China-Taiwan Reunification and Potential Impacts to the Asia-Pacific Region Published Aug. 5, 2024 By Col. Kazimir Kostrubala Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- China's stated goal of reunification with Taiwan, whether achieved through peaceful means or military action, would have significant economic and political repercussions for the Asia-Pacific region, potentially disrupting vital trade routes, destabilizing regional security, and forcing the United States to take a more active role in the conflict. Furthermore, this paper examines the likely impacts to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the countries of Australia and Indonesia and provides recommendations for a US response which protects regional security interests and advances partnerships. Specifically, the United States can improve joint and combined military exercises, conduct humanitarian assistance efforts to improve interoperability and take political steps to encourage Japanese leadership in the region. Introduction The People's Republic of China (PRC) adheres to the "One China" principle, rejecting Taiwanese sovereignty and claiming Taiwan as part of its territory. This position aligns with a 1971 UN resolution and has historically been acknowledged by the United States through its "One China Policy." However, the US also maintains strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. This status-quo has persisted for some time but recently, reunification by any means, has entered the rhetoric of Chinese politics: “We must take resolute action to utterly defeat any attempt toward “Taiwan Independence,” and work together to create a bright future for national rejuvenation. No one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”[1] This statement by Chinese President Xi Jinping clearly outlines the significance of Taiwanese independence to both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and sends a message of deterrence to both the region and the world. This, along with the rapid buildup of Chinese military capabilities has helped to shift the US Stance on China-Taiwan Reunification over the past six years. Previously, the US stance on Taiwanese independence appeared ambiguous. However, recent legislative actions suggest a shift. The Taiwan Assurance Act (2020),[2] Taiwan Partnership Act (2021),[3] and Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act (2023)[4] solidify US support for Taiwan's defense capabilities, technological collaboration, and participation in international forums. These acts highlight a potential US opposition to any form of Chinese reunification with Taiwan. Further complicating the situation was US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taiwan. This move significantly strained US-China relations, already stressed by China's support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The visit triggered unprecedented Chinese military exercises around Taiwan and a halt to US-China military dialogues.[5] Additionally, President Biden's statement that US forces would defend Taiwan in case of invasion indicates a more resolute US stance. This shift in US policy likely stems from concerns about the potential economic and political ramifications of Chinese reunification with Taiwan, not just for the US but for the entire Asia-Pacific region. These consequences include negative impacts to regional and global trade, human rights and freedoms, political ideologies, US national strategic interests and the security of regional allies and partners. Potential Scenarios and Political and Economic Impacts The likelihood of a peaceful reunification between China and Taiwan is dwindling due to an ever-growing gap in views on the issue between the two countries. Within Taiwan, there has been a move toward independence as seen in the following graph by The National Chengchi University Election Study Center:[6] Furthermore, Taiwan’s newest President, Lai Ching-te, has “vowed to safeguard the island’s de-facto independence from China and further align it with other democracies.”[7] As the likelihood of peaceful reunification shrinks, so do the potential benefits for both the two countries and the region. These include increased trade between China and Taiwan and with the issue of Taiwan resolved, the US may be more likely to engage in more economic forums where China is present or holds considerable influence. This includes ASEAN, participation in agreements like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP); both of which would be seen as beneficial by the regional partners of Australia and Indonesia.[8] Reunification by Chinese military action, however, remains the most likely course of action as China is rapidly strengthening its military capabilities and posture to assure a cross-strait victory and counter US involvement[9] This type of reunification would have the direst economic and political consequences for the US and the region. As the second-largest economy in the world and the largest trading partner of many countries in the region, a conflict between China and Taiwan would most certainly be met with economic sanctions like those seen following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The 10 ASEAN countries, collectively the US’s 4th largest trading partner, would be hit especially hard if major trade routes were disrupted in the South China Sea. Economic damages would be especially severe and long-lasting if conflict damaged the limited and vital port infrastructures of the region—infrastructure upon which the US ally of Japan heavily relies (40% of Japanese maritime trade). A Chinese military action to reunify with Taiwan wouldn't just be a regional conflict; it would have a ripple effect across the political landscape of East and Southeast Asia, with the US as a central player. In a conflict scenario, we could see the US shift and divest resources from other regional security concerns, adding to political destabilization. This power vacuum could be used by China to encourage the creation of other destabilizing alliances in the region where distrust in the US is already elevated. Furthermore, the conflict would bring strained US-ASEAN relations where the US might be required to increase military bases in ASEAN nations as opposed to being drawn into a conflict. These negotiations for basing rights might pressure nations into choosing a side, which for Indonesia in particular, would create resentment.[10] Regional Impacts While reunification between China and Taiwan has yet to occur, regional impacts on East and Southeast Asia have already occurred. This section explores the existing impacts of a reunification scenario and presents probable impacts of the most likely scenario: military action. ASEAN: The potential for a China-Taiwan conflict has significantly impacted ASEAN states. The increased US activity in the region, encouraging countries to "take sides," has been met with a cautious "hedging" strategy by ASEAN. This approach, rooted in the intense US-China competition, allows rising middle powers to extract benefits from both sides. On the one hand, US policy nudges ASEAN nations to counter Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.[11] However, ASEAN recognizes the importance of maintaining good relations with its powerful neighbor, China. This is particularly true for Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia, which have closer economic and political ties with China. In a reunification conflict scenario, there is potential for abandonment of this “hedging” strategy with most ASEAN. As history in the region has shown, conflict encourages countries to take a position and a Chinese military action could force them to abandon this neutral stance and choose a side. This decision would have lasting political ramifications: Aligning with China: Choosing China could imply support for authoritarian rule, potentially undermining democratic values in the region. Aligning with the US: Siding with the US could raise sovereignty concerns, particularly for former colonies wary of renewed power imbalances. Additionally, a military reunification could trigger a regional arms race shifting the economic profile of ASEAN nations that have decided to either support China, the US or both. Such a shift could have lasting negative effects once peace is restored. Ultimately, finding a political middle ground may not be possible in a full-blown conflict. However, the potential consequences highlight the importance of continued US-ASEAN engagement and finding solutions through diplomacy that avoid forcing a binary choice. Australia: Rising Chinese assertiveness has significantly impacted Australia's strategic calculus. Canberra has responded by strengthening military ties with the US and Japan, particularly after experiencing Chinese foreign interference in 2016-2018. This "reality check" prompted Australia to push back against Chinese actions it deems detrimental.[12] A significant shift in Australian foreign policy is the creation of AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership with the US and UK. Through AUKUS, Australia plans to acquire nuclear-powered submarines and enhance military interoperability with the US in areas like cyber, AI, and quantum technologies. This focus suggests a potential shift from traditional multilateralism to "minilateralism" alongside close allies.[13] Additionally, Australia's investments in maritime capabilities align with potential support for Taiwan's defense.[14] Furthermore, logistical infrastructure development suggests preparation to support US forces in a regional conflict. While Australia is likely to support the US in a Taiwan military conflict, this decision carries significant weight. It could strain regional ties Australia has carefully nurtured. Additionally, China might target US power projection facilities within Australia, posing a direct threat. Indonesia: Despite the intense US-China rivalry, Indonesia has managed to maintain a "hedging" strategy, fostering economic growth and stability. This approach has yielded positive results: Economic Success: Indonesia boasts a robust 5.3% real GDP growth in 2022, driven by strong domestic consumption.[15] Democratic Progress: High voter turnout (81.7%) in the 2024 presidential election indicates a healthy democratic process.[16] Indonesia balances these successes with: Stronger US Military Ties: Foreign Military Sales like US fighter jets and joint exercises like Super Garuda Shield bolster its defense partnerships with the US. Benefits from China: Chinese foreign direct investment has significantly supported manufacturing, finance, and infrastructure development in Indonesia and ASEAN.[17] In a China-US conflict scenario over Taiwan, Indonesia would be impacted by Non-combatant Evacuation (NEO): The estimated 250,000 Indonesian citizens in Taiwan would likely require evacuation and a recent tabletop exercise with the US Air Force suggests this requirement will exceed[18] Indonesian and regional capacities, making US support highly probable. Overall, Indonesia's position is delicate. They seek to maintain economic growth while navigating the tensions of a potential US-China conflict. US Response Recommendations Engagement with East and Southeast Asia today will be critical to a conflict with China tomorrow. To secure the best chance for victory in a Taiwan conflict scenario, the US should take the following actions during peacetime competition: Military Cooperation: Increase exercise Super Garuda Shield to include more maritime participation from Indonesia. Encourage ASEAN countries to purchase military equipment (FMS) by integrating through multinational exercises within the region. Assist Australia in the development of infrastructure which would support US forward force posture on the continent. Invest in military production base in Australia, Indonesia and other ASEAN states as able. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR): Demonstrate need to improve logistics capabilities in Indonesia and northern Australia by conducting recurring HA/DR exercises. Collaborate with Indonesian and ASEAN state NGOs for humanitarian assistance support. Conduct actual HA/DR efforts with Indonesia/ASEAN states as they arise to demonstrate interoperability and strengthen regional relationships. Political Steps: Support Japanese President Kishida Fumio’s four pillars for a free and open Indo-Pacific[19] including efforts to forge relations with “like minded countries.” Encourage Japan to accelerate offensive military capabilities as possible; increase US FMS to Japan Threaten to withdraw and/or reduce forces from Japan and neighboring South Korea to encourage regional leadership surrounding security issues with China. Conclusion China's pursuit of reunification with Taiwan, whether peaceful or forceful, presents a significant challenge to the US and its partners in the Asia-Pacific. The potential consequences for the region are dire, including disrupted trade routes, destabilized security environment and forcing choices upon a region with a historical penchant for “hedging” between the two great powers. The US response of building partnerships should continue but become more directed toward generating positive military effects. This can be achieved through: Enhanced Military Cooperation: Increased joint exercises, infrastructure development, and interoperability measures will strengthen regional defenses and deter Chinese aggression. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Collaborating on humanitarian efforts builds trust and demonstrates US commitment to regional well-being. Supporting Regional Leadership: Encouraging and supporting Japan's role as a security leader in the region, while strategically adjusting US troop presence to incentivize regional ownership of security concerns. Hopefully, this will also have secondary positive impacts on Indonesian decisions. Despite uncertainties, the US must demonstrate its commitment to regional security while respecting the autonomy of its partners. Building strong partnerships will be critical in deterring Chinese aggression and ensuring a peaceful future for the Asia-Pacific. This research originated in the Air War College Regional Security Studies Seminar and Field Study Col Kostrubala conducted this research as a student at the Air Force’s Air War College. Prior to this developmental education, he was the USINDOPACOM lead of the Joint Task Force Red Hill Joint Planning Group, Camp Smith, Hawaii. It was also at INDOPACOM where he was the Director of the Pacific Deployment and Distribution Operations Center for theater. In the JTF-Red Hill role, he led multiple Joint Command Directorates in the support of safe and expeditious defueling of Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility as specified by the Secretary of Defense. His efforts directly shaped the operational success of the Joint Task Force which included the functions of environmental compliance, requests for forces, funding, DoD fuel operations, and legislative and public affairs. The facilitation of these duties regularly required his direct engagement with Joint Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense, the Environmental Protection Agency and Hawaii’s Department of Health and Governor’s Office. [1] Jinping, Xi, “Speech at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, July 1, 2021. [2] Taiwan Assurance Act, (2019) [3] Taiwan Partnership Act, (2021) [4] Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act, (2023) [5] Paul Haenle, “How Pelosi’s Taiwan visit Has Set a New Status Quo for U.S-China Tensions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 August, 2022 [6] Election Study Center, National Chengchi University,. [7] Adam Schreck, “Taiwan president-elect Lai Ching-te has steered the island toward democracy and away from China,” 13 Jan, 2024. [8] Regional Security Studies: Oceana, Lowy Institute (AUS) & ASEAN engagement (Indonesia), Air War College, 2024 [9] PRC, Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035 (03/12/2021), trans. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (05/12/2021). [10] Regional Security Studies: Oceana, Indonesian Engagements, Air War College, 2024 [11] Lucas Myers, “Balancing Acts in US Southeast Asia Policy,” Wilson Center, October 25, 2022 [12] Baogang He, "Taming Chinese Power," Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2021, pp. 650-661 [13] Herve Lemahieu, "The Case for Australia to Step Up in Southeast Asia," Lowy Institute, October 2022 [14] Regional Security Studies: Oceana, Australian Engagements with Maritime Border Command, Air War College, 2024 [15] OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Asia-Pacific Outlook, 2023. [16] Participation rate of the national election in Indonesia in March 2024. [17] “Indonesia-ASEAN-2023,” Heinrich Boell Institute. [18] Regional Security Studies: Oceana, Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Air War College, 2024 [19] Richard Maude, Daniel Russel, Takako Hikotani, and C. Raja Mohan, “The Quad from the Four Corners,” Asia Society, 16 May 2023.