment at 500 gallons per day for the 803rd, Major Fries requested—unsuccessfully—an exemption for his vehicles. In his weekly engineering operations reports, Casey repeatedly objected, contending that reductions in fuel allocations would adversely affect construction projects. He cited trail development and the improvement of roads and airstrips for all-weather operations particularly. His arguments were temporarily successful. On 21 February, the battalion's allocation was increased to 775 gallons per day. In notifying the quartermaster of the change, the AGO noted that the total average consumption of fuel for all units on Bataan should not exceed 4,275 gallons per day except in "case of great emergency or an extended tactical movement of troops." About two weeks later, the USAFFE Bataan echelon notified Major Fries that the 803rd's gasoline allocation was cut to 400 gallons per day, an action that brought another unsuccessful protest from Brig General Casey. By contrast, the 14th EB saw its allocation decreased from 220 gallons per day to 150.<sup>20</sup>

## Lumber

In addition to fuel, other materials were becoming scarce. By 28 February, the sawmills in the Service Command Area were not operating at full capacity because of the lack of logs. Casey pushed for the continuation of logging operations to feed the mills. By contrast, the USAFFE had an estimated six-month supply of coal on hand for heavy steam equipment, such as derricks and steam shovels. In an attempt to reconcile supply requirements for Bataan with shipping available to transport supplies, the USAFFE quartermaster asked for a list of monthly requirements from the USAFFE engineer. In response,

Maj Lawrence Bosworth at Ft. Mills provided a list compiled by Maj Frank Fries of the 803rd Engineers.<sup>21</sup>

## Personnel Changes

In the last days of the siege and facing Japanese preparations for the final offensive, the 803rd underwent still more changes in personnel. On 24 March, Capt Edmund Zbikowski, commander of Company A, was severely wounded during a bombing of Kindley Field, Corregidor. He died on 2 April 1942. Consequently, on April 6, Capt James D. Richardson, battalion executive officer since the reassignment of Maj Clarence Bidgood, was transferred to Corregidor to take command of Company A. On the same date, Capt Herbert V. Ingersoll moved to battalion headquarters as an executive officer. Enlisted personnel, many of whom still viewed themselves as civilians in uniform, showed open disrespect for officers. However, Ingersoll had earned an excellent reputation for his steadiness; he was not prone to panic or anger, even under fire. With the personnel changes, 1st Lt John H. Wenschuh took command of Company B. First Lt James R. Oppenheim moved from Company B to Headquarters Company as a platoon leader and 1st Lt John E. Mowick moved from Headquarters Company to Company B to replace Oppenheim. Capt William B. Thomas became battalion adjutant, and Lt James Leggett became assistant adjutant, in addition to his duties as a personnel officer.<sup>22</sup>


The enlisted ranks were also affected. Battalion leadership recommended 67 enlisted and selectee personnel from Headquarters, A, and B companies for promotion. The list included three NCOs for promotion to warrant officer: MSgt Clifton O. Snodgrass and SSgt David Huddle of Company B and Cpl T. Rupert “Tom” Gagnet of Company A. Two Company B sergeants were on the recommended list for promotion to second lieutenant: Sgt Edwin Witmer and Sgt Edward Rorke. Sergeant Carl Hendricks of Company A was also recommended for commissioning but there are no further details. As part of the shuffle in Company B, Sgt Paul A. Kloecker replaced Clifton O. Snodgrass as the first sergeant, a move that advanced him over other more senior NCOs. Ever persistent rumors in Company B pointed to two different reasons for the action: Sgt Kloecker’s strong interpersonal skills at a time of declining morale and the possible illness of Master Sergeant Snodgrass. Probably more important, was



the recommended promotion of Snodgrass to warrant officer, a personnel action of which he was not aware of at the time. In Company B, Wunschuh also tried to promote Pfc Laurie Jack Gillespie to sergeant. Major Thomas later documented that in March 1942, the promotion recommendations were “based on meritorious service and superior performance in the construction of airfields and road maintenance.” The assignments and promotions were *de facto* but not *de jure*. Both Witmer and Snodgrass moved on to new assignments, and Kloecker moved up to the first sergeant position. There is not any documentation other than two postwar memoranda signed by Major Thomas to codify these personnel actions. Following up on the matter, the War Department AGO noted in late March 1946, that there was “no record the promotions of enlisted men were ever effected.”<sup>23</sup>

At some point during the siege, further changes in the battalion were in the offing but remained unrealized. A cadre of engineers from Headquarters Company (7), Company A (44)—most of the survivors of the Battle of the Points who were on Corregidor—and Company B (10) of the 803rd was selected for assignment to Mindanao. Company C was not selected. According to Col Henry H. Stickney, the USFIP engineer, Wainwright ordered that he “recommend an engineer organization to be set up if and when any army headquarters was established on the island of Mindanao.” It was to be a headquarters and “certain troop units that would be needed in that contingency.” Stickney, in turn, asked Major Fries to recommend enlisted personnel for both the headquarters organization and an engineer unit. The recommendations were submitted to Wainwright “sometime before the surrender of Corregidor.” The assumption was that the chosen engineers were to build airfields, apparently in locations that Brig General Casey had spotted during his escape from the Philippines. Even in the final days of the siege of Bataan, it seems, the USFIP leadership still clung to the hope of reinforcement or resupply by air.<sup>24</sup>





**Figure 23.1. 803rd Engineer Battalion: organization, early April 1942.** (Adapted from Leggett Roster; Montgomery “Brief History,” 6; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 60.)

### Notes

1. Headquarters, USAFFE, to CO, 803rd Engineer Aviation Battalion, Subject: Commendation, 20 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 9.

2. Zubay to author, letter, ca. 1999; Zubay, diary, ca. 20 January 1942, and interview, 27 March 1999.

3. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 245–47; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 27–29; Minder diary, 5; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 50–51; Casey, report, 8 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Engineer Activities 7 January 1942; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memos, 21 December 1941, and 18 January 1942, no subject [recommendation for commendation for the 803rd], Casey Files, Folder 2; office of the CG, USAFFE, to CO, 803rd Engineer Aviation Battalion, memo, 20 January 1942, Subject: Commendation; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 29 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 31 January 1942, 6–7; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942.

4. Morton, *Strategy and Command*, 184; Leggett, UKY Interview, Part I; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 45; [indistinct] to G-4, handwritten note, 10 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 17. See 1st Lt Sheldon H. Mendelson, *Operations of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment in the Defense of Bataan Peninsula, P.I., 8 January-10 April 1942* (Philippine Islands Campaign) (Personal Experiences of a Platoon Leader, Infantry Officers Advanced Course, The Infantry School, 1946–47), 18, for personal comments on the food situation Mendelson’s paper, is available here: <https://web.archive>

.org/ (hereafter cited as *Operations of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment in the Defense of Bataan Peninsula*).

5. Zubay, dairy entries, ca.12–15 March 1942.
6. Leggett, UKY Interview, Part I; AGO, USAFFE, to all units, memo, 23 March 1942, Subject: Message from General MacArthur, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 29; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 54.
7. Pvt William Wuttke to Lillian Wuttke, letter, March 1942 (courtesy of Lillian Wuttke diGiacomo); Senna, interview, 6 February 1999; Frank Donai, interview 7 March 1999.
8. Leggett, UKY Interview, Part I.
9. Gay to Casey, letter, 1 April 1942, Casey Files, Special Letters Folder.
10. Leggett Roster; [no source], Company “C”, 803rd Engineer Battalion, Aviation, Separate [roster], 19 March 1942. The roster was included in the Leggett Roster package provided by Mrs. Elizabeth Leggett. Special Orders No. 15, Headquarters, 803rd EB, 7 February 1942. Special Orders No. 15, Headquarters, 803rd EB, 7 February 1942.
11. [Brig Gen] L[ewis] B[eebe], G-4, USAFFE], to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 28 December 1941, no subject [report of inspection trip], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 33; Fertig, “Notes of Personal Experiences,” 5; Moyer, interviews, 20-21 October 2002 and 7 February 1999; Zubay, interview, 27 March 1999, and letter to author, ca. 1999; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 43–44; Donai, interview, 7 March 1999; Pflueger to author, e-mail, 8 December 2001; Poster, interview, October 24, 1999. Brezina’s recommendation notwithstanding, Fertig claimed that the quartermaster “did not get more than 40% of their stores out of Manila.”
12. Leggett, UKY Interview, Part I; Wainwright, *General Wainwright’s Story*, 41, 57; Brezina to quartermaster, USAFFE, memo, 5 February 1942, Subject: Supply Situation, Class I Supplies, NARA RG 338, NARA RG338, Box T-4383, Decimal 319.1; Brezina to quartermaster, USAFFE, memo, 30 January 1942, Subject: Supply Situation, Class I Supplies, NARA RG338, Box T-4383, Decimal 319.1; Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; [indistinct] to USAFFE G-4, handwritten note, 10 March 1942. Donai, interview, 7 March 1999, especially remembered the stewed tomatoes.
13. Beebe to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 28 December 1941, no subject [report of inspection trip]; Memo, Brig Gen Allan C. McBride to all units and organizations, 14 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Supply Dumps, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 33; Moyer, interviews, 6-9 April 2005, 20-21 October 2002, and 7 February 1999; Zubay, interview, 27 March 1999, Letter to author, ca. 1999; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 43; Donai, interview, 7 March 1999; Pflueger to author, email, 8 December 2001; Leggett, UKY Interview, Parts I and II; Knutson, interview, 20 February 1998; “Victory, Joe,” NARA RG507, Entry 1054, Box 10. Moyer noted “to my knowledge none of this food was ever turned over to the quartermaster.” Mendelson, *Operations of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment in the Defense of Bataan Peninsula*, 18, said that all of the air corps salvaged food from garrison messes and brought it to Bataan. “This was all confiscated by the Quartermaster Corps in January, with the explanation that it would be re-divided among the troops. Much resentment was aroused when these items never appeared in issue.”
14. Brezina to quartermaster, USAFFE, memo, 2 February 1942, Subject: Supply Situation, Class I Supplies; Memo, Brezina to quartermaster, USAFFE, memo, 30 January 1942, Subject: Supply Situation, Class I Supplies, NARA RG 338; Decimal 319.1, Box T-4383; Bataan Supply Plan (Map) NARA RG338; Decimal 319.1, Box T-4383.

15. Goldblith, “The 803d Engineers in the Philippine Defense,” in Ashton, ed., *And Somebody Gives a Damn*, 323; Van Orden, interview, 14 March 1999; Zubay, narrative, ca. 1999.

16. Hill, interview, 10 March 1999; Middleton, interview, 1 March 2009; “War Stories in their Own Words: Joseph T. Poster,” *The [Allentown, Pennsylvania] Morning Call*, A12; Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; Lamm, interview, 25 October 1998; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 58–59. Fertig, “Notes on Personal Experiences,” 10, also noted that ODE personnel at Little Baguio, close to the Company B bivouac, “were on two meals a day,” and “our cooks continued to turn out appetizing meals.”

17. Kinser, interviews, 26 March and 4 May 1999. Kinser noted the Japanese were growing cashews on the site of Cabcaben Field as of 1999.

18. Gay to Casey, letter, 1 April 1942.

19. Mohnac, interview, 23 March 2000; Van Orden, interview, 14 March 1999; Zubay, narrative, 1999; Leggett, UKY Interview, Part II. The Leggett rosters documented Pfc Sidney Harris as originally assigned to Headquarters Company but listed under the Medical Corps contingent.

20. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 2 January 1942, Subject: Congestion in Bataan; headquarters, USAFFE, Administrative Order No. 2, 23 January 1942, no subject [quartermaster plan], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 30; Gay, MFR, 5 February 1942, Subject: Telephone Call, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey, report, 14 February 1942, Subject: Inspection – 13 February 1942; Capt John Filozof, acting assistant adjutant general, to CO, 803rd Engineer Battalion, memo, 16 February 1942, Subject: Gasoline Allowance, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 46; Filozof, to quartermaster, Philippine Department, memo, 21 February 1942, Subject: Allocation of Gasoline to All Units on Bataan, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 46; Gay, MFR, 11 February 1942, Subject: Staff Conference 11 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942; Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 7 March 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8; Filozof to CO, 803rd Engineer Battalion, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject: Gasoline Allocation, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 46; Filozof to quartermaster, Philippine Department, memo, 8 March 1942, Subject: Allocation of Gasoline to All Units on Bataan, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 46.

21. Casey to CG, USAFFE, memo, 1 March 1942: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 28 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 8; [Cpt Lee] Baldwin to Casey, memo, 1 March 1942, no subject [G-4 request for monthly requirements] and [Cpt ] E. V[iardo], MFR, 1 March 1942, no subject [miscellaneous engineer issues, both in Casey Files, Folder 8].

22. Goldblith diary, 3; Mohnac, interviews, 7 November 1999 and 23 March 2000; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 44–45; headquarters, 803rd Engineer Bn., AVN (Sep) Philippine Military Prison Camp No.2, Dapecol, to CG, U.S. Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations; Montgomery, “Brief History,” 4; Richardson to Pulley, PHILRYUCOM, letter, 1 May 1947; Leggett Roster. Documentation of dates for Richardson’s taking command of Company A, and, hence, Ingersoll’s becoming battalion executive officer varied among 4 April and 6 April. After the war, Richardson said it was 6 April.

23. William B. Thomas, memo, 20 January 1946, Subject: Recommendation for Promotion of Enlisted Personnel, NARA RG407, Box 1369; Senna, interview, 6 February 1999; Middleton, interview, 1 March 2010, and “*Flashbacks*,” 60; Leggett Roster; Van Orden, interview, 14 March 1999; Poster, interview, 25 October 1998; Col F.S. Doll, Chief, Intelligence Branch, Security and Intelligence Division, Army Service

Forces, Third Service Command, to CG, Army Service Forces, Third Service Command, memo, March 20, 1945, Subject: Positive Foreign Intelligence, NARA RG338, Box 54, cited Edward C. Witmer, Jr., as a staff sergeant. Poster, interview, 24 October 1999; Pfc Laurie Jack “Gil” Gillespie [military biography and map], <https://www.usmilitariaforum.com/>. Many, if not most, of the engineers that Maj Thomas listed after the war were not aware of the promotion recommendations. SSgt Snodgrass, for example, was subsequently promoted to the rank of master sergeant in September 1942, while a POW. Years after the war, he mentioned that promotion and the need for its documentation. He did not mention being recommended for promotion to warrant officer. See Clifton O. Snodgrass to Ted Brownell [not further identified], letter to *The Quan*, September, 1977, 5. Paul A. Kloecker was listed as a corporal in both “Alphabetical Listing of Enlisted Personnel in the Philippine Island Area as of 7 December 1941 as Reported to Machine Records Branch through October 1941,” NARA RG407, Entry 1058, Box 5, and “Alphabetical Casualty Listing of Officers and Enlisted Personnel Who Were Reported in the Philippine Islands Area as of 7 December 1941 Supplemental,” ca. 10 October 1945, NARA RG407, Entry 1058, Box 20; 1st Lt Gordon H. Simons, AGO, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific to AGO [War Department], 3rd Ind., 26 March 1946, Subject: Promotion of Personnel, NARA RG407, Box 1369.

24. Col H[enry] H. Stickney to AGO, memo, 25 September 1945, Subject: Recommendation for Promotion of Enlisted Personnel, NARA RG 407, Box 1369; Thomas, memo, 20 January 1946, Subject: Recommendation for Promotion of Enlisted Personnel.



## Chapter 24

# The Final Battle for Bataan

## Japanese Preparation

The siege ended abruptly in mid-March. On 14 March 1942, General Homma began a continuous, systematic movement of supplies and troops into the area opposite the II Corps. By 25 March, the enemy was also indirectly in front of the I Corps. When Maj Gen Edward P. King, Jr., assumed command of the newly designated Luzon Force on 19 March, he told his staff that he expected an attack soon. In addition to I and II Corps—each with a southern beach sector defense element—the Luzon Force Reserve consisted of the 57th Infantry PS, 31st Infantry US, 14th Engineers PS, and the 803rd Engineers. The “second” battle for Bataan began in earnest during the end of March.<sup>1</sup>

The aerial bombardment to cover the Japanese units moving into position for the final assault intensified as March ended. Among the more significant targets of the aerial bombardment was the area around Little Baguio, headquarters for the Bataan advanced echelon; Barrio Mariveles and Mariveles Field; and Cabcaben Field. The chronology was:

- 24 March—In the afternoon, 18 light bombers attacked Bataan Field and front-line positions on Bataan.
- 25 March—Eight groups of six to nine heavy bombers each attacked Corregidor and the rear positions on Bataan. Light bombers attacked Mariveles and Cabcaben Fields in the late afternoon with incendiary bombs. At Mariveles some of the ordnance landed in Mariveles Bay.
- 26 March—In the early afternoon, Japanese bombs hit close to Hospital # 1 (KP169), the Mariveles cutoff, and the Service Command motor pool. An hour or so later, ordnance storage areas on the Mariveles cutoff and the area around KP167-168, were the targets. The raid marked the first of at least three attacks on the KP167 area.
- 27 March—Attacks on the front line and rear area positions on Bataan and Corregidor. Two waves of heavy bombers hit Mariv-

les Field. At 0844, 27 heavy bombers attacked the Mariveles area. Less than two hours later, seven heavy bombers returned to bomb the same area. Only one bomb hit the airstrip at Mariveles. During the second raid, one bomb struck the runway, while most of the ordnance struck Pucot Hill to the rear of the field or the waters of Mariveles harbor. Cabcaben Field was also bombed.

- 28 March—Early in the afternoon, six Japanese dive bombers hit Cabcaben Field. An hour later, nine heavy bombers attacked the field. In the midafternoon, two separate waves of seven heavy bombers each pounded Mariveles. The first target was Pucot Hill, and the second was in the vicinity of Mariveles Field. Eight heavy bombers dropped their loads on the area around KP167. An hour later, the third wave of eight heavy bombers attacked near KP167, close to the Company B bivouac area. One soldier, identified as “Victory Joe,” commented that “nothing [was damaged], a couple of men injured . . . Can’t tell yet what all the renewed bombing effect is for. I hope they don’t know either.”
- 29 March—Eight heavy bombers attacked Mariveles during midmorning, and again at noon the Japanese bombed around KP167.
- 30 March—From 1000 to 1030, the Japanese again hit Little Baguio in two passes. At least one bomb damaged Hospital #1, located near the Company B bivouac area. The bombs enflamed the gasoline and diesel dumps. The fire approached the dump with demolition charges and detonators, which two engineers managed to haul away.<sup>2</sup>

By 27 March, when Homma issued the orders for the attack, Japanese units had moved into attack positions covered by aerial and artillery bombardment. They began to push back the Philippine Army divisions in the II Corps, a plains area more conducive to Japanese offensive action than the mountainous region of the I Corps. In the Service Command area, the 803rd Engineers felt the effects of Homma’s orders. That same day, 27 March, Headquarters Company and Company B were put on call for beach defense and remained in that role until 4 April.<sup>3</sup>

By 2 April, the Japanese had swept south on the flat plains of east-central Bataan, had overrun the last outposts on the northern slope of



**Bataan: Village bombing, 1942**

Source: NARA RG111, SC121284

Mt. Samat, which the US commanders had believed to be impassable, and had positioned themselves for further advances. They had more artillery, tanks, and airpower than before. Nevertheless, as Whitman noted, the Japanese commanders were not optimistic because their newly arrived replacements were second-line troops designated more for occupation than combat. Homma estimated that it would take three to four weeks to defeat the Bataan defenders. He focused on the right center of the II Corps, and on Good Friday, 3 April, his forces dislodged General Vicente Lim's 41st Division PA, which collapsed as stragglers withdrew haphazardly. Other Philippine Army units began to disintegrate. The II Corps blocked attempted barge landings on the East Coast near Limay. By the day's end, the Japanese were ahead of schedule and in a position to attack Mt. Samat. Whitman observed that Wainwright "was starting to lose control." The Japanese continued to push the exhausted, starving Fil-American defenders southward. As the situation deteriorated, units disintegrated, lines of communications disappeared, and supplies failed to arrive. On 4 April, a Japanese artillery barrage forced Filipino units to flee.<sup>4</sup> Consequently,



King began committing all Luzon Force reserves to the defense line. The 57th Infantry PS was ordered to move under cover of darkness to a position of readiness in a concealed area west of Lamao. To block the Japanese move south, the 45th Infantry PS moved from the I Corps across the Pantingan River into the II Corps area.<sup>5</sup>

In late March, the role of the 803rd, less Company A, in the battle for Bataan again extended beyond engineering to encompass a combat role. From 27 March to 4 April, elements of the battalion were assigned to beach defense to augment the 1st and 4th Regiments, PC. On 4 April, the Japanese expanded their offensive, including artillery bombardment coordinated with ongoing bombing and strafing raids. Under pressure from a three-column Japanese assault force, 42nd and 43rd Infantry Divisions PA disintegrated. In danger of being flanked, Gen Lim managed to organize the remnants of two regiments of the 41st Infantry PA and to withdraw to the Pantingan River near Mt. Samat in the center of Bataan. The retreat of those units in the face of Japanese flanking movements precluded the blocking of the Japanese movement south. The weakened condition of the Fil-American forces far offset the strength of their defensive positions. Japanese penetrated the Pilar-Bagac defense line and by the night of 4 April, owned the entire MLR on the western flank. They were in place to storm Mt. Samat.<sup>6</sup>

Major General King tried in vain to avert disaster in the II Corps. In addition to the Provisional Tank Group, he gave Major General Parker, the II Corps commander, the 31st Infantry Regiment from the US. He ordered most of the 45th Infantry Regiment PS to move to the II Corps on 4 April. Parker also ordered the 14th and 803rd Engineers to discontinue its remaining engineer activities, assemble immediately, and prepare for combat as part of his reserve force.<sup>7</sup>

Describing the situation and the environment at that time, Major General Parker and Lt Col Richard C. Malloneé, an artillery officer in the II Corps, pointed to the problems with their after-action reports. (Most of the reports were prepared in POW camps during 1942-44 and have presented challenges for historians.) Parker commented, "all of these units were disorganized and greatly depleted in strength. Control was difficult in the thick jungle, scarcity of trails, and lack of adequate signal equipment, and personnel. Radio and wire communications were completely out. The organization of the ground was not possible. The strength of the entire position did not exceed 2,000 men and officers."<sup>8</sup>

Malloneé agreed: “There is not now nor [will] there ever[be] a clear picture of the events of 5–8 April. The essential element of command—communication—was nonexistent. Commanders reverted to a method of communication used before the advent of telephone and radio—the dispatch of aides, staff officers, and messengers to obtain information, convey orders, and maintain liaison. The jungle vastness defeated this effort.”<sup>9</sup>

The proliferation of personal narratives and histories since Parker and Malloneé recorded their memories has reinforced the validity of their comments. Except for the positions of the 14th Engineers PS and the 26th Cavalry PS, every writer, participant, or historian has a different variation regarding battle locations. Some have slight differences, and in the case of the 803rd Engineers, some major—on the sites of Filipino and US forces on the Alangan River, the last major line of defense for the Fil-American forces.<sup>10</sup>

The following narrative is an attempt to reconstruct the details of the final battle for Bataan as it related to the 803rd Engineers using information not thoroughly reviewed by earlier historians—the 803rd, after all, had only a small role in the final defense line—or not available to them.

By 6 April, the Japanese had captured Mt. Samat, splitting the two corps of the Luzon Force, and were threatening to drive the left flank of II Corps into Manila Bay by pushing toward the San Vicente River. Two divisions and one regiment were lost, a sector headquarters was cut off, and the remaining troops were in poor condition. As a result, King had to fully commit his reserves by throwing all of them into the line. He released the 26th Cavalry PS, the 803rd Engineers, and the 14th Engineers PS to Parker, who wanted to establish the next defense line at the Mamala River. However, the movement of the assigned units was slow. The 14th Engineers, for example, began moving from the West Road on 4 April to Little Baguio. By the afternoon of 6 April, the Scout engineers had advanced north along Trail 26 to Trail 20 and then to Trail 50, just north of the Alangan River. Marching at night under orders from the II Corps, they took Trail 50 to East Road and arrived at the junction of Trails 2 and 10, north of the Mamala River, about 3.5 kilometers from the East Road in the late afternoon on 7 April. The 14th’s objective was to coordinate bivouacs with the 57th Infantry and 26th Cavalry and attach itself to the 57th. They faced artillery fire and bombing all day.<sup>11</sup>

In response to King's order, most of Headquarters Company, Company B, Company C, and 803rd Engineers probably moved north on the evening of 6 April. From Fertig's comments, the inference is that Company C moved separately from the other companies. He said, "Company 'C,' the 803rd Engineers stationed at Bataan Airfield, the last of our reserves [i.e., rather than referring to the 803rd EB less Company A on Corregidor] had already been committed [by 7 April]." Capt Herbert V. Ingersoll led the 803rd—Headquarters Company and Company B, at least—toward the front lines only a few days after replacing 1st Lt Richardson as the battalion executive officer. Affected by an unspecified illness, Major Fries was not present. An advance guard, including Company B's Pvt Al Senna, was armed only with machine guns and Springfield rifles and might have preceded the main column. One rumor was that the 803rd was there to help keep Trail 20 open as an avenue of withdrawal. Some 803rd personnel, including Lt James Leggett and Lt Samuel Goldblith, remained at the battalion CP (KP165.5) to begin destroying equipment.

Starting from Cabcaban and Bataan Fields, Company C probably moved west and then north on Trail 20. Headquarters and B Companies advanced by truck north on Trail 26 to Trail 20, a trail they had helped the 201st and 202nd Engineers PA expand at least as far as the junction of Trail 22 and KP147 of the East Road, near Quitang Point. Pfc Laurie "Gil" Gillespie of Company B placed the location as KP143.8. There, only Company C joined a task force composed of the 26th Cavalry PS, 57th Infantry PS, 14th Engineers PS, 31st Infantry US, and the PACR. Troops fleeing the deteriorating front lines and Filipino civilians moving south by torchlight hindered the engineers' movement north.

En route early on the morning (about 0200-0330) of 6 April, the men of Headquarters and B Companies of the 803rd were able to see the last of two attempted Japanese beach landings in the area between Orion and Limay. They passed through damage, indicating that they had diverted from Trail 20 onto Trail 22, a complex intersection at the Alangan River, and went toward the East Coast instead of continuing north toward Trail 18. While the engineers saw the aftermath of combat, they did not encounter any Japanese during their advance northward. On the morning of 7 April, Pvt George Wonneman remembered passing some soldiers from the 31st Infantry (not further identified but possibly from the US), who seemed puzzled by the 803rd's movement north as the 31st headed south.<sup>12</sup>

In his *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, the late Lt Col John Whitman detailed the disintegration and dysfunction of Fil-American forces retreating from the San Vicente line. The dispirited troops, both US and Filipino, were focused more on survival than resistance. Some argued that they had orders to move farther south to Lamao rather than to the Alangan River, while others just melted into the jungle. One American soldier quoted by Whitman summed up the situation with an understatement: "This was not an orderly retreat as the others had been." Maj Everett Mead mentioned that on the morning of 7 April, elements of his 31st Infantry Regiment US, "tired and weak," were ordered to Lamao. A few made it to Lamao, but they were reorganized and marched north to join their regimental commander on the Alangan River.<sup>13</sup>

At the beginning of the Japanese offensive, Lt Gen Wainwright ordered an increase in the rice ration and released both rice and C rations from Corregidor's reserves for the troops on Bataan. Probably on 7 April, Lieutenant Goldblith and an officer from the 14th Engineers PS drove two trucks south from the junction of Trails 2 and 18, took Trail 50 east to the East Road, and then went back to the quartermaster depot at Signal Hill, north of Mariveles (KP179) for supplies. At least one truck brought back rations and ammunition to the Alangan River by 1500 on 8 April.<sup>14</sup>

On the morning of 7 April, Brig Gen Clifford Bluemel ordered a withdrawal to the Mamala River, southeast of the San Vicente River. By the afternoon, the elements that would make up the bulk of the final defense line were coalescing even as the Fil-American defensive position was continuing to deteriorate. Elements of the 31st Infantry US and 57th Infantry PS straggled through the lines to an assembly area about a mile and a half south of the Mamala River and close to Trail 29. It was probably near the junction of Trails 15, 16, and 20. At the assembly point, the infantrymen joined with Company C, 803rd Engineers, and the 14th Engineers, as well as remnants of the 31st Infantry PA. None of the troops had eaten since breakfast on 6 April. Pfc Blair Robinette of Company C, 803rd Engineers, described the location as a ridgeline and placed the 803rd between the 57th Infantry PS and the 31st Infantry US. Emblematic of the confusion in the lines, Pvt Clarence Kinser of Company C, 803rd, could see the 57th Infantry. Although he knew that other companies of the 803rd were somewhere in the area, Kinser could not see them. In the fluid combat environment, the 803rd's truck drivers were told to keep their

engines running. The engineers did not have heavy machine guns, mortars, or transportation, but to their rear were half-tracks with 75-mm guns. During their brief time in the assembly area, the men of Company C did not encounter Japanese troops.<sup>15</sup>

Bluemel spent the afternoon and evening of 7 April organizing the 26th Cavalry, which had finally come south of the Mamala River, and “remnants”—Parker’s term—of the 31st Infantry US, the 57th Infantry PS, the 14th and the 803rd EBs on the south bank of the Mamala River. By 1830, he had achieved some success but still had to deal with the Japanese occupation of a section of Trail 20 between the 26th Cavalry PS and the remainder of his force. He also had to manage the destruction of the 14th engineer’s supply trucks during a bombing raid. Brig Gen Maxon S. Lough, commander of the Philippine Division, failed to break through from the west.<sup>16</sup>

By the evening of 7 April, pressured by superior Japanese forces on the western edge of the MLR, Bluemel realized he could not hold the Mamala Line. The Japanese had flanked his left at the Mamala River and looked down on the 26th Cavalry—which had just been assigned to him—from the higher north bank. Bluemel thus ordered the 26th to move further south to avoid being cut off. The cavalrymen covered the retreat of the other units. At 2000, he obtained II Corps’ approval to withdraw to the Alangan River. This location was about two and a half miles to the south, along Trails 2, 10, and 20. Parker expanded Colonel Lilly’s span of command by attaching the 803rd (again, probably only Company C) to the 57th Infantry PS.<sup>17</sup>

On 7 April, Bluemel ordered all troops to break off contact, retreat under cover of darkness, and be in place by dawn, 8 April. The men of Company C felt as if they were turning around to retrace their original line of march. Whitman said because “elements of the 803rd were familiar with [the] trail [and]—Company C had worked on trail development in the area of the “Artillery Loop”—they led the march and posted guides at all junctions and turns.” Pfc Robinette said Company C was “the last to come down the road” in its trucks. Some units took the original Trail 20, while others proceeded in the newly developed Trail 20. The absence of communication and the perils of night maneuvers produced a disorganized movement. Company C pulled behind the 31st US, and then the 31st moved through Company C. The 31st Infantry US and the 57th Infantry PS then crossed paths during their southward movement. Massive artillery attacks and bombing raids preceded the Japanese advance. Robinette com-

mented: "With everything burning, it was a scene which would describe Hades. It was a miserable damn time." The Japanese came in behind Company C. During the night march, Company C encountered a Japanese tank pointed northward and passed the sleeping tankers quietly without incident. En route, Company C also passed by the detritus of battle: destroyed half-tracks, tanks, and a bombed-out school bus still loaded with Filipino soldiers.<sup>18</sup>

During the retreat of 8 April, Headquarters Company and Company B moved through "the vicinity of KP147" on the East Road at about the junction with Trail 22, two kilometers south of Limay and a kilometer north of the Alangan River. Company B had worked on trails in this area during mid-January, while Headquarters Company had worked on Trail 20. Lt John Wunschuh, the newly assigned commander of Company B, and two of the Company B engineers, Pfc Dean Dovenburg and Pvt Raymond George, were wounded by Japanese bombs on 8 April, according to informal notes on battalion records made in the Cabanatuan POW camp.<sup>19</sup>

Most of the retreating units stopped and established a defensive line along the Alangan River by 0330, 8 April. An hour later, US Provisional Air Corps Regiment (PACR) occupied an excellent, natural defensive position on the main ridgeline. Among both participants and historians, the positions that those units actually occupied became a subject of much controversy. The only general agreement was that the 14th Engineers PS held the far left (western) flank with the 26th Cavalry PS to its right and astride Trail 20. It was followed by a gap that Bluemel attempted unsuccessfully to fill with stragglers. Under Bluemel's plan for forces under his direct command, the placement (left to right or west to east) continued with the 31st Infantry US, 57th Infantry PS, and Company C from the 803rd Engineers. For the right flank, Major General Parker's report added the 31st Infantry Division PA and the 4th Regiment PC under the command of Col John Irwin. However, the crossing of the 31st US and 57th PS during the retreat from the Mamala River reversed the planned positions. It was a mishap that reformed the line, left to right, with a 1,000-yard gap between the 26th Cavalry and the 31st Infantry US, followed by a 600-yard gap to the 57th Infantry. The 803rd's Company C, at least, was supposed to form up on the right flank of the 57th Infantry. Col Edmund Lilly, commander of the 57th, later said that "a battalion of engineers . . . [was to have] gone in from our right, which was on the east." Lilly and Col Jasper E. Brady, commander of the 31st Infantry

US, managed to establish communications with each other across the gap. They agreed that further maneuvering to adhere to Brig Gen Bluemel's original plan would only add to the confusion and notified Bluemel of the situation. The airmen-turned-infantrymen of the PACR—which wound up east of the 57th—also experienced significant gaps and left unprotected flanks on both their right and left. In the retreat, the defenders lost their 37-mm guns and automatic weapons and exhausted the ammunition for their 155-mm GPFs.<sup>20</sup>

As was the case with other units, the three Bataan-based companies of the 803rd did not emplace according to Bluemel's plan. Moving south from its location on the East Road and Trail 22, Headquarters Company and Company B finally lurched down a steep ravine and up the higher, south bank of the Alangan River. Pvt John Zubay remembered Headquarters Company's original position as a mango grove. The two engineer companies established themselves there. Limited information indicated that Company C moved through its assigned position and crossed the Alangan River line and continued south to Cabcaben. In the process, Company C encountered other troops fleeing the front lines. Company C's engineers found usable tanks parked and waiting for action near Bataan Field and took them to the company motor pool at Cabcaben. Some personnel from Company B might have also continued south, near, or along with Company C. Presumably on 8 April, trucks with rations for the 14th bumbled through the 803rd, possibly from Company C, and had difficulty returning to the line.<sup>21</sup>

In after-action reports that officers prepared in POW camps—and that became historical narratives—the location on the Alangan River for the two 803rd companies varied. Lilly, a participant, and Louis Morton, a historian, both questioned if the 803rd was ever present on the Alangan River defense line. Ingersoll sketched a "Bataan Defense Line," which was sent to the Army's combat analysis files after the war. It could not be located for this study. Thus, recommendations for decorations, written in the Davao Penal Colony (DAPECO) POW Camp in 1943, represented the only remaining account by battalion leaders present for the final battle.

Writing the Silver Star recommendation for Captain Ingersoll in January 1943, Company B commander 1st Lt John Winschuh said that the 803rd was only "near the Alangan River" on 8 April 1942. Newly promoted 1st Lt Samuel Goldblith, who was not present at the Alangan River but was briefly in the front-line area, said the 803rd

was involved in defending the sector from the Mamala River to the Alangan River. He placed the 803rd on the eastern flank between the “grounded Air Corps troops” [i.e., PACR] . . . and Philippine Army troops [i.e., 31st Infantry PA and 4th PC Regiment] on our right.”

From Company B, Pvt Joe Hill said the 803rd was near the 31st Infantry—he did not specify US or PA—and the Philippine Scout units. The engineers filled a position from which Filipino troops had fled. Pvt Walter Middleton mentioned concerns “about the line to our left,” where “an outfit . . . [had] deserted the battle line and left a wounded man” near the Company B position. That location was far from the position that Bluemel had assigned to the 803rd. It was also far from Trail 20, the route that the 803rd supposedly took on the retreat south from the Mamala River. It was, however, almost directly south of the position where Company B personnel were wounded on 8 April.<sup>22</sup>

To call the Fil-American units a defensive force was an overstatement. Under his command, Brig Gen Bluemel had about 1,360 men to protect the left flank of the Alangan line. Lt Col John Irwin’s two regiments [i.e., 31st PA and 4th PC] totaled 1,200 men to hold the right flank. The lines were so decimated as to make their designations meaningless. The men were sick, starved, and exhausted. The Alangan line was crumbling at the same time as it was being set. Before noon on 8 April, low-flying fighters and light bombers hit the positions of the 31st US and 57th, turning the cogon grass and bamboo groves into an inferno. The Japanese attacked the 31st Infantry PA at about the same time, and bombed rear area trails, artillery positions, supply points, and vehicles. By 1400, Japanese infantry appeared before the 57th and began to filter through gaps in the line. The primary Japanese thrust was against the 14th and the 26th on the left flank, and it threatened to envelop the cavalrymen. However, the 14th waited until 1800 hours to pull out of the line. By 1500, men of the 31st Infantry PA and 4th PC had fled in the face of burning cogon grass and banana groves. About the same time, the 57th and 31st US had withdrawn as well. By 1830 Bluemel gave the order to retreat to the Lamao River.<sup>23</sup>

The experiences of the 803rd’s two remaining companies on the Alangan River line varied, but neither, it seemed, had direct contact with Japanese infantry units, given their position on the right flank. On the line, Company B was subjected to Japanese air raids with antipersonnel bombs. Also, as Pvt. Middleton commented, “The Japs



had been quieter than usual all day. A burst of gunfire opened occasionally. Knee mortars were lobbed over in our vicinity every thirty minutes or so. No pattern[,] just nerve busters and shrapnel scattered in every direction.” Some Headquarters Company personnel saw Japanese moving across the Alangan River valley, but the enemy soldiers were not in rifle range.




Figure 24.1. 803rd Engineer Battalion: possible defensive position, 7 April 1942. (Adapted from Paul Ropp.)

Between 1130 and 1330, on 8 April, Wainwright ordered Battery Hearn on Corregidor to fire on the roads of Bataan as an exercise in interdiction. Operating for the first time since being damaged on 7 January, Battery Hearn fired 30 rounds from its 12-inch rifle at the rate of about eight rounds per hour from 1810, 8 April through 0500, 9 April. The battery used a field artillery technique that relied on map data and “walked” projectiles through the 803rd’s position toward enemy targets. According to Pvt John Zubay, one dud round hit within 6 to 8 feet of the Headquarters Company personnel and spun end over end several times before rolling down the bank. All the nearby engineers froze, forgetting to take cover. Battery Hearn’s projectiles also rained down on Cabcaban Field, about 13 kilometers miles south. On the command level, Captain Ingersoll remained as “unshakable” as he had been throughout the campaign.<sup>24</sup>

Probably on the evening of 8 April, Ingersoll sent out scouts to the left and right—Pvt John Zubay was in the detail on the right—to locate other units in the line. They found both flanks uncovered with a gap of possibly a half-mile on the left. Ingersoll assumed that the units on his flanks—the PACR on the left and the 31st PA on the right—had been given “secret orders” to withdraw. He also thought that his flanks and rear were unprotected and vulnerable to encirclement. In fact, by midafternoon, the left (west) of the 803rd, the 31st Infantry US, and 57th Infantry PS had been flanked and had pulled out. At about the same time to its right (east), the 31st Infantry PA and the 4th PC, which Parker assigned and placed to hold the East Road, had broken and fled with Japanese tanks in pursuit. They had faced Japanese air raids from morning until 1500 hours. According to a “regimental history” compiled in a POW camp, PACR leadership believed that bombing, phosphorus fires in the woods, and rifle fire had caused units on both of its flanks to withdraw, leaving the regiment exposed. After contending with Japanese infantry and air raids for most of 8 April, the airmen retreated just before dark.

In his diary, also composed in a POW camp, Lieutenant Goldblith offered an alternate reason for the 803rd’s retreat from the Alangan River: “our own artillery [possibly from Battery Hearn] was firing on and into us.” Without the possibility of keeping communication open, Ingersoll ordered the 803rd to withdraw in the evening or night, perhaps as late as midnight on 8 April. The men of the 803rd thought they were the last to leave the Alangan River line.<sup>25</sup>


With results exceeding expectations, General Homma decided to push directly into Cabcaben rather than pause at the Mamala River. The Japanese kept pressuring the left flank, where the 14th Engineers and 26th Cavalry engaged in a last-ditch effort to protect other retreating units and troops. The exhausted Bluemel ordered them to withdraw, and he prepared to set up a final defense line farther south on the Lamao River. The end was finally near.<sup>26</sup>

Ingersoll led the two companies of the 803rd south, through “unfamiliar terrain” in Lieutenant Winschuh’s words. They probably traveled cross country, as the PACR had done, through the jungle in the dark to Trail 20 toward Cabcaben. Trucks were waiting by a hill about a half-mile south of the Alangan River. A small group of Japanese fired on the last element of Company B to arrive at the trucks. The first troops who made it to the pickup site early were issued rations, but the later arrivals received nothing. The retreat was difficult. Compounding the challenge of the darkness and the jungle was that truck traffic blocked trails and roads, and small Japanese patrols were in the area. During one encounter, Pvt Walter Middleton was wounded. Captain Reynolds, commander of Headquarters Company, placed his driver, Pvt Frank Donai, at one of the junctions in the trail system, probably that of Trails 20 and 26, to direct the engineers to the correct route to their bivouac. Reynolds forgot about Donai and had to send someone back in the morning (9 April) to retrieve him. The engineers were exhausted, and many were sleeping. Pvt Joe Poster fell off a truck because he was asleep. A few soldiers did not bother to return to their bivouac area, as ordered. They dug foxholes along the retreat route and went to sleep.<sup>27</sup>

By the time, he was ordered to withdraw farther south and hold a defensive on the Lamao River, Bluemel commanded only the remaining elements of the 57th Infantry PS, 14th Engineers PS, and 31st Infantry US, a force of about 1,360 officers and enlisted men. The after-action report, which Wainwright ordered while a POW, noted “all of these units were somewhat disorganized[,] and control was difficult, due to darkness. Radio and wire communications were completely out. No organization of the ground was possible.”<sup>28</sup>

Late in the evening of Tuesday, 8 April, during an earthquake, Fries ordered Lieutenants Leggett and Mohnac to bring explosives from the battalion CP to a cave in the Mariveles area, where he had sought shelter and to destroy battalion records. With a sergeant “driving like mad,” said Mohnac, the two lieutenants clung to the sides of

the vehicle as it moved along the East Road. The roads were deserted at the time, but military police still attempted to detain them. In violation of Army regulations, Leggett and Mohnac loaded both dynamite and blasting caps in one jeep. At that time, the Bataan force was destroying its remaining munitions. But the rush was for naught, as Fries had already destroyed the documents.<sup>29</sup>



**Figure 24.2. Final defense (Alangan River) line: possible alignment, 8 April 1942.** (Adapted from Paul Ropp.)

While the Japanese assaulted the Alangan line, the remains of the FEAF's "Bamboo Fleet" used Bataan and Cabcaben Fields for the last time. At the time, fleeing troops flooded the East Road that bisected the two airfields, while Japanese aerial attacks using white phosphorous bombs and naval artillery made a shambles of Bataan Field. A P-40 dubbed "P-40-Something" because of the cannibalized parts



Source: Paul W. Ropp, 10 April 2002  
 (Note the absence of the 803rd Engineers and PACR as part of the Luzon Force reserves).

### Alangan Defense Line Memorial

that comprised it and two P-35As had been held in reserve if the Japanese landed behind US lines. On 8 April, Lt Jack Donaldson took off from Bataan Field in “Kibosh,” a P-40 formerly flown by Capt Edward Dyess. This mission was for a one bomb run, and he rocked his wings over the field and continued flying on to Cebu. Capt Joe Moore of 20th Pursuit Squadron took off in the “P-40-Something” from Cab-caben. First Lt Ozzie Lunde of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron, along with an extra pilot flew from Bataan Field in a P-35A but could only drop its bombs in Manila Bay to lighten the load and conserve fuel. Capt Hank Thorne, 3rd Pursuit Squadron, and 1st Lt Ben S. Brown, 34th Pursuit Squadron, flew the remaining P-35A. Ground crews emptied

gasoline stores, smashed radios, and pulled guns out of the planes. Ordnance Corps personnel came to destroy the bombs. They left for Cabcaban Field as the Japanese approached Bataan Field. At Cabcaban Field, a light aircraft dubbed the “candy clipper” picked up several pilots and Col Carlos Romulo, a newspaper reporter and an aide to Philippine President Manuel Quezon, to escape Bataan. Late in the evening, Dyess and his airmen began the trek west to Mariveles to surrender to the Japanese.<sup>30</sup>

Just before midnight, Maj Gen Edward King decided to surrender Bataan in defiance of orders from Lt Gen Wainwright. He disregarded the wishes of General MacArthur and Secretary of War Stimson to continue the struggle. As Richard Meixsel astutely observed in his detailed biography of Brig Gen Vicente Lim: “The greater the distance from danger, the greater was the determination to fight on.” On the scene, King knew it was necessary to avoid further slaughter. The journal of the USFIP quartermaster captured the sentiment of the time in a handwritten entry: “The G-4 and G-3 make [a] trip to [the] commanding general, Luzon Force, Bataan. Chaotic condition-disintegration of units-malnutrition-exhaustion-evacuation and destruction plan put into effect this night.”<sup>31</sup> Headquarters and B companies moved back to their respective bivouac areas. Headquarters Company stopped at KP 165.5 briefly while destroying a portion of its equipment. General King ordered that trucks and gasoline be saved for the possible transport north for his men as POWs.

However, the 803rd either ignored or was unaware of King’s order. Thus, the engineers began to destroy their trucks, some still loaded with ammunition. Headquarters Company personnel tried to drive some vehicles south and over the hill into Manila Bay. Lieutenant Sam Goldblith shot out tires with a pistol and was wounded by a ricocheting bullet. Then the company moved on to the Company B bivouac area at Little Baguio. Company B’s line element made it back to its bivouac at KP167.5 by 0800 on 9 April. They destroyed equipment by draining oil from trucks and starting the engines or by driving them down the steep hills of Little Baguio toward Manila Bay. Some personnel went down to the bay to escape to Corregidor but could not find any boats. However, Pvt Paul A. Fechner of Company B was successful and found his way to Corregidor. At the same time, the 14th Engineers were blowing up supply dumps. Company B troops got something to eat and were told to hang their bedsheets as a sign of surrender to avoid further military action. The Japanese bombed

Hospital #1 a third and final time on 9 April. Ingersoll put people into tunnels before he sought shelter. Some personnel from Headquarters Company, including John Knutson, an attached civilian, were north of Mariveles. With dynamite supplied by Col Roscoe Bonham, they set charges to damage equipment. Shortly after arrival at their bivouac areas, the exhausted engineers were notified of Major General King's decision to surrender them. Some engineers cried or cursed the government that had abandoned them, while others washed and changed clothes or just slept in the four-person tents. Trenches beside the tents were used for shelter as Japanese bombers flew overhead to renew the assault on Corregidor. Lieutenant Winschuh never used his tent. One engineer led some of the men in a song, "This world is not my home; I'm only passing through."<sup>32</sup>

Lt Col Wendell Fertig and Maj Frank Fries had been ordered to Corregidor from the engineer section base on Mariveles Bay. However, troop movements delayed their departure and that of other engineer officers. By 0500 on 9 April, the interisland boat *Night Hawk* finally moved out through the minefields to Corregidor for the last time.<sup>33</sup>

When the Japanese arrived at Little Baguio on 9 April, many were as hungry as the men of the 803rd. Most of the 803rd moved to the Japanese-designated assembly point at or near Mariveles Field. A few members of the battalion staff remained at KP165.5, the site of the 803rd's CP, for a few days. The Japanese had sufficient trucks to take them to the O'Donnell POW Camp.<sup>34</sup> Among those waiting at Little Baguio were Lt Elgin Radcliff, Pvt John Moyer, and Pvt James Beebe. Beebe sounded off to Radcliff, saying, "Elgin, maybe you will be working for me when we get to Japan, and I'm the head rickshaw guy in Tokyo." Radcliff responded: "Always the wise guy, Beebe."<sup>35</sup>

#### Notes

1. Brig Gen Arnold J. Funk, "Operations of Luzon Force, 19 March-9 April 1942," in Lilly diary, 61, 64; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 470-71.

2. "War Stories in their Own Words: Joseph T. Poster," *The [Allentown, Pennsylvania] Morning Call*, 7 April 2002, A12; hospital bombing, true copy of a record kept by Col Lloyd E. Milienz (n.d.), in John Bartsch papers, MMA; *Canopus* Diary, 28-30; headquarters, 4th Marine Regiment, R-2 Operations Log, 25-30 March 1942, on [www.mansell.com](http://www.mansell.com) (here after cited as "4th Marine operations log"); "Victory Joe" narrative, 28 March 1942.

3. Wuttke deGiacomo and Wuttke, *Just One More Day*, 2; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 50.

4. Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 214-217.



5. Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 472-73, 475-547; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 50; Maj Gen George M. Parker, Jr., "The Bataan Defense Force and the II Philippine Corps from 8 December 1941-9 April 1942," NARA, RG407, Box 92, 52 (hereafter cited as "Report of Maj Gen Parker"); Lilly diary, 61; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 493-547, captures the detail and the emotion of the defenders' operations. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 406.

6. Wuttke deGiacomo and Wuttke, *Just One More Day*, 24; Goldblith, *Diary*, 4; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 427-32; Report of Maj Gen Parker, 50-52; Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 216-217

7. 4th Marine operations log, 25-30 March 1942.

8. Report of Maj Gen Parker, 52; Fertig, "Notes on Personnel Experiences," 14; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 432.

9. Report of Maj. Gen. Parker, 52.

10. Richard C. Malloneé, *The Naked Flagpole: Battle for Bataan* (San Rafael, California: Presidio Press, 1980), 121.

11. See Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 443.

12. Report of Maj. Gen. Parker, 56; Morton, *Fall of the Philippines*, 438-440; [Capt Allison L. Hartman,] "Brief War History of the 14th Engineers," NARA RG407, Box 12, 4 (hereafter cited as "Brief History of the 14th Engineers").

13. Goldblith diary, 4; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 50-51; Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Ingersoll Roster [handwritten annotation]; US Militaria Forum, "Richard Keith Gillespie, Iwo Jima," <https://www.usmilitariaforum.com/>, dated the 803rd's movement to the front as 6 April. Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 498-99, placed the attempted Japanese landings early in the morning of on 6 April near Orion, while Malloneé, *The Naked Flagpole*, 122-24, placed them near Limay on the night 4 April and early morning of 6 April. Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 61-62, said the 803rd saw the beach landings on its movement south, but, as was common in post-war narratives, his chronology did not match the dates of the events. He also said that newly-appointed battalion adjutant and newly-promoted Maj William B. Thomas led Company B to the front, rather than newly appointed company commander 1st Lt John Wünsch. Wonneman, interviews, 29 September and 15 November 1998; Middleton, interview, 1 March 2010; Moyer, interviews 7 February 1999 and 21-22 October 2002; Fertig, *Tulasaffe*, 51. See Col Richard C. Malloneé, "Notes on Col. R. Malloneé's Story of Bataan Campaign," 59, in Lilly diary; Senna, Rutgers interview, 8, 18; Pfc. Laurie Jack "Gil" Gillespie [military biography and map], [militariaforum.com](http://militariaforum.com). Malloneé, *The Naked Flagpole*, 123-26, for additional details on the attempted Japanese beach landings; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 532-34, 544-45, noted that elements of the 31st retreated from the San Vicente River line toward Lamao. George Wonneman did not specify 31st Infantry (US or 31st Infantry PA). On 7 April some US infantrymen claimed they had orders to move from San Vicente to Lamao, while at the same time the 31st (PA) was retreating down the East Road from the San Vicente line.

14. See Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 532-534, 544-45; Maj Everett V. Mead, *The Operations and Movements of the 31st Infantry Regiment (Philippine Division) 7 December 1941 - 9 April 1942* (Philippine Island Campaign) (Personal Experience of a Regimental S-4; Ft. Benning, GA, 1947-48), 28 (hereafter cited as "*The Operations and Movements of the 31st Infantry Regiment*,"). The 31st Infantry (US) personnel moving toward Lamao might have been those whom Pvt. Wonneman saw.

15. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 440. Hartman, "Brief History of the 14th Engineers," 4-5, did not provide an exact date for Lt Goldblith's action. The author documented it only as "last days."



16. Report of Maj Gen Parker, 56; Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 8; Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; Wonneman, interview, 29 September 1998; Zubay, narrative, 1999; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 440, 445-47; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 545; Report of Maj Gen Parker, 56-57; Blair Robinette interview in Donald Knox, *Death March: The Survivors of Bataan* (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1981), 97 (Hereafter cited as “Death March”); Fertig, *Guerrillero*, 8; Marconi Dioso, *The Times When Men Must Die: The Story of the Destruction of the Philippine Army during the Early Months of World War II, December, 1941-May 1942* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Dorrance Publishing, 2010), 115-116.

17. Maj Harry J. Fleeger, diary, n.d., NARA RG407, Box 1663, Microfilm Roll 88, 8; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 538-545; Report of Maj Gen Parker, 57; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 445-47. Under the circumstances, Parker’s use of the term “remnants” presumably applied to all the units he listed.

18. Funk, “Operations of Luzon Force,” in Lilly, *Diary*, 66, Report of Maj Gen Parker, 56-57; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 446-47; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 545; Maj William J. Priestly, Excerpt from Dairy Notebook #1, NARA RG407, Entry 113, Box 1480, (hereafter cited as “Priestly Diary”) identified the 803rd only as “the Engrs.”

19. Bataan: Trail Map; Report of Maj Gen Parker, 57, Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; “Historical Data: Provisional Air Corps Regiment,” NARA RG407, Entry 1113, Box 1480 (hereafter cited as “Provisional Air Corps Regiment History”); Capt Mark Wohlfield, 27th Bomb Group, interview in Knox, *Death March*, 99; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 545-549; Lilly, East Carolina interview, 17-18; Lilly Diary, Vol. 8.

20. Ingersoll Roster [handwritten annotation].

21. Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 549-452, citing *inter alia* Col. Lilly’s report on operations of the 57th Infantry (PS), Lilly’s letter to Whitman, and Bluemel’s report on the 31st Infantry (US); Lilly, East Carolina interview, 17-18; Priestly diary. Col Lilly’s 1976 interview by East Carolina University provided differing accounts of the 57th’s retreat from the San Vicente line to the Alangan River. Fleeger diary; Wohlfield, interview, 99-100; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 448-449. Skerry’s report had the 26th on the extreme left flank and the 14th to the right of the cavalrymen; Mendelson, *Operations of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment in the Defense of Bataan Peninsula*, 22. Col Lilly incorrectly placed the 31st Infantry (US) on his right flank.

22. Hill, interview, 10 March 1998; Wonneman, interview, 29 September 1998; Zubay, interview, 16 February 2001; Kinser, interview, 26 March 1999; Lamm, interview, 25 October 1998; Hartman, “Brief History of the 14th Engineers,” 7, did not provide an explanation of the “last day.” Mead, *The Operations and Movements of the 31st Infantry Regiment*, 26-27.

23. Wonneman, interviews, 29 September and 15 November 1998; Moyer, interview, 7 February 1999; Zubay, narrative, 1999, and interview, 16 February 2001; Hill, interview, 10 March 1998; Fries to CG, US Forces Southwest Pacific Area, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations. While at the Davao Penal Colony (DAVPECOL) POW Camp, Fries, Ingersoll, and Winschuh collaborated on a memorandum recommending decorations for 803rd personnel with Winschuh responsible for the recommendation for Ingersoll. Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 60; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 51. Merrill to author, e-mail, 15 November 1999, also said the 803rd had “to plug a section of the front line that Philippine soldiers had deserted.” See Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 449. Mendelson, *Operations of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment in the Defense of Bataan Peninsula*, 22, added to the confusion by writing that the PACR marched through the night of 7 April and arrived at the Alangan line about 0400, 8 April. “We sniped at the Japanese all evening because units on either side of us had

been compelled to withdraw by heavy bombing, phosphorous fires in wooded areas, and by rifle fire. We were located by Jap [*sic*] bombers about [0430]. The rest of the daylight was spent in a fire fight with Jap infantrymen and dive bombers. We withdrew just before dark from this line and believe were the last to leave this line." Marconi, *The Times When Men Must Die*, 115-16, made no mention of the 803rd on the east flank. None of the major histories cited Major Fries' 18 January 1943 memo that used the comments of Company B commander Lt John Winschuh placing the 803rd on the Alangan River Line for a brief period.

24. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 448-50; [Hartman], Brief War History of the 14th Engineers, 4. Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, Map No. 4, reversed the positions of all units in the final defense line.

25. Wonneman, interviews, 29 September and 15 November 1998; Moyer, interview, 7 February 1999; Zubay, narrative, 1999, and interview, 16 February 2001; Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 60; Capt Thomas W. Davis, Commander, Battery H, 59th Coastal Artillery and Capt George M. Moore, Hqs, 59th Coastal Artillery, statements, in Gen Homer E. Case, 14th Antiaircraft Command, Commanding, "Report as to War Damage to the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bay, Appendix E: Eye Witness Statements, 6 October 1945 and Maj Gen George F. Moore report; Poster, interview, 25 October 1998. Senna, Rutgers interview; [Hartman], "Brief War History of the 14th Engineers," 7; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 568; Dod, *War Against Japan*, 100; Report of Operations, USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands (Luzon Force), Annex VI, Vol. V, 12 March-9 April 1942, NARA RG407, Box 1157, 60 (hereafter cited as "Report of Operations (Luzon Force).")

26. Lamm, interview, 25 October 1998; Zubay, narrative, 1999; Wonneman, interviews, 29 September and 15 November 1998; Moyer, interview, 7 February 1999; Zubay, narrative, 1999, and interview, 16 February 2001; Fries to CG, US Forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations [recommendation of Captain Herbert V. Ingersoll for the Silver Star medal]; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 549-550; Priestly diary; Provisional Air Corps Regiment History; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 51, and diary, 8; Donai, interview, 7 March 1999; Middleton, interview, 1 March 2010, and *Flashbacks*, 60. See Memo, Col. A.F. Clark to AGO, 20 April 1945, Subject: Material Received from Captain H.V. Ingersoll, POW, Japan, NARA RG338, Box 54, which outlined material Ingersoll turned over to SSgt Edward C. Witmer in August 1944.

27. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 447-449; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 550-557.

28. Fries to CG, US Forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater, memo, 18 January 1943, Subject: Decorations; Poster, interview, 25 October 1998; Wonneman, interview, 29 September 1998; Middleton, interview, 1 February and 1 March 2010; Donai, interview, 7 March 1999; Zubay, interview, 16 February 2001, and letter 8 December 2008; Whitman, *Bataan: Our Last Ditch*, 568. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 451, said the 26th, withdrawing along Trail 20, "found the march less trying" than the 57th and 31st (US), which fell back through the jungle."

29. Report of Operations (Luzon Force), 60 and Annex II, 5.

30. Mohnac, interview, 11 November 1999; Leggett, UKY interview, Part I; Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 51.

31. Dyess, *The Dyess Story*, 63-65; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 361-65; Richard B. Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 219.

32. G-4 [USFIP], Ft. Mills, Corregidor journal entry [handwritten], 2:00AM 9 April 1941, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 44; Meixsel, *Frustrated Ambition*, 221.

33. Middleton, *Flashbacks*, 63-64; Lamm, interview, 18 August 1998; Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; Frank Donai, interview, 5 May 1998; Peter J. Dekever, "The Defenders of the Philippines," [Pvt. Paul A. Fechner], *SouthBendTribune.com*, 24 September 2006; Moyer, interview, 7 February 1999; Mohnac, interview 23 March 2000; Knutson, interview, 20 February 1998; Merrill to author, e-mail, 31 March 1999.

34. Fertig, *Tulasaffe*, 52; Col Roscoe Bonham, Officers on Corregidor at the Time of Surrender of Bataan 4/9/42, n.d., 1, NARA RG407, Box 12; Fries to CG, Harbor Defense, memo, 23 April 1942, no subject (roster of officers arriving at Ft. Mills, Corregidor, after 7 April 1942), NARA RG407, File 500-11-1 (Ft. Mills Correspondence).

35. Wonneman, interview, 15 November 1998; Moyer, interviews, 7 February 1999 and 20-21 October 2002. Pvt Beebe escaped from a work detail in Sabangan, Mountain Province, and was murdered by the Japanese, sometime between 13-18 July 1944.

## Chapter 25

### Company A on Corregidor

#### Kindley Field—Origins

In 1920, Kindley Field was built as a seaplane base on the narrow eastern tail of Corregidor and named for Capt Field E. Kindley, a World War I ace. A single turf, slightly bowed airstrip, it was 2,100 feet long and 150 feet wide at the center. The airstrip was rough because of rocky soil at the western end, which sloped upward, the mud at the eastern end, and a rock formation in the center. The eastward slope facilitated takeoff speed and arrested landings. The field's primary purpose was as a base for observation aircraft. It was used to spot for Corregidor's heavy coast artillery guns and provide operational access to the Philippine Department headquarters via air. Second, it was useful for emergency landings and as a landing facility for air shipments. Its alignment was unfavorable because of prevailing wind patterns. Thus, landings were often challenging. The Air Corps turned the field over to the 92nd CA Regiment in 1929, although the name remained the same. The small Air Corps cadre—six or seven officers, their families, and the necessary enlisted personnel—were reassigned to the United States.

Because field maintenance was spotty during the interwar period, Kindley Field was in a poor state of repair by the late 1930s. An engineering estimate in 1939 proposed that the field have a hard-surfaced runway 2,600 feet long and 150 feet wide with 75-foot wide gravel shoulders. The west end was to be extended by using fill from a Navy tunnel project and by lowering both the southwestern end and middle of the runway. The project cost was estimated at \$130,000. During 1939–40, the Air Corps provided \$23,000 for a natural earth extension (i.e., as opposed to a hard-surface runway). However, only “one dilapidated 5-ton QMC truck,” according to Col Lloyd Mielenz, the engineer executive officer on Corregidor, was available to start the fill work in April 1940.<sup>1</sup>

In 1941 the Quartermaster Department attempted to improve the surface with antiquated equipment but accomplished little. In January 1941, the Philippine Department ODE allotted two more trucks to perform fill work on the project. However, facing the same obstacles as

Col Harry Stickney on Luzon, Colonel Mielenz had neither the personnel nor the heavy earthmoving equipment for the improvement of the airstrip (i.e., lowering of the west end).

As of 2 February 1941, the War Department had authorized \$1,000 for the field's enlargement, a small part of the amount initially allotted to Nichols, Clark, Bataan, and Kindley Fields. When the war started, little had been accomplished except the extension of the airstrip from 2,100 to 2,400 feet. Work was suspended because of more urgent demands on the ODE.<sup>2</sup>

As part of the effort to improve the defenses of the Philippines, Kindley Field was not found to be a significant contributor for the Army Air Corps and the War Department. In setting priorities and providing budget estimates for defensive installations in the Philippine Department in early February 1941, the WPD requested \$139,000 for the improvement of Kindley Field and additional amounts to improve or construct other airfields on Luzon. However, in commenting on the WPD's recommendations, the Air Corps opposed the improvement of Kindley Field:


This office questions the utility of attempting to improve the limited facilities available for landing aircraft on Corregidor. Kindley Field has never been a satisfactory installation; [it] serves the sole purpose of providing observation aircraft for the regulation of Coast Artillery firing. It is totally unsuitable as a base for pursuit or bombardment aviation and is so highly vulnerable to destructive air attack that it is believed that this money should be diverted to other purposes.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the Air Corps' position, the WPD prepared a supplemental budget request in mid-March 1941 for \$620,000 for the immediate expansion of airfields in the Philippines. It included \$500,000 for a new airstrip on Bataan, as well as the expansion of facilities at Nichols Field, Clark Field, and Kindley. As soon as funds were available and directed, the preparation of detailed plans for those projects would begin.

President Roosevelt agreed with the War Department's plans to expand the Philippine airfields. On 25 June, Gen George Marshall ordered the release of \$966,400 for the improvement of airfields in the Philippines. Included was \$140,000 specifically for improving Kindley Field. As was the case a month earlier, the bulk of the money went for Nichols, Clark, and Bataan Fields.<sup>4</sup>

In early July 1941, Maj Gen George Grunert, commander of the Philippine Department, submitted another estimate for supplemental funds for constructing or improving defensive installations. Included

was another \$156,000 for harbor defense, Ft. Wint (Subic Bay), and Air Corps facilities in Corregidor. Earlier (late June 1941), the ODE had submitted a supplemental budget request of only \$8,226 for pipe, pumps, and tank modifications at Ft. Wint and Corregidor's Air Corps facilities. At that time, Stickney began construction of a supply depot at Kindley Field. The ODE said that Air Corps construction at Ft. Wint and Corregidor was in the 1942 budget estimate submitted by the US Army CAC.<sup>5</sup>



**Figure 25.1. Corregidor.** (Adapted from Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 554 with author's annotations added based on research.)

The \$2.3 million approved for airfield construction in the Philippines on 2 August 1941 did not allocate funding for Kindley Field. Nor did the War Department provide an estimate for future work over and above the \$140,000 from the fourth supplemental to the Fiscal Year 1941 (FY 1941) budget, initially requested on 5 February 1941. Other harbor defense facilities at Ft. Wint received \$360,000. As of September 1941, the War Department still carried Kindley as a site for observation aircraft used as spotters for CA. General Grunert, nevertheless, believed it had value as an emergency landing field equipment and, in late September 1941, requested the retention of night lighting for the area. Commenting on the request, the USAFFE air officer pointed to the number of night missions over Corregidor and the field's use for emergency landing within the past year. Col

Harold George, then the department's Air Force executive officer, concurred with the maintenance of the lighting system.<sup>6</sup>

## War Comes to Corregidor

The vulnerability of aircraft at Kindley Field came to the attention of the USAFFE engineer in late December 1941. On 27 December, Maj General Sutherland, who had accompanied MacArthur to Corregidor, directed the construction of four revetments under cover and away from the field for the small messenger planes servicing Kindley. In a follow-up memo to the ODE contingent at Ft. Mills, the politically astute Casey considered the request from MacArthur's chief of staff a "first priority." Maj Robert B. Lothrop, the ODE officer responsible for fortification and military works at Ft. Mills tried to begin construction on the afternoon of the same day (27 December) to complete one revetment by 29 December and the remainder in eight to 10 days. They were to be 40 feet wide, 30 feet deep, and 15 feet high. The dimensions were sufficient for the O-49 observation aircraft. Casey ordered that natural cover be preserved and that splinter-proofing would be added later. Given a lack of sandbags, the plans were to splinter proof the revetment by building double walls of lumber with a fill of dirt and rocks. Engineers at Ft. Mills estimated that the project would require 140 cubic yards of material and "two weeks at a minimum to complete." However, only hand tools were available for the work.

Col Dorsey J. Rutherford, a CA officer, then serving as the USAFFE engineer executive officer on Corregidor, noted that three or four planes were "parked around Kindley Field without cover or camouflage of any kind." Pending construction of revetments, he suggested to the air officer that the planes be pushed into the brush and that "exposed parts [be] covered with brush and grass." A 28 December inspection by the USAFFE engineer and the air officer led to the selection of five sites for the revetments, four along the road east of the field and one off the road and to the west of the field. Rutherford deemed the eastern locations, 100 to 600 yards from the airstrip, as the best because of the natural cover. Fill material to compensate for the sloping terrain was readily available at Kindley Field.<sup>7</sup>

Three weeks into the war, after General Homma became aware of MacArthur's escape from Manila to Corregidor, the Japanese began

their bombardment of the island with a joint attack by their Army dive bombers and Navy G4M “Betty” medium bombers. AA batteries at Ft. Mills, Ft. Hughes, and southern Bataan gave a good account of themselves. Estimated Japanese losses were 13 of 81 land-based medium bombers and four out of the 10 dive bombers. Dive bombers did not return until the end of April. The raid resulted in some damage to wooden structures on “Topside” and “Middleside,” two of the three major complexes on Corregidor, but limited damage to other military installations. Two CA gun batteries suffered slight damage, as did small vessels anchored offshore from the “Bottomside” complex. At Kindley Field, the air raid forced Lothrop to suspend work on the one partially completed revetment. Absent adequate protection, two of the PA planes at Kindley Field were destroyed. The day after the raid, Lothrop said he expected to complete one revetment if he could find fill dirt.<sup>8</sup> On 20 December, the FEAF detailed four men for the revetment project and promised another five later.<sup>9</sup>

Despite the 29 December raid and pressure from Sutherland, work at Kindley Field remained a low priority. When Casey inspected the field on 26 January, he documented several problems that needed to be addressed. First, he said, “the critical deficiency in this field is its length.” Shortly after that, an engineer report said P-40s could not use the field unless it was extended 500–600 feet more on the east end. Second, Casey noted the absence of revetments for planes at the field, despite earlier plans for their construction. Third, he pointed out that the aging foliage used as camouflage was inadequate because “the surrounding vegetation [was] still green.” To address those deficiencies, he recommended that the FEAF provide the sandbags for the revetments. He also stated that the airstrip needed to be extended “several hundred feet” on the west end by the removal of a “relatively small amount” of soft rock that rose 15 feet above the field elevation. Finally, he stated that the foliage used for camouflage be renewed regularly. Extension of the field, he said, would require the relocation of two AA machine gun emplacements and the shelter for a searchlight and its power source. He recommended clearance from Maj Gen George F. Moore, commander of harbor defense, for the transfer of the units to perform the work and for the immediate execution of the work by the ODE personnel. Casey added that “although sufficient forces for his project are available locally, this work could be initiated by a company of the 803rd Engineer Battalion.” He added, “that the company with its equipment could be utilized on numerous



miscellaneous construction projects on Corregidor.” Showing his talent as a capable bureaucrat, Casey quickly secured Moore’s informal clearance for the transfer of forces and performance of the work by the ODE.<sup>10</sup>



Source: NARA RG111, SC252249

Kindley Field (E-W), 1946

Following up immediately after the inspection, Casey prevailed on Sutherland to renew work on Kindley Field by adding five splinter-proof camouflaged revetments. Under that proposal, the FEAF personnel concentrated on building sandbag revetments. Mielenz said the revetments or plane pens were a priority project that would be started as soon as labor and material were available. As a stopgap measure, the FEAF offered to renew runway construction and to begin work on the splinterproof, camouflaged revetments. Saying that it had “surplus men” available, it also volunteered to continue to protect the revetments after they were built. Colonel Rutherford said more candidly that the FEAF had personnel on Corregidor “with nothing to do.” Subsequently, 3,000 sandbags were delivered to Kindley Field. However, the CA’s AA units appropriated most of the sandbags, which were actually a higher priority for the defense of Corregidor.<sup>11</sup>

During early 1942, engineers at Ft. Mills attempted to provide options for the extension of Kindley Field and for its use as an alternative airstrip. Capt Lee Baldwin, an engineer with harbor defense, first recommended to Casey in late January that it would be best to work on the Kindley airstrip from both ends. The provision of fill material

to the east end had slowed because of the massive amount of dumped material. The solution, Baldwin suggested, was the construction of a structure with a heavy roof built below the final grade on the eastern end and the placement of fill material on top of it. The practice, he contended, would reduce the amount of fill needed. Baldwin believed the structure could also be designed to serve as a bombproof shop, hangar, or personnel shelter. He reported discussing his approach with both Col Theodore M. Chase and to Maj Arthur C. Peterson, 59th CA Regiment, and had gained their concurrence. A few weeks later, Baldwin suggested a slight reorientation of the airstrip using a cantilever deck with extra fill at the northeast corner and fill at the shallower east end to allow for a length of 3,400 feet. Mielenz, however, rejected both proposals for reasons undocumented.<sup>12</sup>


Col Joseph R. McMiking, a Filipino civilian mining engineer commissioned after the start of the war, suggested to Captain Baldwin that the Topside area of Corregidor be surveyed for other possible airstrip sites. Map and field reconnaissance revealed a potential site near Battery Grubbs, “running right through the Topside Barracks and the movie theater” for a bomber field. Challenges would have included communications and utilities. Mielenz also vetoed that suggestion. He said the matter had been studied previously, and he considered it a closed issue.<sup>13</sup>

A 30 January 1942 engineer inspection report documented the FEAF’s failure to build plane pens or renew camouflage at Kindley Field. In response, the USAFFE Quartermaster relayed the directive that Sutherland wanted the engineers to complete the work because the FEAF did not have sufficient personnel. Formalizing the arrangement quickly, Rutherford forwarded the quartermaster’s memorandum to the ODE (in Ft. Mills) with the comment “for compliance.” Rutherford said the ODE would build the revetments but would conserve sandbags for later use, noting succinctly “no [materiel] . . . No labor now.” He expected MacArthur to assign the work on the revetments a higher priority. The ODE received formal orders in early February 1942 to take over the project. After a lobbying effort by Maj John D. McPherson, Jr., the ODE’s executive officer, Mielenz responded that Company A of the 803rd Engineers, with its full complement of equipment, would erect the revetments. Then, the ODE began a study on the development of Kindley Field and on revetment construction for Casey.<sup>14</sup>

## The Arrival of Company A

As of 3 February, Casey had requested and received orders for the transfer of Company A of the 803rd EB. Their temporary duty tasks at Ft. Mills were to improve Kindley Field and to emplace the 8-inch railway gun that was being moved to Corregidor from Bataan. (The 8-inch gun project is the subject of a separate chapter.) Perhaps Casey was merely seeking a reprieve for the company because it had suffered more casualties than the other three companies of the 803rd. In light of the minor work assignments on Corregidor and the USAFFE's later—and tentative—plans to transfer select 803rd personnel, including most of the remaining Company A personnel, to Mindanao to develop additional airstrips, one must question whether or not Casey was also trying to provide for future efforts. Maj Brewster Gallup oversaw Company A's move. Before the company's arrival, arrangements were made for the transfer of equipment, selection of bivouac area and quarters, and provision of rations. For construction operations, Company A was under the general direction of Maj Robert B. Lothrop. The original orders stipulated that an advance detail of 20 men was to arrive at Corregidor's North (Army) Pier on the evening of 3 February. Still, the location was then switched to the Engineer Dock, located west of the North Dock. Ninety-five Company A engineers arrived at 0400 on 4 February. After a brief formation, they went off to two bivouac areas: the north side of Kindley Field near Cavalry Point, where most of the men were assigned, and a site near Malinta Tunnel. Heavy equipment for the company was to be supplied as required. The company's few remaining men arrived during 5–6 February.<sup>15</sup>

Because they were severely depleted at Quinuan Point, Company A was not considered an effective organization. Company surgeon Lt Herbert Coone described the men who landed on Corregidor as "dirty and despondent." They wore the same clothes they had used on Quinuan Point in the Battle of the Points. The reduction of rations was taking its toll and much in evidence through weight loss, physical weakness, and diseases, particularly malaria. Medical supplies were almost nonexistent. Wounds and sores did not heal. One engineer, probably Pvt Charles H. Hamilton, formerly with Headquarters Company, died of cerebral malaria on 16 April 1942. The situation did not improve. The men were fed twice a day, but portion sizes decreased steadily. As on Bataan, the diet consisted primarily of canned



Source: NARA RG111, Box 1369, SC59585

Bottom side—North (Army) Dock Area (bottom to top) Lorca Dock, Engineer Dock, Battery Point, 1937



Source: NARA RG111, Box 1369, SC59588

Engineer Dock, 1937

salmon and canned beets. It was scrounging that added to the personal food stores of some men. Bathing was difficult.<sup>16</sup>

The company's medical unit set up a field hospital outside the artillery tunnel, about 200 yards from the main Malinta Tunnel. Lieutenant Coone used a branch of the artillery tunnel, which was located close to a nonoperational gun emplacement, as a first aid station. It could hold three stretchers. After receiving primary care, casualties were carried to the main hospital tunnel, across uneven terrain littered with rocks and trees, after dark. The Japanese shelled the field hospital area almost daily.<sup>17</sup>

Mielenz's assurances that the company would be "equipped to do the work" notwithstanding, Company A did not have—nor did it ever receive—a full complement of heavy equipment. Arrangements were made for the immediate shipment one bulldozer less its shovel and one towed carryall (scraper) with a tractor to Corregidor. Other heavy equipment was to be sent when needed. Some additional equipment trickled in later. Shortly after Company A's arrival, Lothrop expected the delivery of 12–14 dump trucks and wanted four more if they were available. However, Major Fries responded that he was sending only seven one-ton-and-a-half vehicles. Similarly, Fries rebuffed Lothrop's request for two power shovels, saying that he had only one and needed it for contractors working on Bataan's West Road. As a result, the engineers used a turn-of-the-century steam shovel employed initially almost 40 years previously to construct the first defensive positions on Corregidor. With its leaky water tanks, the machine could move only a short distance before the engineers had to refill the tanks with water. Lothrop had initially requested four bulldozers but with two bulldozers already at Ft. Mills, he needed only one more from the 803rd. For reasons unspecified, Lothrop said he did not have a requirement for blasting machines. In response to a demand for four galvanometers, possibly for work around underground power lines at Kindley Field, Company A brought over all the 803rd's instruments and left none in stock on Bataan. Lieutenant Leggett, the 803rd's assistant adjutant, arranged to ship a motor grader and one truck from Bataan on 23 February.<sup>18</sup>

Upon arrival, Capt Edmund Zbikowski, the Company A commander, requested several improvements in utilities. At issue was water service to the Navy barracks and a power line to Kindley Field, near Road Junction 15 (RJ15). Rutherford thought water could be brought into the Kindley Field tank from a well located at the field or



filled from the Middleside reservoir. The feeder line from the power plant to Kindley Field was repaired, and the water tank connected to the main distribution line during the week of 1-7 February. By 7 March, the engineers had almost finished removing the underground cable at Kindley.<sup>19</sup>


The original plan was to transfer Company A to Ft. Mills to install the 8-inch gun, extend Kindley Field, “renew plane pen construction,” and undertake other “miscellaneous” projects. An extensive list of utility, fortification, and military construction projects was underway at the time. When orders were finally formalized on 3 February, the company was assigned two essential tasks that were to be taken on simultaneously: lengthen and flatten the runway, remove blind spots, construct revetments at Kindley Field, and emplace the 8-inch gun. Other assignments followed. Company A was also to assist with road maintenance, while some personnel were to serve as back up on beach defense for the 4th Marine Regiment on the north shore. The Kindley Field project called for the construction of a 3,000-foot by 300-foot runway in 30 days. After a long argument, technicians and staff changed the plans to specify a runway 2,600 feet long and 100 feet wide with additional width and length to be done if time permitted.<sup>20</sup>

Work started immediately on the revetments and on lengthening the airstrip. Company A details worked at Monkey Point, just south of Kindley; Bottomside; Middleside; and Topside. Before getting to the rubble from the Navy tunnel, the engineers had to demolish a row of wooden Navy houses on the hill overlooking Kindley Field. Rumor had it that the housing had been initially used for the Navy cryptographers at Monkey Point. The engineers were ordered to destroy all the clothing in the buildings. Despite the condition of their uniforms, they were not permitted to take any clothing items for personal use. Among those on the Monkey Point detail were Sgt Steve Kruchowsky, Cpl Chester A. Bailey, and Privates John Mackowski, Andrew J. King, Frank J. DiPasquale, Alfred J. Schnitzer, Joe Minder, and four or five others. Mackowski drove one of the few two-and-a-half-ton dump trucks charged with hauling dirt and gravel from Bottomside to Kindley Field. DiPasquale operated a bucket loader on the project.<sup>21</sup>

A small squad worked on maintenance of the road from Monkey Point to the hospital tunnel. Cpl Tom Gagnet operated a bulldozer on that project.<sup>22</sup>

On 5 February, Corregidor suffered its first shelling from Cavite. Some projectiles hit the Kindley Field runway, but Company A personnel

were not injured. The engineers considered the incident an attempt by the Japanese to zero in their artillery. Shelling continued almost daily afterward.<sup>23</sup>



**Figure 25.2. Kindley Field and environs.** (Adapted from Rediscovering Corregidor, “Field Notes.” <http://corregidor.org/fieldnotes/htm/fots2-110129.htm>.)

Coincidentally, on 5 February, Lt Henry “Pete” Warden, former assistant engineer officer at the Quezon City air depot, and two pilots were on Corregidor in search of protected repair facilities large enough to accommodate P-40s. The dimensions for the wedge-shaped structure were like those that Casey had specified for the initial revetments: 40 feet wide, 15 feet high, and 35 feet deep. Almost immediately, Sutherland requested the construction of that covered revetment in connection with the extension of Kindley Field. Among the options Warden wanted to discuss with Zbikowski was a small excavation with a side built of sandbags.<sup>24</sup>

Even before the arrival of Company A, Casey had recommended to the USAFFE quartermaster at Ft. Mills that the bulk of the work be scheduled for nights for greater and continued production because “large numbers of laborers and their supervisors . . . [were] engaged in work during daylight hours.” A searchlight on Water Tower Hill overlooked Kindley Field, but it was not used for fear of compromising its position to the Japanese. Thus, the engineers worked during

the night—even though the exhaust of the bulldozers was visible—and lived in foxholes during the day. Pvt Joe Minder claimed to have overheard Capt Zbikowski's comment that with the added light of a full moon, the men should be able to accomplish more work. Smaller groups could be used during the daylight for emergency work or work that could still be performed during air raids.<sup>25</sup>

In late February, Casey recommended to General Moore the construction of a bomb shelter as "highest priority" and said the Service Command engineer section was ready to proceed. "If no shelter is provided, the workmen run to Malinta Tunnel, result in great delay in returning to their work." With the acceleration of boat arrivals, there was doubt that unloading operations could keep up with incoming shipments unless steps were taken to keep workers on site to expedite the work.<sup>26</sup>

In mid-February, an additional survey of Kindley Field and the topography to the northeast and south center was undertaken to determine the best way of straightening the airstrip with a minimum of "cut and fill." They wanted to examine eliminating the bend at the east end and allowing for a maximum extension on the west end. Casey wanted to use material from the southwest end to extend the airstrip. He also sought to ensure better control of the excavation of the central hump and bottlenecks on both sides of the field where the engineers were straightening the airstrip. The objective was to keep the airfield in operation while work was in progress. At the same time, artillery engineers were coordinating on the relocation of electric lines exposed by excavation.<sup>27</sup>

An inspection of Kindley Field on 19 February revealed that bombs stored in the nearby woods were stacked tightly together. The Ft. Mills engineer suggested that the ordnance officer disperse the bombs "more widely."<sup>28</sup> A second inspection the next day, 20 February, demonstrated that Company A had made "excellent progress" in leveling of the west end and extending the eastern section of the airstrip. But Capt Baldwin estimated it would take the engineers two-to-three months to complete the fill to gain 2,900 feet in total length. By 7 March, the work on 10 revetments was about half complete, and the extension of Kindley Field was almost 40 percent complete. The excavation was underway on two Panama mounts for fixed coast artillery positions in the field.<sup>29</sup>

In what became an interesting bureaucratic process shortly after the arrival of Company A, several USAFFE elements, the Philippine



CAC, and the Service Command engineer section began discussing the arming of the engineers. On 12 February, the USAFFE quartermaster of the Bataan advanced echelon deferred to the Philippine CAC on the issuance of additional machine guns for local beach defense. The quartermaster noted that Company A was on Corregidor and was “expected to remain there for several months.” The Ft. Mills quartermaster then requested comment from the USAFFE engineer office, which deferred to the Service Command engineer for comment. Not until 22 February was the issue resolved. Harbor Defense issued Company A three machine guns with ground mounts and accessories and 5,000 rounds of belted ammunition with the stipulation that “these [machine guns were] to be returned prior to [the] departure of this unit.”<sup>30</sup>

Throughout this period, the engineers dealt with diminishing resources. Well documented were problems with equipment repairs and fuel supplies. On 1 March, three civilian employees of the ODE, including Ray Allen, an adviser to Company A, traveled to the Visayas. That island group is in the center of the Philippine archipelago. There they sought to locate and acquire spare tractor parts.

About a week later (9 March), General Sutherland was threatening to cancel the work on Kindley Field for reasons undocumented. By mid-March, Colonel Mielenz recommended that the northern section of Kindley Field be completed since work there was the most advanced. A strip of 50 feet on the northern edge had been graded and was being prepared for rolling and surfacing. The engineers had also started on the middle section of 50 feet. Mielenz pleaded for “sufficient gasoline . . . to keep the gasoline shovel and trucks working twenty-four hours per day” and recommended that Company A receive an additional 50 gallons per day. He also wanted to reduce the number of revetments from 10 to five “to avoid dangerous crowding and difficulty in providing camouflage during the dry season.” During the siege, the USAFFE demurred on the engineer’s requests and recommended that it be staffed out for consideration.<sup>31</sup>

Near the end of the siege of Corregidor, Lt Gen Jonathan M. Wainwright cabled Gen George Marshall that “morale [was] amazingly good[,] considering conditions under which troops [were then] operating.” Still, he conceded it was difficult to maintain morale because of the constant air and artillery attacks. As of March 1942, eight engineers and two corpsmen from Company A were on partial pay as a punitive or disciplinary measure. Most held the rank of private, but

one sergeant had been demoted to private on 1 May. The defenders were beaten down. Some days food or water was unavailable. Other times, food would arrive on an erratic schedule—from the tunnel early in the morning or late at night.<sup>32</sup>

In a joint operation, from 24–28 March, the Japanese army launched its heavy bombers and the Navy medium “Betty” bombers against Corregidor. After that time, the heavy bombers concentrated on Bataan. On the morning of 24 March, Japanese artillery in Cavite opened fire in response to shelling from Batteries Woodruff, Marshall, and Koehler at Ft. Frank. Coincident with the artillery bombardment was a series of bombing raids. The initial attack involved about 79 aircraft. Among the air raids later in the day were two waves of nine heavy bombers each. That attack caught Company A on Kindley Field, while the Japanese also concentrated their artillery fire on the eastern end of the island. During the bombardment, Capt Edmund Zbikowski suffered multiple fractures and wounds. KIA that day were Pfc Leo T. Herrington and Pvt Morton Karp. Wounded were Sgt Lawrence E. Cook, Pfc Charles Agostinelli, and Privates Alden McEwen, Andrew J. King, Forrest E. Wooley, and Daniel Pellegrino, as well as four others. Company A medic, Pvt Fred W. Zimpfer, who died as a POW on the *Oryoko Maru* on 15 December 1944, was awarded the Silver Star medal posthumously for dragging wounded engineers through the burning grass to the hospital in Malinta Tunnel. Company A’s bivouac was burned, and much of Company A’s equipment was damaged. Trees, which provided vital camouflage for the area, were destroyed. When fires broke out, the men left for Malinta Tunnel to determine the number of killed and wounded.<sup>33</sup>

Captain Zbikowski died on 2 April at the Corregidor hospital and was buried the next day. Lt David Bartlett was named acting commander until the arrival of Capt James D. Richardson from battalion headquarters on 6 April. Richardson was later wounded, as well.<sup>34</sup>

On 25 March, Company A moved to a new bivouac area near Road Junction 43 (RJ-43), at the site of the 8-inch gun that it had installed for added protection.<sup>35</sup> While the company was moving, light, heavy, and medium bombers, about 116 in number, attacked Corregidor in waves for over 12 hours (0900 until after 2100). During mid-afternoon, two streams of nine heavy bombers each hit Kindley Field again. Marine observers noted that the bombers were more substantial than the Type 97, Mark 1 “Sally” medium bombers or Type 98

“Mary” light bomber with which they were familiar. The bombs exploded two mines at Kindley Field and damaged 10 others.<sup>36</sup>

Bombing and shelling of Corregidor increased daily from 28 March through 7 April. The men could see the muzzle flashes across the bay. When Company A arrived on Corregidor, the island was verdant, but the steady bombardment gradually denuded Corregidor of vegetation. The detail at Monkey Point used a small communications tunnel for shelter during the attack. The tunnel had a zigzag barrier system to prevent bomb penetrations. It was also an obstacle to men seeking refuge. On 27 April, Japanese shelling started significant fires at Monkey Point. During one raid, Pvt Joe Minder was wounded by blast material as he contended with both the barriers and other engineers seeking shelter.<sup>37</sup>

Easter on 5 April 1942, was just another workday on Corregidor. Company A continued with construction and spent considerable time on repairs to Kindley Field. Other work details maintained roads from Bottomside to Monkey Point. Also, the company was given the responsibility for removing dud bombs and projectiles in the area from Bottomside to Monkey Point, a sector that included Kindley Field.<sup>38</sup>

During the siege of Corregidor, Kindley Field remained operational but served only smaller aircraft on supply and evacuation missions. On 9 April, as Bataan surrendered, four Stearman 76D3 aircraft—armed biplanes used by the PA Air Corps as trainers—were at Kindley Field. Two pilots, Lieutenants Ray Gehrig and Jack Randolph, obtained a release to fly two planes out and took off at 1615. On 10 April, a third Stearman left Corregidor on an unauthorized flight. After landing successfully at Del Monte Field, Mindanao, Gehrig, and Randolph were ordered back to Corregidor to pick up USAFFE intelligence and operational journals, as well as four passengers, including journalist Frank Hewett, the author of the poem “Battling Bastards of Bataan.” They tried to land a four-passenger Waco Custom Cabin aircraft and a Stearman in the early hours of 12 April without the benefit of field lighting. The engineers had removed some boundary lights and bombs, and shrapnel had damaged the remainder of the lights. Wainwright said night landings became possible only when one of Corregidor’s searchlights would “dip its beam along the strip.” Randolph crashed the Waco on a large rock that Company A had been unable to remove from the middle of the airstrip. Gehrig ran his Stearman off the strip, bending its propeller in the process. Their

inbound cargo included medicine, vitamin pills, and chocolates. The remainder of the day was spent repairing the two aircraft. On the morning of 13 April, the two planes left Kindley Field with the journals and passengers. Later that evening, the fourth and last Stearman left Kindley Field. On 19 April, Capt William Bradford, formerly the engineer officer at with the 20th Pursuit Squadron, Bataan Field, flew into Kindley with the medicines. On takeoff a day later, he crashed the plane at the edge of the runway without injury to himself or his passenger.<sup>39</sup>

After the surrender of Bataan, one detail of Company A remained near the Malinta Tunnel, and the other moved to nearby Monkey Point, close to the Navy tunnel. The tunnel facility had formerly housed the Navy cryptographic unit that had intercepted messages about the Pearl Harbor attack. Company A's Monkey Point detachment included: Sgt. Steve Kruchowsky, Cpl Chester A. Bailey, and Privates John Mackowski, Andrew J. King, Frank J. DiPasquale, Alfred J. Schnitzer, Joe Minder, and four or five others. Lt Walter Farrell's platoon at Monkey Point was separated into even smaller details. The men were able to scavenge food from the Navy in return for doing routine kitchen chores. At the same time, officers went to the area around Malinta Tunnel, given inadequate shelter for all the men at Monkey Point. The movements left the work details of Farrell's platoon without an officer-in-charge.<sup>40</sup> Maj Frank E. Fries, commander of the 803rd, probably arrived on Corregidor early on the morning of 9 April. He became the administrative and personnel officer for the US Forces in the Philippines (USFIP), the successor organization to USAFFE after MacArthur's departure, at Ft. Mills. He had limited interaction with the men of Company A.<sup>41</sup>

The fall of Bataan brought a renewed and more relentless pounding from the Japanese. They moved artillery to the heights of Bataan's Mariveles Mountains to shell the island, and air attacks mounted in a fury. Pvt Joe Minder said the almost continuous shelling and bombing made the island tremble "as if there were an earthquake." The engineers got very little sleep for 16 days. Several interisland boats sank while trying to sail to the southern shore of Corregidor. Corregidor's heavy guns began counterbattery firing again on 10 April to reduce the intensity of Japanese artillery. Wainwright halted the firing when he learned of the presence of US and Filipino soldiers marching through the southern tip of Bataan on the Death March. At 1600 on 10 April, Japanese artillery projectiles hit several tons of black powder

and TNT located near Cavalry Point, where part of Company A had originally bivouacked, destroying everything within 500 yards.<sup>42</sup>

Two weeks before the surrender of Corregidor, work on Kindley Field ceased. The company and its sizable earthmoving equipment were needed for road repair. Company A worked at night and between the artillery barrages to keep supplies moving to defenders. However, by that time, they were unable to keep the roads free of obstructions. Many of the broken power and water lines could not be repaired. Two more Company A engineers were KIA on 3 May: Pvt Nolan E. Mathias and Pvt J. R. Graham.<sup>43</sup>

On the emperor's birthday, 29 April, the Japanese air force began final preparations for the invasion of Corregidor. For a week, it concentrated on the north shore and shipping in the bay. The onslaught of those attacks coincided with the last flights from Kindley Field. After almost 10 days on Corregidor, Capt William Bradford, along with Capt Hugh "Tex" Marble, also of the 20th Pursuit Squadron, and 2nd Lt Ed Erickson of the 17th Pursuit Squadron left Kindley Field in two PBY Catalina aircraft for Mindanao. They were the last US pursuit pilots to escape the island. Corregidor gained some respite on 1 May as the Japanese concentrated their bombardment on Ft. Hughes and Ft. Drum in Manila Bay, as well as the eastern tail of Corregidor, near Kindley Field and Monkey Point. The field had become too hazardous for further use.<sup>44</sup>

On 5 May, Company A of the 803rd Engineers was committed to combat operations for a second time. The engineers supplemented the 4th Marine units on beach defense, and three members of Company A served as forward artillery observers. The first Japanese attempt to invade the island came late on that same day. Before the landing attempts, the Japanese shelled targets in the north shore heavily—(W-E) North Dock, James Ravine (near Morrison Point), Battery Point, the area between Infantry and Cavalry points, and at the area between Malinta Tunnel and Infantry Point. Japanese reconnaissance and bomber aircraft flew over Corregidor continually to monitor US positions and soften defenses. In five raids on 5 May, the bombers concentrated on Kindley Field and the James Ravine at opposite ends of the island. Their pilots did not face opposition over Kindley Field; AA guns and range finders had already been destroyed. Company A's Pfc Daniel J. Daugherty was among those KIA while on beach defense. After those attacks, Wainwright wrote to MacArthur in Australia: "Situation here is fast becoming desperate."<sup>45</sup>

Japanese plans called for Lt Gen Kenzo Kitano's 4th Division to land at Cavalry Point with later waves to come ashore farther west between Cavalry and Infantry Points. Maj Gen Kureo Taniguchi's forces were to go from Lamao, Bataan, to Corregidor's north shore between Battery and Morrison points and presumably advance through the James Ravine. Reflecting Japanese incompetence in amphibious operations, those plans miscarried immediately. The tide flowed west out of Manila Bay rather than east, as the Japanese had assumed. Thus, the initial forces landed just before midnight, 5 May, near North Point on the eastern tip of Corregidor and close to Kindley Field rather than between Cavalry and Infantry Points. Because they landed at different times and places, the Japanese forces soon became separated. Fil-American forces, still dazed by the bombardment, met the invaders with heavy fire. This included fire from a two-gun 75 mm battery previously hidden from the Japanese. Japanese artillery fire from Bataan suppressed searchlights, but tracer fire illuminated the area from Kindley Field to Monkey Point. US beach defenders characterized the action as the slaughter of the invasion force.<sup>46</sup>

The second wave of Japanese troops was subjected to the 12-inch mortar fire from the guns of Battery Way. Nearby Ft. Hughes weighed in with additional mortar fire, as smaller 3-inch and 75 mm guns also went into action to destroy landing barges and small boats. At dawn, the heavy guns of Battery Stockade near Bottomside and Ft. Drum succeeded in destroying a large number of small landing craft leaving Bataan. Additional Japanese came ashore at North Point, west of Infantry Point, and advanced in two prongs, one westward toward Malinta Tunnel and the other south to Monkey Point. The first objective was to seize Kindley Field and then push west to occupy Malinta Hill by dawn, 6 May.<sup>47</sup>

At the time of the initial landings, Company A was divided into two groups: one at Malinta Tunnel and the other near the Navy tunnel and Monkey Point. The engineers awaited the light of dawn to be able to see who they were fighting. By 0130, the Japanese forces had split in two. One line of advance had driven across the narrow tail of Corregidor to Monkey Point; the second had taken the area of Battery Denver and established a north-south line across the island with tanks and artillery starting to come ashore. The Marines had command responsibility for the 10,000 yards of shoreline in the Eastern Sector. Pvt Joe Vater described the situation as "chaos." As the Japanese approached Navy tunnel, near Monkey Point, he was standing between

Cpl Samuel A. Drake and Cpl Chester A. Bailey when they were KIA. Then Vater and Sgt Odas A. Greer, CA, covered a machine gun position until Greer was wounded in the chest and Vater in the arm. Vater carried Greer to the hospital at the Navy tunnel. Corporal Angelo J. Palumbo, commanding a machine gun position under heavy artillery fire, was also wounded and taken to the hospital. Palumbo's actions merited a recommendation for the Silver Star Medal from his platoon leader, 1st Lt David Barrett. Pvt August Murn, a RA troop in Company A, was also KIA on or about 6 May.<sup>48</sup>

Despite early mishaps, the Japanese advanced swiftly. By 0200 on 6 May, only two US platoons stood between the Japanese and Malinta Tunnel. General Moore stripped his seacoast batteries to supplement beach defenses. Other CA and AA personnel were released as infantrymen for a counterattack. The Japanese repulsed counterattacks for a few hours in the morning and were surprised by another, which failed, at 0600. The final Japanese assault came about 1000 with infantry supported by tanks. Additional tanks were positioned on Kindley Field. The attack pinned US forces down. The threat of yet another Japanese landing loomed. With all his reserves committed and his guns practically destroyed, General Wainwright realized that further resistance was futile. He decided to surrender at 1000.<sup>49</sup>

The sixth of May was another costly day for Company A. In addition to two men KIA, at least six were wounded: Capt James D. Richardson, the company commander, who suffered a foot wound from shrapnel; Sgt Gilbert E. Soifer; Cpl Tom Gagnet, who was in the hospital tunnel at the time of surrender; Cpl Angelo J. Palumbo; Pvt James K. Stow; and Pvt. Joseph W. Filko.<sup>50</sup>

Before the cessation of military activity, Company A had made considerably more progress on the improvement of Kindley Field. This success was more than had been accomplished before or even in the early days of the war. It had built five aircraft revetments, completed one 50-foot section of runway, and had begun another 50-foot section. The company had also started a second airstrip, but artillery fire made the site untenable for personnel and equipment. Subjected to repeated aerial and artillery bombardment, Company A was able to do little to expand or improve the second runway.<sup>51</sup>



## Notes

1. Meixsel, *Clark Field and the U.S. Army Air Corps*, 87; "Sixteen New Fields 'Christened,'" ACNL 24, no. 13 (July 1941): 11; Col Lloyd E. Mielenz, *Engineer Preparations*, Humphreys Center, Box 99-11 (M343), 9–10; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 103; Gerow to AGO, memo, 6 March 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, FY 1942, NARA RG165, Entry 281, Box 108, directed AGO to send the message to the CG, Philippine Department; Meidling, ed., *Airfield and Air Base Construction*, 489, and *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 29; Vater, interviews, 25 October 1998, and 12–13 October 2003. In July 1941, the USAAF established a new base in Bermuda and named it Kindley Field.

2. Mielenz, *Engineer Preparations*, 9–10; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 103; Gerow to AGO, memo, March 6, 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, FY 1942; C.A.W. (not further identified), ACoS, quartermaster, Philippine Department, to CG, USAFFE, routing and record slip, 20 August 1941, Subject: Construction Program for the Philippine Department, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 36.

3. Gerow to AGO, memo, 6 March 1941, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, FY [Fiscal Year] 1942.

4. Anderson to CoS, memo, 18 March 1941, Subject: Immediate Expansion of Airfields; [Gen George C. Marshall], MFR, n.d. [probably mid-March, 1941, no subject [improvement of Philippine defenses], NARA RG165, Box 80; AGO to CoE, memo, 15 April 1941, Subject: Authorization of Air Corps Construction, Philippine Islands, Fourth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1941, NARA RG18, Project File, Box 1117; Gerow to CoS, memo, 25 June 1941, Subject: Improvement of Air Fields in the Philippine Islands, RG 165, Entry 281, Box 89.

5. CG, Philippine Department, to AGO, memo, 3 July 1942, Subject: Estimates for Defensive Installations, Philippine Department, FY 1942, NARA RG165, Entry 281, Box 108; Stickney to CoE, letter, 22 July 1941, Subject: Fiscal Year 1942 Funds for Air Corps Construction, Philippine Department, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709, File 600.1; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 61.

6. AGO to CoE, memo, 2 August 1941, Subject: Air Field Construction, Philippine Department, Fiscal Year 1941, NARA RG77, Entry 1011, Box 709, File: 600.12; Map, Philippine Air Fields, 1 September 1941, NARA RG165, Box 109, WPD File 3251; air officer to headquarters, air force, USAFFE, routing and record sheet, 13 September 1941; Grunert to AGO, War Department, radiogram, 25 September 1941; and author unknown to AGO, Philippine Department, note [handwritten], 23 September 1941, no subject [Col George's concurrence], all in Casey Files, Folder 7.

7. USAFFE engineer journal, 27 December 1941; Casey to ODE, Ft. Mills, memo, 28 December 1941, Subject: Cover for Planes; Rutherford to air officer, memo, 28 December 1941, Subject: Cover for Planes – Kindley Field; Rutherford to Sutherland, memo, 28 December 1941, Subject: Re-camouflage plans, Kindley Field; all documents in Casey Files, Folder 3. Ft. Mills was named in honor of Brig Gen Samuel M. Mills, Jr., who served as chief of artillery, US Army, during June 1905–September 1906. Ft. Mills was activated in 1907.

8. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 479–81; USAFFE engineer journal (Ft. Mills), 29 December 1941, no subject [status of Kindley Field revetments], Casey Files, Folder 3.

9. USAFFE engineer journal (Ft. Mills), 29 December 1941.

10. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 26 January 1942, Subject: Inspection of Ft. Mills, NARA RG407. The inspection report carried the handwritten notation: "Gen Moore has informally cleared." Author unknown [probably Mielenz, the defense en-



gineer at Ft. Mills] and unspecified recipient [probably USAFFE engineer], n.d. [probably 8 February 1942], Report of Engineering Activities Week Ending 7 February 1941. Maj Robert B. Lothrop was killed in November 1944, while trying to escape the sinking “hellship” *Arisan Maru*. See Bonham, memo, n.d., Officers at Corregidor at the Time of Surrender of Bataan, and Mansell Roster.

11. Mielenz, *Engineer Preparations*, 9-10; Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 29, and *Airfield and Air Base Construction*, 489; Rutherford, MFR, 31 January 1942, Subject: Notes for Eng[inee]r for Study and Decision, NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 32; Rutherford to [unknown – presumably USAFFE G-4], memo, n.d., Subject: Weekly Report 25-31 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6.

12. [Cpt] L[ee] A. B[aldwin] to Casey, memo, 28 January 1942. See Bonham, memo, Engineer Officers on Corregidor at the Time of the Surrender of Bataan; Baldwin to Casey, memo, 20 February 1942, no subject [engineer projects on Corregidor], Casey Files, Folder 6. Lee Baldwin was a civilian formerly employed in the harbor command. He died on 14 or 15 December 1944.

13. Baldwin to Casey, memo, 20 February 1942, no subject [engineer projects on Corregidor].

14. Mielenz, *Engineer Preparations*, 10; Bonham, memo, US Army Officers on Duty with Engineer Headquarters and Units, 21 Feb 1942, 1; USAFFE G-4, to Engineer, USAFFE, 1st Ind., 30 January 1942, no subject [responsibility for revetment construction]; Mielenz to CG, harbor defense for Manila and Subic Bays, 4th ind., 2 February 1942, no subject [assignment of Company A to Kindley Field projects], Casey Files, Folder 4; Rutherford, MFR, 31 January 1942, Subject: Notes for Eng[inee]r for Study and Decision, NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 32; Rutherford to [unknown – presumably USAFFE G-4], memo, n.d., Subject: Weekly Report 25–31 January 1942, Casey Files, Folder 6.

15. Rutherford, MFR, 3 February 1942, no subject [engineer activities on Corregidor], Casey Files, Folder 13; Mielenz to engineer, USAFFE, memo, 1 February 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 25–31 January 1942, Inclusive, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey to ACoS, G-1, memo, 3 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 13; Special Order No. 12, Headquarters, USAFFE, 3 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 13.

16. Montgomery, “Brief History,” 3; Wallace, *POW* 83, 117–18; Vater, interview, 12-13 October 2003; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 41-42; Minder, interview, 1 November 1999. Company A Casualty List documented the death of “Hamilton” from cerebral malaria on 4-11-42; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 103; Meidling, ed., *Airfield and Air Base Construction*, 489. The Kloecker roster mentioned a Pvt J. Hamilton with a date of death as 1 May 1942. The USAFFE roster recorded a Pvt Charles H. Hamilton, Headquarters Company, and date of death as 16 April 1942, probably identical to J. Hamilton.

17. Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 42–43.

18. 1st Lt W[illiam] C. Ramme, [USAFFE, intelligence and supply] to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: Inspection Trip to Fort Mills 5 February 1942 by Lt W.C. Ramme, Casey Files, Folder 4; Mielenz to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 1–7 February 1942, inclusive, Casey Files, Folder 13; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Maj William Gay, MFR, 23 February 1942, Subject: Telephone Calls, Casey Files, Folder 14; Rutherford, MFR, 3 February 1942, no subject; Minder diary, 6.

19. no author [probably Rutherford], MFR, 6 February 1942, no subject [engineer activities and issues], Casey Files, Folder 13; Rutherford, MFR, 3 February 1942, no subject. Mielenz to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 9 March 1942, Subject: Status Report,

Department Engineer, 1–7 March 1942, inclusive, Casey Files, Folder 8; Mielenz to Casey, memo, 9 February 1941, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 1–7 February 1942, inclusive, Casey Files, Folder 13.

20. Mielenz to CG, USAFFE, 1st Ind., 17 March 1942, Subject: Basic Modification & Improvement of Kindley Field, NARA RG 496, Entry 540, Box 32; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 31 January 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 31 January 1942, 6; Fries to all company commanders, memo, 3 February 1942, Subject Changes in Sectors of Responsibility, Casey Files, Folder 4; Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Engineer Operations Report for Week Ending 14 February 1942, 4; Rutherford, MFR, 3 February 1942, no subject; Minder diary, 6, and interview, 1 November 1999; Vater, interviews, 12–13 October 2003 and 22 August 2006; Wallace, *POW* 83, 117; Gagnet, interview, 6 February 1999. ODE (Ft. Mills) to engineer USAFFE, memo, 1 February 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 25–31 January 1942, Inclusive, Casey Files, Folder 4.

21. Mielenz to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 7 February 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 1–7 February 1942, inclusive, Casey Files, Folder 13; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Wallace, *POW* 83, 117, 122.

22. Gagnet, interview, 6 February 1999.

23. Montgomery, “Brief History,” 3; Minder diary, 6; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 42; Vater, interviews, 18–21 May 2006; Gagnet, interview, 6 February 1999.

24. Rutherford, memo, 5 February 1942, no subject, Casey Files, Folder 4; Rutherford to Mielenz, memo, 5 February 1941, no subject [revetment for P-40 repairs], Casey Files Folder 4.

25. Casey to CoS through G-4, memo, 5 January 1942, no subject [work schedules on Corregidor], NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 29; Vater, interviews, 25 October 1998, and 12–13 October 2003; Minder, interview, 1 November 1999.

26. L[ee] A. B[aldwin], assistant, engineer, USAFFE to CG, harbor defense of Manila and Subic Bays, 21 February 1942, Casey Files, Folder 5.

27. Casey to CoS, USAFFE, memo, 15 February 1942, Subject: Inspection of Ft. Mills, Casey Files, Folder 5.

28. E.V[iardo], [assistant engineer, USAFFE, Ft. Mills] to ordnance officer, USAFFE, memo, 19 February 1942, no subject [bomb storage near Kindley Field], Casey Files, Folder 5.

29. Baldwin to Casey, memo, 20 February 1943, no subject [engineer projects on Corregidor]; Mielenz to Engineer, USAFFE, memo, 9 March 1942, Subject: Status Report, Department Engineer, 1–7 March 1942. Panama mounts were either full or partial circles of steel rail set in concrete with a diameter of approximately 36 feet with a large concrete column with a diameter of ten feet in the center to support the gun and carriage.

30. G-4, Bataan echelon, 1st Ind., 12 February 1942, to G-4 USAFFE, Ft. Mills, no subject; G-4, USAFFE, to Engineer, USAFFE, 14 February 1942, no subject; Casey Files (original request not attached to indorsement file); E.V [iardo], MFR, 23 February 1942, no subject [supplies for engineer units], Casey Files, Folder 13.

31. Baldwin to Casey, memo, 1 March 1942, no subject [civilian employees able to travel to the Visayan Islands], Casey Files, Folder 8; Mielenz to CG, USAFFE, 1st Ind., 17 March 1942, Subject: Basic Modification & Improvement of Kindley Field, and Seals to Mielenz, 2nd Ind., 19 March 1942, both in NARA RG496, Entry 540, Box 32; E.V[iardo], MFR, 9 March 1942, no subject [engineer issues], Casey Files, Folder 13.

32. Wainwright to Marshall, radiogram 907, 4 May 1942, NARA RG407; Leggett Roster.

33. Montgomery, "Brief History," 3–4; Minder diary, 7; Casualty History, Company A, 803rd Engineer Battalion (AVN) (SEP) (attached to Special Orders No. 217, 19 September 1941), NARA RG407; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003, said Agostinelli was wounded twice on Corregidor; Leggett Roster; 4th Marine operations log, 25 March 1942; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 493–94; The Hall of Valor Project, "Fred W. Zimpfer," <https://valor.militarytimes.com/>, Zimpfer cited in General Orders No. 10, 30 January 1948.

34. Montgomery, "Brief History," 3; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 45; Richardson to Pulley, PHILRYUCOM, letter, 1 May 1947.

35. Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Minder diary, 7.

36. Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Minder diary, 7; See Maj Gen George F. Moore, Report on the Philippine Coast Artillery Command and the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays (1945) in <https://www.corregidor.org/>; Navy department, office of the chief of naval operations, "ONI 232 S—Japanese Military Aircraft, 22 June 1943," Ibiblio, <http://www.ibiblio.org/>; 4th Marine operations log, 27 March 1942. The new bombers were possibly Type 97, Mark 2, which incorporated the tail gun noticed by the Marines and the Type 98 "Ida," which carried heavier bombs than the "Mary." Estimates of the number of Japanese bombers that participated in the daily attacks varied by source.

37. Wallace, *POW-83*, 126; Minder diary, 7, and interview, 1 November 1999; 4th Marine operations log, 27 April 1942.

38. Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 29.

39. Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 305, 401–11, 413; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003, said the rock was still positioned in the middle of the Kindley airstrip as of 1967; Mielenz, *Engineer Preparations*, 11; Wainwright, *General Wainwright's Story*, 89.

40. Wallace, *POW 83*, 117. Leggett Roster, Mansell Roster; Gagnet, interview, 6 February 1999; Minder, interview, 1 November 1999; Vater, Rutgers interview; Vater interviews, 24 October 1999; 21–22 October 2002; 12–13 October 2003; and 18–22 May and 22 August 2006.

41. Fries to CG, harbor defense of Manila and Subic Bays, memo, 23 April 1942, no subject [roster of USFIP officers who arrived at Ft. Mills since April 7, 1942], NARA RG407, Entry 1050, Box 2; Vater interviews, 18–22 May and 22 August 2006.

42. Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Minder diary, 7; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 553; North American Forts: 1526–1956, "American Forts West: Philippines," <http://www.northamericanforts.com/>; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 105; Wainwright to Marshall, radiogram 907, 4 May 1942, no subject.

43. Mielenz, *Engineer Preparations*, 11; Gagnet, interview, 6 March 1999; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003; Minder diary, 8; Company A Casualty List; Ingersoll Roster; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 105.

44. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 553; Bartsch, *Doomed at the Start*, 418; Minder diary, 8; Wallace, *POW 83*, 126–27; Mielenz, *Engineer Preparations*, 11.

45. Montgomery, "Brief History," 4; Wainwright quoted in Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 548–553; 4th Marine Regiment, operations log, 5 May 1942; Company A Casualty List; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 193, commented on Company A's provision of forward artillery observers, but he provided no names for the men.

46. Wainwright to Agwar [War Department AGO], unnumbered radiogram, 5 May 1942, no subject [pending surrender of Corregidor], NARA RG407; Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 555–57; Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003.

47. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 555–57.

48. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 558–560. Vater, interview, 12–13 October 2003, commented on the deaths of Bailey and Drake. The Leggett roster listed Bailey

as KIA on 5 May and Drake on 6 May 1942. Minder, interview, 1 November 1999; Fries to CG, US Forces Southwest Pacific Area, memo, January 18, 1943, Subject: Decorations; Company A Casualty List; Ingersoll roster; ADBC, 803 Engineer, A.B.C. Companys [sic], 7 December 1941 to 7 December 1987; Vater, Rutgers interview; affidavit, Pfc Dean W. McCall, Death Reports, Cabanatuan POW Camp, NARA RG407, Entry 1072, File 558-7, Box 180. McCall documented the death of Pvt August Murn; the Leggett Roster listed Murn, possibly a private first class at the time, as "missing."

49. Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, 553-560; Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, 30.

50. Company A Casualty List, Ingersoll Roster; Vater, Rutgers interview; Gagnet, interview, 6 February 1999.

51. Mielenz, *Engineer Preparations*, 11; Mielenz to CG, USAFFE, 1st Ind., 17 March 1942, Subject: Basic Modification & Improvement of Kindley Field; Dod, *The War against Japan*, 103; Meidling, ed., *Airfield and Air Base Construction*, 489; Gagnet, interview, 6 February 1999.



## Conclusion

With Maj Gen Edward King's surrender, the military personnel on Bataan continued the war, albeit on a different level. As POW's—"captives" without the benefit of the Geneva Convention in the Japanese perspective—most of the men of Company B, Company C, and Headquarters Company walked from Mariveles or KP165.5 to San Fernando on the Death March, or "the hike" as some participants termed it originally. They were transported to Capas via rail for their initial internment at Camp O'Donnell. Some of the officers—Lt James Leggett, for example—remained on Bataan for a few days and were then trucked to O'Donnell. For most, the march started on 10 April 1942 with nightly stops, probably at Cabcaben, Balanga, Orani, and Lubao before reaching San Fernando on about 13 April. On or about 14 April, the Japanese crammed the men into small freight cars for transport to Capas, north of Clark Field. The last leg of the march was the seven-kilometer walk to Camp O'Donnell, site of O'Donnell Field. Filipino POWs walked the same road but were diverted to a separate enclosure about five kilometers east of Capas. The loss of life among the three companies of the 803rd during the Death March was probably five men, all from Company B, out of an estimated total of 65 US military personnel. The 803rd's deaths probably included Privates Murl Carey, Joseph T. Covaleski, Charles B. Kunkel, Junior V. Schirner, and Cpl Douglas Rowland. Coone estimated that 38 members of Company B died of disease and malnutrition following the Bataan Death March.<sup>1</sup>

Most of the 803rd's Bataan contingent probably arrived at Camp O'Donnell about 18 April. There, the Japanese asked for "volunteers" among the engineers for a mission that was supposed to repair roads and bridges damaged during the campaign. Their real but unstated purpose was to cover the Japanese battle against US and Filipino guerrilla forces in and around Mountain Province in northern Luzon. On or about 23 April, the Japanese trucked the 200 to 240 US POWs from the 803rd Engineers and the 200th CA into North Luzon. The POWs called that time, which lasted until early August, the "Second Death March." The Japanese divided the engineers into three groups. Under Capt Robert Chandler, Company C commander, and Lt. Ralph Gibbs consisted primarily of Company C personnel. It went to Baguio, Mountain Province. The second group had about 200 men. It

included Capt Peter Reynolds, commander of Headquarters Company, and Lt Samuel Goldblith and Capt William Thomas, the 803rd's engineer officer. That group went toward San Fernando, La Union Province, on the East China Sea coast and spent time in Cervantes and Bontoc before repairing to the Bontoc-Lubuagan Road and working in the Baton-Bouhi mine. The third group of about 50 men was under Lt Elgin Radcliff, the 803rd's supply officer. On those details, at least 28 engineers from the 803rd died of disease, malnutrition, or maltreatment by the Japanese. Filipino guerrillas killed Pfc Gerald Sparks, Company C, while attacking the Japanese.<sup>2</sup>



*(Paul W. Ropp, 10 April 2002)*

#### **Kilometer Post 00—Bataan Death March Memorial**

General Wainwright's surrender of Corregidor along with the remainder of the Philippines on 6 May 1942 also marked the end of the original 803rd Engineer AVN Battalion SEP. Some personnel from Company A remained on the island until about 23 May, while others stayed for four to six weeks to participate in the clean-up and repair process before being sent by boat to Manila. As the ships drew close to Manila, the Japanese forced the men into Manila Bay and made them wade through the water to Dewey (now Roxas) Boulevard

along the bayfront. The bedraggled group was formed into ranks, and they marched north on the broad thoroughfare in front of the Filipino crowds. This parade was used as a symbol of the Japanese victory. However, along the parade route, the Filipino band accompanying the Corregidor group broke into “Stars and Stripes Forever,” a musical piece not familiar to the Japanese. Cpl Tom Gagne said the ranks tightened and backs straightened as the men marched more or less precisely in step. Most of the US troops were then shipped via train to Cabanatuan POW Camp in Central Luzon.<sup>3</sup>

The Japanese closed and abandoned Camp O’Donnell for the Cabanatuan POW camp in early June 1942, as deaths from disease and malnutrition continued to mount. At least 76 members of the 803rd died at Cabanatuan. July 1942 saw the highest death rate in general, and among the 803rd, in particular. Twenty-four engineers died that month. October 1942 recorded the second-highest death rate among the engineers with about a total of 15. Dysentery and malaria, frequently in combination with malnutrition, were significant causes of the deaths. Dietary deficiencies—pellagra, scurvy, beriberi, occasionally combined with exophthalmia or Vitamin A deficiency—were among the notable primary reasons, while diphtheria was a secondary factor.<sup>4</sup>

By September 1942, the Japanese began to move POWs to work details at locations, including Lipa, Tayabas, the Manila docks, and Palawan. In October 1942, they shipped the first group of US POWs, including many from the 803rd, outside the Philippines. They went via the transport (“hell ship”) *Tottori Maru* to Pusan, Korea, and from there to Mukden (present-day Shenyang, China) in Japanese-occupied Manchuria (Manchukuo). Their mission as slave laborers was to complete the construction of industrial facilities and produce machine tools for Japan’s war industry. They carried on the war there by sabotaging both the construction and production aspects of their assigned tasks. Others followed on hell ships to Japan for work in mines, mills, factories, and the docks as slave laborers. US Navy submarines and aircraft sank several hell ships, killing hundreds of US POWs in the process. Some 72 to 78 of the 803rd Engineers were killed in action during late 1944–early 1945 as US Navy submarines and aircraft, unaware of US POWs’ presence, pursued and sank the unmarked hell ships *Arisan Maru*, *Enoura Maru*, *Oryoku Maru*, and *Shinyo Maru*. The last hell ship to complete its voyage to Formosa (Taiwan) en route to Japan more or less unscathed was the *Hokusen*



*Maru* (also known as the *Haro Maru* and *Benjo (Toilet) Maru*). It left Manila on 4 October 1944 and included several 803rd engineers. It was no wonder that some of the POWs characterized their time on the hell ships as worse than the Death March.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 26.1. 803rd Engineer Battalion: Deaths and Casualties**

Cause or Location	Deaths	Caulties
Combat (KIA)	25	0
Death March	0	6
O'Donnell	0	45
Mountain Detail	0	32
Cabanatuan	0	105
Palawan	0	4
Other Philippine Camps	0	11
Hell Ships	0	77
Japan	0	16
Manchukuo	0	13
Formosa/Korea	0	2
Combat (WIA)	26	0
Non-Combat	2	0
Total	53	311

Source: Appendix A.

In *Surviving the Sword: Prisoners of the Japanese in the Far East, 1942–45*, Brian MacArthur estimated that 27 percent of Allied POWs of the Japanese died in captivity instead of 4 percent of POWs whom the Germans held.<sup>6</sup> Malnutrition and disease caused most of the deaths in POW camps, but the Japanese's physical abuse was also a significant factor. Four engineers were among those burned to death in the infamous Puerto Princesa massacre (Mid-December 1944), and one died when subjected to Japanese medical experiments in Mukden. During the mountain detail in northern Luzon (late April–early June 1942), Filipino guerrillas accidentally killed one. When statistics for engineers KIA during the sinking of the unmarked hell ships are included, the number of 803rd engineers who perished as POWs of the Japanese was estimated at 311 or 45 percent of the 696 officers and men sent to the Philippines. About another 25 were killed in combat.

For its involvement in the Philippines' defense, the 803rd Engineer AVN Battalion earned three presidential unit citations covering the

periods 8–31 December 1942 (Casey's recommendation) and 12 January–14 February 1942. Also, Company A earned the same award for its contribution to harbor defense from 14 March to 9 April 1942.<sup>7</sup>

In his wide-ranging historical survey, *On Grand Strategy*, John Lewis Gaddis distilled Thucydides' writing and eloquently paraphrased philosopher George Santayana. Gaddis noted that Thucydides' distinction between resemblance and reflection suggested: "that the past prepares us for the future only when, however imperfectly, it transfers."<sup>8</sup> A continuance of Gaddis' analysis, then, would lead to the conclusion that the accomplishments of 803rd EB as the first aviation engineer battalion working in a combat theater of operations as substantial, especially when evaluated against the environment in which they worked. However, from a longer perspective, the battalion's impact was limited. Because of its unique situation, neither battalion personnel nor the COE could transfer knowledge or experience, commonly referred to as "lessons learned," to successive US Army engineer units and planners. That conclusion also applied to engineer units in the Pacific Theater of Operations throughout the war. Even the successors of the 803rd did not have time for detailed operation reports. Brig Gen Hugh J. Casey underwent a short debriefing in June 1944. A brief memorandum was the result. In that debriefing, which did not touch on engineering issues, Casey did not mention, for example, his recommendations for the improvement of aircraft revetments nor angled trenches for personnel. It appeared that even Casey's detailed memorandum on problems with and corrections for aircraft revetments was not recovered until after the war. The first effort to codify war experiences was the publication of *Engineers of the Southwest Pacific*, an eight-volume series covering the Southwest Pacific Theater's engineer activities during 1941–45. As Lt Col George Meidling, the chief editor of the series, explained: "The chaotic conditions [that] prevailed during that period left little time for adequate reports of construction, which, in the last analysis, was predominantly in the field of engineer combat support." Meidling noted that, for the campaign in the Philippines specifically, the personal papers of Major General Casey provided an "a considerable amount of information" but that it had been "buried at fearful risk by friendly Filipino[s] and later dug up and returned to their owner." The transfer of knowledge was limited to what Casey, the only engineer officer to escape the Philippines, had personally acquired in the Philippines. Casey's second interview covered his entire career with

some details on the Philippines' defense and did not occur until 1993. Casey remained MacArthur's chief engineer throughout the Pacific War and the occupation of Japan.

The two most detailed studies covering aviation engineer battalions or their Army Air Service predecessor did not appear until the early 21st Century: *Leading the Way: The History of Air Force Civil Engineers, 1907–2012* by Ronald B. Hartzler for the US Air Force Historical Support Division, in about 2013, and Maj Natalie M. Pearson's *Engineer Aviation Units in the Southwest Pacific Theater*, a master's thesis for the Army Command and Staff College in 2005. These were published as the US Army and Air Force encountered the challenges of building and operating airfields to support tactical missions in less developed areas, such as Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>9</sup>

The only transfer was lateral and, thus, limited, given the outcome of the US defense of the Philippines. Officer and enlisted personnel from the 803rd were reassigned as advisors to or trainers for inexperienced Philippine Army engineer battalions, which were mobilized immediately before the war. The primary beneficiary was the 71st Engineers. Capt Clarence Bidgood, the 803rd's original executive officer, was assigned to command the 71st. A small contingent of commissioned officers accompanied him. In the final weeks of the battle for Bataan, the 803rd also staged training courses for other engineer units.

After the war, a newly formed 803rd EB also participated in the continuing evolution of engineer aviation units during the Cold War. On 2 December 1945, General of the Army MacArthur ordered the inactivation of the 847th Aviation EB Airborne in Quezon City and its re-activation as the 803rd Engineer AVN Battalion. The newly designated unit performed engineer duties in the Manila area until its deactivation on 15 February 1947.

The 803rd was reactivated at Camp Gordon, Georgia, in January 1949, for service during the Korean War. The COE used the same approach that was employed with the original complement. Engineer officers and NCOs were taken from other units, enlisted and selectee personnel were drawn directly from basic training. The postwar period brought dramatic change to the US armed forces, including the engineers, both in size and mission. The first change was a massive downsizing of all the services. In the early postwar world, engineer aviation battalions, albeit on a reduced scale, retained their original mission.<sup>10</sup>

In Korea, aviation engineer units retained most of their World War II missions. Company A of the 802nd Engineer AVN Battalion aug-

mented and detached from the battalion, moved from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, to Korea in July 1950. It repaired, extended, and defended Pohang Air Base, an active airstrip, before the rapidly advancing North Koreans forced it to evacuate to Pusan. Company A later returned to Pohang and worked throughout Korea on various engineer projects, including the construction of defensive tank positions. Subsequently, the battalion moved to Japan in 1953. Later it became a heavy construction unit. The 808th was also sent to Korea (1951–53) and landed at Incheon to work on temporary runways in combat areas before constructing a 10,000-foot concrete runway for jet aircraft at Kunsan. It was involved with repairs at air bases in Chunchon and Pyongtek, as well. During 1952–53, the 811th was no longer designated as a single-race battalion and worked on Kimpo Air Base after the Incheon landing and proceeded to work on other airfields. The 809th initially activated on 1 December 1941, worked at Kimpo Air Base (1953–54) before being transferred to Guam to work on runway extensions at a base designed to support strategic missions. The Navy continued with its Seabee construction battalions. However, with the emphasis on carrier-based platforms, the Seabees took on combat engineers' principal role (e.g., sappers) in the Korean War.<sup>11</sup>

The second issue was the change in mission. The focus was on the threat from the Soviet Union. Events had overtaken the mission of building, maintaining, and defending airfields close to the front lines. The US Army retained control of the aviation engineer units after World War II as Special Category Army with Air Force (SCAR-WAF) units.

The Air Force did not develop a correspondent capability among its civil engineering force. The military challenges presented by the Cold War changed the strategic focus to containing the Soviets and deterring an attack on the United States and its allies. The Air Force focused on building a strategic capability for the general war. Thus, the emphasis was on deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers, transport, and surveillance aircraft, and employing sophisticated refueling techniques to support the longer-range missions. It needed large, fixed air bases in the continental United States, Europe, and Asia (primarily Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Guam), distant from potential combat theaters in the continental US, Asia, and Western Europe. The need for large forward-based tactical air forces, thus, basically vanished during that period.<sup>12</sup>

The new 803rd remained an aviation engineer unit with the changing mission but became a heavy construction battalion attached to Air Force bases, as did all other aviation engineer battalions. Much as the COE had planned in 1939, the reformed battalions were assigned runway and barrack heavy construction projects. These assignments also included building demolitions, runway extensions and resurfacing taxiways and hardstands for aircraft at a single base. They relinquished their role in air base defense. After service on at least two Air Force bases in the United States, the 803rd was moved first to Brize Norton Air Base (August 1950) and then to Stanstead Airport (July 1953) in the UK in 1950. At Brize, the 803rd operated cement and asphalt plants. The battalion, still considered SCARWAF under the US Air Force, moved one last time to Ulm, West Germany, in 1956 before being inactivated for the last time on 20 September 1958.<sup>13</sup>

The Vietnam War changed the paradigm. In that asynchronous conflict, US forces expanded the concept of air mobility. The employment of helicopters, for example, went well beyond the scope of activity during the Korean War. In remote, undeveloped areas, accessible only by fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, air mobility—and, hence, tactical airfields—became critical for close air support operations, search and destroy missions, and logistical support. No aviation engineer elements *per se* were assigned to Vietnam.<sup>14</sup>

For the Vietnam conflict, the Air Force, which supplemented its force with vintage World War II aircraft: A-1E Douglas Skyraiders and Martin B-26 Marauders for tactical air support, and the Army scrambled to meet the changed engineering requirements encountered in warfare in primitive environments.

The Air Force created and deployed Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers (RED HORSE) combat construction teams, essentially engineer aviation units. RED HORSE squadrons built numerous airfields in areas of Vietnam. Similar in capability to Navy Seabees and Army heavy construction organizations, they were trained to be a self-sustaining force in remote, barebones, and possibly high-threat environments at any time, in any place, and collaborate with any branch of the military. Their specialty was runway, revetment, and ramp construction, maintenance, and repair. After reviewing RED HORSE activities, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown noted that the RED HORSE squadrons were required as a permanent part of the Air Force tactical force. However, their work on airfield construction seemed to diminish over time. Air

Force Base Engineer Emergency Force (known as PRIME BEEF) teams engaged in facilities construction and contributed substantially to the theater. According to a history of Air Force civil engineers, “the implementation of PRIME BEEF aligned Air Force civil engineers to support Air Force contingencies and base emergencies. RED HORSE squadrons undertook troop construction in contingency situations, thus reducing reliance on Army support that historically proved problematic.”<sup>15</sup>

The Army also realized the need for airfields for fixed-wing aircraft, primarily transports, to support combat operations and landing zones for rotary aircraft. During January–June 1966, the 8th EB, 1st Cavalry Division, built seven new forward airfields and improved three others for use by DeHavilland CV-2 Caribou and the heavier Fairchild C-123 Provider and Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.

Almost in World War II fashion, the 8th EB was formed from 127th EB, which had just been inactivated on 1 July 1965. The decision to utilize the personnel of the 127th was based on its development of new construction techniques during the testing of a new air assault concept, and they had considerable training in airfield construction. The new 8th EB was equipped with nonstandard, air-transportable (helicopter or small transport aircraft) construction equipment. Differing from earlier aviation engineer units, its headquarters and Headquarters Company had an assault platoon with air drop-capable, light equipment, and two heavy equipment platoons with sectionalized equipment modified for quick assembly with hand tools. With that organization, the Army unknowingly used the 803rd’s one-company, one-airstrip model. The battalion involved in new combat support concepts (e.g., developing and building fire support bases), its work on airbase construction apparently at an end.<sup>16</sup>

The Army has continued research and development of techniques and technologies needed to construct unsurfaced runways capable of handling medium and heavy transport aircraft located in remote areas. The objective was to develop the technology to deploy to a distant theater in 10 days, defeat an enemy within 30 days, and be prepared for another fight within another 30 days. Based on research begun in 2002, the COE Research and Development Center successfully staged the Joint Rapid Airfield Construction (JRAC) Technology Demonstration in Australia’s Northern Territory in June 2008. Its ambitious concept mirrored some of the basic concepts that led to the formation of the original aviation engineer units. The project included the

construction of a 4,100 x 110-foot unsurfaced runway capable of handling the C-130 and the C-17 Globemaster III, a large transport aircraft, and two 45,480-square-foot aircraft parking aprons with associated connector taxiways. This runway was developed using JRAC technologies focused on rapid construction with reduced logistics and increased system reliability.<sup>17</sup>

In the Vietnam conflict and the JRAC experiments, Army engineers had to contend with familiar challenges: soil stability, dust from repeated landings on primitive strips, and the maintenance of crowns on runways, the same issues that the 803rd had confronted in the Philippines.

Overall, the history of the 803rd is interesting and a lesson for future combat situations. Hastily formed, ill-equipped, and shipped out prematurely in 1941, the battalion was thrown into the thick of last-minute attempts to deter Japanese expansion in East Asia. That attempt failed miserably. Neither the US embargo, generally, nor the Philippines' reinforcement, tactically, hindered Japanese military expansion. On the contrary, the US policy decisions, particularly the trade restrictions, proved to be the catalyst rather than the deterrent. This action led directly to the multi-prong attacks that Japan launched throughout the Southwest Pacific in an ill-fated attempt to force the United States to sue for peace and recognize Japanese hegemony in that area.

As that storm was still in formation, the 803rd Engineers improved, expanded, and built the airfields necessary for both a defensive and a deterrent force in the Philippines. As a result, it provided in-theater—that is, as opposed to experience in US-based field exercises—proof of concept for the newly-conceived engineer aviation units.

Mirroring the failure of US deterrent measures was the corresponding failure of USAFFE to mount an effective defense against the initial Japanese air attacks on the Philippines, still a controversial subject. Half of the FEAF was obliterated in one day, and many of that number were destroyed on the ground. Instantly Japan had air supremacy. Consequently, USAFFE was forced to operate in a combat environment against a superior force. In the early days of the war, Japan overwhelmed Wake and Guam, and the two islands surrendered quickly. Thus, the Bataan and Corregidor battles marked the first extended confrontation between the US and Japan in the Pacific. For the first time since the US Civil War, US military units were retreating rather than advancing. Japan's air supremacy gains wrought

unforeseen and rapid changes to standard operating procedures as the 803rd Engineers attempted to adapt. The battalion built and tested defensive structures, such as “V” trenches for personnel and revetments for aircraft, and developed emergency airfields behind retreating armies, a complete reversal of COE doctrine that concentrated on engineer support for offensive warfare.

The 803rd’s achievements in and of themselves were notable, especially considering inadequate resources of food, medicine, fuel, and equipment, and worthy of documentation. The aviation engineer concept, somewhat perversely, became combat proven. Although not used to advantage in World War II, that experience, sometimes termed “lessons learned,” provided some basis for developing COE doctrine for future actions. It may still offer some insights into problems affecting the construction of tactical airfields in primitive areas.

The longer-term question is why anyone should be interested in a small unit that participated in a losing campaign several generations ago? One response could be that the story battalion’s formation, staffing, and equipping highlighted at the unit level the perilous state of US military preparedness in the face of long-visible and growing threats to US national security interests and of the frenetic, last-minute actions to remedy that deficiency. Paul Dickson documented well this effort generally in *The Rise of the GI Army*. The demobilization of the US military after the war and the initially inept military response (i.e., Task Force Smith) to North Korea’s invasion of the south, the first major armed confrontation of the Cold War, showed that the lessons learned about the importance of military readiness during World War II were quickly forgotten and relearned at a high cost. To the issue at hand, the Philippines’ defense during 1941–42 also vividly demonstrated the futility of conducting ground combat operations without control of the air. Viewed in this perspective, the detailed history of the 803rd Engineers becomes a case study of a small unit’s ability to adapt and operate successfully in the face of that failure.

#### Notes

1. Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 53–55; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 194–202. See Historical Data, Roster[s], Special Orders, and Memoranda, Cabanatuan POW Camp, 1942–42, NARA RG407, Entry 1064, Box 42, no subject [Fil-American death



and POW statistics], 105, and [chronology of surrender, Death March, and transfer of POW's from Corregidor, 117. Coone documented the location of Rowland's death as the Olongapo-Mariveles Road junction. The Kloecker roster listed Rowland's death at 4/26/42 without a location, and the Ingersoll roster listed him as "missing." Coone included Pvt Glenn W. Woody among the Company B dead on the Death March, while the Leggett and Ingersoll rosters listed the place of death as Cabanatuan, and the Kloecker roster used 15 June 1942, as the date of death.

2. Goldblith, *Appetite for Life*, 59–66; Coone, *The Sequential Soldier*, 187–204; Perpetuation of Testimony of Samuel A. Goldblith [for war crimes trials], 14 January 1946, NARA RG153 [Office of the Judge Advocate General], Entry A1, Box 1208; War Crimes Office, MFR, no subject [war crimes report from SSgt Thomas Gease, Headquarters Company, 803rd EB] NARA RG 153, Entry 140, Box 36. See 803rd roster, Appendix A. Estimates of deaths on the outside details by company were: Headquarters Company–10; Company A–2; Company B–5; Company C–11. Appendix A provides details on individual soldiers. See 803rd roster, Appendix A. Estimates of deaths on the outside details by Company were: Headquarters Company – 10; Company A–2; Company B–5; Company C–11. See the 803rd roster for details on individual engineers.

3. Gagne, Interview, 6 February 1999. See Historical Data, Roster[s], Special Orders, and Memoranda, Cabanatuan POW Camp, 1942–42, NARA RG407, Box 42, no subject [chronology of surrender, Death March, and transfer of POW's from Corregidor], 117.

4. Roster of Patients alphabetically arranged compiled and maintained at Cabanatuan Prisoner of War Camp, 1942–1943, NARA RG407, Entry 1071, Box 161.

5. Leggett and Kloecker rosters; Elizabeth Kloecker [sister of Sgt Paul A. Kloecker], interview with author, 2 February 2010. See Appendix A, the 803rd roster for details on individual engineers.

6. Brian MacArthur, *Surviving the Sword: Prisoners of War of the Japanese in the Far East, 1942–45* (New York: Random House, 2005), xxvi.

7. War Department, General Orders Nos. 14, 21, 22, and 32, 9 March, 30 April (2), and 6 July 1942, respectively, all in DDE Folder 669.

8. John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (New York: Penguin Press, 2018), 32.

9. MFR, Casey, 16 February 1942, Subject: Plane Pens, Casey Files, Folder 5; See Casey, *Memoirs*; Meidling, ed., *Engineers in Theater Operations*, vii. Santayana noted: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

10. Maj Clarence Campbell, Brief Historical Statement of service for the 803rd Engineer Battalion Aviation (Separate) and 803rd Engineer Aviation Battalion (SCARWAF), 803rd Engineer Battalion Association, nd; Coll *et al.*, *Troops and Equipment*, 56.

11. Hartzer, *et al.*, *Leading the Way: The History of Air Force Civil Engineers, 1907–2012*, 159–166; Korean War Project, "808th Engineer Aviation Bn," <https://www.koreanwar.org/>, (requires a military, NIPR connection); See Naval History and Heritage Command, "Seabee History: Between the Second World War and the Korean War," and "Seabee History: Southeast Asia," <https://www.history.navy.mil/>.

12. Hartzer, *et al.*, *Leading the Way: The History of Air Force Civil Engineers, 1907–2012*, 159. See also Charles H. Hildreth, "USAF Logistic Preparations for Limited War, 1958–1961" (AFD-110321-037) (Washington, DC: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, October 1962.)

13. Campbell, Brief Historical Statement of service for the 803rd Engineer Battalion Aviation (Separate) and 803rd Engineer Aviation Battalion (SCARWAF).

14. Maj Gen Robert R. Ploger, Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Engineers, 1965-1970 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2000), 9-16; US Army Corps of Engineers, *The History of the US Army Corps of Engineers*, 2nd ed. (Ft. Belvoir, VA: Corps of Engineers, Office of History, 1998), 98-99.

15. See The Balance Careers, "Airborne RED HORSE," <https://web.archive.org/>; Herman S. Wolk, *USAF Plans and Policies: Logistics and Base Construction in South-east Asia, 1967* (Washington DC: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1968), 26; USAF, "Prime BEEF Squadron Combines Air Force, Army Engineers," <https://www.af.mil/>; Hartzler, et al., *Leading the Way: The History of Air Force Civil Engineers, 1907-2012*, 176.

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## Appendix A

### 803rd Engineer AVN Battalion SEP—Roster

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Adams, John E., Jr.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1, as of 10/1/1942; Davao; KIA, 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Agostinelli, Charles	PVT	A	WIA, Kindley Field, Corregidor, 3/24/1942; Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943; Yokohama, Osaka POW Camp 12 (Hirohata)
Agzigian, Thomas J.	PVT	Headquarters (HQS)	Mountain detail, murdered while ill, 6/10/1942, Bontoc
Akey, Vernon H.	PVT	HQS	Died, 1800 hours, 6/1/1943, Cabanatuan, dysentery (alt: 7/10/1942)
Albosta, Leo A.	PVT	C	Died, 0430, 8/24/1942, Cabanatuan, malnutrition (alt: dysentery)
Allen, Robert L.	PVT	C	Died, 0800 hours, 7/3/1942 - Cabanatuan - dysentery
Anderson, Arthur W.	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, Group 1, hospitalized as of 10/1/1942; Clark Field, Bilibid Prison, Manila; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
Anderson, Grubbs	SGT	A	Original Westover Field contingent, Company A; died, 2030, 11/6/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery. The ADBC listed Anderson as Headquarters Company."
Andrews, George W.	PFC	B	Mountain detail, murdered while ill, outside detail, Bontoc, 6/10/1942
Angus, Sidney	2LT	Battalion (BN) Staff	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Aquillina, Benny	PVT	A	Listed with Company B, March, 1942; Cabanatuan, Camp 3, as of 10/1/1942; Lipa, as of 12/21/1942; <i>Nissyō Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Arfuso, Frank E.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3, as of 10/1/1942; Japan
Austin, Chalmers	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Pasay; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Austin, Clyde V.	PVT	A	Died, probably 12/17/1941, construction equipment accident, O'Donnell Field (alt: 12/26/1941 and 12/28/1942; Bataan, 1/10/1942 - Ingersoll)
Avitabile, Frume J.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Died, 0830, 10/29/42, dysentery
Babrick, Stanley	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; port area outside detail; <i>Nissyō Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; Yokohama, Japan, as of 10/9/1945
Bachowsky, Michael P.	PFC	HQS	Mountain detail, Bontoc, escaped June, 1942; missing and listed as "AWOL"; murdered by Japanese, Trumauni, Isabela Province, 9/26/1942
Baggett, Alonzo T. Jr.	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Baildon, Melvin F.	PVT	HQS	Died, 5/30/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria and dysentery; recommended for Silver Star for work at Clark Field, 12/8–12/25/41
Bailey, Chester A.	CPL	A	KIA, 5/6/1942 or 5/6/1942, Corregidor, beach defense
Bailey, Claude E.	PFC	HQS	Died, 5/26/1942, mountain detail, Bontoc, buried in Bontoc cemetery; originally listed as missing
Bain, Daniel C.	PFC	HQS	Died, 11/19/42, Cabanatuan, pellagra

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Ballard, Herman L.	PVT	HQS	Detached service, Del Monte, Mindanao, 12/1/1941; DAPE-COL, September, 1942–June 1944; arrived Japan, September, 1944;
Barber, Raymond C.	SGT	A	Detached Service, Del Monte, Mindanao, 12/1/1941; Japan
Barnes, William S.	PVT	C	Died, 0930, 10/12/1942, Cabanatuan; dysentery
Barrett, John	SGT	B	KIA, 1/13/1942, Pilar Airfield, Bataan, bombing (alt: 1/9/42 and 1/10/1942)
Barry, Raymond F.	SGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Rescued at Bilibid Prison by American forces, 2/4/1945
Bartlett, David B.	1LT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1; Mindanao; KIA 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Basara, Frank	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Bilibid Prison hospital as of July, 1944; rescued, 2/4/1945
Battiste, August	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Group 1, as of 11/2//1942, malaria; rescued, Bilibid Prison by US forces, 2/4/1945
Bauer, Carl E.	SGT	A	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Baumgartner, Andrew	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; outside detail, as of 9/27/1942; Davao; Japan
Beard, Lawrence R.	PFC	HQS	Attached to Company C; Died, 11/4/1942, Cabanatuan
Bearden, Carl	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Becotte, Paul A.	PFC	C	Died, 8/13/1942, Cabanatuan, malnutrition (alt: 0600, 8/14/1942, dysentery)
Beebe, James H.	PVT	HQS	Mountain detail; escaped, Sabangan, Mountain Province, and listed as "AWOL"; murdered by Japanese, 7/13/1944 (alt: 7/18/1944)

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Beeching, Melvin B. IV	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; died, 4/2/1945, <i>Oryoku Maru</i> to Japan; Fukuoka Camp 17, starvation
Bergum, Wendel T.	PVT	HQS	Died, 5/21/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, dysentery
Bidgood, Clarence	MAJ		Original Executive Officer (XO); Transfer to 71st Engineers; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea 10/8/1942
Biggs, Carl W.	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Bittle, J.H.	PVT	C	Originally listed as missing; Died 4/1/1946
Blume, Basil L.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, as of 11/5/1942; Clark Field; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal; recommended for Silver Star for work at Clark Field, 12/8-12/25/41
Boback, Paul	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Japan
Bolin, Bedford F.	PVT	A	Detached service to USAFFE, OCE, on Company B roster, as attached; Bilibid Prison, Manila; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan; Tokyo Camp #3 (Mitsushima)
Bolton, Howard M.	PFC	C	Died, January, 1943 (alternate: 8/2/1942), Bilibid Prison, Manila, during hospitalization, malnutrition
Booher, James R.	PVT	C	Died, 5/23/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp
Bourn, Robert H.	PVT	C	Bilibid Prison, Manila; (probably Philippine General Hospital); KIA, 12/15/1944, <i>Oryoku Maru</i> )
Bovell, William H., Jr.	PVT	HQS	Died, 6/16/1942, mountain detail, Bontoc, buried Bontoc hospital

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Boyd, Lester W.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Davao; Japan
Brace, Perley N.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943; possibly died
Bradley, George	PVT	A	Group 1, Cabanatuan as of 11/5/1942; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944
Bradley, Harold K.	PVT	C	Died, 1230 hours, 8/24/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery
Brehm, Charles B.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Niigata, Japan
Brennan, Joseph A.	PVT	B	Died, 5/15/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp after hospitalization, dysentery
Britton, Albert E.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, left 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Died, Mukden, January, 1943
Brohm, Frank J.	PFC	A	Hospitalized, Cabanatuan; Las Pinas; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944; listed on ADBC and USAFFE rosters; no additional detail in USAFFE roster
Broney, Steve (Andrew T.)	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Japan, 10/8/1942; Mukden; listed as "Steve?" with rank of Pfc in Company A (Leggett and Ingersoll); as "Andrew T." and rank of SSgt, same serial number in Company C (USAFFE and ADBC)
Brown, Earl W.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1944
Brown, Julian B.	SGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2, as of 11/5/1942; liberated from Cabanatuan in "The Great Raid," 1/30/1945
Brozowski, Walter F.	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; Died, 7/26/1942, dysentery



Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Brumwell, William S.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; KIA 10/24/1944; <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Bryson, Ralph	PVT	B	Died, 5/18/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria and dysentery
Buckholz, Charles M.	PVT	B	Mountain detail, escaped at Kalinga, Mountain Province, August, 1942; guerrilla; survived
Bugg, Richard O.	PVT	C	Died, Cabanatuan (alt: 6/15/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria)
Bullock, Marvin C.	PFC	C	Hospitalized, Cabanatuan; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Burdette, Karl "Swish"	PVT	B	Cabanatuan; <i>Nagara Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942; liberated on Formosa; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Burkert, Albert	TSGT	HQS	Addition to 809th EC (later Company C) and then assigned to Headquarters Company; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; left of outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Storm King</i> , 10/18/1945
Burnett, Walter E., Jr.	1LT		Died, 7/22/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria; officially listed as MIA-14th Engineer (Combat) Battalion, PS
Burnham, Orvis S., Jr.	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; Lipa; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944
Burns, Dewey	PVT	C	Died, 10/7/1942, Cabanatuan; malnutrition, dysentery
Butler, Edward	PFC	C	Hospitalized, Cabanatuan; Died, 1530, 12/1/1942, cerebral malaria (alt: dysentery)
Byers, Paul R.	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3, as of 11/5/1942; Japan

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Cahayla, John	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; KIA 10/24/1944; <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Cahill, Marvin B.	PVT	A	WIA, Orani, 1/1/1942; Cabanatuan as of 11/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> 10/21/1945
Caldwell, James K.	2LT	C	KIA 1/16/1942, air attack, Cabcaben Field, Bataan
Callahan, James	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943
Cappel, Felman E.	PVT	A	Bilibid Prison, Manila; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Cappelano, Peter J.	PFC	HQS	Outside detail from Cabanatuan, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Caputo, Marco A.	PVT	HQS	Detached Service, Del Monte, Mindanao, 12/1/1942; Davao; <i>Shinyo Maru</i> to Japan; survived the sinking of the <i>Shinyo Maru</i> , 9/7/1944
Carey, Edward P.	PVT	HQS	Died, 0600, 11/25/1942, Cabanatuan after hospitalization, dysentery
Carey, Murl	PVT	B	Originally listed as missing; died on Death March, o/a 4/14/1942; awarded Purple Heart medal
Carlson, Vincent M.	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Lipa; left for Japan, 11/14/1944
Carmack, Joseph D.	CPL	C	Died, 8/31/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery (alt. 0400, 9/1/1942), dysentery
Carney, Everett, J.	1LT	HQS	Died, Cabanatuan, 1305 hours, 9/20/1942, heart and malaria; Silver Star for work on Clark Field, 12/8-12/25/41
Carroll, James O.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; died, Yodogawa, Japan, 2/7/1943, pneumonia and malnutrition

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Carson, Frederick R.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; Left for Japan on hell ship <i>Canadian Inventor</i> , 7/4/1944; Japan, Spring, 1945
Casanova, Stanley	CPL	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; left for Japan on <i>Noto Maru</i> , 8/25/1944 Davao
Caudle, Leer (Robert L.)	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; left for Japan on <i>Nissyo Maru</i> , 7/17/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Storm King</i> 10/18/1945; Las Pinas
Caughey, Ted T.	PVT	C	Mountain detail; died, 5/9/1942, Abatan, Benguet Province, malaria; buried north of Abatan (alt. 6/1/1942)
Centek, Joseph	CPL	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1944
Chandler, Robert J.	CAPT	C	CO, Company C; mountain detail, Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> 10/21/1945 Cabanatuan returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> 10/21/1945
Chavos, Angelo S. ("Sam")	PVT	HQS	Cabcaben, Camp 1, Group 1, 4/19/1942; left for Japan on <i>Clyde Maru</i> , 7/23/1943; Fukuoka 17
Chisholm, Frank L.	PFC	B	Originally listed as missing; Died 9/5/1945 (date of arrival) in two-person escape attempt from Oeyama POW Subcamp 9, Japan (Kloecker) (Alt. 6/1/1946 - ABMC); Purple Heart Medal
Choate, John O., Jr	PVT	A	Detached Service, Del Monte, Mindanao, 12/1/1941; Davao
Cimini, Albert	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Clark, Earl W.	PVT	C	Mountain detail, Died, 6/16/1942, Abatan, Benguet Province; dysentery and beating; buried north of Abitan
Clark, William H.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; as of 11/5/1942; <i>Taga Amru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Clayton, James C.	PFC	C	Died, 0500, 7/31/1942, Cabanatuan POW Camp, dysentery (Death Report); (alt: mountain detail, Baguio, malnutrition; and 0500, 7/31/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery)
Clinton, Edward J.	PVT	C	Died, 1400, 7/31/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery (alt. 10/25/1942)
Clymer, Milton I.	PVT	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; died, Mukden, disease, 10/27/1942
Coffield, William H., Jr.	PVT	A	O'Donnell; Cabanatuan, Group 3; Died, outside detail, Tayabas, 7/9/1942, dysentery
Colley, Cecil W.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Bilibid Rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces 2/4/1945
Conklin, Charles H.	PFC	HQS	O'Donnell; Las Pinas; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Cook, Lawrence E.	SGT	A	WIA, 3/24/1942, Kindley Field, Corregidor, bombing; Cabanatuan, Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Coombs, Donald N.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; hell ship <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan
Coone, Herbert W.	CAPT	A	Medical Corps attached to Company A; outside detail, Lipa, Bilibid, Camp Murphy, <i>Hokusen Maru</i> , 10/1/1944, to Formosa
Cooper, Ralph C.	PVT	HQS	Crew member, USS <i>Gnat</i> ; O'Donnell POW Camp

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Covaleski, Joseph T.	PVT	B	Originally listed as missing; possibly died on Death March, location/date unknown (alt. 4/30/1942)
Cox, Owen A.	PVT	HQS	Died, 5/31/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp
Crisp, French O.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Crocker, Clarence W.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan Camp 1, Group 2; Davao; KIA, 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Manila; Purple Heart Medal
Cronin, Robert W.	CPL	A	Died, Cabanatuan, 0500, 9/28/1942, dysentery (alt. 9/29/1942)
Crum, Charles A.	SGT	HQS	Crystal Force Expedition, September-October, 1941
D'Agostino, Frank M.	PVT	HQS	Detached Service, Del Monte, Mindanao, 12/1/1941; Cabanatuan, as of 11/5/1942
Darby, Theodore J.	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> 10/21/1945
Daugherty, Daniel J.	PFC	A	Injured, Corregidor, possibly 2/8/1942, KIA, 5/6/1942, Corregidor, beach defense; Silver Star and Purple Heart Medals
Davis, Noah G., Jr.	PVT	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Formosa
Davis, Wells S.	PVT	C	Died, 0600, 7/15/1942, O'Donnell, dysentery (alt: Cabanatuan)
Davisson, Dessel R.	SGT	A	Outside detail, Lipa, as of 10/1/1942; to Japan on <i>Hokusen Maru</i> , 10/1/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Day, Arlen	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; to Korea on <i>Tottori Maru</i> , 10/8/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> 10/21/1945

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Day, Harry, Jr.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Mindanao; KIA, 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Del Pino, Antonio	PVT	HQS	Left for Japan, 7/23/1942
Delameter, John W.	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Delamore, Thomas H.	CAPT	C	Originally Company C; transferred to USAFFE, OCE; survived sinking of <i>Oryoku Maru</i> , KIA 1/9/1945, <i>Enoura Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Deller, Chester G.	PFC	HQS	Attached to Company A on Corregidor, originally listed as missing; Bilibid Prison, Manila, as of October, 1942, and Lipa detail, as of 12/22/1942; to Japan on <i>Hokusen Maru</i> , 10/1/1944
Dempewolf, Vincent C.	SGT	C	KIA, 2/26/1942 (Bataan), awarded Silver Star, General Order 287, 1945, and Purple Heart medals; alt: died, possibly 4/10/1942, Bataan (possible Death March–Kloecker)
Dengelegi, Victor	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942
Densmore, Raymond A.	SGT	A	WIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma; left Corregidor on an outside detail; Cabanatuan, left 7/24/1942; Bilibid Prison, Manila; to Japan on <i>Noto Maru</i> , 8/25/1944; Nagasaki; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> 10/21/1945
Derr, Roger G.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan; to Japan on <i>Nagato Maru</i> , 11/7/1942; died, Tokyo Camp 3 (Mitsushima), 2/16/1943, diarrhea; buried, Honshu, Japan; Silver Star Medal

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Dice, Frank J. III	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; to Formosa on <i>Lima Maru</i> , 9/20/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> 10/21/1945
Dick, James O.	CPL	B	Crystal Force Expedition, September-October, 1941
Dickie, John	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; Lipa; KIA, 10/24/1944 <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Diemer, Raymond	PVT	HQS	Died, 7/17/1942, Camp O'Donnell
DiGiacomo, Pasquale S.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Yodogawa, then Osaka Headquarters Camp, as of 8/1/1943
DiMarco, Thomas J.	PVT	HQS	Accidental self-inflicted wound, Bataan, KP168; hospitalized on Bataan; Cabanatuan; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
DiNoble, Daniel	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail
DiPasquale, Frank J.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 7/11/1942; Yodogawa, as of July, 1943
Dombrowski, John J.	PVT	B	Died, 6/3/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria and dysentery (alt: 6/10/1942)
Donai, Frank	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Las Pinas; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Donges, Edward J.	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan, Camp 3
D'Onofrio, Peter F. (alt: Donotrio)	SGT		Special Orders 20, 15 February 42, listed Donotrio as promoted to sergeant and assigned to I Corps; not listed in 803rd, USAFFE, or ADBC rosters; KIA, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> , 9/7/1944

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Donovan, Francis W.	2LT	A	Commander, Crystal Force Expedition detachment, September-October, 1941
Doss, J.T.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; hell ship <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan; Fukuoka
Dovenberg, Dean	PFC	B	WIA, 4/8/1942, KP 147, Bataan; died, 0500, 9/1/42, Cabanatuan Hospital, diphtheria
Drake, Samuel A.	CPL	A	KIA, 5/6/1942, Corregidor, beach defense; Silver Star and Purple Heart Medals
Driggers, Jessie J.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail 10/5/42; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Storm King</i> 10/18/1945
Duff, James H., Jr.	2LT	HQS	Battalion staff; TSGT, commissioned and transferred to I Corps as Assistant G-3; Cabanatuan, as of 10/19/1942; <i>Oryoku Maru</i> to Japan, 12/13/1944, and survived sinking; KIA 1/18/1945, <i>Brazil Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Duff, John F.	PVT	C	Attached from 5th Interceptor Command; died, Cabanatuan, 0720 hours, 8/27/1942; dysentery (alt: malaria)
Duquette, Harvey J.	CPL	HQS	Attached from "other organization" (not further identified); died, 5/26/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria
Dzuibczynski, John	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; died, 0945, 10/3/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria
Eakins, Daniel G.	PFC	C	Died, mountain detail, Baguio, 6/1/1942, diphtheria, buried at Camp John Hay
Earhart, Ernest F.	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 8/10/1942; Mukden
Eaton, Reginald O.	PVT	C	Died, 0600 hours, 4/28/1942, Camp O'Donnell, malaria and dysentery



Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Eberle, Frank E.	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Edwards, William D.	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan, Camp 3
Ellis, Grady	SGT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Bilibid Prison; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, Kamioka (alt: rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces 2/4/1945)
Ennis, Earle E.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Tokyo, Camp 3 (Mitsushima, as of 8/1/1943)
Epley, Wilbert	PVT	C	Died, Mountain detail, 5/16/1943, malaria; buried north of Abatan, Benguet Province
Epps, John R. IV	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 8/10/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Errico, Louis J.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 7/23/1943; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Estes, Clarence A	SSGT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; KIA, 10/24/1944 <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Evanincho, Stanley III	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan, Camp 3; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Storm King</i> , 10/18/1945
Evans, David M.	PVT	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Eye, Ona Donald	CPL	C	Died, 8/11/1942, Cabanatuan, 8/11/1942 (alt. 0900 hours, 8/12/1942), malnutrition, dysentery

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Eyre, George R.	PFC	A	WIA, 12/31/1941; Pilar-Bagac Road, bomb attack, and 1/26/1942, Agloloma; Listed in Mansell Roster as Visaya-Mindanao Force; murdered, Palawan, 12/14/1944
Farrell, Alfred E.	PVT	B	Originally listed as missing; left Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2 for Japan, October, 1944 - Kloecker; alt: Liberated from Cabanatuan in "The Great Raid," 1/30/1945)
Farrell, Walter H.	2LT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1; <i>Nagara Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942; Osaka, Kyushu
Fechner, Paul Andrew	PVT	B	Originally listed as missing; died, 0630 hours, 7/3/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery
Feller, Ernial M.	2LT		Headquarters Company and B Company, TSGT, Commissioned and transferred to 71st Engineers; <i>Oryoku Maru</i> and <i>Brazil Maru</i> to Moji, Japan, 1/30/1945
Ferencik, John	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Ferguson, Orra A.	CPL	C	Outside detail to Tarlac (general officers' POW camp); <i>Nagara Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942; liberated on Formosa
Fernandez, Salvador	CPL	C	Clark Field; Hospitalized at Cabanatuan; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Ferraro, James A.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Nagata Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Died, 1/28/1943, Yodogawa, pneumonia and infection
Ferratti, David L.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Noto Maru to Japan</i> , 8/25/1944; recommended for Silver Star for work at Clark Field, 12/8-12/25/41

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Filko, Joseph W.	PVT	A	WIA, 5/6/1942, Corregidor, beach defense; Cabanatuan; outside detail, 10/5/1942; Nigata
Filmore, Ralph W.	PFC	C	Died, 4/27/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp; dysentery and malaria (alt: 4/30/1942)
Finnegan, James J.	PVT	HQS	Died, 7/25/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery
Fish, Robert L.	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Died, 2/20/1943, Yodogawa, Japan, dysentery
Fiske, Edwin	PFC	HQS	Died, 6/12/1942, mountain detail, Bontoc and buried at Bontoc hospital
Flowers, Travis W.	PVT	A	Possibly PFC; Las Pinas; liberated from Cabanatuan in "The Great Raid," 1/30/1945
Flowers, Walter T.	PVT	A	KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Flynn, Harold F.	PVT	B	Died, 6/12/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery and malaria-ADBC; or prior to surrender of Bataan-Ingersoll
Forsyth, James M.	PFC	C	Died, 0700, 11/13/1942, Cabanatuan, pellagra
Foster, John	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; left of outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea; died 1/11/1943, Mukden, pneumonia
Fox, Joseph G.	CPL	HQS	Left Cabanatuan POW Camp on outside detail, 9/27/1942
Fraser, Hugh K.	1LT	C	Died, 6/27/1942, Cabanatuan (alt. 6/24/1942)
Frederick, Joseph P.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1, as of 11/5/1942
Freeman, John T.	SGT	C	Died, 11/24/1942, Bilibid Prison, Manila, tuberculosis and beriberi
Fries, Frank E.	MAJ	Bn CO	WIA, Clark Field; Corregidor, as of 4/10/1942; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; DAPECOL; <i>Brazil Maru</i> ; Died 1/30/1945, Moji Harbor, Japan

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Fritzel, Joe L.	PVT	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; <i>Lima Maru</i> to Formosa, 9/20/1942
Froling, Karl	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, left for outside detail 9/27/1942; Davao; KIA, 9/7/1944 <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Fultz, Gordon	PVT	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan; liberated from Cabanatuan in "The Great Raid," 1/30/1945
Gagliano, Neil	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Totori Maru</i> to Korea, 11/8/1942; Mukden
Gagnet, Thomas Rupert	CPL	A	WIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Gallion, George F., Jr.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Died 1/20/1945
Garrison, Elmer L.	SSGT	C	Died, 4/26/1942, Camp O'Donnell, malaria
Gaydos, Robert G.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; <i>Nissyō Maru</i> to Japan 7/17/1944
Gease, Thomas W.	SGT	HQS	Left Cabanatuan POW Camp on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942
Geerholt, Raymond	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; died, 11/24/1942, dysentery
Geier, Raymond C.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Hirohata (Osaka, Japan)
Gellert, Paul	SGT	A	WIA, Orani, bomb attack, 12/30/1941; KIA, Agloloma Point, Bataan, 1/26/1942; Purple Heart Medal with cluster
George, Raymond	PVT	B	Died, 0730, 8/27/1942, Cabanatuan hospital, dysentery (alt: 9/24/1942); WIA, 4/8/1942, KP 147, Bataan.

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Giammorino, Anthony N.	PVT	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan, Camp 3; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Gibbons, Charles L.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943; Japan, as of July, 1945
Gibbs, Ralph	2LT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Yodogawa
Gibson, Robert H.	SGT	C	Left for DAVPECOL, 11/11/1942; Bilibid; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Storm King</i> , 10/18/1945
Gilbert, Norman C.	PVT	C	Outside detail, O'Donnell POW Camp; Bilibid; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Gillespie, Laurie	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Toto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/20/1944
Gladdon, Byron C.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 11/8/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Glynn, Herbert J.	SGT	C	Died, O'Donnell POW Camp, 4/27/1942, malaria
Goldbach, Raymond T.	PVT	A	KIA, Agloloma Point, Bataan, 1/26/1942; Purple Heart Medal
Goldblith, Samuel A.	1LT	HQS	Sliver Star, Bataan, 3/15/1942; Mountain detail, Bontoc; Cabanatuan, <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Gonzales, Rene W.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942
Gonzalves, Gordon	CPL	A	Transferred to II Corps; last seen at O'Donnell-Leggett; <i>Nagara Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942; TSGT, liberated at Mukden; survived

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Goodwin, William H.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2, as of 11/5/1942; Bilibid; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Gorman, Andrew	MSGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Bilibid; KIA, 12/13/1944, <i>Oryoku Maru</i> en route to Japan; alt: <i>Enoura Maru</i> and <i>Brazil Maru</i> ; Purple Heart Medal
Gourley, Carlton	PVT	B	Died, 2300 hours, 1/11/1943, Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, diphtheria
Gozzo, Joe	PVT	A	Outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; subject of Japanese "medical experiments"
Grace, Frank L.	PFC	C	Died, O'Donnell POW Camp, 5/18/1942, dysentery, malaria (alt. 5/15/1942)
Graham, Charles G.	CPL	HQS	Died, Cabanatuan, 9/25/1942, malaria, malnutrition
Graham, J. R.	PVT	A	KIA, 5/1/1942, Corregidor, shelling (alt: 5/3/1942)
Grecco, Anthony J.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; Japan, July, 1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Green, Edgar P.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal (alt: <i>Oryoku Maru</i> to Japan, 12/13/1944. died 2/4/1945
Gregel, Tony	PVT	HQS	Originally listed as missing; Tayabas detail; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Storm King</i> , 10/18/1945
Griffin, Thomas J.	PVT	HQS	Originally listed as missing; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944; survived
Grimm, James S	CPL	C	Died, 0818, 10/10/1942, Cabanatuan, heart attack during hospitalization

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Guccione, Charles O.	PVT	A	Clark Field; Cabanatuan, Camp 3, as of 11/5/1942; KIA, 10/24/1944 <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Gutterman, Jacob	PVT	C	Died, 0800, 7/16/1942, Cabanatuan, malnutrition (alt: malaria and dysentery)
Hackman, Clyde	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; outside detail, Las Pinas
Hall, Garland	PVT	C	Died, 1530, 11/27/1942, Cabanatuan; beriberi
Hall, William H., Jr.	PVT	C	Died, 1300 hours, 4/25/1942, Camp O'Donnell, dysentery
Hamblin, Joseph R.	PVT	B	Died, April, 1942, believed on Mountain Province detail-Leggett; alt: KIA, 12/22/1943-USAFFE
Hamers, Gerhard J.	PVT	HQS	Mountain detail, Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, October, 1942-October, 1943; Clark Field detail; Bilibid Prison; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Formosa, 10/1/1944; Moji; Camp Dice, Tokyo; and Niigata
Hamilton, Charles H.	PVT	HQS	Died, ca. 4/11 1942, Corregidor, cerebral malaria; possibly; recommended for Silver Star for work at Clark Field, 12/8-12/25/41; also listed by Kloecker and Coone as "J. Hamilton"
Hamilton, William A.	PVT	B	Died, Cabanatuan, 9/16/1942, disease
Hamrick, Hugh F. "Heavy"	PVT	HQS	Possibly later assigned to Company A, listed as MIA; Manila port area; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; Yokohama
Hangar, Waldo W. (alt: Aldo)	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2
Hardin, Glynn N. (alt: Glenn)	PVT	C	Mountain detail, Bontoc; Bilibid
Harker, Ellsworth C.	PVT	C	Died 6/12/1942, Cabanatuan

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Harlacher, Clyde	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Yokohama; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Harless, Everett	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944; Japan, Spring, 1945
Harrington, Joe D.	PVT	C	Died, 6/17/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, throat infection (alt: malaria)
Harris, Sidney	PFC	HQS	Medical Corps, attached to Headquarters Company; KIA, bomb attack, Bataan, 3/28/1942
Haugh, John	PVT	B	Died, 9/16/1942, Cabanatuan Hospital
Hayman, Ralph M.	SGT	A	Cabanatuan, Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Heard, Edwin	CPL	HQS	Died, 12/10/1942, Ft. Stotsenburg, accidentally shot (alt. 12/13/1941)
Hearn, Charles L.	PFC	HQS	Attached to Company A, Corregidor; originally listed as missing; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Hejkal, Milton M.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, hospital; KIA 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Helfrich, James H.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; died, Mukden, 12/22/1942 - dysentery
Helms, John T.	PFC	C	Hospitalized, Cabanatuan, 11/5/1942; Clark Field; <i>Nissyō Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Hendricks, Carl F.	SGT	A	Stayed on Corregidor after surrender; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart and Silver Star Medals
Hendrix, James E.	PVT	A	WIA four times; Cabanatuan, Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; Osaka



Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Hennessy, Harland J.	PVT	B	Died, 2200, 11/1/1942, Cabanatuan, beriberi (alt. 11/1/1942)
Henrickson, Clarence H.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; died 2/27/1943, Tokyo Camp 3, Mitsushima, kidney disease
Herrington, Leo T.	PFC	A	WIA, 1/26/1942; Agloloma; KIA, 3/24/1942, Kindley Field, Corregidor, bombing
Heuton, Wilbur E.	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Heyback, Charles W., Jr.	PFC	C	Died, 1600 hours, 4/27/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malnutrition (alt: malaria) (alt. 3/2/1943 ABMC)
Higdon, Patrick J.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; Lipa; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
Hill, Alfred P.	PVT	B	Originally listed as missing; died 5/2/1942
Hill, Joe B.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3
Himes, Glenn	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1; Nielsen Field, <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
Hitchcock, Raymond	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; died 1/30/1943, Mukden, dysentery
Hoard, Lester F.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942
Hoffman, Robert	SGT	C	Died, April, 1942, O'Donnell POW Camp (alt: 0700, 6/10/1942 Cabanatuan, dysentery; al. 5/17/1942)
Hogan, Joseph	SGT	B	Died, 6/1/1942, mountain detail, Bontoc, after beating, and buried Bontoc cemetery
Holt, Karl	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; left on outside detail, 9/27/1942, Davao; Baguio or Palawan; Japan

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Hooyman, Charles W., Jr.	SGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1944; died, Mukden, 12/20/1942, beriberi, pneumonia, dysentery
House, Theodore B.	1st SGT	HQS	Died, 6/21/1942, mountain detail, Bontoc, and buried Bontoc hospital
Huddle, David	SSGT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Manila Port Area; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; Tokyo, Camp 3 Mitsushima
Huffstickler, Clyde H.	1LT		Formerly MSgt, Headquarters Company; commissioned and transferred to headquarters, 1 Corps engineers; Bilibid; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Hurwitz, Max	SGT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3, as of 10/1/1942; Japan
Hyde, Revis C.	PFC	C	Attached to Company C from 5th Interceptor Command; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Tokyo Camp 3, Mitsushima, as of 8/1/1943
Hyduk, George	PFC	C	Died, O'Donnell POW Camp, 6/23/1942, dysentery (alt: malaria)
Ianozzi, Joseph J.	PVT	HQS	Outside detail from Cabanatuan, 10/6/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Pusan, Korea, 10/8/1942; died, 10/21/1942; Korea; buried at sea
Ingersoll, Herbert V.	CAPT	Bn Staff	XO; Former CO, Company B; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; DAVPECOL; survived <i>Oryoku Maru</i> and died on the <i>Enoura Maru</i> , 1/9/1945, Japan; Purple Heart and Silver Star Medals
Irwin, Dan			See Pinkston, Dan

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Jackson, Dee	CPL	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Lima Maru</i> to Japan, 9/18/1942; Yokohama; recommended for Silver Star for work at Clark Field, 12/8–12/25/41
Jackson, Lindsay	SGT	C	Died, 4/22/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, dysentery
Jacobellis, John	PVT	A	KIA, Agloloma, Bataan, 1/26/1942
Jacobs, Edward	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1, 11/2/1942; KIA, 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Manila; Purple Heart Medal
Jaggers, William, Jr.	CPL	C	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
James, Edward L.	SGT	A	WIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma; Tanagawa, Osaka District, Japan, as of 1/15/1943
Janciewicz, Stanley	PFC	A	Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Jankiewicz, Joseph C.	PVT	HQS	Originally listed as missing; died, Cabanatuan, 1500, 7/15/42, malaria
Jay, Louie, Jr.	CPL	A	Died, Cabanatuan, Camp 3, 7/26/1942, cerebral malaria—Leggett; Purple Heart Medal; alt: died, Bataan, 1942, non-combat—ADBC
Jenkins, Morgan E.	PVT	A	Outside detail; Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Johnson, Bernard	PFC	C	Died, mountain detail, 6/1/1942, Abatan, Mountain Province, malaria, buried near school, Camp John Hay
Johnson, Edward H.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; Las Pinas; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Johnson, Enos A.	SSGT	C	Camp O'Donnell, left on 4/26/1942, for Tarlac as orderly for US general officers; <i>Nagata Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Johnson, Francis A.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Johnson, Marshall F.	PVT	A	Formosa; possibly Tanagawa, Osaka District, Japan, as of 1/15/1943
Johnson, Richard H., Jr. (possibly Robert)	PFC	C	Died, 0730, 7/23/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria
Johnson, Walter A.	PVT	B	Originally listed as missing (Mansell roster); survived DAVPECOL; left for Japan 7/23/1944 (Kloecker); KIA 9/7/1944 <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Manila; Purple Heart Medal
Johnson, William M.	PVT	B	Died, 4/15/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp (Abraham, p. 556), as possibly murdered near Balanga on Death March, fractured skull; both list residence as Allentown, PA. No mention in Ingersoll, Leggett, Kloecker, or Mansell rosters
Jones, Blynn H.	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Davao; KIA, 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Manila; Purple Heart Medal
Jones, Ralph B.	CPL	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Jordon, Major B.	CPL	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Died 0800, 8/11/1942, beriberi
Joskens, Charles J.	SSGT	C	Died, 6/14/1942 (possibly 2000 hours, 8/11/1942), Cabanatuan, malaria and dysentery; Purple Heart Medal
Joyner, Charles R.	PVT	B	Mountain detail, escaped and originally listed as MIA; survived
Julius, Frederick D.	SGT	HQS	Believed on Corregidor, 5/5/1942; listed as MIA; Clark Field; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Storm King</i> , 10/18/1945

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Jurczak, Stephen	PFC	C	Hospitalized, Cabanatuan, 11/5/1942; Clark Field; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Karp, Morton	PVT	A	KIA, Kindley Field, Corregidor, 3/26/1942
Kasarda, George	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Kasner, Gerald	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 7/23/1943
Kaufman, Vernice	PVT	A	Outside detail; Cabanatuan; liberated from Cabanatuan in "The Great Raid," 1/30/1945
Keaton, Kenneth V.	PFC	C	O'Donnell, left on outside detail to Tarlac as general officer orderly; <i>Nagara Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942; liberated on Formosa
Kennedy, Wilmar L.	PVT	B	Crystal Force Expedition, September-October, 1941
Kenney, James G.	PVT	A	KIA, Agloloma Point, Bataan, 1/26/1942; Purple Heart Medal
Kidd, Raymond R.	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; port area, Manila; <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1944
Kiena, Rudolph	PFC	HQS	Died, 5/5/1942, mountain detail, San Fernando, La Union, buried in cemetery at San Fernando
Kiernan, Gerald M.	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; Cabanatuan, Camp 3; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Kilburn, Erwin J.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, hospitalized, as of 5/5/1942; <i>Nissyo</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Kilgore, Harlie E.	PFC	B	Possibly KIA, Death March, Bacalor Municipality, Pampanga Province, possibly 4/20/1942; no date-ADBC; listed as missing-Kloecker and Ingersoll; also listed as dead-(Leggett roster, annotated by Paul Kloecker)
King, Andrew J.	PVT	A	WIA, 3/24/1942, Kindley Field, Corregidor, bombing; outside detail; Cabanatuan; <i>Oryoku Maru</i> to Japan, 12/13/1944; Died 1/27/1945; Purple Heart Medal
King, Rollin O.	PVT	A	Outside detail; <i>Totori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Kinser, Clarence	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail, 10/6/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1944; Mukden
Kloecker, Paul A.	SGT	B	Company B first sergeant prior to surrender; still listed as a sergeant; mountain detail, Bontoc; Cabanatuan, Group 3, Lipa, as of 11/25/1943; Bilibid Prison, <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Takeo, Formosa, 10/1/1944; Oeyama Subcamp 9, as of 1/5/1945; Purple Heart Medal
Knight, Robert W., Jr.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea; Died, 3/5/1943, Mukden, dysentery
Knox, Charles A.	PFC	HQS	Crystal Force Expedition, September-October, 1941
Kodl, Frank J., Jr.	PFC	C	Died, 5/28/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria and dysentery
Koerner, Richard A.	SSGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; murdered, 12/14/1944, Puerto Princessa, Palawan (Palawan Massacre)
Kohn, Julius	PVT	HQS	Died, Cabanatuan, 1400, 7/8/42, dysentery; recommended for Silver Star for work at Clark Field, 12/8-12/25/41

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Kolthoff, Clifford E.	PVT	A	WIA, Orani, Bataan, 12/30/1941; Mountain detail, died, 6/2/1942, Hospital #1, Little Baguio; beriberi, malnutrition, effects of old wound
Kostecki, Henry	PFC	C	Died, 1400, 7/9/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria
Kowalski, Eugene F.	PVT	HQS	Promoted from private to sergeant and assigned to I Corps; USAFFE listing only
Kozakovitch, Felix	PFC	A	Corregidor, left on outside detail; <i>Totori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Krempecki, Albert	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; outside detail, 9/27/42; KIA, 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Manila; Purple Heart Medal
Kruchowsky, Steve J.	SGT	A	Cabanatuan, Group 3, as of 11/1/1942; KIA, 10/24/1944 <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Kucskar, Joseph J.	PVT	HQS	Died, Cabanatuan, 1700, 11/9/42, dysentery
Kuhn, Virgil F.	SSGT	HQS	Attached from "other organization" (not further identified); at Capas with general officers after surrender; <i>Nagara Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942; died, 2/8/1945, disease, Heito POW Camp, Formosa
Kukasky, Sam	PVT	C	Died, 1330, 8/12/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery or malaria
Kunkel, Charles B.	PFC	B	Listed as missing on the Death March; Died 4/4/1942 or 4/28/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, dysentery
Kushner, Jack J.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 7/23/1943; survived
Lacko, Joe J.	PVT	B	Died, O'Donnell POW Camp, 5/5/1942
Lacko, John W.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Totori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Died 11/14/1942, Jiah Fusan, Korea, dysentery

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Laczko, Steve	PFC	HQS	Outside detail from Cabanatuan, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Ladd, Donald F.	CPL	A	Cabanatuan, Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Lamm, Walter C.	PVT	B	Mountain detail; left Cabanatuan Camp 1, Group 3, 9/27/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Laniauskus, Peter	PVT	C	Murdered, 0345, possibly 11/16/1942, Cabanatuan, by sentry (gunshot)
Larkin, Ralph W.	PVT	A	Nichols Field POW; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Larsen, Christian	SGT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942
Latta, William, Jr.	PFC	C	Died, 6/3/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, dysentery
Lawler, J.B.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
Lear, Ralph B.	PFC	C	Died, mountain detail, Baguio, malaria, beriberi, 5/9/1942, buried at Camp John Hay, Baguio (alt. 6/1/1942)
Ledwith, James J.	PVT	A	Crystal Force Expedition, September-October, 1941
Lee, Harmon C.	PVT	HQS	Cabcaben POW Camp, 4/19/1942; listed as missing; hell ship <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan; survived
Lee, William J.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, as of 11/5/1942; Clark Field; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/15/1944



Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Leggett, James L., Jr.	1LT	Bn Staff	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan; 11/7/1942; Moji, Japan; recommended for DSC for service at Clark Field, 12/8/41; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Lemelin, Albert L.	PVT	C	Died, 2300, 10/29/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria
Leonard, John T.	PVT	A	Outside detail; KIA 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Leone, Donato	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Japan, as of November, 1942
Levine, Morris A.	PVT	HQS	Transferred to Ft. Stotsenburg Hospital following accidental shooting of Cpl. Heard; KIA, 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Manila; Purple Heart Medal
Levy, Melville L.	PFC	B	Later promoted to specialist third class and transferred to I Corps; died, 0100 hours, 9/5/42, Cabanatuan Hospital, dysentery
Liberato, Alfred	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail, 9/27/1942; KIA, 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Manila; Purple Heart Medal
Liggett, Ephrain T.	PVT	A	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Lipinski, Gustov, Jr.	PVT	B	Hospitalized, Cabanatuan; left on outside detail, 9/27/1942; KIA, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> , 9/7/1944 en route to Manila; Purple Heart Medal
Loika, Peter	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Lott, Ruel T.	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Loughner, Earl E.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail; Kobe, Japan
Ludwick, Gale	PVT	B	Hospitalized, Cabanatuan; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Lummus, Luther K.	PVT	HQS	Died, O'Donnell POW Camp, 5/29/1942, malaria
Maciejewski, Frank	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; KIA, 9/7/1944 <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Mackowski, John	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; Davao; <i>Shinyo Maru</i> to Japan; survived the sinking of the <i>Shinyo Maru</i> , 9/7/1944
MacMillan, Robert D., Jr.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Bilibid; hell ship <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1944
Maguire, Edward Patrick	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Bilibid; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Malor, Stanislaus	SGT	C	Hospitalized, Cabanatuan; liberated from Cabanatuan in "The Great Raid," 1/30/1945
Mann, Joseph	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Tokyo, Camp 13b, Omi
Mann, William H.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail, probably to Lipa; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Tokyo Camp 3, Mitsushima, as of 8/1/1943; steel rigger
Manson, Martin A.	SSGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 7/23/1943
Markert, Carl. L.	PVT	B	Died, 0400 hours, 10/15/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria and dysentery
Martin, Hollis	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1, Davao Penal Colony; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Martinez, George	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Pasay; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
Mascola, James V.	PVT	A	Died, 4/27/1943, Yodogawa, Japan, beriberi and dysentery
Mason, John H.	PVT	C	Died, 9/24/42, Cabanatuan, malnutrition (alt. 9/1/1942)
Masters, Ray E.	PVT	A	Died, 0800 hours, 7/25/1942 (ADBC); possibly 10/1942 (Ingersoll), Cabanatuan, dysentery, possibly malaria
Mathe, Arthur E.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan; Hell Ship <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1944
Mathias, Nolan E.	PVT	A	KIA, 5/1/1942, Corregidor (Ingersoll), shrapnel (alt: KIA 5/3/1942 or WIA 5/4/1942, Corregidor)
Matlack, Charles E.	PVT	C	Died, 1530, 7/13/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria
Mattern, Kenneth E.	PVT	A	Outside detail; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Matulewitz, John S.	PFC	HQS	Detached service, Mindanao, 12/1/1941; Davao
Matuozi, Robert E.	SSGT	B	Medical Corps attached to Company B; Hospitalized at O'Donnell POW Camp; Japan
McAnany, Richard E.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; murdered, Puerto Princessa, 12/14/1944 (Palawan Massacre)
McCall, Vincent E.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943
McCartin, Charles	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1 hospitalized as 11/2/1942
McClellan, James A.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; died, 0100 hours, 10/20/1942, dysentery
McCloud, Simon	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Osaka, 6/1/1943, hospitalized as of 6/1/1945 for beriberi and gangrene; survived

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
McClure, Clyde L. (alt. J. McClure)	PFC	A	KIA, Agloloma, Bataan 1/26/1942
McClure, Ross G.	CAPT	B	USAAF, attached to Company B; Died, 0500, 8/11/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery (alt. 1/17/1942, ABMC; July, 1942, Ingersoll)
McCubbin, Eugene C.	SGT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Las Pinas; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
McDonald, Robert J	PVT	A	Bilibid Prison, Manila, as of 10/19/1942; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
McEwen, Alden D.	PVT	A	WIA, Kindley Field, Corregidor, 3/24/1942; Cabanatuan, hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
McGee, Thomas W.	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; Nielsen Field, <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
McGough, Robert E.	PFC	C	Died, 11/19/1942, Cabanatuan,
McHugh, John T.	CPL	C	Died, 1555, 10/30/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery and malnutrition
McNamara, Eugene R.	PVT	B	Died, 5/1/1942, Camp O'Donnell, cerebral malaria and dysentery
Meddaugh, Henry L.	PFC	C	Died, 6/4/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria; believed to have been on the Mountain detail
Menges, Leon	PVT	A	Cabantuan, Camp 3; died, 2/5/1942, Hotel POW Camp, Manchukuo, pneumonia
Menzio, Harry P.	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Group 3, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Yodogawa
Merrill, Smith "Bub"	CPL	B	Bronze Star, Del Carmen Field; Cabanatuan, left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Metras, Treffle E.	1st SGT	A	1st Sgt, Company A; Cabanatuan, Group 3, as of 11/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Meyrick, Richard W.	SGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Japan, as of July 1945
Mezzacappa, Samuel G.	PFC	HQS	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Middleton, Talmadge Walter	PVT	B	Hospitalized, O'Donnell; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Mignatti, August	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Japan, as of July, 1945; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Miller, Leslie	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; outside detail, 10/5/1942; KIA 1/9/1945 <i>Enoura Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Miller, Merrill F.	SSGT	HQS	Died, 1120, 7/12/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria and dysentery
Mims, Walter	PVT	HQS	Mountain detail, escaped, missing; listed as "AWOL"; survived
Minder, Joseph G.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; Las Pinas; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Minota, Benjamin	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942
Mize, Earnest Lucius, Jr.	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 7/23/1943
Mock, Martin	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea; Died, 12/27/42, Mukden, dysentery
Mohnac, Alex M.	1LT	Bn Staff	Dental Corps, assigned to Company A; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Japan, as of April, 1943

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Montgomery, Robert D.	1LT	A	WIA twice, 1/26/1942, Agloloma; Cabanatuan, Group 1
Moody, D.L. Craig	SSGT	B	Died, 1530 hours, 11/21/42, Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, dysentery
Moore, Delbert E.	SGT	B	Transferred from Company A (date unknown; possibly o/a late October, 1941); Cabanatuan, Group 1, hospitalized
Moran, Theodore J.	PVT	HQS	Mountain detail, escaped, missing; listed as "AWOL"; survived; possibly recommended for DSC for service at Clark Field, 12/8/1941
Morgan, Robert K	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; hospitalized; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943
Morris, Dallman	PVT	C	Cabanatuan; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; listed in USAFFE roster as Quartermaster Corps
Morse, Harry H.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Bilibid Prison, Manila; Rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Morse, Robert J.	PVT	HQS	Died, 0730 hours, 10/23/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria and dysentery
Morton, Howard G.	2LT		Company B, SSgt; commissioned as 2nd Lt. and transferred to 71st Engineers; died, 8/11/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp
Mosley, Corville	CPL	C	Died, 12/15/1942, Cabben after hospitalization; alt: 12/9/1942, USAFFE
Mowick, John E.	1LT	B	Died, Tanagawa, Japan 2/15/1943; 2/17/1943)
Moyer, John	PVT	HQS	O'Donnell; outside mountain detail, La Union, Cabanatuan; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Yokohama
Mullins, Noah	PVT	A	Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; Japan, Winter, 1943

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Mulvaney, Robert F.	PFC	HQS	Died, 0900 hours, 10/31/1942, Cabanatuan, after hospitalization, pellagra
Murn, August	PVT	A	Listed as "missing (Leggett Roster), KIA, Corregidor, o/a 5/6/1942; possibly murdered as POW for talking or concealed pistol
Murn, August	PVT	A	Died, 5/6/1942; Corregidor
Nelemont, John	PFC	HQS	Died, 0830 hours, 12/12/1942, Cabanatuan, beriberi
Nelson, Ed L.	PVT	B	Crystal Force Expedition, September-October, 1941
Nelson, Edward F.	PFC	A	Tanagawa, Osaka District, Japan, as of 1/15/1943
Nelson, Lloyd A.	PVT	A	Died, 0600 hours, 11/25/1942, Cabanatuan, pellagra; alt: 11/23/1942
Nester, William L.	MSGT		Died, Cabanatuan, 1145 hours, 7/17/1942, malaria; ADBC roster only; no company listed
Netzlaw, Edmund	PVT	HQS	Died, Camp O'Donnell, 7/5/1942, Cabanatuan
Newell, James, Jr.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Storm King</i> , 10/18/1945
Newton, Harold E.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 7/23/1943
Newton, Marvin	SGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, died, 2300 hours, 11/15/1942, Cabanatuan
Nicolas, Louis C.	SGT	C	Died, Cabanatuan, 0230 hours, 8/15/1942 (alt: 0230, 11/15/1942), malaria and dysentery.
Niday, Floyd T.	SSGT	A	Remained on Corregidor after surrender; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Hirohata, Japan, 9/20/1943; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Nisnevits, Oscar	PFC	HQS	Attached from "other organization" (not further identified); Died, 1600 hours, 10/15/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria and dysentery
O'Laughlin, Thomas M.	PVT	C	Died, 5/13/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, dysentery and malaria
Oppenheim, James R	1LT	HQS	Died, 0200, 6/16/1942, Cabanatuan, Camp 1, dysentery
Orsini, Millard	PVT	B	Hospitalized, O'Donnell; Cabanatuan; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Ostrum, Robert	PVT	A	Group 3, Cabanatuan, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/1/1942; Mukden
Otaro, Marcus	PVT	C	Cabcaben POW Camp, 4/19/1942, hospitalized; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Owens, James B.	SGT	HQS	O'Donnell, hospitalized; Cabanatuan, died, 8/30/42
Packard, Henry H.	PVT	C	Died, 9/25/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery (alt: 110, 9/17/1942)
Page, Wilfred T.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Palumbo, Angelo J.	CPL	A	WIA 5/6/1942, Corregidor, beach defense, Engineer Point, hospitalized; Bilibid Prison, Manila; KIA 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan
Parente, James J.	SGT	B	Outside detail from Cabanatuan, as of 9/27/1942; Davao Penal Colony; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944; died 1/18/1945 Nomachi, Takaoki, Japan
Parker, John W.	PVT	C	Died, 1230 hours, 7/4/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery



Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Parsons, John E.	PVT	HQS	Listed as MIA; Cabanatuan POW Camp, 4/19/1942; <i>Lima Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1942; liberated at Mukden
Parsons, William H.	CPL	C	Died, 0930 hours, 10/5/1942, Cabanatuan, malnutrition
Pasquel, Thomas E	SGT	B	Listed as a private on the Leggett, Ingersoll, and ADBC rosters; and originally as MIA; hospitalized at Cabanatuan; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Paul, Clifford A.	TSGT	HQS	Died, 10/22/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria (alt: 10/21/1942)
Pawlik, Stephen S.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Davao
Peace, David, Jr.	PFC	C	Cabcaben POW Camp, 4/19/1942; hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; DAPECOL, beaten; Japan
Pedota, Bennie	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; KIA, 10/14/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Pellegrino, Daniel	PVT	A	WIA, 3/24/1942, Kindley Field, Corregidor, bombing; Cabanatuan; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; Camp 8, Ashio, Tokyo
Perfett, Michael J.	CPL	HQS	Detached service, Mindanao, 12/1/1941; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 7/20/1943
Perona, John	PVT	A	Group 3, Cabanatuan, as of 10/1/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/1/1942; Mukden
Perrell, Raymond C.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; recommended for Silver Star for work at Clark Field, 12/8–12/25/1941; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Peterson, Lester	PVT	A	Listed as warrant officer, WIA, Agloloma Point, 1/16/1942 and hospitalized at Bilibid Prison as of 8/18/1942 by Col. Herbert Coone, Company A surgeon; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila, by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Peterson, Lewis F.	PVT	A	Originally listed as missing; Bilibid; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila, by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Peterson, William H.	SGT	HQS	Died, possibly KIA, 5/3/1942, Cervantes, on mountain detail; believed bayoneted and buried near Kayan.
Petrosky, Andrew P.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 11/8/1942; Mukden
Pfeifer, Rudolph G.	CPL	HQS	Detached service, Del Monte, Mindanao, 12/1/1941; KIA, 12/15/1944, <i>Oryoku Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Pflueger, Theodore	1LT	71st	Originally assigned to Co. C; transferred to 71st Engineers; <i>Shinyo Maru</i> to Japan, 8/20/1944; survived the sinking of the <i>Shinyo Maru</i> , 9/7/1944
Pharo, Joseph W.	PVT	C	Died, 5/14/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria
Phillips, Thomas E.	PVT	B	Hospitalized at Cabanatuan; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942
Phoenix, Leo E., Jr.	PVT	C	Died, 0500, 7/12/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria (alt: dysentery)
Pierce, Arthur L.	PVT	C	Died, 0500, 7/19/1942, Cabanatuan, malnutrition and dysentery
Pietropolo, John	PVT	HQS	With Company A on Corregidor, missing as of 5/5/1942; Cabanatuan; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan; 7/23/1943; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Pignata, John A.	CPL	HQS	Attached to Company B; left Cabanatuan, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1943; died, Mukden, 1/21/1943
Pigott, Edgar M.	PFC	HQS	Left Cabanatuan, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Died, Mukden, January, 1943
Pinkston, Dan C	PVT	HQS	Crew member, USS <i>Gnat</i> ; <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1942; Omine Machi POW Camp (Hiroshima Branch 6)
Pope, John B.	PFC	A	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Porter, William E. (alt: William Lafayette Porter)	PVT	C	Died, 0300, 7/24/1942, Cabanatuan, malnutrition (alt. 7/27/1942; alt: dysentery); possible recipient of Silver Star medal for action at Clark Field
Poster, Joseph	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Potter, Richard A.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1, as of 11/5/1942; ; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; recommended for DSC for service at Clark Field, 12/8/41; Purple Heart Medal
Power, Joseph	PVT	HQS	Mountain detail, escaped from Bontoc POW Camp, MIA; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Pronchik, Fred C.		B	Died, 1500, 10/22/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery and malaria
Putas, Michael	CPL	C	Hospitalized, Cabanatuan; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943
Rabinowitz, Harold J.	SSGT	B	KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; originally Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Purple Heart Medal
Radcliff, Elgin G.	CAPT	Bn Staff	Mountain detail; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Oryoku Maru</i> to Japan, 12/13/1944; Osaka POW Camp

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Radcliff, Fred	PVT	HQS	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Radziak, Peter L.	PVT	B	Originally listed as missing; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; DAPECOL, as of September, 1943; KIA, 9/7/1944, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Rau, Raymond F	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Ray, John R.	PVT	HQS	Died, O'Donnell POW Camp, 5/3/1942, malaria and dysentery alt: April, 1942)
Rea, Everett	SGT	B	Cabanatuan, Group 3; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; hospitalized on USS <i>Tryon</i> after liberation
Rector, Paul J.	PVT	HQS	Died, Cabanatuan, 6/4/1942, dysentery
Reh, Robert R.	PFC	A	KIA, Agloloma Point, Bataan, 1/26/1942
Reha, David W.	PVT	C	Died, Cabanatuan, 12/2/1942, pneumonia
Reib, Edward H.	PVT	HQS	Died, O'Donnell POW Camp, 6/10/1942, malaria (alt: June, 1942)
Retterath, Peter N.	SSGT	A	WIA, Orani, bombing, 12/30/1941; stayed Corregidor after surrender; Nichols Field POW detail, as of 1944; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Reynolds, Peter W.	CAPT	HQS	CO, Headquarters Company; Cabanatuan; Tayabas detail; Bilibid; KIA, <i>Arisan Maru</i> , 10/24/1944
Ricardo, Dominick	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Nagata Camp 9b, Toyama Iwas, Japan
Richardson, Elmer L.	PVT	A	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Richardson, James D.	CAPT	A	CO, Company A; Original battalion adjutant; WIA, 5/6/1942, Corregidor, beach defense (alt: 5/6/1942); survived <i>Oryoku Maru</i> and <i>Enoura Maru</i> sinkings; <i>Brazil Maru</i> to Moji, Japan, 1/30/1945
Riojas, Jesus	PVT	B	Died, 5/18/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria (alt. 5/10/1942)
Ritchie, Kenneth O. (alt. Kenneth C.)	PVT	C	Listed as missing; Cabanatuan, hospitalized; Las Pinas; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Rizzo, Philip D.	PVT	B	KIA, 9/7/1944 <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Manila; Cabanatuan as of 11/5/1942; Purple Heart Medal
Roberts, Ralph J.	PVT	A	Originally listed as missing; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/17/1942; Yodogawa; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Robertson, Donald A.	PVT	A	WIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma; originally listed as missing; hospitalized, Bilibid Prison, Manila, as of 8/22/1942; survived
Robinette, Blair	PVT	C	Originally listed as "believed died at O'Donnell"; survived
Robinson, Lawrence	PVT	A	Originally listed as missing; survived; liberated from Cabanatuan in "The Great Raid," 1/30/1945
Rogers, Clarence W. "Chief"	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; hospitalized, as of 11/5/1942
Rogers, Marcus A.	PVT	A	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Romanzo, Nathan	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; Davao

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Rorke, Edward F	SGT	B	Cabanatuan, Group 3; left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; Manila port area; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Rose, Frank	MSGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Las Pinas; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Ross, Frank P.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Lipa detail; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944
Rossi, Frank P.	CPL	HQS	Left Cabanatuan, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea; Mukden
Roszkowski, Joseph W.	SSGT	A	WIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma Point, Bataan; Palawan, <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Formosa, 10/1/1944; Japan
Rousey, Edgar M.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944
Rowland, Douglas	CPL	B	Died after beating, Death March, between Balanga and Abucay o/a 4/14/1942, malaria, left for dead (alt. 4/11/1942 & 4/15/1942)
Runyon, Stanton W.	PVT	C	Died, 1845, 6/22/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery
Rush, John W.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; left of outside detail; possibly on <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 7/23/1943
Russell, James A.	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Group 3; Hell ship <i>Canadian Inventor</i> from Manila, 7/4/1944, to Moji, Japan, 9/1/1944
Russell, James E.	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Russell, Robert J.	1LT	B	Died, 0300, 8/18/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria
Rutz, Clarence A.	1LT		Original Company A, 1st Sgt; commissioned as a second lieutenant and transferred to 71st Engineers; Group 1, Cabanatuan; Tayabas detail; Bilibid Prison, Manila, as of 8/26/1942

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Ryswick, Charles A.	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Sabo, Alex	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Moji, Japan, 7/23/1943; Died, 12/17/1944, Hoten (Mukden)
Sachleben, Frank K.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; Clark Field; KIA, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan, 10/24/1944; Purple Heart Medal
Sakowski, Frank	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Clark Field; Purple Heart Medal
Salata, Joe J.	CPL	A	Corregidor, outside detail; Clark Field; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Sanders, Lewis F.	SGT	HQS	Died, 10/4/1942, Cabanatuan
Sanderson, Vern V.	PVT	C	Died, 5/3/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, cerebral malaria
Satkofsky, Andrew F.	SSGT	HQS	O'Donnell; Baguio; Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden, Company C per Kloecker & ADABC
Sauter, John R.	PFC	C	Died, 0900, 9/30/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery (alt. 7/30/1942)
Savant, Ocie R.	PVT	B	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Scalera, Salvatore L.	PVT	HQS	Died, 1630. 12/14/1943, Cabanatuan after hospitalization (alt: 12/4/1942)
Schatz, George A., Jr.	CPL	A	Cabanatuan, Group 1, as of 11/5/1942; Camp 8, Tokyo (Ashio), as of July, 1944
Schaub, William R.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Schirner, Junior V.	PVT	C	Died, 4/10/1942, Bataan (possible Death March) (Kloecker, ADABC, & Coone rosters only); 3/13/1942, USAFFE

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Schlinghoff, Howard I.	SSGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944 (alt: Moji POW Camp, Japan, 7/13/1943); died, 12/15/1944, disease, USAFFE
Schnitzer, Alfred J.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, as of 3/1/1944; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan 7/23/1943
Schoeffler, William F.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; to Japan, November, 1944
Schragel, Edward	PFC	B	Died, 11/30/1942 -ABMC & USAFFE; died, March, 1943, Kloecker; not listed in Leggett & Ingersoll rosters
Schrepel, Melvin	PVT	A	WIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma; originally listed as missing; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Schumaker, Lloyd C.	PVT	A	WIA, 12/31/1941, Pilar-Bagac Road, bomb attack; originally listed as missing; survived
Schumaker, Maurice P.	PVT	C	Originally listed as missing; Cabanatuan, hospitalized; Lipa detail, as of 12/21/1942; survived
Scmoggi, Steven	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; not listed USAFFE
Scott, Jefferson D.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Scott, Robert T.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail 10/5/1942; Las Pinas, <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Seaman, George J., Jr.	PVT	A	Medical Corps attached to Company A; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, hospitalized, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942
Searl, Elmer E.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, Group 2; Davao; KIA, 9/7/1944 <i>Shinyo Mari</i> en route to Manila



Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Seideman, Louis	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2, hospitalized; Las Pinas; <i>Nis-syo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; died 8/26/1944
Seifert, Harry	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, hospitalized; <i>Nis-syo Maru</i> to Japan 7/17/1944; Nagasaki, Camp 2B, Narumi, as of July, 1944
Seivert, Daniel C.	PFC	HQS	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Seymour, Theodore W.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Sgroe, Salvatore	PVT	HQS	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Shaffer, William E.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail, 10/11/1942; rescued at Bilibid Prison, Manila by American Forces, 2/4/1945
Shea, Maurice P.	PFC	C	Left Camp O'Donnell on outside detail (general officer orderly); <i>Nagara Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942
Shearwood, Marvin	SSGT	A	Nichols Field, July, 1944; Bilibid; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/24/1944
Shipman, Lee H.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; as of 10/11/1942; Lipa; died, Bilibid Prison, 12/7/1944
Shultz, Roy G.	CPL	C	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; Died, Bilibid Prison, Manila, 12/7/1944; buried at Del Norte Cemetery
Siebert, Earl E.	PVT	HQS	Died, 0400 hours, 7/27/1942, Cabanatuan, diphtheria
Sillsbee, Ellis R.	PFC	C	Died, 5/18/1942, Hospital 1, Little Baguio, amoebic dysentery (alt: Cabanatuan, 7/24/1942, diphtheria)
Simmons, Lewis N. (also listed as Lester)	SSGT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1944

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Simpson, Glen P.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Group 3; Lipa detail, as of 12/21/1942; left for Japan, 10/1/1944, <i>Hokusen Maru</i> ; died, 2/4/1945, exposure; buried in Japan
Skwarczynski, Thaddeus T.	PVT	C	<i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1944; Nagoya Subcamp 7B (Toyama)
Smith, Arthur F.	PVT	C	Died, 6/2/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, dysentery or malaria
Smith, Buie	PVT	C	Died, 6/2/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria (alt. dysentery; alt. 6/14/1942)
Smith, Carl D.	SGT	C	Died, 5/1/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, dysentery
Smith, Darby	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Smith, Donald	SGT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1; Camp 12, Tokyo (Hitachi), Japan, July, 1945
Smith, James R.	SGT	HQS	Promoted from private to staff sergeant and assigned to I Corps; died, 2/9/1943; USAFFE listing only
Smith, Johnny A. (alt: Johnnie)	PVT	C	Cabanatuan; Las Pinas; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944; Camp 12, Tokyo (Hitachi)
Smith, Nevin	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; hospitalized; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Smith, Philip D.	PFC	C	Died, mountain detail, 5/15/1942 (alt: 6/1/1942), throat infection; buried at Camp John Hay, Baguio
Smith, Sylvester	PFC	B	Cabanatuan; outside detail, as of 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Japan, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Smith, Walter E.	CPL	HQS	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Smithey, Leonard T.	PVT	C	Originally listed as missing; KIA, Bataan, Kloecker (no date); alt: died 5/29/1942, USAFFE
Snodgrass, Clifton O.	MSGT	B	O'Donnell; mountain detail in Northern Luzon; Cabanatuan, <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; Mitsushima and Konose
Sofie, Anthony	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 7/23/1943
Soifer, Gilbert E.	SGT	A	WIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma, and Corregidor, 5/6/1942, beach defense; Cabanatuan, as of 11/5/1942; hospitalized, Bilibid Prison, Manila, as of 8/9/1942; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Sofaralli, Patrick J.	PVT	A	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Sokolsky, John	PFC	B	Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Japan, 10/8/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Soricelli, Albert J.	CPL	HQS	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Sorochety, Charles	PVT	A	Medical Corps assigned to Company A; Cabanatuan, Camp 1; left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Sotkofsky, Andrew	SSGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; left on outside detail 10/5/1942
Sotnikoff, Hyman	PFC	B	Left Cabanatuan POW Camp on outside detail in Bontoc, Mountain Province, killed by Filipino guerillas, 5/15/1942
Spampanato, Vincent	SGT	B	Cabanatuan; outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Japan, 10/8/1944
Sparks, Gerald	PVT	C	Died Cabanatuan, 7/31/1942, malnutrition

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Speranza, Eugene	PVT	A	Lipa detail, as of 12/21/1942; Las Pinas; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944
Spruyt, Leonard P.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, outside detail; Davao; left for Japan, 7/23/1944; KIA, 9/7/1944 <i>Shinyo Maru</i> en route to Manila; Purple Heart Medal
Stadtmiller, Frederick A.	CPL	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; left on outside detail, 10/5/1942; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Steele, Louis Q.	PFC	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2, hospitalized, as of 11/5/1942; Davao; KIA, <i>Oryoku Maru</i> to Japan, 12/13/1944; 12/23/45
Steinfeldt, Paul A.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; died, 11/13/1942, Kloecker
Sternberg, Raymond F.	1st SGT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1944
Stevens, Benjamin F.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 1; Group 3; left on outside detail, 10/1/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Japan
Stevens, Lester C.	PVT	C	Originally listed as missing; died, 0300 hours, 8/9/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery
Stevenson, John	PVT	B	Cabanatuan; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Stewart, Alvin E.	PVT	A	Transfer from USAFFE Engineer Department
Stoddard, John B.	CPL	A	Corregidor, outside detail, as POW; Clark Field; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
Stoughton, John	SGT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2, died, 2200, 11/25/1942, dysentery
Stow, James K.	PVT	A	WIA, Corregidor, 5/6/1942, beach defense; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Streightiff, John O.	TSGT	HQS	WIA, 5/5/1942, Corregidor, beach defense; originally listed as missing; died, 6/18/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria (Alt: 5/18/1942)
Strickland, Clifford H.	PVT	C	Died, 0200, 7/29/1942, Cabanatuan POW Camp; dysentery and malaria (alt: O'Donnell)
Strong, John L.	CPL	C	Died, 6/1/1942, mountain detail, malnutrition, and buried at the Army-Navy Club, Baguio (alt: O'Donnell POW Camp)
Struble, Edwin	PVT	A	Died, mountain detail, Camp John Hay, Baguio, unknown date during May–August, 1942, malnutrition; buried at Army-Navy Club, Baguio
Stuhl, Kenneth J.	PFC	A	Outside detail; Tarlac; <i>Nagara Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942
Sullivan, Logan J.	PVT	C	KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; originally listed as missing; Purple Heart Medal
Sullivan, Robert	PVT	A	Originally listed as missing; KIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma Point, Bataan
Sutherland, William E.	PFC	C	Bilibid Prison, Manila, as of 10/19/1942; <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Kobe No. 2 POW Camp, Purple Heart Medal
Swann, Alton R.	CPL	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; Clark Field; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Swenson, Ralph L.	PVT	B	Died, 1330, 12/13/1942, Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2, beriberi
Swierjewski, John	PVT	B	Medical Corps assigned to Company B from Headquarters Company; O'Donnell, hospitalized; left for Japan, 3/5/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Syzmanik, Stanley	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; KIA, <i>Arisan Maru</i> to Japan, 10/24/1944
Tallmadge, George	CPL	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Nissyo Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944; Yokohama
Thomas, Clifford W.	PVT	C	O'Donnell POW Camp, died, 5/22/1942, malaria and dysentery
Thomas, Elmer A.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
Thomas, William B.	1LT	Bn Staff	Mountain detail, Bontoc; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Tayabas; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945
Thomashosky, John	PVT	C	Died, 5/4/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria
Thompson, Walter M.	PFC	HQS	Mountain detail; died, Baguio, June, 1942, Leggett & Ingersoll; alt: KIA, 1/2/1946 [sic], USAFFE
Thompson, William N.	PVT	HQS	Crystal Force Expedition, September–October, 1941
Thurston, Eugene M.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, as of 11/5/1942; Las Pinas; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
Toback, Charles A.	PVT	C	Died, mountain detail, Camp John, Baguio, 4/17/1942, malaria buried at the school, Camp John Hay, Baguio
Toka, Andrew, Jr. (alt: Tonka - USAFFE)	PVT	A	Cabanatuan; <i>Nagato Maru</i> to Japan, 11/7/1942
Tolson, Charles E., Jr.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan
Tora, Michael	PVT	HQS	Detached Service in Mindanao, as of 12/1/1941; Davao; KIA, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> , 9/7/1944 en route to Japan
Traino, Michael X.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; Las Pinas; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944; Purple Heart Medal

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Trent, James W.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, hospitalized as of 11/5/1942; Camp 8, Tokyo (Ashio)
Trifilo, Santo S.	2LT		Originally Company B; commissioned and transferred to 71st Engineers (PA); Camp 8, Ashio, Tokyo, as of 8/15/1944; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Storm King</i> , 10/18/1945
Tripp, Zebb, Jr.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Pasay; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Trippe, Edward E.	CPL	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; KIA, 10/24/1945, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal (alt: hell ship <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan)
Trunk, Adam J.	PFC	HQS	Died, Camp O'Donnell - Ingersoll (alt: died, 0700, 6/27/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria, ADBC)
Turner, Glenn C.	MSGT	C	Late addition to the 809th EC (later Company C); mentioned only in assignment orders and not in any formal roster
Turturro, Augustine T.	CPL	HQS	Died, 8/21/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp
Tweedy, Raymond W.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, hospitalized, as of 11/5/1942; died, 1/8/1943, Kloecker
Urabick, George	PVT	C	Originally listed as missing; Bilibid; Died, 12/15/1944, <i>Oryoku Maru</i>
Vaccaro, Albert A.	CPL	B	Died, 5/17/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, malaria
Van Orden, William	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, as of 11/5/1942; Hirohata, liberated 9/4/1945
Vater, Joseph	PVT	A	WIA, Corregidor, 5/3/1942; Cabanatuan, as of 11/5/1942; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Vernon, Sidney	CAPT	Bn Staff	Medical Corps, assigned to battalion headquarters and later Company B; Cabanatuan; <i>Nissy Maru</i> to Japan, 7/17/1944
Vladish, Peter (alt: Vladich)	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, outside detail, as of 10/11/1942; Clark Field; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Vogel, Herbert	PFC	HQS	Died, 2100 hours, 7/19/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery
Volney, Glenn	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Clyde Maru</i> to Japan, 7/23/1944
Voorhies, Rex C., Jr.	SGT	C	Died, 1000, 7/23/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery
Voyzey, Steven W., Jr.	PVT	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943; Hirohata
Wagenblast, Francis Leo, Jr.	PFC	A	Outside detail, Bilibid Prison, Manila; <i>Lima Maru</i> to Formosa, 9/20/1942
Walker, George W.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan; Nielson Field; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/1/1944; died 1/24/1945; buried at sea; listed as missing
Ward, Donald R.	PVT	HQS	Died, 2100 hours, 11/29/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria
Ward, Karl H.	PVT	B	Died, 1730 hours, 8/16/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria (alt: 8/10/1942)
Warfield, Edwin W.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Canadian Inventor</i> to Japan, 7/4/1944
Warner, Albert L.	SGT	C	Died, 5/21/1942, Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3 (alt: 8/10/1942)
Warner, Harold P.	PVT	HQS	Died, 5/21/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, dysentery and malaria (alt: 5/9/1942)



Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Wasilewski , Walter J.	CPL	A	Medical Corp attached to Company A; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; to Japan, November, 1944 (also documented as Wafilewski in original orders)
Weaver, Loyal R.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Welch, John	PFC	B	Medical Corps attached to Company B; Died, 0830, 10/15/1942, Cabanatuan, dysentery
Wheeler, William W.	PFC	C	Died, April, 1942, mountain detail, Baguio, buried at Camp John Hay
Whelchel, Charles A.	PFC	C	Died mountain detail 6/12/1942, and buried at Camp John Hay, Baguio; (alt: hospitalized at Cabanatuan,; Died 0830, 10/15/1942, dysentery)
Whitehurst, Matthew S.	MSGT	HQS	Tarlac, 6/1/1942; <i>Nagara Maru</i> to Formosa, 8/11/1942; liberated at Mukden; listed as a 1st SGT
Williams, Albert S.	PVT	A	Attached to Company A from Company B; Mountain detail; died, Bontoc, disease, 12/19/1944, USAFFE
Williams, Dumont G.	1LT	C	Died, 2300, 8/26/1942, Cabanatuan, malaria and beriberi (alt: 9/26/1942)
Williams, Lawrence L.	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, left on outside detail; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Williams, Lawrence M.	PFC	A	KIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma Point, Bataan
Wilson, Andrew J., Jr.	PVT	C	Listed as missing; died, 6/1/1942
Wilson, Harold W.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp1, Group 1; <i>Shinyo Maru</i> to Japan; survived sinking, 9/7/1944
Wilson, Lloyd G. "Blac"	PFC	C	Died, mountain detail, Baguio, 6/1/1942, buried at Army-Navy Club, Baguio

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Wilson, Richard W.	PFC	B	Medical Corps attached to Company B from Headquarters Company; O'Donnell, hospitalized; Mountain detail; Died 6/9/1942, Baguio, dysentery
Windle, Frank A.	PVT	A	Cabanatuan, Camp 3; Davao; <i>Lima Maru</i> to Formosa, 9/18/1942
Winschuh, John H.	1LT	B	Replaced Ingersoll as CO, Company B; WIA, 4/8/1942, KP 147, Bataan; Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3 until late 1942; Davao; <i>Oryoku Maru</i> to Japan, 12/13/1944; Died on the <i>Enoura Maru</i> , 1/9/1945
Witman, Victor W.	2LT		Originally a sergeant in Company B; commissioned and transferred to 71st Engineer Battalion (PA); Rokuroshi POW Camp, Honshu, Japan
Witmer, Edward C.	SGT	B	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; liberated from Cabanatuan in "The Great Raid," 1/30/1945
Wonneman, George J.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, hospitalized; outside detail, Las Pinas; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943
Woody, Glenn W.	PFC	B	Died, 6/15/1942, Cabanatuan
Wooley, Forrest E.	SGT	A	Attached to Company A; WIA, Kindley Field, bombing, 3/24/1942; Cabanatuan; <i>Hokusen Maru</i> to Japan, 10/8/1944; died, 8/15/1945 (alt: 8/19/1944), beriberi and fractured leg
Wuest, Wilfred C.	PFC	B	O'Donnell, hospitalized; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Wuttke, William C.	PVT	B	O'Donnell POW Camp; Cabanatuan; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Japan, 10/8/1942; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Wyatt, John H.	PFC	C	Died, 12/1/1942, Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, dysentery after hospitalization; alt. beaten to death on Death March, according to David Pease
Yager, Lester Clarence, Jr.	PVT	A	Japan
Yancik, John	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, as of 10/5/1942, left on outside detail; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden; returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945; died, October, 1945
Yarmalovicz, Tony	SGT	C	Cabanatuan, died, 1300 hours, 7/24/1942, malaria, ADBC; malaria; alt: Cabanatuan, dysentery, Leggett/Ingersoll
Yasko, Walter	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 2; Japan
Yee, Deck	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 1; KIA, <i>Oryoku Maru</i> , 12/15/1944, en route to Japan
Yochum, Elmer	PFC	A	WIA, Orani, Bataan, 1/1/1941; KIA, 1/26/1942, Agloloma Point, Bataan
Yohn, Leonard	PFC	A	Cabanatuan, Las Pinas; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
York, James H.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, hospitalized; Liberated from Cabanatuan in "The Great Raid," 1/30/1945
York, William E.	PFC	B	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3, hospitalized; <i>Noto Maru</i> to Japan, 8/25/1944
Young, Charles	TSGT	HQS	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; <i>Tottori Maru</i> to Korea, 10/8/1942; Mukden
Young, George	SGT	B	Cabanatuan; outside detail, as of 10/5/1942; Davao; KIA, <i>Shinyo Maru</i> , 9/7/1944
Young, Henry L.	PVT	HQS	Cabanatuan, left for outside detail, possibly to Bataan, 10/5/1942; KIA 10/24/1944 <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal

Name	Rank	Company	Comments
Yuranko, Joseph K.	PFC	HQS	Medical Corps attached to Headquarters Company; died, 2100 hours, 11/10/1942, after hospitalization, Cabanatuan, malaria (documented as Yurando in original orders)
Zbikowski, Edmund P	CAPT	A	Commander, Company A; KIA, 4/2/1942, Corregidor, shell fragment
Ziefle, William J.	PVT	C	Cabanatuan, Camp 1, Group 3; Clark Field; KIA, 10/24/1944, <i>Arisan Maru</i> en route to Japan; Purple Heart Medal
Zieja, Teddy M.	PVT	HQS	Medical Corps attached to Headquarters Company; died, 5/31/1942, O'Donnell POW Camp, dysentery
Zimpfer, Fred W.	PVT	A	Medical Corps assigned to Company A; KIA, 12/15/1944, <i>Oryoku Maru</i> ; posthumous award of Silver Star Medal for bravery on Corregidor, 3/24/1942
Zitone, Forrest E.	PVT	A	Assigned to Company A and later Company B; KIA, <i>Arisan Maru</i> , 10/24/1944; Purple Heart Medal
Zubay, John M.	PFC	HQS	Cabanatuan; <i>Taga Maru</i> to Japan, 9/20/1943; Yokohama, Osaka POW Camp 12 (Hirohata); returned to San Francisco on the <i>Simon Bolivar</i> , 10/21/1945

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## Appendix B

### Recommendation for Promotion of Enlisted Personnel

30 January 1946

Subject: Recommendation for promotion of enlisted personnel

Following statement is made by Major William B. Thomas, CE, 308 South Green St., Huntsville, Alabama[,] in explanation of memorandum to The Adjutant General, subject: Recommendation for promotion of enlisted men, dated 25 September 1945, signed by H. H. Stickney, Colonel, CE, USA, Engineer, USFIP:

The attached list of recommended promotions of enlisted men of the 803rd Engineer Battalion, AVN, SEP, was compiled by Capt. James L. Leggett, Bn. Adj., Capt. Robert Montgomery, and the undersigned upon return to military control 1 October 1945 from memory and partial records. The list represents a true and complete list of the recommended promotions, except for Company "C",[sic] to the best of my knowledge and belief. The recommendations were forwarded to Hq., USFIP[,] in March[,] 1942, and were based on meritorious service and superior performance of duties in the construction of airfields and road maintenance. In the execution of this work, the recommended men worked long hours on exceedingly short rations.

The 803rd Engineer Bn. was awarded a unit citation in January[,] 1942[,] by General Mac Arthur for the construction of airfield under numerous[,] hazardous air bombing attacks. The men on the attached list recommended for promotion and assignment to the Engineer Hq. to be activated on Mindanao were the outstanding men of the 803rd Engineer Bn.

William B. Thomas, Major, CE  
(handwritten) Engineer Officer  
803rd Engr Bn (AVN) (SEP)  
Sept 1941–9 April 1942

## RECOMMENDED PROMOTIONS

### HQ. CO.

Weaver, Loyal R.	Pvt to Pfc
Zubay, John M.	Pfc to Sgt
Jackson, Dee S.	Corp to Sgt
Seifert, Harry W.	Pfc to Corp
Gragel, Tony	Pvt to Pfc
Kuhn, Virgil C.*	S/Sgt to T/Sgt
Perrell, Raymond C.	Pvt To Corp

### CO. A

Barber, Raymond C.	Sgt to S/Sgt
Densmore, Ray A.	Sgt to S/Sgt
Hayman, Ralph M.	Sgt to S/Sgt
Hurwitz, Max	Sgt to S/Sgt
Hendricks, Carl	Sgt to S/Sgt
Kruchowsky, Steve	Sgt to S/Sgt
Smith, Donald	Sgt to S/Sgt
Gagnet, Ruppert T.	Corp to Sgt
Gonzalves, Gordon	Corp to Sgt
Ladd, Donald F.	Corp to Sgt
Palumbo, Angelo	Corp to Sgt
Schatz, George A.	Corp to Sgt
Swann, Alton R.	Corp to Sgt
Agostinelli, Charles	Pfc to Corp
Byers, Paul	Pfc to Corp
Carlson, V.M.	Pfc to Corp
Daughtery, Daniel J.	Pfc to Corp
DiNobile, Daniel	Pfc to Corp
Fish, Robert L.	Pfc to Corp
Heuton, Wilbur E.	Pfc to Corp
Kiernan, Gerald M.	Pfc to Corp
Perona, John	Pfc to Corp
Pilson, William H.	Pfc to Corp
Rouse, Paul	Pfc to Corp
Vater, Joe	Pfc to Corp

Aguilina, Benny	Pvt to Pfc
Brown, William L.	Pvt to Pfc
Cappel, Felman E.	Pvt to Pfc
Choate, John O., Jr.	Pvt to Pfc
Clymer, Milton I.	Pvt to Pfc
Evans, David M.	Pvt to Pfc
Fritzel, Joe L.	Pvt to Pfc
Gozzo, Joe	Pvt to Pfc
Grecco, Anthony J.	Pvt to Pfc
McDonald, Robert J.	Pvt to Pfc
McEven, Alden	Pvt to Pfc
Schnitzer, A.J.	Pvt to Pfc
Stevens, Benjamin F.	Pvt to Pfc
Stewart, Alvin E.	Pvt to Pfc
Stow, James K.	Pvt to Pfc
Yager, Lester	Pvt (spec 5cl) to Pfc
Windle, Fran[k] A.	Pvt to Pfc

## RECOMMENDATIONS EXTRAORDINARY

### CO. A

Corp Gagnet to W. O.\*\* w/USFIP on D. S.\*\*\*

Sgt Hendricks to Comm[issioned] Officer in combat org[anization].

Sgt Hayman to M/Sgt on constr[uction] and demol[ition] of tunnels.

S/Sgt Marvin Shearwood, to T/Sgt on const[ruction].

Corp Palumbo to S/Sgt on constr[uction].

Pfc Agostinelli to Sgt in surveying & mapping.

Pfc Francis L. Wagonblast, to Sgt in surveying & mapping.

Pvt Evans to T/Sgt in mapping.

### CO. B

Snodgrass, Clifton O.

1st Sgt to W.O.\*\*

Huddle, David

S/Sgt to W.O.\*\*

Rabinowitz, Harold J.

S/Sgt to M/Sgt

Rorke, Edward

Sgt to 2nd Lt\*\*\*\*



Larsen, Christian	Sgt to T/Sgt
Spampanato, Vincent	Sgt to T/Sgt
Witmer, Edward C.	Sgt to 2nd Lt
Kloecker, Paul A.	Sgt to 1st Sgt
Parente, James	Sgt to S/Sgt
Dzuibozynski, John T.	Corp to Sgt

\*Virgil F. Kuhn, according to other 803rd rosters.

\*\*Warrant officer

\*\*\**Detached* service

\*\*\*\**Second* lieutenant

Bn=Battalion

CO = Company

HQ CO = Headquarters Company

(NARA RG407, Box 1369).

## Abbreviations

AA	Antiaircraft
AAF	Army Air Forces
ABDA	American-British-Dutch-Australian
ABDACOM	American-British-Dutch-Australian Command
ACNL	Air Corps News Letter
ACoS	Assistant chief of staff
ADB	American-Dutch-British
ADBC	American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor, Inc.
AF	Air Force
AFB	Air Force Base
AFCC	Air Force Combat Command
AFHRA	Air Force Historical Research Agency
AFR	Air Force Reserves
AG&P	Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
AGO	Adjutant General's Office
ATS	Army Transport Service
ATSS	Army Transport Service Ship
AUS	Army of the US
AVN	Aviation
AWOL	Absent without leave
AWPD	Air War Plans Division
Bn	Battalion
BAR	Browning automatic rifle
BPW	Bureau of Public Works
CA	Coast artillery
CAA	Civil Aeronautics Administration
CAC	Coast Artillery Corps
CCC	Civilian Conservation Corps

CG	Commanding general
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNO	Chief of naval operations
CO	Commanding officer
CoE	Chief of Engineers
COE	Corps of Engineers
CoS	Chief of staff
CP	Command post
CPNAB	Contractors, Pacific Naval Air Bases
DAVPECOL	Davao Penal Colony
DDE	Dwight D. Eisenhower Library and Museum
DET	Detachment
DSC	Distinguished Service Cross
EAD	Extended active duty
EAUTC	Engineer aviation unit training center
EB	Engineer Battalion
EC	Engineer Company
ER	Engineer Regiment
ERTC	Engineer Replacement Training Centers
E-W	East-West
FEAF	Far East Air Force
FY	Fiscal year
GHQ	General Headquarters
GMC	General Motors Company
GPF	Grand Puissance Filloux
HPD	Headquarters of the Philippine Division
HQ	Headquarters
IG	Inspector general
JRAC	Joint Rapid Airfield Construction
KIA	Killed in action
KP	Kitchen Police

KP	Kilometer post
MERALCO	Manilla Electric Company
MFR	Memo for the record
MIA	Missing in action
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLR	Main line of resistance
MMA	MacArthur Memorial Archives
MP	Military police
MRR	Manila Railroad
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NEAD	Northeast Air District
NE-SW	Northeast-Southwest
NLF	North Luzon Force
N-S	North-South
NWAD	Northwest Air District
NW-SE	Northwest-Southeast
NYC	New York City
OCE	Office of the Chief Engineer
ODE	Office of the department engineer
OJT	On the job training
OSCE	Office of the Service Command engineer
PA	Philippine Army
PACR	Provisional Air Corps Regiment
PASUMIL	Pampanga Sugar Mill
PC	Philippine Constabulary
PFC	Private first class
POL	Petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POW	Prisoner of war
PRIME BEEF	Air Force Base Engineer Emergency Force
PS	Philippine Scouts

PT	Patrol torpedo
PX	Post exchange
R-5	Rainbow 5
RA	Regular Army
RBP	Reserve Battle Position
RCA	Radio Corporation of America
RED HORSE	Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers
RG	Record Group
ROTC	Reserve officer training corps
SCARWAF	Special Category Army Reassigned with Air Force
SEAD	Southeast Air District
SE-NW	Southeast-Northwest
SEP	Separate
SFPE	San Francisco Port of Embarkation
SLF	South Luzon Force
S-N	South-North
SPM	Self-propelled mount
SWAD	Southwest Air District
TBD	To be determined
TDY	Temporary duty
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TSGT	Tech Sergeant
UK	United Kingdom
UKY	University of Kentucky
US	United States
USAAF	United States Army Air Forces
USAFFE	US Army Forces in the Far East
USAT	US Army Transport
USCGC	US Coast Guard Cutter

USFIP	US Forces in the Philippines
USNR	US Navy Reserve
USS	United States Ship
WIA	Wounded in Action
WPD	War plans division
WPO-3	War Plan Orange-3
WW	World War
XO	Executive officer



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Hastily organized and minimally trained, the 803rd Engineer Battalion was thrown into the breach in late 1941, as part of a stopgap effort to deter Japan's expansion in the Pacific. Tasked with building airfields near the front lines for advancing armies, the 803rd expanded and developed fixed air bases in the Philippines only to witness the Far East Air Force's destruction on 8 December 1941. The 803rd moved on to new responsibilities maintaining a primitive infrastructure essential for logistics support and communications and later fought as infantrymen, enduring barbaric treatment on the Bataan Death March, on death ships, and in prisoner of war camps.

*Good Outfit* highlights the few successes and many difficulties in establishing and maintaining expeditionary airfields in a contested environment with limited resources, while demonstrating the flexibility, courage, and fortitude of an earlier generation of airmen. It provides a cautionary tale for those planning future air concepts, capabilities, infrastructure, and operations.



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