Managing the Russian Threat: France's Deterrence Strategy and Response Strategies for the US Published July 15, 2024 By LtCol Christina Faith Zimmerman Wild Blue Yonder--Maxwell AFB -- On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, changing the geopolitical landscape in Europe and sending shockwaves throughout the European nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite numerous indications and warnings, including prior Russian aggression and military build-up prior to the invasion, neither NATO nor the European Union (EU) effectively deterred Russia from invading a sovereign country. Since that time, the United States (US) and its Allies have provided support to Ukraine while seeking to deter further Russian aggression through a more coordinated and resourced strategy. France’s current deterrence policies and posture create gaps that Russia can exploit, thereby impacting the security interests of the US and partners in Europe. Background In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, the international community did little to stop it. The muted reaction of the international community to previous Russian provocations showed that they were unwilling to take any action to prevent Russia from doing whatever it wanted. This refusal to provide lethal aid seemed to confirm that Ukraine was not capable of resisting, which further strengthened Russia's belief that the invasion would be easy and quick. Therefore, the ongoing war in Ukraine can be seen as a direct consequence of the West's lack of resolve and inability to deter Russia effectively.[1] Like most European countries today, France's greatest security challenge is the increasing strategic competition with and confrontation from Russia, which is threatening France’s strategic autonomy and the international world order. Russia, a revisionist country, is challenging the international order based on the rule of law and is using force and intimidation to undermine France's core interests and values. The return of high-intensity conflict and Russia's use of hybrid strategies pose significant risks to France's security interests. Additionally, because the West failed to deter Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine, many believe that Russia will not stop with Ukraine unless it is stopped in Ukraine and NATO strengthens its deterrence across Eastern Europe.[2] In his RAND article, Understanding Deterrence, Michael J. Mazarr defines deterrence as “the practice of discouraging or restraining someone—in world politics, usually a nation-state—from taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack. It involves an effort to stop or prevent an action.”[3] Certain nations and experts believe that this concept of deterrence only applies to nuclear deterrence and disregards the economic, diplomatic, and conventional military methods of deterrence. France is among these nations that delineates nuclear and conventional military capabilities and defines deterrence in terms of nuclear capabilities. France’s Deterrence Strategy In their 2022 National Strategic Review, France notes that credible nuclear deterrence is crucial for ensuring their freedom to act and protecting their fundamental interests. It is the cornerstone of their defense strategy. The primary function of deterrence is to prevent a major war that could threaten the survival of France by shielding it against both state-sponsored aggression threatening its critical interests and any attempt at coercion. Maintaining the long-term credibility of its deterrent capability is of utmost importance to France, especially in today's complex and uncertain world where some nations are rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenals and even threatening the use of nuclear weapons for intimidation or coercion.[4] France interprets deterrence through the lens of nuclear capability only. Unlike the US and the United Kingdom (UK), France does not envision an integrated deterrence approach using both nuclear and conventional forces. Also, France adheres to a "strategic sufficiency" policy where the country maintains its nuclear arsenal at the minimum level necessary to deal with strategic challenges only. The use of nuclear weapons is severely restricted and reserved for extreme cases of self-defense. Unlike the US and the UK, which have extended deterrence policies, participate in NATO’s nuclear planning mechanisms, and have nuclear forces assigned to NATO, France does not. France protectively maintains an “independent and sovereign deterrent.”[5] These exclusionary policies regarding deterrence hinder France’s ability to maximize its deterrence effect against an increasingly aggressive Russia and decrease France’s ability to function as a true global and regional power. A reasonable question is why France has not changed its deterrence policy and rejoined the NATO nuclear fold, adopting integrated deterrence. Existing political and military factors interact to prevent this change for the time being. Political Policy The first factor that interacts to prevent France from changing its policy about deterrence and, therefore, maximizing its deterrence capability is political. France's political decisions and National Security Strategy are underpinned by its aspiration for strategic autonomy, reflected in its defense policies.[6] France’s desire to maintain strategic autonomy can be traced back to post-World War II. After the Second World War, in which France was forced to rely on the UK and the US for its defense, Charles de Gaulle “refused to conceive that France would once again become a victim of tyranny and oppression, and staunchly believed that [France] should not depend on its British and American allies for [defense]” again.[7] As Céline Jurgensen aptly states, France’s nuclear strategy is based on safeguarding its vital interests and maintaining its independence and liberty of action in every situation.[8] This attitude permeates French society, especially within the political system of France. All political parties in the country support this ideal, and since becoming a nuclear nation, every French president has protected France’s strategic autonomy and independence.[9] France's decision to remain outside of NATO's military command structure creates gaps in its deterrence capabilities which Russia and other adversaries can exploit. To bolster the credibility and strength of France's deterrence against potential Russian aggression, it is imperative that France align its deterrence strategy with that of the alliance. This will help to ensure a more unified and effective approach to deterrence, ultimately enhancing the security of both France and its allies. Additionally, France's participation in NATO's deterrence framework serves as a powerful indication of the Alliance's determination and solidarity in deterring aggression and safeguarding the security interests of its members. This move can effectively discourage the possibility of Russian provocations or miscalculations by exhibiting the combined strength and coherence of NATO, thus emphasizing the Alliance's collective capacity for deterrence. The prevailing reason France does not join the NATO framework is the perceived loss of decision-making ability regarding the employment of its nuclear capabilities.[10] However, this perception is misguided. Just as the US President has final decision-making authority on whether US nuclear assets are employed, so too would the French President. In the event the French President did not agree with the employment of France’s nuclear assets, he/she could effectively veto their use. Therefore, France would not lose decision-making authority over its assets. France’s political policy of strategic autonomy hinders its capability to effectively deter Russia and other adversaries through its nuclear capabilities by leveraging the NATO alliance. France also believes it loses nothing in the way of influence within NATO’s nuclear deterrence framework, as was evident during our meeting with a senior French Officer when the officer stated bluntly that when nuclear options are discussed in NATO, France was in the room with the UK and the US.[11] While it may be true that side meetings between France, the UK, and the US do take place, France loses overall influence within the NATO framework because it does not participate in the Nuclear Planning Group or integrated command structure and, therefore, misses influencing the nuclear policy strategy of NATO. France puts its own interests at risk because it must live with the consequences of any decision or indecision made by the Nuclear Planning Group. Conventional Military Policy The second factor that impedes the effective use of France’s deterrence strategy is its omission of military capabilities within its deterrence strategy. France does not use an integrated deterrence strategy, leveraging conventional military capabilities, cyber, and space with nuclear capabilities. Instead, France relies on a strategy of nuclear deterrence only. Not integrating conventional military capabilities presents several limitations that hinder France’s overall ability to deter aggression. While nuclear weapons are undoubtedly powerful and effective, since the Second World War, countries continue to view these powerful weapons as capabilities used as a last resort. The destructive capability of nuclear weapons limits their use in deterring threats that do not cross the nuclear escalation threshold. Nuclear weapons are not a credible deterrence against conventional aggression because their use would be viewed as disproportionate.[12] By limiting its deterrence policy to one of nuclear use only, France loses the ability to dissuade lower-level aggression through an integrated deterrence framework that leverages conventional military capabilities. Additionally, France adheres to a policy of "strategic sufficiency" and maintains only enough nuclear weapons necessary to deal with strategic challenges, although a strategy based solely on nuclear weapons may not be credible against adversaries such as Russia. This reduces France's overall deterrence credibility since the likelihood of France employing a nuclear weapon in response to an act of aggression, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is practically zero. In such cases, a robust conventional deterrent capability is critical to providing an alternative means of deterrence, whether through punishment, denial, or coercion. Therefore, while nuclear deterrence is a key component of France's security strategy, it must be balanced with a complementary conventional deterrence capability to effectively discourage a wide range of potential threats and mitigate the risks of escalation in crisis situations. As realist scholar John Mearsheimer noted, “for deterrence to succeed, the state seeking war should perceive that the chances of success would be low and the costs high.”[13] The quantity and quality of conventional military assets, such as tanks, aircraft, and other weapons systems, provide bargaining power through the power to inflict cost.[14] A balanced and integrated approach that incorporates both nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities is essential to maintaining a credible and effective deterrence posture. Some officials in NATO and France contend France’s deterrence strategy increases Europe's overall deterrence posture. This argument centers around France’s strategic ambiguity about the use of its nuclear weapons and the perceived decision dilemma it imposes on an adversary. During our meetings at NATO, one speaker mentioned France's strategic ambiguity may enhance the uncertainty for potential adversaries such as Russia, making it difficult for them to determine the threshold for French nuclear retaliation and contributing to deterrence by raising the cost and risks associated with hostile actions against France. This compelling argument supports France's decision when taken in isolation and when considering a scenario in which an adversary's use of nuclear weapons is the action France is seeking to deter. However, not all hostile action resides in the nuclear domain, and using nuclear weapons to deter conventional aggression such as the recent invasion of Ukraine by Russia is not a credible deterrent, nor is it one countries are willing to employ for non-existential threats. Effective deterrence requires credibility, capability, and willingness. United States Response France’s isolationist nuclear policy presents gaps in the NATO deterrence strategy that Russia can exploit, threatening the United States’ security interests in Europe. Responding to France's unwillingness to fully participate in NATO’s deterrence framework and embrace using conventional military forces in its deterrence strategy requires a nuanced approach. The US and France could work through alternative multilateral mechanisms to encourage collaboration on security issues. This approach demonstrates strategic patience and could provide some level of unity of message that could reinforce the deterrent effect on Russia. Regardless, it is essential for the US to conduct an in-depth analysis to comprehend the underlying reasons behind France's hesitation to integrate entirely into NATO's command structure and deterrence framework to determine if anything can be done. Ultimately, the best approach for the US in this multipolar world may be to take a step back and let France and the other European countries continue to evolve their defense structures and strategies in the face of Russian aggression. US policymakers and military leaders, facing the limitations of resources and power, have acknowledged the need for stronger, more integrated partnerships.[15] Listening to France and encouraging European Allies to lead efforts in planning and resourcing the defense of the region may be the most effective way to constrain Russia and China in the long term. Conclusion France faces a significant security challenge due to the growing strategic competition and conflict with Russia. The country's deterrence strategy plays a crucial role in ensuring its freedom to act and protecting its fundamental interests. However, France's political policies and reluctance to use conventional military forces in its deterrence strategy provide Russia with opportunities to exploit known friction points between France and NATO. The US can play a vital role in managing the Russian threat in a way that best protects US security interests and advances regional partnerships in Europe. The US must understand France's reluctance to fully participate in NATO's deterrence framework and respect its preferences while protecting US security interests. Collaborating with France through alternative multilateral mechanisms and engaging constructively with the country can go a long way in building trust and addressing concerns effectively. The US should support France and other European countries in evolving their defense structures and strategies while continuing to work towards a comprehensive and collaborative approach to regional security.[16] This research was originally conducted as part of the Air War College Regional Security Studies Seminar and Field Study. Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Christina Faith Zimmerman is assigned to the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF), Okinawa, Japan. LtCol Zimmerman enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1993 and received her commission in 2002. She holds a Bachelor of Science in Biology from the University of South Carolina-Aiken, a Master of Arts in International Relations from Webster University, a Master's in Supply Chain Management from Pennsylvania State University, and a Master's in Strategic Studies from the Air War College. LtCol Zimmerman’s previous command assignments include Platoon, Detachment, Company, and Battalion Command, and her staff assignments include Strategy and Plans J4 US AFRICOM. LtCol Zimmerman deployed twice to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom (2005) and Operation Inherent Resolve (2019), once to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (2008), supported both Operation Southern Watch and Deliberate Guard while deployed with VMFA-312 on the USS Theodore Roosevelt (1997), deployed in support of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief for the Philippines after Typhoon Nan Madol (2004), and other countries across multiple Combatant Commanders’ Areas of Responsibility in support of bi-lateral and multilateral exercises, theater security cooperation, and advising / support to operations. [1] Liam Collins Sobchak Frank, “U.S. Deterrence Failed in Ukraine,” Foreign Policy (blog), March 18, 2024. [2] Steven L. Basham, “European Command” (Air War College, March 18, 2024). [3] Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), pg. 2. [4] Emmanuel Macron, “National Strategic Review 2022” (Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, 2022). [5] Macron, 33. [6] Macron, “Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017,” 2017. [7] Florence Parly, “France and Nuclear Deterrence - A Spirit of Resistance,” Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, accessed March 16, 2024. [8] Céline Jurgensen, “Europe, France, and Nuclear Deterrence,” Revue Défense Nationale No. 821 (June 2019), 4. [9] Claire Mills, “The French Nuclear Deterrent,” Briefing Paper (United Kingdom: House of Commons Library, November 20, 2020), , 6.; Parly, “France and Nuclear Deterrence - A Spirit of Resistance.” [10] Discussion, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters, Mar 8, 2024. [11] Discussion, Villacoublay Air Base, Mar 4, 2024. [12] Steve Fetter, Richard L. Garwin, and Frank von Hippel, “Nuclear Weapons Dangers and Policy Options,” Physics Today, April 2018, 38. [13] Sobchak, “U.S. Deterrence Failed in Ukraine,” n.p. [14] Thomas C. Schelling and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Arms and Influence, Veritas paperback edition, The Henry L. Stimson Lectures Series (New Haven London: Yale University Press, 2020). [15] The White House, “National Security Strategy,” October 2022; The Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” October 27, 2022. [16] I wish to thank Mrs. Patricia Harris, LTC Joe Sahl, and Lt Col Tanisha Saunders for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. All errors found are on my own.