Congruent FMS and 10 USC 333 Strategy for USINDOPACOM Published May 23, 2024 By Lt. Col. Marc L. Church Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- The United States (US) National Security Strategy (NSS) directs a clear pivot to the Indo-Pacific and calls out China as the pacing threat to the US.[1] The NSS further recognizes that our allies and partners in the INDOPACOM AOR are on the front lines of competition with China and directs the US government to “support their ability to make sovereign decisions in line with their interests and values, free from external pressure, and work to provide high-standard and scaled investment, development assistance, and markets.”[2] This unambiguous direction in the NSS is a call to action, ensuring the US government, and US military provide what our allies and partners need, not just what the US thinks they should have. The US government, military, and USINDOPACOM must look holistically at the region for avenues to provide appropriate assistance to our allies and partners while advancing US competitive advantages in the region. Background While visiting Thailand, I turned on the television in my hotel room and found, unsurprisingly, multiple Chinese stations. I wanted to know what was being discussed on a news program on CCTV2. I used my phone and Google Translate optical recognition to read the Chinese subtitles. To my surprise, the discussion centered on the latest Foreign Military Sales (FMS) tranche to Taiwan.[3] The discussion noted that the sale of Link16 to Taiwan would increase tensions in the South China Sea, specifically in the Taiwan Strait. The reason for the increased tension was the concern over Link16 providing a currently insurmountable advantage Taiwan will have over China if their military forces can integrate their Air Forces and Naval Forces in battle.[4] It was striking to hear that a piece of routine equipment most US forces do not think about often due to its widespread use can cause such anxiety for China. The discussion ended with the conclusion by the CCTV2 commentators calling Taiwan a “quasi-US and NATO ally” based on the inclusion of Link16 in Taiwan’s latest FMS purchase.[5] If Link16 causes China hesitation and concern, why is the US not prioritizing training and equipping our allies in the region with this capability? In observance of the NSS, it could be assumed that the US allies and partners are not interested in acquiring the capability of Link16.This assumption, for the countries of Thailand and the Philippines, is incorrect. In both countries, senior military leaders asked for Link16. However, they have economic concerns due to the initial and sustainment costs of the system. In addition to the economic considerations in obtaining and sustaining Link16, there are political considerations each country in the region must balance to ensure that added capabilities to their militaries do not provoke an unwanted response from China. The economic considerations of any additional military capabilities are significant. Thailand has a GDP of $495 billion.[6] The Philippines GDP is $404 billion.[7] Respectively, they spent 1.04% and 1% of GDP on their military budgets. As a comparison, the US GDP is $25.44 trillion,[8] and the US spends 3.5% of its GDP on the military budget.[9] These numbers show that the US spends almost two times the GDP of either Thailand or the Philippines just on the military budget. Additionally, both countries have significant percentages of the population living below the poverty line, with Thailand at 6%[10] and the Philippines at 18.1%, respectively.[11] With such high levels of poverty and low wages for those not considered impoverished, justification for modernization and new military equipment is difficult at best. The stark reality of economic data bolsters the concerns voiced during meetings held in Thailand and the Philippines over prohibitive costs in acquiring desired military equipment, specifically Link16. In a meeting at the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) Air War College, a senior leader said the RTAF has only one squadron with Link16, but it is outdated, and with no other units equipped with Link16, it is a capability that is not useful. This same officer expressed a desire to have Link16 across the RTAF to better integrate and defend the country.[12] This officer noted the economic considerations and that modernization of the RTAF fleet takes precedence in budgetary considerations.[13] Philippine Air Force (PAF) officers voiced the same desire to have Link16 but have the same concern over initial costs and long-term sustainment that the RTAF expressed.[14] In addition to the PAF, the Philippine Navy has an interest in using Link16 aboard its ships to better coordinate maritime activities with a goal of future integration with the PAF.[15] The Philippines military in these two meetings have well thought out ideas of why they need Link16 and how to utilize it while operating in the West Philippine Sea to gain an advantage over the Chinese Navy (PLAN). Economic concerns naturally bring political concerns. In the case of the INDOPACOM region, these political concerns can be broken into domestic and international. First is the obvious concern of domestic politics when spending large sums of money on modernizing military equipment in dire economic situations. It becomes difficult to show results to constituents if prioritization is given to programs with little visible gains in the standard of living. At best, there is a lack of everyday familiarity among the citizens of Thailand and the Philippines with their military and the missions they perform.[16] In Thailand, the worst-case scenario is a citizenry that remembers multiple successful coups and may relate military modernization as risky. While internal politics play a role in fiscal decision-making, the more significant consideration of how military modernization, especially when that modernization brings a perception of closeness with the US and NATO, is seen in the region. China is a major power in the region and wields considerable leverage through multiple instruments of power. The position of Thailand is often described as ‘bamboo in the wind’ as they are known for balancing between great powers, ensuring their continued advantage.[17] Thailand is an astute player in the region. In multiple engagements, they were not shy about telling the USAF Air War College delegation visit about their intent to balance US and Chinese interests in Thailand. The most direct assertion of this position came in a meeting with a senior Thai officer at the Defense Technology Institute.[18] In contrast to Thailand, the Philippines is not in the business of a balanced approach. They are firmly on the side of the US, and the mutual defense treaty is in hyperdrive.[19] The Philippine military is seeking any means to build closer ties to the US and push back against Chinese aggression in the West Philippine Sea. This aggression was not hypothetical but a reality on 5 March 2024 when the Chinese Coast Guard utilized a water cannon to harass a Philippine resupply mission to the Second Thomas Shoal. This tactic resulted in injury to multiple Filipino citizens.[20] After this incident, the president of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., reminded the international community of his country’s rights and commitment to sovereignty.[21] Implications and Recommendations The willingness of China to continue advancing its hegemonic ambitions in the region and with two US allies is concerning and not surprising. The US commitment to the INDOPACOM AOR has been haphazard and sends mixed signals to allies in the region when their repeated requests for specific assistance go unanswered. There are easy wins for our allies in the region and for US national security. A willingness to listen to both our adversary and our allies can produce results that show US commitment to our allies and the region while simultaneously causing China to spend time and money attempting to overcome new realities. There is evidence that China is concerned with the capabilities and advantages gained by foreign militaries who can operate as a joint force. The INDOPACOM staff should verify this evidence by carefully studying Chinese public statements regarding Link16 and look for other technologies that equally concern the Chinese. This is mainly an intelligence function but cannot stay in intelligence circles. The information learned must be transmitted to the operations teams in INDOPACOM responsible for building partner capacity. Through this methodology, a regional strategy for FMS and building partner capacity can emerge beyond each country. In the specific asks by Thailand and the Philippines for Link16 capabilities, the US government can overcome these two allies' economic and political concerns by utilizing current US law and authorities. 10 USC § 333 provided for building partner capacity. More than training, this US code section specifically justifies giving and sustaining equipment to partner nations. The ability to give Link16 to both Thailand and the Philippines and provide training to effectively use this tool effectively comes from specific language in section 333 to “provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to conduct one or more of the following:…maritime and border security operations…air domain awareness operations.”[22] While this is one specific system requested by both Thailand and the Philippines, there are likely more ways to collaborate with our allies in the region to find ways to get them the equipment they need and want without forcing difficult economic and political decisions on them. As we build the capacity of each ally separately, there are opportunities to start building a regional strategy that supports the efforts of the nations in the region to compete and challenge China. FMS and building partner capacity must evolve to be more than a method of getting equipment to partner militaries individually. The US can leverage existing treaties and relationships in the region, ensuring our pacing threat and main great power competitor feels the US’s commitment to the region. This method also strengthens existing alliances and friendships by generating creative and legal solutions, enabling better interoperability while exploiting known concerns and shortfalls. USINDOPACOM should implement a working group at the deputy J-2 and deputy J-3 to find a convergence of intelligence and training opportunities that exploit adversary demonstrated weaknesses. Upon finding convergence, the senior defense officials in each country should be brought into the working group to assist in finding solutions that not only support US objectives but also support the desires of our allies and partners. Significant overlap exists in these areas, and authorities already exist to solve our partners' and allies' financial and political concerns. The approval process for specific partner capacity building and equipping is rigorous and time-consuming and, therefore, must be started as soon as practical to ensure our allies and partners know we are listening to their desires and generate increased fog and friction to our competitors. This research was part of the coursework for the Air War College Regional Security Studies seminar and field study. Lieutenant Colonel Marc Church is a 2002 graduate of Brigham Young University and a 2009 graduate of the University of Arkansas. Upon graduation from BYU, Lieutenant Colonel Church attended Joint Specialized Undergraduate Navigator training at Randolph AFB, TX. He was then assigned to Hurlburt Field, FL as an AC-130U Navigator. While at Hurlburt Field, Lieutenant Colonel Church deployed eight times in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Additionally, Lieutenant Colonel Church attended and graduated from the US Air Force Weapons School. Following graduation, he was assigned to HQ/AFSOC as the Chief of AC-130 Weapons and Tactics. Upon completion of his assignment at HQ/AFSOC, he was the Aircrew Flight Equipment Officer for the 1st Special Operations Wing. He then moved to Cannon AFB, NM and served as Assistant Operations Officer at the 73d Special Operations Squadron and Wing Executive Officer for the 27th Special Operations Wing. While at Cannon, Lieutenant Colonel Church deployed an additional two times as the Commander of the 73d Expeditionary Special Operations Squadron in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, RESOLUTE SUPPORT, and INHERENT RESOLVE. He then moved to Maxwell AFB, AL as a student at the Air Command and Staff College and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Lieutenant Colonel Church then served as the Chief of Policy and Deputy Operations Officer for Special Operations Command-North. While at SOCNORTH, Lieutenant Colonel Church deployed as the Special Operations Command Forward – Mexico Commander where he commanded all U.S. Army and Navy Special Operations Forces in Mexico. Following this assignment, he returned to Hurlburt Field, FL where he served as the Operations Officer for the 4th Special Operations Squadron and Commander of the 73d Special Operations Squadron. He is currently a Student at the USAF Air War College and upon graduation will be assigned as the Director of the Commander’s Action Group, Air Force Special Operations Command. [1] “National Security Strategy, October 2022, “The White House, accessed Mar 24, 2024 at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf, 20. [2] Ibid., 23. [3] Discussion on CCTV2, February 25, 2024, at 1900 local time in Bangkok Thailand. Translated via Google Translate App optical recognition. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] The World Bank, GDP (current US$) -Thailand, accessed at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=TH on 24 Mar 2024. [7] The World Bank, GDP (current US$) -Philippines, accessed at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=PH on 24 Mar 2024. [8] The World Bank, GDP (current US$) -United States, accessed at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US on 24 Mar 2024. [9] The World Bank, Military Expenditure (% of GDP) -United States, accessed at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=US on 24 Mar 2024. [10] World Bank Group, Poverty and Equity Brief – Thailand, accessed at https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/current/Global_POVEQ_THA.pdf on 24 Mar 2024. [11] World Bank Group, Poverty and Equity Brief -Philippines, accessed at https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/987B9C90-CB9F-4D93-AE8C-750588BF00QA/current/Global_POVEQ_PHL.pdf on 24 Mar 2024. [12] Conversation with a Royal Thai Air Force Colonel, Royal Thai Air Force Air War College, 27 Feb 2024. [13] Ibid. [14] Meeting with PAF Maintenance Wing, 7 Mar 2024. [15] Roundtable meeting with National Defense College of the Philippines, 5 Mar 2024. [16] Sankey, Margaret, RSS 6606 Class discussion, 5 Feb 2024. [17] Skaggs, Ryan D., Chukaew, Nitus, & Stephens, Jordan, “Characterizing Chinese Influence in Thailand,” Journal of Into-Pacific Affairs, (January – February 2024), 25. [18] Meeting at Defense Technology Institute, Bangkok Thailand, 29 Feb 2024. [19] Meeting with Senior US official on the country team, US Embassy, Manila Philippines, 4 Mar 2024. [20] U.S. Naval Institute, “4 Philippine Sailors Injured, 2 Vessels Damaged in Chinese Attempt to Block Second Thomas Shoal Resupply” accessed at https://news.usni.org/2024/03/05/4-philippine-sailors-injured-2-vessels-damaged-in-chinese-attempt-to-block-second-thomas-shoal-resupply on 6 Mar 2024. [21] Ibid. [22] 10 U.S. Code § 333 – Foreign Security Forces: authority to build capacity. Accessed at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/333 on 23 Mar 2024.