Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 6

The Indian

Ocean’s Key

Role in the

Indo-Pacific

Rules-based

International

Order

Nilanthi Samaranayake

n September 2020, the US secre-

tary of defense gave a speech to

promote the “international rules-

based order, rooted in our shared

values, that has supported

stability and prosperity around the

world for more than seven dec-

ades.”

The United States and its

allies and partners have played a

decisive role in establishing inter-

national rules and norms since the

end of World War II. This order,

however, is now being challenged

by a rising China and a resurgent

Russia. The defense secretary re-

ferred specifically to the Indo-Pa-

cific region and Washington’s work

“to focus attention on our priority

theater, the Indo-Pacific. Not only

is this region important because it

is a hub of global trade and com-

merce,” he elaborated, “it is also

the epicenter of great power com-

petition with China. And in the

face of destabilizing activities from

the PLA, particularly in the mari-

time domain, the United States

must be ready to deter conflict, and

if necessary, fight and win at sea.”

Yet, the Indian Ocean is not char-

acterized by rampant territorial

disputes and Chinese assertive-

ness, as the Pacific is. From such

characterizations, it seems clear

that US strategy is still focused on

the Pacific segment of the Indo-Pa-

cific and less so the Indian Ocean,

which remains a secondary theater

for US defense planners. The De-

partment of Defense’s Indo-Pacific

Strategy Report repeated a phrase

that is often stated by US officials:

“The United States is a Pacific

The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │7

nation.”

Whereas China has un-

questionably challenged estab-

lished rules and norms in the Pa-

cific, it has, for the most part, been

a lawful actor in the Indian Ocean.

In considering the rules-based in-

ternational order in the wider

Indo-Pacific region, therefore, it is

important to examine the Indian

Ocean on its own terms and con-

sider options for preserving the

rules and norms of this still rela-

tively peaceful maritime region.

Evolving US Policy toward the

Indian Ocean: From the Asia-

Pacific to the Indo-Pacific

The 2017 National Security Strat-

egy identified China and Russia as

the major threats to US interests,

and great-power competition has

since become the organizing princi-

ple behind the implementation of

Washington’s diplomatic

and de-

fense

policies globally. Since 2017,

Washington has adopted the term

Indo-Pacific to describe the region

stretching from “the west coast of

India to the western shores of the

United States.”

This reflects the

evolution of US policy toward this

region over the past decade, espe-

cially the increased importance of

the Indian Ocean. At the beginning

of the decade, the region was re-

ferred to by the long-standing

“Asia-Pacific” term. By 2011-2012,

this geography was prioritized

under the pivot

(or “rebalance”)

strategy to offset the operational

focus of the United States in the

Middle East. Then, this regional

concept evolved as US diplomats

began to link Southeast Asia with

South Asia under an “Indo-Pacific

Economic Corridor.”

Among US

defense officials, in 2013 Admiral

Samuel Locklear, then the Com-

mander of U.S. Pacific Command

(PACOM), began to refer to the re-

gion as the “Indo-Asia-Pacific.”

The term was used in US military

service documents such as the US

Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast

Guard strategy in 2015. Finally, in

2017 and 2018, the concept of the

“Indo-Pacific” was adopted in

Washington’s highest-level na-

tional strategy documents. This

was in part due to recognition of

how allies such as Japan and Aus-

tralia had described the wider re-

gion. Even PACOM was renamed

“Indo-Pacific Command” in 2018 as

part of this alignment of terms.

Washington has expanded the ar-

ticulation of its interests in this

wider region over the past decade

through shifts in geographic terms.

Most recently, it has assigned a

normative dimension to the region

as well. By calling the region the

“Free and Open Indo-Pacific,”

the

US acknowledges the rules, values,

and norms that it seeks to defend

and promote through the concept.

Samaranayake

Indo-Pacific Perspective │8

Washington applies this vision to

the Indian Ocean segment of the

Indo-Pacific. Yet, even as the In-

dian Ocean has assumed greater

importance in U.S. strategic plan-

ning through the Indo-Pacific con-

cept, the United States continues

to understand the region through a

Pacific lens and risks overlooking

the unique features of the Indian

Ocean.

A Rules-based International Or-

der in the Indian Ocean

As a laboratory for cooperation, the

Indian Ocean has seen many suc-

cesses. This is due largely to the

fact that the Indian Ocean’s strate-

gic importance derives from its eco-

nomics. The region effectively

serves as a highway, connecting

the bustling Pacific waters through

the Malacca Strait and across to

the Middle East and African

straits of the Hormuz and Bab Al-

Mandeb, respectively. The Indian

Ocean sees significant traffic of hy-

drocarbons and container shipping.

Due to the economic significance of

this region, countries increasingly

share a common interest in keep-

ing the sea lanes open and safe.

When piracy in the western Indian

Ocean threatened to disrupt the

stability of these waterways more

than a decade ago, we witnessed a

multinational response to secure

them. Counterpiracy operations

emerged, including from the US-

led coalition Combined Maritime

Forces Task Force 151 and the

NATO alliance’s Operation Ocean

Shield. Meanwhile, China began

its own counterpiracy operations as

an independent deployer, as did In-

dia and Japan. Despite tensions in

other domains, all three countries

coordinate on escort convoys.

In addition to counterpiracy,

search and rescue is another area

where countries have cooperated—

for example, in the search for the

missing Malaysia Airlines 370

plane. Beyond military operations,

countries have pursued Indian

Ocean seabed mineral exploration

rights lawfully through the Inter-

national Seabed Authority. This in-

cludes China, South Korea, and In-

dia, among other countries. The

role of international law in the In-

dian Ocean has also been bolstered

by the use of the International Tri-

bunal for the Law of the Sea and

the Permanent Court of Arbitra-

tion (PCA) to resolve maritime dis-

putes between Bangladesh, India,

and Myanmar.

The respect for in-

ternational law in these cases

stands in contrast to China’s disre-

gard for the PCA decision over the

Philippines-China dispute in 2016.

In addition to working within legal

institutions, major extraregional

powers such as the US and China

have pursued membership roles in

The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │9

existing venues for cooperation in

the Indian Ocean. This includes re-

gional institutions such as the In-

dian Ocean Rim Association

(IORA) and Indian Ocean Naval

Symposium (IONS). Without ob-

stacles such as major territorial

disputes and with converging eco-

nomic interests to protect the free

flow of commerce, the Indian

Ocean is not as contentious as the

Pacific Ocean.

Connecting US Strategic Goals

in the Indo-Pacific with the In-

dian Ocean Order

This examination of the coopera-

tive successes in the Indian Ocean

does not intend to minimize the

threat of major power rivalry in

this region. In fact, this is a histori-

cal concern among countries in the

Indian Ocean region. During the

late 1960s and early 1970s, smaller

countries promoted their vision for

an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace due

to the Cold War rivalry between

the Soviet Union and the United

States. Resident Indian Ocean

countries face a similar challenge

in a new era of great power compe-

tition.

The regional security envi-

ronment is even less stable when

considering the broad-based milita-

rization and increased acquisition

of naval platforms, including in the

undersea domain, by resident

countries themselves.

Yet, while many observers fear the

implications of China’s expanding

footprint through the Belt and

Road Initiative, deployment of sub-

marines to the Indian Ocean, es-

tablishment of a military base in

Djibouti, and even undersea sur-

veillance and exploration for sea-

bed minerals, the reality is that

China is mostly behaving accord-

ing to the laws and norms in the

Indian Ocean. In fact, even actions

that India sees as intrusive, such

as Chinese platforms operating in

its exclusive economic zone (EEZ),

are actually in line with the US in-

terpretation of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS). As China becomes a

global deployer, ironically this sta-

tus helps underscore the order that

the US wants—the freedom of nav-

igation where international law al-

lows. Many Indian Ocean countries

reject the US interpretation of UN-

CLOS that would permit military

activities in EEZs. They include

Bangladesh, Myanmar, India,

Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives,

Mauritius, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri

Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, and

United Arab Emirates.

Still, the United States should be

vigilant about threats by China to

disrupt the Indian Ocean order.

One disturbing demonstration of

this potential lies in the Chinese

military’s lasering of US Air Force

Samaranayake

Indo-Pacific Perspective │10

personnel in Djibouti in 2018. Such

incidents suggest China’s asser-

tiveness in the Pacific could carry

over into the Indian Ocean re-

gion—which is precisely the fear of

resident Indian Ocean countries

that call for an Indian Ocean Zone

of Peace.

As Washington considers its

broader Indo-Pacific strategy, it

should call out the areas where

China wants to benefit across the

board. This is clear when Beijing

seeks to limit international rules

and norms to its advantage in the

Pacific, yet free-ride off the lawful

order and the interpretation of

UNCLOS that the US seeks in the

Indian Ocean. At the same time,

Washington should also recognize

the current strengths that exist to

underpin the lawful order in the

Indian Ocean. More importantly, it

should not ignore the key differ-

ences between this region and the

Pacific while continuing to invoke

the Free and Open Indo-Pacific

concept as another decade begins

in this dynamic region. ■

Nilanthi Samaranayake

Ms. Samaranayake is the Director

of the Strategy and Policy Analysis

program at CNA, a nonprofit re-

search organization in Arlington,

VA. She is the author of numerous

publications on Indian Ocean secu-

rity issues. The views expressed

are solely those of the author and

not of any organization with which

she is affiliated.

The Indian Ocean’s Key Role in the Indo-Pacific Rules-based International Order

Indo-Pacific Perspective │11

Notes

1 Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper, “Secretary of

Defense Speech at RAND (As Delivered),” September

16, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News-

room/Speeches/Speech/Article/2350362/secretary-of-de-

fense-speech-at-rand-as-delivered/.

US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Re-

port: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Net-

worked Region, June 1, 2019, https://media.de-

fense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPART-

MENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-RE-

PORT-2019.PDF.

3 US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pa-

cific: Advancing a Shared Vision, November 4, 2019,

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-

and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.

4 US Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Na-

tional Defense Strategy, January 19, 2018,

https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-

National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

5 The White House, National Security Strategy of the

United States of America, December 2017,

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/up-

loads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

6 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign

Policy, October 11, 2011, https://foreignpol-

icy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/.

7 US Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global

Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January

2012, https://archive.defense.gov/news/defense_strate-

gic_guidance.pdf.

8 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Deliver-

ing on the Promise of Economic Statecraft,” Singapore

Management University, November 17, 2012,

https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clin-

ton/rm/2012/11/200664.htm.

9 Donna Miles, “Locklear Calls for Indo-Asia-Pacific Co-

operation,” American Forces Press Service, February 8,

2013, https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsar-

ticle.aspx?id=119243.

US State Department, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific:

Advancing a Shared Vision, November 4, 2019,

https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-

and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf.

11 Cornell Overfield, “Reflecting the Law of the Sea: In

Defense of the Bay of Bengal’s Grey Area,” Center for

International Maritime Security, July 22, 2020,

http://cimsec.org/reflecting-the-law-of-the-sea-in-de-

fense-of-the-bay-of-bengals-grey-area/44784.

12 Commodore Kazi Emdadul Haq, “The Indo-Pacific

Strategy and Its Ramification on Weaker Countries,”

Security World, June 22, 2020, http://securi-

tyworldbd.com/the-indo-pacific-strategy-and-its-ramifi-

cation-on-weaker-countries/; P.K. Balachandran, “Presi-

dent Gotabaya reiterates Lanka’s plea to make the In-

dian Ocean a Zone of Peace,” NewsIn.Asia, October 5,

2020, https://newsin.asia/president-gotabaya-reiterates-

lankas-plea-to-make-the-indian-ocean-a-zone-of-peace/;

and Meera Srinivasan, “Indian Ocean Has to Remain a

Zone of Peace: Ajit Doval,” The Hindu, December 1,

2014, https://www.thehindu.com/news/interna-

tional/south-asia/indian-ocean-has-to-remain-a-zone-of-

peace-ajit-doval/article6651325.ece

13 Congressional Research Service, U.S.-China Strate-

gic Competition in South and East China Seas: Back-

ground and Issues for Congress, R42784, August 28,

2020, 40, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf.

Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Asian Basing in Africa: In-

dia’s Setback in Seychelles Could Be Worse,” India in

Transition, Center for the Advanced Study of India at

University of Pennsylvania, September 24, 2018.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed or implied in

JIPA are those of the authors and should not be

construed as carrying the official sanction of the

Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education

and Training Command, Air University, or other

agencies or departments of the US government or

their international equivalents.