Civil Reserve Integrated Space Program (CRISP) ~ More Than a Fleet ~ Published Dec. 16, 2024 By Colonel Stephen M. Parrish Sr., U.S. Army (ret) Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- A Domain Apart At the outset of World War II, the United States lacked the military support aircraft it needed to fight two powerful nations on two fronts. To meet the Nation’s airlift needs, President Roosevelt directed the War Department to take possession of any commercial aviation assets it needed.[1] FDR’s decision set precedence, and during the Cold War, an Executive Order established the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) as a National Emergency Preparedness Program. A joint agreement between the Departments of Defense (DoD) and Commerce (DoC) allowed commercial airlines to volunteer their aircraft for crises in exchange for contract preference during peacetime.[2] Although there are several examples of commercial airlines assisting military operations, the DoD has only activated CRAF three times: Operation Desert Shield/Storm (1990-Kuwait), Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-Iraq), and Operation Allies Refuge (2021-Afghanistan).[3] Having commercial aircraft at the ready makes financial sense by providing existing aircraft, experienced personnel, and maintenance.[4] With space capabilities now a critical component of joint operations and the Western way of life, not having enough space capabilities might mean losing a conflict. The DoD already uses a significant amount of commercial space capabilities, but it does not have a formal program to transition additional capabilities during a conflict. The DoD’s recently published, “Commercial Space Integration Strategy” does not go beyond incorporating commercial assets into military operations through contracts or using commercial off the shelf (COTS) products – something the department already does.[5] U.S. adversaries are proliferating increasing numbers of capable counterspace systems to thwart any U.S. advantage space provides. Most space experts acknowledge that the United States will not have enough capabilities to support a global conflict, especially if an adversary negates its systems. A 2012 Joint Forces Quarterly article argued that the DoD needed to consider buying commercial space capabilities instead of space systems using the existing CRAF framework. Doing so would “reduce costs and inefficiencies and forge closer relationships… increase agility, sustain the space industrial base, and enhance deterrence.”[6] Although the DoD has worked with several commercial space providers over the last three decades to augment satellite communications (SATCOM) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, it has done little to develop a formal, comprehensive, and legally binding space preparedness program to address space augmentation in a conflict scenario.[7] However, in July 2021, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) proposed establishing a civil reserve space fleet to control the imagery of commercial providers during times of need.[8] Although limited to imagery products, this effort takes a step in the right direction. Going further, in October of 2022, the Space Force’s acquisition arm, Space Systems Command (SSC), announced plans in early 2023 to discuss establishing a civil reserve space fleet with other government agencies and industry partners.[9] These NRO and SSC efforts are positive and should continue, but the Space Force must consider space augmentation as more than a “fleet,” and the DoD needs to start pushing for a change in U.S. Government policy to ensure commercial space supports national defense. Unlike the air domain, successful space operations require augmentation of all three space segments (ground, link, space), not just satellites, as “fleet” implies. The Struggle U.S. adversaries are increasingly proliferating counterspace capabilities to overcome the competitive advantage space provides the United States. In addition, the Joint Force’s increasing reliance on space has led to an insatiable appetite for space capabilities. The US acknowledges that it does not have enough capacity to support military operations during times of peace and must rely on its commercial partners to fill in the gaps. During a conflict, the picture is much more dire.[10] Even with this knowledge, the Space Force has addressed a symptom rather than the problem. It has narrowly scoped a solution by buying products or data and seems to only consider the space segment (satellites). If the NRO and SSC efforts equate to taking bites out of an elephant, then the Space Force needs to chew faster. The United States must establish a Civil Reserve Integrated Space Program (CRISP) that compels commercial space providers to integrate aspects of all three space segments prior to any future near-peer conflict. A Benefit to Both The DoD must develop CRISP or expand the CRAF to include commercial space providers to ensure the United States is prepared for and can overcome a national emergency. Unlike the voluntary nature of CRAF, CRISP (through Executive Order or law) should include an agreement between the DoD and DoC and, with proper compensation, compel commercial space integration during times of peace to ensure support during times of conflict. Compelling participation would incentivize commercial space providers to overcome shortfalls before a conflict. Commercial space support must include critical mission areas (communications, sensing, and launch) and their related equipment (satellites or payloads, ground stations, radars and optics, gateways, terminals, networks, launch facilities, and launch platforms). This will not come without challenges associated with funding, integration, security/protection, requirements, trust, bureaucracy, and authorities, but the benefits of CRISP outweigh the risks.[11] The Space Force must also identify a means of funding CRISP outside of DoD planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) cycles, which typically take several years between “P” and “E.” The funds can allow the process to begin. The first step Space Force must take is to make its requirements clear, so commercial providers can comply with them. Once Space Force provides its requirements related to integration, security, and protection of the capabilities, it can begin to test and validate the program. Security will be challenging for the DoD, considering many commercial companies often accept security risks to maximize profit. However, increased security will build trust between the military and commercial providers. The Space Force must also cut “red tape,” a term often associated with slow bureaucratic government processes that hinder decision speed and decrease trust between civilian and military organizations. The final piece of this is that the Space Force must have the authority, within CRISP, to direct not only development requirements that ensure future system integration, but also the means to integrate commercial systems into the DoD’s space-reliant military architecture. The space segment is simple. It consists of satellites operating in space that provide various products to the warfighter, ranging from SATCOM to ISR. The DoD can purchase much of this without the worry of integration. The role of the other two segments and how those become a part of CRISP is more complicated. Unlike commercial airlines that use systems common to most aircraft, satellite providers develop their own patented satellite configurations and monitoring and control equipment, sometimes taking years and many dollars to develop. The ground segment consists of ground stations that control satellites, the gateways and terminals that take data and transfer it into usable forms, and launch facilities, which include launch pads, rockets, and control centers. The third, and more difficult to preserve, is the link segment. This segment exists within the electromagnetic spectrum and consists of the signals between satellites and their ground stations or end users. The DoD and the U.S. space industry should view CRISP as symbiotic. Having more satellites to provide capabilities, access to ground stations to control spacecraft and receive data, and multiple protected and diverse links to satellites and data, provides not only resilience to an aging and inadequate DoD space architecture and infrastructure, but also acts as a deterrent to adversary counterspace activities. The robust nature of CRISP makes adversary targeting less beneficial and more costly in terms of weapons systems and international pressure. For commercial space providers, providing the DoD access to all three space segments ensures funding for current and future development, encourages innovation, and allows commercial providers to continue earning revenue. This symbiosis will keep the United States physically and economically strong and ensure that the Nation remains resilient against adversaries wishing to usurp the U.S.-led international order. A CRISP Solution The United States needs to consider how it will integrate commercial space capabilities and systems into the DoD architecture beyond just products and data. Using the CRAF model, the DoD should implement a Commercial Reserve Integrated Space Program (CRISP) as part of the National Emergency Preparedness Program, and it must think of it as more than a fleet of spacecraft or a set of products to use. The Space Force cannot afford to continue developing exquisite military space systems alone. It must expand its capabilities by incorporating commercial space providers to support joint operations and national defense. This must occur across all three space segments - not just satellites. CRAF supports air mobility; however, CRISP will do much more, ensuring that our warfighters have the capabilities they need from space, through ground stations, and across links. “Partnering to Win” is a current Space Force line of effort - CRISP ensures this.[12] Colonel Stephen M. Parrish Sr., U.S. Army (ret) served as an Army Intelligence and Space Operations Officer from 1997 to 2022. He served at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war with assignments in INDOPACOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, and SPACECOM, commanding units from company to brigade levels. He holds two master’s degrees and is a graduate of the Air War College. He currently works as a defense contractor for the U.S. Space Force. The views in this article are his personal views and do not represent any official policy or position. [1] Dick J. Burkard, Military Airlift Command: Historical Handbook 1941-1984, MAC, United States Air Force, Scott AFB, IL, December 1984, p. 1. [2] U.S. Department of Transportation, "Civil Reserve Airfleet" In 1967, the Department of Commerce transitioned CRAF to the Department of Transportation. [3] Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Activates Civil Reserve Air Fleet to Assist With Afghanistan Efforts,” Defense.gov, August 22, 2021. [4] Comptroller General of the United States, “Report to the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government; Joint Economic Committee, The Civil Reserve Air Fleet – An Effective Program to Meet Defense Emergency Airlift Requirements,” December 7, 1978. [5] Department of Defense, “Commercial Space Integration Strategy,” 2024. [6] David C. Arnold and Peter L. Hays, “SpaceCRAF. A Civil Reserve Air Fleet for Space-based Capabilities,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 64, 1st Quarter 2012. [7] Courtney Albon, “Space Force May Seek Civil Reserve Fleet of Spaceships for Emergencies,” Federal Times, October 19, 2022. [8] Theresa Hitchens, “NRO Space 'Civil Reserve' Includes Shutter Control Option,” Breaking Defense, July 30, 2021. [9] Courtney Albon, “Space Force May Seek Civil Reserve Fleet of Spaceships for Emergencies,” Federal Times, October 19, 2022. [10] Government Accounting Office, “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Commercial Satellite Security Should be More Fully Addressed,” August 30, 2002, GAO-02-781. [11] Ryan Elliott, James Hammer, and Peter Cunniffe, “Navigating the Transition from Space Systems to Commercial Services,” Kearney Institute, April 12, 2023. [12] United States Space Force, “Line of Effort #3 – Partner to Win,” Chief of Space Operations Note to Guardians (C-Note).