

MISSION ESSENTIAL

MISSION ESSENTIAL

**CIVILIAN AIRMEN AND
THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**

Anthony Christopher Cain


gatekeeper press[™]
Tampa, Florida

Ira C. Eaker Center for Leadership Development, Maxwell Air Force Base

Mission Essential: Civilian Airmen and the United States Air Force

Copyright © 2024 by Dr. Anthony C. Cain, PhD

All rights reserved. Neither this book, nor any parts within it may be sold or reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the author. The only exception is by a reviewer, who may quote short excerpts in a review.

Copyright for the image: [iStockphoto.com/holwichaikawee](https://www.istockphoto.com/holwichaikawee) (paratroop door)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2024930135

ISBN (paperback): 9781662944147

eISBN: 9781662944154

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, the Air Education and Training Command, the Air University, or any other US government agency.

*Dedicated to the thousands of Civilian Airmen
who are essential to helping the Air Force fly, fight,
and win.*

Today's Air Force, and its assumed dominance, was shaped by highly innovative and courageous Airmen throughout our storied history. Seeing the need for change, they paved the way for the many successes we have achieved. We can do it again. If we are bold enough, we can shape our future proactively vice reactively after experiencing catastrophic loss and potential defeat. To do so, we must accelerate change now, while we have a unique—but limited—window of opportunity.

General Charles Q. Brown, Jr.
22d US Air Force Chief of Staff

[What all scientific revolutions are about...] Each of them necessitated the community's rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it. Each produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or as a legitimate problem-solution. And each transformed the scientific imagination in ways that we shall ultimately need to describe as a transformation of the world within which scientific work was done. Such changes, together with the controversies that almost always accompany them, are the defining characteristics of scientific revolutions.

Thomas S. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

CONTENTS

| | |
|---|----|
| Foreword. | .1 |
| About the Author | .4 |
| Preface | .5 |
| Acknowledgments | .7 |
| Chapter 1 – An Introduction to Civil Servants in Military Institutions. | 11 |
| States and Their Bureaucracies | 11 |
| The Historical Evolution of Bureaucracies | 19 |
| China | 20 |
| France | 24 |
| Great Britain | 31 |
| Insights on Foreign Civil Services | 37 |
| Post-WWII National Security and the Rise of the Military-Industrial Complex. | 39 |
| Understanding Civilian Airmen in the Context of the Air Force Mission | 41 |
| Questions for Discussion | 43 |
| Chapter 2 – From the Early Days of the Republic to 1945 | 45 |
| The Evolution of National Security Policy in the United States: From Independence Until World War II | 47 |
| Early U.S. Foreign Policy: Isolationism and the Monroe Doctrine | 47 |
| U.S. Expansion and Evolving Military Doctrine in the 19 th Century | 50 |
| The United States and World War I: Departure from Isolationism | 54 |
| Wilson’s Diplomatic Challenges and America’s Interwar Shift | 59 |
| The Eve of World War II | 62 |
| America’s Military Transformation and Strategic Planning for World War II. | 65 |
| Conclusion | 78 |
| Questions for Discussion | 79 |
| Chapter 3: National Security Following World War II | 81 |

Beginning the Relationship—Recognition and Initial Interchanges. . . 85

Losing the Peace—Forging the Cold War Order 99

Organizing for Defense—The National Security Act of 1947
and Beyond. 112

Conclusion 134

Questions for Discussion 137

Chapter 4: Legal Foundations for Civil Service. 139

 The Spoils System and the Passage of the Pendleton Act 142

 The Classification Act of 1949 148

 Civilian Airmen and Their Impact on Air Force Missions 160

 The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. 164

 The National Security Personnel System 174

 Conclusion 183

 Questions for Discussion 186

Chapter 5: Regulatory Guidance for Civilian Airmen 189

 The Essential Role of Civilian Airmen in the US Air Force 194

 Cold War Concerns over Employee Loyalty and Security 209

 Labor Relations 224

 Conclusion 242

 Questions for Discussion 245

Chapter 6: Civilian Airmen and National Security in the 21st Century . . 247

 Civilian Airmen and National Security 249

 Civilian Airmen and Professional Development 253

 Civilian Airmen and Leadership 260

 Conclusion 262

 Questions for Discussion 263

Sources 265

Index 283



FOREWORD

One of the things I love most about the Air Force is our rich tradition of valuing education and professional development. For more than 20 years, Department of Air Force political, civilian, and military leaders have emphasized leadership development for our civilian employees. This is not common in many other federal agencies and is a true jewel of what it means to be an Airman—and now a Guardian. Commitment to development reflects a realization that building a strong warfighter corps including officers and enlisted Airmen, Civilian Airmen, and Guardians is necessary but not sufficient in terms of ensuring that the Air Force is prepared for future national security challenges. Studying the profession of arms is equally important as tactical and operational knowledge and proficiency.

With a lot of help from a lot of people, our Air Force implemented the continuum of learning for Civilian Airmen, which is designed to support educational pursuits, to expand critical systems thinking skills, written and oral communication abilities, and to invest in the future of our employees by improving job performance and increasing opportunities for career progression and retention. In 2021, we celebrated the culmination of years of effort when we graduated the first cohort of Civilian Airmen in our Civilian Associate Degree Program. This program, combined with our other education and training programs, prepares our Civilian Airmen to contribute in the myriad ways that help our Air Force remain dominant in air, space, and cyberspace.

In these pages, Dr. Chris Cain provides part of the historical context within which our Civilian Airmen serve. He argues persuasively that our Civilian Airmen make essential contributions to our national defense and to the success of our Air Force. Our officer and enlisted

education programs provide periodic opportunities for Airmen to learn about airpower, the institutional development of the Air Force, and to prepare them for thinking about solutions to tactical, operational, and strategic problems that are just over the horizon. By gaining an appreciation for how Civilian Airmen fit into this overall institutional framework, this book can begin to equip our civilians with the same kinds of intellectual frameworks that their uniformed counterparts rely on for professional development.

Civilian Airmen comprise approximately one-third of our Air Force. Their service, skills, insights, and contributions are essential to innovation, readiness, and mission effectiveness. I encourage civilian and military Airmen alike to refer to the information in this book as another lens through which to view the contributions of our Total Force. As we move toward the future, our Air and Space Force will rely on the right mix of military and civilian leaders to confront and overcome the national security challenges that await us. Knowing our history, building on the successes of the past, and avoiding pitfalls that complicate our contributions to national defense are vital to ensuring those contributions are essential to the mission. I trust that you will find such insights in this book.

Finally, I know that Dr. Cain would agree with me that this is far from the final word on the contribution of our Civilian Airmen. I challenge readers of this volume to continue thinking, researching, and writing about the potential for our Civilian Airmen to transform our Air Force. As our former Chief of Staff General Charles Q. Brown Jr. wrote, we face unprecedented challenges from peer and non-peer competitors alike. We have only one option if we are to overcome those challenges: “Accelerate Change, or Lose.” As Gen. Brown wrote, Civilian Airmen must “be multi-capable and adaptable team builders, as well as innovative and courageous problem-solvers, and demonstrate value in the diversity of thought, ingenuity, and initiative. We must develop

leaders with the appropriate tools to create and sustain an environment in which all Airmen can reach their full potential, valuing the many aspects of diversity within our Air Force. Airmen who do not or cannot reflect these and the related attributes we value fall short of being the future Air Force leaders we require.” Study these pages and take up the challenge of creating the civilian workforce our nation and our Air Force requires.

Frank Shifflett, Colonel, USAF
Commander, Ira C. Eaker Center for Leadership Development
Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Chris Cain served for 38 years on active duty and as a Department of the Air Force Civilian. He earned his commission through Officer Training School in 1981 and served as a B-52 Radar Navigator for 12 years. During this time, he logged 3,200 flying hours, including more than 100 combat hours during Operation Desert Storm. He earned master's degrees from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, The Ohio State University, and Air War College. He completed his PhD in history at The Ohio State University in 2000. He was a Distinguished Graduate of the Air Command and Staff College resident program and subsequently served there as a faculty member, course director, and Dean of Education. He is also a graduate of the Squadron Officer School and Air War College resident and non-resident programs. Dr. Cain was the editor-in-chief of *Air and Space Power Journal* and the founding editor-in-chief of *Strategic Studies Quarterly*. He is the author of *The Forgotten Air Force: The French Air Force and Air Doctrine in the 1930s* (Smithsonian Institute Press, 2002), book chapters, and articles in peer-reviewed journals on issues dealing with military history, airpower, professional military education, effects-based operations, and regional threats from weapons of mass destruction. He culminated his career in federal service as Air University's Chief of Academic Affairs.



PREFACE

The Ira C. Eaker Center for Leadership Development's mission is to *advance our warfighters' capacity for effective action through functionally aligned, relevant, and responsive education, training, research, and advisement*. Since 2016, Eaker Center faculty and staff have applied their talents to develop an associate degree program aimed at our Civilian Airmen. In 2023, senior Air Force leaders expanded the concept by creating the Civilian Leadership Development School with responsibility for the Civilian Associate Degree Program and other force development initiatives aimed solely at our Civilian Airmen. The National Defense Strategy emphasizes building a more lethal, modern, agile force. In today's complex security environment that requires a motivated, diverse, and highly skilled civilian force to complement our uniformed Airmen, Civilian Airmen have careers that span 20–30 years, and they provide continuity for our Air and Space Forces that rely on uniformed Airmen who are ready to deploy and fight at a moment's notice. Our experiences since the 1990s have shown the value that our Civilian Airmen contribute to every aspect of the mission of our Air and Space Forces. Now Air University, under the direction of our senior leaders, is fielding a catalog of developmental education programs, including degree options, to prepare our Civilian Airmen for greater leadership roles and responsibilities.

Dr. Chris Cain's book lays a foundation for our Civilian Airmen to begin understanding how their service has contributed to our larger national security mission. Sometimes we in the military can become so focused on the details of technologies, tactics, and operations that we look past the potential and the contribution of our Civilian Airmen. This book begins the process of placing our Civilian Airmen in their

proper context as essential contributors to the Air and Space Forces and to our national security. As Dr. Cain explains in these pages, the bipolar Great Power Competition of the Cold War era lent a sense of urgency to our national defense establishment. Our military services are leaner today than they were during the Cold War. But they are also agile, lethal, and innovative. Our Civilian Airmen are essential contributors to the characteristics that our citizens have come to rely on for Air, Space, and Cyberspace dominance.

Every generation has its challenges. The present security challenges for our country include rapid technological change, the blurring of lines between state actors, criminal organizations, and international terrorists, a chaotic international economic system, the potential for domestic threats, and the uncertainty that any of these challenges could spawn regional and global conflicts. In every aspect of this complex security landscape air, space, and cyber power will provide essential capabilities to ensure mission effectiveness and to guarantee our national security. That means our Civilian Airmen are just as essential to mission effectiveness as they have been since the inception of airpower.

I challenge all Airmen who read these pages to develop a greater understanding of all our personnel components, active duty, Guard, Reserve, and particularly our Civilian Airmen. To ensure Civilian Airmen remain “mission essential,” they must acquire the leadership, management, and thinking skills required to confront the looming threats to our nation. Use the knowledge, skills, and abilities gained through training, education, and experience to develop leaders ready to contribute our Air and Space Forces’ unparalleled tradition of superiority. Together we will continue to serve and to confront those who would seek to harm our great nation, our partners, and our allies.

Barry C. Waite

Director, Civilian Leadership Development School
Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book began as a product of Mr. Barry Waite's fertile imagination. Barry is the Director of the Civilian Leadership Development School at the Ira C. Eaker Center for Leadership Development, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. We had worked together to launch the Civilian Associate Degree Program (CADP) several years ago and Barry took a leap of faith to give me the opportunity to work on this project. Barry described a "textbook" for Civilian Airmen enrolled in the CADP. He wanted something that would give Civilian Airmen their own history placed alongside the context of the Air Force. He connected me with Dr. Andrew Bowens, the CADP Program Coordinator—who, like Barry, is a never-ending fountain of ideas. Both Andrew and Barry gave me wide latitude in how to conceive and execute the project and provided loads of encouragement along the way. In airpower terms, they provided the target description and briefed the route they wanted me to fly. Any deviations from that plan remain my responsibility.

Dr. Vera McKethan, Lead Instructional System Designer (ISD) and Instructor at CADP, provided sage advice and encouragement as I made the transition from Civilian Airman, to Retired Civil Servant, to Contract Author and ISD team member. Vera and I had worked closely on AF Force Development projects earlier in our careers and I appreciated the opportunity to connect with her again on this project.

I doubt that I could have written a book such as this without long and excellent experiences with many Civilian Airmen. During my 38 years of service I have seen our civilians go above and beyond to support their unit missions. As a group, they take their oaths to support and defend the Constitution seriously, they see themselves as contributing to our national security, and they go the extra mile to support our uniformed

Airmen as they guard the nation. It has been my honor and pleasure to serve alongside some of the finest people in our nation. They truly exhibit the Air Force's Core Values of Integrity, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do.

One would think that writing a book during a pandemic would have certain advantages—and it did. There were fewer distractions, less noise, more time to think and read. But at some point, the writing had to be done. To accomplish a project such as this one requires accessing sources; sources require moving from the isolation of quarantine to public spaces such as libraries and archives. Fortunately, Dr. Mehmed Ali and his outstanding team at the Air University Library had thought through the myriad issues of keeping students, faculty, staff, and researchers safe. By the time the AU Library opened again, the resources available there in person were as accessible as the ever-impressive online resources provided by the "Air Force's Research Information Center." Ms. Alisha Myles and her staff—especially the special collections team Alexandra Aldridge, Ron Dial, and Thomas Simpson—provided invaluable assistance in accessing the vast collection of Army, Army Air Service, and Air Force Regulations and Instructions dating to the 1920s. Anyone who has embarked on a research project like this one knows the value of Interlibrary Loan (ILL) Services, and the Air University Library's ILL team is superb.

Any author who has subjected their family to all of the symptoms of writing a book acknowledges the love and patience spouses and children contribute to such projects. Only authors know that such acknowledgments are not clichés. In my case, my wife of more than 40 years, Mechial, was her usual outstanding self throughout the months it took to complete the project. She endured many boring (I'm sure) monologues on laws, regulations, and other esoterica related to the history of Civilian Airmen while we walked or biked. She, somehow, never doubted that I would complete the project or that it would

somehow “hit the target.” She has my love and my gratitude, always. The adventure continues.



CHAPTER 1 – AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL SERVANTS IN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS

States and Their Bureaucracies

One of the most important developments since the end of World War II has been the evolution of specialized organizational cultures aimed at planning, operating, managing, and overseeing the business of government. Bureaucracies have existed in many forms since ancient times; however, the post-World War II development of civil service bureaucracies accompanied the strengthening of states as the dominant actors in the international arena. In parallel with the trend that strengthened the primacy of the state, international institutions emerged to provide mechanisms for organizing international economic, legal, social, and security interactions. As the post-war international system emerged, countries with the most efficient, well-organized, and effective bureaucracies—organized along functional lines—were best positioned to operate well with other states and with global and regional institutions concerning nearly every aspect of international relations. Conversely, states with corrupt or poorly functioning bureaucratic organizations were rarely able to serve their citizens or promote their interests effectively vis-à-vis other states in the international system.

Studies of civil servants have focused on executive levels of government while ignoring the personnel and operations of specialized bureaucracies that comprise most of the workforce. There are good reasons for this; often, senior executives help formulate and direct the execution of strategic-level policies. A 1953 study of senior civil

servants in the United States recognized the political roles of senior executives. The author observed, “Political views usually count in such appointments... The politics are more likely to be relevant as a necessary condition of doing one’s job properly, given the current aims of the department and the current attitudes of Congress and other influential groups.”¹ Nearly two decades later, a study of senior European civil servants noted, “At the top level, a civil servant must have both political sensitivity and technical skills... However competent he [sic] may be in his field, if he is mistaken about the political opportuneness of a given decision, he will finally be considered, from a political point of view as incompetent.”² Such senior civil servants create bridges between political leaders and government mechanisms that implement political decisions. Senior leaders rely, however, on the work done by those in their organizations. The civil servants who make up the large majority of the staffs of government departments draft policies, position papers, conduct research, and recommend options for senior leaders to consider. At lower organizational levels, civil service members perform both staff and technical tasks that implement higher-level policy decisions. This partnership between senior, staff, and technical career civil servants provides continuity and consistency in the business of government.

Understanding how elements of the bureaucracies that comprise US national security institutions contribute to those institutions’ roles and missions requires comprehending the civilian workforce’s history. “The [Defense] Department’s civilian workforce brings to bear capabilities, expertise, and skills directly impacting DoD’s operational warfighting capabilities ... DoD’s civilians are an essential part of our National Defense Strategy.”³ The Department of Defense employs more than 750,000 civilians and nearly 1.3 million active-duty uniformed

¹ R. N. Spann, “Civil Servants in Washington,” *Political Studies* 1, no. 3 (1953). 231.

² Mattei Dogan, *The Mandarins of Western Europe : The Political Roles of Top Civil Servants* (New York: Sage Publications, 1975), 3.

³ Defense Budget Overview. (Washington, D.C. 2019). 2-8.

personnel.⁴ As the post-WWII defense bureaucracies emerged in the United States, the civilian workforce has evolved from being an ancillary supporting element to making essential contributions to mission success. As this has occurred, the civilian workforce has come to comprise approximately 30% of the total end-strength of each of the traditional military Services (i.e., Army, Air Force, Sea Services), not including the Reserve Component.

What makes this evolution notable is that the civilian workforce contributes to mission effectiveness without replicating or replacing aspects of the military's warfighting mission. The military services have come to rely more on advanced technologies creating opportunities for civilians to contribute directly and indirectly to mission effectiveness. In other words, where appropriate, the civilian workforce has adapted to perform mission essential roles and tasks, thus freeing the military to focus on its warfighting responsibilities. This, in turn, has allowed developed states to rely on smaller, more efficient, and more capable standing professional militaries while phasing out conscript forces.


Rather than focusing on the top tier of Air Force civil servants, this study takes a more holistic approach to focus on how the Service's civilian workforce—Civilian Airmen—have evolved in the context of the Service's national security mission. The focus will be on moving from the federal civil service system's general structure to the operational concerns of the United States Air Force. In doing so, this study does not follow a strictly chronological narrative, nor does it follow a collective biographical approach that seeks to show how individuals or groups of key leaders steered the institution's development. Instead, the civilian workforce appears through the lenses of key themes—parallel tracks of

⁴ The FY2020 Budget Request includes provisions for 758,000 civilians. See: Defense Budget Overview, 2-9. See also, Department of Defense Agency Plans and Reports: Overview. <https://www.performance.gov/defense/#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Defense%20is,is%20the%20nation's%20largest%20employer>. Accessed 21 August 2020.

institutional development that shaped the size, scope, and functioning of Civilian Airmen within the nation's Air Force. The last section of this chapter introduces the themes and lays out a rationale for how they relate to one another in the context of civilian workforce development.

This work capitalizes the term *Civilian Airmen* throughout. The Air Force has struggled over the years to distinguish itself from the other military Services and to identify itself as responsible for missions within the air, space, and cyber domains. The other military Services use traditional terms—*Soldier*, *Sailor*, *Marine*—to identify their personnel. These terms refer to the function individuals perform and to the domains in which they operate. These terms of art also carry an operational connotation; they identify the individual as a member of the profession of arms, as a combatant, and they distinguish combatants from non-combatants. One would not, for example, address a civilian working for the Department of the Army as “Soldier,” which applies specifically to the uniformed combatant.

The Air Force relies on its civilian workforce to do more than provide garrison support for operational forces. Moreover, the Service has defined the term *Airman* in ways beyond those who “fly and fight.” *Airmen* contribute to every aspect of the mission, and the Air Force expects all categories of *Airmen* to adhere to the core values, creed, and ethic of the institution. This is no less true



of *Civilian Airmen* than for officers, enlisted members, active duty, or Reserve Component *Airmen*. As stated above, this book proposes that *Civilian Airmen* have come to contribute to mission accomplishment in myriad direct and indirect ways. They swear an oath to support and defend the Constitution upon entering the civil service that mirrors the oath sworn by officers and enlisted members. They are involved in nearly every aspect of the Air Force's missions, short of direct participation in combat. In every way that matters, they are *Airmen*; consequently, this text treats their roles in the context of their contribution to the Air Force's mission.

Civilian Airmen are civil servants—they are members of the General Schedule (GS), Wage Grade (WG), Senior Executive Service (SES), or Excepted Service.⁵ As members of the Department of the Air Force, they are employees of the government's executive branch. The authorities to perform their jobs derive from US legal statutes through the Executive Branch (i.e., the Office of the President through the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Air Force) and the military chain of command (i.e., the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Major Command Commanders, to unit [wing, group, and squadron] commanders). These authorities are oriented toward accomplishing specific missions to promote national security interests or prosecute national security missions assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense. Viewed in this way, Civilian Airmen function at strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. They are responsible and accountable for planning, managing, and executing tasks related to Air Force roles and missions. Because of their permanence and stability within the personnel structure compared to military members, they

⁵ These personnel categories establish human resources processes and procedures for workforce management. Numerous sources provide statutory authority governing the personnel systems. The Department of Defense and the Department of the Air Force implement the authorities provided in law using specific instructions.

often provide mission continuity and a long-term perspective that neither military nor contractor personnel can contribute.

Military Services concentrate on recruiting and retaining the best possible talent in officer and enlisted components. The Air Force, in particular, seeks to recruit, develop, and retain uniformed Airmen for career-long, professional service because of investments in training and experience. In his classic book, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel P. Huntington argued that only officers were professionals because, of all the various personnel categories, their positions exclusively exercise the legal authority vested in command. They alone make strategic decisions about the priorities of the profession of arms.⁶ Huntington's limited construct has arguably changed as the Services have come to rely on senior enlisted members as crucial members of Service and Major Command staffs. As Civilian Airmen have replaced officers in mid-level and executive positions, the same argument applies. Civilian Airmen now function, and are doing so in increasing numbers, as members of the profession.

The Air Force is only just beginning to view Civilian Airmen as mission essential assets in the same ways that it considers its military personnel. The Service recruits Civilian Airmen based upon position duties and requirements. Organizations fill requirements for civilian positions based on specialized core job requirements within general career fields. Managers within the personnel system must develop grade classification requirements much as an industrial-era factory manager would hire for a production line. The assumption inherent in the government's personnel practices is that classification and hiring procedures produce qualified and competent candidates to perform the tasks specified in the job description. Once hired, training for Civilian

⁶ Samuel P. Huntington. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957), 7-18.

Airmen tends to focus on tasks and skills rather than on developing competencies and professionalism.

Furthermore, training opportunities depend on scarce unit resources allocated annually. The result is an uneven, inconsistent developmental path for Civilian Airmen that tends to constrain them within the narrow confines of career specialty and grade with few mobility or advancement opportunities. In other words, there is no specialized career development pyramid for Civilian Airmen that provides progressive, career-long development, training, and promotion pathways. The Service typically relies on hiring processes to fill vacancies within various grades rather than developing and promoting within the ranks. Fiscal constraints and more than three decades of combat operations since Operation Desert Shield convinced senior Air Force leaders that the industrial approach for developing Airmen was no longer efficient or effective for preparing Airmen to meet current or future challenges.

In 2012, and throughout General Mark A. Welsh III's tenure as Air Force Chief of Staff (2012–2016), the Service pursued a human capital strategy for developing all Airmen. Gen. Welsh reasoned that investments in developing Airmen were equal to if not more important than investments in technology. He directed the Air Staff to develop a *Human Capital Annex to the Air Force Strategic Master Plan*.⁷ The Annex described the Human Capital approach and its intended audience in sweeping terms.

Human capital, as defined by OSD, is "...an inventory of skills, experience, knowledge and capabilities that drives productive labor within an organization's workforce." In larger terms, human capital essentially concerns people and the organization. This document focuses on both:

⁷ Human Capital Annex to the Air Force Strategic Master Plan, (Washington, D.C. 2015).

- People – The Airmen. This includes uniformed and Civilian Airmen from the Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and contractor/contracted workforce.
- Organization – the Air Force. This includes all of our organizations: staffs, centers, Direct Reporting Units (DRUs), MAJCOMs, etc., and units subordinate to these, as well as the components of the Total Force (Regular, Reserve, and Guard).⁸

The overarching goal aimed to provide a diverse, agile, and inclusive force capable of meeting challenges presented by a complex security environment. The text acknowledged Civilian Airmen's contributions along with those of the contractor force. The authors identified six key concentration areas: Attracting and Recruiting; Developing the Force; Talent Management; Retaining Ready, Resilient Airmen and Their Families; Fostering Agile, Inclusive, and Innovative Institutions; and Operating as One Force. The implications for organizations meant that traditional divisions between personnel categories no longer served the Air Force's operational needs. "Future units may consist of a combination of Regular Guard, Reserve, and Civilian Airmen where such collaboration and integration are appropriate."⁹ The Annex outlined six primary objectives and 23 subordinate objectives intended to guide the service toward transforming how it would develop future Airmen.

The human capital approach sought to integrate and balance education, training, and experience to provide the right Airmen with the proper knowledge and capabilities at the right place and time to meet mission requirements. Under this approach, commanders were to emphasize developing Civilian Airmen as part of a holistic human capital strategy. This strategy succeeds to the extent that it will place the Air Force on a path toward a more professional, knowledgeable,

⁸ Ibid, A-2.

⁹ Ibid, A-15 – A-16.

and valued part of the Service's mission.¹⁰ In some ways, it represents an innovative approach to getting the most from its investment in human resources; in other ways, it is consistent with historical patterns for recruiting, developing, and employing civil servants to operate government mechanisms.

Chief of Staff General Charles Q. Brown Jr. placed a more urgent emphasis on the need for Airmen with the talent and courage to pursue change. The resurgence of peer competitors and the effects of decades of irregular warfare, according to Gen. Brown, have weakened the Air Force's ability to ensure victory in a large-scale war against a capable state opponent. He challenged servicemembers to "Accelerate Change or Lose." In Gen. Brown's initial call for change, he concentrated on the need to change technologies, organizations, operational concepts, and doctrine to meet present and future challenges. Empowered Airmen, shrewd leaders, and agile teams are equally important if the Air Force and the United States is to avoid catastrophic failure. Brown wrote, "Our Airmen must be multi-capable and adaptable team leaders, as well as innovative and courageous problem-solvers, and demonstrate value in the diversity of thought, ingenuity, and initiative."¹¹ Thus, there is no more important time for the Air Force to develop Civilian Airmen to lead and to contribute to mission accomplishment. Providing the knowledge of civil service history, legal structures, career paths, and the organizations that contribute to the Air Force's missions is essential to preparing Civilian Airmen for their roles.

The Historical Evolution of Bureaucracies

Governments of all types have recognized the necessity of employing civil servants to ensure the effective operation of state

¹⁰ Mark A. Welsh III, "A Call to the Future: The New Air Force Strategic Framework," *Air and Space Power Journal* 29, no. 3 (2015), <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=OAlsZIoKxfI%3D&portalid=10>. 4.

¹¹ Charles Q. Brown Jr., *Accelerate Change or Lose*, (Washington, D.C. 2020). 6.

agencies. Often viewed with scorn and derision, civil servants, bureaucrats, have provided structure, consistency, and, at times, innovation to make institutions fulfill the purposes for which they were created. The historical trends that are most relevant to how Civilian Airmen function emphasize the recruiting, development, and operation of the civil servant within the society. China, France, and Great Britain stand out for their reliance on professional classes of civil servants. All three societies developed specialized pathways for recruiting talent into the civil service. All three invested civil servants with a high degree of authority and autonomy. Finally, all three societies derived benefits from dedicated, professional, and innovative civil servants while also experiencing the worst possible outcomes when civil servants proved to be self-serving, mired in bureaucratic processes, or lacked the capacity for creativity. A brief overview of the history of Chinese, French, and British civil services will place the Civilian Airman experience in a broader historical context.

China

Perhaps more than any other country or civilization, China is known for its tradition of using bureaucracies to operate the government. Throughout its long history, China's leaders have relied on centralization to administer its vast territory and its equally vast population. Concerns for state security in the face of invaders and rebels combined with social needs in food production, flood management, and cultural development to produce a need for specially trained cadres of administrators known in the west as *mandarins*. Over centuries and many dynasties, the system evolved from one that relied primarily on the hereditary influence of nobles to use centralized examinations to choose the best and brightest candidates for the civil service.¹²As Europeans interacted more

¹² "Timeline of Chinese History," (13 October 2020). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Chinese_history#/media/File:Timeline_of_Chinese_History.jpg.

frequently with China, and especially in the nineteenth century, they developed an impression of the Chinese civil servants as a change-resistant, backward-looking, obstructionist group of bureaucrats. While one could form a similar opinion of any bureaucracy, it was not always the case of China's mandarins because of Chinese culture's characteristics and the practice of competitive examinations.

The Zhou dynasty (1027–221 BC) produced lists of valuable objects, account books, written instructions to subordinates, and royal edicts issued in formal language by trained scribes.¹³ Scribes—indeed nearly all Chinese civil servants throughout history—were not merely functionaries. Their position and success depended on being adept at a wide range of social skills such as painting, calligraphy, music, poetry, and essay writing. Because the government had to be prepared to mobilize for war, scribes in whom the Emperor placed confidence also acquired proficiency with martial skills such as archery and military tactics. Although not formalized as a bureaucracy, these scribes, often members of influential families, filled a vital state need and provided a model upon which to build for succeeding dynasties.

The Qin dynasty emperors (c. 221 BC–220 AD) unified China under the centralized authority of the emperor roughly within the confines of modern-day China by abolishing regional independent kingdoms. “The people were detached from their former allegiance to the individual landowning lords and brought under the direct control of the centralized government. This gave the government access to a manpower potential hitherto unknown both in the army and conscript labor forces.”¹⁴ The emperors relied on bureaucrats to see to the government's needs in the far-flung reaches of the country.

¹³ W. Scott Morton, *China : Its History and Culture*, vol. 3rd ed., 2nd McGraw-Hill pbk. ed (New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 1995). <https://aufric.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=13515&site=ehost-live&scope=site&custid=airuniv>. 22-23.

¹⁴ Morton, *China : Its History and Culture*, 3rd ed., 2nd McGraw-Hill pbk. ed. 46.

While the empire was far from peaceful, the Qin managed to maintain control of the vast territory using a combination of autocratic methods, the mandate of heaven, and the bureaucracy that permeated the society from the court to local levels. The more than 130,000 officials occupied up to twenty ranks that determined their status, potential for promotion, salary, the type of clothing they wore, the type of carriage used for travel, and the types of privileges enjoyed, such as exemption from forced labor and from military service.¹⁵

The Qin dynasty collapsed under the weight of poor leaders and resentment against its strict legalistic stance toward the nobles. The Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) replaced the Qin and lasted four hundred years. “The doctrinaire theories of totalitarian rule and cruelty in their execution which had obtained under Qin were for the most part abandoned by the Han. But the benefits of standardization and centralization which had come with Qin were retained.”¹⁶ This trend toward centralization remained a key feature of China’s dynastic governments until the collapse of the dynastic system in 1911. The 6th Han emperor, Han Wu Di, refined the civil service system to include a group of palace writers “through which he controlled every aspect of civil and military affairs. The writers in turn controlled which of the multitude of documents would reach the emperor’s desk...their Intendant was at the same time commander in chief of the army.”¹⁷

The emperor was the head of state and the sole authority. He chose a Chancellor to coordinate the government’s efforts. A Vice-Chancellor had direct access to the emperor and, at times, served as a check on the Chancellor. Over time, the two functions resulted in a conflict over the inner and outer courts with the Vice-Chancellor having greater access and influence over the inner court—an arrangement that eventually

¹⁵ John Lyman Bishop, *Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese history* (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968). 4-5.

¹⁶ Morton, *China : Its History and Culture*, 3rd ed., 2nd McGraw-Hill pbk. ed. 51.

¹⁷ Morton, *China : Its History and Culture*, 3rd ed., 2nd McGraw-Hill pbk. ed. 53.

resulted in conflict within the government. Below the Chancellor there were nine ministers who were responsible for the functioning of the government and the court. The army operated with a separate organization and rank structure.¹⁸

In keeping with this preference for standardization and centralization, the Han developed standardized methods for selecting civil servants. At regular intervals—sometimes annually, sometimes every three years—the Minister of Ceremonies requested recommendations for candidates to undergo examinations for the civil service. The Minister of Ceremonies also exercised control over student and faculty selection for the Imperial Academy which was one of the most important sources for examination candidates.

The Imperial Academy arose in 124 B.C. from “learned men who knew thoroughly both the past and the present and were completely familiar with the institutions of the state, and capable of answering any questions of the Emperor. Fifty students were placed under the instruction of these learned men, thus the Imperial Academy was formed.”¹⁹ Performance on the examinations determined to a large extent the candidates’ subsequent posting and rank. Those who had not attended the Imperial Academy competed for an opportunity to do so. Those who were already in the Academy competed for postings within the ministries or in other positions throughout the country. “The examination system was perfected and generally applied during the Tang dynasty (618-907), and with various changes it remained the road to office until the end of the empire in 1911.”²⁰ Over time, schools appeared in the provinces and counties with progressive layers of examinations that led to opportunities to compete at the court.²¹

¹⁸ Bishop, *Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese history*.

¹⁹ Bishop, *Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese history*. 20.

²⁰ Morton, *China : Its History and Culture*, 3rd ed., 2nd McGraw-Hill pbk. ed. 88.

²¹ Bishop, *Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese history*.

The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) built on the efforts of previous dynasties while strengthening an emphasis on Confucian morals and ethics. “The young aspirants for office in China received an education in classics written with a distinct didactic aim. [They] were then thrown out at an early age to govern and control the lives of thousands with the confidence that their general education, without the benefit of any specialized study, would fit them to do a good job.”²² The goal was not solely to develop effective bureaucrats, but to ensure that those who made up the civil service reflected the ideal values of the Chinese state. In following this approach, Chinese leaders sought to create a consistent moral approach worthy of the mandate under heaven.

The Qing dynasty (1644-1911) received criticism from Europeans who encountered its later years. Scholars point out that such criticism of the system ignores the centuries of innovation and effective service to the state. Reviewing the history of the Chinese civil service, “one is struck not only by the degree of innovation, but by the logic and courage of the attempts to think out basic administrative solutions to tough economic problems with which the modern world with mostly improved electronic aids, is still manifestly struggling.”²³ As European states came into contact with China, their leaders perceived some value in the Chinese method of organizing the civil service. The desire to have personnel with a broad base of knowledge, the selection of the best minds, the use of competitive examinations combined with personal interviews, and promotion based on merit and performance became desired features as major European powers solidified their state bureaucracies in the modern era.

France

As in China, the French government’s reliance on centralized bureaucracies is well-established in history and political science. Before

²² Morton, *China : Its History and Culture*, 3rd ed., 2nd McGraw-Hill pbk. ed. 88-90.

²³ Morton, *China : Its History and Culture*, 3rd ed., 2nd McGraw-Hill pbk. ed. 124.

the revolution of 1789, the *ancien régime* exercised control in the provinces by appointing officials—intendants (and later prefects)—to communicate the king’s policies, report on conditions, and, above all, to collect taxes. As foreign wars drained the treasury, the monarchy began selling government appointments as an additional means of raising funds. Members of the nobility and the middle class alike purchased these appointments to secure sources of personal income. By reducing essential government functions to commodities, the monarchy effectively lost control of how its agents delivered government services. As one scholar concluded, “Since the officer owned the office, the king could not replace him with a more competent subordinate. Under these circumstances, the king could not impose his will upon those who were nominally his subordinates.”²⁴ Unscrupulous officials helped sow the seeds of revolution by charging exorbitant tolls for using roads and bridges, taking bribes, and having those who resisted their authority unjustly imprisoned.²⁵

The 1789 revolution did not eradicate all of the features of the old regime. The revolutionary leaders still needed the means to administer the country, and the existing centralized bureaucracy provided a ready means to do so. With the office of the intendant intact, a reformed bureaucracy became a source of stability through the waves of revolution and counterrevolution that swept the country between 1789 and 1796. Under the philosophy of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité* France began transforming its mostly peasant society into a society of citizens.²⁶ The government’s visible presence in the person of civil servants provided a means for the government and citizens to communicate with one another. As Napoleon rose to become Emperor, the civil service’s

²⁴ John A. Rohr, *Civil Servants and Their Constitutions*, Studies in Government Policy, (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002). 7.

²⁵ Rohr, *Civil Servants and Their Constitutions*. 4-8.

²⁶ The process of modernization was not complete even at the time of the First World War. See Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).

stability and consistency provided a means for him to administer the country. Revisions to the law in the form of The Napoleonic Code provided a legal construct within which the bureaucracy could work. These two components of the government remained relatively stable until after World War II.

The shock of defeat and occupation during World War II revealed significant flaws in French society and its form of government. The defeat at the hands of Germany in 1940 swept the much-reviled Third Republic aside. “The [Third Republic] regime disappeared amid massive discredit because it was linked to a past of social unrest and political divisions that seemed to have paved the way for the disaster.”²⁷ Divisions within French society that had existed since the late-1800s contributed to the political collapse. At the national level, on the Left, the Communist Party refused to participate in any coalition government, essentially preserving its ideological purity while waiting for the system to collapse.²⁸ On the right, Royalist and Fascist factions sought to undermine liberal coalitions on one hand while at times seeking to join forces with German and Italian fascists on the other. The result, beginning in the early 1930s, was political paralysis characterized by repeated government collapse. Robert O. Paxton, the historian of Vichy France, observed “While the average length of Third Republic ministries was about a year, it fell during periods of economic crisis (1925-26, 1931-36) to six months.”²⁹ By September 1939, after Hitler and Stalin had carved up Poland, the German threat had become so apparent that French leaders had no choice but to declare war. It was a war France neither wanted nor was prepared to fight. After nine months of waiting,

²⁷ Phillippe Burrin, *France Under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise*, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 1996). 20.

²⁸ The exception to this centralized party policy being the short-lived Popular Front government in 1936.

²⁹ Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*, Morningside ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, 1972). 186.

the Germans finally attacked on 10 May 1940. Six weeks later, France sued for an armistice.³⁰

The Germans occupied northern France while allowing Marshal Phillippe Pétain's Vichy government to function in the southern third of the country. Pétain, who was certainly not a liberal, collaborated with the Germans, mostly because he had no other choice, to preserve an illusion of French sovereignty. In both occupied and Vichy zones, the Germans coopted the French civil administration to run the country. Pétain's government favored stability and administrative procedure over liberal principles. "Civil servants were as ready as any interest group to exploit the new climate for change. They carried out long-discussed and long-deferred reforms in public administration."³¹ Meanwhile, the number of civil servants nearly doubled to 900,000 officials. Vichy "restored to prefects the role of 'sole representative of the state' in the departments [i.e., the provinces and local entities] with every public servant except judges under their express control."³² The government backed up the civil servant's authority with modernization initiatives to establish conditions of employment, pay and benefits, and collective bargaining rights. Vichy aimed to extend the power and presence of the state all the way to the local level and civil servants became the mechanism for doing so.

With Germany dictating policy and French officials forced to collaborate to survive, the government suffered through years of crisis. General Charles de Gaulle's Free French, fighting from abroad, and the mostly communist resistance *maquisards* in the country repeatedly attacked the credibility of any official who failed to fight the Germans at every opportunity. The liberation in 1945 could have brought a wave of violence to purge the collaborators and allow the communists and

³⁰ Gordon Wright, *France in Modern Times*, 5th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1995).

³¹ Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*. 194.

³² Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*. 195.

nationalists to fight for dominance. De Gaulle intervened to restore unity and, in doing so, prevented a disastrous civil war. The formula for unity conceded that each Frenchman resisted in whatever ways were possible. While some collaborators received just punishment, for the most part, France avoided vengeful witch-hunts to root out those who may have cuddled too closely with the German occupiers.

France's post-war leaders needed the civil service to operate the government and oversee the country's recovery. As it had done throughout modern French history, the civil service provided continuity as the state worked through the details of transitioning to new government institutions. "Competence and the difficulty of finding replacements told more than political correctness. Of a million civil servants, just over 11,000 received some sanction...and only 5,000 were removed from office."³³ Civil servants, in large measure, avoided being tainted by outright collaboration with the Germans or by their roles as members of the Vichy administration.

Post-war leaders in France recognized that if their country hoped to recover from the dark years of occupation, it needed to reform its governmental institutions. The economy had to move from an antiquated agricultural and small-shop industrial base to one positioned to compete on par in emerging international markets. This required a government staffed by knowledgeable and credible officials who understood how to integrate their agency with the French state's broader needs. For all of its reliance in the bureaucracy, the Vichy regime had failed to connect national policy to regional and local execution. Paxton observed "Vichy was worse than the 'old regime.' Awaiting the peace, forced to improvise, based on a fatal geopolitical miscalculation, Vichy became in that vivid French expression a basket of crabs."³⁴ As early as 1945, reformers planned to transform the civil service. One observer

³³ Robert Gildea, *France Since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 60.

³⁴ Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*. 200.

noted, “The great mass of government employees, the *commis*, have done their work well...The weakness has been at the top, where the lack of training, the absence of modern business management, and a narrow departmental specialization have produced an inefficiency as catastrophic as disloyalty and treason.”³⁵

Operationally, the philosophy would be to keep the parts of the system that worked—“the great mass of government employees”—while investing in measures intended to provide professional leaders at the top levels of the bureaucracy. Public administration came into vogue as an academic discipline for preparing civil servants to perform their functions. Competitive entrance to receive a university-level education paired with competitive examinations provided mechanisms intended to guarantee only the most highly qualified individuals entered the various government departments.³⁶ The result was a civil service system “tightly bound by regulations and tradition, particularly at middle and lower levels. Since most individuals in the civil service devote their entire working lives to the public administration, they expect a large degree of protectionism in return. Thus, security and equality are watchwords for the service, and regulations are detailed and complex.”³⁷ The system worked effectively until the late-1980s when it became evident that the demands of an increasingly integrated European economy and equally increasingly global international markets required the French government once again to transform its civil service.

Scholars have noted structural and cultural influences as sources of crisis in the French civil service of the 1980s. A growing global economy driven by multi-national corporate structures, increasingly complicated technologies, and revolutionary communications capabilities rendered

³⁵ Frederick Gutheim, “Civil Service Reform in France,” *Public Administration Review* 5, no. 4 (1945). 360.

³⁶ Gutheim, “Civil Service Reform in France.”

³⁷ *History of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1976). 353.

the post-war French civil service too slow and cumbersome to provide adequate service to its government. “[S]ome quarters of French society increasingly express[ed] concern that the bureaucracy is too much involved in French life. They see it as a representative of the status quo in a stagnant society. To these critics, France is increasingly governed by a class of insensitive, stifling, technocratic citizens who are a world apart from the general population.”³⁸ Furthermore, the emergence of the European Union required the French public administration to adapt or become irrelevant.

On a cultural level, the bureaucracy tasked with supporting and operating the ubiquitous welfare state distanced the civil servants from the public they were supposed to serve. The French system became organized into “four occupational categories (A, B, C, D) defined by the educational qualifications required for entry...The overall corps system of hierarchical rankings is the source of the extreme compartmentalization and rigid social stratification of the civil service.”³⁹ Entrance to the higher levels of the service had evolved to become restricted to those whose families were well-placed in the bureaucracy or in industry. Top graduates of the Polytechnique or of the *École Nationale d’Administration* found clear pathways to careers in the government bureaus. “A spell of three, six, or ten years in a ministerial office was an excellent jumping off point for a number of careers.”⁴⁰

The French government sought to introduce flexibility into the rigid system while preserving opportunities for all French citizens to compete for entry into the civil service. Simultaneously reformers sought to improve efficiency, preserve employee rights and benefits, and reduce costs to taxpayers. These competing goals meant that change was imperceptibly slow. Changes in private management presented

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ David Clark, “The Modernization of the French Civil Service: Crisis, Change and Continuity,” *Public Administration* 76, no. 1 (1998). 99.

⁴⁰ Gildea, *France Since 1945*. 118.

attractive options for civil service reform, but grafting profit-oriented management practices onto entrenched hierarchical government institutions and processes have not closed the gap between the civil servant and society. The perception of the civil servant who is inflexible, driven by rules and procedures, and distant remains the stereotype.

Great Britain

In the modern era, the British civil service has enjoyed a reputation for professionalism and consistency that is unparalleled. The US Congressional Research Service noted “Throughout more than a century the British Civil Service has been noted for its intellectual caliber, dedication, and incorruptibility of its officers...There is a preference for picking persons on the basis of general attainment and developing special qualifications needed for a particular job by training and experience within the service.”⁴¹ This reputation and structure evolved over more than two centuries of debate, conflict, study, and alternating cycles of entrenchment and innovation. What began as a corrupt mechanism for bestowing patronage among those of the upper class gradually became a merit-based system designed to serve the government and its citizens.

Before the nineteenth century, civil servants, known as Public Officers, received their appointments from government officials. “Appointment to central offices was by patronage exercised either by ministers or heads of departments, with a strong tradition that members of parliament should influence the allocation of local posts.”⁴² In turn, the department heads dispensed appointments to positions within their agencies to those who sought their patronage. Qualifications for office, and even the responsibility to report regularly to work, were not routine

⁴¹ *History of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign Countries*. 320.

⁴² O.R. McGregor, “Civil Servants and the Civil Service, 1850-1950,” *The Political Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (1957). 158.

considerations for receiving appointments. The primary motivation for office-seekers became the security of a regular stipend, the potential for using the position to generate more sources of income, and the security of a retirement income. Those who were well-connected paid deputies to undertake the duties of their office. This system of patronage and proxy deputization permeated the system.⁴³

The inevitable corruption and inefficiency that characterized this system eventually drew the attention of Parliament in 1816 as the costs of operating the government rose. One contemporary critic with direct experience in the Colonial Department noted that the high cost of the public officers failed to yield commensurate excellence in performance. He described three types of civil servant:

[A] small body of men of talent; a number of diligent men adequate to their duties; and a third group, the majority of the members...possessed only in a low degree, and some of them in a degree almost incredibly low, of either the talents or the habits of men of business, or the industry, the zeal, or the knowledge required for the performance of their appropriate functions.⁴⁴

The generally poor performance of individuals and the equally poor return on investment of government funds drove Parliament to take control of the civil service. Financial concerns resulted in responsibility for managing the service being vested in the Department of the Treasury. Financial concerns were not enough, however, to reform the system to produce a competent and reliable civil service system. Patronage remained the primary method of selection and highly placed members of the government jealously guarded their privilege of bestowing appointments on those seeking their favor.

⁴³ Emmeline W. Cohen, *The Growth of the British Civil Service, 1780-1939* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965).

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 105.

Between 1816 and 1855, reformers within the British government sought to change the structure of the civil service. The Indian Colonial Service became the model for structuring reform proposals. Members of the Indian Colonial Service had administered the country, first under the auspices of the East India Company, and later as the most important component of the Colonial Office. Selection and posting clearly depended on family and school connections, but those advantages were not sufficient to secure a post for aspiring younger sons of wealthy families. Officials who selected from among a host of candidates each year to receive postings to India relied on letters of recommendation from well-placed individuals, competitive examinations, and in-person interviews. Recommendations from faculty members at Oxford and Cambridge carried great weight after these institutions developed curricula to prepare graduates for civil service roles. Thus, the Indian Colonial Office concentrated on improving the quality of the candidate pool as the primary method of instilling quality in the performance of the overall system.

Reform requires an agent who will envision change and work to achieve it. For the mid-nineteenth century British civil service that change agent was Sir Charles Edward Treveleyan who served as Permanent Secretary at the Treasury Department in the mid-1850s. Treveleyan had served in India and sought to bring the quality and efficiency he experienced in the Colonial Service to his department. He collaborated with Sir Stafford Henry Northcote, a Conservative politician, to develop proposals for reforming the entire civil service system. The two “envisaged a transformation of the British Civil Service into a profession, capable of attracting the best brains in the country, and organized in accordance with the highest contemporary standards of efficiency.”⁴⁵ Their recommendations, published in what became known as the Northcote-Treveleyan Report, took effect gradually, but

⁴⁵ Cohen, *The Growth of the British Civil Service, 1780-1939*. 102.

eventually set the standards for the civil service that would apply well into the twentieth century.

The first hurdle the Northcote-Trevelyan Report identified was to create a merit-based entrance pathway to the service. The reformers recognized that the officials in the Indian service initially lacked specific expertise to perform their jobs, but they all possessed the willingness and ability to learn how to solve problems. Most were products of upper- and upper-middle class education programs with Oxford and Cambridge contributing the majority of candidates. This educational foundation produced a common experience base with similar values. The intellectual and administrative tools with which they approached issues stemmed from a common set of assumptions and methods. Northcote and Trevelyan argued that institutionalizing this kind of culture in the Home Office was an essential requirement for attracting the best brains in the country to government service.

Both Northcote and Trevelyan were familiar with the Chinese practice of using competitive examinations to identify the best candidates for the civil service. They had also seen its effects on the quality of the Indian Colonial Office and strongly recommended replacing the patronage system with annual competitive examinations. The ultimate goal was to attract the best talent from all sources, but in the short term, they relied on the dons at Oxford and Cambridge to generate the pool of qualified candidates. In their report's opening salvo they specified their vision of the ideal system.

It is highly necessary that the conditions which are common to all the public establishments such as the preliminary testimonials of character and bodily health to be required from candidates for public employment, the examination into their intellectual attainments, and the regulation of the promotions should be carefully considered, so as to obtain full security for the public that none but

qualified persons will be appointed, and that they will afterwards have every practicable inducement to the active discharge of their duties.⁴⁶

By emphasizing references, physical well-being, and, above all, intellectual potential, the authors placed patronage squarely in their crosshairs. To assure fair and impartial competitive selection, they recommended a central examination board presided over by a high officer at the level of Privy Councillor [sic].⁴⁷ In doing so, they engendered resistance to the reforms that would last another twenty years before appointments through patronage would finally die off.

Altering the practice of promotion and retirement became the second target for the reformers. For all but those appointed to high office, civil servants generally entered the system in their twenties (some as early as sixteen) and remained in position until retirements at the top made room for promotion. Pay scales were generally low and increases took years if not decades to appear. One source noted that “The Census of 1851 disclosed nearly 18,000 officials, some 17,500 postmen, interior revenue officers and the like, and 14,500 artificers and labourers [sic] in crown employment. Not more than 5,000 of them earned over £100 a year.”⁴⁸ The detrimental effects of such conditions on both recruitment and performance were obvious to Northcote and Trevelyan. “After a young man has been once appointed, the public have him for life; and if he is idle or inefficient, provided he does not grossly misconduct himself, we must either submit to have a portion of the public business inefficiently and discredibly performed, or must place the incompetent person on the retired list, with a pension, for the

⁴⁶ Stafford Henry Northcote and Chales Edward Trevelyan, *Report on the Ogranisation of the Permanent Civil Service*, House of Commons (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Hyde and Spttswoode, 1854), https://www.civilservant.org.uk/library/1854_Northcote_Trevelyan_Report.pdf. 3.

⁴⁷ Northcote and Trevelyan, *Report on the Ogranisation of the Permanent Civil Service*. 11.

⁴⁸ McGregor, “Civil Servants and the Civil Service, 1850-1950.” 158.

rest of his life.”⁴⁹ The obvious solution for the authors was to introduce merit evaluation and promotion systems that gave top performers opportunities to compete for promotions and appointments across the system as a whole—both within and outside their assigned departments.

Movement among the departments, the authors proposed, would keep staff members motivated, increase the breadth of experience, and would allow for a natural exchange of best practices. This kind of cross-pollination would give each individual “an opportunity of making himself master of the whole business before he is called upon, in due course of time, to take a leading position.”⁵⁰ Thus, the reformers clearly anticipated the need for developmental paths that improved the technical skills and knowledge for civil service members. This broadening of the experience base would act as a shield against stagnation and poor morale while also giving the government a higher caliber of long-serving professional staffers.

Salary reforms acted in concert with the other proposals to preserve morale and to enhance professionalism. Northcote and Trevelejan proposed replacing the position and seniority-oriented pay system with one that provided minimum and maximum limits for each category of employee. Barring an individual’s unusual qualifications or circumstances, each new civil servant, under the reformer’s proposal, would receive the same pay. Assuming satisfactory performance of assigned duties, individuals would receive an annual salary increase using established increments (the equivalent of today’s “step promotions”). By the end of a career, the individual would gradually rise to receive the maximum prescribed salary for the assigned position and duties.

⁴⁹ Northcote and Trevelejan, *Report on the Ogranisation of the Permanent Civil Service*. 5.

⁵⁰ Northcote and Trevelejan, *Report on the Ogranisation of the Permanent Civil Service*. 18.

Promotions became mechanisms for moving to higher salary levels. Individuals could apply for vacant higher-ranking positions. This merit-based promotion system would reduce, if not eliminate, the toxic practice of preventing experienced, highly qualified individuals from competing for promotion outside their assigned departments. In the words of the report's authors, "promotion from class to class is the reward of merit...those only are to be transferred from one class to a higher who have shown themselves capable of rendering valuable services in it."⁵¹ There were, of course, concerns that a nominal merit-based system could become subject to manipulation and inter-office politics. Northcote and Treveleyan sought to reduce the potential for such abuses by centralizing the advertising, application, and selection process for cross-departmental promotions.

The reforms specified in the Northcote-Treveleyan Report took aim at the worst features of the British civil service of the mid-nineteenth century. Each proposal threatened to sweep away opportunities for patronage, departmental prerogative, and individual privilege in the name of establishing a rational, fair, and efficient service for the government and the crown. It took nearly thirty years for the gradual pace of reform to wear down the established system. By the 1880s, the government had allowed all of the key features of the report to permeate the civil service system. The quality, efficiency, professionalism, and apolitical nature of the civil service became one of the most respected characteristics of the British government.

Insights on Foreign Civil Services

There are some common elements that appear in the civil service systems of China, France, and Great Britain. While the details vary with culture, governmental system, and era, there are some principles that help inform the study, structure, and operation of today's civil service

⁵¹ Northcote and Treveleyan, *Report on the Ogranisation of the Permanent Civil Service*. 19.

systems. First, all three case studies included an emphasis on finding some mechanism to ensure the quality of civil servants. All three cases used some form of competitive examination to create candidate pools that provided the potential for selecting the best and brightest of a given cohort. Regardless how contemporary systems operate, there must be some mechanism for defining objective criteria that, when applied to a set of applicants, allows those doing the selection to discern the best candidates from those who do not measure as highly against the criteria. The principle is to select the most highly qualified candidate to fill available vacancies.

The second principle that emerges from a review of the historical cases focuses on effective performance. It is never enough to assume that a competitive selection process will guarantee efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of assigned duties. In each historical case, calls for reforms often resulted from governments becoming frustrated with how the civil service performed its duties. As an aside, governments have often expressed their frustration through calls for reducing the size of the civil service rather than dealing with the causes of poor performance. Equating cost with efficiency and effectiveness often results in decisions that slash numbers of employees on the rolls while refusing to reduce the functions those former employees had performed. Rarely do such strategies improve either the functioning of government or the reputation of the civil service.

The third common observation that emerges from a brief historical review is that development, pay, and promotion are essential to ensure the quality of the civil service. In all three cases, the state's refusal to invest in training, pay, or to manage promotions fairly resulted in adverse consequences in performance, morale, and in the reputation of the civil service. Declining public perception of the civil service has a direct effect on the government's ability to recruit and retain a competent workforce. Stagnation in the workforce erodes mission

effectiveness and, once it sets in, can require draconian measures to eliminate. Leaders should seek to avoid the need for “making examples” or wholesale reorganization to correct issues grounded in failures in development, pay, and promotions.

Finally, the civil service systems of China, France, and Great Britain produced their own sub-cultures grounded in perceptions of individuals’ potential to contribute to the governments they served. In general, power was not a central motivation for individuals to seek positions in the civil service—especially after the systems had matured. Certainly, civil service jobs provided a secure, steady income, but with the exception of executive levels most civil servants exercised very little power that mattered to state security. To the extent that civil servants exercised power, it came in the form of deciding what quality and level of service they provided to the citizens and institutions they served. For the most part, scholars have commented on civil servants’ relative lack of power rather than on the exercise or abuse of power by civil servants. In the post-World War II environment, the increase in the size and scope of government and the corresponding increase in the numbers of civil servants has made the relative lack of power inherent in the civil service even more interesting.

Post-WWII National Security and the Rise of the Military-Industrial Complex

Immediately following World War II, members of the international community began developing institutions intended to provide more effective solutions for problems between states than those that had existed before the war. At the highest organizational level, the United Nations replaced the mostly ineffective League of Nations as a forum for reaching consensus on problems that affected the broader international community. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund addressed development and economic concerns, particularly in

the post-colonial world that emerged as European countries abandoned their colonial territories. The International Criminal Court provided a forum for addressing legal issues that affected member states. Beneath these institutional levels, a host of specialized institutions, each with their bureaucracies, emerged to give members of the international community mechanisms for working through problems and addressing issues of common concern.

For the United States, the post-war world order involved engaging in these new liberal international institutions' formation and functioning while also addressing national security concerns. As early as 1949, with the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the ensuing US-led Berlin Airlift, and the subsequent detonation of a Soviet atomic weapon, it became clear that the international security environment would experience a Cold War dominated by the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Preserving the balance between Cold War force readiness and modernization—especially as technologies evolved rapidly—required cooperation between civilian and military components.

Responsibilities for global and national security interests encouraged the development of what President Eisenhower termed the *military-industrial complex*—the partnership between military services and defense industries to equip, maintain, and operate the standing military institutions that had become essential to national security in the Cold War.⁵² As this trend toward bureaucratic organizations has spread into military institutions, the unique warfighting requirements of the profession of arms contributed to the initial separation of responsibilities between military and civilian workforce elements. While military Services appropriately indoctrinate and train their

⁵² For a comprehensive study of the Cold War's effects on the rise of the military-industrial complex and defense policy in the United States, see: Paul A. C. Koistinen, *State of War: the Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011*, ed. Theodore A. Wilson, Modern War Studies, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012).

members in specialized skills related to wartime missions, their civilian components remain separated by law and practice from warfighting activities valued most by their uniformed counterparts. As the international security environment has evolved, however, civil servants, and particularly Civilian Airmen, have become more enmeshed in essential Air Force mission tasks.

Understanding Civilian Airmen in the Context of the Air Force Mission

To begin developing an understanding of how Civilian Airmen contribute to the Air Force mission, one must first understand the broad outlines of how the independent Air Force came to be in the United States. Chapter 2 introduces how US national security policy evolved from the earliest days of the Republic until the end of World War II.

Chapter 3 continues to explore US national security policy by picking up the story with the end of World War II. Almost immediately following World War II, the United States found itself confronting its former ally, the Soviet Union, in what came to be known as the Cold War. Tracing the origins of the conflicted relationship between the United States and the Soviets helps explain why the alliance fell apart so quickly following the war's end. To prepare for a wider role in maintaining the international system and to confront the rising tide of communism, Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947 which, in part, created the independent Air Force. The newly independent Service, as the most experienced with atomic, and later nuclear weaponry, became the most visible component in the confrontation with the Soviet Union. Nearly every aspect of the Service—organization, training, equipment, recruiting, promotion, and retention—came to be filtered through the lens of preparing for nuclear warfare with the Soviet Union. This naturally brought the Air Force into conflict with the other Services over roles and missions as they sought to secure resources for their assigned

missions. Debates over roles and missions continued throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. As the Cold War ended, the new international security environment sparked questions about optimal force structures, resource allocation, and the best way to organize for defense in the increasingly chaotic and complex world order.

At the risk of overstating the obvious, Civilian Airmen are government employees who serve in accordance with the legal statutes and Service policies that define the conditions of their contributions. Chapter 4 examines the evolution of the legislative and regulatory guidance that establishes the policy, process, and procedural context within which Civilian Airmen serve. Understanding the outlines of how the various acts that created and altered the US civil service provides Civilian Airmen with a vital sense of how their contribution has emerged. In much the same ways that uniformed members come to understand the history of their branch of the armed forces and how that history meshes with the overall flow of the nation's history, Civilian Airmen should understand the history of civil servants and the institutional mechanisms that govern their service. Beginning with the Pendleton Act of 1883 and continuing through various other legislative initiatives that reformed and shaped the nation's civil service as an institution, this chapter provides a long view of the unique context within which Civilian Airmen serve the nation.

Chapter 5 examines how the Air Force implements legislative and Department of Defense policies and processes using official Instructions (before the 1990s, the Air Force issued Regulations—now known as Air Force Instructions—AFIs). Understanding the change and continuity in how the Service implements higher-level policies through its Instructions is an important contextual aspect of understanding the evolution of the Civilian Airmen profession.

Chapter 6 looks toward the future as Civilian Airmen continue to provide mission essential contributions to the nation and to the Air

Force. As we approach the third decade of the twenty-first century, society is undergoing dramatic changes. Viewing Civilian Airmen as valuable agents in connecting the Air Force to the nation is essential to supporting mission effectiveness. Civilian Airmen must continue to think about how they contribute to the Air Force mission. As they evolve, designing strategies that ensure personal growth, technical competence, educational advancement, and career development is essential to creating an effective corps of civilian employees who are poised to contribute to the mission. As they become the most capable and competent Airmen, invested in the unit, Service, and Department of Defense mission, Civilian Airmen will realize their essential contributions to national security and Air Force mission effectiveness.

Questions for Discussion

1. Why are bureaucracies necessary for the effective functioning of large institutions?
2. This text argues that Air Force civilian employees deserve the title *Airmen*. How would you defend the application of this title to civilian employees if asked to do so?
3. What distinguishes Civilian Airmen from their uniformed counterparts other than the obvious wearing of the uniform?
4. Why should Civilian Airmen swear an oath to support and defend the Constitution during their initial in-processing as employees?
5. Provide some examples of how Civilian Airmen contribute directly to Air Force mission effectiveness.
6. What is the most effective model for meeting civilian personnel requirements, the industrial or human capital models? Why?
7. Should the Air Force expand, reduce, or keep the numbers of Civilian Airmen the same? Why?

8. Considering France's history of revolutions and government restructuring, why did the civil service endure with relatively few changes?
9. Why was the introduction of competitive examinations to the British Civil Service in the nineteenth century controversial?
10. All three of the historical case studies mentioned in this chapter involved a combination of competitive examinations, applications, and personal interviews. What advantages do you perceive derive from using competitive examinations as part of the selection process for civil servants?



CHAPTER 2 – FROM THE EARLY DAYS OF THE REPUBLIC TO 1945

Civilian Airmen serve the nation through the Department of the Air Force. Their approach to national defense issues, their technical knowledge and skills, and their interaction with their military counterparts reflects air-mindedness.⁵³ Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell described Airmen as a group who differed significantly from their surface counterparts. “Already we have an entirely new class of people that we may call the ‘air-going people’ as distinguished from the ‘land-going people’ and the ‘sea-going people.’ The air-going people have a spirit, language, and customs of their own.”⁵⁴ The air perspective results in different solutions to the problems of national defense compared to those presented by the land and sea Services.

The relationship between the nation and its defense establishment has evolved steadily since the earliest days of the Republic. Each stage of that evolution reflected changes in society, the security environment, technology, and in the role national leaders perceived for the United States in world affairs. Since aviators began to think about adapting flying machines to military purposes, they had chafed under ground and sea leaders who saw aviation solely as ancillary to surface operations. Mitchell wrote in 1925, “we should have a single Department of National Defense and under it a Department of Aeronautics, Department of the Army, and Department of the Navy.”⁵⁵ Organizing the national defense

⁵³ “Air-mindedness,” *Air Force Doctrine Update* (2013). https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/doctrine_updates/du_13_01.pdf.

⁵⁴ William Mitchell, *Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic and Military* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925; repr., 1988, Dover Publications, Inc., Minnetonka, New York). 6.

⁵⁵ Mitchell, *Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic and Military*. xvii.

establishment to take advantage of Airmen's perspectives in the way Mitchell prescribed, however, was a post-World War II initiative.

The aerial armadas that laid waste to armies and the industrial cities that sustained them during World War II seemed to confirm Mitchell's vision suggesting that organizing airpower under an independent service, coequal to the land and sea services, would serve national defense needs better than past practices. Airmen who had served under Mitchell in World War I and in the early 1920s nurtured his vision through the remaining Interwar Years. Generals Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Carl A. "Tooe" Spaatz, Ira C. Eaker, Haywood S. "Possum" Hansell, Lawrence Kuter, Harold L. George, and others who would lead and command during World War II carried the torch of Mitchell's vision.⁵⁶

Even before the war, Airmen achieved a victory of sorts with the establishment in 1935 of General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force to centralize the organization for aviation units within the continental United States. In June 1941, as US involvement in the war seemed inevitable, the organization became the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) with Arnold as its chief. While not an independent service, the GHQ and USAAF organizations laid the foundations for post-war Service independence. The mechanism for achieving this was the

⁵⁶ For a general outline of the evolution of airpower theory see David MacIssac, "Voices From the Central Blue: The Airpower Theorists," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). To get an understanding of the organizational politics surrounding the fight for air service independence see Robert P. White, *Mason Patrick and the Fight for Air Service Independence* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001). Tami Davis Biddle shows the disconnects between Interwar airpower theories and wartime practice. See Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press, 2002). Michael Sherry traces the connections between Interwar and World War II airpower to later nuclear doctrines. See Michael S. Sherry, *The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).

National Security Act of 1947. The act, simple in its design, contained only 32 pages. It transformed, however, the entire national security establishment in ways that prepared the United States government to assume a radical new position in global affairs.

The Evolution of National Security Policy in the United States: From Independence Until World War II

Early U.S. Foreign Policy: Isolationism and the Monroe Doctrine

Between the end of the Revolutionary War in 1783 and the end of World War I in 1918, the United States followed a general policy of trying to remain aloof from international politics. Leaders cited a canon of national literature recommending abstention from foreign intrigues and conflicts. In this canon, George Washington's *Farewell Address* cast a long shadow over the country's foreign policy owing to his credibility as a leader and statesman. In the early days of the Republic, this policy of isolation was doubly convenient because the nation had little wealth, materiel, or manpower with which to confront major state actors. Given these conditions, it seemed more prudent to let adversaries shoulder the burden of crossing the Atlantic Ocean to wage war on the United States than it would have been to launch expeditions toward Europe.

Washington advised a policy of neutrality toward other nations advising that "nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments to others should be excluded, and that in place of them just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated..."⁵⁷ More than caution, however, Washington foresaw a clear threat to the foundations of the Constitution and government; he wrote, "...history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful

⁵⁷ George Washington, "Farewell Address (17 Sep 1796)," in *National Security Law Documents*, ed. John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts, and Robert F. Turner (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2006). 6-7.

foes of republican government...” and the nation’s leaders should “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world...”⁵⁸ Washington’s stature and the generally shared preference for eschewing the rough-and-tumble world of European politics meant that his advice became the nation’s de facto foreign policy for more than a generation.

By the 1820s, the nation’s leaders had gained confidence in national security and in a vision of the country as a sovereign nation. The Louisiana Purchase (1803) nearly doubled the size of the country, extended the western border beyond the Mississippi River, and set the stage for further expansion into the western half of the continent. The War of 1812 (1812-15) had, to some, confirmed the country’s ability to withstand military assaults from other nations. In Europe, French Revolutionaries had taken inspiration from the United States in 1789 when they overthrew the monarchy to establish a Republic. The execution of Louis XVI in January 1793 followed by the Reign of Terror that lasted until 1796 mobilized Europe and began wars that lasted nearly twenty years. Revolutionary fervor would spread to Central and South America in the first quarter of the nineteenth century with independence movements in Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama following the example of the United States and France in overthrowing colonial and dynastic rule.

In this tumultuous international context, President James Monroe outlined what became known as the Monroe Doctrine. Monroe confirmed the wisdom of Washington’s *Farewell Address* noting, “in the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so.”⁵⁹ He acknowledged the trend toward anti-colonialism and democracy

⁵⁸ Washington, “Farewell Address (17 Sep 1796).” 7.

⁵⁹ James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message (2 Dec 1823),” in *National Security Law Documents*, ed. John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts, and Robert F. Turner (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2006). 10.

sweeping the Western Hemisphere and expressed sympathy for those who sought independence from European rule. He did not, however, wish to provoke European powers by seeming to offer direct support or encouragement for revolution in the Americas.

This foreign policy balancing act meant that the United States “should consider any attempt on their [the European Powers’] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” The point of distinction centered on a government derived from a successful revolutionary movement. Monroe wrote, “with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have in just consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purposes of oppressing them...” Monroe thus signaled that the United States had become the protector of the Western Hemisphere and any intervention toward states the United States had recognized would be “the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.”⁶⁰ The Monroe Doctrine had sent a clear signal to other nations to refrain from trespassing in matters the United States reserved for itself.

The Monroe Doctrine served as the foundation for US foreign policy until the end of the nineteenth century. The nation’s leaders concerned themselves largely with domestic issues. Expanding toward the west coast brought more territories and states into the Union with the attendant concerns over slavery—the most divisive issue in the nation’s history. The Civil War (1861-1865), subsequent reconstruction (1865-1877), and the continued push to settle the western territories reinforced the principles established by Washington and Monroe. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the nation’s expanding economic potential encouraged leaders to look beyond the continent and the hemisphere.

⁶⁰ Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message (2 Dec 1823)” 10.

U.S. Expansion and Evolving Military Doctrine in the 19th Century

There were few officers in the US Army in the last quarter of the nineteenth century who advocated for institutional changes. Perhaps the single exception to this was Emory Upton—a West Point graduate who had risen rapidly through the Union ranks in the Civil War because of his bravery under fire. Upton recognized that industrial-age warfare would require states to rethink how they approached organizing their defense establishments and preparing their military forces for future wars. Frontal assaults against prepared positions had proved disastrous in Civil War battles, and new weaponry would only intensify the danger to assault troops. Upton concluded that relying on militias and poorly trained reserves was inefficient; in the worst cases, units and their leaders would be incompetent and perhaps would lead the nation into disaster. At best, mobilization would consume valuable time as Reserves reported for duty and received their equipment. He toured Europe and Asia and was particularly impressed with the Prussian Army and its General Staff. His observations led him to recommend a reorganization of the Army to include a general staff component, competitive examinations for promotion, the professionalization of the officer corps, revising the promotion system to do away with the seniority system, and a closer relationship between government and industry. Upton's ideas ran counter to the American tradition of eschewing standing armies. His revolutionary ideas shocked some senior leaders in the Army; consequently, they met with resistance and criticism. Upton committed suicide in 1881 at the age of 41.⁶¹

⁶¹ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1964). See also, Carol Reardon, "Emory Upton (1838-1881)," in *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

The Spanish-American War (1898) vindicated many of Upton's ideas. The regular Army consisted of only 28,000 men at the war's outset, 17,000 of which deployed to Cuba during the war. Mobilizing and training reserves proved difficult and inefficient just as Upton had predicted. Difficulties with transportation and logistics hampered operations while the frontal assault on San Juan Heights on 1 July, despite helping Theodore Roosevelt's future political aspirations, cost General William Shafter, the US commander for operations in Cuba, nearly 10 percent of his entire force. Assessments of the Army's performance revealed serious flaws. "All elements of the Army were largely unprepared for fighting as larger organized units. Many units were ill-equipped, the Army's logistical capabilities were inadequate for deploying and sustaining forces overseas, and the tiny Medical Department was overwhelmed by infectious diseases that spread quickly through the ranks. The Army's difficulties were so bad that, in spite of winning the war, the Secretary of War was dismissed."⁶² Public outcry amid accusations of incompetence and corruption prompted President William McKinley to appoint Elihu Root as Secretary of War with a mandate to reform the Army.⁶³

As Secretary of War, Elihu Root sponsored publication of Emory Upton's *The Military Policy of the United States from 1775*. Root launched a reform agenda that adopted nearly all of Upton's ideas such as establishing a system of professional schools including the Army War College, enlarging the regular army to provide flexibility for overseas requirements, establishing modernized readiness standards for the National Guard, and rotating officers from field and staff positions to develop talent and keep staff departments apprised of current field

⁶² Gian Gentile et al., *The Evolution of US Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present*, RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA, 2019). x.

⁶³ David F. Trask, "Spanish-American War," in *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 667-669.

practices. Although the Army resisted creating a staff modeled after the Prussian General Staff, Root was able to replace the Commanding General, US Army position with a Chief of Staff, US Army who would serve as advisor to the Secretary of War and supervise the staff corps thus separating responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping the Service from those of operational command.⁶⁴

With victory in the Spanish-American War, the United States appeared to be in a position to join other great powers on the world scene.⁶⁵ Alfred Thayer Mahan, a Naval officer and instructor at the Naval War College, whose *The Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783* described how great powers rose to prominence and maintained their power, sought to provide an intellectual foundation for the United States' position as a rising power. Mahan argued that the British Empire owed its prominence to mastery of the seas—other nations aspiring to great power status must do likewise. Boiled down to its essence, Mahan's theory held that great nations maintained robust trading relationships around the globe through treaties and colonial possessions. That combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets produced national "wealth and greatness."⁶⁶ Trading relationships were ripe targets for competitors who would seek to interfere with vital sea lines of communication. To protect the nation's foreign interests, great powers relied on large navies, and naval fleets required coaling stations to supply the trading and combat fleets. Coaling stations came either in the form of relations with other countries, or preferably, in the form of overseas colonial or protectorate

⁶⁴ Matthew Oyos, "Elihu Root," in *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Oyos, "General Staff Act of 1903."

⁶⁵ Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

⁶⁶ See, Phillip A. Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). 451.

territories. Therefore, great powers had navies and overseas possessions as tangible indicators of their greatness.⁶⁷

Mahan's message resonated with President Theodore Roosevelt who urged Congress to fund a modern naval fleet comprised of battleships as the primary combatants. Thus armed, the United States would be ready to intervene in international situations that could impinge on its interests.⁶⁸ Roosevelt foresaw situations in which the United States would have to become involved to preserve or restore order. "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require the intervention of some civilized nation."⁶⁹ Roosevelt acknowledged the continuing importance of the Monroe Doctrine with the United States as the primary arbiter and guarantor of stability in the Western Hemisphere.

In areas where instability threatened the status quo, however, Roosevelt envisioned a more active role for the nation's foreign policy. He argued that in "flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence," the United States would be forced "to the exercise of international police power." To justify such policing authority, Roosevelt referred to the right of every nation "to maintain its freedom, its independence." Failing to act against threats to national security or international order would be a flagrant shirking of national responsibility.⁷⁰ Roosevelt's message, combined with the battleship-heavy "Great White Fleet," put the world on notice that the United States was prepared to involve itself in the larger context of international affairs.

⁶⁷ See Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (New York: Dover Publications, 1987).

⁶⁸ Edmund Morris, *Theodore Rex* (New York: Random House, 2001).

⁶⁹ Theodore Roosevelt, "Annual Message (6 Dec 1904)," in *National Security Law Documents*, ed. John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts, and Robert F. Turner (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2006). 16.

⁷⁰ Theodore Roosevelt, "Annual Message (6 Dec 1904)," in *National Security Law Documents*, ed. John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts, and Robert F. Turner (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2006). 16.

The United States and World War I: Departure from Isolationism

Despite assertions and a general sentiment that the United States had entered the ranks of great powers, the public and its leaders proved very reluctant when it came to adopting a policy of intervention and getting involved in World War I. President Woodrow Wilson declared the United States to be neutral and promoted a policy of nonintervention.⁷¹ Russia's exit from the war in the wake of the 1917 October Revolution freed German forces in the east to concentrate on pursuing victory on the Western Front. Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare that aimed to cut supply lines sustaining British and French troops combined with the discovery of a secret German plan to entice Mexico to initiate hostilities against the United States if US forces engaged against Germany in Europe resulted in Congress declaring war in December 1917. A series of German offensives against British forces in the spring of 1918 nearly reached Paris, but the British, reinforced by French forces and the first US troops, managed to halt the Germans.

The British and French had nearly collapsed in the face of the 1918 spring offensives—only the injection of more than 2 million US troops and the mobilization of the country's economy to supply the Allied side tipped the balance. The German retreat became a rout after the failed spring offensives, the effects of four years of war, and an Allied blockade that interdicted food and other necessary supplies to the home front. The war had reached its culminating point for the European powers. For Germany, there was no new source of manpower or supplies. Civilians were starving and the troops had reached the limits of their endurance. Rioting in the streets and panic among the politicians combined with the all-out retreat on the battlefield to force negotiations to end the war. On November 11, 1918, the “eleventh hour of the eleventh day,” the cease-fire went into effect ending the War to End All Wars.

⁷¹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*.

President Wilson had attempted to mediate a peace treaty among the combatants prior to the US declaration of war. After the United States weighed in on the side of the British and French, Wilson became determined to shape the peace at the end of the war. He represented the opinion of most Americans that the European system was diseased and outmoded. Secret treaties, nationalism, and militarism had combined in a toxic mixture to predispose the continent toward destructive wars. Wilson sought to instill a liberal institutionalist system that elevated conflict resolution to the international level.⁷² The mechanism would be the League of Nations. But before Wilson's vision for the post-war world could take root, he had to get representatives for the former combatants to agree to make the armistice that had stopped the fighting permanent. He came to the Versailles Peace Conference armed with Fourteen Points that he believed would inoculate the nations of the world against future disastrous conflicts.

Wilson began by arguing against secret treaties and alliances such as the ones that had bound European powers into decisions to go to war that greatly expanded the conflict. His aim at Versailles was "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view."⁷³ In Wilson's view of the future, diplomacy would no longer be carried out by personal envoys in secret meetings, but would instead be the product of public debate and discussion much as democracies carried on the business of government in Parliaments and Congresses. The League of Nations would become the logical place for national representatives to consort with their

⁷² See Klaus Schwabe, *Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power*, trans. Richard Robert Kimber (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985).

⁷³ Woodrow Wilson, "Address to Congress on War Aims and Peace Terms (8 Jan 1918)," in *National Security Law Documents*, ed. John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts, and Robert F. Turner (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2006). 77

counterparts from other nations, thus elevating democratic principles to an international level.

Wilson's next two points focused on international commerce. In an age when all international commerce occurred through maritime shipping, having some guarantee for freedom of the seas was essential. The German practice during the war of unrestricted attacks against shipping haunted the nations that had fallen prey to the U-boat attacks. Wilson sought to outlaw such attacks in the future by declaring "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war..." Likewise, unfair trading practices incited trade wars and harmed countries with less-developed economies. Wilson sought "the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all nations consenting to the peace..."⁷⁴ Thus, freedom for commerce in peace and war and creating a level playing field by rejecting unfair trading practices would, in Wilson's approach, reduce the potential for future conflicts.

Another source of international conflict was the militarism that dominated Europe in the years before the war. Every state had its version of glorifying nationalistic martial culture. Every state had its arms industries. Wilson saw the proliferation of arms as a source of provocation that, if allowed to continue unabated, would lead to a recurrence of conflict in Europe that would eventually envelope the globe. His aim for the peace conference was to convince participants that "national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."⁷⁵ The problem, of course, with such drastic disarmament is that states would either have to trust other states to join the disarmament movement or there would have to be some external agency prepared to intervene against rogue actors who chose the path

⁷⁴ Wilson, "Address to Congress on War Aims and Peace Terms (8 Jan 1918)." 77.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

of armaments and conquest. While some in Europe supported the disarmament movement, none of the major powers' leaders were willing to trust their nations' security to an international peacekeeping force.

Next, Wilson proposed setting colonial possessions on a path of self-government and self-determination. The principle, according to Wilson, should be to give primacy to "the interests of the populations concerned."⁷⁶ French, Belgian, Japanese, and British representatives sought to reinforce and increase their colonial possessions at the expense of Germany and the now-defunct Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. Rather than setting colonial territories on the path toward self-determination and independence, the victors were more interested in adding to their overseas possessions to help with post-war economic recovery. Wilson's notion of considering the interests of the colonial populations was completely out of step with the mindset of the other delegates at Versailles. His persistence on this and other contentious issues combined with the United States' late entry into the war hampered his ability to influence significant terms of the final treaty.

At the time of the peace conference, Russia was embroiled in a bloody civil war involving Lenin's Bolsheviks, known as the "Reds," and the "Whites," various other groups representing the military and monarchists. The allies had suffered the effects of Lenin's separate peace with Germany through the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which had almost cost them the war. They looked with alarm on the emergence of a communist state the size of the Soviet Union, one with Lenin's vision of global communist domination. Wilson, again in a failure to read the sentiments of his European counterparts, proposed stepping back from intervening in Russia to give "...an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her political development and national policy and assure her of a

⁷⁶ Ibid.

sincere welcome into the society of free nations under the institutions of her own choosing...⁷⁷ Britain, France, the United States, Canada, Italy, and Japan had sent troops to join the Whites in 1918 after Lenin signed the treaty with Germany to obtain peace at any price. The allies sought a mechanism to keep German forces engaged in the East and were alarmed at the July 1918 execution of Tsar Nicholas II and his family. Wilson's notion of allowing the Russians to determine their own course of political development was doomed to failure by the Allied intervention in the civil war on the side of the Whites. His advocacy for Russian self-determination, however high-minded it might have been, earned him no points with his European partners and ultimately rang hollow with Lenin—the ultimate victor in the civil war.

The remainder of Wilson's Fourteen Points dealt with reestablishing order in the international system. Wilson proposed that Belgian and French territory occupied by Germany during the war should be restored and the Alsace-Lorraine region taken by Germany in the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian War returned to France. The states of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire should be afforded the right to determine their own futures and types of government along cultural and ethnic lines. The Ottoman Empire would be dissolved with Turkey becoming an independent state and former Ottoman territories in the Middle East and North Africa being given rights to self-determination. He argued for the creation of the free state of Poland with access to the sea (later known as the Danzig Corridor) as a buffer between Russia and Germany. Finally, Wilson's last bargaining point sought "A general association of nations...formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

By involving the United States in World War I and the subsequent peace negotiations Wilson had departed from more than one hundred years of foreign policy tradition. He had intended to shape the peace in ways that required international cooperation and, above all, leadership by the United States to prevent future wars. He envisioned a world order in which colonial powers divested themselves of their overseas possessions. And he urged states that had formerly relied on vast military-industrial enterprises as guarantors of security to disarm while trusting in enlightened international diplomacy to resolve future disputes. Wilson believed that the League of Nations could revise punitive aspects of the peace treaty and that Germany would ultimately rejoin a more stable, peaceful community of European powers. He saw the United States assuming greater responsibility for ensuring justice and liberty in a progressive world order that would reject empires and colonization.

Wilson's Diplomatic Challenges and America's Interwar Shift

Unfortunately, Wilson had failed to include representatives from Congress in his delegation. The Senate, jealously guarding its constitutional power to make treaties, bristled at the notion of committing the United States to a sweeping treaty aimed at ending the fighting, redrawing the map of Europe, distributing colonial territories, and establishing an international institution that promised to alter the role of traditional diplomatic processes.⁷⁹ Pressures from the British and French resulting in modification or abandonment of many of Wilson's Fourteen Points had changed the outcome Wilson expected to achieve at the negotiating table. Wilson's snub of Congressional representation at the prestigious conference combined with the punitive character of the final draft of the treaty resulted in the Senate's refusal to approve the Treaty of Versailles. Furthermore, Senators rejected the notion that an

⁷⁹ Frederick Lewis Allen, *Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1931; repr., 1964). 20-29.

international congress could dictate policies to member states without prior coordination and approval by national legislators. “Wilson’s plan to use the peace treaty to integrate the vanquished enemy into a new liberal order for the world had, for the time being, failed. This failure was not the result of any ‘betrayal’ on Wilson’s part...forced as he was to negotiate from a position of weakness, he had to act contrary to his original aspirations if there was to be any peace treaty at all.”⁸⁰ The League of Nations would operate throughout the Interwar Years without the influence and participation of the United States.⁸¹

The rejection of Wilson’s agenda by the Senate combined with a post-war economic boom to return US foreign policy to a general isolationist tendency that would last until December 1941. Frederick Lewis Allen wrote about the post-war trends that occupied Americans’ attention during the early 1920s. Radio and sports captured the public’s imagination. Later, the explosion of affordable automobile sales (automobile ownership increased by more than 340% to more than 22 million autos between 1921 and 1929) allowed city-dwellers to escape to the country while remaining able to work at their jobs in the cities.⁸² Insulated from the destructive effects of the war, Americans returned to normal routines quickly and prospered more rapidly than did their European counterparts. Unlike in many British and French towns and villages which had had a generation of their youths killed or maimed, with the future leaders of their countries gone, American soldiers returned home to widespread acclaim, rapid demobilization, and a booming economy.

⁸⁰ Schwabe, *Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919*. 395.

⁸¹ See Schwabe, *Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919*. Alan Sharp, *The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).

⁸² Allen, *Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s*. See 134-136 for Allen’s discussion of the explosion of automobiles during the 1920s, a trend that would continue despite the Great Depression in the 1930s.

The United States military during the 1920s could not have served as a tool of imperialist, or even, activist foreign policy. By 1922, Congress had set the size of the Army at 12,000 officers and 125,000 enlisted men.⁸³ This included the Army Air Service, later renamed as the Army Air Corps. The Air Service personnel authorizations dropped from a wartime high of nearly 140,000 personnel in 1918 to an average of approximately 9,600 between 1922 and 1926. The rapid promotions that had occurred during the wartime expansion saw equally rapid demotions under Congressional pressure to demobilize. Promotion lists governed by seniority meant that officers had little prospect for advancement for most of the Interwar Years. For example, Kenneth N. Walker, a key airpower proponent, spent 17 years as a First Lieutenant during the 1920s and 1930s.⁸⁴

As the Depression set in, public and political opinion opposed any notion of intervening in foreign wars. Economic conditions subjected Americans to enough privation without the added sacrifices that accompanied wars. Moreover, after Hitler rose to power as German Chancellor in 1933, his ability to work apparent economic miracles for the German people encouraged many in Europe and in the United States to see him as a man with solutions to problems rather than as the source of problems. Few had read his manifesto, *Mein Kampf*, and even fewer could discern that the turnaround in Germany had come about because of the Nazi's brutal racist tactics. With 25% of the American workforce unemployed and people starving to death, any hint of success appeared worth serious consideration. On the labor front, as wages dropped and prices rose, workers fortunate enough to have jobs sought security in collective bargaining prompting violent reaction by corporations. Strikes and labor demonstrations met with police and

⁸³ *Background Brief*, (1992), <https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/BB-38-The-US-Army-Between-World-Wars-I-and-II.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Martha Byrd, *Kenneth N. Walker: Airpower's Untempered Crusader* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997).

private security firms that were not reluctant to disperse strikers and protesters using violent means.⁸⁵ The last thing Americans wanted was to become embroiled in yet another destructive European war.

As European security crises revealed Hitler's malevolent intent, President Franklin D. Roosevelt perceived that Europe, and possibly the world, would experience another major war. His response in 1933, with the nation still feeling the effects of the Depression, was to call for international disarmament—focusing on banning offensive weapons. Roosevelt argued that there were two types of nations, those that sought to conquer their neighbors and those that sought to defend their territory. Every nation had a right to defend itself, but those few nations with offensive designs against their neighbors could plunge entire regions into disastrous wars that could threaten the global order. His call for nations to disarm their offensive inventories, backed by commitments of all states to cooperate in coercing those that refused to join the movement would guarantee compliance. For US defense policy, Roosevelt's call for disarmament signaled his intent to remain aloof from international conflict, for the time being.⁸⁶

The Eve of World War II

Japanese aggression in the Far East and Hitler's moves in Europe signaled that the only result of disarmament policies was subjugation of the weak by the aggressors. By 1938, Roosevelt saw clearly that the world was headed for another bloody cycle of war. Congress and his own political party, however, were determined to remain isolated from the coming storm. Gerhard Weinberg wrote, "combined with a voluntary reduction of the American army to about the level imposed

⁸⁵ Piers Brendon, *The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000). Robert S. McElvaine, *The Great Depression: America, 1929-1941* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009).

⁸⁶ H.W. Brands, *Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (New York: Anchor Books, 2008). 262.

on Germany by the [Versailles] peace treaty, the measures taken to keep the United States out of war merely encouraged Adolf Hitler and thus helped precipitate another war.”⁸⁷ Converting US industrial potential to wartime production would take time—each delay in starting industrial mobilization only pushed back the dates for the United States to influence the war’s outcome.

In England, Winston Churchill had waged a nearly solitary campaign during the 1930s to mobilize his country against Hitler’s rising militarism. The second book in William Manchester’s three-volume biography of Churchill describes the 1930s as Churchill’s “wilderness years” when his opposition to government policies nearly ended his distinguished and legendary political career.⁸⁸ Prime Ministers Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain had led Parliament and the nation to appease Hitler to their ultimate disgrace. Chamberlain returned from the 1938 Munich Conference declaring he had secured peace—but it was a peace bought at the expense of Czechoslovakian freedom—and British and French honor. Hitler consumed Czechoslovakia while preparing for future conquests. While late to the game, Britain and France eventually confronted Hitler over his (and the Soviet Union’s) conquest of Poland in September 1939—Europe was at war.⁸⁹

Rather than going on the offensive while German forces were mopping up the last vestiges of Polish resistance, Britain and France waited throughout the fall, winter, and spring of 1939-40 giving Germany the chance to plan and organize for an all-out assault on Western Europe. The assault came in June 1940. The French Army and the Third Republic collapsed in six weeks. A right-wing regime led by octogenarian Marshal Phillippe Pétain replaced the inept Third

⁸⁷ Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 17.

⁸⁸ William Manchester, *The Last Lion*, vol. 2, *Alone* (New York: Bantam Books, 1983).

⁸⁹ Manchester, *The Last Lion*, 2, *Alone*.

Republic and the national values of Libert ,  galit , Fraternit  gave way to the uninspiring slogan of Travail, Famille, Patrie (work, family, homeland).⁹⁰ The British Expeditionary Force, trapped against the English Channel and rapidly advancing German armored columns everywhere else, lived to fight another day owing to heroic evacuation efforts at Dunkirk. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1940, it appeared that all of Europe would cower under the Nazi flag. Except England. Winston Churchill answered the call to become Prime Minister in what he later called England's darkest hour. He swore to resist German tyranny unto death and demanded the same from his fellow English and Commonwealth citizens. For nearly a year, it seemed that death was the likely outcome for Britain as Hitler's Luftwaffe bombed British cities mercilessly—eventually, more than 100,000 British civilians would die as a consequence of German aerial attacks.

While England absorbed German bombardment, Churchill appealed repeatedly to President Roosevelt to send material—food, weapons, ships, tanks, ammunition—to give England the tools to carry the fight to Germany. Roosevelt's hands were tied by public law and public opinion. As a neutral party, US firms could trade with any nation and chose to do so on a cash-and-carry basis. British citizens, and their leaders, began to see the insistence on the part of US companies—and the US government—that they receive prior payment for goods and services as taking advantage of circumstances to drain the Empire and its treasury. Roosevelt eventually came up with the idea for Lend-Lease as a mechanism to support the British war effort, priming the machinery for American rearmament, and for the time being, keeping the United States out of the war.⁹¹

⁹⁰ See Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*, Morningside ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, 1972).

⁹¹ Brands, *Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt*. 577-579.

The United States Army had begun a halting rearmament and industrial expansion fueled by the infusion of British gold as the war in Europe intensified. In the fall of 1939, Roosevelt authorized the active duty and National Guard end-strength to grow to 227,000 and 235,000 respectively. By the summer of 1940, tensions in the Far East and Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union prompted Congress to authorize an Army budget of \$8 billion and an end-strength of one and a half million officers and enlisted men.⁹² While the national mood and the avowed policy remained steadfastly isolationist, most Americans had come to believe that the war would eventually threaten national security—and, as it appeared to most observers in 1940-41, if Hitler defeated the Soviet Union—as he was likely to do, only a badly battered Britain and the United States would remain to oppose him.

America's Military Transformation and Strategic Planning for World War II

In the summer of 1941, four Airmen produced a remarkable document, Air War Plans Division (AWPD)-1, called by Major General Haywood S. Hansell—one of the four—"The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler." The four Army Air Corps officers were Lieutenant Colonels Harold L. George and Kenneth N. Walker, and Majors Haywood S. Hansell and Laurence S. Kuter. All four officers had served on the faculty of the Air Corps Tactical School at Maxwell Field near Montgomery, Alabama during the 1930s. More importantly, all four were part of the Air Corps' "bomber mafia." They had refined Brigadier General Billy Mitchell's ideas on how to use airpower into a doctrine labelled High Altitude Precision Daylight Strategic Bombardment. They tied their doctrine to a technology—the self-defending bomber—and a tactic—daylight precision air strikes against an enemy's "industrial web," the

⁹² *Background Brief*, 5-6.

network of industries that produced military and commercial goods that sustained the state.⁹³

USAAF Chief, General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, assigned George and his team to produce a “production plan” comprising the amount and types of materials necessary to defeat the enemy. The AWPD-1 planners saw this as an opportunity to shape not only the production requirements for the war, but also to shape the strategy in ways that used airpower to the best advantage. They believed that using the right materials in the wrong ways would not only squander planes and men, but equally important, using what they considered to be a nonsensical approach would hinder the progress of airpower toward their ultimate goal—an independent air force. Thus, all four had multiple purposes in mind when they gathered in the stifling Munitions Building that housed the Air Staff offices in Washington in the late summer of 1941.

First, they had to give Arnold what he had asked for, a production plan that outlined the numbers and types of aircraft, munitions, trained aviators, mechanics, spare parts, and support materials. Second, they wanted to describe the strategy for using the vast air armadas they intended to create. In their minds, that meant employing airpower to strike at the source of enemy industrial power—the interdependent elements of the industrial web that sustained the enemy state and its fielded forces. Third, they wanted to lay a foundation for how airpower would figure in post-war defense strategies by showing that aviation, properly employed, could win the nation’s wars more efficiently and more effectively than land and sea power.

All four Airmen believed that pursuing an airpower-centric strategy would save American lives. Their reference point for this belief was the casualty bill from World War I in which more than 9 million soldiers lost their lives and as many as 4 million more were

⁹³ Robert T. Finney, *History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1940*, vol. 100, USAF Historical Studies, (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1955; repr., 1998).

maimed and wounded on the stalemated battlefields. Airpower would restore mobility and strategy to warfighting while ground forces became stalled in the face of lethal artillery, gas, and machine guns. Finally, if the planners could accomplish all of these tasks, they would have laid a foundation for organizing national defense around an independent Air Force that would become the dominant military Service in the post-war era.

The key concept in the air planners' strategy was the concept of the industrial web—the notion that modern societies relied on a complex network of industrial organizations. Attacks against any single node or component of the system would have cascading effects throughout the system. The essence of air strategy involved analyzing the enemy's industrial web to identify key components as targets for concentrated precision bombardment. The planners, informed by Hansell's recent assignment to England where he observed Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command's approach to the war, believed that the German war economy had been fully mobilized. Operating at full-speed, the connections between nodes of German industry would be under great stress, therefore, they would be susceptible to concentrated aerial attack.⁹⁴ This fundamental assumption would later prove to be in error—not until 1943 under Albert Speer's leadership did German industry begin to take up the slack.

Under intense pressure to complete the plan, the AWPD-1 team proposed attacks against 154 critical German targets comprising electrical power generating capability, transportation, aircraft assembly plants, and petroleum processing facilities. Getting to these targets deep in Germany would require fighting through layers of enemy fighters and avoiding murderous anti-aircraft defenses (which would logically

⁹⁴ James C. Gaston, *Planning the American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941, An Inside Narrative* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982). 33. Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945*. 176-213.

be positioned to protect cities and industrial areas). The plan called for gaining air superiority—“an intermediate objective of overriding priority”—but stopped short of making it a prerequisite for launching the strategic attacks. Airmen accepted that they would have to fight their way to their targets until the USAAF could gain air superiority. Air Corps Tactical School dogma held that the speed and self-defending capabilities of the bombers would provide adequate protection against enemy fighter aircraft.⁹⁵

The AWPD-1 team delivered a production plan that called for more than 60,000 aircraft with heavy and medium bombers dominating the request. Using the best data they had available, the planners factored in attrition from enemy defenses, equipment breakdowns, and accidents. Like many of their assumptions, the attrition estimates fell short of actual losses during the war. Similarly, the planners calculated the numbers of sorties required to destroy a target using estimates of anticipated bombing accuracy. The RAF had abandoned attempts at daylight precision bombing early in the war in favor of nighttime area bombing because German defenses were too lethal and RAF aircrews could not put their bombs on the targets with precision. USAAF bombing advocates remained committed to the doctrine of daylight bombing as the primary means of achieving the precision necessary to destroy the enemy's vital industrial targets. Accuracy, however, remained a relative term as American aircrews were to find out in the skies over Germany.

In August 1941, the USAAF did not have the beginnings of a force capable of implementing its strategy. The Service was in the process of expanding to 152,000 men in the context of a total authorized end-strength for the Army of 1,531,800. Major Kuter projected a requirement

⁹⁵ Haywood S. Hansell, *The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler* (Atlanta, GA: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter, 1972; repr., 1975, US Government Printing Office).

of 2,164,916 Airmen and 63,417 planes by April 1944.⁹⁶ There were fewer than 50 B-17 airplanes in the inventory and most fighter aircraft were underpowered and lacked modern aerodynamic design features. The AWPD-1 planners forecast a need for bombers with 3,000-mile range, capable of speeds greater than 300 nautical miles per hour, and capable of carrying a 3,000-pound payload. Should the war continue past 1945, or should Germany conquer Britain and render its airbases unavailable, the USAAF would require aircraft with intercontinental range capable of carrying much heavier payloads. With amazing foresight, they had anticipated the B-36 intercontinental bomber more than a decade before the first such aircraft saw service.⁹⁷

As insightful as the planners were when it came to the bomber force, they were less prescient when projecting requirements for long-range escort fighters or ground attack aircraft. Hansell recalled, “A high-flying bomber, cruising over 200 miles per hour, simply could not be intercepted by a fighter of about the same speed which must first spot the oncoming enemy from the ground, then fire up the engine and climb to altitude before it could attack. By that time, the bomber would be past the only alternative was to keep fighters on constant airborne alert, or patrol, a system far too expensive and impractical.”⁹⁸ Fighter aircraft were included in the plan, but they did not figure significantly in the offensive strategy because the fighters of the day did not have the range to escort bomber formations deep into German from their home bases in England.

The planner’s prejudice toward bombers reflected their desire to justify an independent service with offensive war-winning potential. “George and Walker contended that bombardment was the real

⁹⁶ Gaston, *Planning the American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941, An Inside Narrative*.

⁹⁷ Hansell, *The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler*.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 18-19.

offensive element of the air force, and hence it was the basic air arm.”⁹⁹ None of the AWPDP-1 planners rejected the requirements for fighter aircraft, they simply could not envision technological advances that would give fighters the speed and range that would allow them to keep pace with long-range bombers. Furthermore, fighters could not deliver concentrated offensive strikes against the enemy’s vital industrial systems with the same power as the bombers. Large numbers of ground attack aircraft would relegate airpower’s contribution to a supporting role for ground forces. AWPDP-1 was a comprehensive plan in that it included production requirements for all types of aircraft, munitions, and support materials. The emphasis on strategic attack of vital enemy centers, however, sowed the seeds for intra-service conflict that would have far-reaching organizational and cultural effects.

Because AWPDP-1 was a production plan designed before the United States entered the war, its authors did not fully consider the potential demands of a two-theater war. Although they clearly expected war against Japan in the Pacific, they assumed that Germany would remain the primary opponent. After defeating Germany, they would pivot air forces to deal with the Japanese. They also did not anticipate the challenges inherent in coalition warfare. One of the most important factors, however, that prevented them from implementing their strategy of attacking the German war economy centered on the rate at which they could build up the force. By 1942, the United States found itself engaged in a global war. While President Roosevelt had confirmed the planners’ intuition to concentrate on winning the war in Europe before turning toward the Pacific, the reality was that US and Allied forces found themselves fighting simultaneously on all fronts. US Army leaders sought to launch an invasion in Western Europe as quickly as possible, but slow mobilization, an immature logistics system, and the

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

interplay with Russia and Great Britain delayed the invasion until the Spring of 1944.

| Distribution and Composition of Forces (Including Unit, Depot, and Initial Replacement Reserves of Aircraft) in AWPDP-1 | | | | | |
|---|----------------|------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|
| Type | | Distribution | | | Total |
| | | European Theater | Asian-Far East Theater | Western Hemisphere (American Theater) | |
| | | Gp/Planes | Gp/Planes | Gp/Planes | Gp/Planes |
| Medium Bombers | B25/26 | 10/1060 | | | 10/1060 |
| Heavy Bombers | B17/24 | 20/1700 | 2/170 | 25/2125 | 47/3995 |
| Very Heavy Bombers | B29/32 | 24/2040 | | | 24/2040 |
| Very Long Range Bombers | B36 | 44/3740 | | | 44/3740 |
| Fighters | P40/47/51 | 21/3412 | 1/162 | 32/5200 | 54/8744 |
| Light Bombers | A-20 | | | | 13/936 |
| Dive Bombers | | | | | 13/1248 |
| Transport | C47/46/54 | | | | 19/1064 |
| Observation | | | | | 27/1917 |
| Trainers | | | | | 37051 |
| Total | | 119/11952 | 3/332 | 57/7325 | 251/61795 |
| Unit Equipment and Depot Reserves Including Initial Replacements | | | | | |
| | Unit Equipment | Reserves | Percent | Total | |
| Medium Bombardment Group | | 57 | 49 | 96 | 106 |
| Heavy Bombardment Group | | 35 | 50 | 150 | 85 |
| Very Heavy Bombardment Group | | 35 | 50 | 150 | 85 |
| Very Long Range Group | | 35 | 50 | 150 | 85 |
| Fighter Group | | 80 | 82 | 100 | 162 |
| Light Bombardment Group | | 37 | 35 | 100 | 72 |
| Dive Bomber Group | | 57 | 39 | 70 | 96 |
| Transport Group | | 52 | 4 | 8 | 56 |
| Observation Group | | 52 | 19 | 36 | 71 |

Table 1: AWPDP-1 Aircraft Production Requirements¹⁰⁰

In the meantime, airpower—especially the bomber force—became a necessity to address the demands of all theaters. While war in the central Pacific concentrated on carrier and amphibious operations, General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific theater with its main bases in Australia and New Guinea relied on heavy and medium

¹⁰⁰ Hansell, *The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler*. 92-93.

bombers to carry the fight to the Japanese.¹⁰¹ Ground attack and fighter aircraft also figured significantly in operations against the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. MacArthur transmitted a steady, never-ending stream of requests for more men and materiel to support his operations. For its part, the Navy argued that the Japanese were the primary enemy and all war production should support operations to defeat the Empire's forces that had attacked the United States directly.

As for the allies, Stalin pressured Roosevelt and Churchill to open a second European front. He claimed, not without some justification, that the Soviet Union was doing the lion's share of killing Germans—and in the process was also doing the lion's share of the dying. Stalin never missed an opportunity to press his demand for a second front in Europe. Churchill, to his credit, sought every opportunity to do so despite his concerns that failure in a cross-channel invasion could fatally weaken British and American warfighting capabilities. US Army generals, especially General George C. Marshall, argued forcefully for launching the invasion of Europe, but the numbers of transports and landing craft simply were not available in 1942 and 1943—to say nothing of the anemic state of the Army's combat and logistics forces.

The RAF had conducted night bombing raids against German cities since 1940, but the numbers of aircraft available for the bombing campaign, the terrible weather, poor navigation capabilities, and German defenses limited the effectiveness of Bomber Command's raids. Stalin never acknowledged the RAF's operations as constituting a second front in the air. Nor would he later acknowledge the role played by US Lend-Lease contributions in supplying and sustaining Soviet forces or the USAAF bombing contribution as making a difference in depleting Germany's warmaking potential. What mattered to Stalin was troops on the ground killing Germans. By placing Germany in the dilemma of

¹⁰¹ See George C. Kenney, *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War* (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997).

fighting a two-front war Stalin sought to accelerate the attrition of the Wehrmacht and, ultimately, to bring the war to an end.

On the ground, British and American forces were far from ready to combine their operations in 1942, but leaders from both countries acknowledged the necessity of engaging German land forces somewhere. North Africa proved to be the most logical place for Allied ground forces to attack German forces while learning to work together. If the allies could neutralize German forces in the Mediterranean, they would secure the Suez Canal route for vital oil supplies to Britain and Allied air forces would gain a second area from which to base bombardment raids into Southern and Eastern Europe. Operation Torch—the invasion of North Africa—gave British and American forces their first experiences fighting together.¹⁰² After defeating German forces in North Africa, Roosevelt and Churchill met at Casablanca to decide the next steps in the campaign.

From the USAAF perspective, the most important decision to come out of the Casablanca conference was to preserve the ability of US bombers to conduct daylight raids against Germany. Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, commander of the USAAF Eighth Air Force, presented the logic of daylight strategic precision bombardment. Churchill remained skeptical in light of his knowledge of the RAF experience with day and night bombing raids over Germany, but he also realized that attempting to force the Americans to do something they were dead set against would not serve his long-term strategic interests. In the end, the leaders reached a compromise. RAF Bomber Command would continue with its night area bombing raids against German cities while USAAF bombers would strike German industrial targets during daytime. Along with the original targets proposed in AWPD-1, the wartime experience resulted in adding German submarine bases as a high priority target

¹⁰² See Rick Atkinson, *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943*, 1st ed. ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2002).

set. German submarine operations in the North Atlantic threatened to knock the British out of the war, and in late 1942-early 1943, the U-boats remained a deadly threat to Allied transit routes between the United States and Europe.

German ball bearing production represented another alteration to the AWPD-1 target list. Analysts reasoned that nearly every type of modern weapon system—tanks, ships, airplanes, field artillery, and submarines—depended on anti-friction bearings. Planners believed the factories that produced these critical components were susceptible to air attack and, once struck, would be difficult to reconstitute. Thus, the target list for the Combined Bomber Offensive remained similar to the list produced by the AWPD-1 planners, but it dispersed the concentration of the bombardment raids by increasing the numbers and types of targets Airmen would attempt to destroy. Furthermore, by adding targets that were not essential to the operation of the war economy as a whole, the dispersal of the bombing effects further compromised the strategy. Allied leaders supported the basic tenet of airpower theory with some modifications—that modern states rely on connected industrial systems and attacking those systems using precision daylight bombardment would bring about the eventual collapse of the warmaking potential of the enemy. As US airpower increased in strength, Airmen would test the validity of that theory with their lives over the skies of Germany.

German defenses exacted a terrible toll on Allied Airmen. Fighters attacked the bomber formations as they entered and left their target areas putting pre-war theories of the invincibility of self-defending bombers to the test. In response, USAAF commanders stressed to their crews the importance of maintaining rigid formation discipline so the bombers could protect themselves with interlocking fields of fire from their .50 caliber machine guns. German fighters outranged the bombers'

guns with 20mm cannon and 7.9mm machine guns. At times, German fighters rammed lead bombers to break up the formation.

Bombers that survived attacks by waves of fighters on the inbound run to their targets encountered murderous anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire (FLAK—derived from the German word for anti-aircraft guns “flugabwehrkanone”). Bomber tactics dictated that aircraft fly “straight and level” on the target run to improve bombing accuracy. Many aircraft took direct hits from ground fire while over target areas causing damage to critical control mechanisms, wounding, or killing crewmembers. Damaged aircraft that could not maintain formation speed and altitude on the return to their home bases became easy prey for German fighter aircraft. RAF Lancaster bombers carried crews of seven men and the Wellington carried a crew of five. B-17 and B-24 aircraft carried 10-man crews and bailing out required moving to the bomb bay or to a wheel-well to jump or fall out of the aircraft. This was difficult under normal circumstances, but in airplanes that were damaged, out of control, or breaking up, bailing out was even more difficult or impossible. RAF Bomber Command suffered 125,000 killed, missing, or captured aircrew. Combined losses for USAAF 8th and 15th Air Forces reached almost 70,000 killed, missing, and captured.

Reviews of airpower’s contribution during the war remain controversial. Participants like Maj Gen Haywood Hansell argued that diverting bombers to strike less critical targets denied Airmen the opportunity to prove their theories. He perceived attacks against submarine bases and ball bearing plants as diversions that wasted valuable sorties, ordnance, and lives on targets that could not bring about the anticipated collapse of the German war economy. Similarly, he saw the pre-D-Day campaign against transportation targets in France and Germany as a diversion from the strategic aim of knocking Germany out of the war. While he acknowledged the importance of isolating the Normandy beaches from German reinforcements, he

remained adamant that bomber attacks against railroad marshaling yards and bridges allowed the Germans time to repair and reconstitute industries that were on the verge of collapse.

Hansell admitted that German defenses exceeded his and the rest of the AWPD-1 planners' estimates. The lethal combination of fighters and AAA inflicted unsustainable casualties on both RAF Bomber Command and USAAF bomber units forcing pauses in bomber operations that gave the Germans time to repair facilities and develop workarounds to compensate for those which the bombers had destroyed. One way to view the effects of Germany's air defense system was that it shifted the much-feared trench war of attrition of World War I to the skies. When airpower was the only means of striking a blow at Germany available to the allies, overall attrition rates of up to 15% became the terrible price that Allied leaders agreed to pay.

The German industrial web proved more resilient than Airmen had expected. In the first place, the Nazi war industries had not fully mobilized for war, and the internal competition for resources meant that it never operated with peak efficiency. Therefore, Airmen were shocked to find that German industrial output rose as Albert Speer, the Nazi Minister of Armaments and War Production, took up the slack in the system. Attacks against the German aircraft industry had an effect, as did the losses of Luftwaffe pilots in the air war over Germany. But, changes in Allied fighter tactics that allowed pilots to range ahead of the bomber formations to hunt German fighters, the shift of German fighter defenses to the eastern front as Soviet forces surged toward Germany, and the addition of long-range drop tanks to Allied fighters which allowed them to reach Berlin combined with the bomber attacks against aircraft factories to attrit the German fighter force. By the end of the war, German fighter pilots averaged 10 hours of training before flying their first combat missions compared to 220 hours for US fighter

pilots.¹⁰³ Under such conditions, the Luftwaffe fighter force experienced a death spiral of progressively increasing attrition.

President Roosevelt commissioned a group of industry experts and scientists to conduct a survey of the results of the bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan. *United States Strategy Bombing Survey (USSBS)* teams followed ground forces into Germany and Japan after each nation surrendered to observe and document the effects of air attacks against enemy cities. The detailed reports on each target system provide on-the-scene assessments of the effects of modern air war against well-defended cities. Airmen looked to the *USSBS* reports to validate pre-war theories of air warfare. They used the reports as evidence that the best way to organize, train, and equip forces for air warfare was through a separate air force. With respect to the war in Europe, the *USSBS* authors concluded that airpower was “decisive” in combination with sea and land forces in bringing about the defeat of the European Axis Powers.¹⁰⁴

The Pacific War was more difficult to understand using a strategic bombing lens. For much of the war, US Airmen could not strike at the sources of Japanese war industries. The *USSBS* authors described the destruction of the Japanese Navy, the merchant fleet, and the isolation of the Japanese Army—all of which required airpower operating in concert with land and sea power. In the Home Islands, Japanese war industries remained dispersed in the cities making targeting for bombers more difficult. In fact, Gen Arnold replaced Maj Gen Hansell with Maj Gen Curtiss E. LeMay when Hansell refused to abandon pre-war notions of industrial targeting. LeMay removed defensive armament from his B-29s, ordered strikes to occur from medium altitudes to improve

¹⁰³ Stephen L McFarland and Wesley Phillips Newton, *To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority Over Germany, 1942-1944* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991).

¹⁰⁴ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Summary Reports: The European and Pacific Wars*, 7th, 2001 ed. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1987).

accuracy, and switched to incendiary bombs rather than relying solely on high explosives. The result was terrifying—cities burned to the ground and thousands of civilians were killed or wounded in each attack. By the time of the atomic bomb drops in August 1945, most major cities were smoking ruins. To the *USSBS* authors, airpower was essential in the Pacific, but not decisive.¹⁰⁵

Conclusion

The history of US foreign policy from the early days of the Republic to the end of the Second World War reveals two contradictory trends. The dominant trend involves a preference for isolationism. The relative sanctuary of the Western Hemisphere provided by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans gave national leaders the luxury of remaining aloof from international conflicts—or at least giving them the option of choosing in which conflicts and at which times they would become involved. The second trend emerged in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involving the interplay between the nation's rising economic and industrial power and the attendant potential for coming into conflict with other international actors. The international power dynamics of the first half of the twentieth century brought an increased emphasis on using the military instrument of power to promote national interests. This, consequently, brought on the need for larger, permanent military institutions that were trained and ready to engage at a moment's notice.

Technological revolutions accompanied the social and political trends. As early as the US Civil War, railroads had transformed how nations moved and sustained their armies in the field. The advent of the airplane further transformed how nations prepared for and fought wars by introducing a third dimension to warfare. While the addition of airplanes forever altered conditions over battlefields by subjecting surface forces to observation and attack from above, it also expanded the

¹⁰⁵ Survey, *Summary Reports: The European and Pacific Wars*.

war to encompass the home fronts of the combatants. Entire societies could become engaged in the war effort as airplanes capable of overflying and bombing enemy towns and cities became legitimate targets. The destruction formerly confined to areas adjacent to battlefields now expanded to the entire nation. Airpower's prominent role in every theater of World War II meant that no state would consider waging future wars without investing in some type of airpower capability. For non-state actors that would become prominent contenders in the post-World War II security context, fielding large air forces would not be an option. They would, however, have to devise strategies and tactics to counter the airpower capabilities fielded by their adversaries.

The unsteady alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union would not survive in the peace that followed. While the special relationship, as Winston Churchill characterized it, between the United States and Great Britain remained viable, the wartime trends that saw the United States taking a senior role in the relationship accelerated after the war. For their part, the Soviet Union's leaders sought to extract payment for the losses inflicted on their nation by Germany during the war. Stalin and the Communist Party sought to create vassal buffer states between the Soviet Union and Western Europe while removing every asset of material or economic value from the conquered territories. As the Soviets' post-war behavior and policies became more draconian, conflict with the United States and other democracies seemed to be an inevitable outcome. This, in turn, became a catalyst for changes in the US defense establishment.

Questions for Discussion

1. Why do Airmen view national security challenges differently from Sailors, Soldiers, Marines, or Guardians?

2. Why was there a reluctance on the part of US leaders in the nineteenth century to establish deep relationships with foreign powers?
3. In what ways did the Monroe Doctrine differ from the advice in Washington's *Farewell Address*?
4. What influenced US foreign policy in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and how did those influences affect the military?
5. Given the US intent to "exercise international police power," why do you believe it took the United States so long to enter World War I?
6. How did the late entry of the United States affect President Wilson's ability to achieve his peace treaty goals?
7. Why did the United States reduce its military force structure so drastically between World War I and World War II?
8. Why did the United States persist in an isolationist policy for so long before becoming involved in World War II?
9. How did airpower prove "decisive" during World War II?
10. Why did the United States not return to an isolationist policy following World War II?



CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL SECURITY FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II

The obvious change that came about after World War II was that the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as superpowers. Writing in the 1941 seminal *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to Hitler*, Edward Mead Earle presciently observed “it would be a rash man who would forecast Russian military strategy in Europe and the Far East after the German invader has been crushed. But the foundation of that strategy almost certainly will be the strategic security of the USSR...other nations may wane, but the USSR. and the USA. will emerge from the present struggle in overwhelming strength.”¹⁰⁶ Earle’s prediction came true in spades in 1945 as Allied forces swept in on Germany from all sides and as the noose around Japan tightened. As events following the war would show, the shared vision of defeating the Axis Powers did not carry over into a shared vision of the post-war world order.

Understanding the mindset, the assumptions, the tools, and the overarching technology, nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, that formed the context for the early Cold War is essential to understanding its later evolution. A careful reading of the interactions between Soviet and United States diplomats, however, reveals more fundamental issues that led to the tensions that ultimately coalesced into the bipolar standoff. From today’s vantage point, the Cold War can seem to be a somewhat bizarre period when even the most enlightened

¹⁰⁶ Edward Meade Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to Hitler* (New York: Athenum, 1941; reprint, 1961). 363-64.

leaders seemed unable to prevent their nations from being swept along by Machiavellian forces that threatened to plunge the world into another global war. Compared to today's complex, dangerous, and ever-shifting threat environment, strategists, military leaders, and diplomats can perceive the Cold War to be a simpler, easier-to-manage time.

This ethno- and ego-centric perspective, however, conceals a misunderstanding of the inherent complexities of international conflict, the role that diplomacy and strategy play in international relations, and a lack of appreciation for how difficult it is for leaders to step outside their paradigms. Today we have a healthy fear of *The Bomb*, but many leaders in the early Cold War perceived atomic weapons to be just *bigger bombs* with which to intimidate potential aggressor states. In the early Cold War, policy makers and strategists still viewed the military instrument of power through the lens of balancing the power of conventional military forces and the war industries that sustained them. It was only after atomic weapons gave way to thermonuclear weapons and scientists matched those warheads to long-range missiles that national security practitioners began casting about for ways to frame conflicts around deterrence strategies designed to prevent the escalation toward direct nuclear confrontation.

Today, we rely on a rich literature focused on deterrence, but many leaders in the years following World War II had no such legacy upon which to draw. Today, we operate in a world in which the numbers of actors and the levels of interaction are fluid and shifting, while in the early years of the Cold War the state, and for practical purposes, the two superpowers, remained the supreme actors and arbiters on the world stage.

In many ways it is as difficult for contemporary observers to comprehend the early Cold War context as it is to imagine a world without personal computers, cellular telephones, or the Internet. Viewing the early Cold War through the lenses of the features of the

mature conflict contributes to erroneous critical analyses. Without a thorough appreciation for the facts of the case, the assumptions behind decisions and actions, and the alternatives available to decision makers, contemporary strategists and analysts are likely to go astray when seeking to draw lessons from the past to inform contemporary policies and strategies.¹⁰⁷

During the early years of the Cold War, the run-up to World War II and the conduct of that war constituted the formative paradigm for most leaders. Most contemporary professional military education institutions in the United States limit their exploration of this period to the blockade of Berlin by the Soviets and the Korean War. This narrow view casts the conflict into a purely military light and often ignores the long-term sources of tension between the two states. From such a perspective, the Soviet Union clearly instigated a confrontation that escalated with each exchange. The United States and the Western Alliance repeatedly gave ground and formulated restrained options to confront the Soviets' aggressive moves. Eventually, the West settled on a containment strategy designed to keep the Soviets at bay until the inherent economic strength of the Alliance proved the flaws in Communist dogma. That may have been what happened. However, from the US perspective, the policies that led to such events occurred in a context shaped not only by the apparent collapse of a wartime partnership, but within the memory of exchanges that had taken place since the United States recognized the Soviet Union in 1933. From the Soviet perspective, the relationship may have soured much earlier in the Russian Civil War and the attempts by the United States and other powers to shape the outcome of the Russian Revolution.

¹⁰⁷ Parts of this chapter derive from an unpublished conference paper delivered at King's College, London. See Cain, Anthony C. "Seeking Effectiveness: Forging Early Cold War Strategy," a paper presented at the Sir Michael Howard Centre's Early Cold War: New Perspectives Conference, King's College, London 14 November 2018.

Two primary sets of sources provide particular insights into the evolution of the relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. The first is *The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*—the vast set of State Department correspondence that give researchers insights into the inner workings of the US Foreign Service. The letters, telegrams, memoranda, meeting minutes, and policy-execution exchanges between the US Embassy in Moscow, the State Department, and other US Government agencies reveal the challenges encountered by the first generation of US diplomats charged with engaging with the Soviet Union. The second set of records involves the post-war articles published in *Foreign Affairs*. Certainly, the publication of George Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” under the pen-name “X” is a watershed in the history of the Cold War. But a review of the articles published between 1945 and 1950 shows how scholars and policy makers in the United States reached consensus regarding how the relationship between the burgeoning superpowers should take shape. Furthermore, matching the State Department records with the trend in public policy articles shows that while Kennan came to moderate his thinking regarding US strategy toward the Soviet Union, many in the policy community, most of whom lacked Kennan’s insight into the Soviet leadership’s culture and behavior, urged a more aggressive approach toward their Soviet interlocutors.

During the war years—roughly from 1940 to 1945—the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union temporarily set aside many grievances that would resurface after the war in favor of prosecuting the war against common enemies. The Soviets, rightly, perceived themselves in a literal struggle for national survival. British and American leaders, while keenly aware of the hard road ahead, were convinced of the ultimate outcome after the United States entered the war in December 1941. The Western Allies focused on ensuring the return to continental Europe would lead to ultimate victory. Stalin repeatedly badgered

Churchill and Roosevelt to open a second front while ignoring the logistical difficulties in doing so.

Stalin also discounted Allied material contributions to Soviet survival through Lend-Lease—in his mind, the blood contribution in the bitter struggle against Germany was all that mattered and the Soviet Union bore the brunt of that contribution. Soviet leaders remained equally unconcerned about the Pacific War that required the mobilization of previously unthinkable resources in terms of ships and supplies to loosen the Japanese garrote on the vast, but sparsely populated Pacific and Far East. Almost immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, to the dismay of many US diplomats and the frustration of the Truman administration, the Soviets began constructing their view of the post-war world order.

The early Cold War was a period with no solid doctrine of nuclear warfare, no conception of Mutually-Assured Destruction, Extended Deterrence, and no Escalation Theory with which to inform policy makers. In a very real sense, this was a world in which atomic, and subsequently thermonuclear weapons remained viable tools of warfare. If the Cold War was a set of conscious strategic choices, those choices must have occurred within a decision-making framework informed by some consensus visible to the leaders of the day.

Beginning the Relationship—Recognition and Initial Interchanges

In 1933, President Roosevelt decided to recognize the Soviet Union and appointed William C. Bullitt, Jr. as the first US Ambassador to Moscow.¹⁰⁸ The negotiations leading up to recognition were

¹⁰⁸ H. W. Brands' masterful biography of Roosevelt summarizes Roosevelt's approach to recognition. Brands illuminates the linkage between foreign policy and the domestic issues related to climbing out of the depression. "Roosevelt leaned toward recognition from the start of his presidency. As harsh as he could be toward certain business groups when it suited his political purposes, he fully understood that exports benefitted all classes in America. And, without thinking too specifically

contentious and there were several issues that remained unresolved. After making the decision to establish normal relations with the Soviet Union, President Roosevelt reached out to Mikhail Kalinin, President of the Soviet All-Union Central Executive Committee, writing, "It is most regrettable that these great peoples, between whom a happy tradition of friendship existed for more than a century to their mutual advantage, should now be without a practical method of communicating directly with each other. The difficulties that have created this anomalous situation are serious but not, in my opinion, insoluble; and difficulties between great nations can be removed only by frank, friendly conversations."¹⁰⁹ Roosevelt had occupied the White House for seven months and had given his policy advisors ample opportunity to comment on the pros and cons of extending recognition. In the end, Roosevelt believed that with more normal relations, the two states could resolve what he considered to be petty differences and forge a more solid coalition against a rising Nazi state that, frankly, held more danger for the Soviets than it did for the United States.

The State Department advised the President not to recognize the Soviet Union. The global financial crisis, the ongoing challenge of enacting the post-World War I peace treaties, and skepticism bordering on outright resentment of the Soviet regime had worked against recognition for more than a decade. Hoover Administration Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, summarized the issues for Senator William E. Borah in a September 8, 1932 letter. "We were trying to buttress the great peace treaties which had been negotiated since the end of the war by developing in behalf of them an international sentiment throughout

about it, he concurred in the belief that an American-Russian rapprochement might give pause to aggressors in Central Europe and East Asia." See H. W. Brands. *Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt*, (New York: Anchor Books, 2009): 438-39.

¹⁰⁹ *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)*, The Soviet Union, 1933, President Roosevelt to the President of the Soviet All-Union Central Executive Committee (Kalinin), Washington, October 10, 1933: 17-18.

the world in support of good faith and the sacredness of keeping international promises.”¹¹⁰ Despite the failure of the United States to enter the League of Nations, the Secretary of State clearly perceived an obligation on the part of the United States to assert its influence to help resolve international tensions.

Secretary Stimson viewed the Soviets with suspicion and urged caution regarding granting recognition without drawing tight boundaries on expectations for the relationship. He continued, “If, under these circumstances and in this emergency we recognized Russia in disregard of her very bad reputation respecting international obligations and in disregard of our previous emphasis upon that aspect of her history, the whole world, and particularly Japan, would jump to the conclusion that our action had been directed solely by political expedience and as a maneuver to bring forceful pressure upon Japan.”¹¹¹ The Soviets apparently were convinced that the Japanese interests in and aggression toward Manchuria were indications of designs on further expansion toward Siberia. The Kremlin recognized that mobilization toward the Far East would be, in the first place, incredibly difficult given the poor transportation links between European Russia and the Far East, and, in the second place, conflict in the east would leave Russia vulnerable to aggression on its European border. From a diplomatic and military aspect, the Soviet Union had become desperate to bring international pressure to bear on Japan.

Industry leaders in the United States were equally desperate to find any solution to the economic crisis—opening markets for US manufactured goods was a critical component of any strategy to prime the economic pump. State Department leaders again urged caution toward establishing any relations with the Soviets. During the Russian Civil War, the United States had extended loans to the

¹¹⁰ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1933, The Secretary of State (Stimson) to Senator William E. Borah, Washington, September 8, 1932: 1.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

Tsarist government during WWI and to the Kerensky government following the 1917 Revolution. US policy emphasized the repayment of those loans and cited the Soviet refusal to honor those obligations as reason for caution in any subsequent economic relationship. State Department officials identified losses totaling \$628 million stemming from refusal to repay loans and property confiscated since the 1917 Revolution—this would be a persistent source of frustration until the start of World War II.

The Under Secretary of State wrote to Mr. Fred Eberhardt on March 3, 1933, on behalf of the Secretary in response to a query regarding the economic benefits of recognition: "...any real or lasting benefit to the people of the United States would not be attained by the establishment of relations with Russia until the present rulers of that country have given evidence that they are prepared to carry out in good faith the international obligations which experience has demonstrated are essential to the development of friendly intercourse and commerce between nations."¹¹² Thus, a key concern of US diplomats was the Soviet regime's refusal to behave in accordance with established international norms. A second concern centered on the Soviet economy as a viable market. US diplomats also cautioned that extending recognition without first obtaining binding settlement of any outstanding political or economic issues would leave "little likelihood that subsequent negotiations would result in a mutually satisfactory settlement."¹¹³

While the economic crisis of the 1930s damaged every major nation, the Soviets compounded its effects through their domestic economic and social policies aimed at transforming Russian society into a more modern form of Socialism. The Five-Year Plans, forced collectivization, rapid centralized industrialization, and the

¹¹² *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1933, The Secretary of State to Mr. Fred Eberhardt, Washington, March 3, 1933: 3-6.

¹¹³ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1933, Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Kelley), Washington, July 27, 1933: 6-11.

redistribution of state, private, and international assets inside the Soviet Union called into question the viability of the Soviet economy as a trading partner for other nations. The Under Secretary emphasized that “There is no question that at the present time the rulers of Russia are desirous, in their own interests, of purchasing more goods in this country. Their inability to increase their purchases appears to rise from the circumstance that they are unable either to pay in cash, or... to obtain credit terms acceptable to them...recognition would not appreciably alter the factors responsible for the credit standing of the Soviet regime.”¹¹⁴ Distrust in the foundations and operation of the Soviet economy would remain a theme as relations between the two nations proceeded.

State Department officials viewed the Soviets’ revolutionary ideology as an almost insurmountable barrier to establishing normal relations. Robert F. Kelley, the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, wrote “The fundamental obstacle in the way of establishment with Russia of the relations usual between nations in diplomatic intercourse is the world revolutionary aims and practices of the rulers of that country...it would seem, therefore, that an essential prerequisite to the establishment of harmonious and trustful relations with the Soviet government is the abandonment by the present rulers of Russia of their world revolutionary aims and the discontinuance of their activities.”¹¹⁵ US policy makers saw little difference between Communist ideology and dogma that postulated irreconcilable conflict between capitalism and Socialism and Soviet behavior in international relations. In other words, as US diplomats scanned the Soviet Union in a search for common ground, they perceived little distance between Soviet revolutionary rhetoric and deeds and

¹¹⁴ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1933, The Secretary of State to Mr. Fred Eberhardt, Washington, March 3, 1933: 3-6.

¹¹⁵ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1933, Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Kelley), Washington, July 27, 1933: 6-11.

therefore found scant common ground upon which to establish a foundation for harmonious relations.

At the outset of the Roosevelt Administration, recognition was a key issue. Secretary of State Cordell Hull urged deliberate caution should the President choose to pursue recognition. Hull wrote, "...at the moment, the Government of the United States has two powerful weapons which can be used to bring about a favorable settlement of some, if not all, of our outstanding problems with the Soviet government [granting credits and recognition]. I am convinced, from the experience of other countries, that, unless we utilize every means of exerting pressure on the Soviet government in order to obtain a settlement of outstanding problems, there is little likelihood that such problems can be satisfactorily settled...the Soviets, it is believed, prefer at the moment credits to recognition."¹¹⁶ Hull's insights proved to be prophetic after the President reached out and ultimately extended formal recognition to the Soviet Union on November 16, 1933.

Ambassador Bullitt assumed his position armed with a clear understanding of his mission and equipped with a capable staff that included some of the most highly trained professional foreign service officers in the State Department. Three of the senior staff, Loy Henderson, Robert Kelly, and George Kennan, would have stellar careers in government service—all would hold ambassadorships in their own right—and all would participate in formulating US policy during the Cold War. Their collective experience while serving under Bullitt and his successor, Joseph E. Davies, confirmed a rapidly forming consensus among senior policy makers in the State Department that the Soviets were more adversaries than partners.

For their part, the Soviets' behavior did little to disabuse the members of the nascent US mission to Moscow of their hardening

¹¹⁶ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1933, The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt, Washington, September 21, 1933: 12-13.

perceptions regarding their counterparts' motives and ultimate goals. According to one author, "The Soviets did not play the diplomatic game by traditional rules. As a revolutionary state, the Soviet Union saw foreign diplomatic missions as a source of counterrevolution and the growing paranoia surrounding the regime's brutal purges further isolated the embassies and their staffs."¹¹⁷ This, coupled with limited observations of life in a Soviet Union undergoing first forced collectivization followed by forced industrialization, frustrated the embassy staff and colored the advice they gave to the ambassadors they served and to the State Department. They gradually came to look past the official bureaucracy of government looking instead for sources of power in the Communist Party apparatus, and ultimately to Stalin and his closest lieutenants as the sole arbiters of policy.

It fell to Ambassador William Bullitt to resolve the outstanding issues after President Roosevelt extended recognition to the Soviet Union. The major issue involved the settlement of the outstanding debt from the World War I and Revolution eras. Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov sought, predictably, to set the figure for repayment as low as possible. In preparation for the negotiations, the State Department had identified a figure of \$628 million that combined loans and private property confiscations. Roosevelt indicated that the United States should show good faith in setting the range of the final amount of the government debt between \$150 and \$50 million. Bullitt, acting as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, wrote directly to the President expressing grave concerns that the Soviets would refuse to pay any more than the minimum amount unless the figure were settled on a specific amount prior to recognition. Litvinov also refused to consider private claims in any Soviet obligations and predictably argued that "\$50 million would be a fair settlement of all claims and debts."¹¹⁸ Bullitt

¹¹⁷ Weaver, Larry A. "Joseph E. Davies and the Mission to Moscow, 1936-1938," Indiana University, PhD, diss., 1998: 16.

¹¹⁸ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1933, The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

urged the President to set the minimum figure at \$100 million as a precondition for recognition—an extremely generous offer considering the total figure at stake.

Roosevelt agreed on a minimum payment figure of \$75 million with Litvinov's verbal agreement to work out the final amount at a later date. Soviets set the tone for the subsequent negotiations almost immediately after the announcement of the United States' recognition of the Soviet Union. The United States Embassy in Latvia noted that on Saturday, 18 November 1933, two days after Roosevelt's letter to Kalinin, the Soviet press covered the event in an article entitled "An Act of the Greatest International Importance." The article characterized the normalization of relations as closing "a long period in which the Soviet Union has fought for normal diplomatic relations with the capitalistic world surrounding it. The United States, the greatest capitalistic power in the world, has at last been compelled to establish normal diplomatic relations."¹¹⁹ Having attained their goal of recognition, Soviet negotiators had no incentive or intention of linking recognition to subsequent negotiations on debt payments.

Rather than painting the Soviet Union as being isolationist, the article described capitalist countries that refused to normalize relations as isolating themselves from the Soviet peoples. Further, the article claimed that the Soviet economy was the model for the world to follow stating, "The extraordinary growth of the productive powers of the USSR has compelled even the most stubborn representatives of capitalism to wonder whether they could get along without economic relations with such a great and growing economic power as the land of the Soviets."¹²⁰ To the US interlocutors this must have seemed a curious twist on the logic of the situation as the Soviets persisted in limiting

(Bullitt) to President Roosevelt, Washington, November 15, 1933: 25-26.

¹¹⁹ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1933, The Chargé in Latvia (Cole) to the Acting Secretary of State, Riga, November 23, 1933: 43-46.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

their liability for past loans while they simultaneously sought new long-term loans at unreasonably low interest rates.

Having secured recognition, backed only by a verbal agreement to settle the final amount of past loans, the Soviets—represented by Foreign Minister Litvinov who had served as the primary negotiator of the recognition agreement—absolutely refused to follow through with the final terms of the debt settlement. This prompted the Secretary of State to note that the entire administration was “greatly surprised and keenly disappointed to learn that Mr. Litvinov offered a contention and a version of the debt understanding, entered into at the time of his visit here, entirely different from anything the American officials thought they were discussing.”¹²¹

The Soviets’ true motivation appeared to be to secure loans with which to continue the mobilization of the Russian industrial base. By the Spring of 1934, barely six months after the formal exchange of ambassadors, the Soviets were demanding that the US extend a \$200 million, interest-free, line of credit and were refusing to acknowledge any responsibility for debts incurred by previous Russian governments.¹²² In what Ambassador Bullitt characterized as “a most unsatisfactory hour” with Foreign Minister Litvinov, the Soviet official brusquely asserted that “No nation today pays its debts. Great Britain has defaulted, Germany is defaulting. And no one will be able to make propaganda against the Soviet Union if we do not pay one dollar on a debt we did not contract.”¹²³ For their part, US diplomats expressed concern that American dollars would be applied to armaments programs rather than to strengthening trade between the two countries. To address this concern, in part, Congress passed

¹²¹ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1934, Memorandum by the Secretary of State, Washington, March 26, 1934: 70-71.

¹²² *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1934, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt), Washington, May 23, 1934

¹²³ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1934, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 16, 1934: 108-109.

a law on April 13, 1934, sponsored by Senator Hiram W. Johnson, a Republican from California, that prohibited the purchase or sale in the United States of obligations in the form of loans or credits to any government in default on previous obligations.

A second issue that plagued the US mission to Moscow involved the operation of the US Embassy. When Ambassador Bullitt met Stalin shortly after arriving in Moscow, the Russian leader had promised to make a plot of land available for the construction of a new Embassy facility. Bullitt soon learned that Stalin's public promise was no guarantee that the action would occur—unless, of course, Stalin wanted it to. The Moscow Oblast refused to grant permission for the construction of the Embassy and neither Bullitt nor his successor managed to solve the Soviet bureaucratic puzzle to cash in on Stalin's promise.¹²⁴

In similar fashion, the Soviets complicated the operations of the Embassy by refusing to exchange dollars for rubles at predictable rates.¹²⁵ This made it difficult for the staff to conduct business in Moscow and while on official trips within the Soviet Union. Soviet citizens employed by the Embassy were on one hand suspected of spying for the Soviet government, and on the other hand, rounded up with no notice during the Great Purges on suspicion of counter-revolutionary activities. Embassy officials found suspicious cables that “went nowhere” in the attic and, at times, found direct evidence that the Soviets were tapping their phone lines and opening correspondence that was not secured in diplomatic pouches.

The third major issue confronting the US Mission concerned the Soviet Union's sponsorship of world revolution. The Soviet hosting

¹²⁴ For a detailed distillation of the Embassy site location see Weaver, “Joseph E. Davies and the American Mission to Moscow, 1936-1938.” The *FRUS* documents related to The Soviet Union for the years before World War II also contain numerous Memoranda and Telegrams between the Embassy in Moscow and the State Department on the overt disregard for the needs of the US Ambassador and his staff.

¹²⁵ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1934, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, March 28, 1934: 71-75.

of the Communist Internationale (COMINTERN) provided an opportunity for Soviet leaders to issue doctrine and guidance for the global plan to advance Communism. It also afforded Communist Party representatives from other countries opportunities to recount their contributions to the global struggle. US diplomats protested to their Soviet counterparts that the COMINTERN's activities represented an overt attempt to sow subversion among US citizens. In a meeting in Washington with the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, in which the Soviet Ambassador complained about statements against the Soviet Union made by a National Recovery Administration official, a US official replied "that his own Government seems to have violated its pledge against propaganda by permitting the Third Internationale to send out from Moscow urgent suggestions that Communists everywhere should seek the overthrow of our Government and other governments by violent methods. He simply shrugged his shoulders at this."¹²⁶ The pattern of Soviet accusations and taking offense at any hint of criticism in the press while openly promoting conflict and violent overthrow of non-communist regimes would persist into the Cold War.

Ambassador Bullitt summarized what would become the US attitude toward Communism and the Soviet Union. He wrote,

Contrary to the comforting belief which the French now cherish, it is my conviction that there has been no decrease in the determination of the Soviet Government to produce world revolution. Diplomatic relations with friendly states are not regarded by the Soviet Government as normal friendly relations but 'armistice' relations and it is the conviction of the leaders of the Soviet Union that this 'armistice' cannot possibly be ended by a definitive peace but only by a renewal of battle. The Soviet Union genuinely desires peace on all fronts

¹²⁶ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1934, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Moore) of a Conversation with the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Trojanovsky), Washington, June 20, 1934: 111.

at the present time but this peace is looked upon merely as a happy respite in which future wars may be prepared... To keep Europe divided and to postpone the war which will certainly come if Europe remains divided, is the substance of Russian policy in Europe.¹²⁷

In this strategic mindset, the Soviets had constructed a zero-sum negotiating stance in which every action that appeared to be critical of the Soviet Union had to be met with extreme protest and possibly retaliation using indirect means. Any action that the Soviets took that might offend other nations was justifiable in the context of revolutionary dogma. In other words, relations with other nations were inherently conflictual rather than cooperative. Any nation that thought otherwise was proceeding from fundamentally flawed assumptions.

For the remainder of the interwar years, US diplomats found nothing to change Ambassador Bullitt's assessment of Soviet motivations and actions. The correspondence between the Embassy in Moscow and Washington failed to inspire optimism that the Soviets could be trustworthy allies against rising German and Japanese aggression. On the domestic front, the Great Purges and the Show Trials gave the diplomats significant cause for concern. Dr. Larry Weaver's research into Ambassador Joseph E. Davies's rose-colored interpretation of the trials is highly critical of the Ambassador. Weaver judges that Davies viewed the trials through a strictly legal lens and took the defendants' confessions at face value.¹²⁸ The Embassy Staff took a more sanguine view of the proceedings. They recognized that the confessions had been coerced from the defendants and took note that leniency was not a sentencing option for the accused.¹²⁹ The

¹²⁷ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1935, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, July 19, 1935: 224-27.

¹²⁸ See: Larry A. Weaver, *Joseph E. Davies and the American Mission to Moscow, 1936-1938*.

¹²⁹ Loy Henderson, the Chargé in the Embassy wrote: "It is difficult to state with any degree of certainty the extent to which the accused were guilty of the crimes to

Embassy seemed to have been unaware of the full scale of the mass murders committed during the purges given the restrictions on their travel and access to average life in the Soviet Union.

The outbreak of war in 1939 revealed the cynical nature of Soviet foreign policy. As the collusion with the Germans resulted in the carving up of Poland and the Soviet campaign against Finland, US leaders attempted to apply pressure to rein in Soviet aggression. President Roosevelt sent a direct message to the Soviets through the Embassy in which he admonished the Soviets to operate with restraint and to avoid indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas. “The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centers of population...has resulted in the maiming and in the death of thousands of defenseless men, women, and children has...profoundly shocked the conscience of humanity...I am therefore addressing this appeal to the Soviet Government...to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no event and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian populations.”¹³⁰ Roosevelt was more specific in a statement to the press on the following day in which he condemned the Soviet action against Finland and expressed support and admiration for Finland.

The Soviets failed to heed Roosevelt’s admonitions and continued to carve up Poland and Finland with the assistance of their erstwhile German allies. The Roosevelt Administration reacted by halting all shipments or economic arrangements related to “plans, plants, manufacturing rights, or technical information required for the production of high quality aviation gasoline.”¹³¹ The embargo did not explicitly target any one nation, but the Soviet and Japanese dependence

which they confessed or to explain the motives prompting their behavior at the trial.” *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1936, The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, August 27, 1936: 300-02.

¹³⁰ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1939, The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston), Washington, November 30, 1939: 798-99.

¹³¹ *FRUS*, The Soviet Union, 1939, The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt), Washington, December 24, 1939: 806-07.

on aviation gasoline meant that its effects on those two countries would be immediate. The State Department telegram also indicated that engineers and other employees from US companies in the Soviet aviation industry would most likely desire to exit the country and that any hindrance to their departure would affect US attitudes toward the Soviets in other areas. At this point in the relationship, there was little common ground on which to form productive relations. Only the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 changed the attitudes of Soviet leaders and paved the way for the alliance that defeated Germany and Japan.¹³²

Between 1941 and 1943, leaders in the United States and Britain confronted the nagging suspicion that the Soviets would make a separate peace with Germany if it suited Stalin's purposes. Lend-Lease, the various Allied strategy councils, the Allied air campaigns against the German war economy, and the push to open a second front in Europe served, in part, to "keep the Russians in" until Germany had spent her strength. Fortunately for the US and Great Britain, German forces obliged by attempting perhaps the most brutal conquest in history. As we now know, aside from the destruction of vast amounts of property and military casualties lost in the war, the German conquerors scorched the earth they passed, killed the non-German populations they captured, and worked to death those whom they did not kill. Hitler and the Wehrmacht were, in a sense, the most effective agents for solidifying the alliance than any other measure that Churchill or Roosevelt could conceive.¹³³

¹³² For the most comprehensive, accessible account of the war see Gerhard L. Weinberg, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*, (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

¹³³ Neil Sheehan puts an even more poignant emphasis on the effects of the war on the Soviet Union. "For every American lost in the Second World War, approximately twenty-seven Soviet service men and women died: 11.285 million, including the 2.7 million who perished in German captivity...there are no reliable statistics for civilian deaths in the Soviet Union. What appears to be the most reasonable estimate places the combined military and civilian toll at about 28 million. A second

Losing the Peace—Forging the Cold War Order

Policy makers in the United States had begun thinking about the post-war order long before “the Big Three” had reached consensus on the strategy for winning the war. Analysts within the US War Department had begun sketching out plans for occupation, governance, and recovery as early as 1943.¹³⁴ Key themes in US notions of how the international system should change included institutions for collective security, international economic and monetary stability, and mechanisms to address conflicts and disagreements among large and small states. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1945, Grayson Kirk asserted, “...our geographic remoteness from other great centers of national power no longer assures us the same margin of safety as we formerly enjoyed. This has produced an unprecedented public interest in the principle of an international security organization and...a public demand that the United States shall remain, after the war, more powerful militarily than it has been in the past.”¹³⁵ The notion of a United Nations organization clearly factored into the minds of Churchill and Roosevelt as they prosecuted the war, but sorting out the details would require hard work—especially when it came to reconciling Soviet objectives with those of collective security and cooperation.

The international financial collapse that brought on the Great Depression, and the recognition that the war had destroyed much of the world’s economic production capacity, also captured the attention of estimate, probably excessive, speaks of nearly 50 million...Nazi Germany suffered combat losses of 13.6 million killed, wounded, missing, and captured. Of these, approximately 10 million, or about 73 percent, occurred on the Eastern Front.” See Neil Sheehan, *A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon*, (New York: Random House, 2009): 77-78.

¹³⁴ See: James Dobbins et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003).

¹³⁵ Grayson Kirk, “National Power and Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 23, no. 4 (1945). 620. Kirk was a Professor of Government at Columbia University who served in the Security Section of the US Department of State’s Political Studies Division during the war.

policy makers. Alvin Hansen opined, “I believe there will be a need in the post-war years for three new international economic institutions, one to take care of monetary stabilization, a second to expand international capital investment, and another for the control of prices of primary products.”¹³⁶ Hansen’s overtly capitalistic approach to global economic management would certainly have clashed with the Soviet view of the flow of history and the inherent incompatibility between capitalism and communism. As the economic outlines of post-war policy emerged in the European Recovery Act (more commonly known as the Marshall Plan) and other measures, the Soviets interpreted the West’s actions as being direct economic attacks against their continued viability.

One author posed, then answered, the question of national security: “What will be the immediate threats to our national security when the enemies we have now beaten have been disarmed?” The first concern was a threat from a resurgent Germany or Japan--unlikely given the level of destruction inflicted on those two nations and the determination of the Allied nations to hobble the former Axis Powers militarily and economically. The other threat, however, was well within the realm of the possible; “a breach of unity among the three greatest Powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain...The result might in either case be the establishment of hegemony over Europe by a Power hostile to us, so that it might be impossible for us to have normal political, economic, and social relations with any European nation.”¹³⁷ Clearly, the concerns centered on creating a European order predicated on mutual consensus and cooperation, but among US policy makers there were few precedents for expecting cooperation from the Soviets.

¹³⁶ Alvin H. Hansen, “World Institutions for Stability and Expansion,” *Foreign Affairs* 22, no. 2 (1944). 248. Hansen was a Professor of Economics and Harvard. He helped create the Council of Economic Advisors and the Social Security System.

¹³⁷ R. Keith Kane, “The United Nations: A Perspective--The Security Council,” *Foreign Affairs* 24, no. 1 (1945). 12.

W. Averell Harriman, serving as US Ambassador in Moscow, wrote to the Secretary of State in April 1945,

...we now have ample proof that the Soviet Government views all matters from the standpoint of their own selfish interests...The Communist Party or its associates everywhere are using...economic difficulties in areas under our responsibility to promote Soviet concepts and policies and to undermine the influence of the western Allies...Unless we and the British now adopt an independent line the people of the areas under our responsibility will suffer and the chances of Soviet domination in Europe will be enhanced. I thus regretfully come to the conclusion that we should be guided as a matter of principle by the policy of taking care of our western Allies and other areas under our responsibility first, allocating to Russia what may be left...¹³⁸

Public awareness of the atomic bomb and its influence on post-war relations and US security policy grew as the Truman Administration began to view Soviet actions as confrontational. Ambassador Harriman again opined, "...whatever may have been in their minds at Yalta, it now seems that they feel they can force us to acquiesce to their policies."¹³⁹ Adding to US concerns was the relatively weak military capability, exacerbated by demobilization and disarmament, with which to confront the Red Army in Europe. Relying on atomic weapons as a trump card, however, reinforced Soviet concerns that the West was attempting to draw a noose around the Soviet throat.

For the Soviets, the US saber-rattling stance gave Stalin a ready tool to keep Russian citizens off balance as the regime fueled concerns over a renewal of hostilities. The Soviet economy was slow to recover from the

¹³⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, "The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State," (Moscow, April 4, 1945). 817-20.

¹³⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, "The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State," (Moscow, April 6, 1945). 821-24.

war; it rested on poor foundations—weakened before the war by flawed state economic policies, damaged by the war itself, and dependent on Lend-Lease aid which sustained military industries but did nothing for consumer goods. Transferring resources from occupied Eastern Europe provided a temporary injection to the wounded economy, but did little to support long-term recovery and stability.¹⁴⁰ For that task, Stalin needed time and the freedom to reconstruct the Soviet economy on foundations of territorial security, economic contributions from satellite states, and, above all, fealty to Communist doctrine and Party rule. These characteristics would guide Soviet policy and the post-war interaction with the emerging international system.

Between 1946 and 1950, Soviet actions shaped the Truman Administration's perceptions of the decreasing potential for cooperation. In one sense, skepticism among US policy makers regarding Soviet policies, motives, and intentions resulted in a predisposition to see Stalin and the Politburo as the master manipulators who controlled vast armies of fifth column activists in every nation or territory. This perception dated to the early days of the Russian Revolution, and more recently for US policy makers in Soviet control of the COMINTERN before the war. Party doctrine required support for the violent overthrow of capitalist governments to usher in global revolution. For the US administration, there was little way to separate rhetoric from reality—especially when faced with aggressive Soviet posturing in Eastern Europe, moves toward Iran (1945-46), Soviet pressure on Turkey to allow access to

¹⁴⁰ See: Neil Sheehan, *A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Shriever and the Ultimate Weapon* (New York: Random House, 2009). 73. Sheehan wrote: "Stalin understood the political implications of the atomic bomb. As long as the United States held a monopoly, the bomb gave America an aura of unique technological and military prowess. Once the Soviet Union had its own bomb, that aura would be broken, and Stalin would achieve what amounted to strategic parity with Washington." In the context of the early Cold War, *strategic parity* meant greater room for the Soviet Union to achieve its larger political aims in areas ripe for inserting Communist ideology."

the Dardanelles (1946), a Communist insurgency in Greece (1946-47), continual tensions over occupied countries leading to the Berlin Blockade crisis (1948), and, perhaps most alarming to the Truman administration, the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb (August 1949) and the defeat of Nationalist Chinese forces by Mao Zedong's Communists (1949). While some revisionist authors may criticize the Truman administration for its failure to discern the difference between Soviet rhetoric and actions, the evidence available to US policymakers certainly indicated that the Soviets were both consolidating gains acquired during the war and preparing for future offensives where it was convenient and possible.¹⁴¹

As Western diplomats sought to create a sustainable economic order, the Soviets countered with restrictive trading blocs between Russia and the countries under its influence. Elbridge Durbrow, Chief of the State Department's Eastern European Affairs Division, reported, "We have just received...what we believe to be the full texts of the recently-concluded Soviet-Bulgarian and Soviet-Rumanian Trade Agreements...The general tenor of these agreements is very restrictive and are [sic] apparently aimed at excluding free trade in this areas by

¹⁴¹ Sheehan argues that this perception among US government officials was a failure to distinguish between party rhetoric and the true strategic interests and actions of the Soviet state. "The most important misreading of him [Stalin] by the Truman administration, the evidence shows, was that while he was a monster, he was not an expansionist monster in the likeness of Hitler. The people threatened by his paranoiac personality were the inhabitants of the Soviet Union and the populations of the East European lands he had placed within his baleful rule by the defeat of Germany, not normally those beyond...While he meant to manipulate the large Communist parties in Italy and France in order to weaken and hinder US influence in those and neighboring countries, he had no intention of provoking a war with the United States by invading Western Europe...Kennan's analysis [in the Long Telegram] did not reflect the reality of the Soviet Union or Stalin. Rather, it reflected Kennan's antipathy to both and confused Marxist-Leninist rhetoric trotted out for ritual occasions with the actual reasoning that lay behind Soviet moves." See: Sheehan, *A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Shriever and the Ultimate Weapon*. 80-82.

other powers...it is fair to assume that the Soviet Government will make similar agreements with all other countries in the areas under its control and that by this method they will create an almost airtight economic blackout.”¹⁴² The perception among US policymakers of the Soviet intention to divide Europe into Eastern and Western trading blocs would grow with time. Ambassador Harriman wrote to the Secretary of State, “Soviet aims in this area are primarily strategic security and aggrandizement...The endless, fluid pursuit of power is a habit of Russian statesmanship, ingrained not only in the traditions of the Russian State, but also in the ideology of the Communist Party, which views all other advanced nations as Russia’s ultimate enemies and all backward nations as pawns in the struggle for power...”¹⁴³ It was in this context that George Kennan’s Long Telegram arrived at the State Department—rather than altering the course of US diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, it instead confirmed the conclusions and predispositions within the American foreign service that had been taking shape since President Roosevelt extended recognition in 1933.

Kennan’s assessment of what US policymakers should expect when interacting with the Soviets came from his direct experience in the US Embassy in Moscow in the years before the war and from his continuing observations in the post-war years. In some ways, he took Soviet rhetoric at face value—if a Soviet leader made a public statement regarding a matter of policy or strategy, what alternative did a foreign diplomat have but to believe the public statement? But Kennan also linked public statements to actions and behaviors among his Soviet interlocutors. His direct interaction with Soviet leaders convinced him of their belief in the “official Soviet thesis that [the] entire world

¹⁴² Foreign Relations of the United States, “Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews): Subject: Soviet Policy of Tying Up Economic Activities in the Balkans,” (Washington, DC., May 30, 1945). 852-53.

¹⁴³ Foreign Relations of the United States, “The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State,” (Moscow, October 23, 1945). 901-08.

is hostile and menacing to [the] Soviet people...A hostile international environment is the breath of life for [the] prevailing international system in this country.”¹⁴⁴ The history of negotiating in bad faith, the Russo-German non-aggression pact, the persistent refusal to acknowledge British, French, and American contributions to the war effort, the brutal conquest of Germany and Eastern Europe, and the ongoing plunder of Soviet-occupied territories provided ample evidence that diplomacy with the Soviet Union was not a game for lightweights. Kennan was not the only US policymaker to reach this conclusion.

President Truman appointed Major General Walter Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower’s wartime Chief of Staff, as Ambassador to Moscow in March 1946. During his initial interview with Stalin, Smith reported that the Soviet leader was “restrained” and skeptical of US and British motives for the post-war order. Smith communicated to Stalin that the Truman Administration harbored grave concerns over Soviet methods in occupied Europe. He tried to emphasize the consensus required to make “long-range decisions on our future military policy,” in what could have been interpreted as an olive branch on one hand, and a veiled threat on the other. Stalin responded with concerns over Churchill’s speech at Fulton, Missouri in which he described an Iron Curtain descending over areas under Soviet influence. Stalin “implied that this speech and many other occurrences could indicate nothing but a definite alignment of Great Britain and the United States against the USSR.”¹⁴⁵ For all practical purposes, Stalin had signaled his intention to

¹⁴⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, “The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” (Moscow, March 20, 1946). 721.

¹⁴⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, “The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State,” (Moscow, April 5, 1946). 732-36. Smith reported in a telegram to the Secretary of State that the British Foreign office had reached a more pointed view of the situation—“...we are about to be driven into a position—if we are not already there—where facts of the situation compel us to view Europe not as a whole, but as divided essentially into two zones: a defensive one in the east where at best we can hope only to moderate Soviet dispensation, and a second zone in the west which has still not been brought under Soviet dominion and in which there is

view US and British actions as being directed against Soviet interests. For his part, Smith proved equally willing to view Soviet actions as running counter to US security interests.

The Soviet response to Churchill's speech came, in part, in an address on 7 June 1946. Fedor Oleshchuk, assistant head of the Chief Administration for Propaganda and Agitation, acquainted US and British actions to a continuation of Fascism. This rhetoric served to accentuate tension within the Soviet population and to focus those tensions on external threats. Equating US and British actions abroad with Fascism represented a propaganda strategy designed play on the memories of the wartime invasion and occupation. "Fascism is supported by 'reactionary forces' in capitalistic countries. Both the United States and Great Britain are supporting Fascism in the hope of using it to fight democracy and the Soviet Union." In the post-war order, Soviet leaders appeared to be searching for ways to secure Soviet borders while simultaneously keeping options open for acquiring strategic materials for the economy and supporting the Party's revolutionary agenda abroad. In this trinity of competing strategic goals, US policymakers apparently believed that Soviet leaders concluded "the United States is now regarded as the chief center of world reaction and as such will be regarded by the Soviet Government and held up to the Soviet people as the principal potential enemy of the Soviet Union."¹⁴⁶

still opportunity for USA and UK to nourish and support growth of healthy society reasonably immune and resistant to totalitarian views." Foreign Relations of the United States, "View of British Foreign Office Official Expressed to Harriman: The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State," (Moscow, May 31, 1946). 758.

¹⁴⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, "Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Stevens)," (Washington, DC, July 26, 1946). 770-71. The Chargé reported in September to the Secretary of State, "Day in, day out during past months tom-toms of Soviet propaganda have beat out themes that American and British reactionaries are seeking to foment new war against USSR." Foreign Relations of the United States, "The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State," (Moscow, September 8, 1946). 783.

Tensions continued to rise with each new interaction between the former allies culminating in the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June 1948. At each turn, US leaders perceived Soviet actions in the context of a global Communist conspiracy designed to subvert legitimate or nascent democracies. The American perception of the monolithic Soviet puppet master served Soviet needs in that it lent more credibility to disparate communist efforts than they probably deserved while bolstering the impression that the Soviets were more capable and powerful than they were. As for leaders in the United States, preventing the American public from slipping back into isolationism required a vision of a global mission designed to prevent another global war. Confronting another totalitarian state using the strengths of democracy, economic development, and liberalism was a message that the American public could accept.

Even with the rapidly coalescing Cold War, there were lingering issues between the United States and the Soviet Union that needed resolution. One of the most significant of these was the issue of Soviet repayment of Lend-Lease obligations from the war—and it confirmed in the minds of American diplomats that there was little point in pursuing relations with the Soviets. By 1947, US leaders began negotiations with nations that had received Lend-Lease funds and materials during the war. While Great Britain benefitted the most from Lend-Lease, US material and financial contributions kept the Soviet Union in the war and continued after the war to support recovery efforts. The Soviet Union received \$11 billion (1942 dollars) during the war and \$225 million after the war. US negotiators recognized the dire financial straits of the debtor nations and attempted to set fair and reasonable repayment terms. War Department, Navy Department, and State Department personnel wrote off items damaged, destroyed, or consumed during the war. The result

was a final inventory “depreciated to September 2, 1945, estimated at approximately \$2,607,000,000,”¹⁴⁷ a write-off of nearly \$8.4 billion.

The Soviets, following tactics similar to those employed during the 1930s when negotiating the outstanding debts from the revolutionary era, quibbled over every item. The Soviets had re-purposed several Lend-Lease ships, changed their names and flags, and refused to recognize them as being subject to Lend-Lease terms. After months of frustrating negotiations, the Soviet Ambassador delivered a statement to the Secretary of State stating,

...while chiefly through the war effort of the Soviet people the United States not only avoided any kind of destruction on its own territory but even found it possible during the war to increase considerably its own material resources...The Soviet Government considers the collapse of the common enemy was brought about to a considerable degree by the efforts of the Soviet Union, and that the benefits received by the United States of America as a result of the war effort of the Soviet Union immeasurably exceed the benefit received by the Soviet Union in the form of lend-lease supplies.¹⁴⁸

In short, the Soviets refused to consider repayment of Lend-Lease. By 1948, after nearly three years of negotiations, the Soviet Ambassador wrote the Secretary of State indicating “The Soviet Government considers that the sum of One Hundred Seventy Million dollars is a figure which represents fair compensation for the Lend-Lease articles furnished to the Soviet Union...the payment of this amount to be made in fifty equal annual installments...at the rate of 2% per annum.”¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ FRUS, The Soviet Union.

¹⁴⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, “The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State,” (Washington, DC, December 16, 1947). 715-17.

¹⁴⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, “The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Panyushkin) to the Secretary of State,” (Washington, DC, June 25, 1948). 989-93.

Soviet leaders thus attempted to dictate not only the amount of their obligation, but the term of the payment schedule and the interest rate.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were fraught with difficulty from the time President Roosevelt recognized the Communist State in 1933. Revisionist views of the Cold War hold that the standoff under the cloud of atomic diplomacy and US actions in the policies of the Truman administration gave the Soviets little choice but to gear up for a confrontation with their former ally. Under this interpretation, members of the US diplomatic corps, led by George Kennan, laid the ground work for confrontational policies that spiraled into the Cold War. Kennan, the other members of the staff of the US Embassy in Moscow, the foreign service officers of the Department of East European Affairs, and scholars within the American Academy developed skepticism that occasionally devolved to animosity toward their Soviet counterparts.

After the war, despite vast amounts of Lend-Lease aid and the opportunity to shape a constructive world order, the Soviets returned to their pre-war stance with respect to relations with the United States. For their part, US leaders perceived communist aggression behind every action that did not conform to their notions of how the post-war order should evolve—and the Soviets did little to disabuse their American counterparts of their paranoia. If politics is war by other means, then it follows that the fog and friction that characterize warfare also cloud the perceptions and judgment of politicians in the same ways that they do so for generals. Writing in 1941, Edward Meade Earle pointed out that modern strategy—rather than being the sole province of generals—had come to consume the attention and resources of the state. He observed, “Strategy, therefore, is not merely a concept of wartime, but is an inherent element of statecraft at all times...strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the means of a nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively

promoted and assured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.”¹⁵⁰ The formulation of strategy, however, often occurs on the fly; those who find themselves responsible for its creation rarely have opportunities for second chances if they get it wrong the first time.

Counterfactual enthusiasts wonder if the Cold War would have happened if Roosevelt had lived, if Truman had not been Roosevelt’s Vice President, or if Stalin had died during or shortly after the war. While such thought exercises are interesting, they ignore the conditions that shaped US-Soviet relations—probably reaching back to 1917. The Communist Party’s doctrine that presumed a state of conflict between communism and the outside world represents one parameter that would have to change if the fundamental relationship between the two countries were to change. On the other side, American policy makers would have to abandon their animosity toward communism—in many ways, the suspicions on both sides confirmed one another and tainted the relationship before it began.

Another fundamental factor that shaped the relations between the two countries concerned the competition that emerged between the representatives of the two states. To be sure, in the Soviet Union of the 1930s, any departure from the Party line was a dangerous step for Soviet diplomats, but diplomacy often rests on developing personal, friendly, respectful relations with counterparts. The *FRUS* correspondence indicates that American diplomats never achieved the degree of rapport with their Soviet opposites that could form a foundation for working through differences. This continued—even at the highest levels—through the war years and beyond. In the post-war years, Soviet Foreign Ministry officials launched invective after invective against the United States and Great Britain while protesting vigorously against any hint of criticism of their country’s policies in the American and British press. Ambassador Smith remarked in frustration to Deputy Foreign Minister

¹⁵⁰ Earle, *Makers of Modern Strategy*. viii.

Andrey Vyshinski, “For God’s sake, when will you Soviet statesmen get rid of your inferiority complex. There is no reason or excuse for such an attitude on the part of representatives of a nation as powerful as this one.”¹⁵¹ In an atmosphere in which neither side could establish trust and confidence, it is unlikely that any other result could have emerged.

Finally, what about the atomic bomb? While the bomb became the defining feature of later Cold War strategies, it had little direct effect on the early years of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Stalin certainly pursued a Soviet atomic bomb recognizing it as an essential tool for achieving parity with the United States. But in the five years after World War II, the United States did not possess enough weapons, enough delivery platforms, or enough trained air crews to hold enough critical targets in the Soviet Union at risk to the point that the United States derived strategic advantage from possession of atomic weapons. This was a point in history in which the army with the biggest divisions still ruled the battlefield. In other words, atomic weapons were clearly a factor in the minds of those who formulated strategy in those years, but atomic weapons alone were not sufficient to dominate strategic calculations.

Strategy in the Cold War would take a dramatic turn as weapons and delivery systems evolved. At some point, strategic room for maneuver dropped to minutes (or even seconds). To prevent disaster in the nuclear age, strategists and policy makers had to overcome the tainted relationships that had characterized US-Soviet relations in the 1930s and 1940s. That effort would take the better part of the second half of the twentieth century and airpower would figure prominently at every stage of the relationship.

Conflicts over how best to organize and employ airpower during the war combined with concerns over the United States’ responsibility

¹⁵¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, “The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs,” (Moscow, January 16, 1947). 519-21.

for leading the international community to prevent future wars. Additionally, the introduction of atomic—and later nuclear weapons—increased the risks of wars for all concerned. Questions of which service would be responsible for custody of the nuclear arsenal while preparing to launch nuclear attacks against potential adversaries motivated reviews of how best to organize the national defense establishment. Some in the Army believed a centralized Defense Department was essential to ensuring readiness for the nation's military forces while the Airmen remained convinced that the wartime experiences confirmed the necessity of organizing airpower under a separate, independent Service.

Organizing for Defense—The National Security Act of 1947 and Beyond

Politicians and defense professionals had argued for a centralized national security organization since the late-nineteenth century. The global character of World War II had shown the necessity of planning, budgeting, organizing, and training at the national level in close cooperation with the President and Congress while leaving the details of combat to operational commanders in the field. Even before the war ended, military and civilian leaders had begun to think about how to organize the defense establishment for a greatly expanded role in the post-war international order. Vannevar Bush testified to Congress, “In the past, the pace of war has been sufficiently slow so that this nation has never had to pay the full price of defeat for its lack of preparedness. Twice we have just gotten by because we were given time to prepare while others fought.”¹⁵² Within the military establishment, Army leaders favored centralization (or “unification,” as they termed it)—a Defense Secretariat within the Executive Branch while each Service

¹⁵² Elizabeth Tencza, Adam Givens, and Miranda Priebe, *The Evolution of US Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present*, RAND (Santa Monica, CA, 2019). 39.

would have its own civilian Secretary. The Navy opposed centralization on the grounds that allowing the Navy Secretary direct access to the President served national security needs better than inserting a Defense Secretary between the Services and the President. Navy and Marine Corps leaders viewed unification as a way for the Army to absorb or abolish the Marine Corps and for the nascent Air Force to seize the Sea Services' carrier-based aviation assets.¹⁵³ Airmen supported the Army's proposal because they saw the virtue in unification, but also because they saw an opportunity for carving out an independent Service under a Defense Department organization.

As early as 1943, Congress had attempted to craft legislation to organize the United States defense establishment for an active role in shaping and preserving the post-war international order. Then-Senator Harry S. Truman argued "the end, of course, must be the integration of every element of America's defense in one department under one authoritative, responsible head...We must never fight another war the way we fought the last two."¹⁵⁴ The generation of leaders who witnessed the rise of totalitarian states in the Interwar Years recognized that confronting such challenges required credible military establishments. The Soviet Union's actions since the end of the war had convinced President Truman and leaders in the State Department that another global conflict was possible. As a superpower, the world's democracies would look to the United States to confront any anti-democracy aggression. The first step was to institutionalize the "integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relation to the national security."¹⁵⁵ This was the decision point Airmen had sought since the early 1920s.

¹⁵³ Charles A. Stevenson, "The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947," *Military Review* 88, no. 3 (2008).

¹⁵⁴ Stevenson, "The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947." 14.

¹⁵⁵ "National Security Act of 1947," in *National Security Law Documents*, ed. John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts, and Robert F. Turner (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1947). 755.

To provide national security advice on a continuing basis, the Act established the National Security Council (NSC). In the 1930s, President Roosevelt had relied on close friends and his own counsel regarding national security needs. He routinely invited representatives from the Academy, Wall Street, and industry to hear their views on a wide range of issues. His close relationships with his senior cabinet officials provided other sources of information, but Roosevelt remained determined to navigate the international security waters using informal advisors rather than being bound to follow any group or individual. During the war, “Roosevelt ran World War II directly from the White House, working with and through four senior military officers—two Navy admirals, Ernest King and William Leahy, and two Army generals, Chief of Staff George Marshall and Chief of the Army Air Forces Hap Arnold.”¹⁵⁶ The post-war world had become too complicated for Roosevelt’s collegial, informal management style which had worked because of the skills and the personalities of his entourage more than because of any inherent institutional effectiveness.

Many in Congress concluded that post-war presidents needed formal advice “with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security.”¹⁵⁷ The President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, and other cabinet-level executives would form the Council. As President, however, Truman balked at any hint of providing the NSC with any authority beyond an advisory role. Truman was famous for his “the buck stops here” slogan and this extended to his opinion regarding any suggestion that a security council or committee would make decisions. He took decisive steps as the proposed

¹⁵⁶ Stevenson, “The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947.” 14.

¹⁵⁷ “National Security Act of 1947.” 755.

legislation evolved to ensure that Congress did not invest the NSC with policymaking or coordinating powers.¹⁵⁸

Strategic assessment would become critical in the future. In addition to its primary role of providing advice to the President, the NSC would develop risk assessments to inform the President of trends, threats to national security, and strategic options for dealing with potential and emerging threats. This responsibility represented a radical departure from the historical traditions in US national security posture which kept the United States aloof from foreign affairs—especially from those situations that might lead to military confrontation. “The act created the unified Defense Department, the Permanent Intelligence Community, and, importantly the NSC inside the presidency because of what both Republican and Democratic policy makers believed: Soviet expansionism was a grave threat to that the United States felt compelled to oppose.”¹⁵⁹ The NSC, and indeed the entire defense establishment, would now become focused on projecting US power into strategic areas around the world to enhance national security and to encourage democratic development. US foreign policy was in the process of becoming activist; the primary instrument of power shifted from diplomacy toward the permanent military establishment.¹⁶⁰

Strategic assessment requires current, high-quality intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information aimed at collecting data on the full range of potential adversaries. The Act created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headed by a Director of Central Intelligence to advise the NSC, make recommendations for coordinating the

¹⁵⁸ Stevenson, “The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947.” 17.

¹⁵⁹ Kent M. Bolton, *The Rise of the American Security State: The National Security Act of 1947 and the Militarization of US Foreign Policy* (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2018), <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=5124200>, 1 online resource. 15.

¹⁶⁰ Bolton, *The Rise of the American Security State: The National Security Act of 1947 and the Militarization of US Foreign Policy*. 36.

government's intelligence activities, assess and disseminate intelligence products within the government, protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, and to oversee other intelligence activities of government departments.¹⁶¹ Strategic warning and assessment would inform not only those in executive roles, but would help the military departments develop strategies, plans, technologies, and, ultimately, operations designed to preserve US supremacy in the global confrontation to come. The Act, however, placed limits on the intelligence community's powers—it would have “no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions.”¹⁶² The Intelligence Community's gaze would be outward as it sought to identify threats and adverse trends that could affect national security. Congress took steps in drafting legislation to ensure it would not become a tool for creating a police state such as had existed in Nazi Germany or continued in the Soviet Union and its growing cadre of satellite states. Policy makers considered the CIA, like the Defense Department, to be an essential feature in gaining and maintaining the advantage in future competition with international adversaries.

The Act provided a National Military Establishment, a compromise to keep Navy Secretary James Forrestal from derailing the legislation. The vaguely named establishment, a Defense Department in everything but name was headed by the Secretary of Defense who would serve as the “principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security.”¹⁶³ With the memories of mobilization experiences in two world wars, Congress assigned broad responsibilities for maintaining readiness for the military departments. The defense secretary would have authority over “procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research.” Thus, even without the reorganization of the military services, the new defense

¹⁶¹ “National Security Act of 1947.” 756-757.

¹⁶² Ibid. 756.

¹⁶³ Ibid. 758.

department's role and authority signaled a dramatic shift in the US role in international affairs. Forrestal's objections to attempts to create a stronger Defense Department would haunt him as Truman appointed him to be the first Secretary of Defense. By the end of his tenure, Forrestal concluded that the only way to make the system work was to vest greater authority in the office of the Secretary of Defense.¹⁶⁴

Two significant aspects of the Act would generate repercussions to the present day. The first was the creation of the Department of the Air Force. The second was to preserve the status quo for the Marine Corps and naval aviation. The Department of the Air Force with its own Secretary and Chief of Staff absorbed the "Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, United States Army, and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Combat Command)" by transferring all personnel, bases, and assets previously assigned to the Army to the new Service.¹⁶⁵ The new Service would have equal standing with the Army and the Navy and, with certain exceptions, would be responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces to conduct warfighting in the air domain. Stuart Symington, a Missouri businessman, became the first Secretary of the Air Force and General Carl A. "Tooe" Spaatz, who commanded 12th Air Force, 15th Air Force, and the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe during the war, became the first Air Force Chief of Staff.

The decision to preserve the status quo with respect to the Marine Corps and naval aviation avoided a bitter battle between the President, Congress, and the Navy Department. President Truman was no fan of the Marine Corps, which he characterized as little more than the "Navy's police force." Despite Truman's disdain for the Marine Corps, he also recognized that Marines had served with valor and distinction during the war. He knew that moving the Corps under the Army would meet with stiff opposition in Congress and on Main Street where Marines

¹⁶⁴ Stevenson, "The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947." 19-20.

¹⁶⁵ "National Security Act of 1947." 760.

had dedicated supporters. Army leaders who sought to concentrate land warfighting assets and responsibilities under a single Army organization wisely chose to avoid taking on the Corps' lobby. In preserving the Marine Corps as a branch of the Navy, however, the Act sowed the seeds for future conflict with the Air Force. The Act specified, "The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."¹⁶⁶ For their part, Marines would jealously guard their "organic" aviation assets. Air Force leaders would seek to obtain control of all aviation assets to serve the joint campaign.

Naval Aviation presented a similar potential conflict for the newly created Air Force. The Act specified, "All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall consist of combat and service and training forces, and shall include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the United States Navy..."¹⁶⁷ Operations in the Pacific during World War II had witnessed the rise of carrier aviation and the diminished importance of battleships as the dominant surface warfare assets in naval warfare. The key conflict centered on how to develop, operate, organize, and control the emerging nuclear arsenal. Navy leaders sought to preserve aviation capabilities while also seeking to expand the fleet's potential for delivering nuclear weapons. For their part, Air Force leaders concluded that long-range bombardment

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. 759.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. 759.

aviation represented the natural mechanism for guarding the nation's security against all existing or potential future threats.

To coordinate the efforts of the services and to prepare strategic plans, the Act created the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the National Military Establishment to serve as the principal military advisors to the President. This formalized the roles performed by Army Chief of Staff General of the Army George C. Marshall, USAAF Chief General of the Air Force Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, and Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. Congress provided the option for presidents to appoint a Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, but stopped short of establishing a permanent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the original legislation. This again was a necessary compromise to overcome the Navy's objections.

With an eye toward the complexities involved in fighting a global war during World War II, Congress expected the Joint Chiefs to "prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces; prepare joint logistic plans...establish unified commands in strategic areas...formulate policies for joint training...formulate policies for coordinating the education of the military forces...to review major material and personnel requirements...and to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations."¹⁶⁸ This broad portfolio of responsibilities required the Service Chiefs of Staff to oversee their responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping their forces when they operated as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Service Chiefs could also retain authority to operate as warfighting chiefs if the Joint Chiefs had not established unified commands. This served Navy interests well because it continued the wartime practice exercised by Fleet Admiral King in which he issued directives to subordinate fleet commanders while retaining overall responsibility for global operations as the Chief of Naval Operations.

¹⁶⁸ "National Security Act of 1947." 761.

Generals Marshall and Arnold had, for the most part, concentrated on strategic planning, training, and logistics while leaving operational matters to their theater commanders. The difference was as subtle one, but when combined with the decisions to allow the Navy and Marine Corps to retain aviation elements, it set the stage for a major bureaucratic clash over the development and deployment of nuclear weapons.

Three other elements of the Act also reflected the wartime experiences. The National Security Resources Board would oversee industrial and civilian mobilization and the collection and distribution of critical supplies and materials. The Munitions Board would coordinate with industry representatives to prioritize and produce armaments and other equipment required for national security. Congress intended for the Munitions Board to “promote efficiency and economy” while simultaneously overseeing the management of reserves of strategic materials. Finally, the Research and Development Board would prepare strategic assessments of future military technology requirements. Rather than returning to the pre-war traditions of isolationism and small standing military forces, Congress intended the National Security Act of 1947 to lay comprehensive foundations for a global leadership role for the United States with the military establishment in effect as the agency resourced, organized, and trained to secure national interests and goals in the international system.

President Truman appointed James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy and one of the most vocal critics of unification as the first Secretary of Defense. “White House Counsel Clark Clifford explained the rationale for the appointment: ‘If Forrestal remained Secretary of the Navy, he would make life unbearable for the Secretary of Defense; if, on the other hand, *he* was the Secretary, he would have to try to make the system work.’”¹⁶⁹ Forrestal found that the compromises and barriers he had worked to install in the Act made it impossible to forge an effective

¹⁶⁹ Cited in Stevenson, “The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947.” 19.

department. He sought psychiatric treatment to deal with overwork and depression in 1949, but still found the pressures of the job and politics overwhelming. Forrestal found himself at odds with President Truman over how to plan and manage the defense budget—Truman was determined to limit defense spending, but faced an increasingly dangerous and unstable security environment—and over political matters. Truman requested Forrestal's resignation on 28 March 1949—he complied and checked himself into the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, MD five days later. On May 22, he committed suicide by jumping out of a sixteenth-floor window.

Congress amended the National Security Act in 1949 to correct some of the flaws in the original legislation. In the first place, the amendment did away with the half-measure of a National Military Establishment in favor of a true Department of Defense headed by the Secretary of Defense. The Executive Branch of the government thus consisted of Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and the Post Office. The amendment specified that “The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.”¹⁷⁰ The Secretary of Defense's authority expanded to include the responsibilities of the 1947 Act's Munitions and Research and Development Boards. Second, the amendment established the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and an expanded Joint Staff. The Chairman would preside over the Joint Chiefs, develop the agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs, and inform the Secretary of Defense or the President when the Joint Chiefs could not agree upon or resolve issues.¹⁷¹ Thus, in strengthening the Secretary of Defense's position and creating the position of the Chairman of the

¹⁷⁰ “National Security Act Amendments of 1949,” in *National Security Law Documents*, ed. Kenneth H. Moore Jr, Guy B. Roberts, and Robert F. Turner (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1949). 765.

¹⁷¹ “National Security Act Amendments of 1949.” 767.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congress gave the nation a defense establishment that was potentially equal to the challenges that would come in the emerging Cold War.

For the newly created Air Force, the primary concern was to prepare for strategic attack against any potential adversary. From 1950 until 1989, that meant focusing on the Soviet Union as the primary threat to national security. In the early years, equipped with few trained aircrews, fewer atomic weapons, and faced with rapidly evolving aviation technologies, Air Force leaders sought to apply targeting philosophies that were similar to those used against Germany during World War II. Striking at the heart of Soviet industrial power represented the fastest route to victory. As the 1948-49 Berlin crisis demonstrated, however, the Red Army's divisions could overwhelm Allied ground forces in Western Europe before US reinforcements arrived to strengthen the units garrisoned there. Atomic weapons could stall Soviet advances, but they were of little use when Allied ground troops were in the proximity of Red Army units. Furthermore, the emphasis on bombardment aviation meant that US Air Force tactical fighters would be too few in number to slow or stop a Soviet offensive aimed at Germany and Western Europe. How the Service would employ bombers and atomic weapons in peripheral areas such as Greece, Turkey, the Middle East, and elsewhere was even less clear.

For its part, the Navy intended to prepare for operations in the Pacific using atomic-capable carrier air wings aboard a new supercarrier, the planned CVA-58.¹⁷² Since atomic and nuclear weapons were to be the dominant technologies of the Cold War era, the Navy planned to have large, flush-deck carriers capable of handling heavy, long-range aircraft capable of carrying out nuclear strikes against enemy targets in the Soviet Union or China (after the Communists won the Civil War in

¹⁷² See John T. Correll, "The Revolt of the Admirals," *Air Force Magazine* 101, no. 5 (2018), <https://www.airforcemagazine.com/article/the-revolt-of-the-admirals>.

1949). The Air Force argued that aircraft carriers were too expensive to build and maintain and that they would be too vulnerable in future conflicts. Even the largest carriers would not be capable of transporting, sustaining, and operating enough heavy bombers to make a difference in the overall war strategy. Air Force advocates argued the defense budget would be better served by developing long-range, land-based bomber and fighter aircraft capable of attacking Soviet and Chinese targets from bases in the United States or in allied countries that were out of range of Soviet strike aircraft. By the late-1940s-early 1950s that meant the massive intercontinental six-engine B-36—the largest piston-driven aircraft ever in military service. A budget-minded Administration cancelled the Navy's plans for the supercarrier in favor of funding the Air Force's B-36 program, setting off a firestorm that became known as "The Revolt of the Admirals."

Members of the Navy Staff alleged that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force had acted inappropriately in awarding the contract for the B-36. Several Admirals, including the Chief of Naval Operations, endorsed the allegations and campaigned with Congress to overturn the CVA-58 cancellation. Subsequent inquiries and investigations cleared the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Air Force of any wrongdoing. Furthermore, the investigations revealed that members of the Navy Staff had based their allegations on rumors, gossip, and outright fabrications created by a special propaganda section within the Department of the Navy. Undeterred by the scandal, senior Navy officials switched tactics and attempted to discredit the B-36 and the strategy of long-range strategic bombardment. The issue came down to how much of the defense budget the Navy would receive—the Admirals argued for an even split among the three Services—and whether the Navy would have a share of the nuclear mission. After nearly six months of turmoil, Joint Chiefs Chairman General Omar N. Bradley testified that the admirals

had attempted to circumvent decisions taken by the Joint Chiefs to satisfy their parochial interests. By the Fall of 1949, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfield was relieved and replaced, other senior officers on the Navy Staff had their careers sidelined for a time, the B-36 remained in service until 1958, and the Navy got its supercarrier in 1955—albeit with an offset bridge superstructure and angled flight deck rather than the flush deck designed for larger aircraft envisioned in the CVA-58 proposal. Until the development of long-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the Air Force had won responsibility for the long-range strategic attack mission.

Given the dominance of the pre-war bomber mafia and the emerging importance of nuclear weapons, it was no surprise that the newly formed United States Air Force would give precedence to bombardment aviation in its organizational scheme. The wartime bombardment numbered air forces and commands served as the foundation of the new Strategic Air Command (SAC) created in March of 1946 with General George C. Kenney, former commander of General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Air Forces, as the first commander. At the same time, Tactical Air Command (TAC) emerged with responsibility over fighter and ground attack missions. The bomber advocates' grip on strategy and the budget reduced the size, prestige, and budget share of tactical air forces—even in naming the two combat commands strategic and tactical the leaders of the early Air Force signaled their disdain for anything except the long-range strike mission. Despite the Service's fixation on long-range bombardment, during the war USAAF aviators had worked out effective tactics and procedures for cooperating with Army units. The division of combat air assets into bomber and fighter communities would create competition within the Service's combat forces until 1992 and the reorganization that produced Air Combat Command. The Military Air Transport Service, renamed Military Airlift Command in

1966, Air Materiel Command (which became Air Logistics Command in 1961 and Air Force Materiel Command in 1992), and Air Training Command (renamed Air Education and Training Command in 1993) rounded out the major command structure.

The Air Force quickly meshed with the national security strategy of containment. George Kennan's *Foreign Affairs* article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" painted a bleak picture of US-Soviet relations. He concluded "it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."¹⁷³ That perspective became translated into strategy in the form of National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68). Given the Soviet detonation of its first atomic bomb in August 1949, the authors of NSC-68 assumed that an arms race between the two superpowers would ensue. The mere possession of nuclear weapons by the Soviets constituted a threat to US national security when considered in light of Kennan's analysis of Soviet behavior and intentions. In terms of military consequences, the United States would have to "develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression...as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable."¹⁷⁴ Despite conflicts such as the Korean War and the Vietnam War in which bombers shifted from their traditional strategic roles, and in which nuclear weapons never received serious consideration, the twin concepts of containment and deterrence would shape the dominant culture in the Air Force.

¹⁷³ X (George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947).

¹⁷⁴ National Security Council, "NSC-68: Soviet Union Nuclear Capabilities," in *National Security Law Documents*, ed. Kenneth H. Moore Jr, Guy B. Roberts, and Robert F. Turner (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1950). 64.

Over time, the Department of Defense began to shift its warfighting emphasis away from the Services toward unified and specified combatant commands. Unified combatant commands (CCMD) include capabilities from more than one military Service. Defense legislation passed in 1958 “gave unified commanders operational command over their assigned forces and removed the military departments from the operational chain of command...the services never complied with these provisions.”¹⁷⁵ Specified combatant commands employ capabilities from only one Service. During the Cold War, the primary unified commands included SAC, United States European Command (USEUCOM), and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).

SAC was unique within the Air Force in that it functioned as a specified command with its nuclear warfighting responsibilities and as an Air Force Major Command (MAJCOM). The SAC commander, therefore, reported through the Secretary of Defense to the President when serving in his specified command role and to the Air Force Chief of Staff when wearing his MAJCOM hat. This somewhat convoluted command chain complicated warfighting command and control for bomber and air refueling units during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.¹⁷⁶ Because of the demand for airpower capabilities during war, commanders at every level wish to retain control of any airpower assets available.

The seams between command layers, combined with the Air Force’s determination to operate airpower assets in ways that conformed to the Service’s theory and doctrine, fractured command and control when the operations required the Services to function as part of a joint warfighting team. One analysis identified at least seven

¹⁷⁵ James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, ed. Joseph G. Dawson III, Texas A&M University Military History Series, (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). 28.

¹⁷⁶ See James A. Winnefeld and Dana A. Johnson, *Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993).

layers of command authority for air assets, not including the frequent interposition of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, and the White House in the various air operations throughout the Vietnam War.¹⁷⁷ In this fragmented command environment, the best the Services could achieve was to coordinate and deconflict their operations—forging an effective team would require Congressional intervention.

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the Services turned their gazes inward to find out what had gone wrong. Armed with evidence of tactical success at times bordering on brilliance, the legacy of a divided domestic front, and deep divides between operational commanders and stateside political and military leaders, the general consensus was that the vital connections between the military, the government, and society had ruptured. In this view, the government tied commanders' hands and the home front had turned against the troops. Airmen needed no further proof than the result of the Christmas 1972 Linebacker II strikes against North Vietnam that forced the Communists to the Paris negotiating table. The strikes carried out over 12 days and nights by more than 200 B-52s vindicated the Airmen's belief in strategic bombing. It also indicated that modern air defenses were no less lethal than those mounted by Nazi Germany during World War II as North Vietnamese surface-to-air missiles downed ten B-52s over Hanoi and Haiphong with another five aircraft crashing or landing with severe damage in Thailand or Laos. With the end of the war, the Air Force once again focused on the nuclear deterrence mission.

By the mid-1980s, Congressional leaders perceived that the Defense Department, was not organized properly to meet national security needs. Operations during and after the Vietnam War had indicated that the Services fought independently, duplicated efforts in procurement and logistics, and had not developed their personnel to think about

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. See also, Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. 29-30, 44.

joint operations, the relationships between strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, or the profession of arms. Moreover, the Service Chiefs had become accustomed to dominating their civilian Secretaries and the Defense Department. One analyst commented, “The services wielded their influence more to protect their independence and prerogatives than to develop multiservice commands capable of waging modern warfare. They also blunted efforts to make their separate forces, weapons, and systems interoperable.”¹⁷⁸ The JCS Chairman functioned as a committee head with little authority over the members of the JCS; any decision emanating from the JCS required unanimity from the members—otherwise individual chiefs exercised veto power over the other members. The Services did not value Joint Staff assignments and consequently either did not fill their quotas or did not send their high-performing officers to the staff. For their part, officers viewed joint assignments as career-killers.

In terms of operations, there was no joint doctrine, no mechanism for creating interoperability, and no unity of command. In the aftermath of the 23 October 1983 terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, investigators found that the Services had bypassed US European Command, the unified command with responsibility for Lebanon. “Thirty-one units in Beirut reported directly to the Pentagon. Orders to the carrier battle group off Lebanon came straight from the jury-rigged ‘Navy only’ chain of command that originated with the CNO. Only after the Navy had set plans for fleet operations were superiors in the operational chain of command informed.”¹⁷⁹ Similarly, a Congressional fact-finding group to Grenada in the aftermath of the 25 October 1983 invasion found “...the Army and Marine Corps had fought side-by-side under separate chains of command. The Army had trouble coordinating with the Navy for gunfire support, and the Services had been unable to

¹⁷⁸ Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. 15.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 158.

coordinate their air activities. Planners and Soldiers and Marines on the ground had been forced to rely on tourist maps. Worst of all, a third campus of American medical students—whose rescue was the rationale for the invasion in the first place—went undiscovered for days.¹⁸⁰ Despite these obvious deficiencies, the Services and the Secretary of Defense resisted Congressional attempts to reorganize the Defense Department. By 1985, leaders on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees had concluded that legislative action was the only way to bring about efficiency and unity of command for national security.

Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn on the Senate Armed Service Committee and Congressman Bill Nichols on the House Armed Service Committee had concluded that the Defense Department would not address its serious flaws if left to its own devices. Any mention of reform such as the 1982 proposal forwarded by outgoing JCS Chairman General David C. Jones met with determined resistance—especially from the Navy and Marine Corps. Echoing the Navy's resistance to the post-World War II unification initiatives, Navy leaders in the 1980s claimed the Army and the Air Force intended to seize naval aviation and eliminate the Marine Corps. Former Marine Corps Commandant Paul Krulak and Brigadier General J.D. Hittle represented a radical view by proposing to eliminate the Department of Defense in favor of the arrangement used during World War II. In their opinions, the wartime arrangement had won the most deadly conflict in history and it should suffice for any other conflict. In contrast, the two retired Marines argued, the Defense Department had not improved warfighting capability and it prevented the Service Chiefs from giving timely advice to the Commander-in-Chief.¹⁸¹

The determined, and at times disrespectful resistance from the Services convinced Congress that it should act. The Goldwater-Nichols

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. 135.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, passed on 1 October 1986 with only 27 dissenting votes in the House and no dissent in the Senate. The 88-page law imposed the most significant change on the Defense Department since its creation. Congress was clear in its intent:

- (1) To reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
- (2) To improve the military advice provided to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense;
- (3) To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of the missions assigned to those commands;
- (4) To ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
- (5) To increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;
- (6) To provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
- (7) To improve joint officer management policies; and
- (8) Otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.¹⁸²

This sweeping legislative directive strengthened the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the combatant commanders while specifying the role of the Services as force providers to the unified and specified commands.

¹⁸² Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, (Washington, DC 1986). 3.

The first goal of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to remove the ambiguity and weakness of the Secretary of Defense that had existed since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. In specifying that “The secretary has sole and ultimate power within the Department of Defense on any matter on which the secretary chooses to act,” Congress removed any doubt regarding the relationship between the Services and the Defense Secretary.¹⁸³ To opponents, this created the potential for uninformed civilian meddling in purely military matters. Critics claimed that clarifying and enhancing the Secretary of Defense’s role while correspondingly subordinating the roles of the Services would prevent sound military advice from reaching the President. They also warned that military operations would become less effective as the increased civilian authority created the potential for meddling in operational matters. For the most part, events since the Act’s passage have proven the critics wrong. With few exceptions, Defense Secretaries have developed effective working relationships with their Service Secretary subordinates and the quality of Defense Department budget and policy presentations has improved since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols.

By redefining the role of the Chairman of the JCS as the principle military advisor to the President, Goldwater-Nichols created the potential for improving the civil-military relationship within the Department. Before Goldwater-Nichols, Chairmen only had the influence and authority the Service Chiefs were willing to grant; after Goldwater-Nichols, the Chairman’s position has afforded the President and the Secretary of Defense with credible, authoritative military advice that has been essential in confronting the complex security challenges of the post-Cold War era. The Act allows Service Chiefs to submit dissenting advice, but it also requires that advice

¹⁸³ Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. 438.

to accompany the Chairman's recommendations. This reduces the potential for bureaucratic log-rolling, obstruction, and intrigue. Because of the enhanced authority of the Chairman's position, Service parochialism tends to creep into defense policy less often than it had before Goldwater-Nichols.

Unified and specified combatant commanders became warfighters in name and in substance with the passage of Goldwater-Nichols. The Act transformed the geographic combatant commands from loose confederations of Service units that owed their primary allegiance to their Service Chiefs into combat organizations with the authority and responsibility for applying the principle of unity of command. Service Secretaries and Chiefs became solely responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces that would be assigned to the unified and specified combatant commanders. "The Goldwater-Nichols Act empowered each combatant commander to give authoritative direction, prescribe the chain of command, organize commands and forces, employ forces, assign command functions to subordinate commanders, coordinate and approve aspects of administration and support, select and suspend subordinates, and convene courts-martial."¹⁸⁴ The chain of command thus became streamlined from the President through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commander.

Goldwater-Nichols intruded on Defense Department and Service prerogatives in the area of Joint officer development perhaps more than in any other area. By specifying requirements for officer training, development, education, assignments, and promotion, Goldwater-Nichols laid a foundation for creating a Joint warfighting culture that would become essential in the conflict-ridden security environment that emerged after the Cold War and intensified with the dawn of the 21st Century. The Act required the JCS Chairman to develop Joint Doctrine

¹⁸⁴ Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. 441.

and a Joint education system that was linked to officer development and promotion. Neither had existed before 1986. The Act required officers to complete prescribed Joint education courses and serve in qualified Joint assignments to be eligible for promotion to flag officer ranks. Certain general officer positions, including Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, their Vice Chiefs and Vice Commandant, and the top-level unified and specified positions require service in at least one qualified Joint assignment as a general officer.¹⁸⁵ Using the power of legislation, Congress changed the attitudes of officers toward Joint assignments and Joint education—rather than viewing Jointness as detrimental to officers' careers, it became a sought-after pathway to promotion and advancement.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act came at an opportune moment in history. Within slightly more than two years of the Act's passage the Cold War ended. The most prevalent threat to US national security, the Soviet Union, ceased to exist. US Air Force active-duty end-strength reached its post-Vietnam high of slightly more than 608,000 in 1986—the same year that Congress passed Goldwater-Nichols.¹⁸⁶ From that point, the end-strength would decline steadily until it reached a low of nearly 300,000 in the second decade of the 21st Century. Goldwater-Nichols prepared the Department of Defense to respond to conventional operations such as Desert Shield and Desert Storm (August 1990-February 1991), but nuclear operations, formerly the *raison d'être* for much of the Air Force, became less relevant. After Operation Desert Storm, Air Force leaders reorganized the Service along functional lines. President George H.W. Bush had taken a portion of the B-52 force off alert during Operation Desert Storm; by 1992, only the ICBM force remained on constant alert status. This, combined with

¹⁸⁵ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

¹⁸⁶ Tamar A. Mehuron (ed.), "The Air Force in Facts and Figures," *Air Force Magazine* 79, no. 5 (1996). 40.

a recognition that conventional operations would likely increase over the coming decades, resulted in disestablishing SAC and TAC to form Air Combat Command. SAC air refueling aircraft moved to the newly created Air Mobility Command (AMC) to join the airlift fleet formerly operated by Military Airlift Command.

As operations intensified in the post-Cold War era, Air Force leaders adopted an expeditionary model to present forces to unified and specified combatant commanders. While Air Force units remained assigned to specific geographic commands, when operations required additional airpower assets, the Air Force used the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) presentation model to meet combatant commander needs.¹⁸⁷ The Service assigned every military member to an AEF “bucket” which would be vulnerable for deployment for a specified time. Members would be prepared during their window of vulnerability to meet deployment requirements. Combatant commanders had visibility into the numbers and skills available in each AEF and could request Airmen to fill emerging mission requirements in their region. As this system evolved, Civilian Airmen could volunteer to fill non-combat requirements in the combatant commands provided their supervisors and unit commanders agreed to allow them to deploy. Despite the flexibility and predictability of the AEF approach, the pressure of constant deployments in the mid-to-late-1990s, and especially since 2001, has placed significant stress on the Department of Defense and on the Air Force.

Conclusion

Viewed in the totality of US history, the evolution of US national security strategies and institutions appears to portray steady, inevitable progress toward a centralized defense department that projects power throughout the globe. As the preceding pages have shown, the reality is

¹⁸⁷ John A. Tirpak, “The Expeditionary Air Force Takes Shape,” *Air Force Magazine* 80, no. 6 (1997).

quite different. The legacy of the Revolutionary War and the Founding Fathers was one of remaining aloof from international conflicts. US citizens preferred small standing armies as a means to keep costs low and to prevent political leaders from entangling the country in foreign wars. Even until the mid-20th Century, public opinion constrained the nation's leaders from spending vast sums on defense or becoming involved in foreign conflicts. The experience of two global wars—and especially the bloody Second World War—convinced Americans of the necessity to lead in international affairs. After World War II, the military instrument of power became the primary mechanism for achieving the national interests in international affairs.

Airpower emerged after World War I as a means to fight and win the nation's wars more effectively and efficiently than traditional approaches. While aviation technologies had not matured, Airmen could see the potential for airpower to become decisive in warfare. They developed theories and doctrine during the Interwar Years that anticipated the arrival of aviation weaponry that could bring about the collapse of the enemy's warmaking capability. The experience of World War II did not conclusively validate Airmen's pre-war notions, but it did reveal that airpower would remain an essential feature of future wars. The development of nuclear weapons and the marriage of nuclear weapons and aircraft delivery systems provided a sufficient rationale for establishing the Air Force as an independent Service.

The troubled history of relations between the United States and Soviet Union resulted in the tensions of the Cold War—despite the common cause both states found in the campaigns to defeat Germany during World War II. When both nations acquired nuclear weapons, the stakes in conflicts involving their interests became higher, the potential for missteps more vital to their national interests. Organizing the national defense establishment and the national decision-making apparatus to preclude such missteps became an important feature of

the Cold War culture in the United States. As this culture evolved, the Defense Department gradually rose to prominence as the most visible, if not the primary, agent for signaling and pursuing US interests in international relations.

While the creation of an independent Air Force seemed justified following World War II, the need to establish a centralized Department of Defense was not as evident to some—especially leaders in the Navy and Marine Corps. The Services fought to preserve their access to the President, to prevent any initiatives that diminished their shares of the global defense mission, and especially to prevent any reduction in their shares of the budget. Ironically, although the Air Force gave precedence to the nuclear deterrence mission, Cold War conflicts in Korea and Vietnam forced it to operate in a conventional environment. These conflicts also highlighted the lack of unity of command and the institutional weakness of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By the mid-1980s, Congress had decided to use its power to change the Defense Department to perform its global mission more efficiently and effectively.

Civilian Airmen do not figure prominently in this broad institutional overview of national security and Defense Department history. Yet it is their history because they serve within this national and institutional context. Equipped with a knowledge of how and why the Air Force and the Defense Department have evolved can provide Civilian Airmen a foundation that is similar to the one shared by uniformed Airmen. As the security environment evolves, Civilian Airmen will be called on to contribute to complex and demanding operational missions; a knowledge of their institution's history will prepare them to meet those challenges more effectively. This historical context also can help Civilian Airmen gain an understanding of the continuity in their assigned organizational missions.

Questions for Discussion

1. Why did proponents of defense reorganization recommend unifying the military Services under a Department of Defense following World War II?
2. What justification did Airmen give for a separate, independent Air Force within the Department of Defense?
3. Why did the Big Three (Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union) Alliance disintegrate following World War II and why did a Cold War emerge between the United States and the Soviet Union?
4. How did nuclear weapons influence the US Air Force and the national defense establishment during the Cold War?
5. What were the shortcomings of the National Security Act of 1947 and why did they occur?
6. What was the significance of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act?
7. How did national defense organizational requirements change as the Cold War ended?
8. Since August 1990, the US Air Force has operated as an expeditionary force. Why is the expeditionary approach significant for military and Civilian Airmen?



CHAPTER 4: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR CIVIL SERVICE

The civil service system in the United States emerged out of concerns in the late-nineteenth century over corruption and political abuses. Reformers campaigned for a legal basis that sought to remove political influence from civil service appointments while instilling a merit-based system. The result was the Pendleton Act of 1883 which created the Civil Service Commission and established the merit system based on open, competitive examinations. Following World War II, the civil service end-strength remained high, despite the inevitable post-war drawdowns, because of the vastly expanded size of government. In 1949, Congress passed the Classification Act of 1949 to provide standardized pay scales for the various specialties across the departments and agencies. The Commission and the civil service system remained in effect until the Carter Administration and the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978. Despite making significant structural and organizational changes to the system, the CSRA preserved the twin objectives of ensuring the quality of the federal work force and protecting employees from political pressure. Between 2004 and 2009, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld attempted to extract the Department of Defense's (DoD) civilian workforce from the system by expanding the DoD's Title 10 authorities to create the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). Rumsfeld's initiative aimed at establishing a pay-for-performance human resource management system ran afoul of Congress, the Office of Personnel Management, labor unions, managers, and employees. NSPS serves as a cautionary case study of the

challenges involved in making changes to a long-standing personnel and manpower system that has many constituents.

The story of legislative and regulatory evolution is complex despite the appearance of stability suggested by the longevity of the Civil Service Commission and the civil service workforce. Any time Congress or the Executive branch attempts to create new laws, regulations, or to reform existing statutes, the inertia of the federal bureaucracy can become energized against the effort. This is true, even when there is a general consensus that change is necessary. Civilian Airmen serve under the legal construct established by two separate statutes, Title 5 and Title 10, and under the authority of three executive agencies—The Office of Personnel Management, The DoD, and the Department of the Air Force. At times, these statutes and agencies can create competing pressures that make it more difficult for individuals to perform their jobs effectively. At other times, the competition between military and civilian agencies can create tension that leads to misunderstanding and even resentment.

The similar, but different, cultures of civilian and military workforces can lead to misunderstanding and stereotyping. Some military members have perceived Civilian Airmen as lacking initiative, commitment to the mission, or creativity. For their part, Civilian Airmen can perceive military members as rigid, overbearing, and too focused on regulations and processes. Neither perspective is entirely accurate.

A panel discussion at the Air Force Association's 1964 annual convention focused on manpower issues—including those related to managing the civilian workforce. Panelists included the Secretary of the Air Force, a member of the Civil Service Commission, an industry representative, the Director of the Selective Service, and a Military Court of Appeals judge. The panelists related that one million civil servants supported military operations while the Air Force had to

access more than 500,000 individuals each year just to replace military members who retired or separated. The key to solving the manpower problem for the panelists was to find the right mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel to perform jobs; the guiding principle being to use military members for tasks that only military members could and should perform.

Questions from the audience related to managing the civilian workforce reflected stereotypes held by both military and civil servant leaders. When asked about getting more from the civil servants in the Air Force, Civil Service Commissioner Robert E. Hampton opined that military managers in general appeared to be less knowledgeable than they should have been about civilian programs. Participants in the discussion responded that civilians would be more useful if managers could have more flexibility in moving them to meet mission requirements. Commissioner Hampton responded, "I think management can move anyone anywhere they want to if they go about it in the right way." When the discussion moved to discipline and corrective action, Hampton relayed, "I've never experienced any difficulty in getting rid of an employee who was not performing properly. There are certain procedural requirements, and if you meet these requirements you can make these charges."¹⁸⁸ In this panel discussion, the outlines of the divide between military and civil service components appeared in stark relief.

Today, Civilian Airmen serve in a professional civil service that merges the ethic and ideals of merit-based competence and political neutrality with the mission of the United States Air Force. To understand their roles and their potential to contribute to the organizational mission Civilian Airmen must become knowledgeable about how the civil service moved from being a corrupt, incompetent, and dishonest system to one characterized by the twin ideals of merit and political

¹⁸⁸ Jackson V. Rambeau, "Military Manpower Dilemma--A Galaxy of Problems," *Air Force Magazine* 47, no. 10 (1964). 74-78.

neutrality. That history relies largely on the intervention of and the partnership between Congress and the President as much as it does on the actions of unnamed and unseen civil servants. Developing an awareness and an understanding of how the civil service evolved and merged with the Air Force to achieve a common purpose is an essential step in professional development for Civilian Airmen as they progress in their careers.

The Spoils System and the Passage of the Pendleton Act

The spoils system emerged between 1830 and 1883, in part, as a reaction against the somewhat elitist practice used by the first six presidents to staff the civil service. Until approximately 1830, presidents had few requirements for offices within the federal government and they consequently sought to appoint men who were educated, committed to the federal ideal, and competent at performing the task of their offices. As the nation's population and territory grew, powerful local political power centers emerged to exert pressure on Congress and the White House.

During the Spoils Era, the federal civil service degenerated into a partisan marketplace for presidents to dole out federal positions to political cronies and supporters. "Each change in national administration was the signal for wholesale removal of Government employees to provide jobs for the supporters of the new President, his party and party leaders, and sometimes the leaders of a faction within the party."¹⁸⁹ Presidents exercised their constitutional authority to remove government employees as a way to purge opposition party members from the government and to free up jobs for hordes of office-seekers. Washington, and even the White House, became inundated with unscrupulous fortune-hunters eager for an opportunity to secure

¹⁸⁹ Office of Personnel Management, *Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Service* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 16.

an appointment as a government official with a steady salary and, more importantly, the authority to influence policies and access to power brokers in the government. The practice of rewarding loyal supporters with government appointments rapidly eroded the quality, efficiency, and the effectiveness of civil servants. Practitioners of the spoils system attempted to justify their actions by claiming that the wholesale removal from office of nearly the entire civil service with each new administration prevented the growth of a professional bureaucracy with its own agenda that differed from that of the party in office or of the electorate at large. Such sentiments, of course, merely provided a façade to justify the corruption that ruled the day in the federal government.

The effect of the spoils system on the quality provided by the civil service was deleterious as political cronyism became more important in the selection of employees than their qualifications to perform the tasks required by their positions. “Bestowing public office on individuals as a reward for political activity resulted in a lack of continuity and experience, appointment of unfit incumbents, and encouragement of low moral standards, including the temptation of employees to seek, from public funds, reimbursement for the expense of getting and keeping jobs. Not only incompetence, but graft, corruption, and outright theft were common.”¹⁹⁰ Some unscrupulous appointees took a page from the equally corrupt and inept British system and hired replacements at reduced rates to perform the duties they were being paid to perform further damaging the effectiveness and reputation of the government agencies for which they nominally worked.

By the 1870s during the Grant Administration, it had become obvious that the spoils system could not continue. President Grant sponsored legislation to explore how to reform the system to provide a more reliable and professional civil service at the national level.

¹⁹⁰ Office of Personnel Management, *Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Service*. 17.

Under Grant's Administration the Department of the Interior began experimenting with competitive examinations as a means to curtail the spoils system and to ensure the quality of civil servant appointees in the Census Bureau, the Indian Office, and the Patent Office. Grant also sought and received \$25,000 (approximately \$500,000 in 2020 dollars) in temporary funding from Congress to initiate government-wide competitive examinations.¹⁹¹ This effort, which ultimately failed, informed deliberations that led Congress to pass the Pendleton Act of 1883 which created the modern, competitive civil service.

Despite the political parties' vested interests in perpetuating the spoils system, it had become too unwieldy and too much of a political liability to continue. "While civil service reform was a constant and repetitive theme of editorials and stories in the daily and weekly press throughout the post-Civil War period, the contingency that galvanized public opinion was the assassination of President Garfield in 1881 by a man found to be a 'disappointed office seeker.'"¹⁹² Building on the Grant Administration's experiments with competitive examinations and informed by analyses of the British Trevelyan-Northcote reforms, Congress undertook the task of unraveling the spoils system in favor of a more professional model for the federal civil service. Because much of the impetus behind the spoils system originated with local political machines, reformers sought to create a compelling case for professionalization that would generate reform movements in state and local civil service systems as well.

The Pendleton Act of 1883 became law on 16 January 1883. It first established a Civil Service Commission consisting of "three persons,

¹⁹¹ Office of Personnel Management, *Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Service*. 34-35.

¹⁹² Jerry L. Mashaw, "Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age," *The Yale Law Journal* 119, no. 7 (2010), https://www-jstor-org.aufric.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/25681946.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%3Aa2cb501bc7d1ac1f135d7d41bcb2f0c2.1389.

not more than two of whom shall be adherent of the same party” to oversee and manage the federal civil service.¹⁹³ The Commission would create and administer methods to select and place employees into federal service. The law was specific in how this would occur, the Commission would “provide and declare, as nearly as the conditions of good administration will warrant as follows:

First, for open, competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants for the public service now classified or to be classified hereunder.

Second, that all the offices, places, and employments so arranged or to be arranged in classes shall be filled by selections according to grade from among those graded highest as the results of such competitive examinations.

Third...Every application for an examination shall contain, among other things, a statement under oath, setting forth his or her actual bona fide residence at the time of making the application.

Fourth, that there shall be a period of probation before any absolute appointment or employment aforesaid.

Fifth, that no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligation to contribute to any political fund, or under any political service, and that he will not be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so.

Sixth, that no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or influence to coerce the political action of any person or body.”¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Forty-Seventh Congress, An Act to Regulate and Improve the Civil Service of the United States, (Washington, DC 1883). 403.

¹⁹⁴ Congress; An Act to Regulate and Improve the Civil Service of the United States, (United States: Federal Register, 1883); Congress. 404.

The Act also charged the Commissioners to preserve the integrity of the examinations and the examination process. Congress gave the Executive Branch six months to appoint the three commissioners and begin the process of classifying and appointing civil servants using the competitive merit system.

The passage of the Pendleton Act initially brought only a small percentage of the federal civilian employees into the new merit-based civil service. The Act specified that “after the expiration of six months from the passage of this act no officer or clerk shall be appointed, and no other person shall be employed to enter or be promoted in either of the said classes now existing, or that may be arranged...until he has passed an examination...”¹⁹⁵ Post Office and State Department employees were exempt from the new system. “Once in place...the reforms of Pendleton were rapidly consolidated. Over fifty percent of the public service outside the Post Office was covered by the Pendleton Act within five years of its passage.”¹⁹⁶ The examination system that emerged differed from the British system which sought to evaluate candidates based on a broad range of knowledge and competence. The US civil service examinations were more technical and specific to the anticipated tasks. “Examinations were to be practical rather than theoretical or academic as were the British exams...The statute ensured that a substantial percentage of the federal civil service would have the basic competence of a decent common school education.”¹⁹⁷ Thus the US civil service would provide few employees who would be expected to function independently to formulate and oversee the implementation of policies. The impression of a bureaucracy filled with clerks and typists is more typical of the American system than the British model of erudite young university

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. 406.

¹⁹⁶ Mashaw, “Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age.” 1391-92.

¹⁹⁷ Mashaw, “Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age.” 1390.

graduates operating with a great deal of autonomy and authority to administer the Empire.

The Pendleton Act helped set the stage for expanding the services the federal government provided by establishing merit-based standards for selecting and promoting the civil service work force. Writing three years after the act's implementation, Woodrow Wilson observed "the present movement called civil service reform must, after the accomplishment of its first purpose, expand its efforts to improve, not the personnel only, but also the organization and methods of our government offices."¹⁹⁸ As a leader of what became known as Progressivism, Wilson was both an observer and an advocate of expanding the provision of government social services to the public. According to one scholar, Progressivism "advocated forceful use of the powers of government in order to achieve advances in the collective public welfare, and it advocated the improvement of public administration in order that progressive policies might be carried out efficiently."¹⁹⁹ Wilson's 1886 article, "The Study of Administration," helped lay the foundation for the systematic study of how to make the business of government effective and efficient. He urged the community of scholars and government officials to join in creating "a science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness."²⁰⁰ As President, Wilson came into a position to infuse the apparatus of

¹⁹⁸ Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (1941), 1886, https://www-jstor-org.aufriidm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/2143644.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%3Ab3c7efbbda2f6fa39be7f63f1f270589. 481.

¹⁹⁹ Larry Walker, "Woodrow Wilson, Progressive Reform, and Public Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 104, no. 3 (1989), https://www-jstor-org.aufriidm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/2151276.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%3A08ee8902e032516e60c05daed0ff8cd4. 512.

²⁰⁰ Wilson, "The Study of Administration." 485.

the civil service with the scientific, business-like approach that he had envisioned nearly thirty years before he took office.

Wilson envisioned civil servants as being stewards of the government, the departments and agencies, and of the quality of life for the citizenry it served. Reform in the 1880s was a necessary step in guaranteeing moral, effective, and efficient government. According to Wilson, "Civil-service reform is thus but a moral preparation for what is to follow. It is clearing the moral atmosphere of official life by establishing the sanctity of public office as a public trust, and, by making the service unpartisan, it is opening the way for making it businesslike."²⁰¹ Viewed in this way, the Pendleton Act, according to Wilson, set the nation on a path of moral purity and administrative efficiency. It was, in effect, creating a government worthy of a nation with a moral purpose. If Congress enacted morally justifiable laws, the reformed civil service would be prepared to execute and administer those laws by virtue of its technical qualifications and its political neutrality. "It will be necessary to organize democracy by sending up to the competitive examinations for the civil service men definitely prepared for standing liberal tests as to technical knowledge. A technically schooled civil service will presently have become indispensable."²⁰² During his administration, Wilson took advantage of the civil service system created by the Pendleton Act to infuse the federal government with the kinds of bureaucracies he proposed in 1886.

The Classification Act of 1949

The federal workforce grew to more than 800,000 employees owing to the demands of the Great Depression.²⁰³ During the 1930s, public works programs and emergency measures included in New Deal

²⁰¹ Ibid. 494.

²⁰² Ibid. 500.

²⁰³ Office of Personnel Management, *Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Service*. 84.

programs allowed the government to provide jobs that would otherwise have been unavailable in the private sector.²⁰⁴ This growth was consistent with the Progressive philosophy espoused by President Wilson which emphasized government's role in enhancing the quality of life for its citizens. It also gave President Franklin D. Roosevelt the means to address the economic emergency that did not depend directly on the recovery of private corporations and economic markets. Roosevelt mobilized unemployed workers using vast public works projects such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the Works Progress Administration to create jobs and improve or create infrastructure in areas that desperately needed investments to move from agrarian economies to compete in an industrial economy.²⁰⁵

World War II brought unprecedented requirements for government and private workers. Between 1938 and 1945, the civil service expanded to almost 4 million employees.²⁰⁶ The inevitable pressure to expand quickly to meet wartime needs caused War Department officials to petition Congress for authority to bypass Civil Service Commission processes to give the Department the freedom to acquire the employees required to support and sustain the war effort. After hearing from the Civil Service Commissioners that they were prepared to adapt to wartime needs, the War Department withdrew its request. Through the course of the war, the Commission waived or modified civil service examination requirements and created pathways to access temporary employees to meet all federal workforce needs.

Inefficiency accompanied the unprecedented growth in the workforce as Congress, the executive branch, and the Civil Service

²⁰⁴ George Thomas Kurian, ed., *A Historical Guide to the US Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 116-117. See also Robert S. McElvaine, *The Great Depression: America, 1929-1941* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009).

²⁰⁵ See H.W. Brands, *Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (New York: Anchor Books, 2008).

²⁰⁶ Office of Personnel Management, *Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Service*. 84. See also, Kurian, *A Historical Guide to the US Government*. 117.

Commission modified laws, regulations, and practices to fill the federal workforce ranks. While the Commission had responded to wartime requirements by waiving or postponing competitive examinations and classification procedures, such emergency expedients inflated the federal workforce with individuals who were potentially unqualified for the positions they occupied. In many ways, the wartime expansion solved short-term problems while creating the potential for workforce management issues in the long-term. The Commission classified appointments that did not derive from competitive examinations during the wartime emergency as temporary or contingency appointments. After the war ended, the federal workforce contracted significantly and employees classified in temporary or contingency positions were the first to be released from organizational rosters. “Between July 1946 and July 1949, the Commission announced 104,413 [competitive] examinations and processed 4,769,735 applications which resulted in 1,348,470 placements.”²⁰⁷ The Commission encouraged temporary and contingency workers hired during the war to compete for the positions thus, the Commission leveraged the merit system to reduce the numbers of wartime employees while also reinforcing the principle of fair and open competition for available positions.

Another effect that emerged from the workforce expansion of the 1930s and 1940s was a chaotic situation with respect to pay for civil service employees. Pay scales had expanded to include more than 40 pay grades with nearly 30 steps. The lack of standardization and the absence of systems that supported Commission efforts to oversee pay setting practices for all executive departments and agencies led to inequities in pay setting. There was no standardization in defining work and levels of skill or responsibility. Employees performing similar jobs could, and did, receive vastly different rates of pay because of the rapid expansion of the workforce.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 88-89.

Post-war assessments of the Commission's response to the government's need for workers credited the civil service system with significant accomplishments. In spite of the need to waive or modify examinations and some merit principles, the commission managed to preserve the merit system while instilling adaptability and flexibility into hiring and management practices. The Commission acted effectively to recruit qualified workers to meet the vastly expanded needs of government agencies. The Commission also acted to offset potential deficiencies in workers' knowledge and skills by creating training programs tailored to wartime requirements. Finally, the Commission launched initiatives to improve employee-management relations and personnel management practices. Deficiencies included inadequate control mechanisms for interagency employee transfers, ineffective promotion policies, an inadequate pay structure, the failure to control the size of the civilian workforce, and the lack of effective policies and procedures to assist agencies in coping with subversive or insubordinate employees.²⁰⁸

As the Cold War emerged in the late-1940s and early 1950s, another issue related to civil service workforce characteristics became evident. The war had spawned new technologies and scientific techniques with the atomic bombs being the epitome of technology applied to warfare. Researchers, scientists, and industry leaders partnered to design, develop, and produce the tools required to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. Following the war, many researchers, university professors, and industry personnel returned to their communities leaving the government in search of highly qualified, innovative scientists and engineers. The authorities provided by existing legislation provided limited flexibility for government agencies to compete for talent with the private and academic sectors. The system created by the Pendleton Act and the roles envisaged by reformers like President Wilson were

²⁰⁸ Ibid. 86.

no longer adequate for coping with the demands of advanced materials manufacturing and systems engineering that would dominate the Cold War and especially for the US Air Force. The civil service classification system and pay structure lagged behind the private sector. Additionally, a standardized competency examination would not always provide the most desirable candidate pool in science, mathematics, engineering, and technology fields in which research interests, teaching, mentoring, and publication track records would provide a more complete picture of the knowledge, talent, and skills of potential candidates for government positions. Competing for talent in specialized fields was difficult in the early post-war years; it would only grow more difficult as industries became the drivers of new technologies.

The Truman Administration responded to the challenges plaguing the civil service system by working with Congress to pass the Classification Act of 1949. Rather than seeking to modify the merit system created by the Pendleton Act, the new legislation focused on creating a rational pay, rewards, and promotion system for the civil service. By standardizing pay grades in what the act termed the GS, and creating three new grades at the top of the scale (GS-16, 17, and 18), the act sought to bring order to what had become a chaotic system. The top three grades would “make it possible for the Government to compete more effectively with higher-paying private employment for the services of outstanding people, and to offer a greater incentive to able young men and women considering whether to enter public service as a career.”²⁰⁹ The new legislation created a predictable career pathway within each grade structure, and it created standards for departments and agencies to work with the Civil Service Commission to administer department personnel management practices. Unlike the Pendleton Act, which gradually infused merit principles in the federal workforce taking years

²⁰⁹ Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President Upon Signing the New Classification Act, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949). 536-537.

to incorporate members of the federal workforce, the Classification Act of 1949 brought more than 900,000 federal employees under the same pay, rewards, and compensation structure within a matter of months.²¹⁰

The Classification Act of 1949 brought order and consistency to significant numbers of federal employees. It established the principle of “equal pay for substantially equal work” while recognizing that variations would occur. “Differences in difficulty, responsibility, and qualification requirements” would become the standards against which variations could occur. While the Civil Service Commission retained its authority and roles in overseeing and managing the competitive merit system, the Commission could delegate authority to departments and agencies for managing the various grades established by the act. The standardized structure based on classes and grades significantly reduced the potential for inflating executive pay practices.²¹¹

The act created two compensation schedules—the GS and the Crafts, Protective, and Custodial Schedule (CPC).²¹² Subsequent legislation converted the CPC Schedule to the WG Schedule. There would be 18 pay grades that covered most of the federal work force with each pay grade having seven progressive steps (later expanded to ten steps). The law specifically prohibited using “the size of the group, section, bureau, or other organization unit or the number of subordinates supervised” to justify placing employees in supervisory grades.²¹³ Classes for positions derived from lists maintained by the Civil Service Commission, but departments and agencies could propose additions to the Commission’s classification lists as new requirements evolved.

The act established 18 pay grades in the GS. The level of supervision required established the first characteristic for distinguishing between

²¹⁰ Albert A. Belman, “Wage Chronology No. 13 Federal Classification Act Employees, 1924-50,” *Monthly Labor Review* 72, no. 3 (1951), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41832309>. 296.

²¹¹ The Classification Act of 1949, (Washington, D.C. 1949).

²¹² *Ibid.* 959.

²¹³ *Ibid.* 957.

the grades. GS-1 and GS-2 required immediate supervision with the difference between the two grades being that GS-2 employees could perform tasks with “limited latitude for the exercise of independent judgment.” GS-3 grades represented a transition point in the schedule in which employees operated under either immediate or general supervision. Grades GS-4 through GS-10 operated under general supervision. GS-11 and GS-12 grades required general administrative supervision with “wide latitude for the exercise of independent judgment.” GS-13 and GS-14 grades required general administrative direction with wide latitude for the exercise of independent judgment. GS-15 employees required general administrative direction with “very wide latitude for the exercise of independent judgment.” GS-16 employees required general administrative direction with “unusual latitude fore the exercise of independent judgment.” GS-17 and GS-18 grades envisioned employees who served as heads of bureaus.²¹⁴

The second characteristic used to distinguish between the various grade levels concerned the progressive complexity of the nature of the work to be performed by the employees. The descriptions in the legislation portrayed several bands of grades based upon the complexity of the work, the level of training and experience required, and the level of judgment expected of the employees. Grades GS-1 through GS-3 represented the first band requiring no training to some training. GS-1 employees performed “the simplest routine work in office, business, or fiscal operations or elementary work of a subordinate technical character in a professional, scientific, or technical field.” GS-2 employees performed “routine work in office, business, or fiscal operations, or comparable subordinate technical work of limited scope in a professional, scientific, or technical field requiring *some* training or experience.” GS-3 positions required employees with “*some* training or experience, working knowledge of a special subject matter, or to some

²¹⁴ Ibid. 960-963.

extent the exercise of independent judgment in accordance with well-established policies, procedures, and techniques.”²¹⁵

Grades GS-4 through GS-6 required specified levels of training, experience, or both. Candidates for GS-4 positions required a “*moderate* amount of training and minor supervisory or other experience, good working knowledge of a special subject matter or a limited field of office, laboratory, engineering, scientific, or other procedure and practice, and the exercise of good judgment in accordance with well-established policies, procedures, and techniques.” GS-5 positions required employees with “*considerable* training and supervisory or other experience, broad working knowledge of special subject matter or of office, laboratory, engineering, scientific, or other procedure and practice, and the exercise of independent judgment in a limited field.”²¹⁶

GS-7 through GS-9 positions began the transition toward journeyman class type activities. GS-7 positions required “considerable specialized or supervisory training and experience, *comprehensive* working knowledge of a special and complex subject matter, procedure, or practice, or the principles of the profession, art, or science involved; and to a considerable extent the exercise of independent judgment.” Employees in GS-8 positions required “considerable specialized or supervisory training and experience, *comprehensive and thorough* working knowledge of a specialized and complex subject matter, procedure, or practice, or of the principles of the profession, art, or science involved, and to a considerable extent the exercise of independent judgment.” GS-9 positions required individuals who had “somewhat extended specialized training and considerable specialized, supervisory, or administrative experience which has demonstrated capacity for sound independent work, thorough and fundamental knowledge of a special and complex subject matter, or of the profession,

²¹⁵ Ibid. 960 [emphasis added].

²¹⁶ Ibid. [emphasis added] 960-961.

art, or science involved, and considerable latitude for the exercise of independent judgment...requiring professional, scientific, or technical training equivalent to that represented by graduation from a college or university of recognized standing.” At these three levels, the legislators’ intent appeared to be to provide the civil service with a mid-level cadre of workers with the training and experience to work independently to accomplish technical tasks.²¹⁷

GS-10 through GS-12 provided standards for mid-level supervisory type work that required specific and detailed knowledge of the organization’s mission and purpose. GS-10 positions required employees who possessed somewhat extended specialized, supervisory, or administrative training and experience which had “demonstrated capacity for sound independent work, thorough and fundamental knowledge of a specialized and complex subject matter, or of the profession, art, or science involved, and considerable latitude for the exercise of independent judgment.” GS-11 employees would have extended specialized, supervisory, or administrative training and experience which has “demonstrated important attainments and marked capacity for sound independent action or decision, and intimate grasp of a specialized and complex subject matter, or of the profession, art, or science involved, or of administrative work of marked difficulty.” GS-12 positions required individuals who possessed extended specialized, supervisory, or administrative training and experience which has “demonstrated leadership and attainments of a high order in specialized or administrative work, and intimate grasp of a specialized and complex subject matter or of the profession, art, or science involved.” In current organizational terms, the GS-10 through GS-12 grades would provide individuals who could supervise small teams or serve as branch chiefs.²¹⁸

²¹⁷ Ibid. [emphasis added] 961.

²¹⁸ Ibid. 961-962.

GS-13 through GS-15 grades would provide the managers and supervisors for the organizations served by the civil service. GS-13 candidates required “extended specialized, supervisory, or administrative training and experience which has demonstrated leadership and marked attainments to serve as assistant head of a major organization involving work of a comparable level within a bureau.” GS-14 positions required individuals who could “serve as head of a major organization within a bureau involving work of a comparable level to plan and direct or to plan and execute major professional, scientific, technical, administrative, fiscal, or other specialized programs.” GS-15 employees were “to serve as head of a major organization within a bureau involving work of a comparable level, to plan and direct or to plan and execute specialized programs of marked difficulty, responsibility, and national significance...and to perform consulting or other professional, scientific, technical, administrative, fiscal, or other specialized work of equal importance, difficulty, and responsibility.” In current organizational terms the GS-13 through GS-15 positions described in the Classification Act of 1949 would align with division chiefs, organization chiefs, or, in the case of organizations with a military director, the deputy division chief.²¹⁹

To provide organizations a capability to recruit, develop, and retain individuals with highly technical knowledge and skills or with the potential to serve as government executives, the Classification Act created three executive grades, GS-16, GS-17, and GS-18. As with the other grades, the legislation specified requisite knowledge and skills, but Congress limited the numbers of positions in the executive branch in an attempt to forestall inflation at the higher end of the GS. The numbers of position with the three highest grades formed a very steep pyramid with GS-16 positions limited to no more than 300 positions, GS-17 positions limited to 75 positions, and GS-18 positions limited

²¹⁹ Ibid. 962-963.

to 25 positions in the entire civil service. GS-16 and GS-17 positions required prior approval by the Civil Service Commission, and GS-18 positions were reserved for Presidential appointment after being recommended by the Civil Service Commission. The limitations on the numbers of top three positions and the appointment requirements would become a source of discontent, especially within the Defense Department, as governmental roles and duties evolved. Because Congress had embedded the limitations in law, each request for modification to the numbers required legislative change actions—which served legislators’ intent to constrain growth in the civil service, especially in the higher grades, but it also constrained organizational flexibility to meet emerging missions and requirements.²²⁰

To address the issue of pay setting, Congress prescribed the initial pay scales and specified procedures for transferring individuals in existing pay scales into the new GS and CPC scales. In general terms, the Commission would work with departments and agencies to match existing pay rates to the new GS and CPC rates. The first concern was to match existing grades with the new grade schedule—assuming that the grade description aligned with the position requirements. After matching grades with the appropriate GS or CPC grades, the next process involved matching the step within the grade. Again, the principle was to preclude loss of pay if possible while transitioning employees to the new system. In general, an employee’s pay would round up to the appropriate step if his or her existing pay fell between two step levels on the new scale. Existing pay scales overlapped the new GS and CPC scales to make it easier to transition the workforce to the new system.²²¹

Legislators anticipated the need to manage career progression by providing guidance for periodic step increases and mechanisms for recognizing superior performance. Section 701 of the act provided a

²²⁰ *Ibid.* 959.

²²¹ *Ibid.* 966-967.

step increase each year for employees whose pay scale increases were less than \$200. Employees whose pay scale increases exceeded \$200 from one step to the next earned a step increase every 72 months. The new law required employees to achieve “good” or better performance ratings and to have received “satisfactory” or better conduct ratings during the period between step increases. Additionally, each department or agency could award additional step increases if the employee’s performance and contributions warranted the additional award. Finally, legislators provided guidance for a “longevity” step increase beyond the maximum rate in the pay scale for every three years of acceptable service.²²² These provisions standardized pay increases throughout the federal workforce and, in doing so, provided employees information on when to expect pay increases and how much of an increase was available. While not a pay-for-performance system, linking periodic step increases to performance ratings gave managers and supervisors a potential tool to help increase effectiveness in their organizations. The act required managers and supervisors to rate employee performance with each agency having the flexibility to determine the system that fit its organization and mission. Organizations could reduce employee pay grades for those whose performance failed to meet acceptable standards. The Civil Service Commission would oversee and inspect how each agency or department administered its rating system.²²³

Under the title “General Provisions,” Section 1103 of the act provided a non-discrimination clause. “In the administration of this Act, there shall be no discrimination with respect to any person, or with respect to the position held by any person, on account of sex, marital status, race, creed, or color.”²²⁴ In this somewhat innocuous statement, Congress sent a clear signal that employment practices in the federal government would be free from discrimination in most

²²² Ibid. 968.

²²³ Ibid. 970.

²²⁴ Ibid. 972.

cases. Later legislation would expand the non-discrimination principle to include gender, sexual orientation, age, national origin, and those with disabilities. While the Classification Act of 1949 did not direct the elimination of all bases of discrimination in federal hiring practices, it did provide an important, principled first step in establishing standards for fair and unbiased employment opportunity.

The Classification Act of 1949 did not attempt to reform all of the principles of the Pendleton Act of 1883. It focused solely on the federal pay structure and on reinforcing the Civil Service Commission's role in overseeing departments and agencies within the executive branch. There were many government agencies that were exempt from the provisions of the act, so it did not provide a monolithic solution to the problem of standardizing pay for all government agencies. It did, however, rationalize the mechanisms for hiring and progression through a career pathway for most civil servants. The act envisioned opportunities for promotion from one grade to another by provided broad standards for distinguishing between the grades. In practice, however, achieving promotions within the grade structure became more of an exception rather than the rule. Employees found themselves moving horizontally along the pay scale during the course of their careers with the periodic step increases rather than moving vertically through their organizations by achieving promotions. Nevertheless, the act was an effective piece of legislation that positioned the civil service for its role in government for the Cold War and numerous national security challenges that emerged between the 1950s and 1970s.

Civilian Airmen and Their Impact on Air Force Missions

By the mid-1950s, the numbers of civil service employees had grown to 2.6 million, with 86 percent of employees in the competitive merit system. The Civil Service Commission sought to foster unity among the diverse members of the federal workforce by appealing to

their sense of shared professionalism. Writing in the inaugural issue of the *Civil Service Journal* in 1960, Civil Service Commission Chairman Roger W. Jones addressed the civil service's responsibility in the impending transition from the eight years of Republican administration under President Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration. "Federal career officials, and personnel officers in particular, must recognize and accept a dual responsibility: first, to prepare the agencies and personnel of the agencies to respond to the programs and policies of the new administration, and second, to prepare to assist the new political officials to come to full effectiveness in their new roles as quickly as possible."²²⁵ The ideal for civil servants across the government would be to share a sense of identity based on merit principles and political neutrality as originally envisioned in the Pendleton Act. Rather than emphasizing the differences inherent in the various departments and agencies, the Commission highlighted the professionalism and efficiency that civil service employees brought to their organizations.

The themes of efficiency, effectiveness, and non-partisanship dominated messages from the Civil Service Commission. Again, writing in 1960, Commission Chairman Jones wrote "the tempo, complexity, and perils of our time make it imperative that the Government change hands with practically no lost motion...all of us in the career service must use our technical competence and administrative know-how to demonstrate that the incoming political executives and the general public can take for granted the ability and the essentially nonpartisan character of career people in the civil service."²²⁶ The Air Force, however, had already embedded its civil servant workforce in the Service's mission in direct and significant ways.

The Korean War saw Air Force end-strength numbers rise with nearly one million active-duty members in uniform. Civilian end-

²²⁵ Roger W. Jones, "1961 Top Team Must 'Hit the Ground Running'" *Civil Service Journal* 1, no. 1 (1960). 2.

²²⁶ *Ibid.* 3.

strength remained relatively stable in proportion to the active-duty military force at roughly 30 percent of military end-strength. Following the Korean Armistice, the total numbers of Airmen declined for much of the remaining 1950s. As the Cold War heated up near the end of the decade with the advent of the space race and the increase in numbers of thermonuclear weapons military and civilian numbers rose again. The Kennedy Administration reduced the numbers of military and civilian authorizations, but the Johnson Administration's 1964 decision to increase the US role in the Vietnam war brought on an expansion in total numbers of military and Civilian Airmen. Civilian end-strength, however, would remain approximately 30% of the Air Force's total active force between 1961 and 1980.²²⁷




Table 2: USAF Military and Civilian End Strength

One reason for the stability of the civilian component of the total Air Force manpower profile involved how the Air Force deployed its civilian authorizations. As mentioned earlier, Congress had recognized the need for more science, engineering, mathematics, and technology professionals in the ranks of the civil service following World War II.

²²⁷ United States Air Force, *USAF End-Strength* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters US Air Force, 2018).

The Air Force depended on such professionals to conduct research into new technologies and to maintain existing weapon systems. Air Force Logistics Command (currently Air Force Materiel Command) was, and remains, the largest employer of Civilian Airmen. Civilians represent the majority of Airmen in the depots, repair facilities, and laboratories. Before the force reductions of the 1990s, the Air Force operated major depots at McClellan AFB in Sacramento, CA, Kelly AFB in San Antonio, TX, Hill AFB in Ogden, UT, Tinker AFB in Oklahoma City, OK, and Warner Robins AFB near Macon, GA. In 1973, for example, Air Force Logistics Command employed 100,043 Civilian Airmen with the depot bases accounting for 92% of this total. Including Air Force Systems Command's total added another 28,544 Civilian Airmen to the impressive footprint that the civilian workforce contributed to the overall research, development, support, and sustainment mission components. For comparison purposes, the major combatant commands, SAC, TAC, and Military Airlift Command, employed no more than 15,000 Civilian Airmen each during the same time period. Currently, Hill, Tinker, and Warner Robins are the only remaining depot facilities; they continue, however, to employ the largest numbers of Civilian Airmen accounting for more than half the total of civilian employees in the Air Force.²²⁸

The significance of how the Air Force employs its Civilian Airmen reveals their importance to accomplishing the Service's mission. The large concentration of civilians at the depot facilities means that routine maintenance and major repairs depend almost entirely on Civilian Airmen to keep planes and weapon systems updated, safe, and equipped with the most current modifications from manufacturers. For example, when the C-5A Galaxy aircraft entered the Air Force's inventory as its primary strategic airlift platform, Air Force Logistics Command

²²⁸ See *Air Force Magazine's* Annual Almanac issue usually published in May of each year between 1973 and the present. In 2017, the almanac issue began appearing in the June issue.

selected Kelly AFB as the primary depot maintenance facility. An *Air Force Magazine* article from 1968 related how the depot design integrated with the overall sustainment plan for the massive airlifter. According to the author, “At the peak of the C-5A program...some 2,600 AFLC personnel will be involved in direct support of the aircraft. This represents about two percent of the command’s civilian work force... From conception onward, AFLC specialists have served as principal logistics advisors on the C-5A, accomplishing the preliminary logistics planning concurrent with the planning for research, development, and testing of the aircraft.”²²⁹ Considering the ways in which the Air Force depended on its Civilian Airmen, any disruption in the workforce would affect how the Service accomplished its mission.

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978

President Jimmy Carter came to office convinced that the civil service system was outdated, inefficient, and responded poorly to administration agendas. As those in the 1800s had argued in attempting to avoid reforming the spoils system, Carter argued that the career civil servants had hijacked the government for their own purposes rather than serving the political and social needs of the administration in office. He observed that “the President found in place a civil service under the direction of an independent Civil Service Commission, with layers of rules and restrictions on what the President and his appointees could or could not do...the Commission was focused on balancing the interests of managers and employees in the vast civil service and did not have a serious role as the President’s personnel management office for the civil service.”²³⁰ Carter became determined to achieve wholesale reform

²²⁹ “How AFLC Designed Intrinsic Ease of Maintenance Into C-5,” *Air Force Magazine* 31, no. 4 (1968). 99-100.

²³⁰ Office of Personnel Management, *Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Service*. 148.

of the entire system which had functioned for nearly a century without major modification.

Given the President's opinion of the Civil Service Commission, it was unlikely that it would survive any reform initiative. It had become apparent that the Commission's two-fold function—ensuring the quality of the workforce through examinations and enforcing merit principles on the one hand and overseeing the departments and agencies as they managed the workforce on the other—placed the Commission on the horns of a dilemma. To solve the problem, the Commission resorted to detailed rules and processes that caused government agencies and departments to develop equally complex internal mechanisms to remain in compliance with the Commission's dictates. The President gave his reform team a mandate to “develop a civil service reform proposal that would make government more efficient and businesslike...to modernize human resource management by streamlining the system through simplification and decentralization.”²³¹ The Personnel Management Project team eventually comprised more than 100 members including civil servants from several government agencies. The team concluded that the service was “a tangled, confusing web of laws, regulations, authorities, and exceptions...Managers could not hire or promote without heavy-handed oversight and second-guessing from agency personnel shops or the central personnel authority. Neither could managers discipline or fire poor workers without burdensome and elaborate record-keeping and the threat of long, drawn-out legal proceedings.”²³² Despite the consensus that change had become necessary, reconciling

²³¹ Douglas A. Brook, “Merit and the Civil Service Reform Act,” in *The Future of Merit: Twenty Years After the Civil Service Reform Act*, ed. James P. Phiffer and Douglas A. Brook (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 2.

²³² James P. Phiffer, “Government Legitimacy and the Role of the Civil Service,” in *The Future of Merit: Twenty Years After the Civil Service Reform Act*, ed. James P. Phiffer and Douglas A. Brook (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 26-28.

the interests of those who depended on the system required time-consuming negotiations.

One of the most contentious issues in those negotiations centered on codifying collective bargaining rights for federal employees. Labor unions representing civil servants had operated under an Executive Order issued by President Kennedy in 1962. Succeeding administrations had allowed the order to remain in effect rather than sponsoring legislative change to make the collective bargaining rights more secure. According to a participant on the reform team, “the Defense Department was strongly opposed to granting union demands for a larger role. It had dealt with the unions at its many installations and it was determined to maintain its right to manage those installations without, as it considered, cumbersome union restrictions.”²³³ Even President Carter refused to include a collective bargaining proposal in his original proposal to Congress for changing the civil service system. He only did so after the House and Senate committees had drafted versions of the bills that would eventually become the CSRA of 1978. At that point, both houses had bought into the need to reform the system and had invested time and energy to prepare the necessary legislation. Also, the draft legislation included provisions for a Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Labor Relations Authority that would be a natural fit for bargaining unit employees’ and union representatives to seek redress for any potential conflicts with department and agency management.²³⁴

The CSRA of 1978 took effect on 13 October 1978. Its authors and sponsors sought for it to be a comprehensive modernization of the system for managing the federal workforce. In the policy statement

²³³ Felix A. Nigro, “The Politics of Civil Service Reform,” *Southern Review of Public Administration* 3, no. 2 (1979), https://www-jstor-org.aufric.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/43865926.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%3Aa3b93f361aa442faeece720fc8666334. 206.

²³⁴ Kurian, *A Historical Guide to the US Government*. 119.

that introduced the legislation, Congress indicated that the purpose of the legislation was “to provide the people of the United States with a competent, honest, and productive Federal workforce reflective of the nation’s diversity.” To protect employees from prohibited personnel practices, the law would specify what constituted merit principles and would create the Merit Systems Protection Board to process hearings and appeals and simultaneously expanded the authority of the Special Counsel to investigate allegations of abuse.²³⁵

Defining merit principles was an important contribution of the act—for nearly one hundred years, the civil service system had equated competitive examinations with merit. The reform act went further and specified the characteristics of merit principles.

Recruitment sources should reflect all segments of the larger society and promotion should reflect relative ability, knowledge, and skills after fair and open competition.

Employees and applicants should receive fair treatment without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or handicapping condition and with regard for their privacy and constitutional rights.

Equal pay should be provided for work of equal value...and appropriate incentives should be provided for excellence in performance.

All employees should maintain high standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest.

The Federal workforce should be used efficiently and effectively.

²³⁵ Ninety-fifth Congress, “An Act to Reform the Civil Service,” (United States, 1978). 1112.

Employees should be retained on the basis of the adequacy of their performance, inadequate performance should be corrected, and employees should be separated who cannot or will not improve their performance to meet required standards.

Employees should be provided effective education and training in cases in which such education and training would result in better organizational and individual performance.

Employees should be a) protected against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes, and b) prohibited from using their official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a nomination for an election.

Employees should be protected against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of information which the employee reasonably believes evidences a) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or b) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety.²³⁶

While clearly preserving the legacy of the Pendleton Act and the Classification Act of 1949, the new legislation outlined specific requirements that constituted legal and ethical standards for organizations and employees alike.

One of the Carter Administration's major goals was to reorganize the federal workforce administration to streamline and simplify the government's management of the system. To that end, the legislation abolished the 95-year-old Civil Service Commission.²³⁷ In its place, the law established the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to manage the government's human resources and to publish policies for the various departments and agencies that employed civil servants.

²³⁶ Congress, "The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978." 1113-1114.

²³⁷ Ibid, 1119-1131.

“The thrust of the CSRA was not to consolidate personnel practice into one plan, however, but to delegate personnel authority to agencies and reserve for OPM oversight and advisory capacity.”²³⁸ In many ways, the codification of merit principles and the creation of OPM set the system on a path that gradually led away from reliance on competitive examinations in favor of managers creating objective and subjective criteria for evaluating applicants.

To free OPM from dealing with allegations of abuse or complaints, the law created the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). In doing so, the act “separated the inherently conflicting functions of the old Civil Service Commission—protecting civil servants from political abuse, while advising the president on personnel matters, and administering a personnel management system.”²³⁹ The division of responsibility between human resource management and policy publication on the one hand and labor relations on the other addressed complaints that the now-defunct Civil Service Commission had not responded adequately to political agendas.

Where the Classification Act of 1949 had helped establish the principle of non-discrimination in federal employment, the CSRA went further. “The Office of Personnel Management shall, by regulation, implement a minority recruitment program...for the recruitment of members of minorities for positions in the agency... to eliminate underrepresentation of minorities...with special efforts directed at recruiting in minority communities, in educational institutions, and from other sources from which minorities can be recruited.”²⁴⁰ Government agencies, including the US Air Force, responded with human resource programs to ensure their programs

²³⁸ Pfiffer, “Government Legitimacy and the Role of the Civil Service.” 26.

²³⁹ Brook, “Merit and the Civil Service Reform Act.” 3.

²⁴⁰ Congress, “The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.” 1152.

remained in compliance with Congressional intent for creating a more diverse workforce.

The final major reform directed in the CSRA involved the structure of the GS system. The Classification Act of 1949 had created 18 grades with grades 16, 17, and 18 being reserved for executive positions. The regulations and pay scale limitations inherent in the GS had made it difficult for government agencies to recruit executives with the requisite education, training, experience, and talent. Consequently, the CSRA abolished the top three GS grades to create the SES. The SES would consist of a flexible system that included career employees, non-competitive appointees, and temporary employees. Employees in GS-16, 17, and 18 grades converted to the SES as career employees. The concept provided for flexible transfers of SES members across federal organizations to broaden experience for individuals and to provide opportunities for sharing perspectives and talent among all government agencies. Rather than imposing strict limitations on numbers of SES employees, the CSRA allowed agencies to submit proposals for creating SES positions as the need and personnel budgets allowed. To preclude runaway inflation in the SES ranks, the act directed a biennial report to Congress on the status of SES positions in the Executive branch. Finally, the act required OPM to develop leadership development programs that would help agencies prepare promising GS employees for promotion to the SES.²⁴¹

Critics have tendered mixed assessments of the CSRA's results. In doing away with the Civil Service Commission, the act sought to create conditions that would lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness in the departments and agencies that rely on civil servants. "OPM never achieved the status that its framers sought...the question of centralized versus decentralized personnel management has hovered over OPM...OPM often evolved into a centralized maker and keeper of

²⁴¹ Congress, "The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978." 1154-1179.

the rules despite efforts to decentralize.”²⁴² To be sure, decentralization of authority to the departments and agencies has given them greater flexibility, but the policies, processes, and procedures required to operate credible human resource management programs have grown more complex rather than becoming simpler as President Carter had desired.

A long-standing complaint against the civil service system under the Commission centered on the detailed processes for assessing performance and dealing with employees who failed to meet standards. “Many saw a civil service system that protected incompetents, encouraged mediocrity, and had no dedication to quality, productivity, or performance.”²⁴³ The CSRA devoted ten percent of its 117 pages to detailed performance assessment, appraisal, discipline, and appeals processes. Congressional members clearly intended to specify mechanisms for linking performance to pay, rewards, promotions, and, if necessary, discipline and dismissal. According to one critic, “Performance appraisals and merit pay were standardized and procedurally sound but lacking in higher productivity outcomes. The performance-linked pay system showed little evidence of success in achieving the overall objective of improved performance.”²⁴⁴ OPM and the departments and agencies spent the remainder of the 20th Century attempting to find the right mechanisms linking performance, appraisal, and pay. As the next section will show, the DoD ultimately attempted to jettison the civil service system for one of its own design.

By codifying collective bargaining and non-discrimination in the CSRA, President Carter left an indelible mark on the civil service. Even though collective bargaining rights had existed since the Kennedy Administration, the potential for new presidents to rescind the Kennedy-era Executive Order loomed over the system and weakened

²⁴² Brook, “Merit and the Civil Service Reform Act.” 5.

²⁴³ *Ibid.* 9.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 4.

employee union leverage in labor negotiations. The CSRA set a high bar for removing collective bargaining rights because any modification to such rights would thereafter require agreement from the House of Representatives and the Senate—and employees and their union leaders would become energized to lobby against any such discussions.

Equal opportunity and non-discrimination principles created the policy and structures for diversifying the federal workforce. Rather than passively stating the principle of non-discrimination, the CSRA required OPM, departments, and agencies to create active programs for filling the civil service ranks with members from minority and underrepresented communities. Organizations had to change virtually every personnel practice to ensure compliance with the law. At the end, the federal workforce became more representative of the larger society, acquired the benefits of more diverse skills, knowledge, and ideas, and opened employment opportunities in government service to entire communities to whom government had formerly been an alien and potentially hostile entity.

In the 1990s, the dissolution of the Cold War and the realization that communication and information processing technologies were transforming business and government led to attempts to reform the system created by the CSRA. The Clinton Administration's approach to the role and size of government envisioned "government as catalyzing, enterprising, decentralized community-owned, competitive, mission-driven, customer-friendly, market-oriented, and results-oriented."²⁴⁵ This approach led inevitably to reductions in the size of organizations or to their elimination altogether. In a direct critique of the civil service system, the Clinton Administration cut more than 300,000 positions, often without commensurate reductions in the requirements and tasks performed by individuals who had occupied those positions.²⁴⁶ At the

²⁴⁵ Pfiffer, "Government Legitimacy and the Role of the Civil Service." 21.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

same time, the administration sponsored initiatives aimed at increasing government programs and services. “The solution [was] to deliver the appearance of a shrinking government but at the same time maintain the ability to provide the goods and services that the public demand[ed]. This solution has, in turn, led to the fragmenting of the public service.”²⁴⁷ The Defense Department was hit especially hard by the post-Cold War re-engineering of its budget and the civil service.

Civilian Airmen felt the pressure throughout the first decade following the Cold War. One *Air Force Magazine* article from July 1989 identified a “Quiet Crisis” in the civilian component of the total force that comprised one-third of the active force structure. Changes in business and industry at the time generated an exodus of workers from the civil service—especially in high tech career fields. Also, the government had failed to adapt its recruiting approach to attract highly qualified candidates to the civil service. Where past appeals to a career of service had attracted candidates, such approaches were no longer sufficient in a booming post-Cold War economic environment.²⁴⁸ The Clinton Administration’s re-engineering of government compounded the problems for the Air Force. One analyst observed, “Over the six-year period from Fiscal 1989 to 1995, the Air Force eliminated 71,508 of its 249,000 civilian jobs—that is 28.7 percent of the civilian force that was in place at the start of the decade...Air Force officials plan to cut about 25,000 more civilians over the next six years. When all the cutting is done, the number of civilian workers will be down to only 153,000, about thirty-nine percent fewer than in 1990.”²⁴⁹ In what would become an all-too familiar formula, Air Force personnel management officials would announce calls for voluntary reductions including early

²⁴⁷ Ibid. 23.

²⁴⁸ Staff Report, “The Quiet Crisis in Civilian Personnel,” *Air Force Magazine* 72, no. 7 (1989). 62.

²⁴⁹ Suzanne Chapman, “Civilian Drawdown: Hard and Fast,” *Air Force Magazine* 79, no. 1 (1996). 28.

retirements, voluntary separation incentives, and voluntary moves before beginning Reduction-in-Force actions that rippled through the civil servant workforce at bases around the Air Force.

The National Security Personnel System

As the Bush Administration took office in 2001, the global strategic environment had changed dramatically. According to the Defense Office of Force Transformation, “the increasingly porous boundaries between political, economic, and military domains as a result of rapid technological advances and the impact of globalization in the early 21st Century” required new approaches to national security.²⁵⁰ The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 intensified the sense of urgency for reframing the Defense establishment. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld prescribed a multi-axis approach designed to create a Defense Department prepared to cope with dramatically altered global security challenges. Rumsfeld launched a transformation initiative that emphasized strengthening joint operations, exploiting the nation’s intelligence advantages, developing new concepts and conducting experimentation, and developing transformational capabilities.²⁵¹ In what would become one of the most controversial aspects of the Rumsfeld transformation agenda, the Defense Department attempted to replace the civil service system with the NSPS designed to align the Department’s civilian workforce with the flexibility expected of the military components.

For the Air Force, in particular, civilian workforce trends that had become evident in the late-1990s had proven to be valid. One unanticipated consequence of the force reductions of the 1990s was a graying of the force resulting from processes that protected employees with seniority when the Service eliminated positions. One

²⁵⁰ Office of Defense Transformation, *Elements of Defense Transformation*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2004). 2.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.* 6.

analyst described a “Civil Service Time Bomb” that was ticking away beneath the surface of the Air Force personnel system. He wrote, “In the years just ahead, the Air Force likely will face a personnel crisis of unparalleled scope and magnitude as thousands of civilian employees with crucial technical, scientific, and program management skills approach retirement age.”²⁵² The combination of force shaping initiatives and reductions in recruiting and hiring exacerbated the effects of the graying of the civilian workforce while also sending signals to prospective applicants that career opportunities were limited for Civilian Airmen.²⁵³ Unlike the military component which relies on models based on predictable accessions of new recruits to maintain required end-strength levels, the civilian force structure is much harder to maintain. The Service can anticipate when employees become eligible for retirement, but with no mandatory retirement age and no way to forecast with certainty other transitions, the Air Force entered the 21st Century on an unsound footing with respect to its civilian workforce profile.

Secretary Rumsfeld and other Defense Department leaders sought to create a civilian component that could partner with the military and industry components to confront the challenges of the 21st Century. Reform advocates argued that the Defense Department’s more than 800,000 civilian employees, the largest of any other government agency, justified a separate personnel system tailored to national security needs. “Given Title 5, US Code, requirements that supported a seniority-based system together with the Department’s aging workforce and the projected retirements anticipated by Bureau of Labor Statistics Analyses, DoD’s institutional knowledge and its future ability to acquire skilled personnel was assumed to be at risk.”²⁵⁴ Thus, Defense officials

²⁵² Peter Grier, “The Civil Service Time Bomb,” *Air Force Magazine* 84, no. 7 (2001), <https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0701civilian/>. 56.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Inganita M. Clark and Akindallis T. Whitman, “The History of the Defense

believed that greater flexibility in hiring and pay setting was necessary to transform the civilian workforce in keeping with the overall Defense Transformation strategy.

OPM assessments of the existing personnel system lent support to reform-minded advocates. “An OPM white paper on modernizing federal pay issued in 2002 stated, ‘The General Schedule system does not permit an agency to send strong messages about performance through base pay. The outcome is that even mediocre employees can prosper and better performers will not necessarily get better pay.’”²⁵⁵ Pay-for-performance rather than giving precedence to seniority would serve as one of the cornerstones of proposals for the new personnel system. Of course, pay-for-performance also implied that low performers would receive less pay and eventually would be dismissed from their positions.

Rather than trying to carve out sections of Title 5, US Code, to provide exceptions for DoD employees, the Defense strategy aimed to create the NSPS within the authorities provided to the Secretary of Defense under Title 10, US Code. This served at least two purposes: In the first place, it allowed OPM and other agencies to retain existing GS and Title 5 personnel authorities thus avoiding drawn-out negotiations with Congress and federal agencies that were not in favor of Defense reform proposals. Second, by proposing that the new system reside within the Title 10 authorities, DoD officials nested the development of the legislation in the House and Senate Armed Service Committees under the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In the aftermath of the terror attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001,

(DoD) Civilian Personnel System: The Conversion from General Service (GS) to National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and then Back to General Service” (Master of Science in Program Management Joint Application Project, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011) (2011-06). 11.

²⁵⁵ Barbara I. Haga, Roger Richman, and William Leavitt, “System Failure: Implementing Pay for Performance in the Department of Defense’s National Security Personnel System,” *Public Personnel Management* 39, no. 3 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.1177/009102601003900302>. 212.

DoD sought, in effect, to create an independent personnel system that it could manage in ways that met national security needs.

The nesting of the legislation in the NDAA avoided the civil service committees that would have normally had oversight of civil service reform legislation; although it allowed Defense reformers to fast-track the legislation through Congress, it fostered resentment among key Congressional stakeholders with interests in the civil service system.²⁵⁶ Representative Ike Skelton, the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, who was not known as a Defense adversary, observed “This bill seeks to make the most sweeping changes to the DoD since the Goldwater-Nichols legislation...The Goldwater-Nichols bill was developed over a period of five legislative years. And this committee will have less than three weeks to consider these sweeping changes.”²⁵⁷ On top of the sweeping changes the proposal DoD provided in the draft legislation did not include enough specific information for some lawmakers.

Senator Daniel Akaka wrote to Secretary Rumsfeld to express his misgivings. “Employees throughout the federal government, especially those charged with defending the Nation, deserve compensation, appraisal, labor-management, and appeals systems that are fair. The NSPS is not fair. It gives the DoD great flexibility and authority, without real accountability.”²⁵⁸ Reform advocates in the DoD might have countered that restoring balance to the accountability equation in the civilian personnel system was the true aim of NSPS. Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David S.C. Chu sought to allay Congressional concerns that DoD would acquire unbridled power over its civilian workforce. Ultimately, DoD agreed

²⁵⁶ See Douglas A. Brook and Cynthia L. King, “Enactment and Implementation of the National Security Personnel System: Policy Made and Policy Unmade,” *Public Administration Review* 71, no. 6 (2011). 901-903.

²⁵⁷ John T. Correll, “Rumsfeld Tackles the Civil Service,” *Air Force Magazine* 86, no. 7 (2003), <https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0703rumsfeld/>.

²⁵⁸ Clark and Whitman, “The History of the DoD Civilian Personnel System.” 21.

to collaborate with OPM in designing and implementing the new system.²⁵⁹ This apparent concession from the DoD perspective helped secure enough votes to pass the bill.

Labor unions rose up in opposition to the NSPS proposal. The president of the American Federation of Government Employees union stated, “DoD’s legislative proposal amounts to nothing more than giving the Secretary of Defense the power to decide which laws and regulations he’d rather do without.”²⁶⁰ Union leaders argued that DoD did not have the right to seek employee perspectives on the proposal; DoD, in their opinion, could only deal with employees through the unions. When working to refine the bill, union representatives tried to use the opportunity to expand collective bargaining rights while accusing DoD of trying to redefine or eliminate employee collective bargaining rights.²⁶¹ Defense officials countered that “it takes an average of five months to hire a new federal employee; 18 months to fire a federal employee; pay raises are based on longevity rather than performance; and the protracted collective bargaining process set up in Title 5 can delay crucial action for months and in some cases years.”²⁶² The NSPS provision of authority to reduce employee pay or to streamline discipline and dismissal processes combined with the proposal to create a National Security Labor Relations Board which would operate within DoD with its membership at the full discretion of the Secretary of Defense virtually guaranteed union opposition.²⁶³

From the Defense Department’s perspective, the proposed new personnel system had the potential to provide improved flexibility, higher quality performance, and greater organizational effectiveness. “The performance culture envisioned in the regulations required managers

²⁵⁹ Ibid. 22.

²⁶⁰ Correll, “Rumsfeld Tackles the Civil Service.”

²⁶¹ Clark and Whitman, “The History of the DoD Civilian Personnel System.” 23-24.

²⁶² Correll, “Rumsfeld Tackles the Civil Service.”

²⁶³ Ibid. 24.

and supervisors to commit to a continuous process of performance planning, monitoring employee performance, developing employees, rating performance, and rewarding performance.”²⁶⁴ Defense officials pointed to experiments with pay-for-performance that had occurred over long periods authorized under the CSRA of 1978 to justify moving the entire Defense establishment into a performance-based system.²⁶⁵ “The intent was to become more competitive in setting salaries and flexible to adjust salaries based upon various factors, including labor market conditions, performance, and changes in duties.”²⁶⁶ Behind the broad proposal was an assumption that Defense managers and employees alike sought to escape the narrowly defined, task-oriented job description system of the existing GS system.

Pay banding instead of the 15 pay grades of the GS would be a primary feature of the NSPS. The Defense Department intended to collapse the 15 General Schedule grades into “three broad pay bands representing GS grades 1-5, 6-13, and 14-15 respectively... providing supervisors additional flexibility in awarding pay increases commensurate with employee performance.”²⁶⁷ The pay banding approach had the potential to increase organizational flexibility, improve mission effectiveness, and led to increased employee satisfaction, according to results from the Navy’s experiments at its research laboratories. Critics pointed out that the Navy’s laboratories were not representative of organizations with a full range of GS pay grades. Most employees covered under the experiments had occupied the higher grades. “With broad pay bands, the Department wanted to move employees more freely across a range of work opportunities

²⁶⁴ Haga, Richman, and Leavitt, “System Failure: Implementing Pay for Performance in the Department of Defense’s National Security Personnel System.” 218.

²⁶⁵ Brook and King, “Enactment and Implementation of the National Security Personnel System: Policy Made and Policy Unmade.” 900.

²⁶⁶ Clark and Whitman, “The History of the DoD Civilian Personnel System.” 26.

²⁶⁷ Haga, Richman, and Leavitt, “System Failure: Implementing Pay for Performance in the Department of Defense’s National Security Personnel System.” 217.

without being bound by narrowly described work definitions... pay bands did not have steps through which employees advanced automatically with satisfactory job performance. Instead, in NSPS, funds formerly used to pay for within-grade, quality-step, and other increases in the GS were pooled and used to fund the pay increases determined at the end of the performance appraisal cycle.”²⁶⁸

Because “the system design included added opportunities for supervisors and managers to make discretionary judgments on employee performance,” the NSPS had the potential to run afoul of labor relations processes from the outset.²⁶⁹ The lower GS grades typically fell under collective bargaining agreements which required, at a minimum, notifying local union representatives any time management wished to change the work environment. Employees also had the right to file grievances against management actions that affected their working conditions.

On 24 November 2003, President Bush signed the NDAA that included the outlines of the NSPS.²⁷⁰ Neither Congress, OPM, nor the unions were completely satisfied with the way the negotiations leading up to the final language in the bill had occurred. Some members of Congress resented the fast-track approach that had side-stepped the more experienced civil service committees, OPM representatives resented being ignored in the proposal drafting process, and the unions viewed NSPS as “a direct attack on employees’ rights to organize and to bargain collectively, and they perceived a number of ‘union busting’ clauses.”²⁷¹ While DoD proceeded with implementing the new system with a goal of converting more than 300,000 GS employees into the NSPS pay bands by October 2004, OPM engaged Secretary Rumsfeld

²⁶⁸ Clark and Whitman, “The History of the DoD Civilian Personnel System.” 27-28.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 218.

²⁷⁰ Brook and King, “Enactment and Implementation of the National Security Personnel System: Policy Made and Policy Unmade.” 903.

²⁷¹ *Ibid.* 903-904.

to raise concerns over implementation plans, the Department's failure to include OPM representatives in drafting the NSPS regulations as required by Congress, and labor relations issues expressed by union leaders. Rumsfeld directed a pause in implementation to give DoD officials time to address OPM concerns. After the revised regulations appeared in the *Federal Register*, the unions filed suit in federal court to oppose the system implementation.²⁷²

The union lawsuit took aim at the core principles of the new personnel system. "The suit challenged the NSPS in five areas:

1. Collaboration with and participation of employee representation.
2. Compliance with independent third-party reviews.
3. Employee rights to organize and bargain collectively.
4. Independence of the proposed National Security Labor Relations Board.
5. Fair treatment and due process in the appeals process."²⁷³

In the meantime, opposition in Congress began to solidify as members heard from unions and employees. By including the NSPS in the National Defense Authorization Act, the Defense Department had opened a fast track to passing the legislation, but it also left itself more vulnerable because the NDAA came up for review and revision every legislative year. In January 2006, the US District Court ruled in favor of the unions in three areas and ordered the remaining two areas be frozen effectively tying the DoD's hands on implementing the system. Congress followed by revoking or revising much of the Department's authority to implement the NSPS as originally envisioned. As the Obama Administration entered office, the President froze all pending programs from the previous administration, "effectively barring DoD from expanding or implementing the finalized [NSPS] regulations."²⁷⁴

²⁷² Ibid. 904.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid. 905.

The 2010 NDAA, signed in October 2009, directed the return of DoD employees who had been converted to the NSPS to the GS system—NSPS was terminated.

The legacy of the NSPS experience reveals the difficulty of making major changes to deeply entrenched bureaucratic systems. In retrospect, the Defense Department's strategy of seeking independent authority to create its own personnel system challenged the interests and prerogatives of OPM, the labor unions, and employees—to say nothing of alienating members of Congress who served those constituencies. The burden on managers and employees to link job duties to organizational missions, document contributions to those missions, and, for managers, to provide the required level of assessment, appraisal, and feedback was significant. The potential for the pay pool system to overturn a supervisor's assessment caused concern that the time and effort invested was wasted to a degree. As employees transitioned back to the GS, the President had directed that no employee would lose pay. Because the pay band structure and the flexible pay setting process for the nearly 200,000 employees who had converted to NSPS had diverged from the GS pay schedule, some employees re-entered the General Schedule at higher steps than their previous levels. Others re-entered the GS at lower grades because of the process used to convert from NSPS to the GS. While such employees retained their higher NSPS pay for two years, they were potentially locked into a lower grade than they had held previously.

All-in-all, NSPS became synonymous with how not to reform a personnel system. As anticipated, DoD managers and supervisors appreciated the flexibility and the emphasis on mission accomplishment. Employees for the most part also appreciated the linking of performance to mission, but they disliked the potential for pay reductions, the potential for secrecy inherent in managing the pay pools during the appraisal process, and the potential loss of collective bargaining rights.

In any major change initiative that cuts across organizational and departmental lines, communication and collaboration are essential requirements. DoD officials clearly fell short in failing to hear concerns from Congress, OPM, the unions, and the Department's own employees—in doing so, they missed opportunities to improve the NSPS by hearing the perspectives of others. The end result was the failure to create a consensus for human resource management reforms.

Conclusion

The federal government has sought to instill quality and flexibility into its civil service system while responding to societal trends that favor protecting employee rights. Executive agencies like the US Air Force focus appropriately on accomplishing the organization's missions and therefore seek the most efficient and effective ways to employ the workforce to do so. Nevertheless, Civilian Airmen are not military members. They do not experience, for the most part, the same risks and consequences that uniformed members of the Air Force incur when they commit to national defense. Additionally, the Service does not invest the types and amounts of resources to recruit, develop, and retain civilian employees as it does its military component. In general, the expectation is that Air Force leaders, managers, and supervisors will hire civilian employees with the required skills, knowledge, and abilities to accomplish the desired tasks. This works as long as the required tasks remain relatively stable and fixed; since the end of the Cold War, however, the national defense establishment has confronted challenges that require agility and innovation on the part of military and civilian personnel alike.

The history of civil service management in the United States reflects trends toward establishing and reinforcing structures that create and preserve an apolitical, stable, credible workforce. Initiatives such as the Pendleton Act and the CSRA of 1978 have succeeded in doing so for

the civil service in general. Regarding the DoD's component of that workforce, however, the structures imposed by Congress combined by reductions in both military and civilian manpower authorizations may make it more difficult for the Department and its components to adapt to meet existing and emerging threats. As the NSPS experience showed, however, even though the DoD employs the vast majority of civil servants, congressional political concerns, labor unions, and employees are reluctant to depart from long-established civil service structures and practices that would seem to favor employee job security and seniority over mission effectiveness concerns.

In cases where Congress has acted to change how the civil service system operates several conditions must be present. First, there must be a recognition among multiple stakeholders that the existing system is so inefficient and ineffective that it fails to provide the expected service to the public. This occurred in 1883 and in 1978 when Congress and the White House collaborated to enact sweeping legislation to establish and then modify the civil service based on merit principles. In contrast, the NSPS effort foundered in part because neither Congress nor the OPM agreed that existing practices required a radical revision of the existing system. Second, in the modern age, labor unions are significant stakeholders and they must participate in any attempt to modify civil service structures or management practices. The Pendleton Act did not have to consider labor unions in the creation of the civil service system, but beginning with the Kennedy Administration's executive order government employees acquired labor organization and collective bargaining rights. The CSRA of 1978 formalized this feature of the civil service system and in doing so created a requirement for consulting with union leaders for any modifications to the system. NSPS ran afoul of the unions from the outset—not necessarily because it sought to “bust the unions,” but because DoD officials failed to consult union leaders effectively in the design and implementation of the new system; in doing

so, it violated the principles of collective bargaining. Third, the success of any personnel management system requires employees, supervisors, and managers to partner in its design, deployment, and operation. Any initiative that appears to be arbitrary or introduces uncertainty in established personnel management practices undermines trust and confidence that employees have in their supervisors and managers. Additionally, supervisors and managers are the “face” of any personnel system. They must understand the intent of any changes; they must be trained and proficient in using the system to manage the workforce; and they must be prepared to answer employee questions and concerns in implementing the system. In the end, changes to the personnel systems should result in better performance *and* better collaboration between employees and those who lead them.

Finally, the history of the civil service in the United States indicates a general lack of understanding on the part of the public, and even on the part of members of the system, regarding the roles of government employees and the constraints under which they operate. This leads to perceptions of laziness, inefficiency, and entitlement—perceptions that take on the aura of fact if not countered with specific evidence that most government employees are dedicated, hard-working, and committed to seeing their organizations succeed. While it may be true that removing employees for poor performance requires supervisors and managers to follow detailed bureaucratic processes, such processes are in place to protect employees from arbitrary actions on the part of their superiors. Such protections rest on the assumption that the public deserves and requires a professional and competent civil service workforce. Employees hired into the system bring required skills and knowledge and they acquire more expertise in a career of service to the nation. Preserving the expertise, skills, and knowledge should be a priority for government agencies. Therefore, the first step in leading a civilian workforce is to find ways to correct unsatisfactory performance through

training or other interventions. Should the employee meet standards, the interventions will have proven successful and there should be no cause for further action unless the employee's performance declines. If, however, the employee does not improve or meet standards, managers and supervisors should be prepared to document and defend any disciplinary or dismissal actions required. Failing to do so is not fair to the employee, to the organization, or to the public.

On a more positive note, documenting good performance is as important as is documenting poor performance. This is the condition that most managers and supervisors face in leading Civilian Airmen. During any appraisal cycle, supervisors have ample evidence of employees giving effective, if not superlative, service as they serve their organizations. In most cases, the question is not whether to give out awards and incentives, but how to divide the limited available awards and incentives among the numbers of deserving employees. Civilian Airmen, like their military counterparts, routinely go above and beyond to ensure their units' missions success. In the sense that Civilian Airmen deliver on their oath of office day-in and day-out, the civil service system works—sometimes in spite of rather than because of the statutory structures that govern their service.

Questions for Discussion

1. What characteristics of civil service led Congress to pass the Pendleton Act of 1883?
2. How would you describe the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of the federal civil service?
3. What were the primary reasons for the Carter Administration's initiative to reform the civil service system?
4. What are merit principles and why are they important to preserving the quality of the civil service?

5. Why do you believe it is important for government employees have the ability to form unions and to bargain collectively?
6. Why did Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld decide to pursue creating the NSPS?
7. What prevented the NSPS from succeeding?
8. How can civil service employees, managers, and supervisors create more efficient and effective working relationships focused on achieving mission effectiveness?
9. How should civil service structures change to streamline processes for removing poor performers in the civil service?
10. Why do you think civil service reform is so difficult to achieve?



CHAPTER 5: REGULATORY GUIDANCE FOR CIVILIAN AIRMEN

Military institutions organize, train, and equip forces in accordance with formal regulations that implement laws and other federal guidance. At times regulations can be quite detailed and prescriptive leaving those within the organizations little room for applying flexibility or judgment. In other cases, regulations provide broad guidance leaving organizational leaders freedom to adapt the guidance to unit missions. Like doctrine, the information in regulations reflects the institution's leaders' beliefs regarding the best approach to managing people, resources, and accomplishing assigned missions. Also like doctrine, regulations emerge from the context of the times in which they are written. For example, Airmen of the Interwar years developed daylight precision strategic bombing doctrine in the context of the memory of the stalemated ground operations of World War I. They sought to restore mobility and the potential for decisive military action to what they believed would be the inevitable stagnated surface warfare battles that had characterized the last great war.²⁷⁵ The Interwar Airmen failed to anticipate technological advances that negated some of their assumptions. Likewise, regulations written under certain assumptions with the best of intentions, as will become evident in the following pages, can impose unanticipated and unwanted conditions on the institutions they seek to regulate.

Gaining a comprehensive understanding of how regulatory guidance evolves requires patience and persistence. The bureaucratic

²⁷⁵ For an entertaining and recent narrative of the importance of strategic bombing theory was to the early Air Service, see Malcolm Gladwell, *The Bomber Mafia: A Dream, A Temptation, and The Longest Night of the Second World War* (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2021).

language is often dry, specialized, and difficult to internalize. While a study of any military institution's regulations provides perspective on how the institution's leaders intend to accomplish their assigned missions, historians cannot distinguish between intent and practice solely by referring to the official publications. Departmental regulations provide overarching guidance to subordinate commands, but invariably, those commands have authority to implement the higher-level guidance to fit the specific needs and circumstances of the operational missions for which they are responsible.

As previous chapters have indicated, a gap exists between Civilian Airmen and the military institution within which they serve. Regulations that governed the management of the civilian workforce represented one way to narrow the gap. When the Air Force emerged as a separate service as a result of the National Security Act of 1947 there were two sources of continuity for civilian employees. The first was the Civil Service Commission. All federal civilian employees within the new DoD continued to serve under the administration of the Commission which published policies and procedures for federal departments and agencies. Each installation that employed civilians had a Civilian Personnel Office to support the civilian workforce and to liaise with higher headquarters and the Civil Service Commission. Also, civilians who felt compelled to file grievances against managers who may have violated Commission policies or procedures ultimately had the option to have their cases reviewed and addressed by offices within the Commission. The relationship between the Commission and the new Department of the Air Force remained the same as it had when the US Army Air Service was a component of the War Department. For Civilian Airmen in the new Service this meant that most management practices changed little, if at all in the immediate aftermath of the standing up of the Air Force.

The second source of stability and consistency came in the form of existing Army and Army Air Forces Regulations that prescribed policies and procedures for administering the civilian workforce in accordance with War Department and Civil Service Commission requirements. The global nature of the war and the creation of the USAAF had established a pathway for the creation of the independent Service. USAAF Regulations had already emerged to provide Service-specific guidance. Those regulations remained in effect during the stand-up of the independent Air Force. In many cases, the former AAF Regulations simply became Air Force Regulations with no additional changes to the guidance. Over time, however, as the numbers of regulations grew to reflect the complexity of the missions and the workforce that carried out those missions the Air Force departed from its Army regulatory roots. In the early days of the new Air Force, however, Civilian Airmen could rely on a body of publications that were consistent with guidance they had used as employees of the Army Air Forces.

The Special Collections section of the Air University Library contains copies of Air Force and Army Regulations dating back to the pre-World War II era. Publications managers for each organization maintained the unit library of current regulations. The Air University Library became a depository for all Regulations from its earliest days making it a valuable resource for organizations and researchers wishing to see how the Service guidance on a particular issue evolved. The collection is organized by year and indexed in a card catalog system. The system can be quite daunting at first because of the plethora of topics covered by the Regulations—in some years the numbers of published Regulations require more than ten bound volumes to capture the changes to Regulations made during the year.

An additional source of complexity entered the system in the mid-1990s when the Air Force completely transformed its publication hierarchy from Regulations to Instructions. This transformation

did away with the 40-Series Regulations that formerly contained all guidance related to Civilian Personnel in favor of merging all personnel issues into the 36-Series Instructions. There are two ways to trace how the 40-Series Regulations became incorporated into the new 36-Series Instructions. The first is to search the O-2 Index which provides the record—sometimes on a monthly basis—of which publications were current and how Regulations migrated into the new publication system. The process took more than three years to complete before the O-2 Index reflected no Regulations as being in effect. The second way to trace the transition is to search manually through the bound volumes of the 40- and 36-series publications in the Special Collection. Combining the two techniques gives some insight into which regulations merged with the new 36-series Instructions and which were eliminated in the transition. Some new instructions remained dedicated to policies and processes related to civilian employees; for the most part, however, the Service adopted a more generalist approach in which Instructions applied to all personnel unless Civilian Airmen required a specific set of Instructions. In such cases, the Instructions included chapters or paragraphs that applied to Civilian Airmen rather than providing such guidance in a separate Instruction.

Before the transition to the current system, the Air Force regularly distributed changes to regulations from the Air Staff office responsible for the policy. Most regulations were on a two-year revision cycle in which the Air Staff would reissue an entirely new publication. The Air University Library Special Collection catalog reflects the dates when changes took effect. This means that a lag occurs within each annual bound volume of the collection. For example, if one wishes to see a change to a regulation that took effect in 1966, the change will usually appear in the 1968 bound volume when the next change that superseded the 1966 regulation took effect. There were several types of changes. In the interim between the two-year revision cycles the

Air Staff could issue partial changes in the form of line-by-line pen-and-ink changes or in the form of remove-and-replace pages. The card catalog includes entries that reflect each publication of a change to any Regulation in the collection. Thus, researchers seeking to understand the collection must become sensitized to the changes to the regulations reflected in the catalog and contained in the annual bound volumes. The O-2 Index provides another source for determining the currency of all Regulations and other publications. Cross-referencing the O-2 Index with the card catalog is the most effective method of tracing changes to specific regulations as they evolved over time. Even with such cross-referencing, researchers have no way of assessing changes to content short of referring to the annual bound volumes and reading the regulation that was current in a given year.

As with the preceding chapters, this chapter concentrates on themes reflected in the Regulations that governed how the Air Force managed its civilian workforce rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive account of how the Regulations evolved. In general, the Regulations provided consistent, stable guidance for employees and managers alike. Over time, the topics included in specific Regulations and the numbers of new topics reflected in new Regulations expanded. These expansions came from two sources—the need for more specific guidance and the emergence of new issues requiring specific regulatory guidance. In some cases, the introduction of new requirements such as the CSRA's formalization of collective bargaining rights spawned new Regulations to help managers and employees alike comply with federal policy. In others, the Air Force sought to improve management practices by publishing regulations on how to assess performance and provide feedback. Regardless of the types of regulations or the ways in which they evolved, Civilian Airmen should become familiar with the outlines of the policies and procedures that have governed their service within the Air Force.

The Essential Role of Civilian Airmen in the US Air Force

One of the fundamental hypotheses of this book is that Civilian Airmen are essential to the Air Force—the Service could not accomplish its assigned missions without the contributions of its Civilian Airmen. In the course of this research, however, finding how the Service values its civilian employees compared to its uniformed personnel—active duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve members—has not produced a consistent body of evidence to support the hypothesis. Many military members have little direct experience working with Civilian Airmen and the typical avenues for recognizing members' accomplishments tend to concentrate on the contributions of military members rather than on those of Civilian Airmen. Nevertheless, from the earliest days of the Air Force, senior leaders sought to codify the importance of Civilian Airmen's contributions.

Air Force Regulation 40-2, *Delegation of Authority for Civilian Personnel Administration within the AAF*, published on 2 January 1947, recognized that the Secretary of War (later the Secretary of the Air Force after the implementation of the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of the US Air Force) had ultimate responsibility for complying with Civil Service Commission and Federal Regulations with respect to civilian personnel administration. Maintaining a centralized system within an organization as large as the Air Force, however, would be impractical. AFR 40-2 delegated authority and responsibility for civilian personnel administration to subordinate commanders at installations with a central civilian personnel office. The key acknowledgment of how important Civilian Airmen were appears in this regulation and remained in some form as long as there was a regulation specifying authorities and responsibilities for civilian personnel administration. The authors wrote, "With the large civilian complement of the AAF, it will be readily understood that the continued excellent operation of

the AAF civilian personnel program *is as important to the successful accomplishment of the AAF mission as is the military establishment.*²⁷⁶ Commanders would be held accountable for operating an effective civilian personnel administration program in accordance with Service, Defense Department, Civil Service Commission, and Federal policies, practices, and procedures.

AFR 40-2 defined several key tasks for commanders:

- a) To allocate positions to appropriate grades;
- b) To appoint, assign, promote, and separate civilian employees;
- c) To operate programs...which will ensure:
 - 1) Sound administration of civilian personnel;
 - 2) That employees are assigned to jobs for which they are best fitted by aptitude and experience;
 - 3) That employees are trained so that an effective civilian work force is developed and maintained;
 - 4) That employees are compensated equitably;
 - 5) That a high degree of employee morale and productivity is maintained.²⁷⁷

In fulfilling these responsibilities, the Service expected commanders to exercise judgment regarding when to use military members and when to assign Civilian Airmen to particular tasks. “Civilian personnel *will be used to the maximum extent possible to fill those positions which do not require military skills or which do not require military incumbents for reasons of training, security, or discipline.*”²⁷⁸ In the Cold War context, circumstances could force installations, or

²⁷⁶ *Army Air Force Regulation 40-2: Delegation of Authority for Civilian Personnel Administration Within the AAF*, (Washington, D.C.: 2 January 1947). 2-3. [emphasis added]

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 1.

²⁷⁸ *Air Force Regulation 40-3, Civilian Personnel: Utilization of Civilians Within the Air Force* (Washington, D.C.: 18 May 1948). 1. [emphasis added]

even the entire nation, to transition with little warning to a wartime footing. Military members could deploy, leaving Civilian Airmen to ensure the continued operation of garrison missions. The expected benefits of a smoothly operating partnership of military and Civilian Airmen involved: “Free[ing] the maximum numbers of military personnel for tactical assignment. Provid[ing] the nucleus of trained civilians necessary for expansion of overhead personnel in any future emergency. Assur[ing] a continuity of experienced civilian administrative, research, supply, and maintenance personnel to Air Force activities, regardless of movements of tactical organizations or military personnel.”²⁷⁹ This regulation concluded with a reminder of the size of the civilian workforce and its vital importance to the Air Force mission.

By 1962, detailed guidance for administering civilian personnel programs had migrated to AFR 40-102, *Basic Authorities, Principles, and Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration*. In addition to the basic guidance found in AFR 40-102, other regulations provided additional policies in what would become a significant number of regulations that applied to the civilian workforce. The guidance in AFR 40-102 was detailed and reflected an increasing emphasis on human relations in personnel programs. The regulation included the following principles to which commanders would adhere:

- Employees and job applicants will be treated fairly and impartially regardless of race, sex, color, creed, or national origins.
- Within the limits of security requirements, employees will be kept fully informed of plans and policies affecting them or their positions.
- Effort will be made to assign employees to positions for which they are best qualified. Appointments, transfers, reassignments,

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

and promotions will be based on merit and will comply with Federal Civil Service principles and requirements.

- Employees will be provided with full opportunity for self-development and advancement; where necessary and feasible, training authorized by law and regulation will be provided.
- Employees will be compensated equitably under established salary and wage administration procedures. Their positions will be classified in accordance with, or consistent with, Civil Service and Air Force standards.
- Employee performance will be evaluated by comparison with established reasonable job requirements and without regard to the rater's personal like or dislike of the employee being rated. Supervisors will discuss the results of their evaluation with each employee. All significant achievements and contributions will be given full recognition and whenever performance fails to meet standards, the supervisor will take the necessary corrective action promptly.
- Working conditions will be made as safe and healthful as possible.
- Employees are encouraged to comment on work methods or working conditions. Where practical, they will be afforded the opportunity to participate in developing policies affecting their employment. Employees have the right to present grievances and complaints and to join lawful organizations or associations without interference, restraint, or fear of reprisal.
- Employee services will be provided if needed and legally permissible.
- Conduct of all employees, both on and off the job, is expected to meet accepted moral and ethical standards and to reflect

favorably on the Air Force and the Federal Government. Corrective action, where necessary, will be taken promptly in order to maintain discipline, achieve a high level of employee morale, and protect the reputation of the Air Force and the Federal Government as an employer.²⁸⁰

The non-discrimination policy outlined in the first principle had its origins in the post-World War II decisions taken by national leaders—particularly by President Truman to integrate the military and the federal workforce. Although the earliest emphasis concentrated on race, by the early 1960s, there was a growing awareness that all forms of discrimination harmed unit morale and mission effectiveness. The fight for racial equality characterized the 1960s and served as a catalyst for other civil rights movements. Women began to campaign for equal rights, abortion rights, family support services, and equal pay—a campaign that continues today. Until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, even a federal and departmental policy against discrimination could be inadequate to protect access to federal jobs for people of color and women. The provision that required supervisors “to assign employees to positions for which they are best qualified” anticipated to a degree the need to avoid discrimination against disabled individuals that would become law in the Americans With Disabilities Act that did not become law until 1990. The Civil Service Commission had, at times, emphasized hiring disabled individuals—especially disabled veterans—in civil service positions, but employers could justify not hiring disabled individuals by citing job requirements for many years after the initial publication of AFR 40-102.

²⁸⁰ *Air Force Regulation 40-102, Civilian Personnel: Basic Authorities, Principles, and Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration*, (Washington, D.C.: 2 July 1962). 1.

Air Force Regulation 40-320, *Matching Physical Capacities with Physical Demands*, represented an early attempt to provide equal employment opportunity to handicapped individuals. The basic policy required “selective placement as a common sense approach to the goal of placing a well qualified man or woman in each Air Force position.” This required hiring and classification authorities to be objective about the skills, physical requirements, education and training requirements, and mental aptitude required for each position. The hiring official could request evaluation by a physician before making the final appointment, but “the existence of a physical impairment will not be used as a reason for failure to select an applicant or retain an employee if he can perform the duties of the position efficiently and without hazard to himself, fellow employees, or others.” This guidance laid a foundation for expanding the rights for handicapped individuals.²⁸¹ Subsequent versions of the regulation provided more rigor in the meaning of handicaps—the Service adopted a very broad definition—establishing the principle of equal employment opportunity for handicapped individuals, and “meeting the needs of employees who become disabled through job-connected injuries, off-the-job accidents, or disease.” Although the Air Force did not use the term “accommodation,” it clearly established the principle that would become a cornerstone after the passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act.²⁸²

The provisions regarding assignment, transfer, and reappointment stemmed from changes in Air Force basing and force structure as the Service sought to balance efficiency and effectiveness in the Cold War. While the Service’s personnel end-strength remained high compared to today’s standards—active-duty military authorizations averaged nearly

²⁸¹ *Air Force Regulation 40-320, Civilian Personnel: Matching Physical Capacities with Physical Demands*, (Washington, D.C.: 28 February 1963).

²⁸² *Air Force Regulation 40-320, Civilian Personnel: Matching Physical and Mental Capacities with Physical and Mental Demands*, (Washington, D.C.: 27 March 1967).
2.

750,000 personnel between 1960 and 1980 while civilian end-strength averaged more than 300,000 personnel for the same period—base closures and mission realignments affected civilian employees in ways that differed from the effects on military members.²⁸³ Military members expected to be reassigned periodically during their service; on the other hand, civilian members often expected to remain at a the same base for their entire careers. When the base closed, or the mission transferred to another base, civilian employees faced the uninviting prospects of losing their jobs entirely or being forced to uproot their families to move to another installation. Therefore, the provision in AFR 40-102 that required commanders and supervisors to keep employees informed of “plans and policies affecting them or their positions” was a significant concession to the human effects of Headquarters US Air Force decisions.

By the early 1960s, Air Force Regulations reflected an awareness on the part of senior leaders that the contributions of Civilian Airmen merited purposeful training and development. AFR 40-411, *Employee and Career Development*, outlined policies for what Service leaders would call human capital development in the second decade of the twentieth century. The Regulation distinguished between training, employee development, and career development. Training involved “the organized instructional process for improving employees’ skills, knowledge, work habits, and attitudes.” Employee development included activities that led to “the systematic development of employees through planned experience; examples and guidance from supervisors, superiors, and associates; self-study and improvement; training and formal education, to enable them to attain and maintain proficient performance in their day-to-day work assignments and anticipated future assignments.” Career development involved the “systematic development of selected employees toward the objective of obtaining fully qualified, responsible,

²⁸³ USAF *End-Strength*, (Washington, D.C.: 2018).

self-motivated members of the Air Force.” Such development programs applied only to “a planned broad-base program for long-range development of individuals whose potential and/or performance warrants preparation for higher level responsibilities.” The Regulation charged commanders and supervisors with the responsibility to develop comprehensive employee training and development programs that achieved tangible benefits for Air Force missions.²⁸⁴

The principles governing employee advancement and promotion were perhaps among the most difficult to administer and the most contentious with respect to having the potential to harm organizational morale. The classification and pay system inherent in the Civil Service Act of 1883 and the Classification Act of 1949 established relatively rigid career pathways for the federal workforce. Moving through the ten steps in a particular grade, assuming that an employee’s performance met established standards, occurred automatically with the supervisor’s concurrence. Because the system provided for such within-grade-increases approximately every three years, an employee who began at Step 1 would take between 28 and 30 years to reach Step 10, or the maximum pay within any particular grade. The principles of merit and competition further limited the potential for promotion.²⁸⁵

Promotion involved moving from one grade to another, higher grade (e.g., GS-11 to GS-12) compared to within-grade-increases (e.g., Step 3 to Step 4). Moving outside established grades, even in the 21st Century, typically requires open competition which placed the burden of proof on the employee to demonstrate that he or she meets the minimum standards for the higher grade. Moving from one

²⁸⁴ *Air Force Regulation 40-411, Civilian Personnel: Employee and Career Development*, (Washington, D.C.: 2 July 1962). 1-3. *Air Force Regulation 40-411, Civilian Personnel: Employee and Career Development*, (Washington, D.C.: 6 April 1965). 1-2. *Air Force Regulation 40-411, Civilian Personnel: Employee and Career Development*, (Washington, D.C.: 30 June 1965).

²⁸⁵ *Air Force Regulation 40-527, Civilian Personnel: Step Increases*, (Washington, D.C.: 14 June 1962). 2.

career specialty to another introduced an additional burden of proof for the employee seeking to broaden his or her career prospects. Even with proof of strong education, training, and experience credentials, obtaining promotions across career fields from within the system proved to be an uphill battle against the inherent inertia of the civil service system. AFR 40-102 clearly required commanders and supervisors to provide training and development for their employees, but selecting employees for developmental opportunities that had the potential for promotion could generate resentment among employees who were denied such opportunities thus exerting negative effects on organizational cohesion.

AFR 40-331, *The Merit Promotion Plan*, published in December 1962, provided policies for administering promotions for Civilian Airmen. After emphasizing that normal promotions occurred through competitive processes, most of the regulation contained policies for exceptions—“non-competitive” promotions—and how commanders and supervisors could identify employees with high potential for promotion without favoritism or prejudice against other employees. Some promotions could have occurred when the position was classified to a higher pay grade. In such cases, the incumbent employee would advance to the higher grade, assuming she or he met the qualification standards of the higher grade, without being required to re-compete for the position. Supervisors could also increase, or enlarge, the duties of a particular position, which could have resulted in reclassifying the position to a higher pay grade.

As with other reclassified positions, a job enlargement could promote an incumbent into the higher pay grade if he or she met the minimum requirements for the resulting higher grade. Supervisors could also identify employees for targeted formal training programs that had the potential for promotion to higher grades. To avoid allegations of discrimination or favoritism, employees chosen for targeted training

programs must have come from a Civil Service Commission register or from a central Air Force list of employees with proven potential to function at the higher grades. Employees also had to complete the specified training program to be eligible for the promotion.

Understudies represented a way for commanders and supervisors to conduct transition planning for their organizations. In cases involving the anticipated retirement or transfer of an individual, leaders could identify an understudy who could assume the position when it became vacant provided the understudy was qualified, had competed for the opportunity to serve as an understudy, and had held a position at the same grade or higher and had been downgraded without cause because of some organizational change (e.g., reduction in force, transfer of function, or base realignment and closure). Other possible reasons for promoting an employee without subjecting a position to open competition could include downgrading positions, reductions-in-force, and temporary promotions. By 1969, AFR 40-335 had eliminated any discussion of non-competitive promotion opportunities in the wake of changes to Civil Service Commission policies that governed the larger civil service population.²⁸⁶

One of the most significant barriers to promotion from within the Air Force remained the relative lack of mobility among civilian employees. Non-competitive promotion opportunities often carried mobility agreements. Air Force policy emphasized that “broad experience in more than one organization and location will have greater value when experience and training are being rated for higher grade positions.”²⁸⁷ Consequently, senior leaders expected Civilian

²⁸⁶ *Air Force Regulation 40-331, Civilian Personnel: The Merit Promotion Plan*, (Washington, D.C.: 20 December 1962). 1-3. *Air Force Regulation 40-335, Civilian Personnel: The Merit Promotion Program*, (Washington, D.C.: 6 February 1965). *Air Force Regulation 40-335, Civilian Personnel: The Merit Promotion Program*, (Washington, D.C.: 1 July 1969). *Air Force Regulation 40-335, Civilian Personnel: The Merit Promotion Program*, (Washington, D.C.: 9 January 1976).

²⁸⁷ *Air Force Regulation 40-303, Civilian Personnel: Civilian Mobility*, (Washington,

Airmen to “understand the need for mobility and to the maximum extent possible accept assignments to other positions when selected for reassignment or promotion.”²⁸⁸ Although official policy suggested that the Service would not force a relocation on its civilian employees, the only practical concession to employee concerns involved not asking employees to “move to areas where climatic conditions would be injurious to their health or the health of any members of their immediate families or other dependents.”²⁸⁹ As base and organizational functions contracted, smaller numbers of civilian positions reduced promotion opportunities for Civilian Airmen at their home installation. Although such conditions resulted in a very stable civilian workforce, it also resulted in fewer career advancement opportunities. Some military members failed to grasp the effects of the institutional constraints on their civilian counterparts. The lack of civilian mobility—defined by uniformed Airmen as the flexibility to move Civilian Airmen where they were most needed—represented a persistent theme in journal articles focused on the Air Force’s personnel management programs.²⁹⁰

D.C.: 13 November 1962). Air Force Regulation 40-303, Civilian Personnel: Civilian Mobility, (Washington, D.C. 21 May 1969). *Air Force Regulation 40-303, Civilian Personnel: Civilian Mobility*, (Washington, D.C.: 17 December 1969). *Air Force Regulation 40-303, Civilian Personnel: Civilian Mobility*, (Washington, D.C.: 4 May 1972).

²⁸⁸ Air Force Regulation 40-303, Civilian Personnel: Civilian Mobility. 1-2.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ See, for example, Jackson V. Rambeau, “Military Manpower Dilemma--A Galaxy of Problems,” *Air Force Magazine* 47, no. 10 (1964). Lt Gen William S. Stone, “Personnel--Key to the Aerospace Future,” *Air Force Magazine* (April 1965). Gen John C. Meyer, “Managing the USAF: The Now and Future Challenges,” *Air Force Magazine* 53, no. 1 (1970). Ed Gates, “The Civilian Third of the Total Force,” *Air Force Magazine* 60, no. 11 (1977). Ed Gates, “Brighter Career Prospects for USAF’s Civilian Employees,” *Air Force Magazine* 61, no. 4 (1978). Suzanne Chapman, “Civilian Drawdown: Hard and Fast,” *Air Force Magazine* 79, no. 1 (1996); Peter Grier, “Depots in Dispute,” *Air Force Magazine* 77, no. 7 (1994). MacKenzie Eaglen, “Cut the Pentagon’s Civilian Workforce,” *Breaking Defense* (30 April 2014), <http://breakingdefense.com/2014/04/cutthe-pentagons-civilian-workforce>.

Current Service policies continue to rely on flexibility and mobility within the civilian workforce. The benefits to the Service remain consistent with those emphasized in the early 1960s—namely, to develop breadth and depth in the civilian workforce and to provide avenues for employees to seek promotion or other developmental opportunities. Air Force leaders have attempted to remove perceptions of coercion in assignments requiring mobility by providing mobility agreements for such assignments. If necessary, commanders can request an involuntary mobility assignment for an employee to fill a critical need, but the decision for approving such requests resides with Career Field Policy Councils. Employees have the option to accept or reject the mobility requirements without prejudice to their present positions. The Service also recognized that functional and organizational moves within the same career specialties may be possible without requiring mobility agreements. This key option provides commanders, supervisors, and employees alike opportunities for career development without forcing employees to decide between career and other life concerns.²⁹¹

Overseas bases and organizations required skilled Civilian Airmen in ways that were, perhaps, more critical than similar positions in the United States. AFR 40-19, *Oversea Assignment Policy and Related Procedures*, outlined policies for filling critical civilian positions at overseas bases. By identifying positions as critical “based on the significance of the job categories affected as related to the total mission and needs of the Air Force,” Service leaders acknowledged Civilian Airmen’s vital contribution to Air Force and unit mission effectiveness.²⁹² There may have even been a degree of coercion required to fill such positions as implied in the admonishment for commanders

²⁹¹ *Air Force Instruction 36-202, Personnel: Civilian Mobility*, (Washington, D.C.: 19 August 2019).

²⁹² *Air Force Regulation 40-19, Civilian Personnel: Oversea Assignment Policy and Related Procedures*, (Washington, D.C.: 14 February 1949). *Air Force Regulation 40-19, Civilian Personnel: Oversea Assignment Policy and Related Procedures*, (Washington, D.C.: 16 September 1952). 1.

“to encourage actively and, in some instances, to solicit cooperation from qualified employees to accept reassignment to ‘critical’ positions at oversea air commands.”²⁹³ Employees who accepted such positions became entitled to re-employment rights at their former installations under certain conditions and they received employment assistance in securing positions in the United States within 60 days of their scheduled overseas tour end date.²⁹⁴ Even in the early days of the independent Air Force, it was evident that Civilian Airmen had become embedded in a wide range of Air Force operational requirements.

Current overseas employment policies remain largely consistent with those developed during the Cold War. Air Force leaders encourage civilian employees to compete for overseas assignments to provide broader experience and skills development. DoD policies limit civilian overseas assignments to five years unless a waiver provides the opportunity for longer assignments. Employees selected for certain assignments have return rights under conditions similar to those provided under earlier regulatory guidance. In some cases, employees must sign overseas mobility agreements to ensure they are accepting the assignment willingly. Commanders at overseas locations must consider US citizens or qualified foreign nationals in their local areas before initiating personnel actions to recruit stateside applicants.²⁹⁵

The Cold War context combined with the relative size of the civilian workforce placed Civilian Airmen in the position of being vital assets to the Air Force’s warfighting capability. AFR 40-911, *Emergency-Essential Civilian Positions*, provided guidance to commanders on identifying key positions and capabilities within the civilian workforce during wartime.²⁹⁶ The Regulation included a sample letter to Civilian Airmen

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid. 4.

²⁹⁵ *Air Force Manual 36-204, Personnel: Overseas Employment*, (Washington, D.C.: 25 March 2019).

²⁹⁶ *Air Force Regulation 40-911, Civilian Personnel: Emergency-Essential Civilian Positions*, (Washington, D.C.: 19 April 1962).

that described their contributions to the war effort. “While these are non-combatant positions which do not require military incumbency, the duties are vital to the accomplishment of your organization’s mission and their importance cannot be over-emphasized.”²⁹⁷ Unit mission requirements determined which positions at each installation would be considered “emergency-essential.” Examples of such positions included those “essential to the launching of strike or defense aircraft or missiles. Essential to the functions at an alternate headquarters or relocation site. Essential to the operation of base utilities and communications systems. Essential to the repair and maintenance of buildings and runways required for D-Day operations. Essential to fire protection and prevention. Essential to base security.”²⁹⁸ Subsequent versions of AFR 40-911 expanded the list of emergency-essential civilian specialties reflecting the maturation of the Air Force’s approach to Cold War scenarios and to the importance that Civilian Airmen would play in the event of a sudden need to implement war plans.²⁹⁹

Force reductions following Vietnam, the end of the Cold War, and even during the active Global War on Terror campaigns of the first decade of the 21st Century, failed to diminish the Air Force’s reliance on its Civilian workforce. Between 1972 and 1980, the active military end-strength decreased from 725,635 to 557,969 Airmen; a 23 percent reduction as the Air Force grappled with the demands of post-Vietnam requirements in the context of the ongoing Cold War. The introduction of the all-volunteer force in 1973 added momentum to the post-war drawdown and helped Service leaders establish force structure baselines. The civilian workforce contracted at the same time

²⁹⁷ *Air Force Regulation 40-911, Civilian Personnel: Emergency-Essential Civilian Positions*, (Washington, D.C.: 29 April 1963). 7.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.* 2.

²⁹⁹ *Air Force Regulation 40-911, Civilian Personnel: Emergency-Essential Civilian Positions*, (Washington, D.C.: 16 October 1963); *Air Force Regulation 40-911, Civilian Personnel: Emergency-Essential Civilian Positions*, (Washington, D.C.: 18 June 1964).

from 299,552 to 244,342—an 18 percent reduction reflecting the vital roles Civilian Airmen performed for the Air Force.

The end of the Cold War brought dramatic reductions as political leaders sought to capitalize on a post-war “peace dividend.” Active-duty Air Force numbers dropped 36 percent from 570,872 to 360,877 Airmen and the civilian component dropped from 260,575 to 160,006 Civilian Airmen—a 38 percent cut between 1989 and 2000. The post-2001 force structure departed from historical patterns in which the active-duty component numbers increased to meet wartime demands. The Air Force dropped an additional 8 percent of its active-duty end-strength from 357,000 to 329,460 uniformed personnel between 2001 and 2013. Civilian numbers *increased* during the same period from 159,061 to 188,592 members—an 18 percent increase reflecting the transition to the Expeditionary Air Force concept. Active duty, Guard, and Reserve Airmen deployed to conduct operations—primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq—resulting in an increased need for Civilian Airmen to operate and sustain garrison operations. The search for more economy in the force structure prompted some analysts to target the civilian workforce for aggressive reductions. As the active-duty force reached its low point of approximately 313,000 in 2015, calls to reduce the civilian component resulted in slight reductions in the civilian end-strength with the total authorizations settling near 173,000 by 2020.³⁰⁰

Current Air Force Publications describe the mix of active duty, reserve component, and civilians as the “Total Force.” In much the same way that the earliest Air Force Regulations acknowledged the contribution of Civilian Airmen to the Service’s mission, the contemporary Air Force continues to rely on the knowledge, skills, and contributions of its civilians. The goal is to leverage and to integrate the “unique strengths of each component...[to] provide a balance between

³⁰⁰ USAF End-Strength. For an example of calls to reduce civilian end-strength, see Eaglen, “Cut the Pentagon’s Civilian Workforce.”

operational readiness and experience, as well as strategic depth.”³⁰¹ To achieve integration, commanders and supervisors must remain open to making organizational changes and to hearing the views of Airmen. Integration also implies that commanders and supervisors will develop Airmen to meet mission demands. According to the Service’s policy, “the Air Force will...provide career development opportunities through assignments in Total Force organizations. Each component’s command and leadership opportunities will ensure force development and leadership growth.”³⁰² The Service’s primary Instruction for implementing force development encompasses 395 pages. It provides guidance on Civilian Force Development Teams that parallel those found in the uniformed career fields along with guidance on education, training, and professional development for Civilian Airmen.³⁰³ Thus, the Air Force has moved from an approach that sought to recruit and retain Civilian Airmen with the requisite skills to support the Service’s mission toward a more active and purposeful approach that includes, at least in its policies, retaining and developing Civilian Airmen to adapt to the changing security environment.

Cold War Concerns over Employee Loyalty and Security

As shown in Chapter 3, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly following the end of World War II. Aside from the behavior of Soviet leaders in their pursuit of foreign policy aims, revelations of espionage and other covert actions gave US leaders cause for concern. Throughout World War II, US citizens who were members of the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) and Soviet agents

³⁰¹ *Air Force Policy Directive 90-10, Special Management: Total Force Integration*, (Washington, D.C.: 27 September 2019). 3.

³⁰² *Ibid.*

³⁰³ See, *Air Force Instruction 2670, Personnel: Total Force Development*, (Washington, D.C.: 7 December 2020).

had maintained an aggressive effort to extract secret information from the US military and government agencies. The Soviet Union's detonation of its first atomic weapon in 1949 followed by the Communist takeover of China appeared to confirm for many observers that the international Communist movement had become a serious threat to democratic states and, specifically, to the United States. By 1950, indications of the widespread espionage effort began to surface prompting what became known as the Second Red Scare.³⁰⁴ Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wisconsin), as chair of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, seized on the popular mood to launch wide-ranging accusations of Communist infiltrations into government, the press, academic institutions, and the entertainment industry.³⁰⁵

The penetration of the Manhattan Project by American and British citizens spying on behalf of the Soviet Union became of particular concern. Klaus Fuchs, an atomic physicist who had been a member of the German Communist Party in the early 1930s, served as a member of the British team assigned to work on the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, NM. The KGB had recruited Fuchs, and he passed secret information on the atomic bomb project that may have accelerated the Soviet atomic bomb program by at least two years. After the war, he worked at Britain's Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell where he continued to provide his Soviet handlers with classified information. British and US counter-intelligence efforts resulted in Fuchs' arrest, trial, and sentencing for espionage in February 1950. During his questioning, he identified

³⁰⁴ For a study of how the Soviet espionage program affected the Manhattan Project and subsequent US nuclear and missile programs, see Neil Sheehan, *A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Shriever and the Ultimate Weapon* (New York: Random House, 2009).

³⁰⁵ Richard C.S. Trahair and Robert L. Miller, *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations*, Third ed. (New York: Enigma Books, 2012). 316, 577-578.

other Soviet agents connected with the Manhattan Project, including Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.³⁰⁶

The Rosenbergs and Ethel's brother, David Greenglass, had been members of the CPUSA since the 1930s. They were active in CPUSA activities and in union organizations. Julius was hired in 1942 as an Engineer Inspector for the US Army despite his ongoing affiliation with Communist and Communist-front organizations. Like Fuchs, the KGB recruited Julius to provide scientific and technical information on US Army weapons research. Greenglass worked as a machinist at the Oak Ridge, TN and Los Alamos, NM facilities, and would become the primary collector of information on the atom bomb program for the Rosenberg's spy network. After the war, Greenglass was not an active participant in espionage activities. Klaus Fuchs named the Rosenbergs and Greenglass as Soviet intelligence assets inside the Manhattan Project leading to their arrest. Greenglass testified against the Rosenbergs in exchange for immunity from prosecution for his wife. The Rosenbergs were found guilty in what became a sensational trial and executed; Greenglass received a 15-year sentence.³⁰⁷

Communist Party member and Soviet spy Elizabeth Bentley became connected to the Fuchs and Rosenberg cases and to the McCarthy hearings. Bentley had joined the CPUSA in the late-1930s and became romantically involved with NKVD agent Jacob Golos who used her as a courier for passing intelligence information and instructions between spies in New York and Washington, D.C. Her contacts included George Silverman who worked for the Pentagon during World War II and Nathan Silvermaster who worked at the Treasury Department. Bentley became disillusioned with Communism in 1945 and offered to turn FBI informant. She

³⁰⁶ Ibid. 147-149.

³⁰⁷ Ibid. 170-173, 455-458.

provided information on Soviet-sponsored spy rings and against the CPUSA. She named 35 people in government agencies who had passed secret military, technical, and political information that made its way to the Soviet Union. She testified against the Rosenbergs and at the McCarthy hearings. Her testimony along with the revelations of other Soviet attempts to infiltrate military and government agencies helped stoke the fires of McCarthyism and the fears of a determined assault by the Soviet Union on American democracy.³⁰⁸

In response to mounting evidence of determined espionage by the Soviet Union and the apparent concentration on government employees, President Truman issued Executive Order 9835, *Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employees Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government*, on 21 March 1947. Truman was determined not to appear to be weak on confronting Communism and his executive order provided broad authority for government department and agency heads to investigate any suspicious activity or associations by their employees. Historians have viewed Executive Order 9835 as a domestic companion to the Truman Doctrine—the commitment to contain Communist expansion around the world.³⁰⁹ In announcing what became known as the Loyalty Program, Truman “declared that the presence of any disloyal or subversive person in government employment ‘constitutes a threat to our democratic processes.’”³¹⁰ While the historical context is important, it is equally important to note that the Loyalty Program subjected millions of federal civil servants to

³⁰⁸ Ibid. 32-35, 479-482.

³⁰⁹ Samuel Walker, “Harry Truman: Courage and Contradictions,” in *Presidents and Civil Liberties from Wilson to Obama* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 128.

³¹⁰ Ibid. 129.

investigation, accusations of disloyal activities, and ultimately cost thousands their jobs.³¹¹

Executive Order 9835 provided the top-level guidance for government agencies to develop policies and regulations to ensure the reliability and loyalty of every employee in the federal government. The order opened by asserting that “it is of vital importance that persons employed in the Federal service be of *complete and unswerving* loyalty to the United States.” To meet this requirement, the order specified that “there shall be a loyalty investigation of *every person* entering the civilian employment of any department of the executive branch of the Federal Government.” The Civil Service Commission would conduct the investigations through a Loyalty Review Board unless the Commission had established agreements and procedures with departments or agencies to delegate the responsibility for the investigations to internal Loyalty Review Boards. In any event, the Commission and the department or agency heads remained ultimately responsible for the investigations and any appeals.³¹²

Department and agency heads had broad authority to suspend, without pay, the employment of any persons suspected of subversive activity, associations, or attitudes. Concerns over past affiliations with the CPUSA or other such organizations known or suspected of seeking the overthrow of the government led Truman to charge the Attorney General with creating a list of undesirable or subversive organizations. Membership in such organizations, regardless of when such membership occurred, was sufficient cause for leaders to suspend employees and launch deeper investigations. This broad-

³¹¹ “Truman’s Loyalty Program,” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, accessed 23 May, 2021, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/trumans-loyalty-program>. 70.

³¹² *Executive Order 9835: Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employees Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government*, (Washington, D.C.: 21 March 1947). [emphasis added]

brush approach to defining what constituted disloyal behavior predictably intensified paranoia and created work environments that set employees and supervisors against one another. As one historian has concluded,

The fatal civil liberties flaw in the Federal Loyalty Program was the principle of guilt by association. Truman's executive order specified that "sympathetic association" with alleged subversive groups or individuals was cause for doubt about a federal employee's loyalty...It made no difference how brief or how far into the past such activities occurred, or what the person's political views were in 1947. The taint was permanent.³¹³

If the initial investigation merited a closer look, the Loyalty Review Boards could refer the case to the FBI for a more rigorous probe into the employee's background and activities. Many employees simply resigned rather than subject themselves to a system in which their guilt was presumed.

The impunity with which the Loyalty Review Boards and the FBI operated regarding due process and secrecy compounded the problems of implementing the program. While employees had the right to submit statements and to call witnesses on their behalf, they could not question confidential witnesses or statements against them. This violation of due process empowered accusers with bad motives because they would not have to testify at the Review Board hearings. Some sought to settle old grudges against the accused, while others informed on co-workers to prove their loyalty and zeal for rooting out subversives in the ranks. Membership or sympathy with organizations such as peace groups, labor unions, or any left-leaning activist organization was sufficient for department and agency leaders to suspend an employee and initiate an investigation.

³¹³ Walker, "Harry Truman: Courage and Contradictions." 129-130.

When considered in the context of aggressive domestic surveillance activities by the FBI such as wiretapping and mail monitoring, the threat of dismissal or imprisonment was sufficient for more than 12,000 federal employees to resign from their positions over a period of nearly ten years.

The Air Force implemented the Loyalty Program required by Executive Order 9835 through Air Force Regulation 40-12, *Loyalty and Security Program*, which initially went into effect on 13 January 1950. The Regulation began ominously by referring to higher-level policies that “require exclusion and removal from Federal employment of individuals who are unwarranted security risks or who are disloyal to the Government of the United States...The current appropriation act... requires removal of any employee who advocates or who is a member of an organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence.”³¹⁴ The tone of the language used in the Regulation clearly communicated a degree of discomfort with the potential for harming the careers and reputations of Civilian Airmen who served faithfully. Commanders were to distinguish between cases that concerned loyalty and those that may have had other security concerns to avoid the unwarranted branding of an employee with the taint of disloyalty—a thinly veiled euphemism for harboring sympathies for the Communist cause.

The Air Force’s Central Loyalty-Security Board resided at Headquarters USAF in Washington, D.C. Similarly, the Service chose to centralize the Loyalty-Security Appeal Board within the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. Loyalty-Security Hearing Boards at each base with a central civilian personnel office would refer cases to the Central Loyalty-Security Board for consideration. The Secretary of the Air Force, appropriately, remained the final authority in all cases.

³¹⁴ *Air Force Regulation 40-12, Civilian Personnel: Loyalty and Security Program*, (Washington, D.C.: 13 January 1950). 1.

Hysteria over fears of Communism gripped the nation for more than half of the 1950s. President Eisenhower refused to abolish Truman's Loyalty Program, but he modified the program by rescinding Executive Order 9835 and issuing Executive Order 10450 which kept many of the principles created during the Truman Administration. Scholars of civil liberties cite Eisenhower's disgust with McCarthyism, but point to his refusal to make public statements against McCarthy or the Red Scare.³¹⁵ They also point to his Executive Order which opened by stating "the interests of national security require that all persons privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States."³¹⁶ For the Eisenhower Administration, national security would be the focus of federal employment programs. Each agency or department would conduct an investigation of prospective employees. The minimum requirement involved a national agency check and "written inquiries to local law enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools attended by the person under investigation."³¹⁷ Initial investigations resulting in information that cast suspicion on the employee would require a full field investigation. Additionally, agencies were charged with the responsibility to identify as sensitive positions those which had the potential, if compromised, to harm national security. Such sensitive positions required a full field investigation.

The Eisenhower order retained the "guilt by association" character of the previous administration's Loyalty program. The Eisenhower order moderated the requirements that had existed in Executive Order 9835 for suspending employees pending the results of investigations. Employees remained susceptible to be dismissed, however, during

³¹⁵ Walker, "Dwight D. Eisenhower: A Failure of Presidential Leadership."

³¹⁶ *Executive Order 10450: Security Requirements for Government Employment*, (Washington, D.C.: 27 April 1953). 1.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.* 2.

investigations if information surfaced that suggested the employee was a risk to national security.³¹⁸ The Executive Order included a detailed list of characteristics and activities that posed risks to national security. These included “behavior, activities or associations which tend to show the individual is not reliable or trustworthy...Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion.”³¹⁹ Modern scholars point to the addition of sexual perversion as a subversive activity as an attack against homosexuals—which it most certainly was—but such prejudices were consistent with the attitudes of American society at the time.³²⁰ Nevertheless, President Eisenhower’s preservation of a security program that presumed guilt by association damaged the civil liberties reputation of his presidency.

The Air Force continued implementing the provisions of the administration’s security program through AFR 40-12. The administration’s emphasis on security rather than on loyalty resulted in a name change for the Regulation. The Service also began to moderate its implementation. The 22 June 1954 change to AFR 40-12 directed commanders and supervisors regarding membership or association with potentially suspicious organizations. “An employee’s membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic association with any organization...is but one of the factors which will be considered in making the security determination...consideration will be given to the employee’s statements concerning the reasons and circumstances which led to his joining the organization involved, and his knowledge of the purposes of the organization.”³²¹ This amounted to an acknowledgment that employees had some right to private lives

³¹⁸ Ibid. 3.

³¹⁹ Ibid. 4-5.

³²⁰ Walker, “Dwight D. Eisenhower: A Failure of Presidential Leadership.”

³²¹ *Air Force Regulation 40-12A, Civilian Personnel: Security Program*, (Washington, D.C.: 22 June 1954).

and that their attitudes and motivations could change over time. By allowing the employee to provide a rationale for any association or affiliation, commanders and supervisors could use their judgment to prevent undue harm to an employee's career or reputation.

Regardless whether Air Force leaders could exercise judgment regarding suspensions or investigations of employees for affiliation or association with potentially subversive organizations, the Service had to submit regular reports to the Civil Service Commission on investigations. AFR 40-16, *Quarterly Report of Actions Under Executive Order 10450*, and AFR 40-9, *Reporting Requirements for Security Cases Under Executive Order 10550*, provided policy and procedures for submitting reports to the Commission.³²² As with Executive Order 9835, the Commission could conduct its own investigations of any civil servant regardless of the agency decision with respect to the case. By 1958, the Service only included reports to the Commission that involved security determinations. Investigations limited to national agency checks or that resulted in no reason to suspend or terminate the employee were not forwarded to the Commission.

Although the Kennedy Administration did not completely dismantle the Eisenhower-era Security Program, it placed security investigations in a proper context and did away with the guilt-by-association aspects of the earlier programs. AFR 40-23, *Investigations for Employment*, established policies and procedures that would define the outlines of the Air Force's approach to employment and granting

³²² The original Executive Order 10450 was amended by Executive Order 10550. *Air Force Regulation 40-16, Civilian Personnel: Quarterly Report of Actions Under Executive Order 10450*, (Washington, D.C.: 25 July 1950); *Air Force Regulation 40-16, Civilian Personnel: Quarterly Report of Actions Under Executive Order 10450*, (Washington, D.C.: 25 July 1955); *Air Force Regulation 40-16, Civilian Personnel: Quarterly Report of Actions Under Executive Order 10450*, (Washington, D.C.: 29 February 1958). *Air Force Regulation 40-9, Civilian Personnel, Reporting Requirements for Security Cases Under Executive Order 10550*, (Washington, D.C.: 7 February 1955).

security clearances to civilian employees to the present. The Regulation defined civilian positions in relation to their requirements for access to security information. The Civilian Personnel Office assigned the category during the position classification process in consultation with the hiring authority. Categories included non-sensitive, non-critical sensitive, and critical sensitive positions, and the category determined the type of investigation that satisfied legal and Civil Service Commission requirements. As with previous investigation programs, if derogatory information surfaced during the investigation, the Air Force would broaden the scope of the investigation to determine whether the employee or prospective employee should hold a position with the government.³²³

By the mid-1960s, nuclear-capable weapon systems brought requirements for more rigor to both military and civilian personnel programs. AFR 40-925, *Administration of Civilian Employees Under the Human Reliability Program*, established requirements for investigations, medical screening and monitoring, and monitoring “individuals who have a history of repeated conduct detrimental to an assignment for duty with nuclear weapons, such as records of adverse actions, reprimands or admonishments, overindulgence in alcohol, negligence or delinquency in performance of duty, serious involvement with law enforcement authorities, financial or family irresponsibility, or poor attitude or lack of motivation toward either the mission or the program of which he is a part, or duty with nuclear weapons.”³²⁴ Although

³²³ *Air Force Regulation 40-23, Civilian Personnel: Investigations for Employment*, (Washington, D.C.: 8 March 1960). *Air Force Regulation 40-23A, Civilian Personnel, Investigations for Employment*, (Washington, D.C.: 27 July 1960). *Air Force Regulation 40-203, Civilian Personnel: Investigative Requirements for Filling Civilian Positions*, (Washington, D.C.: 28 January 1963).

³²⁴ *Air Force Regulation 40-925, Civilian Personnel, Administration of Civilian Employees Under the Human Reliability Program*, (Washington, D.C.: 24 June 1965). 2, 4. *Air Force Regulation 40-925, Civilian Personnel: Administration of Civilian Employees Under the Human Reliability Program*, (Washington, D.C.: 24 October 1968).

the broad latitude under which commanders and supervisors could intervene in an employee's suitability for performing his or her duties resembled some of the characteristics of the earlier loyalty and security programs, the association with nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and their components justified an extra level of monitoring.

The Human Reliability Program (later the Personnel Reliability Program) sought to create a partnership between employees and their leaders in which everyone associated with nuclear weapons programs monitored and reported on factors that could harm the mission. Employees could, and were expected to, report to their commanders if some aspect of their lives could have an adverse effect on the performance of their duties. Provided the situation was temporary and not related to illegal activities, commanders could temporarily suspend the employee from nuclear weapons-related duties pending the resolution of the situation. This was a far cry from the presumption of guilt and hair-trigger suspensions of the loyalty era. Especially where nuclear weapons and their associated systems were concerned, Air Force leaders expected civilian and military members alike to focus on the mission and to hold themselves and others accountable for security and safety concerns.

By the 1970s, the Air Force had changed its approach to issues of security and reliability in the civilian workforce. The Service extended trust toward its civilian employees to replace the suspicion and presumption of guilt by association that had characterized the late-1940s and 1950s. Under this philosophy, employees were responsible and accountable for exhibiting good conduct and adhering to ethical standards. Moreover, employees had the right to participate in political activities within the civil society. "An employee's participation in demonstrations, petitions, speeches, publications, and similar individual or group expressions of support for, or opposition to, causes, policies, and programs of the Government entails the lawful exercise

of his constitutional rights of freedom of speech, peaceable assembly, and petition to Congress for redress of grievances.”³²⁵ In other words, employees had the right to pursue activities in their private lives as long as they were legal and did not bring discredit on the Air Force or interfere with military missions. The distinction between conduct and ethics was a clear distinction between the emerging policies and those of the early Cold War.

The first publication of a Code of Ethics for Government Service marked a transition from a rules-based compliance system toward a standards-based system of personal responsibility and accountability. Congress agreed to a Code of Ethics that emphasized loyalty to the country over loyalty to individuals, parties, or government department. The responsibility for upholding the Constitution was inherent in the oath of office. Because the Civil Service Commission and the Air Force viewed public employment as a trust, the Code of Ethics emphasized the employees’ responsibility to provide effective, economical service and upholding legal and ethical principles in representing the government in acquisition or other economic relationships. Stamping out discrimination or favoritism was also a key feature of early expressions of ethical behaviors.³²⁶ The shift in emphasis was significant because it marked a recognition on the part of senior Air Force leaders that Civilian Airmen were as much a part of the profession of arms as the uniformed components of the institution.

21st Century ethics concerns have expanded considerably compared to those of the 1940s-1970s. The potential for government employees to have financial relationships or to convey information to contractors that would compromise acquisition programs has resulted in the publication of a detailed Joint Ethics Regulation (JER) made up of nearly 130 pages. As of this writing, the JER has “redlined” or

³²⁵ *Air Force Regulation 40-735, Civilian Personnel: Employee Responsibility and Conduct*, (Washington, D.C.: 26 July 1971). 2.

³²⁶ *Ibid.* 5.

eliminated the 1960s-era Code of Ethics for Government Employees in favor of a list of “values.” The values include honesty, integrity, loyalty, accountability, fairness, caring, respect, promise keeping, responsible citizenship, and pursuit of excellence.³²⁷ As with any values-based system, members of the institution must see those around them exhibiting values expressed in the institutions governing regulations and instructions. As it becomes evident that the values are held and practiced by the majority of the members of the institution, individuals will begin to internalize the set of values and make them their own. To the degree that the institution has to impose values on individuals, it will find itself at odds with individual rights and beliefs.

Two modern Air Force Instructions address the issues of civil liberties and professional conduct for Civilian Airmen. Air Force Instruction 33-332, *Air Force Privacy and Civil Liberties Program*, falls in the functional area of Communication and Information. It outlines policies, processes, and procedures for protecting individual information and “fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution of the United States.”³²⁸ In the Information Age, unauthorized access to personal information can have far-reaching and disastrous consequences for individuals. Protecting such information has grown out of harsh experiences such as those of the loyalty program and, in contemporary times, data breaches that exposed employees and their families to the potential for significant personal, social, and financial harm. Investigative violations before the 1970s led Congress to pass the Privacy Act of 1974 that protects individuals from unauthorized information collection by federal agencies. It is difficult to imagine the loyalty programs of the 1950s operating if the protections provided by the Privacy Act of 1974 had existed.

³²⁷ *Joint Ethics Regulation, Department of Defense 5500.07-R (Change 7)*, (Washington, D.C.: 17 November 2011). 118-119.

³²⁸ *Air Force Instruction 33-332, Communication and Information: Air Force Privacy and Civil Liberties Program*, (Washington, D.C.: 10 March 2020). 6.

AFI 33-332 protects individual civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution including the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.³²⁹ Employee rights with respect to freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and right to due process came under attack under the loyalty programs of the 1950s. The most egregious assault on civil liberties involved the presumption of guilt by association and the refusal to allow individuals accused of disloyal behavior to confront and question confidential informants. By the 1970s, Air Force Regulations had included steps to protect civil liberties; today, however, the Secretary of the Air Force is accountable for investigating allegations of civil liberties violations. While no employee may long elude discovery for violating laws or regulations, neither the Service nor any government agency can arbitrarily accuse, investigate, suspend, or prosecute Civilian Airmen without first following proper procedures that protect individual rights and liberties.

Air Force Instruction 36-703, *Civilian Conduct and Responsibility*, provides guidance that reflects the emphasis on standards and ethics rather than on mere rules-based compliance. This AFI places equal responsibility on management and employees for complying “with standards of conduct and responsibilities” which are “essential to the effective functioning of the Air Force and accomplishment of its national security mission.”³³⁰ While affirming employees’ rights to labor representation and protection under Equal Opportunity programs, the AFI emphasizes that Civilian Airmen provide vital contributions to the Air Force mission. As such, they have a responsibility to conduct themselves professionally in accord with the Service’s “Core Values of *Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do.*”³³¹ Specific standards of conduct, in keeping with the philosophy of

³²⁹ Ibid. 42.

³³⁰ *Air Force Instruction 36-703, Personnel: Civilian Conduct and Responsibility*, (Washington, D.C.: 30 August 2018). 3.

³³¹ Ibid. 6.

professionalism, include providing testimony; participating in public or civic activities; indebtedness, canvassing, soliciting, and peddling; gambling; outside employment; and misuse of government property.³³² Issues such as dress and appearance, professional and unprofessional relationships, violence in the workplace, drug and alcohol abuse, and ethical conduct appear prominently in the pages of AFI 36-703. There is a clear lineage in these issues that reach back to the earlier days of the Air Force when the prevailing attitude toward civilian employees among uniformed Airmen was somewhat derogatory. Such attitudes have no place in the modern Air Force.

The regulatory journey from the early Cold War loyalty programs to the more reasonable standards-based programs that govern the force today was difficult for military and Civilian Airmen. Legitimate concerns of Soviet attempts to penetrate Air Force programs combined with evidence that civilian, and military, government employees were complicit in or sympathetic with the Communist cause resulted in the creation of intrusive loyalty programs that harmed the lives and careers of many loyal civilian employees. With the passage of time, Air Force leaders created policies that provided sufficient safeguards for critical defense programs and information while protecting the rights and civil liberties of Civilian Airmen. The consistent strain in this decades-long evolution was that Civilian Airmen made vital contributions to Air Force capabilities and missions.

Labor Relations

The history of US labor relations is complex; this study will only touch on that history as it applies to relations between the federal government and its civilian employees. As seen in the previous chapter, the CSRA of 1978 formalized the rights of much of the civil service to engage in collective bargaining. This completed a legislative journey

³³² Ibid. 7-9.

that had its origins in the second decade of the twentieth century. The Clayton Act of 1914 focused primarily on antitrust issues that had generated controversy and scandal in the years before its passage. In a significant reform, however, Congress provided employees the right to organize for mutual benefit in the act. Buried within the Act's 26 sections, Section 6 established the principle "That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence of and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help..."³³³ This established a foundation for subsequent labor relations legislation that guaranteed and expanded employees' rights to bargain collectively.

In a more sweeping initiative to guarantee collective bargaining rights, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 in recognition that "the denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining leads to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest."³³⁴ The Act established the National Labor Relations Board to oversee labor relations and defined employee and employer rights. Most significantly, "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."³³⁵ Employers could not interfere with the employees' right to organize or operate unions. Furthermore, employers could not involve themselves in the process of selecting labor organizations on behalf of their employees. Just as the Act defined unfair labor practices

³³³ *Public Law 212, The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914*, (Washington, D.C.: 15 October 1914). 731.

³³⁴ *Public Law 74-198: The National Labor Relations Act of 1935*, (Washington, D.C.: 6 July 1935). 449.

³³⁵ *Ibid.* 452.

for employers, it also prohibited actions of employees and their representatives that could adversely affect business operations.³³⁶

Concerns over leftist infiltration in the labor union movement had always influenced the establishment's perceptions of the unions—fears in the early Cold War, as discussed in the previous section—influenced Congress to pass legislation prohibiting Communist organizations from representing employees. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 prevented union members affiliated with the Communist Party from holding union office. The Act outlined an employee's bill of rights that aimed at establishing democratic principles for union operations. Unions had to implement processes that guaranteed periodic secret ballot elections for offices. Unions could not expel members without establishing and publishing minimum standards for membership and following due process. The Act also required unions to file reports on financial and other assets regularly to the National Labor Relations Board so that the government could review the unions' business operations for ethical practices. As with other features of the Red Scare, the prohibitions against Communist Party membership failed to stand up in federal court, but the key protections guaranteed in the 1959 Act remained.³³⁷

Popular perceptions of the Kennedy Administration contrast the youthful, idealistic, innovative Democrat with the conservative, almost stagnant approach of the Eisenhower Administration. Over the years, historians have altered the narrative of Kennedy's "Camelot" with studies that emphasize Kennedy's staunch anti-Communist policies. Kennedy was also slow to adopt a public civil rights leadership position between 1961 and 1963 when anti-desegregation lynching and riots in the South dominated national

³³⁶ Ibid. 452-453.

³³⁷ *Public Law 86-257: The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959*, (Washington, D.C.: 14 September 1959).

news.³³⁸ Kennedy did, however, take decisive action to provide federal civil servants collective bargaining rights that were similar to those in the private sector. He signed Executive Order 10988, *Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service*, on 17 January 1962. The assumption behind extending collective bargaining and labor organization rights to the civil service held that “participation of employees in the formulation and implementation of personnel policies affecting them contributes to effective conduct of public business.”³³⁹ In much the same way that workers had acquired the right to organize and bargain, Kennedy’s Executive Order provided protections for federal employees both to form, organize, and join labor unions, but also to abstain from such activities.

Kennedy’s principled stance had its limits; public sector employees could not have the same protections that applied to the private sector. In the first place, labor organizations that sought to represent civil servants could not “assert the right to strike against the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, or to assist or participate in any such strike.” In an acknowledgment that the Cold War was a primary concern for the Administration and that the labor movement could become an avenue for Communist infiltration, the Executive Order prohibited organizations or movements “which advocate the overthrow of the constitutional form of Government in the United States.” Finally, labor unions could not discriminate against members or potential members “because of race, color, creed, or national origin.”³⁴⁰ In prohibiting the right to strike, the Administration drew a clear line that emphasized the missions of government agencies over individual and collective rights.

³³⁸ Samuel Walker, “John F. Kennedy: The Failed Promise of the New Frontier,” in *Presidents and Civil Liberties from Wilson to Obama: A Story of Poor Custodians* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

³³⁹ John F. Kennedy, *Executive Order 10988: Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service*, (Washington, D.C.: 17 January 1962). 1.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 2.

Because employees had the right to form or select organizations to represent them, the Executive Order established an exclusivity requirement. Employees would select one organization to represent all eligible employees in what became known as a “bargaining unit.” Local unions could organize to support a bargaining unit independent of national unions, or they could combine with the national union provided members of the bargaining unit voted to associate with the national representation. After an agency, department, or organization extended recognition to a labor organization for a particular bargaining unit, however, agency representatives were required to negotiate with that organization for all matters included in the collective bargaining agreement.

Collective bargaining and organization did not necessarily apply to all employees. A fundamental principle excluded managers and supervisors from representation to prevent a conflict of interest. In general, this came to mean that unions represented employees up to GS-11 (although some GS-9 -11 grades could supervise). Managers and supervisors, therefore, technically represented the agency and the government in any negotiation or dispute. The government also reserved the right to “direct employees of the agency; to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees in positions within the agency, and to suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disciplinary action against employees; to relieve employees...to maintain the efficiency of Government operations...to determine the methods, means, and personnel by which such operation are to be conducted; and to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the mission of the agency in situations of emergency.”³⁴¹ Although employees could follow the agreed-upon grievance procedures in attempts to obtain redress for alleged infractions, management retained significant rights to bring to the bargaining table.

³⁴¹ Ibid. 4.

President Kennedy's Executive Order remained in effect through the Johnson Administration. President Nixon, however, perceived a need to modify the principles contained in Executive Order 10988 and thus rescinded the Kennedy-era Executive Order replacing it with Executive Order 11491, *Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service*, on 1 January 1970. The Nixon Administration order preserved the fundamental premises of the previous policy. Collective representation and bargaining provided benefits to the government and employees alike; government operations would become more efficient if employees had avenues for participating in formulating personnel policies; and labor organizations provided mechanisms for creating cooperation between management and employees.³⁴² Similarly, the Nixon Administration order prohibited strikes, subversive actions, or discrimination—adding sex and age to the list of conditions against which unions could not discriminate.

President Nixon prescribed more details for administering federal labor relations than had existed in the Kennedy-era Executive Order. He assigned responsibility for “administering, interpreting, deciding major policy issues, and prescribing regulations” to the Federal Labor Relations Council (later changed to the FRLA through the CSRA of 1978).³⁴³ By creating a separate Council focused on labor relations, Nixon altered the traditional role of the Civil Service Commission as the single agency responsible for federal employee matters. The new Executive Order also created the Federal Service Impasses Panel to consider and attempt to resolve labor relations impasses.

The expanded Executive Order specified the relationship between unions and all members of bargaining units. “When a labor organization has been accorded exclusive recognition, it is the exclusive representative of employees and is entitled to act for

³⁴² Richard M. Nixon, *Executive Order 11491: Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service*, (Washington, D.C.: 1 January 1970). 1.

³⁴³ *Ibid.* 4.

and negotiate agreements covering all employees in the unit. It is responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the unit without discrimination and without regard to labor organization membership.”³⁴⁴ Thus, civil servants did not have to be members of labor unions to realize the benefits of collective bargaining.

Finally, the Nixon Administration’s order defined unfair labor practices for both government agencies and labor unions. On the government side, the government could not restrict employees’ rights to representation, could not assist labor unions in the performance of their functions or otherwise intervene in the collective bargaining process after a union had been identified as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit. Management could not discipline an employee for giving testimony in a labor relations grievance or case, nor could management refuse to recognize a labor organization if it followed the procedures specified by the Federal Labor Relations Council. Labor unions were prohibited from interfering with an employee’s choice regarding representation, interfering or coercing an employee regarding submitting grievances, attempting to initiate a strike or work stoppage, discriminating against an employee, or refusing to negotiate with an agency.³⁴⁵ Following President Nixon’s resignation in 1973, President Ford retained the structure of Executive Order 11491 with minor amendments that adjusted the language of the Nixon-era order.

As discussed in the previous chapter, President Carter initiated significant reforms to the civil service through the CSRA of 1978. One of the most sweeping changes to the system involved codifying the rights of civil servants to organize and bargain collectively. President Carter rescinded the Nixon-Ford-era Executive Orders and worked with Congress to embed collective bargaining rights for federal employees in the CSRA. Although institutionalizing collective bargaining was not a

³⁴⁴ Ibid. 9.

³⁴⁵ Ibid. 14-15.

major objective of the CSRA proposal, by the time the draft legislation had made it through House and Senate subcommittees, Congressional leaders recognized that it would be illogical to exclude labor relations from the sweeping reforms. Amendments to the final bill that guaranteed collective bargaining and organizing rights to federal employees passed with little discussion.

Air Force policy regarding labor-management relations emphasized the benefits of a collaborative team approach. Echoing the Kennedy Administration's assumptions regarding the benefits of involving employees in decision affecting workplace conditions, Air Force Regulation 40-701, *General Employee-Management Policy*, asserted "the possible effect on the morale, welfare, stability, and productivity of employees concerned is a significant planning factor in considering optional or directed changes in policies, programs, procedures, and missions."³⁴⁶ Air Force officials expected leaders, managers, and supervisors to set the conditions for effective working relationships. This extended to adhering to ethical standards and setting the tone for the quality and efficiency of assigned products. One of the primary goals of the employee-management relationship was to "develop a mutual interest and identity with management and the Air Force" this would lead to "reducing or eliminating elements of dissatisfaction."³⁴⁷ The policy was not overtly concerned in 1962 with collective bargaining or relationships with labor organizations, but that would change as federal employees began to exercise their rights under the various executive orders.

By 1967, AFR 40-701 included an elaboration of employee rights and responsibilities. Civilian Airmen were responsible for "discharging their assigned duties conscientiously, in the most effective manner possible, and to observe in spirit and action the laws and regulations

³⁴⁶ *Air Force Regulation 40-701, Civilian Personnel: General Employee-Management Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: 17 August 1962). 1.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 1-2.

governing their employment.” The Regulation admonished Civilian Airmen to conduct themselves in ways that would not “reflect adversely on the Air Force or the public service.” Although the Regulation did not mention interaction with labor unions, it did acknowledge that Civilian Airmen could “confer with the civilian personnel officer and his staff.” Furthermore, “no civilian employee requesting an opportunity to meet with the civilian personnel office (CPO) on a matter related to his Air Force employment will be denied this opportunity unless the CPO determines that the employee has already been provided all reasonable service.”³⁴⁸ Providing time normally reserved for assigned duties to allow civilian employees to consult with their representatives—including the CPO—was a significant step in granting employee rights and privileges that had applied in the private sector for many years.

Another feature that characterized the evolution of employee-management policy concerned the requirement for employees to work with their leaders and supervisors to address conflicts and problems. While employees clearly had the right to union representation guaranteed under the Executive Order, Air Force leaders embedded the military principle of resolving conflict at the lowest possible level using the chain of command. By establishing a responsibility for employees to “confer with line management officials, initially, starting with the immediate supervisor to discuss matters, obtain information, or resolve problems related to their Air Force employment,” management officials ignored the power imbalance inherent in labor-management relations.³⁴⁹ The principle in labor relations that employs the power of collective bargaining to protect individual employees from being coerced or otherwise pressured requires allowing the union representative to speak on behalf of employees. Despite good intentions

³⁴⁸ *Air Force Regulation 40-701, Civilian Personnel: General Employee-Management Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: 24 March 1967). 2.

³⁴⁹ *Air Force Regulation 40-701, Civilian Personnel: General Employee-Management Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: 2 October 1967). 2.

and mission focus on the part of Air Force leaders, the guidance in AFR 40-701 appeared to ignore situations in which employees may have felt intimidated when dealing with commanders and supervisors—especially those in uniform.

Fortunately, the Air Force issued further guidance that applied to labor-management relations. Air Force Regulation 40-702, *Employee Management Communication* (Change A), went into effect on 10 September 1962. This Regulation provided policies to implement Executive Order 10988 and referred to a DoD Directive that provided department-wide policy on labor-management relations. Attachment 1 to the Regulation was a copy of a Memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force to the Chief of Staff dated 17 May 1962 in which Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert relayed the purpose of the Executive Order. Secretary Zuckert asserted that “*there exists within the Air Force a basic mutuality of interest between employees and management. Sincere and full compliance with the provisions of the Executive Order will capitalize on this fact and will provide the basis for further improvement in the highly satisfactory relationships with Employee Unions which the Air Force has historically enjoyed.*”³⁵⁰ To reinforce the Kennedy Administration’s policy, the AFR included the full text of the Executive Order.

AFR 40-702 recognized that employees had the right to organize at local and national levels. Installation commanders would serve as management representatives for local union recognition and negotiations. The Air Force Director of Civilian Personnel would represent management at the national level.³⁵¹ Regardless of which level applied, management officials would remain strictly neutral with respect to forming or organizing labor organizations. Unfortunately, the right to organize and bargain collectively inserted some distance between local CPO and employees. The CPO hypothetically remained

³⁵⁰ *Air Force Regulation 40-702A, Civilian Personnel: Employee Management Cooperation*, (Washington, D.C.: 10 September 1962). 11. [emphasis added]

³⁵¹ *Ibid.* 3.

a resource for managers and employees alike, but with the introduction of unions, the CPO was required to serve as the principal advisor to commanders on labor-management relations issues. This placed the CPO and members of the CPO staff who had access to management information clearly on the management side of the labor-management divide. Consequently, over time employees became conditioned to seeking redress through union representatives—a situation that worked directly against the sentiments expressed in the Executive Order and in Secretary Zuckert's Memorandum.

Because the AFR delegated authority to installation commanders for recognizing unions and negotiating with union representatives, the AFR provided extensive guidance on recognition policies. With the implementation of the Executive Order, commanders became accountable for recommending what constituted a bargaining unit for their installations to higher headquarters. Bargaining units had to have some degree of commonality in terms of function or community of interest. Workforce characteristics that commanders had to consider included organization, similarity of skills, distinctiveness of function, integrated work processes, grouping, interchangeability, authority, supervision, and history.³⁵² Thus, extending recognition was not a simple decision that grouped all installation employees into a single unit.

The nature of military operations and Air Force culture resulted in tensions as the Air Force attempted to implement policies related to labor relations. By 1966, AFR 40-702 had evolved to include some significant exceptions that had the potential to limit or roll back the effectiveness of the unions. The first policy change prohibited an employee from acting “as a member, officer, or agent of an employee organization if it causes him to act in conflict with the proper exercise of his administrative responsibilities. The individual involved in such a

³⁵² Ibid. 6.

conflict or incompatibility is given a reasonable opportunity to eliminate the conflict. If, after an adequate opportunity, he fails to do so, the Air Force will take action under applicable regulations to relieve him of his supervisory or managerial responsibilities that conflict with his activities in the employee organization.”³⁵³ Although it was entirely appropriate for managers and supervisors to be excluded from union participation, by placing an employee’s “supervisory or managerial responsibilities” at risk, the new Regulation restricted union membership and potentially promotion potential for employees with only a portion of their duties involved in managerial activities.

A second change that directly affected the effectiveness of employee organizations involved the use of government time to conduct union activities. The Regulation included a new paragraph that stated, “In the interests of efficient conduct of Government business and the economical use of Government time, and in order to draw a reasonable distinction between official and non-official activities, those activities concerned with the internal management of employee organizations or membership meetings, solicitation of membership, observing grievance procedures, collection of dues by representatives of employee organizations, campaigning for employee organization offices, and distribution of literature will be conducted outside of regular working hours.”³⁵⁴ This clearly pushed union organization and operations outside the boundaries of the workplace and clashed with Executive Order 10988’s philosophy that employee organization’s helped improve government efficiency and effectiveness.

Finally, the 1966 version of AFR 40-702 provided specific guidance on what constituted matters for consultation and negotiation—and more importantly, what did not. Local policies, matters of safety, training, and implementation of personnel policies were included as matters open for

³⁵³ *Air Force Regulation 40-702, Civilian Personnel: Employee Management Cooperation*, (Washington, D.C.: 28 June 1966). 4.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 5.

discussion. Government representatives were not required to discuss, consult with, or negotiate with labor representatives on areas related to mission effectiveness, work assignment, higher-headquarters policies, or budgets.³⁵⁵ In other words, the Government had wide latitude in defining the relationship with collective bargaining organizations. This, combined with the legal prohibition against strikes and work stoppages left the unions in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis their government counterparts.

By 1970, AFR 40-702 changed to comply with the Nixon Administration's Executive Order 11491 which had rescinded the Kennedy-era Executive Order. The regulation had shrunk from 21 pages to 7 owing, in part to the omission of the full text of the Executive Order, the Secretary of the Air Force Memorandum, and a list of civilian specialties that had appeared in earlier versions. Also, the name of the Regulation changed to *Labor Management Relations*. The new AFR did not reiterate the Executive Order's prohibition against strikes or work stoppages. It also streamlined considerably policies related to employee rights to form and organize collective bargaining organizations. Commanders could delegate to Civilian Personnel Officers the authority to consult with labor organization representatives. In a significant shift in policy, the AFR included guidance for negotiating "appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the realignment of work forces or technological change." Finally, in perhaps the most significant improvement in the Service's policy, employees who served as officials in the labor organization and employees were allowed duty time to conduct activities such as presenting a grievance or appeal, preparing for a hearing or inquiry, observing a grievance or appeal, and attending training. Some activities such as organizing efforts, union elections, external negotiation workshops, and negotiating agreements with government activities remained prohibited on official time, but

³⁵⁵ Ibid. 4.

the AFR authorized managers and supervisors to grant leave or leave without pay to employees engaged in such activities.³⁵⁶ The September 1970 version of the AFR appeared to remove much of the adversarial tone that had characterized earlier versions of the policy. Employees gained substantial rights and freedoms that the earlier policies had either not addressed or had specifically prohibited.

The 1972 version of AFR 40-702 remained consistent with the 1970 version. The updated AFR did, however, clarify the meaning of the term “supervisor.” For the purposes of deciding which employees were authorized to join and participate in union activities, supervisors had “authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees...or the responsibility to direct them or evaluate their performance or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action.”³⁵⁷ This clarification removed the ambiguity inherent in the earlier policy that placed the responsibility on employees who had some supervisory duties to remove themselves from union activities or risk losing their positions or other responsibilities.

The emphasis on labor-management collaboration and cooperation to accomplish assigned missions resulted in new and detailed regulations intended to guide employees and management representatives. More effective communication between managers and employees was one area that Air Force leaders explored for improving relationships. Air Force Regulation 40-704, *Employee-Management Communication*, appeared in August 1962. The Regulation stated Air Force policy directing “Necessary procedures for obtaining effective employee-management communications will be established at all organizational levels and carried out by all personnel.”³⁵⁸ The Regulation emphasized

³⁵⁶ *Air Force Regulation 40-702, Civilian Personnel: Labor Management Relations*, (Washington, D.C.: 24 September 1970).

³⁵⁷ *Air Force Regulation 40-702, Civilian Personnel: Labor-Management Relations*, (Washington, D.C.: 20 April 1972). 2.

³⁵⁸ *Air Force Regulation 40-704, Civilian Personnel: Employee-Management Communication*, (Washington, D.C.: 10 August 1962). 1.

the importance of downward and upward communication channels and suggested that commanders include civilians in Commander Calls, send out written forms of communication using multiple media (e.g., letters, bulletin boards, newsletters), and even hosting a Civilian Call to give Civilian Airmen from multiple work areas access to commanders. Employee unions provided the obvious forums for employees to collaborate among themselves, but the Regulation also emphasized that managers could communicate organizational goals and decisions through the unions.³⁵⁹ By 1969, the language used in the Regulation was much more general in nature. The paragraph that dealt with communicating with unions had become more legalistic: “Unions having formal or exclusive recognition are entitled to consult with and be consulted by management on a variety of matters on a periodic basis...Regular and positive communication with employee unions enables management to get its message to employees with maximum understanding and acceptance, and at the same time inspires employee confidence in management by providing for consideration of employees’ proposals and problems at the highest level.”³⁶⁰ It appears that Air Force leaders had come to understand that working collaboratively with collective bargaining units required a more nuanced approach than was required in dealing with military members.

By the 1970s, Air Force leaders had developed specific training for managers and supervisors of civilian employees who were eligible for membership in collective bargaining organizations. The Labor-Management Relations Course was a component of a larger syllabus of management training courses; it required four hours of formal class, or in the terminology used at the time, conference time. Other course topics included the following subjects: Equal Employment Opportunity, Suggestions and Awards, Employee-Management Policy, Disciplinary

³⁵⁹ Ibid. 1-3.

³⁶⁰ *Air Force Regulation 40-704, Civilian Personnel: Employee-Management Communication*, (Washington, D.C.: 8 August 1969). 2.

Policy, Grievances and Appeals, Supervisor's Role in Recruitment and Examination, Supervisor's Responsibilities in Selection, Merit Promotion Program, Supervisor's Utilization of Employees, Supervisor's Responsibilities for Training, Supervisor's Responsibilities for Career Development, Basic Classification Principles, Supervisor's Responsibilities for Classification.³⁶¹

The course began with a review of the history of labor relations in the United States and among federal employees. The Conference Leader's Guide included an assessment of implementing Executive Order 10988—the Kennedy Administration's order that granted federal employees' organization rights. According to the Conference Leader's Guide, "The new policies...contributed to more democratic management of the workforce and to marked improvement in communication between agencies and their employees...By 1969, approximately 145,000 [Air Force] employees were represented by unions in exclusive units...representatives of the unions and of Air Force activities had met at the bargaining table, and by the end of 1969, 101 approved agreements were in effect."³⁶² The next phase of the course introduced participants to the purpose of unions in the federal workplace and explained employee rights with respect to union membership and operations.

Following the introduction of unions and employee rights, the course guide devoted 90 minutes to explaining management and supervisory roles with respect to labor relations. The course material relied on Executive Orders, Federal Statutes, and Defense Department and Air Force Regulations to outline in considerable detail how supervisors were to function in environments that included collective bargaining agreements. The remainder of the course employed case studies in which supervisors had to apply policies to deal with

³⁶¹ *Air Force Pamphlet 50-4, Training: Labor-Management Relations Course Conference Leader's Guide*, (Washington, D.C.: 23 August 1971). A1-1.

³⁶² *Ibid.* A1-6 – A1-7.

situations involving employees who were union members. Case study topics included interacting with union representatives during a scheduled union election, potential conflicts with union organizers, allegations of unfair labor practices, supervisor responsibilities to allow union formation and organization, dealing with a threatened walk-out, and dealing with an overtime dispute.³⁶³ The Labor-Management Relations Course provided supervisors with a solid grounding in the history, theory, and policies related to labor relations. It also provided opportunities for supervisors to apply their understanding of the government's labor relations policies to practical situations that they could encounter in the workplace.

By the Twenty-first Century, the Air Force had consolidated its policies related to labor relations into Air Force Instruction 36-701, *Labor-Management Relations*. This Instruction begins with the assertion "The Air Force is committed to fostering an effective labor-management relationship that contributes to the overall efficiency of the mission and is within the public interest...Management will bargain in good faith and provide union representatives information necessary for negotiations to the extent permitted by law or regulation."³⁶⁴ Management roles remained vested in installation commanders, supported by their Civilian Personnel Officers (who employ labor relations specialists) and front line supervisors. Prohibitions against strikes and work stoppages remain owing to the nature of the defense mission. Employees serving as union officials are allowed to represent the union in collective bargaining, negotiations, grievance processes, and other representational functions during official duty time (referred to as Taxpayer-Funded Union Time). Management representatives may deny requests to perform authorized union functions if the employee's absence would compromise mission requirements. Unfair

³⁶³ Ibid. A2-9-A2-12.

³⁶⁴ *Air Force Instruction 36-701, Personnel: Labor-Management Relations*, (Washington, D.C.: 14 November 2019). 6.

labor practices remain similar to those established in the late-1960s and early-1970s. Finally, the Instruction provides overarching policies for submitting grievances and arbitration that have their origins in the policies that prevailed in the Executive Order days.

In sum, the pathway toward collective bargaining rights for civil servants was not a clear or obvious one when viewed from the vantage point of the late-1940s and early-1950s when the Air Force was finding its way as a separate Service. President Kennedy's commitment to collective bargaining rights for federal employees was rooted in a vision that such rights would lead to more effective and efficient institutional performance in the public sector. Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford agreed, but did not take the next step to codify collective bargaining rights in law. President Carter's sense that the timing was right and that Congress would be receptive to adding a collective bargaining amendment to the CSRA of 1978 secured permanent rights for all federal employees.

From a management perspective, working with unions can be a difficult experience. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld discovered that it was inadvisable to ignore the unions when he attempted to implement the NSPS in the early 2000s. At local levels, however, the labor-management collaboration has given employees the means to seek redress for grievances without fear of intimidation or reprisal. For managers, in the best of circumstances, union involvement in unit missions has helped improve work processes and helped forestall situations with the potential to cause significant harm to the mission. Far from being an inherently contentious relationship that pits labor and management representatives in perpetual conflict against one another, Air Force labor-management relations represent two perspectives on how best to accomplish the mission while creating a safe, collaborative, efficient, and effective workplace.

Conclusion

From what started as a few, very short, regulations in the early days of the Air Force, the library of Regulations devoted solely to providing policies relevant to Civilian Airmen grew to include more than 70 publications by the early 1990s. This does not include Manuals, Policy Directives, Handbooks, Pamphlets, or classified Regulations. Leading, organizing, managing, and supervising a workforce that comprised approximately one-third of the personnel footprint of the entire service required specific policies that reconciled the laws, regulations, and policies of the Civil Service Commission (later the OPM) with those of the Air Force. In many ways, Air Force leaders attempted to impose a military template on its civilian workforce through the language and policies used in the Regulations. Examples include the policies governing civilian mobility and the early Regulations related to labor-management relations.

For the most part, however, a review of the Air Force Regulations that governed its Civilian Airmen reveals a focus on the mission—and an awareness of how important Civilian Airmen's contributions were to that mission. Specific Regulations for Civilian Airmen were necessary because leaders could not simply apply the policies developed for uniformed Airmen to the civilian component. To create effective and efficient pathways for Civilian Airmen to integrate with military organizations required Regulations that bridged the divide between the personnel components. By providing clear guidance that referred to laws and other sources of guidance that applied to all federal civilian employees, the 40-series Regulations communicated a clear rationale for the differences in policies that governed the civilian workforce.

Civilian Airmen, on the other hand, were members of an institution that was in many ways set apart from the society it served. The nature of military organizations is such that they create values, standards,

and traditions that differ from those of the societies they serve. Each specialized Service has its own version of martial culture that sets it apart from the larger society and from the other Services. The Air Force is no exception—and in the years following the creation of the separate Air Force, the new Service culture and institutional norms took time to evolve and solidify.

To the extent that Civilian Airmen saw themselves as federal employees rather than as part of the Air Force, they clashed with the larger Air Force culture. As one observer noted, “We had just come out of a long and trying war [World War II], we were a contracting organization, we were attuned to the requirements of a totally military activity, and our civilian workforce served in a totally military environment. The concept of a military-civilian management team had not been fully developed... Our requirement as an organization was not for a highly sophisticated work force such as we have today but rather for what was often referred to as an ‘army of clerks,’ denoting an absence of professionals.”³⁶⁵ When performance and duty expectations change, especially in a system like the highly regulated and rigid Civil Service, the transition from task-oriented “clerks” to part-owners in the mission is a difficult one.

Following the Vietnam War and the creation of the all-volunteer force, the uniformed military embarked on a path to professionalize the force. This significant shift in emphasis should have created mechanisms for Civilian Airmen to partner more effectively with their uniformed counterparts. The literature, however, reflects that the two components remained somewhat at odds—some military members viewed Civilian Airmen as lacking professionalism and commitment to the mission. Some Civilian Airmen resented the military’s refusal to

³⁶⁵ Charles A. Roberts, “Managing the Civilian Work Force in the Seventies: What is Past is Prologue,” in *US Air Force Personnel Management/Programs: Background Information* (Washington, D.C.: Secretary of the Air Force: Office of Information Internal Division, December 1970). 25.

understand the difference between civilian and military commitments. In an environment that harbored two such different cultures, the body of regulatory guidance helped create touch points for collaboration and understanding.

To achieve a transition toward a professional civilian force requires much the same journey followed by the uniformed component. From the perspective of the 1970s when the country had just experienced a tragic war, sweeping societal changes, and waves of internal dissent and violence, the future for Air Force civilians was far from certain. “Tomorrow’s work force is going to be different, to say the least. Different by virtue of the environment in which it grew up, different by virtue of a new set of values spreading across the land. It will be more involved, more articulate, better educated, and as capable as any group we have seen before...Tomorrow’s manager, as far as relations with the work force are concerned must above all be capable, dedicated, honest to himself, well read, and highly compassionate.”³⁶⁶

Civilian Airmen today must continue working to be essential to the Air Force mission. That requires more than technical proficiency in their assigned job duties. To justify the significant footprint of the civilian workforce, Civilian Airmen must be trained and educated for duties and skills they do not currently possess. In other words, Civilian Airmen must become lifelong learners. They must become familiar with the national security trends that affect their organizations to be prepared to help their military counterparts cope with those trends. Finally, they must become innovators who can solve unanticipated challenges. With the anticipated challenges to national and global security, Civilian Airmen can no longer function as an “army of clerks.” They must perform as mission essential contributors in every situation.

³⁶⁶ Roberts, “Managing the Civilian Work Force in the Seventies: What is Past is Prologue.” 28-29.

Questions for Discussion

1. What insights can one gain from understanding how regulatory guidance has evolved?
2. How would you address critics who point to the lack of mobility among Civilian Airmen as an indicator that the civilian workforce does not provide flexibility to Air Force missions?
3. What were the fundamental issues with the Cold War-era Loyalty Programs? How do current security and information protection programs avoid such issues?
4. How would you describe the difference between a compliance-based culture and one that emphasizes individual responsibility and integrity?
5. How would you describe the relationship between the Air Force's Core Values and ethical behaviors?
6. What is collective bargaining and why is it important that Civilian Airmen can engage in collective bargaining?
7. How does collective bargaining affect the relationship between subordinates and supervisors?
8. What effects do collective bargaining rights and processes have on the organizational culture?
9. In what ways do collective bargaining rights and processes affect the professionalism of Civilian Airmen?
10. How would you describe the importance of Civilian Airmen to the Air Force mission today? What evidence helps support your argument?



CHAPTER 6: CIVILIAN AIRMEN AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The historical experience with civil service cadres has emphasized the fielding of a corps of administrative technocrats that operate the bureaucracy of government. What has mattered most to governments such as those in China, France, Britain, and even the United States for much of its history, is the requirement to develop cadres of workers, an “army of clerks,” who would keep the machinery of the state moving without interfering with politics. In the United States following World War II, global interests and responsibilities gradually changed the structure and purpose of the federal civil service. Reliance on competitive entrance examinations, once the *sine qua non* of merit-based civil service systems, proved inadequate as federal agencies required civil servants to become more involved in the planning, resourcing, and execution of policies and procedures. Political appointees and senior executives may still rely on the vast bureaucracy for research, background information, and policy recommendations, but increasingly, the distance between executive levels and the civil service is collapsing in much the same way that military theorists argue that the distance between strategic and tactical levels of war appears to be collapsing. The public appears to require more information and explanations for decisions and the civil servants, not the executives, typically have a greater understanding of the information and its relationship to policy recommendations.

As this evolution has occurred, critics of the civil service have concentrated on the quality of the employees rather than on the system. Such criticism takes aim at the difficulty in hiring the best-qualified

individuals, the poor quality of work, the inflexible personnel system that makes it difficult to discipline and dismiss poor performers, and the careerist mindset of some civil servants. In most organizations, however, examples of high-performing, motivated, dedicated, professional workers far outnumber the stereotypes of underperforming government workers. In most organizations, in fact, civil servants tend to go above and beyond their job descriptions to deliver the best service possible to their organizations and their customers.

When critics have focused on the system, they point to the outdated organization, policies, and practices that make the civil service a poor fit for the challenges of the 21st Century. One critic characterized the civil service system as “appalling” citing anachronistic human resources policies and systems, poor performance, opposition to innovation and creativity, and ineffective management.³⁶⁷ Yet, attempts to reform the civil service have failed over the years—only the Carter Administration’s CSRA has achieved significant change and other attempts such as the ill-fated Defense Department’s NSPS have failed miserably. Even aspects of the CSRA such as merit-based pay practices faltered after several years as it became evident that organizational differences made it difficult to implement a fair overarching merit-based pay scheme. Experience with organization-specific personnel management systems such as with the US Postal Service and the State Department suggest that breaking the system into functionally oriented units might solve the systemic problems confronting the vast government bureaucracy.

In the Defense Department—and by extension in the US Air Force—the size of the civil service magnifies the importance of the civil service’s role in the mission of the organization. With more than 800,000 civil servants in the DoD and with Civilian Airmen making up approximately one-third of the Air Force’s total personnel footprint, it

³⁶⁷ Howard Risher, “Appalling’ Is the Right Word for the Civil Service System,” Article, *Government Executive* (2015), <https://www.govexec.com/management/2015/09/appalling-right-word-civil-service-system/121466/>.

is inevitable that civil servants will play a significant role in nearly every aspect of the military mission. Civilian Airmen have deployed, fought in combat, and have even died as they served the nation.³⁶⁸ The question becomes, “How can Civilian Airmen contribute more effectively to Air Force missions in the future?” The answer lies in three broad areas: first, to understand how the Air Force contributes to achieving national goals and objectives. Second, Civilian Airmen must focus on career-long professional development. Finally, Civilian Airmen must actively seek out and assume leadership responsibilities in their organizations to demonstrate how their knowledge, expertise, and skills contribute to unit and Air Force operational capabilities.

Civilian Airmen and National Security

Civilian Airmen must develop a deeper understanding of the national strategy and how the Air Force contributes to achieving the nation’s strategic goals. The Biden Administration’s strategy as of this writing, *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, specifies how the Administration intends to orchestrate policies and instruments of power to achieve greater security for the nation.³⁶⁹ The primary emphasis in the document is that the United States will pursue its interests by engaging with allies and partners around the world. The numbers and types of threats to national security have grown, however, to staggering proportions compared to those of earlier eras.

Threats from states fall into two categories: peer or near-peer states and threats from states that can destabilize regional and global security. China and Russia are currently the peer competitors that pose the greatest challenge to US security interests. Of the two, the Biden Administration’s interim strategic guidance clearly portrays China

³⁶⁸ John A. Tirpak, “The Air Force Investigators,” *Air Force Magazine* 97, no. 7 (2014). Peter Grier, “Civilians in Harm’s Way,” *Air Force Magazine* 88, no. 7 (2005).

³⁶⁹ Joseph R. Biden Jr., *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, (Washington, D.C.: 2021).

as the most significant threat in the near- and mid-term. “China, in particular, has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”³⁷⁰ The dangerous mix of an authoritarian government, expanding military power, and unethical and coercive trading practices makes China particularly difficult to confront.

The Biden Administration’s policy aimed at dealing with the complex challenges that China presents using diplomacy as the primary instrument of power—backed by highly capable military Services. Simply relying on past strategies and doctrines will not be sufficient to confront China’s growing military capability. As Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Q. Brown, Jr. has indicated, “Competitors, especially China, have made and continue aggressive efforts to negate long-enduring US warfighting advantages and challenge the United States’ interests and geopolitical position...They have studied, resourced, and introduced systems specifically designed to defeat the US Air Force capabilities that have underpinned the American way of war for a generation.”³⁷¹ Any confrontation involving China will require Airmen to employ advanced technical capabilities and innovative thinking—the lack of either places the nation at risk.

Russia presents a different kind of challenge. “Russia remains determined to enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage.”³⁷² Russia maintains significant military capabilities including nuclear-capable systems from the Soviet era. Despite international arms reduction initiatives, US nuclear deterrence postures will likely remain focused on Russia for the foreseeable future. The authoritarian regime has intimidated and encroached on former Soviet states from Eastern Europe to Central Asia. In the early 2000s,

³⁷⁰ Ibid. 8.

³⁷¹ Charles Q. Brown Jr., *Accelerate Change or Lose*, (Washington, D.C.: 2020). 3.

³⁷² Biden Jr. 8.

Russia's vast oil and natural gas resources became an economic weapon used to intimidate Western European states; in 2020, Russia walked out of the OPEC+ conference prompting Saudi Arabia to initiate a price war which dropped oil prices by more than half. Allegations that Moscow was behind cyber-attacks against its Eastern European neighbors suggest that Russian leaders view cyberspace campaigns as tools to achieve economic, diplomatic, and even military objectives while denying official involvement. To date, public linkages between the Russian government and major cyber operations have remained difficult to establish.

US Air Force strategic postures with respect to both China and Russia require Airmen to develop familiarization and proficiency with a wide range of technologies and capabilities. Remaining locked in functional stove-pipes may have worked in the past to confront states that could not match US technological advantages. In the future, Airmen will have to be capable of adapting to the changing strategic and operational context. As General Brown observed, "After decades of near-continuous combat operations, we must align Air Force processes and force presentation to better support readiness, the generation of combat power, and warfighting...Garrison structures and processes must align to these new models, eliminating unnecessary bureaucracy and redundancies, and repurposing manpower to emergent and under-resourced requirements."³⁷³ For Civilian Airmen, this will likely mean filling roles formerly performed by deploying uniformed Airmen to keep garrison capabilities viable during times of conflict or international crises. Doing so, however, will require acquiring new competencies, altering current work assignments, and forging new organizational models to prepare the civilian workforce to be more adaptable in times of crisis.

³⁷³ Brown Jr. 6.

Beneath the level of peer competitors there is a broad range of threats involving state- and non-state actors. Regional actors such as Iran and North Korea can exert destabilizing influence on US partners and allies.³⁷⁴ Both have aggressive nuclear programs that require US leaders to deploy a full range of national power to deter further acquisition programs and attempt to roll back existing programs. Conflict involving either country will likely not remain contained to the immediate region—Iran has stated its ambition to destroy Israel and has had long-standing animosities toward Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. For its part, North Korea has threatened South Korea and Japan numerous times and has launched nuclear-capable missiles toward Guam. Containing both states using economic and diplomatic actions backed by credible military capabilities may suffice to preserve US interests in the near- to mid-term, but finding viable, permanent solutions to the threats posed by Iran and North Korea will require significant changes in policies (and possibly in political systems) for both regimes.

Non-state and state-sponsored terrorist organizations pose threats to the United States and its partners in nearly every region. Terrorist actors and their sympathizers can conduct clandestine planning and operations using the freedoms of democratic societies against them. Every countermeasure deployed to keep free societies safe erodes the very freedoms that lie at the foundation of democracy. Although terrorists may not pose an existential threat to the United States and its partners, the Biden Administration characterizes domestic and international terrorism as “significant threats.”³⁷⁵ Civilian Airmen can contribute to efforts to counter threats from terrorists and other non-state actors by remaining vigilant and practicing sound security countermeasures.

³⁷⁴ Biden Jr. 8.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

To this point, the narrative has described familiar threats that have manifested themselves since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, however, other threats rooted in international crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, population migrations, climate change, and energy insecurity have complicated attempts to provide national security. For the Biden Administration's strategy, engagement rather than isolation is the key to confronting the various challenges that may not pose existential threats, but certainly threaten the values, interests, and quality of life in for the United States and its international partners. Reinvigorating international institutions, multi-lateral agreements, and forging new partnerships, according to the *Strategic Guidance* is the best approach to provide national security while advancing the nation's democratic values.

To contribute to the full range of strategic options envisioned in the Biden Administration's *Strategic Guidance* and in General Brown's *Accelerate Change or Lose*, Civilian Airmen must integrate more effectively across functional lines. More importantly, they must become more conversant with and able to operate in Joint and Combined environments. The Biden Administration's security agenda has as its fundamental premise that the United States will reinvigorate and resurrect international relationships, partnerships, and institutions. On a more operational level, the US Air Force deploys and fights as an integral element of the Joint Force. By becoming more knowledgeable and conversant with Joint and Combined concepts, Civilian Airmen will solidify and enhance their partnership with the Air Force's operational focus thus contributing more directly to the Service's ability to fly, fight, and win.

Civilian Airmen and Professional Development

One of the most significant transformations in US military history occurred after the Vietnam War when the Defense establishment

shifted from a conscript-based force to an all-volunteer, professional force. Investments in training, education, and experience combined with personnel structures that favored retaining highly competent officer and enlisted members resulted in a professionalization of every Service component. Parallel efforts to bring Reserve component (Guard and Reserves) training, education, and experience levels to the same standards as the active components resulted in a comprehensive, flexible, highly capable mix of forces that could adapt to meet emerging security challenges. The longer-serving professional force provided deep experience and maturity that enabled national leaders to reduce the size of active-duty components after the end of the Cold War.

Civilian Airmen must adopt a similar approach to professionalization to prepare them better for meeting the challenges described by national leaders. This means taking the initiative to create and implement career developmental plans that align technical, professional, and educational pathways with the needs of national security and unit missions. Fortunately, mechanisms already exist within the personnel management structures to facilitate such an approach. Civilian Airmen can leverage the annual work planning and feedback process to make supervisors aware of their developmental goals and objectives. By using established processes to present clear developmental plans that are linked to mission requirements, Civilian Airmen can obtain support and buy-in for training, education, and other development opportunities that will reinforce their contributions to their organizations. In turn, Supervisors, armed with concrete information developed in collaboration with their employees, can engage with Career Field Managers and Career Field Teams to provide resources and implementation plans to execute development plans.³⁷⁶

³⁷⁶ See, *Air Force Instruction 36-130, Personnel: Civilian Career and Developmental Programs*, (Washington, D.C.: 27 September 2019).

Several institutional barriers exist that prevent the optimal integration of Civilian Airmen with the Air Force mission and capabilities. According to Mr. Barry Waite, Director of the Air Force's Civilian Leadership Development School, Civilian Airmen remain constrained by the civil service system created more than a century ago despite the reforms enacted by the CSRA and attempts to instill flexibility in leadership, management, training, and development practices. Under the pressure of more than 30 years of nearly continuous combat operations, the Air Force has come to rely on Civilian Airmen for more operational functions—particularly in mid- and senior-level management positions—but the numbers of civilians with college degrees and with professional developmental education credentials have not kept pace with their military counterparts. According to Waite, this places Civilian Airmen at a distinct disadvantage compared to uniformed Airmen.³⁷⁷ This applies even when considering the enlisted force. The Community College of the Air Force has provided enlisted Airmen a pathway to earn an Associate degree related to their military specialty since the 1970s. Today, according to the Air Force Personnel Center, 34% of Senior Non-commissioned Officers have earned Bachelor degrees and 12% have Master's degrees.³⁷⁸ Providing developmental education and training to the civilian component is a necessary step to securing the Air Force's continued effectiveness.

The first, and most obvious development area should be in improving technical skills. Every Civilian Airman must be proficient and current in their assigned career specialty. This requires obtaining initial qualification to meet established performance standards and receiving refresher and upgrade training on a regular basis to remain abreast of trends in the career field. Each Civilian Airman should know what relevant training opportunities exist and they should

³⁷⁷ Interview with Mr. Barry Waite, July 2021.

³⁷⁸ See afpc.af.mil/About/Air-Force-Demographics

come prepared to discuss those options at every scheduled employee-supervisor feedback session. Additionally, there are ancillary skills that may not appear in Core Personnel Documents, but that are necessary for employees to have to be successful. Civilian Airmen should seek out opportunities to acquire those skills and to keep them current. Examples include software training, management workshops, design workshops, or critical and creative thinking seminars. When organizations invest in any developmental opportunity, employees must hold themselves accountable to integrate the knowledge and skills acquired in the training into their work environment.

According to Mr. Waite, a significant step towards civilian professional development was the establishment of the Civilian Leadership Development School (CLDS) in 2019. With a mission to provide civilian undergraduate and professional continuing education and workforce development integrated with the Total Force, the School accomplishes this through four lines of effort: CADP provides Civilian Airmen quality professional development through an Associate of Science degree in Air Force Leadership and Management Studies. The Leadership Development Department introduces civilians to leadership and management concepts at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The Managerial and Supervisory Department delivers federally mandated supervisory and managerial courses. Performance Management Coaching integrates coaching skills with the performance management process. Finally, the Workforce Development Department provides new employee orientation and foundational employee development.³⁷⁹

The school's four lines of effort support the Air Force's GS and WG civilian employees, which comprises nearly one-third of the total force. The primary target population is GS-12 and below and Federal Wage Service and equivalent employees who do not qualify for Department

³⁷⁹ Waite interview, July 2021.

of the Air Force Civilian Enterprise developmental education. The CLDS offers courses and programs which include senior civilians and military personnel to create opportunities for integrating both perspectives in the context of its educational offerings. The goal is to create pathways that prepare Civilian Airmen for further educational opportunities in Officer and Enlisted Professional Military Education programs and in centrally managed civilian developmental education programs. In an acknowledgment of the distinct requirements and perspectives of the civilian component, however, the School tailors its programs and courses to the specific development needs of Civilian Airmen. These needs fall into three broad categories: competency training, guidance awareness, and educational development.³⁸⁰ In the slide below, the areas in green represent the current CLDS Civilian Leadership Development offerings



Figure 1: Civilian Leadership Development School Courses and Programs

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

A second developmental pathway that leads to a more professional civilian workforce involves formal professional education. For the uniformed services, one of the most important methods of instilling and reinforcing the professional nature of the force is in the Professional Military Education (PME) programs. To date, Civilian Airmen may request to attend such programs, but their supervisors and organizations must agree to release them to attend resident schools, they may have to meet certain physical fitness requirements, and the numbers of opportunities may be limited. Despite some of the institutional barriers to attending PME in residence, the experience can be transformative. Employees will certainly gain a greater understanding of the Service and of the perspectives of military members. Every PME program focuses on developing leadership competencies along with course content on military history, Service doctrine, and Joint warfighting. Finally, both resident and non-resident programs provide opportunities for creating lasting relationships with fellow professionals as students interact with one another in seminar and group discussions and other activities. As indicated in the figure above, the CLDS will prepare select Civilian Airmen for opportunities to attend PME programs.

In addition to PME programs, Civilian Airmen should seek out opportunities to attend formal professional education that has the potential to enhance their contribution to their unit mission. In much the same way as described above in the technical training narrative, Civilian Airmen should come to each feedback session with supervisors and other leaders equipped with proposals for education opportunities intended to enhance their value and contribution to the organization. Examples such as professional organization annual meetings, subject-specific seminars and workshops, and interagency symposiums allow participants to expand their professional networks while acquiring information on the latest technologies, research results, and senior leader perspectives. By presenting to their supervisors specific

information on the course, where it occurs, how much it costs, how much time away from assigned duties it will take, and the expected benefits of the educational program, employees can equip supervisors with the necessary information to make resource decisions.

Academic developmental opportunities can be separate from professional developmental education. If, for example, an employee has a goal to complete a degree related to her or his career field or to their organization's mission, they should bring that information to their supervisor's attention. Even though it may not be possible to use Air Force funds to support such efforts, by making supervisors aware of their efforts to acquire more knowledge, skills, and credentials employees may obtain support for promotions or other opportunities. By using the opportunity presented by feedback sessions to discuss comprehensive developmental goals, employees can obtain feedback, suggestions, and encouragement from their supervisors as they work to complete their professional and personal developmental goals.

Finally, finding balance between personal and professional interests is essential to remaining effective and motivated in the work environment. Stress can accompany working in high-performance, fast-paced organizations; as stress accumulates in the workplace, it can bleed over into other areas of an individual's life. Sustaining peak performance, finding work-life balance, and managing stress requires being healthy and physically fit. Employees should work with their supervisors to find ways to implement healthy lifestyle habits in the workplace. Where Service and organizational policies permit, take advantage of the fitness facilities on each installation. Plan work schedules to provide time for healthy eating habits. Finally, help create organizational cultures with methods for offloading stress and pressure. Because Civilian Airmen provide long-term continuity, stability, and institutional memory for many Air Force organizations, they must integrate lifestyle balance in their approach to professionalization.

Civilian Airmen and Leadership

Professional Airmen are leaders. This is true regardless of the personnel component in which one serves. Civilian Airmen should aspire to lead in their workplace, in their organizations, and in the Air Force at large. Doing so requires developing a personal leadership development plan that combines self-study, mentoring, and leadership opportunities. Discussing leadership aspirations and goals with supervisors, managers, and commanders can help focus efforts and can open opportunities for conversations about supervisors' experiences. As with any professional program, however, the responsibility for consistency and sustainment lies with the individual employee.

Leadership development inevitably begins with self-study. Having a consistent and challenging reading agenda provides one of the best avenues for forming independent perspectives about topics of personal interest. Many great leaders throughout history have sustained impressive reading programs throughout their lives.³⁸¹ Each military Service Chief in the United States publishes a professional reading list. The current Chief of Staff of the Air Force Reading list is accessible from the Air University Library online at <https://static.dma.mil/usaf/csafreadinglist/index.html>. The list is divided into six categories: Leadership and Decision Making; Warfighting; Heritage; Strategic Environment; Technology and Innovation; and Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force Picks. Each category is divided into developmental levels—Gateway, Intermediate, and Pinnacle. The Air University Library provides information on how to access the books (many are available as eBooks) and offers reading guides that help the reader develop strategies for accessing the information in the books. The site also provides links to videos and TED Talks selected to assist Airmen in their self-study professional development efforts.

³⁸¹ See for example, Roger H. Nye, *The Patton Mind: The Professional Development of an Extraordinary Leader* (Garden City Park: Avery Publishing, 1993).

To bring individual self-study initiatives into the professional environment, Civilian Airmen can engage with their peers to discuss books, papers, and other sources. Taking the initiative to form professional study groups, develop agendas, select books to read, and scheduling discussion group meetings can create opportunities for exchanging information and perspectives across organizational lines. In doing so, many organizations at a base (or at multiple bases if the group uses virtual meeting capabilities to conduct meetings) can forge closer personal and professional relationships that can enhance the overall effectiveness of the unit and organization.

Mentoring is a professional relationship in which a person with greater experience connects with and guides another person to develop personally and professionally.³⁸² By connecting with a more senior individual, Civilian Airmen can gain insights into what has contributed to the mentor's leadership style and success. The relationship takes time—time for the relationship to develop, time to discuss concepts and issues, and time to develop a sense of the desired results of the mentor-mentee relationship. Air Force literature describes the mentors' roles as being advisors, coaches, facilitators, and advocates.³⁸³ Because such relationships can become deeply personal, both mentor and mentee should have a clear understanding of boundaries and expectations. When they are most effective, such relationships result in both individuals gaining greater insight and experience as leaders and as contributors to the organization's mission.

Being attuned to and available for leadership development opportunities can provide Civilian Airmen hands-on experience that contribute to greater professionalism. In any large organization there are occasions for individuals to contribute to projects and initiatives. By being willing to participate in such initiatives, Civilian Airmen can

³⁸² *Air Force Handbook 26-2643, Personnel: Air Force Mentoring Program*, (Washington, D.C.: 17 May 2019). 2.

³⁸³ *Ibid.* 4-5.

expand their knowledge, skills, and their value to the organization. With each new opportunity, the individual civilian employee will engage with more members of local organizations, encounter new problems and challenges, learn new ways of framing problems, and have occasion for presenting group recommendations to senior leaders. Each interaction in such projects has the potential to improve and refine leadership skills and knowledge. Consulting with one's supervisor to ensure that participating in outside projects does not compromise one's primary duties is an essential first step, but assuming that one's supervisor supports participation, working on a larger organization project can result in significant leadership growth.

Conclusion

Recent investments in formal civilian development programs have created new and innovative opportunities for Civilian Airmen to enhance their service to the Air Force and the nation. Civilian Airmen are essential contributors to the US Air Force's ability to fly, fight, and win, thus assuring national security. With an increasingly dangerous and complex security environment, civilian employees can rapidly enhance the Air Force's capabilities by seizing opportunities to develop as professionals. By doing so, they will assume greater responsibilities for missions, free up uniformed personnel for more operational warfighting duties, and integrate more closely with Service and Joint planning and execution efforts. The next personnel development revolution in the Air Force could be in accessing previously untapped capabilities, knowledge, ideas, and insights from its Civilian Airmen. Occupying more than one-third of the total personnel investment for the Service, Civilian Airmen have long contributed to tactical, operational, and organizational effectiveness. Building on that legacy, they can solidify their professional contributions, take advantage of Service force

development policies, processes, and procedures, and create effective career paths grounded in their contributions to national security.

Questions for Discussion

1. How do you connect your unit and your personal contribution to the goals of the Interim National Security Guidance?
2. What additional knowledge do you need to improve your understanding of the Air Force's role in national security? How do you intend to acquire that knowledge?
3. What are your near-, mid-, and long-term objectives for professional development? Have you produced a written plan to discuss with your supervisor?
4. What technical skills do you believe will make you more able to support your unit mission? What is your plan to acquire those skills?
5. What educational opportunities do you believe will make you a better asset to your organization while also preparing you for greater career opportunities in the future? How will you access those educational opportunities?
6. How would you evaluate your personal and professional balance? What area, if you chose to concentrate on it, would make the most difference in achieving balance for you? What is your plan to concentrate on that area?
7. How would you rate your physical, emotional, and mental fitness? What is your plan to address any shortfalls in each area?
8. What five books do you intend to read in the next six months that will prepare you to perform better as a Civilian Airman?

9. What formal leadership courses do you wish to attend in the next year? How do you intend to present your desire to attend such courses to your supervisor? When will you do so?
10. What leadership opportunities are available in your organization, and how will you request to be assigned to those opportunities?

SOURCES

Primary Sources

Interviews

Interview with Mr. Barry Waite, Director of the Air Force Civilian Leadership Development School, July 2021.

Government Documents

“Air-mindedness.” *Air Force Doctrine Update*. (2013). Accessed 17 November 2020. https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/doctrine_updates/du_13_01.pdf.

The Classification Act of 1949. Washington, D.C., 1949.

Congress, Forty-Seventh. *An Act to Regulate and Improve the Civil Service of the United States*. Washington, DC, 1883.

Congress, Ninety-Fifth. “An Act to Reform the Civil Service.” 117. United States, 1978.

Background Brief. (1992). <https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/BB-38-The-US-Army-Between-World-Wars-I-and-II.pdf>.

Defense Budget Overview. Washington, D.C., 2019.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Executive Order 10450: Security Requirements for Government Employment*. Washington, D.C.: National Archives, 27 April 1953.

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Washington, DC, 1986.

Human Capital Annex to the Air Force Strategic Master Plan. Washington, D.C., 2015.

Biden Jr., Joseph R. *Interim National Security Strategic Guidance*, Washington, D.C., 2021.

Brown Jr., Charles Q. *Accelerate Change or Lose*. Washington, D.C., 2020.

- Foreign Relations of the United States. "The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs." Moscow, January 16, 1947.
- . "The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State." Moscow, April 4, 1945.
- . "The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Panyushkin) to the Secretary of State." Washington, DC, June 25, 1948.
- . "The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State." Moscow, April 6, 1945.
- . "The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State." Moscow, October 23, 1945.
- . "The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State." Moscow, April 5, 1946.
- . "The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State." Moscow, September 8, 1946.
- . "The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State." Moscow, March 20, 1946.
- . "The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State." Washington, DC, December 16, 1947.
- . "Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Stevens)." Washington, DC, July 26, 1946.
- . "Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews): Subject: Soviet Policy of Tying up Economic Activities in the Balkans." Washington, DC., May 30, 1945.
- . "View of British Foreign Office Official Expressed to Harriman: The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State." Moscow, May 31, 1946.

House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. *History of Civil Service Merit Systems of the United States and Selected Foreign Countries*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1976.

Kennedy, John F. *Executive Order 10988: Employee-Management Cooperation in the Federal Service*, Washington, D.C., 17 January 1962.

Monroe, James. "Seventh Annual Message (2 Dec 1823)." In *National Security Law Documents*, edited by John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts and Robert F. Turner. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2006.

"National Security Act of 1947." In *National Security Law Documents*, edited by John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts and Robert F. Turner, 755-63. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1947.

"National Security Act Amendments of 1949." In *National Security Law Documents*, edited by Kenneth H. Moore Jr, Guy B. Roberts and Robert F. Turner. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1949.

National Security Council. "NSC-68: Soviet Union Nuclear Capabilities." In *National Security Law Documents*, edited by Kenneth H. Moore Jr, Guy B. Roberts and Robert F. Turner, 35-66. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1950.

Nixon, Richard M. *Executive Order 11491: Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service*, Washington, D.C., 1 January 1970.

Northcote, Stafford Henry, and Charles Edward Trevelyan. *Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil Service*. House of Commons (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office Hyde and Spottswode, 1854). https://www.civilservant.org.uk/library/1854_Northcote_Trevelyan_Report.pdf.

Office of Defense Transformation. *Elements of Defense Transformation*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2004.

Public Law 74-198: The National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Washington, D.C., 6 July 1935.

Public Law 86-257: The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Washington, D.C., 14 September 1959.

Public Law 212, The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914. Washington, D.C., 15 October 1914.

Roberts, Charles A. "Managing the Civilian Work Force in the Seventies: What Is Past Is Prologue." In *US Air Force Personnel Management/Programs: Background Information*, 24-29. Washington, D.C.: Secretary of the Air Force: Office of Information Internal Division, December 1970.

Roosevelt, Theodore. "Annual Message (6 Dec 1904)." In *National Security Law Documents*, edited by John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts and Robert F. Turner, 15-17. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2006.

Truman, Harry S. *Executive Order 9835: Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employees Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government.* Washington, D.C., 21 March 1947.

———. *Statement by the President Upon Signing the New Classification Act.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949.

United States Air Force. *USAF End-Strength.* Washington, D.C.: Headquarters US Air Force, 2018.

Washington, George. "Farewell Address (17 Sep 1796)." In *National Security Law Documents*, edited by John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts and Robert F. Turner. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 2006.

Wilson, Woodrow. "Address to Congress on War Aims and Peace Terms (8 Jan 1918)." In *National Security Law Documents*, edited by John Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts and Robert F. Turner, 77-78. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2006.

Regulations and Instructions

Air Force Handbook 26-2643, Personnel: Air Force Mentoring Program.

Washington, D.C., 17 May 2019.

Air Force Instruction 33-332, Communication and Information: Air Force Privacy and Civil Liberties Program. Washington, D.C., 10 March 2020.

Air Force Instruction 36-130, Personnel: Civilian Career and Developmental Programs. Washington, D.C., 27 September 2019.

Air Force Instruction 36-202, Personnel: Civilian Mobility. Washington, D.C., 19 August 2019.

Air Force Instruction 36-701, Personnel: Labor-Management Relations. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2019.

Air Force Instruction 36-703, Personnel: Civilian Conduct and Responsibility. Washington, D.C., 30 August 2018.

Air Force Instruction 2670, Personnel: Total Force Development. Washington, D.C., 7 December 2020.

Air Force Manual 36-204, Personnel: Overseas Employment. Washington, D.C., 25 March 2019.

Air Force Pamphlet 50-4, Training: Labor-Management Relations Course Conference Leader's Guide. Washington, D.C., 23 August 1971.

Air Force Policy Directive 90-10, Special Management: Total Force Integration. Washington, D.C., 27 September 2019.

Air Force Regulation 40-3, Civilian Personnel: Utilization of Civilians within the Air Force Washington, D.C., 18 May 1948.

Air Force Regulation 40-9, Civilian Personnel, Reporting Requirements for Security Cases under Executive Order 10550. Washington, D.C., 7 February 1955.

Air Force Regulation 40-12, Civilian Personnel: Loyalty and Security Program. Washington, D.C., 13 January 1950.

Air Force Regulation 40-12A, Civilian Personnel: Security Program. Washington, D.C., 22 June 1954.

Air Force Regulation 40-16, Civilian Personnel: Quarterly Report of Actions under Executive Order 10450. Washington, D.C., 25 July 1950.

Air Force Regulation 40-16, Civilian Personnel: Quarterly Report of Actions under Executive Order 10450. Washington, D.C., 29 February 1958.

Air Force Regulation 40-16, Civilian Personnel: Quarterly Report of Actions under Executive Order 10450. Washington, D.C., 25 July 1955.

Air Force Regulation 40-19, Civilian Personnel: Oversea Assignment Policy and Related Procedures. Washington, D.C., 14 February 1949.

Air Force Regulation 40-19, Civilian Personnel: Oversea Assignment Policy and Related Procedures. Washington, D.C., 16 September 1952.

Air Force Regulation 40-23, Civilian Personnel: Investigations for Employment. Washington, D.C., 8 March 1960.

Air Force Regulation 40-23A, Civilian Personnel, Investigations for Employment. Washington, D.C., 27 July 1960.

Air Force Regulation 40-102, Civilian Personnel: Basic Authorities, Principles, and Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration. Washington, D.C., 2 July 1962.

Air Force Regulation 40-203, Civilian Personnel: Investigative Requirements for Filling Civilian Positions. Washington, D.C., 28 January 1963.

Air Force Regulation 40-303, Civilian Personnel: Civilian Mobility. Washington, D.C., 13 November 1962.

Air Force Regulation 40-303, Civilian Personnel: Civilian Mobility. Washington, D.C., 17 December 1969.

Air Force Regulation 40-303, Civilian Personnel: Civilian Mobility. Washington, D.C., 4 May 1972.

Air Force Regulation 40-320, Civilian Personnel: Matching Physical and Mental Capacities with Physical and Mental Demands. Washington, D.C., 27 March 1967.

Air Force Regulation 40-320, Civilian Personnel: Matching Physical Capacities with Physical Demands. Washington, D.C., 28 February 1963.

Air Force Regulation 40-331, Civilian Personnel: The Merit Promotion Plan. Washington, D.C., 20 December 1962.

Air Force Regulation 40-335, Civilian Personnel: The Merit Promotion Program. Washington, D.C., 9 January 1976.

Air Force Regulation 40-335, Civilian Personnel: The Merit Promotion Program. Washington, D.C., 1 July 1969.

Air Force Regulation 40-335, Civilian Personnel: The Merit Promotion Program. Washington, D.C., 6 February 1965.

Air Force Regulation 40-411, Civilian Personnel: Employee and Career Development. Washington, D.C., 2 July 1962.

Air Force Regulation 40-411, Civilian Personnel: Employee and Career Development. Washington, D.C., 6 April 1965.

Air Force Regulation 40-411, Civilian Personnel: Employee and Career Development. Washington, D.C., 30 June 1965.

Air Force Regulation 40-527, Civilian Personnel: Step Increases. Washington, D.C., 14 June 1962.

Air Force Regulation 40-701, Civilian Personnel: General Employee-Management Policy. Washington, D.C., 24 March 1967.

Air Force Regulation 40-701, Civilian Personnel: General Employee-Management Policy. Washington, D.C., 2 October 1967.

Air Force Regulation 40-701, Civilian Personnel: General Employee-Management Policy. Washington, D.C., 17 August 1962.

Air Force Regulation 40-702, Civilian Personnel: Employee Management Cooperation. Washington, D.C., 28 June 1966.

Air Force Regulation 40-702, Civilian Personnel: Labor-Management Relations. Washington, D.C., 20 April 1972.

- Air Force Regulation 40-702, Civilian Personnel: Labor-Management Relations.* Washington, D.C., 24 September 1970.
- Air Force Regulation 40-702A, Civilian Personnel: Employee Management Cooperation.* Washington, D.C., 10 September 1962.
- Air Force Regulation 40-704, Civilian Personnel: Employee-Management Communication.* Washington, D.C., 8 August 1969.
- Air Force Regulation 40-704, Civilian Personnel: Employee-Management Communication.* Washington, D.C., 10 August 1962.
- Air Force Regulation 40-735, Civilian Personnel: Employee Responsibility and Conduct.* Washington, D.C., 26 July 1971.
- Air Force Regulation 40-911, Civilian Personnel: Emergency-Essential Civilian Positions.* Washington, D.C., 16 October 1963.
- Air Force Regulation 40-911, Civilian Personnel: Emergency-Essential Civilian Positions.* Washington, D.C., 29 April 1963.
- Air Force Regulation 40-911, Civilian Personnel: Emergency-Essential Civilian Positions.* Washington, D.C., 19 April 1962.
- Air Force Regulation 40-911, Civilian Personnel: Emergency-Essential Civilian Positions.* Washington, D.C., 18 June 1964.
- Air Force Regulation 40-925, Civilian Personnel, Administration of Civilian Employees under the Human Reliability Program.* Washington, D.C., 24 June 1965.
- Air Force Regulation 40-925, Civilian Personnel: Administration of Civilian Employees under the Human Reliability Program.* Washington, D.C., 24 October 1968.
- Army Air Force Regulation 40-2: Delegation of Authority for Civilian Personnel Administration within the AAF.* Washington, D.C., 2 January 1947.
- Joint Ethics Regulation, Department of Defense 5500.07-R (Change 7).* Washington, D.C., 17 November 2011.

Books

Allen, Frederick Lewis. *Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the 1920s*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1931. 1964.

Mitchell, William. *Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power, Economic and Military*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925. 1988, Dover Publications, Inc., Minneloa, New York.

Office of Personnel Management. *Biography of an Ideal: A History of the Federal Civil Service*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003.

Journal Articles

Belman, Albert A. "Wage Chronology No. 13 Federal Classification Act Employees, 1924-50." *Monthly Labor Review* 72, no. 3 (1951): 296-309.

Gutheim, Frederick. "Civil Service Reform in France." *Public Administration Review* 5, no. 4 (1945): 360-63.

Hansen, Alvin H. "World Institutions for Stability and Expansion." *Foreign Affairs* 22, no. 2 (1944).

Jones, Roger W. "1961 Top Team Must 'Hit the Ground Running.'" *Civil Service Journal* 1, no. 1 (1960): 2-5, 22.

Kane, R. Keith. "The United Nations: A Perspective--the Security Council." *Foreign Affairs* 24, no. 1 (1945).

Kirk, Grayson. "National Power and Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 23, no. 4 (1945).

McGregor, O.R. "Civil Servants and the Civil Service, 1850-1950." *The Political Quarterly* 22, no. 2 (1957): 154-63.

Spann, R. N. "Civil Servants in Washington." *Political Studies* 1, no. 3 (1953): 228-46.

Wilson, Woodrow. "The Study of Administration." *Political Science Quarterly* 56, no. 4 (1941): 481-506. 1886.

X (George Kennan). "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947): 566-82.

Secondary Sources

Books

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Upton and the Army*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1964.

Atkinson, Rick. *An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943*. 1st ed. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2002.

Biddle, Tami Davis. *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945*. New Haven, CT: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Bishop, John Lyman. *Studies of Governmental Institutions in Chinese History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968.

Bolton, Kent M. *The Rise of the American Security State: The National Security Act of 1947 and the Militarization of US Foreign Policy*. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, an imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2018. <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=5124200>.

Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina. *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003.

Earle, Edward Meade, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to Hitler*. New York: Athenum, 1941. Reprint, 1961.

Brands, H.W. *Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt*. New York: Anchor Books, 2008.

Brendon, Piers. *The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.

- Brook, Douglas A. "Merit and the Civil Service Reform Act." In *The Future of Merit: Twenty Years After the Civil Service Reform Act*, edited by James P. Phiffer and Douglas A. Brook, 1-11. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
- Burrin, Phillippe. *France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise*. Translated by Janet Lloyd. New York: The New Press, 1996.
- Byrd, Martha. *Kenneth N. Walker: Airpower's Untempered Crusader*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1997.
- Clark, Inganita M., and Akindallis T. Whitman. "The History of the Defense (DoD) Civilian Personnel System: The Conversion from General Service (GS) to National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and Then Back to General Service." Master of Science in Program Managemet Joint Application Project, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011 (2011-06).
- Cohen, Emmeline W. *The Growth of the British Civil Service, 1780-1939*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1965.
- Crowl, Phillip A. "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, 444-77. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Dogan, Mattei. *The Mandarins of Western Europe : The Political Roles of Top Civil Servants*. New York: Sage Publications, 1975.
- Finney, Robert T. *History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1940*. USAF Historical Studies. Vol. 100, Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1955. 1998. Research Studies Institute, Historical Division, Air University.
- Gaston, James C. *Planning the American Air War: Four Men and Nine Days in 1941, An Inside Narrative*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1982.

- Gladwell, Malcolm. *The Bomber Mafia: A Dream, a Temptation, and The Longest Night of the Second World War*. New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2021.
- Gentile, Gian, Jameson Karns, Michael Shurkin, and Adam Givens. *The Evolution of US Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present*. RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA: 2019).
- Gildea, Robert. *France Since 1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Hansell, Haywood S. *The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler*. Atlanta, GA: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter, 1972. 1975, US Government Printing Office.
- Kenney, George C. *General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War*. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997.
- Koistinen, Paul A. C. *State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1945-2011*. Modern War Studies. Edited by Theodore A. Wilson. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012.
- Kurian, George Thomas, ed. *A Historical Guide to the US Government*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Locher III, James R. *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*. Texas A&M University Military History Series. Edited by Joseph G. Dawson III. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.
- MacIssac, David. "Voices from the Central Blue: The Airpower Theorists." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, edited by Peter Paret, 624-47. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. New York: Dover Publications, 1987.
- Manchester, William. *The Last Lion*. Vol. 2, Alone, New York: Bantam Books, 1983.

- McElvaine, Robert S. *The Great Depression: America, 1929-1941*. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009.
- McFarland, Stephen L and Wesley Phillips Newton. *To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority Over Germany, 1942-1944*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991.
- Millett, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*. New York: The Free Press, 1994.
- Morris, Edmund. *Theodore Rex*. New York: Random House, 2001.
- Morton, W. Scott. *China : Its History and Culture*. Vol. 3rd ed., 2nd McGraw-Hill pbk. ed, New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 1995.
- Nye, Roger H. *The Patton Mind: The Professional Development of an Extraordinary Leader*. Garden City Park: Avery Publishing, 1993.
- Oyos, Matthew. "Elihu Root." In *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, edited by John Whiteclay Chambers II, 623. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- . "General Staff Act of 1903." In *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, edited by John Whiteclay Chambers II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Pfiffer, James P. "Government Legitimacy and the Role of the Civil Service." In *The Future of Merit: Twenty Years after the Civil Service Reform Act*, edited by James P. Phiffer and Douglas A. Brook, 15-38. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
- Paxton, Robert O. *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944*. Morningside ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, 1972.
- Rambeau, Jackson V. "Military Manpower Dilemma--a Galaxy of Problems." *Air Force Magazine* 47, no. 10 (1964): 74-78.
- Reardon, Carol. "Emory Upton (1838-1881)." In *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, edited by John Whiteclay Chambers II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

- Rohr, John A. *Civil Servants and Their Constitutions*. Studies in Government Policy. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
- Schwabe, Klaus. *Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power*. Translated by Richard Robert Kimber. Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
- Sharp, Alan. *The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- Sheehan, Neil. *A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Shriever and the Ultimate Weapon*. New York: Random House, 2009.
- Sherry, Michael S. *The Rise of American Airpower: The Creation of Armageddon*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987.
- Trahair, Richard C.S., and Robert L. Miller. *Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations*. Third ed. New York: Enigma Books, 2012.
- Tencza, Elizabeth, Adam Givens, and Miranda Priebe. *The Evolution of US Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present*. RAND (Santa Monica, CA: 2019).
- Trask, David F. "Spanish-American War." In *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, edited by John Whiteclay Chambers II, 667-69. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- "Truman's Loyalty Program." Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, accessed 23 May, 2021, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/trumans-loyalty-program>.
- "Timeline of Chinese History." 13 October 2020. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Chinese_history#/media/File:Timeline_of_Chinese_History.jpg.
- United States Strategic Bombing Survey. *Summary Reports: The European and Pacific Wars*. 7th, 2001 ed. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1987.

- Walker, Samuel. "Dwight D. Eisenhower: A Failure of Presidential Leadership." Chap. 6 In *Presidents and Civil Liberties from Wilson to Obama*, 163-202. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- . "Harry Truman: Courage and Contradictions." Chap. 5 In *Presidents and Civil Liberties from Wilson to Obama*, 127-62. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- . "John F. Kennedy: The Failed Promise of the New Frontier." Chap. 7 In *Presidents and Civil Liberties from Wilson to Obama: A Story of Poor Custodians*, 203-37. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976.
- Weinberg, Gerhard L. *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- White, Robert P. *Mason Patrick and the Fight for Air Service Independence*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001.
- Winnefeld, James A., and Dana A. Johnson. *Joint Air Operations: Pursuit of Unity in Command and Control, 1942-1991*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993.
- Wright, Gordon. *France in Modern Times*. 5th ed. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1995.

Articles

- Correll, John T. "The Revolt of the Admirals." *Air Force Magazine* 101, no. 5 (2018). <https://www.airforcemagazine.com/article/the-revolt-of-the-admirals>.
- Brook, Douglas A., and Cynthia L. King. "Enactment and Implementation of the National Security Personnel System: Policy Made and Policy Unmade." *Public Administration Review* 71, no. 6 (2011): 900-08.

- Cain, Anthony C. "Seeking Effectiveness: Forging Early Cold War Strategy." A paper presented at the Sir Michael Howard Centre's Early Cold War: New Perspectives Conference, King's College, London, 14 November 2018.
- Chapman, Suzanne. "Civilian Drawdown: Hard and Fast." *Air Force Magazine* 79, no. 1 (1996): 28-31.
- Clark, David. "The Modernization of the French Civil Service: Crisis, Change and Continuity." *Public Administration* 76, no. 1 (1998): 97-115.
- Correll, John T. "Rumsfeld Tackles the Civil Service." *Air Force Magazine* 86, no. 7 (2003). <https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0703rumsfeld/>.
- Eaglen, MacKenzie. "Cut the Pentagon's Civilian Workforce." *Breaking Defense* (30 April 2014). <http://breakingdefense.com/2014/04/cutthe-pentagons-civilian-workforce>.
- Gates, Ed. "Brighter Career Prospects for USAF's Civilian Employees." *Air Force Magazine* 61, no. 4 (1978): 73-76.
- . "The Civilian Third of the Total Force." *Air Force Magazine* 60, no. 11 (1977).
- Grier, Peter. "Depots in Dispute." *Air Force Magazine* 77, no. 7 (1994): 4.
- . "The Civil Service Time Bomb." *Air Force Magazine* 84, no. 7 (2001): 54-56. <https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0701civilian/>.
- . "Civilians in Harm's Way." *Air Force Magazine* 88, no. 7 (2005): 52-55.
- Haga, Barbara I., Roger Richman, and William Leavitt. "System Failure: Implementing Pay for Performance in the Department of Defense's National Security Personnel System." *Public Personnel Management* 39, no. 3 (2010): 211-30.
- "How AFLC Designed Intrinsic Ease of Maintenance into C-5." *Air Force Magazine* 31, no. 4 (1968): 99-100.
- Mashaw, Jerry L. "Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age." *The Yale Law Journal* 119, no. 7 (2010): 1362-472.

- Mehuron (ed.), Tamar A. "The Air Force in Facts and Figures." *Air Force Magazine* 79, no. 5 (1996): 39-61.
- Meyer, Gen John C. "Managing the USAF: The Now and Future Challenges." *Air Force Magazine* 53, no. 1 (1970): 50-52.
- Nigro, Felix A. "The Politics of Civil Service Reform." *Southern Review of Public Administration* 3, no. 2 (1979): 196-239.
- Staff Report. "The Quiet Crisis in Civilian Personnel." *Air Force Magazine* 72, no. 7 (1989): 60-63.
- Stevenson, Charles A. "The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947." *Military Review* 88, no. 3 (2008): 13-20.
- Stone, Lt Gen William S. "Personnel—Key to the Aerospace Future." *Air Force Magazine* (April 1965): 82-84.
- Tirpak, John A. "The Expeditionary Air Force Takes Shape." *Air Force Magazine* 80, no. 6 (1997): 28-33.
- Walker, Larry. "Woodrow Wilson, Progressive Reform, and Public Administration." *Political Science Quarterly* 104, no. 3 (1989): 509-25.
- Welsh III, Mark A. "A Call to the Future: The New Air Force Strategic Framework." *Air and Space Power Journal* 29, no. 3 (2015): 3-9.
- Risher, Howard. "'Appalling' Is the Right Word for the Civil Service System." Article. *Government Executive* (2015): 1-1. <https://www.govexec.com/management/2015/09/appalling-right-word-civil-service-system/121466/>.
- Tirpak, John A. "The Air Force Investigators." *Air Force Magazine* 97, no. 7 (2014): 42-47.

INDEX

| | | | |
|---|-------------------|--|--------------------|
| <i>Accelerate Change or Lose</i> | 2, 19, 253 | American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) | 178 |
| Afghanistan | 208 | Americans With Disabilities Act | 198-199 |
| Air Combat Command (ACC) | 117, 124, 134 | ancien regime | 25 |
| Air Corps | 61, 65, 68, 117 | Anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) | 75-76 |
| Air Corps Tactical School | 65-66, 68 | Army War College | 51 |
| Air Education and Training Command (AETC) | v, 125 | Arnold, Henry H. | 46, 66, 77, 114, |
| Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) | 134 | “Hap,” General of the Army, General of the Air Force | 119-120 |
| Air Force Association | 140 | atomic | 40-41, 78, 82, 85, |
| Air Force Magazine | 164, 173 | | 101, 103, 109, |
| Air Force Reserve | 18, 194 | | 111-112, 122, |
| Air Logistics | 125 | | 125, 151, 210 |
| Command (ALC) | | Australia | 71 |
| Airman’s Creed | 14 | Austro-Hungarian Empire | 57-58, |
| Air Materiel | 125 | Axis Powers | 77, 81, 100 |
| Command (AMC) | | B-17 | 69, 75 |
| Air Mobility | 134 | B-24 | 24 |
| Command (AMC) | | B-29 | 77 |
| Air National Guard | 18, 194 | B-36 | 69, 123, 124 |
| Air Training | 125 | B-52 | 4, 127, 133 |
| Command (ATC) | | Baldwin, Stanley | 63 |
| Air University Library | 8, 191-192, 260 | bargaining unit | 166, 228- 230, |
| Air War College | 4 | | 234, 238 |
| Air War Plans | 66-71, 73, 74, 76 | Beirut Bombing | 128 |
| Division-1 (AWPD-1) | | Bentley, Elizabeth | 211 |
| Air Force Materiel | 125, 163 | Berlin | 40, 76, 122 |
| Command (AFMC) | | Berlin Airlift | 40 |
| Akaka, Daniel K. | 177 | Berlin Blockade | 83, 103, 107 |
| Allen, Frederick Lewis | 60 | Biden Administration | 249-250, 252, |
| Alsace-Lorraine | 58 | | 253 |

- | | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| Big Three | 99, 137 | Code of Ethics | 221-222 |
| Bolsheviks | 57 | Cold War | 6, 40-42, 81-85, 90, 95, 99, 107, 109, 110-111, 122, 126, 131-137, 151- 152, 160, 162, 172-173, 183, 195, 199, 206- 209, 221, 224, 226-227, 245, 253-254 |
| Borah, William E. | 86 | collective bargaining | 27, 61, 166, 171- 172, 178, 180- 181, 184-185, 193, 224-225, 227-228, 230- 232, 236, 238, 239-241, 245 |
| Bradley, Omar N., General, USA | 123 | Colonial Office | 33-34 |
| British Atomic Energy Research Establishment | 210 | Combined Bomber Offensive | 74 |
| British Expeditionary Force | 64 | COMINTERN | 95, 102 |
| Brown Jr., Charles Q., General, USAF | ix, 2, 19, 250- 251, 253 | Commis | 29 |
| Bullitt Jr., William C. | 85, 90-91, 93, 94- 96 | Communism | 41, 95, 100, 110, 211-212, 216 |
| Bush Administration | 174 | Communist Party | 26, 79, 91, 95, 101, 104, 110, 210-211, 226 209 |
| Bush, George H. W. | 133 | Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) | 17, 251, 258 |
| Bush, George W. | 180 | Competencies | 76, 110, 116, 124, 140, 150, 167, 201, 203 |
| Bush, Vannevar | 112 | Competition | 7, 15, 43, 47, 221-223 |
| C-5A | 163-164 | Constitution, US | 59, 142, 167, 221, 227 |
| Civil Service | 139- 141, 144, 149, 152-153, 158-161, 164- 165, 168-170, 190-191, 194- 195, 198, 203, 213, 218-219, 221, 229, 242 | Constitutional | 63 |
| Commission (CSC) | | Chamberlain, Neville | |
| Civil Service Journal | 161 | | |
| Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) | 139, 164 | | |
| Civil War, US (1861- 65) | 49-50, 78, 144 | | |
| Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) | 190, 194, 215, 219, 232 | | |
| Civilian Personnel Officer | 232, 236 | | |
| Classification Act of 1949 | 139, 148, 152- 153, 157, 160, 168-170, 201 | | |
| Clayton Act of 1914 | 225 | | |
| Clifford, Clark M. | 120 | | |

| | | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| Chief of Naval Operations | 119, 123-124, 133 | Deterrence | 82, 85, 125, 127, 136, 250 |
| China | 20-22, 24, 37, 39, 122, 210, 247-251 | Director of Central Intelligence | 115 |
| Chinese civil service | 24 | Disarmament | 56-57, 62, 101 |
| Core Values | 8, 14, 223, 245 | Discrimination | 159-160, 169, 171-172, 198, 202, 221, 229-230 |
| Cambridge | 33-34 | DoD | 12, 139-140, 171, 175-178, 180-184, 190, 206, 233, 248 |
| Cuba | 51 | Dunkirk | 64 |
| career development | 17, 43, 200, 205, 209, 239 | Durbrow, Elbridge | 103 |
| CVA-58 | 122-124 | Eaker, Ira C., General, USAF | 46, 73 |
| Career Field Managers | 254 | Earle, Edward Meade | 81, 109 |
| cyber operations | 251 | East India Company | 33 |
| Career Field Policy | 205 | Eberhardt, Fred | 88 |
| Council | | École Nationale d'Administration | 30 |
| Cyberspace | 1, 6, 251 | Education | 1-2, 4-6, 18, 24, 29-30, 34, 43, 83, 119, 125, 132-133, 146, 168-170, 199-200, 202, 209, 254-259, 263 |
| Career Field Teams | 254 | Eighth Air Force | 73 |
| Czechoslovakia | 63 | Eisenhower, Dwight D. | 40, 105, 161, 216-218, 226 |
| Carter Administration | 139, 168, 186, 248 | end-strength | 13, 65, 133, 161-162, 175, 199-200, 207-208 |
| Carter Jr., James Earl | 164, 166, 171, 230, 241 | equal employment opportunity | 199, 238 |
| Casablanca | 73 | Escalation Theory | 85 |
| Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) | 115-116 | European Recovery Act | 100 |
| Central Loyalty-Security Board | 215 | European Union | 30 |
| Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) | 119, 121 | | |
| Dardanelles | 103 | | |
| Davies, Joseph E. | 90, 96 | | |
| D-Day | 75, 207 | | |
| de Gaulle, Charles, General | 27-28 | | |
| Defense Office of Force Transformation | 174 | | |
| Denfield, Louis E., Admiral, USN | 124 | | |
| Department of the Air Force | v, 4, 15, 45, 117, 140, 190 | | |

| | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|--|
| Examinations | 20-21, 23-24, 29, 33-34, 44, 50, 139, 144-146, 148, 150-151, 165, 167, 169, 247 | Feedback | 182, ,193, 254, 256, 258-259 |
| Excepted Service | 15 | Finland | 97 |
| Executive Order 9835 | 212-213, 215- 216, 218 | Five-Year Plans | 88 |
| Executive Order 10450 | 216, 218 | Ford Jr., Gerald R. | 230 |
| Executive Order 10988 | 227, 229, 233, 235, 239 | Forrestal, James V. | 116-117, 120- 121 |
| Executive Order 11491 | 229-230, 236 | Fourteen Points | 55, 58-59 |
| Expeditionary Air Force | 208 | France | 20, 24-28, 30, 37, 39, 44, 48, 58, 63, 75, 247 |
| Experience | 5-7, 16-18, 20, 31-37, 40-41, 47, 62, 73, 77, 88, 90, 104, 112, 116, 120, 135, 141, 143, 154- 157, 170, 180, 182, 183-184, 194-196, 200, 202-203, 206, 209, 222, 241, 244, 247-248, 254, 258, 260- 261 | Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) | 58 |
| Extended Deterrence | 85 | Free French | 27 |
| Far East | 62, 65, 81, 85, 87 | Fuchs, Klaus | 210-211 |
| Fascism | 106 | Fulton, Missouri | 105 |
| FBI | 211, 214-215 | Garfield, James A. | 144 |
| Federal Labor Relations Authority | 166, 169 | Garrison | 14, 122, 196, 208, 251 |
| Federal Labor Relations Council | 229-230 | General Headquarters Air Force | 117 |
| Federal Register | 181 | General Schedule (GS) | 15, 152-158, 170, 176, 179, 180, 182, 201, 228, 256 |
| | | General Staff | 50, 52 |
| | | George, Harold L., Lt. | 46, 65 |
| | | General, USAF | |
| | | German Communist Party | 210 |
| | | Goldwater, Barry M. | 129 |
| | | Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense | 129, 131-133, 137, 177 |
| | | Reorganization Act of 1986 | |
| | | Golos, Jacob | 211 |
| | | Grant Administration | 143-144 |
| | | Grant, Ulysses S. | 143-144 |

| | | | |
|--|---|--|---|
| Great Britain | 20, 31, 37, 39, 58, 63-65, 69, 71, 73, 79, 84, 93, 98, 100, 105-107, 110, 137, 210, 247, | Hull, Cordell | 90 |
| Great Depression | 61-62, 99, 148 | Human Capital | 17-18, 43, 200 |
| Great Power | 6 | Labor-Management Relations Course | |
| Competition | | Human Capital Annex to the Air Force | 17 |
| Great Purges | 91, 94, 96-97 | Strategic Master Plan | |
| Greece | 103, 122 | Human Reliability Program | 219-220 |
| Greenglass, David | 211 | human resources | 19, 168, 248 |
| Grenada | 128 | Huntington, Samuel P. | 16 |
| Grievance | 84, 180, 190, 197, 221, 228, 230, 235-237, 239-241 | independent Air Force | 41, 66-67, 136- 137, 191, 206 |
| Guam | 252 | Indian Colonial Service | 33 |
| guilt by association | 214, 216-217, 220, 223 | Industrial Web | 65-67, 76 |
| Gulf States | 252 | Interim National Security Strategic Guidance | 249 |
| Hampton, Robert E. | 141 | International Criminal Court | 40 |
| Han dynasty | 22 | international | 11, 40, 253 |
| Handicap | 167, 199 | institutions | |
| Hanoi | 127 | International | 39 |
| Hansell, Haywood | 46, 65, 67, 69, | Monetary Fund | |
| S. "Possum," Major | 75-77 | Interwar Years | 46, 60-61, 96, 113, 135, 189 |
| General, USAF | | Iran | 102, 252 |
| Hansen, Alvin | 100 | Iraq | 208 |
| Harriman, W. Averell | 101, 104 | Israel | 252 |
| Henderson, Loy | 90 | Japan, Japanese | 58, 62, 70, 72, 77, 81, 85, 87, 96-98, 100, 252 |
| High Altitude Precision | 65 | Japanese Army | 77 |
| Daylight Strategic Bombardment | | Japanese Navy | 77 |
| Hitler, Adolf | 26, 61-65, 81, 98 | Johnson | 162, 229 |
| Hittle, J.D., Brigadier General, USMC | 129 | Administration | |
| Home Office | 34 | Johnson, Hiram W. | 94 |
| House Armed Services Committee (HASC) | 177 | Johnson, Lyndon B. | 241 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Joint | 118, 121, 124, 126, 128, 130, 132-133, 174, 253, 258, 262 | lifestyle | 259 |
| Joint Chiefs of Staff | 119, 121-122, 127, 136 | Litvinov, Maxim | 91-93 |
| Joint Ethics | 221 | Long Telegram | 104 |
| Regulation (JER) | | Los Alamos, NM | 210-211 |
| Jones, David C., General, USAF | 129 | Louis XVI | 48 |
| Jones, Roger W. | 161 | Louisiana Purchase | 48 |
| Kalinin, Mikhail | 86, 92 | Loyalty Program | 212, 214-216, 222-245 |
| Kelley, Robert F. | 89 | Loyalty Review Board | 213 |
| Kennan, George F. | 84, 90, 104-105, 109, 125 | Luftwaffe | 64, 76-77 |
| Kirk, Grayson | 99 | MacArthur, Douglas, General of the Army | 71-72, 124 |
| Korean War | 83, 125, 161 | Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Rear Admiral, USN | 52-53 |
| Kuter, Laurence S., General, USAF | 46, 65, 68 | MAJCOMs | 18, 126 |
| laboratories | 163, 179 | Manchuria | 87 |
| labor unions | 139, 166, 178, 182, 184, 214, 226-227, 230, 232 | Mandarin | 20-21 |
| Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 | 226 | Manhattan Project | 210-211 |
| Laos | 127 | Mao Zedong | 103 |
| Leadership | 1, 5-7, 59, 67, 84, 120, 156-157, 170, 209, 226, 249, 255-258, 260-262, 264 | Maquisards | 27 |
| League of Nations | 39, 55, 59-60, 87 | Marshall Plan | 100 |
| Leahy, William D. Fleet Admiral, USN | 114 | Marshall, George C., General of the Army | 72, 114, 119-120 |
| LeMay, Curtiss E., General, USAF | 77 | McCarthy, Joseph R. | 210-212, 216 |
| Lend-Lease | 64, 72, 85, 98, 102, 107-109 | McKinley, William | 51 |
| levels of war | 15, 128, 247 | Mediterranean | 73 |
| | | Mein Kampf | 61 |
| | | Mentoring | 152, 260-261 |
| | | Merit | 24, 31, 34, 36-37, 139, 141, 146- 147, 150-153, 160, 166-167, 169, 197, 201- 202, 239, 247 |
| | | merit principles | 151-152, 161, 165, 167, 169, 184, 186 |
| | | Merit Systems Protection Board | 166-167, 169 |
| | | merit-based pay | 171, 248 |
| | | Middle East | 58, 122 |

| | | | |
|---|--|--|--|
| Military Air Transport Service (MATS) | 124 | National Security Act of 1947 | 41, 47, 112, 120, 131, 137, 190, 194 |
| Military Airlift Command (MAC) | 124, 134, 163 | National Security Council (NSC) | 114-115, 125, 130 |
| military-industrial complex | 39-40 | National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) | 125 |
| Ming dynasty | 24 | National Security Personnel System (NSPS) | 139, 174, 176-184, 187, 241, 248 |
| Minority | 169, 172 | national security policy | 41, 47 |
| Mitchell, William "Billy," Brigadier General, USA | 45-46, 65 | Nationalist Chinese | 103 |
| Mobility | 17, 67, 189, 203-205, 242, 245 | Naval aviation | 117-118, 129 |
| mobility agreements | 203, 205-206 | Naval War College | 52 |
| Monroe Doctrine | 47-49, 53, 80 | Nazi | 61, 64, 76, 86, 116, 127 |
| Monroe, James | 48-49 | New Deal | 148 |
| Moscow | 84-85, 90, 94-96, 101, 104-105, 109, 251 | New Guinea | 71 |
| multi-lateral | 253 | Nichols, William F. | 129 |
| Munich Conference | 63 | Nixon Administration | 229-230, 236 |
| Munitions Board | 120 | Nixon, Richard M. | 229-230, 241 |
| Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD) | 85 | NKVD | 211 |
| Napoleon | 25 | non-discrimination | 159-160, 169, 171-172, 198 |
| Napoleonic Code | 26 | Normandy | 75 |
| National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) | 176-177, 180-182 | North Africa | 58, 73 |
| National Defense Strategy | 5, 12 | North Atlantic | 74 |
| National Labor Relations Act of 1935 | 225 | North Korea | 252 |
| National Labor Relations Board | 225-226 | Northcote, Sir Stafford Henry | 33-37 |
| National Military Establishment | 116, 119, 121 | Northcote-Trevelyan Report | 33-34, 37, 144 |
| National Recovery Administration | 95 | nuclear weapons | 81-82, 85, 112, 118, 120, 122, 124-125, 135, 137, 162, 219-220 |
| | | oath | 7, 15, 43, 145 |
| | | oath of office | 186, 221 |

| | | | |
|-----------------------|---|------------------------|---|
| Obama | 181 | Poland | 26, 58, 63, 97 |
| Administration | | Politburo | 102 |
| October Revolution | 54 | Privacy Act of 1974 | 222 |
| (1917) | | profession of arms | 1, 14, 16, 40, 128, 221 |
| Office of Personnel | 139-140, 168- | professional education | 258 |
| Management (OPM) | 172, 176, 178, 180-184, 242 | Professional Military | 4, 83, 257-258 |
| Oleshchuk, Fedor | 106 | Education (PME) | |
| OPEC+ | 251 | Professional Reading | 260 |
| Operation Desert | 17, 133 | List | |
| Shield | | Professionalism | 17, 31, 36-37, 161, 224, 243, 245, 261 |
| Operation Desert | 4, 133 | Professionalization | 50, 144, 254, 259 |
| Storm | | Promotion, | 17, 22, 24, 34-39, promotions |
| Operation Linebacker | 127 | | 41, 50, 61, 132- 133, 151-152, 160, 167, 170, 197, 201-205, 235, 239, 259 |
| II | | Prussian General Staff | 52 |
| Operation Torch | 73 | Public Administration | 27, 29-30, 147 |
| Ottoman Empire | 57-58 | Qin dynasty | 21-22 |
| Oxford | 33-34 | Qing dynasty | 24 |
| Pacific War | 77, 85 | RAF Bomber | 67, 73, 75-76 |
| Parliament | 31-32, 55, 63 | Command | |
| Patronage | 31-32, 34-35, 37 | Reconstruction (1865- | 49 |
| Paxton, Robert O. | 26, 28 | 77) | |
| pay banding, pay | 179-180 | Red Army | 101, 122 |
| bands | | Red Scare | 210, 216, 226 |
| peace dividend | 208 | Reduction in Force | 174, 203 |
| peer competitors | 2, 19, 249, 252 | (RIF) | |
| Pendleton Act of 1883 | 42, 139, 142, 144, 146-148, 151-152, 160- 161, 168, 183- 184, 186 | Reign of Terror | 48 |
| Pentagon | 128, 211 | Research and | 120-121 |
| Permanent | 210 | Development Board | |
| Subcommittee on | | Reserve Component | 13, 15, 208, 254 |
| Investigations | | Revolt of the Admirals | 123 |
| Personnel | 165 | Roosevelt | 90 |
| Management Project | | Administration | |
| Personnel Reliability | 220 | | |
| Program | | | |
| Pétain, Marshall | 27, 63 | | |
| Phillipe | | | |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|--|
| Roosevelt, Franklin D. | 62, 64-65, 70, 72-73, 77, 85-86, 91-92, 97-99, 104, 109-110, 114, 149 | Soviet Union | 40-41, 57, 63, 65, 72, 79, 81, 83-87, 89, 90-98, 100, 104-111, 113, 116, 122, 125, 133, 135, 137, 209-210, 212 |
| Roosevelt, Theodore | 51, 53 | Spanish-American War | 51-52 |
| Root, Elihu | 51-52 | Specified Command | 126, 130 |
| Rosenbergs, Ethel and Julius | 211-212 | Speer, Albert | 67, 76 |
| Royal Air Force (RAF) | 67-68, 72-73, 75-76 | Spoils Era, spoils system | 142-144, 164 |
| Rumsfeld, Donald H. | 139, 174-175, 177, 180-181, 187, 241 | Stalin, Joseph | 26, 72-73, 79, |
| Russia | 57-58, 71, 87-89, 101, 103, 249- 251 | Vissarinovich | 84-85, 91, 94, 98, 101-102, 105, 110-111 |
| Russian Civil War | 83, 87 | Stimson, Henry | 86-87 |
| Saudi Arabia | 251-252 | Strategic Air Command (SAC) | 124, 126, 134, 163 |
| self-study | 200, 260-261 | Stress | 67, 134, 259 |
| Senate, United States | 59-60, 129-130, 166, 172, 176, 231 | Study of Administration, The | 147 |
| Senior Executive Service (SES) | 15, 170 | Suez Canal | 73 |
| Shafter, William, General, USA | 51 | Supervisor | 197, 232, 237, 240, 262-264 |
| Show Trials | 96 | Symington III, William S. | 117 |
| Siberia | 87 | Tactical Air Command (TAC) | 124, 134, 163 |
| Silvermaster, Nathan | 211 | Tang dynasty | 23 |
| Silverman, George | 211 | technical skills | 12, 36, 255, 263 |
| Skelton IV, Issac Newton | 177 | Thailand | 127 |
| Smith, Walter Bedell, Major General, USA | 105-106, 110 | Third Republic | 26, 63 |
| Spaatz, Carl A. | 46, 117 | Title 5, US Code of Federal Regulations | 140, 175-176, 178 |
| “Tooey,” General, USAF | | Title 10, US Code of Federal Regulations | 139-140, 176 |
| South Korea | 252 | Total Force | 2, 18, 173, 208- 209, 256 |
| Southwest Pacific | 71-72, 124 | | |

| | | | |
|--|---|--|--|
| Training | 1, 5-6, 16-18, 29, 31, 38, 41, 51-52, 76, 112, 117-120, 132, 151, 154- 157, 168, 170, 186, 195, 197, 199-203, 209, 235-236, 238, 239, 254-258 | US European Command (USEUCOM) | 126, 128 |
| Treaty of Brest-Litovsk | 57 | US Marine Corps | 113, 117-118, 120, 128-129, 133, 136 |
| Treaty of Versailles | 59, 63 | US Navy Department | 107, 117 |
| Truman | 85, 101-103, 105, | US Pacific Command (USPACOM) | 126 |
| Administration | 109, 152, 216 | US Postal Service | 248 |
| Truman Doctrine | 212 | US Secretary of Defense | 15, 114, 116- 117, 120-121, 123, 126-127, 129-132, 139, 174, 176, 178, 187, 241 |
| Truman, Harry S. | 105, 110, 113-114, 117, 120-121, 198, 212-213 | US State Department | 84, 86-91, 98, 103-104, 107, 113, 146, 248 |
| Tsar Nicholas II | 58 | US War Department | 99, 107, 149, 190-191 |
| Turkey | 58, 102, 122 | Versailles Peace Conference | 55, 57 |
| U-boats | 74 | Vichy France | 26-28 |
| Ulyanov, Vladimir Ilyich (Lenin) | 57-58 | Vietnam War | 125-127, 133, 136, 162, 207, 243, 253 |
| Unified Combatant Command (CCMD) | 126 | Voting Rights Act of 1965 | 198 |
| Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) | 81, 92, 105 | Vyshinski, Andrey | 111 |
| United Nations | 39, 99, 119 | Wage Grade (WG) | 15, 153, 256 |
| United States Strategic Bombing Survey | 77-78 | Walker, Kenneth N., Brigadier General, USAAF | 61, 65, 69 |
| Upton, Emory | 50-51 | War of 1812 | 48 |
| US Army Air Forces (USAAF) | 46, 66, 68-69, 72-76, 119, 124, 191 | Warfighting | 12-13, 40-41, 67, 72, 117-119, 126, 129, 132, 206, 250-251, 258, 260, 262 |
| US Department of Defense (DoD) | 12, 42-43, 121, 126, 129-131, 133-134, 136- 137, 139 | Washington, George | 47-49, 80 |

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Weaver, Larry A. | 96 |
| Wehrmacht | 73, 98 |
| Weinberg, Gerhard | 62 |
| Welsh III, Mark A. | 17 |
| General, USAF | |
| Western Alliance | 83 |
| Western Allies | 84, 101 |
| Western Front (WWI) | 54 |
| Wilson, Thomas | 54-60, 80, 147- |
| Woodrow | 149, 151 |
| within-grade-increase | 201 |
| World Bank | 39 |
| World War I | 46-47, 54, 59, 66, 76, 80, 86, 91, 135, 189 |
| World War II | 11, 26, 39, 41, 46, 47, 62, 65, 79, 80-83, 88, 111-112, 114, 118-119, 122, 127, 129, 135- 137, 139, 149, 162, 191, 198, 209, 211, 243, 247 |
| Yalta | 101 |
| Zhou dynasty | 21 |
| Zuckert, Eugene M. | 233-234 |

