Mission Command: Doctrinal Improvements for Peer Conflict Published Oct. 1, 2024 By Maj. James Ramirez Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- “We cannot eliminate friction in war, but we can minimize its impact with rigorous training, adaptive doctrine, well-practiced planning and decision-making processes, and appropriate leadership development.” – Joint Publication I, Joint Warfighting, II-13[1] The 2020s have become a pivotal decade despite having only reached its third year. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and China’s continued emphasis on the growth and influence of their military have placed constant strain on the rules- based international order.[2] While the United States military has remained at war continually since September 11, 2001 the nature of this conflict against violent extremist groups has left the military with ample experience in tactical level warfare, but with a tremendous gap in experience and development for the operational level of war. The purpose of this essay will be twofold: 1) demonstrate that the Counter – Violet Extremist Organization (C-VEO) fight of the last 22 years has atrophied the United States military’s ability to conduct warfare at the operational level 2) advocate for doctrinal improvements to better prepare leaders for mission command and further refine the Air Force’s role at the operational level of war. A Historical Lesson: The Battle of Trafalgar While the character of war “shifts, sometimes dramatically” military leaders should always study historical examples to inform and transform current policy.[3] On October 21, 1805, at the naval Battle of Trafalgar, Admiral Horatio Nelson, British Mediterranean Commander, led his fleet against a coalition French-Spanish fleet that was superior both in numbers and weaponry. Nelson’s enduring legacy has been his willingness to place complete faith and confidence in his subordinate commanders by bucking the conventional employment of naval forces at the time. Instead of relying on extensive signaling from a commanding ship, Nelson armed his subordinate commanders with a weapon that overcame his enemy’s superior numbers and fire power: Commander’s Intent. Nelson seized the initiative utilizing a seldom tested and extremely risky two column direct approach; this tactic limited his ability to communicate with his fleet and placed the fate of the battle in the hands of his subordinate commanders. Fortunately for Nelson his gamble paid off with this tactic successfully disorganizing the enemy’s formation thus disorienting their command and control, and ultimately proving decisive in his fleet’s victory. Nelson suffered a mortal wound in the early stages of the battle, but his contributions to the theory of warfare will be studied for generations to come. Although the instruments of war have evolved with time, exemplary leadership in the form of effective mission command represented by clear articulation of intent and a development of shared understanding could be the deciding factor in the potential peer war of tomorrow.[4] Operational Level Atrophy: The C-VEO Fight On September 11, 2001, America was shocked by a terrorist attack that would come to define the era. The ensuing fight to remove Al-Qaeda from their terrorist stronghold in Afghanistan would eventually evolve into a protracted conflict that would see 100,000 troops deployed to Afghanistan and 160,000 troops deployed to Iraq at the height of the war.[5] This incredible commitment of personnel and resources to the C-VEO mission led this chapter in warfare to be defined by its asymmetry. The United States sends large numbers of personnel, weapons, equipment, and the latest technologies to the battlefield to fight terrorists armed with comparatively rudimentary equipment. This has left many in the U.S. military with ample tactical experience, but the potential peer war of tomorrow will look drastically different than C-VEO. The asymmetrical nature of C-VEO has also led to an additional unintended consequence: increased senior leader involvement in tactical level decision making. One capability that has grown exponentially during the C-VEO campaign has been Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Manned and unmanned ISR assets have continually been procured to provide decision-makers situational awareness in Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) across the globe.[6] Today when an MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) requests to prosecute a target there are frequently numerous decision makers involved in the approval process, many of which have the luxury of viewing the MQ-9’s video feed in high definition on the many televisions that are ubiquitous in JOCs.[7] Historical examples of senior military involvement in tactical level actions exist, most notably during the Vietnam War, but what is novel about the contemporary example is the amount of situational awareness and approvals prior to actions occurring.[8] The politically sensitive nature of operations in Africa and the Middle East have dictated a high level of scrutiny to ensure that tactical level miscues do not have strategic level implications.[9] Incidents such as the inadvertent targeting of a hospital in Afghanistan are indicative of how tactical decisions can have strategic implications.[10] Accordingly, leaders have become accustomed to making decisions with an abundance of information that will not be available in a contested environment. Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 1-1 offers this description of the overly directive dynamic in question: “the operational environment the last few decades have instead typified centralization at all levels.”[11] Also, the C-VEO conflict has created a gap in relevant operational level experience. Figure II-1 of Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfighting provides a depiction of these “Levels of Warfare.”[12] While the JP-1 does provide the caveat that “there are no finite limits or specific boundaries between these levels” it is apparent when analyzing C-VEO that it is characterized by strategic level thinking informing tactical level actions.[13] Terrorists do not frequently present operational level problems given their disregard for the rules of war, and preferred tactics of small group ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and suicide bombings.[14] When these tactical level activities are contrasted with conducting campaigns and major operations it becomes evident C-VEO has not provided leaders with relevant operational level experience. Doctrinal Improvements: Mission Command and the Operational Level of War A logical question following a discussion of C-VEO is why the operational level of war is so relevant to potential future conflicts. Air Force Doctrine Note (AFDN) 1-21 Agile Combat Employment (ACE) describes a conflict with a peer adversary where “every domain will be contested and characterized by fluctuating levels of superiority.”[15] The complexity of this operational environment (OE) stands in stark contrast to the asymmetry of C-VEO. Creating the campaigns to defeat a peer adversary will “require a different framework than that employed for tactical operations, particularly in situations where the U.S. is in a long-term competition with a global or regional power.”[16] Despite the concerns stemming from the protracted C-VEO campaign, prudent doctrine development has led the Air Force to update Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP)-1 The Air Force to include mission command as a tenant of airpower. The addition of AFDP 1-1 Mission Command further develops the philosophy and applicability of mission command to potential future conflicts with peer competitors. Mission command’s focus on decentralized execution is likely to be essential to success in the “uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing environments” across the competition continuum.[17] AFDP 1-1 serves as an excellent primer for Airmen to understand mission command and how to execute the approach it prescribes and the culture it necessitates. However, the operational level gap in experience is exacerbated by AFDP 1-1’s lack of clear articulation of how the Air Force can contribute at the operational level of war. Additionally, AFDP 1-1 should include relevant references to joint doctrinal principles of operational art/operational design and campaign development against a peer threat. Most importantly, AFDP 1-1 should be revised with AFDP 3-0 Operations and Planning to incorporate mission command, ACE, and Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO). Operational Art and Operational Design Operational art is defined as, “the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks.”[18] Additionally, the focus of the operational level of warfare is “the application of operational art.”[19] Operational design “is the analytical framework that underpins planning”, and “provides an iterative process that enables the commander’s vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends – ways – means – risk questions.”[20] These joint principles and relevant terminology will arm Airmen with the right methods and vernacular to succeed in a contested OE given it will inherently be a joint environment. AFDP 1, AFDP 1-1, AFDP 1-21, and AFDP 3-99 all include numerous references to mission command as a principle, tenant, and an enabler of Air Force operations through the utilization of mission-type orders (MTOs) describing “what needs to be done rather than what to do or how to do it.”[21] Given that the “commander is the central figure in planning” AFDP 1-1 requires revision to include joint principles of operational design informed by operational art.[22] This is not to suggest that the joint planning process is the only answer to operational level constraints in the OE, for this is precisely the reason that effective MTOs could prove advantageous in contested environments, however these joint principles provide a framework through which mission commanders and their staffs can consider problems to determine appropriate responses. Campaign Development Recent additions to Air Force doctrine (mission command focus, ACE, JADO) construct a vision of future operations that avoids the centralization of both processes and infrastructure typified by C-VEO. For appropriate context JADO is defined as “(Operations) comprised of air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space domains, plus the electromagnetic spectrum. Actions by the joint force in multiple domains integrated in planning and synchronized in execution, at speed and scale needed to gain advantage and accomplish the mission.”[23] Agile Combat Employment is defined as, “a proactive and reactive operational scheme of maneuver executed within threat timelines to increase survivability while generating combat power.”[24] Operationalizing these concepts into executable campaigns will require innovative thinking. AFDP 3-99 Department of the Air Force Role in JADO aptly describes the “linear” and “slow and predictable” nature of the joint planning process as described in JP 5-0.[25] While joint doctrine will certainly require updates to incorporate the rapid changes codified in recent Air Force doctrine, AFDP 1-1, AFDP 1-21, and AFDP 3-99 provide primarily philosophical contributions that provide Airman an analytical framework for how to think about these operating concepts. The relevant Air Force doctrine requires revision to create an integrated approach that utilizes mission command in a JADO construct to provide an example of campaign development against a peer adversary. Airmen will benefit from the actualization necessitated by campaign development, which will take theoretical principles such as JADO and ACE and put them into practice in a well-constructed campaign. JP 3-0 Chapter VII Joint Campaigns and Operations in Armed Conflict and JP 5-0 Chapter III Joint Planning Process serve as relevant models for how this new campaign focused doctrine could be structured. Consideration should be given to drafting a classified appendix for this addition to protect information that could have national security implications. Further justification for campaigning as a key addition to AFDP 1-1 can be found in the fact that the 2022 National Defense Strategy lists campaigning as one of the methods through which the Defense Department will achieve defense priorities.[26] AFDP 3-0 Operations and Planning Update The effort to incorporate all the rapid changes in Air Force doctrine has unfortunately not included a revision of AFDP 3-0 Operations and Planning. The required changes are likely in development, but just as in joint doctrine AFDP 3-0 should provide the unification of these various updates (mission command, JADO, ACE) into a keystone publication nested under the capstone AFDP-1. In its current form AFDP 3-0 is a comprehensive document providing an Airmen’s perspective on conducting operations. It is robust in both its construction of heuristics, and prescriptive processes for executing airpower. However, the current version does not take advantage of the adaptive approaches to airpower exemplified by JADO and ACE. This is not strictly because it is outdated, but the recommended methods demonstrate how archaic thinking could jeopardize our competitive advantage in future conflict. For example, AFDP 3-0 states strategy “should be estimative and anticipatory, rather than prescriptive and deterministic.”[27] This quotation would appear to advocate for a JADO-like approach, but counterintuitively in reference to Air Tasking Order (ATO) execution it states that unassigned forces “can be redirected only with the approval of the commander who has operational control over them…the commander may delegate the authority to redirect missions to C2 mission commanders as necessary, but they should still notify the AOC of all redirected missions.”[28] This centralized and overly restrictive approach to airpower can perhaps best be illustrated in the fact that the only mention of mission command in the entire 153-page document is in reference to a requirement to report back to a centralized command authority. An updated AFDP 3-0 working with a revised AFDP 1-1 will give mission commanders the leadership philosophy and the operational approach to succeed at the operational level of war. Conclusion The 2022 National Defense Strategy refers to the 2020s as a “decisive decade”, further describing that “the defense strategy that the United States pursues will set the Department’s course for decades to come.”[29] The continued challenges to the rules based international order from both pacing threats and VEOs increase the complexity of the global security environment. The unprovoked nature of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Hamas’ attack on Israel should immediately conjure thoughts of similar events in American history (Pearl Harbor and 9/11). Historic events occur often without the participants’ consent and without regard for levels of preparedness. There is no better time than the present to review military doctrine with a discerning eye and reflect on the development of leaders who are prepared for mission command in a contested environment. Once again, returning to the powerful lessons of history, consider the consequences of Nelson’s decisive victory at the Battle of Trafalgar. The fleets involved were large and the series of moves and countermoves leading up to the battle were crafted by strategists in a deliberate campaigning effort. Before the battle Napoleon had plans to invade England via the English Channel and were it not for Nelson’s victory he very well could have succeeded. However, the British triumph at Trafalgar was so definitive that it eliminated the possibility of a French invasion, served as “the tipping point that began Napoleon’s downfall”, and established Britain as the preeminent naval power.[30] Nelson’s example epitomizes an operational level success that enabled an overwhelming strategic victory, and he achieved this through a textbook example of mission command. Major James Ramirez is a U-28A Evaluator Combat Systems Officer assigned to the 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon AFB, NM. He recently returned from a deployment as a U-28A Expeditionary Squadron Commander in East Africa. [1] Joint Publication I, Joint Warfighting. [2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2023), i. [3] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2023), II- 13. [4] Joseph F. Callo, “Lasting Lessons of Trafalgar,” Naval History Magazine, vol 19, no.5 (October 2005). [5] C. Todd Lopez, “Defense Official Says U.S. Remains Committed to Middle East,” DOD News, June 5, 2023. [6] Marina Malenic, "Pentagon Looks To Spend $268 Billion On New Aircraft Over Next Decade." Defense Daily, February 3, 2010. [7] Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing, Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, 112th Cong. 82 (2013) (statement of Cartwright, James, General, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired). [8] Department of the Air Force, Mission Command, AFDP 1-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2023), 14. [9] Department of the Air Force, Operations and Planning, AFDP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2016), 14. [10] Jim Garamone, “Campbell: Kunduz Hospital Attack ‘Tragic, Avoidable Accident’,” DOD News, November 25, 2015. [11] Department of the Air Force, Mission Command, AFDP 1-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2023), Foreword. [12] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2023), II- 9. [13] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2023), II- 9. [14] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Combating Terrorism, JP 3-26 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), xiv. [15] Department of the Air Force, Agile Combat Employment, AFDN 1-21 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2022), 5. [16] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Competition Continuum, JDN 1-19 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), 4-5. [17] Department of the Air Force, Mission Command, AFDP 1-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2023), 1. [18] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Campaigns and Operations, JP 3 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022), xiii. [19] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2023), vii. [20] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Planning, JP 5 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), IV-1, III-4. [21] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfighting, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2023), III-1, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp1_vol1.pdf [22] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Planning, JP 5 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), III-9. [23] Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations, AFDP 3-99 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2021), 4. [24] Department of the Air Force, Agile Combat Employment, AFDN 1-21 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2016), 1. [25] Department of the Air Force, Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations, AFDP 3-99 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2021), 2. [26] Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022), 12. [27] Department of the Air Force, Operations and Planning, AFDP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2016), 7. [28] Department of the Air Force, Operations and Planning, AFDP 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2016), 127. [29] Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2022), III. [30] Joseph F. Callo, “Lasting Lessons of Trafalgar,” Naval History Magazine, vol 19, no.5, October 2005.