Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 12

Chinese Vision

of a Rules-

based Order

International Order with

Chinese Characteristics

Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho

n recent years, the idea of a

“rules-based order” (RBO) has

been in vogue among scholars

and practitioners of international poli-

tics, particularly in the Asia-Pacific (or

Indo-Pacific) region amid heightened

geopolitical rivalry between the

United States and China. At first

glance, the need for “rules” to ensure

international order is stating the obvi-

ous: to have order, individuals and

states need to operate with some rules.

At the same time, however, what

these rules might be (and ought to be)

remains a vexing problem, particu-

larly given the varying opinions and

views among states regarding who

gets to set the rules and, more funda-

mentally, whose interests the rules

are meant to serve.

To be certain, countries in the

West are far from monolithic; com-

petition for global influence exists

even among states who subscribe

to the liberal tradition. However,

the idea that rules remain neces-

sary to ensure a degree of predicta-

bility and regularity in interna-

tional affairs is generally accepted

by Western powers. From this

view, only with rules can interna-

tional stability—even as an ideal-

ized outcome—be sustained and

safeguarded amid shifting domes-

tic-political dynamics.

The rise of China complicates the

Western-centric understanding of

RBO given that the idea of a rules-

based order is not inherently self-

evident within traditional Chinese

political philosophy. Indeed, Bei-

jing’s experience of encountering

RBO (and multilateralism more

generally) is a comparatively re-

cent phenomenon; only after its re-

form and opening-up program in

the 1980s was Beijing more ame-

nable to considering its foreign pol-

icies in such terms—and even

then, mostly with an eye to the

Chinese Vision of a Rules-based Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │13

Taiwan issue. It was only after the

2008–09 global financial crisis,

whereby Chinese leaders perceived

a notable decline in the West and a

reduction of Western (particularly

American) influence in global mul-

tilateral institutions that Beijing

started to court multilateral insti-

tutions with greater deliberation.

As the thinking in China goes, di-

minished American influence

would create an opportunity to

modify the rules governing the in-

ternational system. In addition,

Beijing’s realpolitik vision of inter-

national politics leads it to con-

clude that most countries who

aligned with the United States in

the past did so not because of some

higher ideational motivation (for

instance, to preserve individual hu-

man rights, or believing that de-

mocracy was the best form of gov-

ernance) but because their own na-

tional interests—often materially

defined—were best served sub-

scribing to the American-led inter-

national order. A Chinese-led order

could therefore expect to command

similar levels of support.

China perceives the present mo-

ment, marked by US domestic dys-

function and the especially the on-

going COVID-19 pandemic, as a

golden opportunity to shape global

norms and values in accordance

with its own preferences. This does

not mean entirely dismantling the

present international structure

and replacing it with a Chinese one

(Beijing is aware that many coun-

tries would not go along with it),

but rather to continue to support a

rules-based order (jiyu guize de

guojizhixu 基于规则的国际秩序)

that preserves “Chinese character-

istics” and ultimately Chinese na-

tional interests.

To be clear, the safeguarding of na-

tional interests is hardly unique to

China; most if not all countries

prefer rules that favor themselves.

What is problematic is that China’s

national interests are defined pri-

marily with respect to the preser-

vation of its one-party rule. In lib-

eral democracies, of course, politi-

cal parties vie to see who can best

articulate the national interest. As

observed by Qin Yaqing, who pre-

viously headed the China Foreign

Affairs University, “the most basic

feature of socialism with Chinese

characteristics is the leadership of

the Chinese Communist Party.”

Seen this way, it comes as no sur-

prise that many Chinese scholars

equate the pursuit of a rules-based

order as being synonymous with

the pursuit of a liberal interna-

tional order, which runs funda-

mentally at odds with the CCP’s

single-party rule. Indeed, the nar-

rative the CCP frequently touts is

that the pursuit of a liberal order

by the United States is meant to

Indo-Pacific Perspective │14

make other countries to become

more “Western,” thus fundamen-

tally threatening the CCP’s grip on

power.

Not surprisingly, when Chinese

leaders discuss regional order, they

frequently talk about building “a

more just, equitable, fair, demo-

cratic and representative interna-

tional political and economic order”

in the future tense, a vision that

China aims to have an influential

role in helping to implement.

Sim-

ilarly, there is a deeply held belief

among many Chinese scholars and

policymakers that the United

States—as a hegemonic power—

does not practice what it preaches

in terms of living up to the ideals

of the RBO. For instance, China

points to the United States as hav-

ing violated (or opted out of) core

aspects of international order—

such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq

or Washington’s nonratification of

the UN Convention on the Law of

the Sea (UNCLOS)—to argue that

hegemons have the privilege of hy-

pocrisy.

Again, this suggests that

China perceives the RBO as being

conceived ultimately to preserve

American international primacy

while artificially constraining

China’s own rise.

With this in mind, I contend that

China’s approach to multilateral-

ism is one which seeks not to ac-

quiesce in existing ideas of RBO

(which posits certain universal ide-

als) but rather one which call into

question the relevance of multilat-

eralism as framed by Western

thinking and worldview. China

takes a more flexible approach to

international law by portraying

such rules as less morally (and le-

gally) binding than how the West

views them. In other words, Bei-

jing seeks to relativize the applica-

tion of international rules for rea-

sons of self-interest. Unlike the US

vision of multilateralism and RBO,

which is that international rule-

making can help to preserve inter-

national stability despite changing

domestic-political circumstances,

China’s goal for a revised RBO is

far narrower, more limited, and

conspicuously inverted: to ensure

domestic stability amid a changing

international environment. In sum,

multilateralism and the RBO

means different things to different

state actors: the United States and

the West see multilateralism as a

means of entrenching global leader-

ship and promoting a liberal vision

of world order, while China sees

multilateralism as a diplomatic

tool to preserve China’s national in-

terests and legitimize its one-party

rule.

Moving forward, it will be more

necessary than ever for countries

to demonstrate that their support

for RBO (if indeed they support

Chinese Vision of a Rules-based Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │15

such an order) is more than just an

outgrowth of their alignment with

the United States or a product of

anti-China politics. In other words,

states will have to articulate how

and why abiding by the tenets of a

RBO is inherently good for them,

or else what the characteristics of a

better, more equitable RBO ought

to be like. Should their dispositions

depart from the preferences of

Washington and Beijing, then per-

haps it is time the international

community come together to exam-

ine what is problematic and how

best to remedy it. On the other

hand, if there are core aspects of

Notes

1 Yaqing Qin, Song Dexing, Zhang Yensheng, Zhang

Xiaotong, Zhu Feng, and Lu Chuan Ying. “Zhuan-

jiabitan: Dabianjuzhong de zhongguo yu shijie” [Ex-

perts in conversation: China and the World in the

Great Game], Shanghai Institute of International

Studies conference, 2019, DOI:

10.13851/j.cnki.gjzw.202001001 (accessed at CNKI),

see 5.

2 See Mira Rapp-Hooper, Michael Chase, Matake Ka-

miya, Shin Kawashima, and Yuichi Hosoya. “Re-

sponding to China’s Complicated Views on Interna-

tional Order.” Carnegie Endowment for International

RBO that speak to broader univer-

sal concerns, than China’s framing

of international order as inherently

biased in favor of the West will be

exposed as self-interested and, in-

deed, irresponsible. ■

Dr. Benjamin Tze Ern Ho

Dr. Ho is an assistant professor in

the China Programme, S. Raja-

ratnam School of International

Studies, Nanyang Technological

University, Singapore.

Peace, October 10, 2019, https://carnegieendow-

ment.org/.

3 Rapp-Hooper et al., “Responding to China’s Compli-

cated Views on International Order.”

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be

construed as carrying the official sanction of the

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education

and Training Command, Air University, or other

agencies or departments of the US government

or their international equivalents.