“STRIKES ALL OVER PACIFIC!” ACE Risks Greater Destruction Throughout the Indo-Pacific Published Aug. 12, 2024 By Maj. Joshua A. Rummel Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- The headlines on newspapers nationwide on December 8, 1941, exclaimed the brutal reality of Japan’s coordinated attacks on Pearl Harbor, Guam, the Marianas, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and throughout the Pacific, which thrust the United States into World War II. Seven decades later, the potential adversary has changed but the threat of total war in the Indo-Pacific is growing again. The Air Force has adopted a new tactic for deterrence and response, but does it risk a similar or greater outbreak? After two decades engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East, defense leadership has shifted its focus to the Indo-Pacific. Secretary Frank Kendall, after his confirmation to lead the Department of the Air Force in 2021, stated that his top priorities “in order … are China, China, and China.” According to the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, is the “pacing challenge.” In a 2023 report to Congress, the DoD makes the problem clear: China has modernized their forces and capabilities to be a credible military tool by as early as 2027. Aggression in the region, both in rhetoric and in hostile actions in the territorial waters of other nations, and the increasing threat of Taiwan unification efforts have disrupted the theater. Described by the 2022 National Security Strategy as the “epicenter of 21st century geopolitics,” the Indo-Pacific is vast, covering nearly half of the earth’s surface and housing half of the global population. During normal operations, the region is home to approximately 375,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel assigned at no fewer than 34 distinct locations. Many of those operating locations are in non-U.S. territory, and almost all of them are in range of China’s increasingly sophisticated arsenal of various ballistic and cruise missiles, both conventional and nuclear—not to mention the intercontinental ballistic missile threat. China’s development and successful testing of hypersonic glide vehicles further increases jeopardy in the region. In March of 2023, the Defense Intelligence Agency conceded that through intense investment and effort, China has amassed the world’s largest and most sophisticated arsenal of hypersonic weapons. Capable of flying below typical radar detection altitudes at many times the speed of sound, the latest hypersonic missile vehicles are maneuverable, making tracking and intercepting significantly more difficult. Amid this emerging problem-set, the Air Force developed the concept of Agile Combat Employment (ACE), a scheme of maneuver to increase survivability while generating combat airpower. The fundamental concept underlying ACE is multiple dispersed “spoke” locations sustained by main base “hubs,” creating a complex targeting problem and presenting political and operational dilemmas for an adversary. Success of the ACE scheme in the geographically dispersed Indo-Pacific depends upon access to locations sufficient both in number and in facilities with operational feasibility. Those 34 locations with enduring DoD presence throughout the region? Subtracting joint basing and naval or ground facilities without aviation, they provide regular access to only 19 distinct airfields—in Hawai’i, Guam, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Diego Garcia—in an area of that covers half of the globe. Other locations have all provided rotational airfield access for ACE and other U.S. exercises and operations, but Airmen in the Pacific know that more spoke locations and more partner nations are necessary to succeed in a future fight. But China’s rapid military modernization, with its increasingly sophisticated and capable air force and its surface and subsurface naval forces to partner the missile threat, when considered against the backdrop of aggression and the Belt and Road Initiative, demonstrates a desire to dominate the region. Efforts by the U.S to attract allies and partners, through diplomacy and military dialog, are undoubtedly designed to deter future conflict with China: the greater likelihood of forces surviving an initial attack and responding is precisely why ACE is an important component of modern deterrence. Indisputably, more ACE locations across the theater increases the operational difficulty and political cost of a pre-emptive strike. This region, however, bore witness to the failure of deterrence and the resulting widespread cost when Japan launched coordinated surprise attacks in December 1941. Today, the number of potential ACE hub and spoke locations and airfields in the Indo-Pacific is dwarfed by the number of Chinese missiles. This presents the dilemma for Indo-Pacific nations. There is an inescapable dichotomy between the rise of China as a potential global superpower and the U.S. desire for containment in the region. China has stated (albeit in the context of their dubious claims to the South China Sea) that the “U.S. ropes in allies.” On its face this may cause doubt for any Indo-Pacific nation considering assisting the U.S.—specifically those island nations which have long maintained a “friend to all, enemy to none” diplomatic attitude. However, China’s conduct in the region, including efforts to build artificial reefs, provide aid funds with opaque conditions, or interfere with maritime shipping undermines its attractiveness as an ally. This stark reality leaves potential partners with little choice—aligning with the U.S. to deter Chinese aggression by increasing foreseeable political costs may be the only route to stability in the region. The threat of devastation across the Indo-Pacific grows with China’s continued hypersonic, missile, and air and naval force improvement. However, partnering with the U.S. (for ACE operations or otherwise) in this political landscape signals alignment against China, and unfortunately a “roped in” nation may be in effect enrolling its airfields on China’s enemy order of battle in the event of conflict. Do allies with no genuine alternatives make for reliable allies? The U.S. engages in security cooperation with partners for a variety of reasons that support mutual security goals. Those actions can be directly intended to prevent or deter conflict in a region, but they may also provide the U.S. with increased access, basing prospects, and overflight opportunities. Island nations that may perceive a lack of meaningful choice between two great powers in the region may be reluctant to make lasting commitments for these traditional defense cooperation activities. Such an ally or partner may be susceptible to a “better deal” as those regional power dynamics continue to evolve. Will ACE lead to greater destruction in the Indo-Pacific in the event of conflict? Were China to consider an all-out attack in the near future, perhaps to prevent interference in a military effort to unify with Taiwan, is there any reason it would not strike all U.S.-affiliated airfields with an opening salvo? More concerning, is there any reason not to also strike any potential ACE hub or spoke, whether aligned with the U.S. or not? Despite the obvious political cost of a pre-emptive strike against U.S.-aligned nations, it is difficult to envision significant additional consequences if China were to attrit all airfields within range of its highly capable ballistic and cruise missiles. The greater cooperation and partnership seen between the new “axis of evil” of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine lends support: despite early sanctions against Russia and the provision of materiel support to Ukraine, the ability of western nations to exact lasting political cost after more than two years of conflict remains dubious. Such a future war between great powers in the Pacific would be more widespread than even WWII, in part because of the increased number of targets presented by potential ACE locations. In the vast and dynamic theater of the Indo-Pacific, ACE maintains freedom of actions but is also a catalyst for the exact type of conflict it seeks to prevent. While the People’s Republic of China has raised stakes in the region through its military modernization, hypersonic weapons development, and continued willingness to flout international maritime norms, the potential contributions of increasing ACE exercises and partnerships should not be ignored. Hopefully deterrence, including through ACE and the complex targeting dilemma and the political consequences it presents, continues to succeed and the world never finds out. Major Joshua A. Rummel was a 2024 Air Force Strategic Policy Fellow assigned to the Office of Foreign Assets Control in the Department of the Treasury with a policy portfolio of programs including Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Counter-terrorism related sanctions. A judge advocate with significant operational experience, he is a certified air operations center crew member and a qualified Air Advisor, and he has deployed and supported joint and coalition air operations during Operations FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, ENDURING SENTINEL, INHERENT RESOLVE, ALLIES REFUGE, SPARTAN SHIELD, and NOBLE EAGLE. Prior to this fellowship, Major Rummel was the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at the 36th Wing, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and following his fellowship will be the Staff Judge Advocate at the Office of Defense Cooperation - Türkiye (ODC-T), Ankara, Republic of Türkiye.