Surprise! Strategies for Successful Military Advantages and Family Festivities Published Aug. 19, 2024 By Maj. Christopher A. Guida Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- Offsets and Chasing Nuclear Advantage Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced on November 15th, 2014, that the US would pursue a “Third Offset” to maintain US global military advantage[1]. The US Offset Strategy follow two previous “offsets” that have allowed the US to maintain worldwide hegemony. The first was nuclear weapons, which inarguably hastened the end of World War II and has allowed for a period of relative peace (i.e., no conflicts that result in hundreds of thousands of deaths) over the last 75 years[2]. The second was broad technological advances post-Vietnam – new Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, precision-guided weapons, aircraft stealth, and space-based communications and precision, navigation, and timing. The third offset that Secretary Hagel called for resulted in next generation power projection technologies – the Long-Range Strike Bomber (B-21 Raider), unmanned underwater vehicles, and space based remote sensing[3]. While precision munitions and stealth aircraft have proven to be enormous force multipliers and have given the US considerable advantages in peace and wartime, they are not the same as the discovery and implementation of high yield nuclear weapons. Military leaders have spent entire careers analyzing the proper distribution and employment of the 11 US Navy nuclear powered aircraft carriers without consensus. Indeed, in 2020 the U.S. Navy stopped a study on future carrier requirements – seemingly because it could have been viewed as a threat to the survival of the venerable platform, with new strategies rendering the vessels obsolete[4]. Similarly, the Air Force is constantly refining tactics, techniques, and procedures for flying low observable aircraft on optimal routes to avoid adversary radar. The fission bomb was such a change in the way that nations could fight that it is unfair to lump it with the any other technological breakthrough. Yet military leadership wants to use similar vernacular to put the next “thing” on par with it, which is a fool’s errand. Normal technological changes in warfare take time to scale and become the mechanism that will give the US an advantage in its next near peer conflict. The military acquisition community needs to be more open and transparent with oversight bodies and the public with realistic descriptions of next generation weaponry. Through overpromising technological advancements and underdelivering on threshold requirements the US military not only hurts its credibility with Congress and taxpayers, but other nations who could feel emboldened to upend the current world order[5]. An example of technological supremacy that is often overhyped is directed energy weapons. Lasers have long held the potential of being a “game changing” technology for a number of reasons; near infinite “magazine depth” (i.e., as long as a unit has power they can continue to engage, unlike kinetic weaponry that depletes), limited collateral damage (i.e., the ability to impact only the hostile entity and not damage surrounding infrastructure or noncombatants), and immediate impact (i.e., the target has limited ability to maneuver away since the “shot” moves at/near light speed)[6]. The last 40 years of military research and development has sadly resulted in limited successfully fielded programs for the military[7]. There are numerous ways (e.g., chemical and electrical, then further subdivided into fiber combined and diode pumped) to have lasers at “high” energy levels. Military engineers and Department of Defense developers often struggle with proper beam control (i.e., being able to hold the energy on a given area for long enough to heat it and cause failure) and form factor (i.e., something that can be fielded in environments with difficult weather and handling conditions). This is all truly relevant when it comes to the US military’s credibility in the eyes of adversaries. Recently, Houthi rebels have been emboldened to attack commercial shipping lanes off the East Coast of Africa. The US and its allies’ inability to stop low-cost skiffs and drones from attacking free trade has been destabilizing to world markets. The coordinated response has thus far had mixed results[8]. Directed energy weapons would be an enormous force multiplier for patrol cruisers, but systems capable of engaging even these low-cost actors have not been prioritized in past military budgets and thus are not available to operators. Testing using the USS Ponce was one of the first “large” scale operational demonstrations to see a fielded laser system, but warships have not had directed energy weapons installed for a myriad of technical, schedule, and cost reasons[9]. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has recently announced plans to field directed energy countermeasures (ODIN) more widely, but it is unlikely that laser technology will reach a true “Offset” status anytime in the next 10 years[10]. Strategic Surprise Military planners should think of Offsets that are capable of Strategic Surprise, though not all Strategic Surprises are Offsets. The former are capabilities such as cyber-attacks that decimate an adversary’s ability to conduct command and control across a theater, while the latter can be the massing of a large invasion force. Another example of an Offset that provides Strategic Surprise are Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) that are faster and more maneuverable than the US Government had previously observed[11]. It important to differentiate between strategic surprise by peer nations (i.e., the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941) and that of terrorist organizations (i.e., the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th, 2001). While both resulted in over three thousand deaths, the former was done by the backing of a nation with a large economy, geographic boarders, considerable military capacity, and comparable technology to the US. The latter was executed by an organization of several thousand people, with no true independent financial capacity at scale, and no technological advantage to the US. Both caught the US off guard and resulted in the loss of life, but only one was an existential crisis to the future safety and security of the homeland. Nuclear surprise is the worst of all surprises because it can generate a world that is incapable of supporting humans. Historically, there have been “red lines” drawn to discourage any action that would compromise a nation’s ability to know if a nuclear weapon were inbound or had been detonated. Attacking nuclear command and control relay infrastructure, or nuclear infrastructure in general was an area the Soviet Union and US agreed to avoid during the Cold War[12]. Over the last several years, the threshold for strategic surprise has shifted. The only reason to have an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) is to deliver a nuclear payload. The infrastructure for such weaponry, as well as the time lag from when it is launched, make them inefficient choices for delivering conventional munitions. Consequently, nations have not invested in delivering conventional munitions in this manner as it could be viewed as delivering regime changing (i.e., strategic) effects. As hypersonic weapons have evolved and been messaged as delivering more traditional munitions for tactical engagements, the ambiguity of the intended target and yield of the weapon will make it harder to anticipate if an adversary is about to cross a “red line.” An approachable analogy to Strategic Surprise is a surprise trip to Disneyworld for children. Adults can buy plane tickets, pack bags, and arrange logistics while unsuspecting progeny assume that parents are doing boring adult things. Any changes to the normal routine, such as adjusting practice schedules, could arouse suspicion. “Red lines” that would tip the children off that something was afoot are delicately managed. Moving the whole family away from home for several days is a complex endeavor that involves parties in numerous geographically separated locations – much as surprising an adversary across numerous fronts would be. The effects are longer lasting as the amount of equipment and personnel involved will result in a decidedly different laydown of forces (i.e., everyone spending days at an amusement park and nights in hotel rooms) because of the exercise. Tactical Surprise The more easily rehearsed and continuously exercised threat of surprise is at the tactical level. This is when an adversary’s forces have an unknown presence lying in wait at a smaller scale (i.e., smaller area and fewer units). Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, from satellites to hand launched drones, can help shed light on what lays beyond for forward combat elements. During hostilities, tactical resources are difficult to apportion properly – particularly for conflicts that have large forward fronts. For conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US enjoyed near constant and uninterrupted access to supporting battlefield intelligence feeds. Whenever there were Troops in Contact, all assets in the area were re-tasked to support that emergency. In Ukraine, with a decidedly massive forward line of conflict, it is difficult for both the Ukrainians and Russians to ensure actionable intelligence is in the hand of someone who can do something fast enough[13]. Therefore, avoiding tactical surprise often relies on attentive military members noticing changes to daily patterns of behavior of the adversary that could be indicative of a force amassing capacity. One of the largest paradigms shifts in the way the US has shifted in avoiding tactical surprise is getting intelligence quickly to “edge nodes.” Historically, US ISR platforms have been tasked by Intelligence Community analysts who use exquisite systems to determine strategic goals of adversaries[14]. An adversary moving a squadron of bombers from one base to the next could signal an escalation in posture, a training event, or a trivial logistical movement. IC analysts historically will author reports of the movement, placed in a broader context and with additional sources included to provide a comprehensive picture. During peacetime, these kinds of reports are valuable for senior leader awareness. At the outset of hostilities however, “edge nodes” need timely information on where to amass fires and the potential of being attacked[15]. The future of warfare is to boil all enemy locations down to dots on a screen for the forward most sensors and shooters to keep custody of. This is far easier dictated than accomplished, and there have been numerous seams in organizational responsibility that have been publicly debated over the last several months[16]. An approachable analogy to tactical surprise is a trip to get ice cream after sports practice. Changing the destination for a child who can barely see street signs is relatively straightforward and does not require considerable planning efforts. The effects are short lasting since the child will likely not remember so much as the flavor of ice cream past a day or two. The payoff will be short-lived if not followed up with additional inducements. Overlap between Strategic and Tactical Surprise One near history altering overlap between strategic and tactical surprise can be found in the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese surprise attack on the Navy Base and surrounding airfields was tactical in its relatively small geographic size but could have been an enormous strategic blow to the U.S. had its aircraft carriers not been conducting training missions out at sea[17]. If the Japanese had damaged or destroyed some of these invaluable strategic assets, the strategic impact on the US ability to wage war in the Pacific would have been delayed considerably while the US industrial base built new ships over the course of many months. The US has invested considerable resources in pursuit of avoiding another Pearl Harbor level surprise to its homeland and allied nations. Robust remote sensing from space, sonobuoys in the oceans, and Signals Intelligence monitoring make it challenging for adversaries to maneuver or plan in ways that would catch the military and intelligence community off guard. One recent example of a “gray” area between strategic and tactical surprise can be found in use of tactical nuclear weapons. The US has limited doctrine and thresholds for how it would respond to tactical (e.g., low, sub .3 kiloton yield) nuclear weapons – particularly against non-NATO countries (e.g., Ukraine)[18]. This would be a tactical weapon employed against a fortified position but would have enormous strategic implications. While international commendation is certain, it seems unlikely that such an act would push the US or any other nuclear armed NATO ally in to using its stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons. If the resulting radiation were to drift into a NATO country however, the next move becomes far less certain. Birthdays, D-Day and Technical Surprise With all the broad strategies now defined, we can begin to discuss how they are best implemented – and how technology enables such events. The most challenging everyday occurrences to have a surprise around are birthdays and anniversaries. These events are written on a calendar and occur every year. The annual question is how much will either party care – or how much effort will they put in to celebrating the occasion. A child will be incredibly overt about signaling what they expect on Christmas. Action figures, dolls, and video games that all must be surreptitiously procured, wrapped, and stuffed under a tree without the suspecting child becoming aware. Similarly, superpower militaries must practice and hone their tactics with amphibious assault ships, penetrating aircraft, and long-range munitions without tipping their hand about any particular objective. Ensuring that adversaries have a similar “wow” moment of surprise as a family trip to Disneyworld is the objective of offensive minded militaries. When the objective is not tightly coupled to a specific date, it is easier to catch an adversary off guard. As Russia was massing forces on its border with Ukraine, they attempted to conduct deception operations and plead that they were merely conducting exercises[19]. However, with numerous intelligence agencies monitoring internal Russian discussions and the enormous logistical footprint that was in place, it was impossible for the Russians to hide their intentions. This was akin to telling a child to have their bags packed with Disney gear but not sharing the flight details. Much as Putin’s eventual invasion did not surprise many in Ukraine’s military, the progeny knew what was coming. Open-source intelligence suggests that the disinformation extended even to multiple levels of Russia’s military, with only a few senior decision makers aware of the true “D-Day” (shortened from Decision Day) when forces would move across the border[20]. Arguably this resulted in many units being sub optimally prepared for conflict, as the troops themselves were unsure of the objectives. Further back in history, in 1944 the Nazis knew that the Allies would eventually try to wage a land war to retake France. The allies utilized a massive deception campaign that had German leadership believe that the allies would begin their campaign from several fronts – through Italy, Southern Spain, or Northern France. All of these were all viable options (and had numerous proponents within Allied leadership circles), but the exact point of attack was difficult to determine[21]. In an example of a surprise that worked better than expected, Colonel Theodore Roosevelt Jr. went ashore dozens of miles north of his expected landing point on D-Day. They confronted virtually no resistance and secured a beachhead quickly. Once they realized they were not at their intended location, they could have reembarked on to their landing craft and been redeposited in the correct location. Col Roosevelt was quoted as saying “we will begin the war right here” and were able to secure the original landing location by attacking laterally – a direction that Nazi forces were ill prepared to defend. There is an adage in the Army that sometimes “if you are wrong, stay wrong.” This could apply in everyday life where the opportunity to propose to a significant other happens in an unexpected place – such as the aforementioned trip to the ice cream shop after practice. There could have been a more elaborate and better plan, but being pragmatic about a given situation is a tremendous way of keeping an adversary on their heels. Technical Surprise Achieving technical surprise is increasingly difficult for modern militaries. Over the past centuries, it was difficult to share information across large distances – and harder still to communicate the precise novelty of a technological breakthrough. It was difficult for even the designers of the technology to determine the exact radar cross section of military aircraft when carefully calibrated equipment was required. For an adversary to determine a radar cross section within the same level of precision would have been near impossible to achieve without the actors being discovered. Or in the case of our progeny’s birthday party, it is harder to guess what exact toy will impress them without engaging in reconnaissance of their viewing habits – which could draw suspicion. “Why does dad all of a sudden care about what model Police Car that Chase, the rescue pup in Paw Patrol, is driving?”. A somewhat recent example of technical surprise in the military comes in the form of Adaptive Optics. In 1982, Starfire Optical Range (SOR) at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque New Mexico successfully demonstrated a then classified effort to image satellites using deformable mirrors to compensate for atmospheric turbulence. The quality of their images outpaced academic efforts by at least two decades in the 1990s[22]. Once academia caught up, the Air Force Research Laboratory declassified Starfire Optical Range’s work. This allowed the hardworking engineers and scientists at SOR to be officially recognized by their peers. These technical advances allowed the US government to collect better intelligence on adversary space assets than rival nations thought was feasible. The US military needs to walk a difficult balance in finding the next technological breakthrough that will give it an advantage in the next conflict. Simultaneously, the sooner the adversary discovers the US is pursuing a given technology, the more quickly the former will begin to invest in defeat mechanisms. In order to prolong the shelf life of emerging technologies, the US Government tries to enforce “Need to Know” mechanisms such as classifying different technologies under Executive Order 13526. However, there is a common adage that “you cannot classify physics.” The scientists at Starfire Optical Range did not try to hide the fact that there were lasers at their site or that they had large optics. What they were protecting was how well they were doing in refining their Adaptive Optics technologies, which are underpinned by lasers for atmospheric compensation[23]. The US military and Intelligence community invest heavily in remote sensing precisely to avoid technological surprise. One of the highest collection priorities across the US Government’s vast sensing apparatus is time sensitive testing of modern technologies. The most obvious example is North Korea’s frequent testing of new and evolving Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) technologies[24]. When rogue nations with less diplomatic-minded leaders like North Korea and Iran can directly impact the US and its allies from afar, it can lead to a strategic surprise. Adversaries who conduct hypersonic vehicle testing are also of considerable interest to defense and intelligence community leadership. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles can be able to avoid traditional ICBM collection systems such as the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (PARCS) and are too dim (e.g., not hot enough) to be detected by legacy Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites operating in Geosynchronous Orbit. The US needs to determine with certainty what nation is responsible for an action to conduct follow-up operations. Risks of Military "Tribalism" to Holding Technological Advantage There are a few unsettling examples of military doctrine getting in the way of advancing the rollout of innovative technology. One of the most glaring is the shift from Calvary to mechanized (e.g., tanks) units at the start of World War II. US Army Major General John Herr famously said, “When better roller skates are made, Cavalry horses will wear them.” Major General Herr had been promoted within the cavalry “tribe,” and it was his turn in leadership to ensure that his subordinates had positions to inherit. The final event that cavalry proponents could not dismiss were the Louisiana Maneuvers in 1941[25]. The results of these exercises laid bare just how undermatched horses were to modern mechanized units. The predictable challenges from Major General Herr that the terrain was not reflective of Europe and that the organizers were not including logistical planning accurately was ignored. Major General Herr was the last General to command a cavalry unit. The lesson for the US Military to learn is to not be held hostage by past technologies and strategies. This can be difficult when there are examples of Congressional Oversight preventing the military from moving on to newer technologies. The US Air Force wanted to retire the A-10 aircraft for nearly 20 years before the first one was shipped to the bone yard for decommissioning earlier this year[26]. Congressional leaders either viewed divestment of the venerable platform as (pessimistically) a threat to jobs in their district or (optimistically) that the US Air Force would need the platform again for a future fight against a non-near peer combatant. Another example is when the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Programmatic Evaluation (CAPE) challenged the number of surface vessels Congress mandated the US Navy sustain. Congress set the topline number of needed Amphibious Assault Ships at 31 vessels. When CAPE recommended alternatives, such as fewer ships with newer technology, some members of Congress wrote draft legislation what would have eliminated CAPE as an organization[27]. To ensure we are adopting principled and thoughtful assessments of our capabilities the Department of Defense needs independent parties to challenge service assertions. Attempts by Congress to stifle such dialogue are ways to ensure the Department of Defense becomes beholden to organizations with suspect motivations and specious reasoning to support those conclusions. Applicability of Surprise to US Strategy It is unlikely that the US will be the first to start the next conflict with a peer nation. Therefore, US operational plans center on the adversary’s D-Day and potential locations for hostilities to start. Current operational plans are built around an understanding of when “D-Day” is. The Time Phased Force Deployment (TPFD) is military planner’s best guess to make sure that people and equipment are in the right place at the start of any myriads of contingency operations. Move everyone too early and they could start running low on supplies, as well as provoke conflict that could have otherwise been off ramped. Move everyone too late, and the adversary will have a “first mover” advantage and be able to dictate the starting conditions of the conflict. When it comes to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, there are any number of “D-Days” that the former could use to start a conflict. The Chinese Communist Party could put an ultimatum on an election in Taiwan, where hostilities would start shortly after the results are finalized. There could be a holiday, such as Double Ten Day (Taiwan’s Independence Day, 10 October) that the CCP views as particularly insulting and a good date to start. Indeed, the CCP has already conducted exercises on Double Ten Day[28]. One thing that is true for both the offensive and defensive parties in a conflict is that it is expensive to keep forces on alert for a conflict. Paying personnel to move equipment, occupy watch stations, and work shifts is taxing on the military. Planners generally do not want to stay in heightened states of readiness for protracted periods of time, and desire clear and consistent guidance from civilian leadership. Daily perturbations to strategic guidance will result in wasted resources, which military planners are continually attempting to optimize. One way for an adversary to still achieve surprise is using a third party to start hostilities on behalf of the aggressing nation. For an anniversary or birthday, it could be conscripting a relative or friend to host a surprise party. While the child or spouse is particularly attentive to adjustments in daily behavior at home, going to a seemingly neutral location should not rouse much suspicion. Using Ukraine as an example, the Russian Federation could have used Belarus as a proxy to start the conflict[29]. The Ukrainian military was not optimally placed to defend a forward line of contact that stretched throughout the northern portion of the country. Another example in a conflict in the South China Sea could be North Korea starting hostilities at sea. Military plans, while robust, cannot possibly account for a large-scale conflict to start from numerous vectors. The obvious counter to being caught off guard in this manner is to have a robust intelligence apparatus that can intercept communiques betwixt nations, as well as monitor troops amassing in any suspected proxy countries. The analogy to everyday life here is conscripting a co-conspirator in the form of a family member or friend to conduct the surprise. Even though the child or spouse knows the date of the anniversary or birthday, they are unlikely to suspect external parties would be brought into the fold. Hosting the event at an unexpected place further draws attention away from otherwise attentive suspects. Wargames and Modeling--Virtue and Over-Reliance Until the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, it has been challenging to assess the efficacy of US weaponry against its adversaries. For each service, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands conduct exercises and wargames multiple times a year. These exercises ensure that operators in the field will know what to do “when the balloon goes up” (e.g., when hostilities start) but are also used to inform budgetary decisions. If a wargame in the Pacific uses a given missile more than others, then it is highly likely that the service will buy more of the former and less of the latter. Services are quick to tout the success of their toys at exercises and downplay the realism if they fare poorly[30]. These are how tactical decisions on force laydown are made, which is a dense subject area worthy of further discussion. Fighting as a Fluid: How Tactical Modeling Can Yield a Better Spectrum of Possible Results At the strategic level, it is important to have context on how truly “game changing” any given weapon system is as part of a larger conflict. Purdue University researchers have developed a simulation environment that treats the forward line of conflict as more of a fluid boundary than a monolithic dice roll of discrete entities, as is typically done in virtual wargames. Many of the findings in their paper are grounded with historical realities of how battles were fought and shows the variability of success even with all the known conditions being used for input. There is some literature which show very close correlation to actual results in conflict, with the Lanchester equations for modeling area fires in the Ardennes campaign of World War II being a sort of universally adopted standard by many historians and modelers[31]. The model has currently only been applied to dismounted infantry on variable types of terrain, but data scientists have plans to include tracked vehicles, longer range munitions, and other domains. A tremendous example from their work that is applicable to this paper can be found in a simulation the researchers have done on the Battle of Champion Hill during the American Civil War. There is a robust historical record of the precise conditions on May 16th, 1863, which provides researchers a vignette to apply new modeling towards. Roughly 80% of the time, the model predicts the precise number of losses by both sides, where choke points were in getting through fencing, and how long it took for Union soldiers to take the crest of the hill. The historical record is not precise enough to stay which units had or did not have firearms with rifling, but some elements can be inferred based on analysis using the model outlined by Purdue researchers. How frequently did the outcome of the battle change based on either Union or Confederate forces being more accurate – or in terms of current military wargame parlance, Probability of Kill (Pk) – at greater distances? At a more individual level, if one soldier charged towards cover faster than in previous simulations, how much did individual heroism impact the number of casualties or time to take the hill crest? All these variables can be adjusted and tinkered with, and all will result in probabilities of any given outcome being most likely. The lesson to be had is that for all the investment the US military makes in being able to maintain a technological edge on its competitors, the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the warfighter have an outsize impact on results compared with individual equipment. If the Confederates had a functioning artillery battery on that day in May, Champion Hill most likely would have still fallen, although at a greater loss of Union personnel. During peacetime it is easy for services to lobby for more funds to ensure that piece of equipment exists and is ready to be implemented. What is harder is to determine how impactful the enabling technology (long range weapons, remote sensing, and logistical support) will be towards a US victory in various clashes. The tactical advantage of more Union soldiers having rifling on their weapons and therefore being more effective in combat enabled them to be more successful in skirmishes. The Confederates did not encounter a true tactical or technological surprise as the result of many Union forces having rifling, but the resulting casualties could have been vastly different – although the prevailing side would not have. Conclusion Elected officials and senior leaders in the military do not want their legacies to be “asleep at the switch” during the next large-scale conflict. Spouses do not want their partners to think that they are not interested in celebrating their relationships. Humans are creatures of habit and will work tirelessly for normalcy. If there are attempts to alter standard predictable schedules, people will notice. Military planners want to rely on predictable linear systems that a given quantity of resources will result in a predictable (and repeatable) outcome. Much as we must continue to work on our relationships with our friends and family, military planners must work doggedly to maintain superiority over their adversaries. From Strategic to Technological and every other form of surprise in-between, the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community must continue to refine their methods. Improving tactics, techniques, and procedures, investing in next generation weaponry, and monitoring adversary behaviors are all essential to ensuring the US maintains its status in the world. Major Christopher Guida wrote this while assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He serves as a Program Analyst at the Office of the Secretary of Defense in Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and has been in numerous Department of Defense acquisition offices. He is a graduate of Rutgers University where he attained a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering, and the University of Southern California where he attained a Master of Business Administration and a Master of Science in Astronautical Engineering. [1] James Hasik. "Beyond the Third Offset: Matching Plans for Innovation to a Theory of Victory." Joint Forces Quarterly 91 no. 4 (2018): 3-4. [2] Catherine Dill, et al. Ending Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Brief History and a Path Forward. Washington, D.C.: Council on Strategic Risks, 2023. [3] Paul McLeary. "The Pentagon's Third Offset May Be Dead, But No One Knows What Comes Next." Foreign Policy, December 18, 2018. [4] Megan Eckstein. 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"Republican Lawmakers Question CAPE on Amphibious Warship Buys," USNI News, March 1, 2024. [28] Liu Zhen. "Chinese Military Stages Island Invasion Drill During Taiwan's 'Double Tenth' Holiday," South China Morning Post, October 11, 2020. [29] Brian Whitmore. "Hundreds of Belarusians Join Ukraine's Fight Against Russian Imperialism". Atlantic Council. March 30, 2022. [30] Government Accountability Office. Defense Analysis - Additional Actions Could Enhance DOD's Wargaming Efforts. Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2023. [31] Jonathan Poggie, Sorin A. Matei, Robert Kirchubel. "Simulating Military Conflict with a Continuous Flow Model." Journal of the Operational Research Society 73, no. 2 (2020): 273-284.