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Exploiting Offensive Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS): Learning from Our Adversaries

  • Published
  • By Maj. Richard Anderson

“I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities” --Admiral Samuel Paparo, the Commander of INDOPACOM, states that one of his strategies is to use unmanned capabilities to delay an invasion of Taiwan long enough for the rest of everything to arrive.[1] This strategy is bolstered by a study conducted by the Center for New American Security (CNAS) which found that drones will play a critical role in a U.S. conflict defending Taiwan.[2] “Hellscape” is designed to be a delaying action with Marine Littoral Regiments, Army Multi-Domain Tasks Forces, and Naval Carrier strike groups.[3] Notably absent from this strategy are any Air Force elements.

The use of small drones in warfare became standard by conventional forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Azerbaijani forces leveraged drones to identify Armenian high-value military targets.[4] The Ukraine-Russia war built upon these tactics, highlighting to the world the true threat of drone warfare. This conflict has led to the evolution of flying IEDs, long-range kamikaze drone strikes, networked ISR platforms with repeaters to overcome jamming, and an escalation of drone autonomy that will lead to humans being removed from the kill chain.  Russia and Ukraine are pushing for AI to enable machines capable of quick strike capability without the time constraints of human decision-making.[5] The Chinese are also learning how to use loitering munitions from this conflict for SEAD, anti-artillery, anti-armor, and anti-infantry.[6] The PLA is arming their operators with FPV drones and tactics learned from Ukraine.[7] While the conflict in Ukraine highlighted the use of drones in warfare, non-state actors have been using them for a decade and have developed a deep strategy to use them.

Terrorist groups have been using small drones to expand their combat capabilities since the mid-2010s. While ISR has been their primary use, several tech-savvy groups were able to adapt the platforms to carry munitions for kinetic strikes.  Hamas was able to use sUAS platforms to profound effect during its offensive in Israel. Using quadcopters armed with small explosives, Hamas neutralized nine key C2 towers and eliminated multiple Iron Dome weapon platforms.[8] Small drones are such a problem in the Middle East that the CENTCOM Commander testified at the House Armed Services Committee that American Forces have been operating without complete air superiority since the Korean War.[9] These words became a sober reality when a drone strike killed three soldiers and wounded forty-seven more in Jordan.[10]

Drones are a key tool in many Mexican Drug Cartels’ arsenal. The CJNG Cartel has developed a specialized drone team that has been used in smuggling, human trafficking, reconnaissance, and kinetic strikes against opponents.[11] In 2023, a US Border Patrol agent testified that there were 10,000 incursions and 25,000 sightings in their sector for the year.  General Guillot, the NORAD Commander, told the Senate that there are over 1,000 drone incursions along the border a month.[12]

DJI, a Chinese technology company, owns nearly 70% of the global small drone market.[13] Their most popular model is the Mavic 3 Pro.  It weighs less than 3 pounds, can fly at 47 mph, has a flight time of 43 minutes, and has a max altitude of six thousand meters. Ukraine is attempting to buy tens of thousands of these models a month to help with their war effort. These models are small, difficult to detect on radar, and are difficult to see. Their high-power camera can take 4K video and has a 28x zoom. Most importantly, these drones are considered low cost at $2200. Ukraine has built its drone program from models such as the Mavic 3 Pro. It has since adapted to building its own through specialized drone units with the intent for ease of use, ease of mass-production, and small explosive payload capability. Using these drones, Ukraine has been able to monitor Russian movements and strike into the heart of Moscow. 

The Air Force is finally taking an offensive role with small drones, but it comes after a decade of adversarial forces outpacing our ability in this domain.  In 2022, AFCENT stood up Task Force 99 at Al Udeid Air Base to rapidly innovate new capabilities to confront emerging tactical capabilities. Their goal is to create an agile, specialized unit designed to enhance the ability to detect and defeat any unfriendly drone.[14] Task Force 99 is attempting to build the skillsets shown by Ukrainian and other sUAS operators. The TF comprises Airmen from multiple AFSCs working together to build an offensive skill set in a combat-tested environment.  They also developed in-house systems using 3-D printing for around $2500 a drone. They currently have ninety-eight drones in their inventory used in operational ISR capacity. There is also the ability to use them for kinetic strikes, with each drone having the capability to hold a three-kilogram payload. Unfortunately, these skills have not yet expanded to the rest of the Air Force.

The Air Force needs to build an offensive sUAS force now. It needs to leverage the lessons learned from our adversaries and partners alike. sUAS are affordable, easy to develop, and most importantly, multi-capable. These platforms can be used for ISR, to distract the enemy, and as kinetic strike vehicles against key targets. They can be used to find radar systems, artillery positions, or anti-air platforms. The potential is limited to that of the mind of the operator.    

Additionally, the Air Force should develop an AFSC dedicated to sUAS operations. This AFSC would be able to expand upon the magnificent work that Task Force 99 is doing. It would be able to develop best practices on sUAS, and more importantly, give critical insight on how to truly counter drones from impacting operations. This AFSC would be a great force protection multiplier in ACE by providing expanded ISR capabilities and the ability to carry out quick strikes against small threats.

Drones have forever changed the face of war. Our adversaries have learned how to use this platform as a low-cost method to hinder operations throughout our theaters. Hamas used them to blind Israel before the October 7th attack.  Ukraine credits its adaptation of drones into its forces as a key component in keeping Russia at bay. The Army, Navy, and Marines are integrating drones to expand their ISR network and as a kinetic strike option. The Air Force must learn how to use them before it is too late.         

Maj Richard Anderson wrote this while a Strategic Policy Fellow with the Department of Homeland Security Counter-UAS Program Management Office.  He has served in the Air Force for 21 years as a Security Forces Member and Weather Officer, with experience working at the Squadron, Wing, and Staff levels.  He is a graduate of Ashford University where he attained a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology, and Liberty University with a Master of Arts in Management and Leadership.


[2] Stacie Pettyjohn et al, Swarms over the Strait: Drone Warfare in a Future Fight to Defend Taiwan (Washington DC: CNAS, 2024). 

[4] Eado Hecht, “Drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh War: Analyzing the Data,” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 7 no. 4 (Winter 2022): 31-37.

[5] Paul Mosur and Adam Satariano, “A.I. Begins Ushering in an Age of Killer Robots,” The New York Times, July 12, 2024.

[6] Lyle Goldstein and Nathan Waechter, “Chinese Strategists Evaluate the Use of ‘Kamikaze’ Drones in the Russia-Ukraine War,” RAND Commentary, November 7, 2023.

[9] Brian W. Everstine, “U.S. Forces Operating ‘Without Complete Air Superiority’ Due to Small, Armed Drones,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, April 20, 2021.

[13] Ishveena Singh, “The Secret to DJI’s Drone Market Dominance: Revealed,” Drone DJ, June 28, 2024. 

[14] Chris Gordon, “Task Force 99 Exploring ‘One-Way Kinetic Attack’ Drones, AFCENT Boss Says,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, October 4, 2023.

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