The Periodicity Predicament: How I Learned to Love Space ISR in a Near-Peer Threat Environment Published July 22, 2024 By Christopher T. Swain Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine for the second time in the past ten years. The advancement of Russian Advanced Surface-to-Air missile systems along the Russian-Ukrainian border into Ukraine and Belarus effectively grounded all NATO Theater ISR assets. This would have dramatically hindered the effective acquisition of targetable intelligence if the fight were to grow kinetically in scope. NATO forces scrambled to provide many intelligence collection solutions that would provide insight into how the conflict was going and accurate and timely information in preparation for the worst-case Course of Action (COA). Utilizing concepts from the current conflict in Europe with a near-pear threat, China’s capabilities and way of war using similar Anti-Access Area Defense (A2/AD) capabilities will be wielded across the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea. Figure 1 demonstrates the effective combat ranges of Chinese Surface-to-Air missile systems, fighter aircraft, surface ships, and coastal defense cruise missiles launched from the eastern Chinese coast. Figure 1. Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial[1] These combat ranges will effectively render United States military Theater ISR assets, with an effective collection range of ~200 nautical miles, ineffective in supporting the defense of Taiwan.[2] Therefore, this will leverage significant importance on national Geospatial ISR resources to fulfill targeting requirements against Chinese hostilities. However, Chinese weapon systems don’t just have significant ranges to engage Western assets from afar, but their “weapons ranging from cruise missiles to air defense systems to ballistic missiles are deployable on mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that can set up, fire, and relocate, sometimes within minutes.”[3] This provides insufficient timelines as National Geospatial ISR rapid revisit rates are hours, if not days, apart. Therefore, reliance on theater ISR against an advanced A2/AD threat environment will be sporadic at best and non-existent at worst. The current dependence on space-based ISR does not have the periodicity capabilities to enable the kill chain against mobile targets, as revisit rates are too infrequent. Context and Analysis 2018’s National Defense Strategy prioritized China as the pacing threat for the American military weight of effort focus. This has subsequently altered “the primary aim shared by the service intelligence chiefs… to shift from a manpower-intensive, permissive environment force to an automation-intensive, high-threat environment force that is cost-effective, [which] can reliably find and fix elusive targets…”[4] Each component has updated its service-specific ISR strategies to focus specifically on the counter-China problem set. Beginning with the Air Force, they have prioritized “enhanced persistence, resilience, maneuverability, and flexibility for future capabilities.”[5] This shift in focus is demonstrated in Figure 2 below, highlighting the future of Air Force ISR operating in highly contested environments, primarily China. Figure 2. US Air Force future ISR Portfolio[6] The Space Force has taken their strategy in a slightly different direction, focusing on “United States government-owned, allied, and commercial space systems… to support joint operations.”[7] This has paid dividends with partnerships in the commercial earth observation sector. The Army has formulaically focused on “provid[ing] persistent… satellite-based geospatial… coverage… in support of long-range fires.”[8] These capabilities look to utilize space-based ISR to enable ATACM engagement opportunities. Lastly, the Navy has prioritized a completely different aspect of the fight, focusing on big “data and the integration of emerging technologies” to enable connected warfighting capabilities within the Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) construct. To support the Department of Defense’s future efforts, “a handful of commercial companies are deploying constellations with meaningful numbers and decent revisit times. [However,] achieving true persistence will require the ability to connect multiple constellations using ‘plug-and-play’ interferences… This… is a worthy goal for U.S. policymakers.”[9] Commercial space support for the Department of Defense has been optimistic in recent years, where civilian earth observation satellites from 2015 to 2022 have quintupled in quantity, providing a unique support opportunity. Due to the aggressive growth within the past decade, 40% of all remote sensing satellites belong to United States commercial industries, giving the United States Government a distinct advantage to tap into the potential opportunities. In taking advantage of this massive influx of civilian infrastructure, the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) has already awarded multiple contracts partnering with the commercial space industry to receive ~75,000 images weekly. While this is a good development, the partnership only enables 7.4 images every minute, assuming the customer is looking at the exact geographic location. Once this concept is spread globally across Russia and China, the Rapid Revisit rate drops exponentially, providing insufficient coverage in a kinetic conflict executing a long-range kill chain against a near-peer adversary. The final concern is data formatting differences within intelligence community organizations, the various military services, and commercial districts disseminating national geospatial intelligence imagery. This creates complexities for data brokers to parser and translate information from one source to another. This complexity increases dissemination timelines and the likelihood of error, decreasing the confidence in targetable data against time-sensitive targets. Proposed Solutions This dilemma must be resolved by utilizing policy and increased investment into the right resources to provide tangible solutions. The first resolution must focus on policy and roadmaps that enforce specific and measurable goals to enable long-range kill chains and Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) objectives within the Department of Defense. To do this, “Congress [must] consider whether the DOD data strategy includes ISR data and is interoperable with data generated from the intelligence community. Once the strategy is published, the services will execute their implementation plans.”[10] Once Congress, or the delegated entity, implements its data strategy, the standardization of data formats among the various components within the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and commercial space businesses must be discoverable, accessible, usable, and trusted amongst the community. For this to happen, the responsibility of data standardization should be delegated to the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System office. Within their roles and responsibilities, “ABMS is [the] network intended to provide data to pass information across all domains.”[11] This will qualify the appropriate functions and duties to be delegated to the relevant entities, enabling tangible expectations and outcomes for the future of data standardization. The expected roadmap to implement these changes with the necessary outcomes and timelines has already been identified by the Space Development Agency’s (SDA) National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA) Roadmap, shown below. Figure 3. SDA Product Roadmap[12] Throughout the roadmap and expected timelines, data utilization and standardization are implied tasks to reach each mile marker in the future. Therefore, the longer a data strategy doesn’t identify the appropriate roles and responsibilities to delegate tasks, the more each milestone has a diminishing chance of being met, increasing the risks for those potentially going into a future near-peer conflict. The second necessary solution is a significant investment into Space-X style Low Earth Orbit Geospatial-Intelligence capabilities that enable a rapid revisit rate every 5-10 minutes. The acquisition process must shift from a Space Systems model to a Space Services model. This will decrease the lengthy acquisition process, enable resilient constructs, and encourage innovation across the commercial space industry. Maintaining a Space Services model will assist in widening the technological gap between the United States and China. The most recent Starshield service contract, awarded for $70 million, is a significant step in the right direction, focusing on Earth Observation, communications, and hosted payloads on the assets.[13] This partnership will enable resilient national ISR capabilities with increased rapid revisit timelines, empowering the necessary effects for future near-peer conflicts. Acknowledgment of Limitations The most significant limitation of this problem set and proposed solutions is the nature of the classification available to this audience. While the end product for the customer will hopefully one day be UNCLASSIFIED with either commercial or Department of Defense imagery, the solutions and roadmaps for current implementation are hidden behind classification banners greater than what is available to this class. The most prevalent evidence of this can be seen in the NRO and NGA’s strategies and roadmaps. Each is filled with vague and ambiguous buzzwords that lack detail on how the organization will resolve the periodicity problem. While this does affect the previously mentioned issue with specific goals, roles, responsibilities, and lack of coordination, it is more indicative of additional classified documentation unavailable in this medium. Conclusion Due to the timeliness and sensitivity of the problem set, the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and Commercial Space entities must work together to form an effective partnership that will enable long-range geospatial intelligence kill chains against near-peer threats. The implementation of these policy changes and alterations in investment is paramount to saving thousands of American and Allied lives if and when the United States military engages in conflict with a near-peer adversary that possesses advanced A2/AD capabilities. Major Christopher T. Swain is the Chief of Weapons and Tactics of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division (ISRD) at the 603d Air Operations Center (AOC), Ramstein Air Base, Germany. In this capacity, he leads 117 Airmen, Soldiers and Sailors in conducting weapons and tactics development, operational mission planning, and data strategy in support of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) for USAFEAFAFRICA. Maj Swain received his commission in 2012 through ROTC from Kansas State University. He has served in a wide variety of intelligence assignments to include three flying unit intelligence operations supporting F-16, F-35, MQ-1, MQ-9, and B-1B aircraft. Maj Swain has deployed as the Chief of Intelligence, 4th Fighter Squadron in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION FREEDOM’S SENTINEL. This research was originally conducted during the author's Air Force Fellowship at the Texas A&M Bush School of Government and Public Service [1] Nishawn S.Smagh, "Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Design for Great Power Competition," Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2020, pg. 8. [2] Federation of American Scientists, "Rivet Joint," Intelligence Research Program, 2023. [3] J. Michael Dahm, "Offensive and Defensive Strike," South China Sea Military Capability Series, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab, 2021 [4] Smagh, pg. 14. [5] Ibid, pg. 16. [6] Ibid, pg. 15. [7] Ibid, pg. 16. [8] Ibid, pg. 22. [9] Thomas D. Taverney, "The Evolution of Space-Based ISR," Air & Space Forces Magazine, August 10, 2022. [10] Smagh, p. 35. [11] John R. Hoehn, "Joint All-Domain Command and Control: Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, January 21, 2022, p. 2 [12] Dr. Derek M. Tournear, “Keynote Address” Space Development Agency, February 11, 2021. [13] Unshin Harpley, “Space Force Awards Contract to Space-X for Starshield, It’s New Satellite Network” Air & Space Forces Magazine, 4 Oct 2023.